# LEBANON

## LEBANON'S FOOD SECURITY EXPECTED TO DETERIORATE FOLLOWING THE ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT

**IPC ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY ANALYSIS**
**OCTOBER 2024 - MARCH 2025**
**Published on 17 January 2025**

### CURRENT PERIOD: OCTOBER – NOVEMBER 2024 (Lebanese Residents, Syrian Refugees, Palestine Refugees)

**1.59M**
29% of the population analysed

People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

| | |
|---|---|
| Phase 5 | 0 People in Catastrophe |
| Phase 4 | 205,000 People in Emergency |
| Phase 3 | 1,386,000 People in Crisis |
| Phase 2 | 2,329,000 People in Stressed |
| Phase 1 | 1,655,000 People in Food Security |

### PROJECTED PERIOD: DECEMBER 2024 – MARCH 2025 (Lebanese Residents, Syrian Refugees, Palestine Refugees)

**1.65M**
30% of the population analysed

People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

| | |
|---|---|
| Phase 5 | 0 People in Catastrophe |
| Phase 4 | 201,000 People in Emergency |
| Phase 3 | 1,453,000 People in Crisis |
| Phase 2 | 2,351,000 People in Stressed |
| Phase 1 | 1,582,000 People in Food Security |

## Overview

Between October and November 2024, about 1.59 million Lebanese, Syrian refugees, and Palestine refugees (29 percent of the total population analysed) experienced high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above). Among them, about 205,000 people (4 percent of the population analysed) experienced IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and 1.4 million people (25 percent of the population analysed) experienced IPC Phase 3 (Crisis). These results show an increase compared to the 1.26 million people in Phase 3 or above estimated for the April-September 2024 period by the IPC analysis projection update conducted in March 2024. The significant deterioration of more than 300,000 people in Phase 3 or above is mainly attributed to the compounded impact of conflict and large displacement on aggregate sectors of Lebanese economy such as trade and tourism, which further aggravated the deep economic crisis of the recent years.

For the current period of analysis (October to November 2024), the details of the population analysed showed that a total of 928,000 Lebanese residents (24 percent of the resident population), 579,000 Syrian refugees (38 percent of the total Syrian refugee population in Lebanon), and 84,000 Palestine refugees (40 percent of the total Palestine refugee population in Lebanon) experienced Phase 3 or above.

### SECURITY SITUATION AND POPULATION MOVEMENTS

The analysis took place between 18 November and 4 December 2024. The ceasefire was announced on 27 November 2024. As such, the assumptions used for the projection period were updated on the day of the ceasefire, based on the available information at that time. The analysis assumed that the ceasefire would extend beyond the initial sixty days until the end of the projection period in March 2025. In addition, given the fluidity of the situation, and its effect on population movements, the analysis assumed that a certain level of displacement will persist throughout the projection period.

### Current Acute Food Insecurity: October - November 2024




### Projected Acute Food Insecurity: December 2024 - March 2025



Between December 2024 and March 2025, a slight deterioration of the food security situation is expected with about 1.65 million people (30 percent of the analysed population) likely to experience high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above). A total of 201,000 individuals (4 percent) are likely to experience Phase 4, and 1.45 million people (26 percent) are likely to experience Phase 3. Among them, 970,000 Lebanese residents (25 percent of the resident population), 594,000 Syrian refugees (39 percent of the total Syrian refugee population in Lebanon), and 89,000 Palestine refugees (40 percent of the total Palestine refugee population in Lebanon) are likely to experience Phase 3 or above. These populations require urgent humanitarian action to reduce food gaps, protect and restore livelihoods and prevent acute malnutrition.

In this period, the protracted economic contraction as a residual effect of conflict will persist in a context of likely reduction of Humanitarian Food Assistance (HFA) planned to be distributed in early 2025. Additionally, the high number of internally displaced people (IDPs) returning to their districts of origins in the highly affected areas will not coincide with an immediate reversal of the economic dynamism and food security, despite the implementation of the ceasefire.

The mitigating impact of HFA on food insecurity is evident. Based on the pilot PINHA analysis that was conducted for Lebanese residents only in this round, over 230,000 thousand Lebanese resident individuals nationally would also fall into Phase 3 or above in the absence of external humanitarian support.

## KEY DRIVERS

**Conflict escalation:** Between September and November 2024, the conflict had significant humanitarian impact across Lebanon with over 4,000 fatalities, 16,500 injuries, and 1.3 million people directly affected or displaced, overwhelming government services and humanitarian response capacities.

**Economic deterioration:** Already facing a dire economic situation prior to the escalation of the conflict due to the protracted economic and financial crisis since late 2019, the conflict severely impacted economic activity and livelihoods across all sectors. Market functionality nationwide has dropped, with the most severe impact on operationality and supply chains in El Nabatieh, South and Baalbek-El Hermel governorates.

**Inflation:** Albeit softening compared to previous years, inflation remains a key driver of food insecurity, with monthly food inflation reaching 5 percent and year-on-year inflation hitting 23 percent in October 2024, despite exchange rate stability. The phase-out of wheat imports subsidies, drove a 9 percent rise in the food Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket cost to USD 37.7 between May and December 2024.

**Humanitarian Food Assistance (HFA):** While HFA was scaled up following the intensification of the conflict in October 2024, previous cuts had a negative impact on vulnerable families affecting their ability to cope with the different challenges during this period of analysis.

## POPULATION

The IPC Technical Working Group (TWG) endorsed the use of population figures provided by the Lebanon Response Plan (LRP) and the Inter-Agency coordination system for the various population groups for this round of analysis, including Lebanese residents, Syrian refugees, and Palestine refugees. While the overall total population figure for the various groups remained the same as in previous analyses, (except for an increase in the number Palestine refugees), there have been significant changes from previous analyses in the total population at district level reflecting both pre-ceasefire displacements and the return movements observed post-ceasefire, necessitating continuous monitoring and updated planning to address the evolving situation effectively.

For the current period, the LRP 2025 planning figures per district prior to the announcement of the ceasefire were used for the Lebanese and Syrian Refugees population groups, as they cover the population movements within the country for the period of October and November 2024. For Palestine refugees, the previous IPC analysis figure was used at the national level. For the projection period, the LRP 2025 planning figures per district post the announcement of the ceasefire were used and cover population movements inside the country until 4 December 2024. It is important to note that these estimates did not account for population movements outside the country.

This approach ensures coherence with established frameworks but is subject to severe limitations as the lack of updated and reliable official population statistics and significant population movements within and beyond Lebanon have substantially changed the geographical distribution of the population. Discrepancies in the available estimates further highlight the challenges in estimating the scale of displacement and baseline population figures. For instance, the Lebanon Response Plan (LRP) continues to estimate the Lebanese population at 3.86 million and the Syrian refugee population in Lebanon at 1.5 million, despite ongoing crossings back and forth into Syria. According to Lebanese General Security, between 23 September and 26 November 2024, approximately 641,000 individuals, including 397,000 Syrian refugees and 245,000 Lebanese nationals, crossed from Lebanon into Syria. This mass movement underscores the fluidity of population dynamics during this period. In addition, following the latest developments in Syria, around 92,000 individuals were estimated to have been displaced from Syria into Lebanon by 20 December 2024, including both Lebanese and Syrians nationals (LRC).

DISCLAIMER

*This report incorporates population figures based on the data endorsed by the LRP and inter-agency coordination systems. These figures were utilized in recognition of the inherent challenges in accurately estimating population numbers during this fluid and rapidly evolving period. Factors influencing this decision include the lack of reliable baseline population figures, significant cross-border movements between Lebanon and Syria, and discrepancies in existing estimates of displacement and population movements, as highlighted above.*

*The report acknowledges the provisional nature of these figures and will review these figures in subsequent IPC rounds, as soon as greater clarity and updated data becomes available. This approach aims to ensure alignment with ongoing planning and coordination mechanisms in Lebanon, avoiding divergence that could hinder collective response efforts.*

# CURRENT SITUATION MAP AND POPULATION TABLES (OCTOBER 2024- NOVEMBER 2024)

### LEBANESE RESIDENTS - CURRENT ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY: OCTOBER – NOVEMBER 2024

**928,000**

24% of the population analysed

People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

| | |
|---|---|
| Phase 5 | 0 People in Catastrophe |
| Phase 4 | 100,000 People in Emergency |
| Phase 3 | 828,000 People in Crisis |
| Phase 2 | 1,557,000 People in Stressed |
| Phase 1 | 1,379,000 People in Food Security |

### SYRIAN REFUGEES - CURRENT ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY: OCTOBER – NOVEMBER 2024

**579,000**

39% of the population analysed

People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

| | |
|---|---|
| Phase 5 | 0 People in Catastrophe |
| Phase 4 | 94,000 People in Emergency |
| Phase 3 | 485,000 People in Crisis |
| Phase 2 | 687,000 People in Stressed |
| Phase 1 | 234,000 People in Food Security |

### PALESTINE REFUGEES - CURRENT ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY: OCTOBER – NOVEMBER 2024

**84,000**

40% of the population analysed

People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

| | |
|---|---|
| Phase 5 | 0 People in Catastrophe |
| Phase 4 | 10,500 People in Emergency |
| Phase 3 | 73,500 People in Crisis |
| Phase 2 | 84,000 People in Stressed |
| Phase 1 | 42,000 People in Food Security |



# POPULATION TABLE FOR THE CURRENT PERIOD (OCTOBER – NOVEMBER 2024)

| District | Population | Total population analysed | Phase 1 | | Phase 2 | | Phase 3 | | Phase 4 | | Phase 5 | | Area Phase | Phase 3+ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | #people | % | #people | % | #people | % | #people | % | #peop | % | | #people | % |
| Akkar | Lebanese | 346,806 | 52,021 | 15 | 156,063 | 45 | 121,382 | 35 | 17,340 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 138,722 | 40 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 165,704 | 16,570 | 10 | 82,852 | 50 | 57,996 | 35 | 8,285 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 66,282 | 40 |
| | Total | 512,510 | 68,591 | 13 | 238,915 | 47 | 179,379 | 35 | 25,626 | 5 | 0 | 0 | | 205,004 | 40 |
| Aley | Lebanese | 302,223 | 120,889 | 40 | 136,000 | 45 | 45,333 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 45,333 | 15 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 114,044 | 34,213 | 30 | 45,618 | 40 | 34,213 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 34,213 | 30 |
| | Total | 416,267 | 155,102 | 37 | 181,618 | 44 | 79,547 | 19 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 79,547 | 19 |
| Baabda | Lebanese | 348,495 | 121,973 | 35 | 139,398 | 40 | 69,699 | 20 | 17,425 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 87,124 | 25 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 127,204 | 19,081 | 15 | 57,242 | 45 | 44,521 | 35 | 6,360 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 50,882 | 40 |
| | Total | 475,699 | 141,054 | 30 | 196,640 | 41 | 114,220 | 24 | 23,785 | 5 | 0 | 0 | | 138,005 | 29 |
| Baalbek | Lebanese | 180,798 | 27,120 | 15 | 72,319 | 40 | 45,200 | 25 | 36,160 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 81,359 | 45 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 162,371 | 8,119 | 5 | 64,948 | 40 | 56,830 | 35 | 32,474 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 89,304 | 55 |
| | Total | 343,169 | 35,238 | 10 | 137,268 | 40 | 102,029 | 30 | 68,634 | 20 | 0 | 0 | | 170,663 | 50 |
| Bcharre | Lebanese | 21,780 | 10,890 | 50 | 9,801 | 45 | 1,089 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1,089 | 5 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 2,091 | 418 | 20 | 1,255 | 60 | 418 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 418 | 20 |
| | Total | 23,871 | 11,308 | 47 | 11,056 | 46 | 1,507 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 1,507 | 6 |
| Beirut | Lebanese | 318,521 | 127,408 | 40 | 111,482 | 35 | 79,630 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 79,630 | 25 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 60,946 | 15,237 | 25 | 24,378 | 40 | 21,331 | 35 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 21,331 | 35 |
| | Total | 379,467 | 142,645 | 38 | 135,861 | 36 | 100,961 | 27 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 100,961 | 27 |
| Chouf | Lebanese | 331,465 | 132,586 | 40 | 132,586 | 40 | 66,293 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 66,293 | 20 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 97,560 | 24,390 | 25 | 43,902 | 45 | 29,268 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 29,268 | 30 |
| | Total | 429,025 | 156,976 | 37 | 176,488 | 41 | 95,561 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 95,561 | 22 |
| El Batroun | Lebanese | 58,739 | 32,306 | 55 | 23,496 | 40 | 2,937 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2,937 | 5 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 19,544 | 4,886 | 25 | 11,726 | 60 | 2,932 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2,932 | 15 |
| | Total | 78,283 | 37,192 | 48 | 35,222 | 45 | 5,869 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 5,869 | 7 |
| El Hermel | Lebanese | 12,735 | 1,274 | 10 | 5,731 | 45 | 3,821 | 30 | 1,910 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 5,731 | 45 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 6,701 | 335 | 5 | 2,680 | 40 | 2,680 | 40 | 1,005 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3,686 | 55 |
| | Total | 19,436 | 1,609 | 8 | 8,411 | 43 | 6,501 | 33 | 2,915 | 15 | 0 | 0 | | 9,416 | 48 |
| El Koura | Lebanese | 82,171 | 41,086 | 50 | 36,977 | 45 | 4,109 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4,109 | 5 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 24,986 | 4,997 | 20 | 12,493 | 50 | 7,496 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 7,496 | 30 |
| | Total | 107,157 | 46,083 | 43 | 49,470 | 46 | 11,604 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 11,604 | 11 |
| El Meten | Lebanese | 429,764 | 214,882 | 50 | 150,417 | 35 | 64,465 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 64,465 | 15 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 75,252 | 22,576 | 30 | 33,863 | 45 | 18,813 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 18,813 | 25 |
| | Total | 505,016 | 237,458 | 47 | 184,281 | 36 | 83,278 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 83,278 | 16 |
| El Minieh-Dennie | Lebanese | 137,099 | 27,420 | 20 | 61,695 | 45 | 41,130 | 30 | 6,855 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 47,985 | 35 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 81,411 | 8,141 | 10 | 40,706 | 50 | 28,494 | 35 | 4,071 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 32,564 | 40 |
| | Total | 218,510 | 35,561 | 16 | 102,400 | 47 | 69,624 | 32 | 10,926 | 5 | 0 | 0 | | 80,549 | 37 |
| Hasbaya | Lebanese | 19,845 | 5,954 | 30 | 9,923 | 50 | 3,969 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3,969 | 20 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 4,297 | 859 | 20 | 2,149 | 50 | 1,289 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1,289 | 30 |
| | Total | 24,142 | 6,813 | 28 | 12,071 | 50 | 5,258 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 5,258 | 22 |
| Jbeil | Lebanese | 147,114 | 73,557 | 50 | 58,846 | 40 | 14,711 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 14,711 | 10 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 24,041 | 7,212 | 30 | 12,021 | 50 | 4,808 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4,808 | 20 |
| | Total | 171,155 | 80,769 | 47 | 70,866 | 41 | 19,520 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 19,520 | 11 |

| District | Population | Total population analysed | Phase 1 | | Phase 2 | | Phase 3 | | Phase 4 | | Phase 5 | | Area Phase | Phase 3+ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | #people | % | #people | % | #people | % | #people | % | #peop | % | | #people | % |
| Jezzine | Lebanese | 32,419 | 11,347 | 35 | 19,451 | 60 | 1,621 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1,621 | 5 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 5,368 | 1,342 | 25 | 3,221 | 60 | 805 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 805 | 15 |
| | Total | 37,787 | 12,689 | 34 | 22,672 | 60 | 2,426 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 2,426 | 6 |
| Kesrwane | Lebanese | 246,844 | 135,764 | 55 | 86,395 | 35 | 24,684 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 24,684 | 10 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 27,996 | 9,799 | 35 | 13,998 | 50 | 4,199 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4,199 | 15 |
| | Total | 274,840 | 145,563 | 53 | 100,393 | 37 | 28,884 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 28,884 | 11 |
| Rachaya | Lebanese | 33,368 | 10,010 | 30 | 16,684 | 50 | 6,674 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 6,674 | 20 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 10,755 | 1,613 | 15 | 4,840 | 45 | 3,227 | 30 | 1,076 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4,302 | 40 |
| | Total | 44,123 | 11,624 | 26 | 21,524 | 49 | 9,900 | 22 | 1,076 | 2 | 0 | 0 | | 10,976 | 25 |
| Saida | Lebanese | 219,538 | 54,885 | 25 | 98,792 | 45 | 65,861 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 65,861 | 30 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 61,472 | 6,147 | 10 | 30,736 | 50 | 21,515 | 35 | 3,074 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 24,589 | 40 |
| | Total | 281,010 | 61,032 | 22 | 129,528 | 46 | 87,377 | 31 | 3,074 | 1 | 0 | 0 | | 90,450 | 32 |
| Tripoli | Lebanese | 212,784 | 63,835 | 30 | 74,474 | 35 | 63,835 | 30 | 10,639 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 74,474 | 35 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 62,879 | 9,432 | 15 | 25,152 | 40 | 25,152 | 40 | 3,144 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 28,296 | 45 |
| | Total | 275,663 | 73,267 | 27 | 99,626 | 36 | 88,987 | 32 | 13,783 | 5 | 0 | 0 | | 102,770 | 37 |
| West Bekaa | Lebanese | 75,266 | 18,817 | 25 | 37,633 | 50 | 18,817 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 18,817 | 25 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 85,783 | 8,578 | 10 | 47,181 | 55 | 21,446 | 25 | 8,578 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 30,024 | 35 |
| | Total | 161,049 | 27,395 | 17 | 84,814 | 53 | 40,262 | 25 | 8,578 | 5 | 0 | 0 | | 48,841 | 30 |
| Zahle | Lebanese | 156,809 | 54,883 | 35 | 54,883 | 35 | 47,043 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 47,043 | 30 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 236,056 | 23,606 | 10 | 106,225 | 45 | 82,620 | 35 | 23,606 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 106,225 | 45 |
| | Total | 392,865 | 78,489 | 20 | 161,108 | 41 | 129,662 | 33 | 23,606 | 6 | 0 | 0 | | 153,268 | 39 |
| Zgharta | Lebanese | 83,927 | 33,571 | 40 | 37,767 | 45 | 12,589 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 12,589 | 15 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 27,155 | 5,431 | 20 | 13,578 | 50 | 8,147 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 8,147 | 30 |
| | Total | 111,082 | 39,002 | 35 | 51,345 | 46 | 20,736 | 19 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 20,736 | 19 |
| Bent Jbeil - El Nabatieh - Marjaayoun - Sour | Lebanese | 65,787 | 6,579 | 10 | 26,315 | 40 | 23,025 | 35 | 9,868 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 32,894 | 50 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 16,386 | 819 | 5 | 6,554 | 40 | 6,554 | 40 | 2,458 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 9,012 | 55 |
| | Total | 82,173 | 7,398 | 9 | 32,869 | 40 | 29,580 | 36 | 12,326 | 15 | 0 | 0 | | 41,906 | 51 |
| Palestine Refugees | Palestine Ref. | 210,220 | 42,044 | 20 | 84,088 | 40 | 73,577 | 35 | 10,511 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 84,088 | 40 |
| Total | Lebanese residents | 3,864,297 | 1,379,055 | 36 | 1,557,128 | 40 | 827,916 | 21 | 100,197 | 3 | 0 | 0 | | 928,113 | 24 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 1,500,002 | 233,801 | 16 | 687,316 | 46 | 484,754 | 32 | 94,130 | 6 | 0 | 0 | | 578,884 | 38 |
| | Palestine Ref. | 210,220 | 42,044 | 20 | 84,088 | 40 | 73,577 | 35 | 10,511 | 5 | 0 | 0 | | 84,088 | 40 |
| | Grand Total | 5,574,519 | 1,654,901 | 29 | 2,328,533 | 42 | 1,386,248 | 25 | 204,838 | 4 | 0 | 0 | | 1,591,086 | 29 |

*Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, therefore they may need continued action. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages of totals and grand totals are attributable to rounding.*

# CURRENT SITUATION OVERVIEW (OCTOBER 2024- NOVEMBER 2024)

The IPC analysis was carried out in 23 units of analysis, including 22 districts and one clustered unit that included the four districts in Southern Lebanon of Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun, El Nabatieh, and Sour. Three population groups were covered: Lebanese residents, Syrian refugees, and Palestine refugees. The analysis covered over 99 percent of the population living in the country and produced the IPC current (October to November 2024) and projected (December 2024 to March 2025) acute food insecurity phase classification.

The conflict escalation between September 2024 and November 2024 had a significant impact on the food security situation in Lebanon. The escalation of the conflict compounded an already fragile access – physical and especially financial – to food and curtailed the capacity of traders to supply markets compared to pre-September 2024 period, especially in the most affected areas. Local agriculture production was also affected, particularly in the South, El Nabatieh and Baalbek El Hermel governorates, with over 85 percent of farmers households reporting crop production difficulities in December 2024 (FAO). These food insecurity levels were already high prior to September 2024 due to the protracted economic crisis, cuts to humanitarian aid, and hostilities taking place in the southern and eastern Lebanon.

Based on the current classification, 24 percent of the Lebanese population corresponding to about 928,000 people, 38 percent of the Syrian refugee population (579,000 people), and 40 percent of the Palestine refugee population (84,000 people) experienced Phase 3 or above and required urgent humanitarian action to reduce food gaps, diversify food intake, protect, and restore livelihoods and prevent acute malnutrition. Of particular concern was the situation of 100,000 (3 percent) Lebanese residents, 94,000 (6 percent) Syrian refugees, and 10,500 (5 percent) Palestine refugees who experienced IPC Phase 4 (Emergency).

The highest incidence of acute food insecurity was observed in districts most affected by the conflict, including Baalbek, El Hermel, Bent Jbeil, El Nabatieh, Marjaayoun, and Sour in Southern Lebanon. One district (Baalbek) was classified in Phase 4 for the first time in an IPC analysis in Lebanon for both Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees, due to the compounding factors of conflict and displacement, damages to infrastructure, deteriorating market access and disrupted supply routes, as well as chronic vulnerabilities already affecting Baalbek district.

**Lebanese residents:** 13 of the 23 units of analysis were classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) including 12 districts (Akkar, Baabda, Beirut, Chouf, El Hermel, El Minieh-Dennie, Hasbaya, Rachaya, Saida, Tripoli, West Bekaa, Zahle) and one cluster of districts (Bent Jbeil, El Nabatieh, Marjaayoun and Sour). The district of Baalbek is the only one classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency), as the population in Phase 4 reached 20 percent while a total of 45 percent of the population was classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or above. In the South cluster, 50 percent of the population was classified in Phase 3 or above, of which 15 percent were in Phase 4. Another five districts classified in Phase 3 reported a high incidence of acute food insecurity, including Akkar, El Minieh-Dennie, Saida, Tripoli, and Zahle, where between 30 and 40 percent of the resident population were classified in Phase 3 or above. The highest occurrence of acute food insecurity was in Akkar district (139,000), followed by Baabda (87,000), Baalbek (81,000), and Tripoli (74,000).

**Syrian refugees:** Seventeen districts were classified in Phase 3, namely Akkar, Aley, Baabda, Bcharre, Beirut, Chouf, El Hermel, El Koura, El Meten, El Minieh-Dennie, Hasbaya, Jbeil, Rachaya, Tripoli, West Bekaa, Zahle, Zgharta and one cluster (Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun, El Nabatieh, Sour). In the South cluster, 55 percent of the Syrian refugee population was classified in Phase 3 or above, of which 15 percent was in Phase 4, while in Baalbek and El Hermel districts, 55 percent of the Syrian refugee population was also classified in Phase 3 or above, of which 20 and 15 percent respectively were in Phase 4. In absolute terms, the districts with the highest number of Syrian refugees who were acutely food insecure were Zahle (106,000), Baalbek (89,000), Akkar (66,000) and Baabda (51,000).

**Palestine refugees:** Palestine refugees in Lebanon (both residing in camps and outside camps) and Palestine refugees from Syria were analysed as a single unit of analysis at the national level only. Overall, 40 percent of the Palestine refugee population, representing 84,000 individuals, was classified in Phase 3 or above, out of which 35 percent (73,500) were in Phase 3 and 5 percent (10,500) were in Phase 4.

# KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

Between late September and late November, Lebanon grappled with one of the worst humanitarian crises in its history, driven by the escalation of the conflict along the southern border which resulted in significant damage and economic loss. In parallel, the country remains in the grip of a severe economic, political, and social crisis which has driven monetary poverty to unprecedented levels.

## Conflict Escalation

The conflict that erupted on 8 October 2023, along Lebanon's southern border escalated significantly in September 2024, spreading to new areas, and exacerbating the humanitarian crisis. Initially localized in southern Lebanon near the border, the conflict expanded to Baalbek–El Hermel, South and El Nabatieh governorates, Central Beqaa, and the southern suburbs of Beirut, as hostilities intensified. Sporadic attacks took place also in other areas across the country, including Beirut on multiple occasions. By 1 October 2024, a ground operation was launched in southern Lebanon, which continued until the announcement of the ceasefire on 27 November 2024. In parallel, evacuation warnings were issued to most villages south of the Awali river, while massive aerial bombardments continued to strike locations across the country.

By 29 November 2024, a few days following the announcement of the ceasefire, the conflict had already resulted in over 3,961 fatalities and over 16,500 injuries. Displacement reached unprecedented levels, with more than 902,000 individuals internally displaced (IOM, Round 67) and over 640,000 crossing into Syria, including 396,523 Syrians and 244,640 Lebanese (General Security), in addition to around 41,442 Lebanese that arrived in Iraq by 27 November (UNHCR). Widespread destruction of homes, livelihoods, and public infrastructure has left many displaced families facing unsafe and untenable conditions in their areas of origin.

The conflict overwhelmed and hindered government services and humanitarian response capacities, particularly in regions throughout south Lebanon and El Nabatieh, Baalbek-El Hermel governorate, and the southern suburb of Beirut. Fuel shortages, disruptions to markets and supply chains, and severe damage to transportation networks, healthcare facilities, and water infrastructure further compounded the challenges faced by affected communities.

Humanitarian access to conflict-affected areas in Lebanon has been severely constrained during the escalation of hostilities, with significant challenges persisting up to the ceasefire on 27 November 2024 and hindering humanitarian efforts due to the fragile security environment and ongoing clashes. Regions near the Blue Line, including South Lebanon and Nabatieh governorates, Baalbek-El Hermel, and parts of the Bekaa Valley, were largely inaccessible due to the military operations, the presence of armed groups, and extensive infrastructural damage. Humanitarian access in these areas was further impeded by unexploded ordnance, roadblocks, and security-related restrictions, limiting both the mobility of affected populations and the ability of humanitarian actors to deliver aid effectively. As such, logistical operations were hampered by these factors, requiring coordinated inter-agency convoys to ensure the delivery of critical supplies.

Conflict has caused significant damage across multiple sectors in Lebanon, with losses estimated at USD 5.1 billion and physical destruction valued at USD 3.4 billion as of the end of October 2024 (World Bank DaLa). There were significant impacts on housing, accounting for 82 percent of physical losses, as entire neighbourhoods in Southern Lebanon were destroyed. The agricultural sector faced USD 125 million in direct damages and USD 1.1 billion in economic losses, including the destruction of 60,000 olive trees and displacement of farming communities. The commerce sector recorded USD 1.7 billion in economic losses, while the tourism and hospitality sector incurred USD 1.1 billion in losses due to reduced visitor arrivals. Public infrastructure and the environment also sustained widespread damage. Key shocks include displacement, the destruction of agricultural assets and supply chains, and severe market disruptions, leaving vulnerable populations struggling with diminished food availability, access, and stability. The displacement of farming communities, losses of key economic sectors like tourism, and impaired connectivity due to damaged telecommunications have further deepened vulnerabilities and hampered recovery efforts.

## Displacement

Displacement was a critical driver of food insecurity in Lebanon. The intensification of the conflict at the end of September 2024 caused a dramatic surge in displacement, with 900,000 individuals internally displaced by 25 November 2024, and over 600,000 crossing into Syria in search of safety[1]. Among those displaced internally, 83 percent were from heavily affected districts, including Sour, El Nabatieh, and Bent Jbeil, with many IDPs having to flee multiple times due to the continuous spread of hostilities, destruction of infrastructure, and limited access to essential services.

The displacement disrupted livelihoods, particularly for agricultural households in rural areas, small businesses, and temporary workers. An estimated 63 percent of farmers in highly affected areas were forced to abandon farming activities, leaving vast agricultural lands untended. Displaced populations, especially those reliant on informal employment or seasonal work, faced heightened vulnerabilities due to the loss of income and resources. A rapid assessment conducted by the Near East Foundation in October 2024 found that out of the 713 micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) owners that were found to be displaced, almost half declared that they temporarily closed, with plans to resume operation after the war, while 22 percent declared that they had completely shut down their businesses. Around 45 percent of those were in the services industry, 29 percent conducted commercial activities, and another 21 percent conducted commercial activities.

Host communities have also been severely strained. Nearly half of all IDPs were living with host families, while 21 percent were housed in overcrowded collective shelters by late November 2024. This has intensified competition for resources such as housing, food, and basic services. Rental costs in major host areas, including Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and Bekaa, surged significantly, amplifying economic pressures for both host communities and displaced households.

## Lebanon's deepening economic crisis

Several macroeconomic analyses corroborate how the escalation of conflict has deepened Lebanon's economic crisis, compounding vulnerabilities for already struggling households. The projected GDP contraction for 2024 ranges from 5.7 percent (World Bank) to 9.2 percent (UNDP), primarily driven by reduced private consumption—historically a key economic driver—and disruptions in critical sectors such as commerce, tourism, and agriculture. This sharp economic downturn reflects a protracted economic crisis characterized by a 34 percent contraction in real GDP since 2019, stagnant investment levels, and declining business confidence.

The Lebanese Pound's relative stability, achieved through central bank interventions, masks deeper systemic vulnerabilities, as international reserves resumed declining following the intensification of the conflict. Reduced public revenues and constrained international support have left public services underfunded, limiting the government's ability to support vulnerable families. The 2025 budget reflects this imbalance, with limited allocations for social protection and reconstruction amidst growing fiscal pressures.

Private consumption, which accounts for over 34 percent of GDP, continues to decline, further limiting households' ability to purchase essential goods, including food. The conflict has also exacerbated the collapse of Lebanon's financial system, transitioning the economy to a dollarized and cash-based model. While this has stabilized incomes for some, vulnerable populations reliant on Lebanese Pound (LBP), denominated earnings face steep price increases for basic goods, directly impacting their food security.

Agricultural disruptions caused by the conflict have further intensified food insecurity. Key agricultural regions in Southern Lebanon report extensive damage to assets, diminished productivity, and reduced income opportunities for farming households. The inability to rebuild agricultural supply chains and secure stable inputs has contributed to increased reliance on food imports, leaving Lebanon highly susceptible to global price fluctuations.

As household purchasing power erodes, particularly for Syrian refugees and low-income Lebanese families, access to adequate nutrition becomes increasingly difficult. Rising transportation costs and localized market disruptions have inflated the cost of the food Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB), which now exceeds the purchasing capacity of many vulnerable families.

## Market situation

A nationwide Market Functionality[2] survey of 982 retailers conducted by WFP in November 2024 provided critical insights into Lebanon's markets amidst escalating conflict and economic challenges.

[1] As of March 2024, internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Lebanon since October 2023 numbered around 90,000, primarily concentrated in regions affected by prior unrest. By September 2024, displacement had increased to 112,000 individuals, driven by increasing localized tensions that were slowly spreading.

[2] The Market Functionality Index (MFI), conducted regularly by WFP, provides a detailed evaluation of market functionality across Lebanon based on four dimensions: assortment, availability, price, and resilience. These metrics guide the feasibility of market-based interventions, with scores ranging from zero (low functionality) to ten (high functionality).

The intensification of the conflict affected markets functionality throughout the country, especially in the most impacted areas. El Nabatieh, Baalbek-El Hermel, and the South experienced the lowest functionality, with Market Functionality Index (MFI) scores of 0.8, 2.1, and 2.2 (out of ten), respectively. These regions suffered from widespread shop closures, stock depletion, and fragile supply chains, driven by escalating conflict and restricted access.

Despite the conflict, markets in Beirut and Mount Lebanon demonstrated the highest levels of functionality, with MFI scores of 7.3 and 6.9, respectively. These areas maintained strong assortment, availability, and resilience, showcasing their capacity to operate effectively despite ongoing economic and logistical challenges. In contrast, regions such as Akkar, the North, and the Bekaa reported moderate functionality, with MFI scores averaging 6.3, reflecting a mix of stability and limitations in meeting local needs.

Resilience in supply chains is strongest in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and Akkar, where markets have been able to adapt to disruptions and maintain long stock coverage periods. Conversely, areas like El Nabatieh and the South faced acute vulnerabilities, with markets heavily reliant on fragile supply chains and limited suppliers. Baalbek-El Hermel also suffered from weak resilience, amplifying the impact of conflict on market functionality.

### Inflation

Rising inflation continued to be a key driver of food insecurity in Lebanon, although 2024 saw a significant softening of the inflation rate compared to previous years. After four consecutive years of triple-digit inflation, the stabilization of the Lebanese Pound (LBP) in the informal market and global food price containment contributed to moderating inflationary pressures. By October 2024, year-on-year general inflation reached 16 percent, down from 215 percent the previous year, while food inflation stands at 23 percent, a notable decrease from 218 percent in October 2023. Energy prices also saw a notable yearly decline of 14 percent by October 2024.

Between March and November 2024, the cost of essential goods and services in Lebanon rose significantly, driven by conflict escalation, supply chain disruptions, and the phase out of the subsidy on wheat for pita bread production. The food Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) increased by 4.7 percent to USD 37.6, with price hikes in cereals, tubers, and vegetables. Non-food SMEB costs surged to USD 259 in October 2024, with annual increases in water (+123 percent), electricity (+123 percent), rent (+59 percent), and transportation (+29 percent), particularly affecting conflict-displaced households. These rising costs have pushed many households into adopting negative coping mechanisms, such as reducing meal sizes and consuming less nutritious foods.

### Labour opportunities

The ongoing economic crisis in Lebanon, compounded by the escalation of conflict, has severely disrupted the labour market, with significant implications for food security. Analyses by the CFSAM and the World Bank Poverty and Equity Assessment highlight a sustained decline in labour force participation, rising unemployment, and a surge in informal and seasonal employment offering minimal security or benefits. These disruptions have forced vulnerable households to rely on precarious income sources, exacerbating their inability to access adequate nutrition. The crisis has also triggered a "brain drain" of skilled professionals, weakening essential sectors like healthcare and education.

Between November 2023 and October 2024, based on WFP's real time monitoring (RTM) data, labour market indicators showed stark challenges. Monthly employment rates for individuals aged 18–64 ranged between 50 and 61 percent, peaking during seasonal demand in August 2024. Unemployment calculated using the International Labour Organization's relaxed definition[3], averaged 27 percent over the same period, reaching 36 percent during winter economic slowdowns in February 2024 before declining to 22 percent during peak agricultural and tourism seasons. Gender disparities persisted, with women facing disproportionately lower employment rates (27 percent) compared to men (74 percent) and significantly higher unemployment rates of 50 percent for women versus 18 percent for men.

The intensification of the conflict has further deepened unemployment, pushing more individuals out of the formal labour market. Projections by the UNDP estimate unemployment will rise by the end of 2024, driven by disruptions of key economic activities, including imports, exports, and public revenues. Loss of livelihoods and displacement exacerbate existing tensions, both intercommunal and within host communities, as competition over limited resources

[3] The ILO's standard definition of unemployment defines the unemployed as all persons of working age who are: a) without work during the reference period, i.e. are not in paid employment or self-employment; b) currently available for work, i.e. are available for paid employment or self-employment during the reference period; and c) seeking work, i.e. have taken specific steps in a specified recent period to seek paid employment or self-employment. The "relaxed" definition (also known as "broad unemployment") includes those who want to work but do not actively seek employment because they view job opportunities as limited, or because they have restricted labour mobility, or face discrimination, or other structural, social or cultural barriers

intensifies. These dynamics have particularly affected key sectors such as agriculture, food production, and essential goods manufacturing, further straining market supply chains and raising prices.

Micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), which comprise 90 percent of Lebanon's economy, have faced severe setbacks. A rapid assessment by the Near East Foundation in October 2024 revealed that out of 713 surveyed MSMEs impacted by conflict-related displacement, nearly half temporarily closed operations, with 22 percent reporting complete shutdowns and another 22 percent suffering physical destruction of assets. Supply chains for food, agricultural products, fuel, and medical supplies have been particularly affected, disrupting access to raw materials and essential goods. This has further limited employment opportunities in key sectors, including food processing (21 percent of MSMEs) and agriculture (4 percent of MSMEs).

## Social assistance

Food security assistance remains crucial in Lebanon, as all population groups continue to face severe economic, social, and security challenges. In 2024, the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster (FSAC) required USD 780 million to address the needs of 2.4 million people, including Lebanese citizens, Syrian refugees, Palestine refugees, and migrants, requiring food security assistance. In addition, the FSAC estimated in USD 131 million the budget requirements to address the immediate humanitarian food security needs of one million displaced people, host communities, and populations affected by the ongoing conflict between October and December 2024.

In 2024, funding gaps were significant, with only 29 percent of the 2024 budget requirements met by the third quarter of the year. These financial constraints forced the FSAC to reduce the scope of assistance, resulting in lower cash transfers per household, less frequent distributions for Lebanese residents, and reduced coverage for Syrian refugees.

The National Poverty Targeting Programme (NPTP) experienced severe financial challenges in 2024, securing only USD 33.3 million, against a requirement of USD 147 million for the year, with no additional contributions after June 2024, Following the intensification of the conflict, assistance was expanded, with the resumption of the Emergency Social Safety Nets (ESSN) / AMAN payments in October 2024, as well as the introduction of the Shock Responsive Safety Nets (SRSN) program by WFP and the Ministry of Social Affairs, which expanded social safety nets targeting vulnerable families from conflict affected areas or from areas hosting a high number of displaced families.

Syrian refugees also faced a reduction in the coverage of cash-based food assistance in Lebanon from January 2024 to September 2024, reflecting funding challenges faced by FSAC partners in Lebanon. While the number of Syrian refugees receiving food cash-based assistance decreased from around 1.01 million in November 2023 and to about 850,000 in September 2024, the coverage of assistance to these Syrian refugees was increased in October 2024 in response to the escalation of the conflict and increasing needs reaching 90 percent of the Syrian refugee population. The transfer value (TV) for food assistance was raised as well starting November 2024 to USD 20 per person.

Food assistance coverage for IDPs in Lebanon's collective shelters showed a significant effort from FSAS partners to address food needs through the distribution of hot and cold meals and ready to eat rations for the displaced population in shelters, achieving a stable and high level of coverage. Initially, coverage was at 36 percent, with only 51 258 individuals receiving assistance out of over 142,000 IDPs in shelters. Over the following weeks, this number steadily increased, reaching over 133,000 individuals on 29 October, with coverage percentages fluctuating between 56 percent and 71 percent. By early November, food assistance stabilized at 88–91 percent coverage, reaching approximately 171,000 IDPs on average. However, only around 19 percent of IDPs inside collective shelters (equivalent to 36,000 individuals) were found to be receiving two meals per day over a period of 27 days during the month of October 2024.

Despite these efforts, barriers to accessing HFA persisted, particularly in highly affected areas like Baalbek-El Hermel governorate. Limited functionality of redemption points, movement restrictions preventing beneficiaries from redeeming assistance in neighbouring districts, and in-kind distributions centralized in Zahle rendered assistance inaccessible for many. Barriers to accessing humanitarian food assistance persisted for those remaining in the most affected areas of the South and El Nabatieh governorates throughout the conflict escalation as well. Deliveries of critical supplies required coordinated inter-agency convoys and a notification system to ensure safe passage for aid. Despite these efforts, multiple obstacles persisted, hindering relief operations, and consequently limiting the access of thousands of civilians to essential life-saving assistance.

### Heavy burden on public services

Lebanon's multiple crises have continued to deeply affect the provision of essential services, including health, water, electricity, and education. The prolonged economic decline, compounded by the recent conflict, has further strained an already fragile public service delivery system.

The health system in Lebanon continues to face immense pressure, compounded by the destruction of infrastructure and a worsening shortage of healthcare personnel. By November 2024, 100 Primary Health Care Centres (PHCCs) and eight hospitals were closed due to security concerns or resource limitations, while eight other hospitals were operating at reduced capacity. Attacks on healthcare facilities and personnel between October 2023 and mid-November 2024 resulted in 137 recorded incidents, contributing to 199 injuries and 226 deaths among healthcare workers (WHO – November 2024). Medication shortages remain critical, particularly for chronic illnesses and reproductive health needs, as subsidies on essential drugs were removed earlier in the crisis. High transportation costs and rising fees for medical services have left 47 percent of Lebanese households unable to access healthcare, disproportionately affecting vulnerable populations such as IDPs and refugees.

The water and sanitation infrastructure in Lebanon remains in a critical state, exacerbated by the ongoing conflict and economic crisis. Damage to water supply systems, power shortages, and limited financial resources have severely constrained access to clean and affordable water, particularly in conflict-affected areas. Since the beginning of the conflict escalation in October 2023, at least 34 water facilities have been damaged, affecting access to safe water for over 400,000 residents nationwide. Indirect damage to distribution networks and the electrical grid has rendered many water stations non-functional, particularly in South Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley. With public water services failing to meet demand, households increasingly rely on private water trucking services, which are often expensive and unregulated, raising concerns about water quality. These services dominate in areas where public water infrastructure has ceased to function, leaving vulnerable populations exposed to health risks. The reliance on private vendors has created financial strain on households, with the poorest unable to afford even basic water supplies.

The conflict has also disrupted wastewater treatment services, with many facilities ceasing operations due to power shortages and insufficient funding. Untreated wastewater discharge has escalated environmental and public health risks, particularly in coastal and inland areas. In areas hosting large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs), the strain on already fragile sanitation infrastructure has further exacerbated hygiene challenges.

Access to electricity remains severely limited, further constraining households' ability to meet basic needs. Households reported receiving only 13 hours of electricity from any type of source between July 2024 and September 2024 (mVAM) despite the implementation of a public electricity reform plan in early 2023, aimed at improving service delivery through tariff adjustments. Fuel shortages and conflict-related infrastructure damage in areas such as South and El Nabatieh governorates have further disrupted electricity provision, leaving many households reliant on sporadic and costly private alternatives.

### Deteriorating livelihoods of farmers

Farmers were facing immense challenges, particularly in the southern districts of Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun, and Sour, where 95 percent of households were displaced as highlighted in the RNA, conducted by FAO in October 2024. Nearly all crop producers and 90 percent of livestock farmers in these areas were unable to access their farms due to security constraints. Moreover, 86 percent of households expressed apprehension about harvesting their crops, while 47 percent were uncertain about planting for the next season, signalling a prolonged threat to food security and agricultural sustainability.

The damage to agricultural assets was also widespread and severe. Over half of the surveyed households reported harm to land, farms, or essential equipment, with Bent Jbeil experiencing the highest levels of destruction—97 percent of households reported severe damage. This included the destruction of more than half of the cropland and nearly two-thirds of livestock farms, highlighting the extensive scale of loss. In Bekaa and Baalbek-El Hermel, nearly two-thirds of crop producers anticipated severe losses this season, though a majority expressed optimism about planting next season despite the challenges. However, the situation was more dire in southern regions, where nearly all households expected significant crop losses, exacerbating concerns over food security and income generation.

Compounding these challenges, the DIEM round 8 Impact-Monitoring survey (December 2024), showed that 85 percent of households reported crop production difficulties due to limited access to fertilizers, pesticides, plots, and labor, with 63 percent anticipating decreased harvests, especially in Baalbeck and Bent Jbeil. Olive trees (64 percent) were the most affected crop, and nearly 98 percent of crop producers expected significant losses, with 79 percent anticipating over 75 percent reductions. Livestock producers (80 percent) faced high feed costs, limited pasture, and veterinary services, with hostilities causing severe declines in milk, egg, and honey production. Significant damage to agricultural equipment, irrigation infrastructure, fodder, and shelters was reported. Security concerns disrupted market access and forced many to abandon fields. Most households (96 percent) reported a need for assistance with crop input and livestock feed.

### Risk of rising malnutrition

Malnutrition continues to pose a significant risk to vulnerable populations in Lebanon, particularly children, adolescents, and women. The nutrition sector, in collaboration with the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), has completed Lebanon's first-ever Integrated Micronutrient, Anthropometric, and Child Development Survey (LIMA). This landmark study provides comprehensive data on the nutritional status of the population, including hidden forms of malnutrition such as micronutrient deficiencies, stunting, and wasting.

The LIMA survey revealed concerning trends in child food poverty, with three out of every four children under the age of five living in food poverty. One in three children suffers from severe food poverty, consuming diets consisting of at most two food groups, typically cereal and milk. These diets leave children highly vulnerable to severe stunting and wasting, both of which impair physical and cognitive development and increase mortality risks by up to 12 times. Stunting affects 14 percent of children under five, with higher rates observed in poorer households and among Syrian refugees. Wasting rates remain low at 1.3 percent for children under five but are significantly higher (6 percent) among infants under six months.

Child food poverty affects more girls than boys in Lebanon, and while all nationalities are affected, it is more prevalent among Syrian and Palestine refugees. The surveillance of the acute malnutrition program continues to show concerning trend, with the rates of admission to the program increasing by one percent on a yearly basis by Q2 of 2024. North and Akkar followed by Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and Bekaa, Baalbek and Hermel regions registered the highest rates of admission to malnutrition programs.

### Food systems and domestic food supply

The 2024 WFP-FAO Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) highlighted that food imports account for approximately 50 percent of the total food supply and 90 percent of the cereal supply. The CFSAM also estimated a requirement of 1.48 million tonnes of cereals and potatoes (in cereal equivalent) of which the import requirement for the 2024/25 marketing year (July/June) was estimated at 1.28 million tonnes. Wheat, the country's primary food staple, is largely sourced through imports. The domestic food deficit in 2024/25 was expected to be fully covered by commercial imports and stock levels are anticipated to remain unchanged year on year.

Based on the CFSAM, in 2024, local production provided significant coverage of key consumption needs, particularly for potatoes (97 percent), vegetables (88 percent), fruits (100 percent), eggs (98 percent), and meat (78 percent). However, gaps in production and consumption remain for cereals and pulses, underscoring the country's reliance on imports for staple grains. In 2024, cereal production (wheat and barley) is expected to be 40 percent below average due to conflict, adverse weather, and a lack of seed regulation. Potato production was eight percent below average, and other crop outputs also remained low.

Lebanon's Council of the South, responsible for evaluating damages reported that farmers were unable to harvest crops from 12,000 hectares of crop land. In total, 12,200 hectares of crop land were either burned or could not be harvested due to the hostilities, representing 22 percent of the agricultural land in the South and Nabatieh governorates. It is estimated that the agriculture sector has incurred losses amounting to USD 1.1 billion over a 12-month period. This significant impact is attributed to the widespread burning and abandonment of large tracts of agricultural land and livestock, particularly in the southern and Bekaa regions. Additionally, many farmers have been displaced from the south, resulting in lost harvests, and further exacerbating the sector's challenges.

Despite the intensification of the conflict at the end of September 2024, Lebanon's wheat supply remained stable, with stocks and incoming shipments expected to meet demand for up to two months continuously. As of 16 October 2024, Lebanon's wheat stock stood at approximately 38,000 tons (covering four to six weeks), with a shipment of 26,000 tons (covering an additional two weeks) expected to arrive later in the month. However, food supply disruptions have worsened across most governorates in early November, especially in El Nabatieh, South, and the Southern Suburbs of Beirut (SSB), where most shops reported disrupted supply chains because of the conflict.

# FOOD SECURITY OUTCOMES

## Food Consumption Score (FCS)

The adequacy, quality and diversity of diets of Lebanese residents, as measured by the Food Consumption Score (FCS), has registered some slight deterioration between late 2023 and mid-2024, while that of Syrian refugees has shown some improvements between 2022 and 2024. Around 17 percent of Lebanese residents' households were unable to meet an adequate diet in August 2024, while that share for Syrian refugees was 39 percent according to VASyR 2024 data.

Based on near real-time food security monitoring (RTM data), 'poor food consumption' has fluctuated between 2 percent in November 2023 and 5 percent in August 2024, while 'borderline consumption' has shifted from 11 to 18 percent in the same period. The highest average diet inadequacy rates over the monitoring period were recorded in the northern districts of Bcharre (36 percent), Akkar (25 percent), El Minieh-Dennie (24 percent), and Tripoli (24 percent). The highest proportion of poor food consumption was reported in El Minieh-Dennie, Tripoli and Kesrwane, with 5 percent of Lebanese residents showing severely inadequate food consumption in each district over the monitoring period.

Syrian refugee households in Lebanon have exhibited notable progress in their food consumption scores between 2022 and 2024. A comparative analysis of food consumption scores for VASyR 2024 against the figures from 2022 and 2023 reveals a 9 percent reduction in the prevalence of poor food consumption, a 9 percent decrease in borderline food consumption, and a notable 18 percent increase in the prevalence of acceptable food consumption. Despite this positive shift in food consumption patterns, more than one-third of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon were still consuming an inadequate diet in 2024. The districts with the highest proportion of Syrian refugee households with inadequate food consumption in 2024 were Chouf (74 percent), Jbeil (57 percent), West Bekaa (54 percent), and Zahle (53 percent).

## Coping strategies

When households do not have enough food or lack resources to buy food or to access other essential needs, they adopt strategies and behaviours to manage food shortages. Food coping strategies imply changes in food consumption patterns such as relying on less expensive foods or reducing the number of meals or portion sizes.

Throughout the RTM reporting period (November 2023 – August 2024), the percentage of Lebanese households employing medium coping strategies remained notable, showing a slight increase from 40 percent in November 2023 to 45 percent in August 2024. Conversely, the proportion of households using high coping strategies fluctuated but generally displayed a declining trend, decreasing from 37 percent in November 2023 to 31 percent by August 2024. The districts with the highest average rate of rCSI indicating severe constraints over the monitoring period were Akkar (48 percent), West Bekaa (42 percent), Marjaayoun (41 percent) and Baalbek (40 percent).

The rCSI for Syrian refugee households reported by VASyR from 2021 to 2024 indicates a consistent reliance on both medium and high coping strategies, although there were signs of improvement by 2024. The proportion of households utilizing medium coping strategies remained stable, with a slight increase to 51 percent between 2022 and 2024. In contrast, the percentage of households employing high coping strategies improved significantly, dropping from 44 percent in 2022 to 30 percent in 2024, although these levels are still considered elevated. The largest proportion of Syrian refugee households using high coping strategies was found in the districts of Hasbaya (78 percent), El Nabatieh (66 percent), and Bcharre (61 percent).

## Livelihood coping strategies

Livelihood strategies are coping behaviours that cause changes in income-earning activities or involve responses to food insecurity such as asset sales that affect household resilience. Livelihood coping strategies are categorized as stress, crisis, or emergency strategies. While stress strategies indicate a reduced ability to deal with future shocks, crisis and emergency coping strategies reduce future productivity, hindering resilience.

RTM data indicates a sustained reliance on crisis-level coping strategies among Lebanese resident households between November 2023 and August 2024, with emergency coping strategies remaining low but persistent. Between 14 percent and 19 percent of households employed crisis coping strategies, peaking at 19 percent in November 2023, March and August 2024, likely due to economic stressors such as inflation and income instability. Temporary improvements in household livelihoods were noted in January and June 2024, when the percentage using crisis strategies dropped to 14 percent. Emergency coping strategies were less frequently utilized, ranging from 1 percent to 3 percent of households, with peaks of 3 percent in January and June 2024. The highest average share of Lebanese residents adopting critical coping strategies (crisis or emergency) over the monitoring period were found in Akkar (27 percent), West Bekaa (27 percent), Bent Jbeil (24 percent), and Hasbaya (24 percent).

VASyR trends indicate sustained reliance on coping strategies among Syrian refugee households in 2024, hinting at lingering vulnerabilities in household resilience. Crisis coping strategies decreased slightly to 19 percent in 2024, down from 21 percent in the previous year, reflecting enhanced economic stability and continued humanitarian support.

Emergency coping strategies, after dropping to 5 percent in 2023, rose slightly to 7 percent in 2024, suggesting that some vulnerable households still face significant challenges. Districts with the highest proportion of Syrian refugee households using critical coping strategies in 2024 were El Nabatieh (43 percent), Aley (39 percent), and Bent Jbeil (38 percent).

### A gendered lens on food insecurity in Lebanon

To improve food security responses through increased gender-sensitive analysis in IPC, Oxfam in Lebanon (OiL) launched a gender-sensitive pilot study as part of the multi-country project, Improving Gender-Sensitive and Local NGO Engagement in IPC Processes and Food Security Analyses. This pilot reflects how location, nationality, employment status, and gendered coping mechanisms reveal more complex vulnerabilities, and highlights the importance of being attentive to women's dietary diversity, which is often far more sensitive to household size, employment, and socio-economic pressures.

The pilot employed a quantitative approach to measure food security at household and individual levels across five districts selected for high population shares (Baabda, El Meten, Zahle, Baalbek, and Akkar), with 830 completed surveys.

Overall, the indicators collected at household level show no major gendered differences in food consumption, coping strategies, or food expenditures ([FSC], [rCSI], [LCS-FS], and [FES]). However, deeper analysis that accounts for nationality, gendered coping strategies, and employment uncovers disparities. Women-headed households (WHHs), particularly Syrian refugees or non-working heads, face higher food insecurity: 13.4 percent of Syrian WHHs reported poor FCS compared to 3.4 percent of Lebanese WHHs. Non-working men-headed households (MHHs) exhibited slightly higher food security challenges. MHHs showed a slightly higher tendency to resort to emergency strategies, such as illegal income activities; this might be linked to societal expectations, limiting their willingness or ability to seek external assistance.

Looking at individual data showed more nuanced gender difference, where women's dietary diversity within the same household is sensitive to a larger number of variables compared to men's dietary diversity. The Minimum Dietary Diversity for Women (MDDW) reveals that only 19.6 percent of women aged 18–49 achieved adequate dietary diversity, while 80.4 percent did not. Additionally, larger households correlated with lower dietary diversity; women in smaller households (average size 4.2) fared better than those in larger households (5.5). Employment status was also critical: working women exhibited higher dietary diversity, as did women in households with an employed head, regardless of their own employment status. Thus, women's dietary diversity is acutely sensitive to household size, employment, and socio-economic pressures, making them more susceptible to micronutrient deficiencies compared to men, whose dietary diversity remains more stable within the same household.

Regional disparities are critical to understanding food insecurity, which acutely affect women and other vulnerable populations, reflecting decades of geographic and economic marginalization, particularly in the case of Akkar, with 38.1 percent of households reporting poor or borderline FCS and 60 percent relying on severe coping strategies (rCSI >19). Finally, nationality is key to understanding gendered insecurity with Lebanese women achieving higher dietary diversity than Syrian refugee women.

# PROJECTION SITUATION MAP AND POPULATION TABLES (DECEMBER 2024- MARCH 2025)

**LEBANESE RESIDENTS – PROJECTED ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY: DECEMBER 2024 - MARCH 2025**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **970,000** | Phase 5 | **0 People in Catastrophe** |
| **25% of the population analysed** | Phase 4 | **109,000 People in Emergency** |
| People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) | Phase 3 | **862,000 People in Crisis** |
| | Phase 2 | **1,576,000 People in Stressed** |
| IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION | Phase 1 | **1,318,000 People in Food Security** |

**SYRIAN REFUGEES - PROJECTED ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY: DECEMBER 2024 - MARCH 2025**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **594,000** | Phase 5 | **0 People in Catastrophe** |
| **40% of the population analysed** | Phase 4 | **81,000 People in Emergency** |
| People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) | Phase 3 | **514,000 People in Crisis** |
| | Phase 2 | **686,000 People in Stressed** |
| IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION | Phase 1 | **220,000 People in Food Security** |

**PALESTINE REFUGEES - PROJECTED ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY: DECEMBER 2024 - MARCH 2025**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **89,000** | Phase 5 | **0 People in Catastrophe** |
| **40% of the population analysed** | Phase 4 | **11,000 People in Emergency** |
| People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) | Phase 3 | **78,000 People in Crisis** |
| | Phase 2 | **89,000 People in Stressed** |
| IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION | Phase 1 | **45,000 People in Food Security** |



# POPULATION TABLE FOR THE CURRENT PERIOD (OCTOBER – NOVEMBER 2024)

| District | Population | Total population analysed | Phase 1 | | Phase 2 | | Phase 3 | | Phase 4 | | Phase 5 | | Area Phase | Phase 3+ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | #people | % | #people | % | #people | % | #people | % | #peop | % | | #people | % |
| Akkar | Lebanese | 300,872 | 45,131 | 15 | 120,349 | 40 | 120,349 | 40 | 15,044 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 135,392 | 45 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 152,640 | 15,264 | 10 | 68,688 | 45 | 61,056 | 40 | 7,632 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 68,688 | 45 |
| | Total | 453,512 | 60,395 | 13 | 189,037 | 42 | 181,405 | 40 | 22,676 | 5 | 0 | 0 | | 204,080 | 45 |
| Aley | Lebanese | 247,856 | 99,142 | 40 | 123,928 | 50 | 24,786 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 24,786 | 10 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 100,696 | 30,209 | 30 | 45,313 | 45 | 25,174 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 25,174 | 25 |
| | Total | 348,552 | 129,351 | 37 | 169,241 | 49 | 49,960 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 49,960 | 14 |
| Baabda | Lebanese | 395,448 | 138,407 | 35 | 158,179 | 40 | 79,090 | 20 | 19,772 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 98,862 | 25 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 144,004 | 21,601 | 15 | 64,802 | 45 | 50,401 | 35 | 7,200 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 57,602 | 40 |
| | Total | 539,452 | 160,007 | 30 | 222,981 | 41 | 129,491 | 24 | 26,973 | 5 | 0 | 0 | | 156,464 | 29 |
| Baalbek | Lebanese | 196,679 | 29,502 | 15 | 78,672 | 40 | 68,838 | 35 | 19,668 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 88,506 | 45 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 180,935 | 9,047 | 5 | 72,374 | 40 | 81,421 | 45 | 18,094 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 99,514 | 55 |
| | Total | 377,614 | 38,549 | 10 | 151,046 | 40 | 150,258 | 40 | 37,761 | 10 | 0 | 0 | | 188,020 | 50 |
| Bcharre | Lebanese | 21,077 | 10,539 | 50 | 9,485 | 45 | 1,054 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1,054 | 5 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 1,882 | 376 | 20 | 1,223 | 65 | 282 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 282 | 15 |
| | Total | 22,959 | 10,915 | 48 | 10,708 | 47 | 1,336 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 1,336 | 6 |
| Beirut | Lebanese | 259,874 | 103,950 | 40 | 103,950 | 40 | 51,975 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 51,975 | 20 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 44,765 | 11,191 | 25 | 20,144 | 45 | 13,430 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 13,430 | 30 |
| | Total | 304,639 | 115,141 | 38 | 124,094 | 41 | 65,404 | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 65,404 | 21 |
| Chouf | Lebanese | 220,561 | 88,224 | 40 | 99,252 | 45 | 33,084 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 33,084 | 15 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 71,540 | 17,885 | 25 | 35,770 | 50 | 17,885 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 17,885 | 25 |
| | Total | 292,101 | 106,109 | 36 | 135,022 | 46 | 50,969 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 50,969 | 17 |
| El Batroun | Lebanese | 53,638 | 29,501 | 55 | 21,455 | 40 | 2,682 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2,682 | 5 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 18,335 | 4,584 | 25 | 11,001 | 60 | 2,750 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2,750 | 15 |
| | Total | 71,973 | 34,085 | 47 | 32,456 | 45 | 5,432 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 5,432 | 8 |
| El Hermel | Lebanese | 21,848 | 2,185 | 10 | 9,832 | 45 | 7,647 | 35 | 2,185 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 9,832 | 45 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 11,137 | 557 | 5 | 4,455 | 40 | 5,012 | 45 | 1,114 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 6,125 | 55 |
| | Total | 32,985 | 2,742 | 8 | 14,286 | 43 | 12,658 | 38 | 3,299 | 10 | 0 | 0 | | 15,957 | 48 |
| El Koura | Lebanese | 73,844 | 36,922 | 50 | 33,230 | 45 | 3,692 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3,692 | 5 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 22,785 | 4,557 | 20 | 11,393 | 50 | 6,836 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 6,836 | 30 |
| | Total | 96,629 | 41,479 | 43 | 44,622 | 46 | 10,528 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 10,528 | 11 |
| El Meten | Lebanese | 405,417 | 222,979 | 55 | 141,896 | 35 | 40,542 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 40,542 | 10 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 65,040 | 19,512 | 30 | 32,520 | 50 | 13,008 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 13,008 | 20 |
| | Total | 470,457 | 242,491 | 52 | 174,416 | 37 | 53,550 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 53,550 | 11 |
| El Minieh-Dennie | Lebanese | 123,550 | 24,710 | 20 | 49,420 | 40 | 43,243 | 35 | 6,178 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 49,420 | 40 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 77,389 | 7,739 | 10 | 34,825 | 45 | 30,956 | 40 | 3,869 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 34,825 | 45 |
| | Total | 200,939 | 32,449 | 16 | 84,245 | 42 | 74,198 | 37 | 10,047 | 5 | 0 | 0 | | 84,245 | 42 |
| Hasbaya | Lebanese | 20,812 | 6,244 | 30 | 10,406 | 50 | 4,162 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4,162 | 20 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 4,599 | 920 | 20 | 2,300 | 50 | 1,380 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1,380 | 30 |
| | Total | 25,411 | 7,163 | 28 | 12,706 | 50 | 5,542 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 5,542 | 22 |
| Jbeil | Lebanese | 120,050 | 60,025 | 50 | 54,023 | 45 | 6,003 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6,003 | 5 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 14,223 | 4,978 | 35 | 7,112 | 50 | 2,133 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2,133 | 15 |
| | Total | 134,273 | 65,003 | 48 | 61,134 | 46 | 8,136 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 8,136 | 6 |

| District | Population | Total population analysed | Phase 1 | | Phase 2 | | Phase 3 | | Phase 4 | | Phase 5 | | Area Phase | Phase 3+ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | #people | % | #people | % | #people | % | #people | % | #peop | % | | #people | % |
| Jezzine | Lebanese | 27,508 | 9,628 | 35 | 16,505 | 60 | 1,375 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1,375 | 5 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 4,168 | 1,042 | 25 | 2,501 | 60 | 625 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 625 | 15 |
| | Total | 31,676 | 10,670 | 34 | 19,006 | 60 | 2,001 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 2,001 | 6 |
| Kesrwane | Lebanese | 232,171 | 127,694 | 55 | 92,868 | 40 | 11,609 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 11,609 | 5 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 23,562 | 8,247 | 35 | 11,781 | 50 | 3,534 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3,534 | 15 |
| | Total | 255,733 | 135,941 | 53 | 104,649 | 41 | 15,143 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 15,143 | 6 |
| Rachaya | Lebanese | 31,951 | 9,585 | 30 | 15,976 | 50 | 6,390 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 6,390 | 20 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 9,749 | 1,462 | 15 | 4,387 | 45 | 2,925 | 30 | 975 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3,900 | 40 |
| | Total | 41,700 | 11,048 | 26 | 20,363 | 49 | 9,315 | 22 | 975 | 2 | 0 | 0 | | 10,290 | 25 |
| Saida | Lebanese | 267,102 | 66,776 | 25 | 133,551 | 50 | 66,776 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 66,776 | 25 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 73,810 | 11,072 | 15 | 36,905 | 50 | 22,143 | 30 | 3,691 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 25,834 | 35 |
| | Total | 340,912 | 77,847 | 23 | 170,456 | 50 | 88,919 | 26 | 3,691 | 1 | 0 | 0 | | 92,609 | 27 |
| Tripoli | Lebanese | 202,015 | 60,605 | 30 | 60,605 | 30 | 70,705 | 35 | 10,101 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 80,806 | 40 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 60,012 | 9,002 | 15 | 24,005 | 40 | 24,005 | 40 | 3,001 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 27,005 | 45 |
| | Total | 262,027 | 69,606 | 27 | 84,609 | 32 | 97,711 | 37 | 13,101 | 5 | 0 | 0 | | 110,812 | 42 |
| West Bekaa | Lebanese | 68,667 | 13,733 | 20 | 34,334 | 50 | 20,600 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 20,600 | 30 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 89,411 | 8,941 | 10 | 49,176 | 55 | 26,823 | 30 | 4,471 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 31,294 | 35 |
| | Total | 158,078 | 22,675 | 14 | 83,510 | 53 | 47,423 | 30 | 4,471 | 3 | 0 | 0 | | 51,894 | 33 |
| Zahle | Lebanese | 140,960 | 49,336 | 35 | 49,336 | 35 | 42,288 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 42,288 | 30 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 224,491 | 22,449 | 10 | 101,021 | 45 | 78,572 | 35 | 22,449 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 101,021 | 45 |
| | Total | 365,451 | 71,785 | 20 | 150,357 | 41 | 120,860 | 33 | 22,449 | 6 | 0 | 0 | | 143,309 | 39 |
| Zgharta | Lebanese | 73,168 | 29,267 | 40 | 32,926 | 45 | 10,975 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 10,975 | 15 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 24,573 | 4,915 | 20 | 12,287 | 50 | 7,372 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 7,372 | 30 |
| | Total | 97,741 | 34,182 | 35 | 45,212 | 46 | 18,347 | 19 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 18,347 | 19 |
| Bent Jbeil - El Nabatieh - Marjaayoun - Sour | Lebanese | 359,228 | 53,884 | 15 | 125,730 | 35 | 143,691 | 40 | 35,923 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 179,614 | 50 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 80,254 | 4,013 | 5 | 32,102 | 40 | 36,114 | 45 | 8,025 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 44,140 | 55 |
| | Total | 439,482 | 57,897 | 13 | 157,831 | 36 | 179,806 | 41 | 43,948 | 10 | 0 | 0 | | 223,754 | 51 |
| Palestine Refugees | Palestine Ref. | 223,026 | 44,605 | 20 | 89,210 | 40 | 78,059 | 35 | 11,151 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | | |
| Total | Lebanese residents | 3,864,296 | 1,317,968 | 34 | 1,575,904 | 41 | 861,554 | 22 | 108,870 | 3 | 0 | 0 | | 970,424 | 25 |
| | Syrian Ref. | 1,500,000 | 219,561 | 15 | 686,083 | 46 | 513,837 | 34 | 80,521 | 5 | 0 | 0 | | 594,358 | 39 |
| | Palestine Ref. | 223,026 | 44,605 | 20 | 89,210 | 40 | 78,059 | 35 | 11,151 | 5 | 0 | 0 | | 89,210 | 40 |
| | Grand Total | 5,587,322 | 1,582,134 | 28 | 2,351,197 | 42 | 1,453,450 | 26 | 200,542 | 4 | 0 | 0 | | 1,653,991 | 30 |

*Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, therefore they may need continued action. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages of totals and grand totals are attributable to rounding.*

# PROJECTION SITUATION OVERVIEW (DECEMBER 2024- MARCH 2025)

During the projected period (December 2024 – March 2025) about 1.65 million people, corresponding to 30 percent of the analysed population, will likely experience high levels of food insecurity, IPC Phase 3 or above. This marks a one percentage point increase from 29 percent to 30 percent of people in Phase 3 or above compared to the October-November 2024 current period of analysis.

While improvement in the classification of several districts were registered compared to the current period, the slight increase in the population classified in Phase 3 and above is due to the large number of IDPs returning to their districts of origins in the highly affected areas following the start of the ceasefire. These areas tend to have a higher percentage classification in Phase 3 and above, and thus this led to this slight increase compared to the current period, despite the improvement registered in most districts.

Over the projected period, the ceasefire currently enforced is anticipated to persist. Nonetheless, some degrees of displacement are also likely to remain along with reduction in humanitarian assistance. Market functionality in areas most affected by conflict will not resume to pre-escalation levels, and inter-communal tensions over resources will likely continue.

These lingering challenges would largely offset expected improvements in market functionality and seasonal work opportunities, underpinning a slight increase of population in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) by around 70,000 people while the population in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) remains stable, if not slightly decreases, compared to October-November period of analysis.

Lebanese residents: As a result of the assumptions, 25 percent of the Lebanese population were classified in Phase 3 or above, representing a one percentage increase in comparison to the current period, with the number of Lebanese residents facing Phase 4 increasing by 9,000 to reach 109,000 people (3 percent) over the projected period. During the projected period, residents living in 16 districts were classified in Phase 3. The district of Baalbek was classified in Phase 3 for the projected period compared to a Phase 4 classification for the current period. The highest occurrence of acute food insecurity during the projected period was estimated in the cluster of four districts in southern Lebanon merging Bent Jbeil, El Nabatieh, Marjaayoun and Sour districts (180,000), followed by the districts of Akkar (135,000), Baabda (99,000), Baalbek (89,000), and Tripoli (81,000).

Syrian refugees: Some 40 percent (594,000 people) are projected to be in Phase 3 or above, a one percentage point increase in comparison to the current period, while the number of Syrian refugees facing Phase 4 is expected to decrease from 94,000 (6 percent) in the current period to 81,000 (5 percent) in the projected period. In the projected period, 21 districts where Syrian refugees are living are classified in Phase 3. The highest incidence of acute food insecurity among Syrian refugees during the projected period is expected in seven districts (Baalbek, Bent Jbeil, El Hermel, El Nabatieh, Marjaayoun, and Sour) where the percentage of the Syrian refugee population classified in Phase 3 or above is 50 percent or more. This is followed by Akkar, El Minieh-Dennie, Zahle, Baabda, Tripoli and Rachaya where 40 to 45 percent of Syrian refugees will likely experience high levels of acute food insecurity during the projected period. In absolute terms, the district with the highest number of Syrian refugees classified in Phase 3 or above over the projected period is Zahle (101,000), followed by Baalbek (100,000) and Akkar (69,000).

Palestine refugees: A total of 89,000 (40 percent) Palestine refugees are classified in Phase 3 or above in the projected period, corresponding to an additional 4,000 individuals compared to the current period. Of these, 78,000 (35 percent) are classified in Phase 3, an increase of 4,000 individuals from the current period, and 11,000 (5 percent) are classified in Phase 4, the same number compared to the current period.

## Key Assumprions

### Conflict

The ceasefire is expected to hold throughout the projection period, facilitating gradual improvements in security and access. However, localized hostilities are expected to continue due to ceasefire violations.

### Displacement

Displacement trends remain fluid, with 165,000 individuals displaced and 829,000 returnees as of 19 December 2024. Localized displacement within districts in the South and Beqaa is expected to persist due to infrastructure damage, ceasefire violations, and enduring access restrictions.

### Economic growth

Economic contraction is expected to continue throughout the projection period, with a projected GDP decline of 5.7 percent in 2024 and limited recovery prospects in 2025, contingent on international aid and reconstruction efforts.

### Currency depreciation

Exchange rate stability was expected to continue, supported by ongoing interventions from the central bank. A stable monetary base, public sector salaries and allowances paid in US dollars, and injections of foreign currency through expatriates' remittances—particularly during the holiday season—were also expected to further ease pressures on the Lebanese pound.

### Inflation

Inflation is expected to remain within the last six months averages, given the anticipated exchange rate stability and steady global outlook of commodities in the international market for the next year. The lifting of the bread subsidy on its part is expected to push the food SMEB price by up to 10 percent.

### Humanitarian assistance

HFA reductions are anticipated across all population groups due to funding constraints, impacting their food security and resilience. Emergency assistance provided to Lebanese following the conflict escalation is expected to decline/end, while Syrian refugees will face a 30 to 40 percent reduction in assistance by February 2025. Assistance for Palestine refugees will also decline.

### Recovery plans

As the political deadlock continues across the different political levels, it has been assumed that no further progress would be made in the implementation of the structural and financial reforms required under the IMF Staff Level Agreement to access financial aid.

### Tensions

Intercommunal and intracommunal tensions are expected to persist and potentially intensify, driven by competition for jobs, services, and reconstruction resources. Population movements and regional dynamics add to the complexity.

### Market functionality

Gradual improvement to be registered in areas highly affected by the conflict. In the south and Baalbek-El Hermel, improvement will take longer due to the destruction.

### Conflict and security

Lebanon's security situation evolved significantly following the ceasefire in November 2024, marking the end of the hostilities that began in October 2023. While large-scale violence has subsided, the country remains in a fragile state, with sporadic incidents that continue to be reported in southern Lebanon and border areas at the time of writing of this report. Also, nighttime curfews and a "no-access zone" south of the Litani River were established, restricting civilian movement until full withdrawal and security handover to LAF and UNIFIL.

The ceasefire, assumed to hold throughout the projection period, is expected to facilitate gradual improvements in security and humanitarian access, though challenges are anticipated in rebuilding trust and ensuring stability in conflict-affected areas. Access is improving but remains challenging. Humanitarian operations have fully resumed in Bekaa and Baalbek-El Hermel, but certain areas in southern Lebanon near the border or with significant military presence remain hard-to-reach and are expected to stay so until at least the end of January 2025. Ongoing assessments indicate that these regions will require additional support for reconstruction and resource mobilization.

### Persistent displacement and population movements following the ceasefire

According to the latest IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) (Round 68, 19 December 2024), approximately 165,000 people remain displaced as a direct result of the conflict, while 829,000 IDPs have begun returning to their communities. The report notes that given the complexity and fluidity of population movements in the country, these observed returns cannot be considered permanent and should be viewed as a snapshot in time, as many people remain on the move. This fluidity underscores the protracted nature of displacement and the ongoing instability in affected areas. The dynamics of population movements have also been influenced by the situation in Syria, where the security situation and limited economic opportunities have led to increased cross-border mobility.

It is worth noting that initial estimates of displacement trends were conservative, as early return figures following the ceasefire show a significantly larger movement of populations back to their areas of origin than initially anticipated. The projection on returnees was agreed upon by the plenary on the day of the ceasefire announcement, as the IPC analysis required an extension and update of all assumptions based on the available information at that time. Given the highly fluid situation, these estimates were deliberately conservative to account for the evolving dynamics. Continuous monitoring remains essential to capture the ongoing changes in population movements and address emerging needs effectively.

### Economic contraction expected to persist throughout the projection period

Economic contraction is anticipated to persist throughout the projection period (December 2024 to March 2025), as Lebanon continues to grapple with the compounded effects of the conflict and its prolonged economic crisis. The World Bank's Fall 2024 Economic Monitor estimates that the significant escalation of the conflict is likely to have reduced real GDP growth for 2024 by at least 6.6 percent, compared to a growth forecast of 0.9 percent without conflict, leading to a projected contraction of 5.7 percent. This would mark the sixth consecutive year of economic decline and represents a near 64 percent decline in the size of the GDP since 2018. This significant downturn reflects the extensive damage caused by the conflict, particularly in Southern Lebanon, which disrupted key economic sectors, diminished agricultural productivity, and curtailed tourism revenues.

The agricultural sector, which accounts for a significant share of livelihoods in the South, has been particularly hard-hit. Recovery in this sector is expected to remain slow, hindered by lingering access challenges, damaged infrastructure, and the destruction of key assets, including 60,000 olive trees. Limited recovery in this sector is anticipated during the projection period, as efforts to rebuild agricultural infrastructure and restore supply chains are likely to require sustained investment and time.

The tourism sector, a vital driver of Lebanon's economy, has shown signs of stabilization since the ceasefire in November 2024, with a limited number of airlines restarting operations through the Beirut International Airport, and number of arrivals, especially Lebanese expats, expecting to pick up during the Winter Holiday season. However, the overall number of visitors in 2024 remains significantly below pre-conflict levels, and the outlook for early 2025 remains subdued. The conflict's impact on Lebanon's image as a tourist destination continues to weigh heavily on the sector.

The reconstruction efforts once initiated following the ceasefire are expected to generate some job opportunities in the construction and public works sectors. However, these efforts remain constrained by limited funding, bureaucratic delays, and the scale of destruction, particularly in southern Lebanon. Reconstruction is likely to focus on critical infrastructure and housing, with slower progress expected in restoring agricultural assets and supporting livelihoods.

Job and income opportunities across sectors are expected to remain constrained throughout the projection period. The labor market, already strained by years of economic decline, has been further disrupted by the massive displacement of over 1.3 million people and the destruction of businesses and productive assets in conflict-affected areas. While informal or seasonal employment opportunities may increase, especially during the last two weeks of December during the winter holiday seasons, they are unlikely to offset the widespread job losses in agriculture, commerce, and services. Competition for low-skilled jobs is expected to remain a source of intercommunal tension, as displaced populations and vulnerable groups compete for limited opportunities.

### Despite exchange rate stability and global food price containment, inflation is expected to rise driven by increasing costs of services

The exchange rate is expected to remain stable throughout the projection period (December 2024 to March 2025), supported by several interventions from the central bank, including limited USD withdrawals from old bank deposits, and steps towards the exchange rate unification. Exchange rate stability was further supported by the caretaker cabinet's decision to adjust and disburse public sector salaries and allowances in US dollars, which began retroactively from December 2023.

This exchange rate stability is expected to mitigate food inflation. Given Lebanon's high dependency on imports, any deterioration in the exchange rate would directly impact inflation levels. With the exchange rate holding steady at LBP 89,700/USD since mid-October 2023, food inflation was largely anticipated to reflect oscillations in international commodity prices, which were expected to remain stable.

The escalation of the conflict in October and November 2024 has already placed additional upward pressures on inflation. Market disruptions, damage to supply chains, and increased transportation costs resulted in price spikes, particularly in conflict-affected regions such as the South and Baalbek-El Hermel. While exchange rate stability mitigated broader inflationary risks, conflict-related factors contributed to volatility in essential item prices. The phase-out of wheat subsidies in mid-September has already driven increases in bread prices, and it is likely to continue in the projection period. The cost of the food SMEB per person (USD37.6) has soared by 4.7 percent between September and November 2024 and is expected to remain elevated throughout the projection period as markets adjust to the post-subsidy environment and ongoing conflict recovery. Non-food items experienced notable price increases due to the conflict, reaching 3 percent between September and October 2024. This elevated level is expected to persist, due to the time required to reverse the aggregate market sector, severely affected by disruptions during the conflict, higher demand for essential goods in displacement-affected areas, and increased transportation costs linked to fuel price volatility.

Essential services, including electricity, water, education, and health, are expected to remain key inflationary drivers as prices continue to adjust to pre-crisis levels in USD terms. Between April 2024 and October 2024, the non-food SMEB rose by 16 percent, from USD 223 in April to USD 259 in October 2024. Displacement caused by the conflict further drove up rent costs, exacerbating inflationary pressures. Despite these increases, the non-food services SMEB in October 2024 remained 36 percent below its pre-crisis level of USD 403 per family in October 2019. As such, the nonfood services SMEB basket was expected to continue increasing in the upcoming projection period, similar to the previous period's trend.

### Gradual market recovery with persistent regional disparities

Market functionality across Lebanon is expected to gradually recover over the projection period, though challenges remain in areas heavily affected by the conflict. The cessation of hostilities has allowed for modest improvements in market access and operations, particularly in Bekaa and Baalbek-El Hermel, where humanitarian efforts and stabilization measures have begun to restore functionality. However, in districts in the south, such as El Nabatieh and Sour, recovery will likely remain slow due to significant infrastructure damage and ongoing security concerns near the border. Markets in less affected regions, such as Beirut and Mount Lebanon, are anticipated to maintain higher functionality during the projection period, supported by more resilient supply chains and better infrastructure. In contrast, market activity in the South and peripheral areas is expected to remain constrained by persistent logistical challenges, including damaged roads, elevated transportation costs, and disrupted supply chains. These factors will likely lead to continued price volatility for essential commodities in these regions.

Access to goods is projected to stabilize in most areas, with essential commodities remaining available despite higher transportation costs and localized supply chain inefficiencies. Prices for food and non-food items are anticipated to remain high but relatively stable compared to peak conflict levels, reflecting ongoing adjustments in supply chains and demand dynamics. The recovery of market functionality in the South will depend heavily on the pace of reconstruction and the clearance of debris, with access to key markets likely to remain partially restricted until at least February 2025.

Improvements in functionality are also expected to be uneven, with urban centers adapting more quickly due to better infrastructure and more established networks, while rural and conflict-affected areas will require targeted interventions to rebuild markets and stabilize supply chains.

The latest WFP nationwide Market Functionality Index Assessment of 1005 retailers, conducted in December 2024 following the ceasefire, already confirms those trends. Nationwide, an improvement in market functionality was observed between November 2024 and December 2024. The most notable monthly increase in the MFI score was in the governorates of Baalbek-El Hermel (2.1 to 6.8) and South (2.2 to 6.8). An improvement in the assortment of items sold at shops in El Nabatieh governorate resulted in a 2.8 monthly increase in the average score of the governorate, despite market functionality remaining low in the area (3.6). Solid market functionality was observed in the remaining governorates, building on healthy levels of assortment and availability of items as well as strong resilience of supply chains. Persisting issues with price predictability affected MFI scores in those regions. In addition, an improvement in the prevalence of shops that were regularly operational was noted, especially in regions that were most affected by the hostilities, with the greatest monthly increase in El Nabatieh (18 to 58 percent), South (34 to 82 percent), and Baalbek- El Hermel (61 to 86 percent).

### Continued uncertainty in Lebanon's governance structure likely to further delay the implementation of reforms

As Lebanon continues to grapple with the compounded effects of the economic crisis and the recent conflict escalation, the country remains entrenched in governance uncertainty. Given the available information and the highly fluid situation at the time of the analysis, the presidential vacuum, ongoing since October 2022, was expected to persist well into 2025, further exacerbating the political deadlock. However, a new President was elected on 9 January 2025, at the time of writing of this report, ending over two years of vacuum. Next steps now include nominating a new prime minister, the formation of a new government with full authority, the first time since the parliamentary elections in May 2022, and a vote of confidence in the parliament. Once those are completed, then both the government and the parliament will have full capacity to govern effectively and address the different needed critical decision and legislative actions, including tackling the growing number of vacancies in key leadership positions, and the implementation of reform package stipulated by the IMF staff-level agreement. As such, despite the recent positive development, the repercussions of the previous deadlock are expected to persist throughout the projection period.

In addition, no significant progress has been made on the reform package stipulated by the IMF staff-level agreement. As the new President was just elected and the formation of the new executive branch will take time, meaningful developments on this front are not anticipated in the short term. An IMF mission conducted in May 2024 noted that the implemented monetary and fiscal reforms, including steps to unify the multiple exchange rate, have helped reduce inflationary pressure, however the mission stated that these remain limited and "insufficient for significant recovery" without swift action. The IMF emphasized the need for comprehensive reforms to address Lebanon's severe financial crisis, which has been exacerbated by the recent conflict and ongoing political paralysis (IMF 2024).

### Increasing tensions amid ceasefire recovery and regional dynamics

Intercommunal tensions have continued to intensify throughout 2024, fueled by worsening economic vulnerabilities, declining services, and the prolonged impact of the conflict escalation[4]. These tensions have been exacerbated by diminishing humanitarian food assistance throughout 2024, prior to the conflict escalation, and reduced access to basic resources, placing additional pressure on vulnerable communities.

The ceasefire in Lebanon has shifted focus toward recovery, but competition over reconstruction efforts and resources could potentially ignite tensions both within Lebanon and across the border in Syria. As conditions in Syria remain

[4] According to the UNDP-led Tension Monitoring System (TMS), intercommunal relations further deteriorated throughout 2024, with nearly 40 percent of respondents in September 2024 reporting negative communal relations between Lebanese and Syrian refugees, compared to around 32 percent in April 2024. Competition for low-skilled jobs remains the most frequently cited driver of tensions, with 49 percent of respondents identifying it as a primary concern. Increasing competition for basic services and utilities (47 percent mentioned it), coupled with high levels of economic insecurity, has further strained relations between Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees.

precarious, discussions around the voluntary return of Syrian refugees have reignited debates, with host communities expressing growing frustration over prolonged displacement. However, many refugees remain hesitant to return due to security concerns and the lack of infrastructure or basic services in their areas of origin in Syria.

At the same time, intercommunal tensions over aid allocation and reconstruction priorities are likely to grow as resources are stretched thin. The perception of unequal aid distribution between Lebanese host communities, IDPs, and refugees could further exacerbate grievances. Moving into early 2025, these overlapping factors are expected to amplify tensions, threatening the fragile social cohesion in Lebanon as the country navigates its post-conflict recovery and its evolving relationship with Syria.

### A reduction in the level of assistance is expected to impact Lebanese, Syrian refugees, and Palestine refugees

Humanitarian food assistance (HFA) is projected to decline during the projected period starting January 2025, with reductions impacting all population groups due to funding constraints and limited programmatic capacities. These anticipated cuts, aligned with the latest assumptions, reflect a continuation of the challenges faced in previous periods, as assistance fails to meet increasing needs across vulnerable populations.

For Lebanese households, in-kind food assistance provided by WFP is expected to continue at current levels, supporting approximately 35,000 households throughout the projection period. However, no additional funding has been secured to expand emergency food assistance programs beyond December 2024. The Emergency Social Safety Nets (ESSN) program, which provides cash assistance to Lebanese households, is anticipated to continue at current levels throughout the projection period, as it approaches the end of its second loan. However, the Shock Responsive Safety Nets program, which was introduced by the Ministry of Social Affairs with support from WFP following the escalation of the conflict, was not expected to continue beyond January 2025, due to the lack of confirmed funding.

For Syrian refugees, following the recent increase in coverage starting November 2024 and the escalation of the conflict, reductions in HFA are expected to materialize again, with a projected cut of 30 to 40 percent in assistance levels starting February 2025. This decrease aligns with the broader funding shortfalls affecting aid agencies and reflects the growing gaps in the ability to sustain large-scale food assistance programs. The reduced coverage of the transfer values (TVs) compared to the recommended ones will further strain Syrian refugees' food security as they face declining purchasing power and increased vulnerabilities.

Multipurpose cash assistance programs for Palestine refugees in Lebanon (PRL) and Palestine refugees from Syria (PRS) remain dependent on the availability of funding, which has been decreasing steadily. For PRL households, a single cash transfer of USD 35 has been confirmed for the first quarter of 2025, while further assistance remains uncertain. For PRS households, no additional funding has been confirmed, and assistance levels are expected to remain minimal, further exacerbating vulnerabilities.

## LEBANESE RESIDENTS POPULATIONS IN NEED OF HUMANITARIAN FOOD ASSISTANCE (PINHA) PILOT ANALYSIS

The standard IPC population estimates are prepared for current and projection periods. The estimates for the current period include any potential effects of humanitarian food security assistance that has been provided in recent times. For the projection periods, analysts considered the information provided on planned, funded/committed and most likely assistance while classifying the severity of the situation and estimating the populations. In both cases, IPC population estimates either implicitly (current period) or explicitly (projection periods) consider assistance, and hence some households may face lower levels of food insecurity (and perhaps be in lower IPC phases) only thanks to the assistance provided.

Consequently, the standard IPC population estimates do not provide the total number of people in need of assistance, especially in a context where large-scale assistance is provided. To provide more information for decision-making, new protocols have been developed to estimate the total number of people in need of humanitarian food security assistance. These protocols were applied in the projection period analysis for Lebanese residents as a pilot in this analysis, for areas where the impact of assistance on food security is or is expected to be highly significant, i.e. at least 25 percent of households meeting at least 50 percent of their kcal needs through assistance.

During this round, a pilot of the PiNHA analysis was conducted for the first time in a Lebanon IPC analysis, covering the Lebanese resident population, and using the projection period analysis as a basis. The results of this pilot analysis indicate that 31 percent of the Lebanese resident population would be classified in Phase 3 or above (equivalent to around 1.2 million people) during the projection period of December 2024 – March 2025, versus 25 percent classified in Phase 3 or above in the regular IPC projection analysis for the same period.

The specific percentage of this pilot PINHA analysis for each unit of analysis are presented in the table below. For areas where HFA is not significant, the standard population estimates are treated as the PiNHA estimates. The PiNHA estimates are expected to assist agencies working on response to have a more complete set of data at their disposal when planning HFA programmes.

Table 1: PINHA analysis on a district level for Lebanese residents: December 2024 - March 2025

| Unit of analysis | Total population | Projection P3+ | Total population in P3+ | PINHA | P3+ PINHA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Akkar* | 300,872 | 45% | 135,392 | 60% | 180,523 |
| Aley** | 247,856 | 10% | 24,786 | 15% | 37,178 |
| Baabda** | 395,448 | 25% | 98,862 | 30% | 118,634 |
| Baalbek* | 196,679 | 45% | 88,506 | 60% | 118,007 |
| Bcharre | 21,077 | 5% | 1,054 | 5% | 1,054 |
| Beirut | 259,874 | 20% | 51,975 | 20% | 51,975 |
| Chouf | 220,561 | 15% | 33,084 | 15% | 33,084 |
| El Batroun | 53,638 | 5% | 2,682 | 5% | 2,682 |
| El Hermel* | 21,848 | 45% | 9,832 | 60% | 13,109 |
| El koura | 73,844 | 5% | 3,692 | 5% | 3,692 |
| El Meten | 405,417 | 10% | 40,542 | 10% | 40,542 |
| El Minieh-Dennie* | 123,550 | 40% | 49,420 | 55% | 67,953 |
| Hasbaya** | 20,812 | 20% | 4,162 | 25% | 5,203 |
| Jbeil | 120,050 | 5% | 6,003 | 5% | 6,003 |
| Jezzine | 27,508 | 5% | 1,375 | 5% | 1,375 |
| Kesrwane | 232,171 | 5% | 11,609 | 5% | 11,609 |
| Rachaya* | 31,951 | 20% | 6,390 | 25% | 7,988 |
| Saida* | 267,102 | 25% | 66,776 | 30% | 80,131 |
| Tripoli* | 202,015 | 40% | 80,806 | 55% | 111,108 |
| West Bekaa* | 68,667 | 30% | 20,600 | 40% | 27,467 |
| Zahle* | 140,960 | 30% | 42,288 | 40% | 56,384 |
| Zgharta | 73,168 | 15% | 10,975 | 15% | 10,975 |
| Cluster South (Nabatieh, Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun & Sour)* | 359,228 | 50% | 179,614 | 60% | 215,537 |
| **Total** | **3,864,296** | **25%** | **970,424** | **31%** | **1,202,212** |

* Districts where at least 25 percent of households are meeting at least 50 percent of their kcal needs through assistance

** Aley and Baabda had 23 percent of households meeting at least 50 percent of their kcal needs through assistance, while Hasbaya had 22 percent, and thus they were also considered as significant for the purpose of this PINHA pilot analysis

## IPC trends

Since the initial IPC analysis in Lebanon in September 2022, the number of individuals in urgent need of assistance (IPC Phase 3 or above) has consistently remained at or above one million. Food insecurity has primarily been driven by the prolonged effects of the economic crisis, and cuts to the HFA programmes. However, with the escalation of the conflict in September 2024, disruptions to the local economy such as trade, tourism and agricultural productions, displacement, and limited humanitarian access have emerged as significant compounding factors affecting directly, or indirectly food insecurity of most Lebanese and refugees in the country, as reflected in the latest IPC analysis.

The IPC analysis conducted in May 2023 reported 1.4 million individuals in IPC Phase 3 or above during the period of May to October 2023. In October 2023, the number of people in Phase 3 or above it went down to 1.05 million (19 percent). The present analysis conducted in November 2024 shows a stark increase of people in urgent needs of assistance to 1.59 million (29 percent) for the October and November (current period) and depicts a further deterioration to almost 1.65 million people in the projection period (December 2024 to March 2025). These trends are largely attributable to the residual impact of conflict on livelihoods and the slow return to normality for the hundred thousands that fled their homes between September and November 2024.

The population classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) notably increased from 74,000 (1 percent) in October 2023 to 85,000 (2 percent) in March 2024, reaching 205,000 (4 percent) in November 2024. This deterioration was mainly driven by worsening conflict, reduced humanitarian access, and persistent inflation despite some degrees of stability shown in terms of the exchange rate of the local currency. The substantial deployment of humanitarian assistance following the escalation of the conflict in late september 2024 —despite access constraints in some areas—has likely played a crucial role in mitigating the surge in needs that the country would have experienced without external support.

**Classification comparison with previous round**



# RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

## Response Priorities

**Situation Monitoring:** This report assumes a sustained ceasefire post-December 2024, leading to gradual improvements in humanitarian access and market functionality. However, the evolving conflict dynamics require continuous monitoring of displacement trends, tensions, and food insecurity indicators, especially in conflict-affected districts like South, El Nabatieh, and Baalbek-Hermel. A robust early warning system for economic shocks and tensions, particularly concerning the impacts on Syrian and Lebanese populations, is also essential.

**Lifesaving and humanitarian food assistance:** Immediate actions remain critical to address food consumption gaps for populations in Phase 3 or above. Humanitarian assistance should prioritize IDPs and returnees concentrated in high-conflict and hosting regions, ensuring sufficient food transfer values and supplies aligned with the updated SMEB and MEB costs. Particular emphasis should be placed on: i) sustaining food assistance levels for vulnerable populations, especially given reductions in aid to refugees and escalating costs of essential goods; ii) coordinating multi-sectoral humanitarian efforts, ensuring consistent supply chain operations to conflict-affected zones, and addressing gaps in aid caused by accessibility challenges. It remains crucial that humanitarian food assistance value is set based on needs and gaps.

**Social safety net systems:** Strengthening the capacity and funding of programs such as the AMAN/ESSN extension and SRSN is paramount to mitigate poverty among Lebanese households, especially following the removal of the last remaining subsidies and economic shocks from the conflict, on top of the protracted economic crisis. Technical support to unify and expand and target social protection programs is critical to ensuring equitable coverage and improved targeting, reducing duplication in assistance delivery as well as inclusion and exclusion errors.

**Livelihood assistance:** To stabilize fragile economic conditions, the scaling up of agricultural and non-agricultural livelihood interventions is critical. Recommendations include introducing employment schemes for IDPs and affected population to reduce dependency on humanitarian aid and foster resilience. As such, the scale-up of different livelihood support programs, becomes of the outmost importance, to ensure access to stable income sources and mitigate losses of purchasing power that the most vulnerable households face. Households have a multitude of essential needs that are competing with their food ones, and as such, strengthening their economy and resilience can position them to better tackle those needs while remaining food and nutritionally secure. Interventions targeting micro, small and medium enterprises and cooperatives are crucial for improved performance and expanded market access, which stimulate local markets and improve local economic growth.

**Agricultural support and recovery:** This is especially important as local agriculture has been greatly affected by the escalation of the conflict in the country, on top of other factors. It will be important to focus on rehabilitating agricultural lands and infrastructure damaged during the conflict prioritizing high-impact areas such as South, El Nabatieh, Baalbek-El Hermel, and Bekaa governorates. Priorities include:

- Supporting cash for work activities for the rehabilitation of agricultural infrastructure (land rehabilitation including debris removal, irrigation infrastructure, animal farms and shelters, as well as pastureland.
- Expansion of the asset creation and recovery programmes in agriculture especially in areas with high reliance on food from own production and in areas with high prevalence of households in IPC Phase 2 (Stressed) to protect already volatile livelihoods sources.
- Scaling-up of cash assistance to improve access of small-scale crop producers and livestock keepers to quality agricultural inputs (fertilizers, pesticides and seeds, feed, veterinary services).
- Facilitating access to agricultural inputs for farmers in conflict-affected regions and ensuring recovery programs for crop and livestock production.
- Supporting nation-wide livestock vaccination programs with high risk of contamination due to IDPs moving with their livestock to other areas.
- Scaling up assistance for crop diversification and climate-resilient farming techniques, particularly for communities more reliant on small scale farming.
- Providing support to livestock (small ruminants) re-stocking. It is paramount to assist farmers in enhancing their capacity for safe storage practices to prevent further depletion of assets and ensure continued market access. Given

the vital role of crops and livestock farmers play in ensuring food security, the absence of agricultural outputs can have significant repercussions.

**Support to recovery of food systems:** Food Systems Recovery is fundamental to addressing the impacts of the conflict on Lebanon's agricultural and food value chains in conflict affected areas, taking a comprehensive approach that integrates multiple components of the food system. Interventions aimed at the rapid restoration of food system functionality may include: support towards the rehabilitation food processing factories, storage facilities, market and supply infrastructure (e.g. feeder roads, food retailers, bakeries and other outlets of essential goods), in the form of in kind equipment and raw materials, as well as micro-grants or loans to conflict affected small and medium enterprises active in the agri-food system.

**Education and school feeding programs:** School-based feeding initiatives should expand, targeting both displaced and host community children to reduce dropouts and child labor. Linking these programs with local agricultural production will foster resilience and support economic recovery.

## Situation Monitoring and Update

- **Conflict:** The ceasefire, implemented on 27 November 2024, is set to expire on 26 January 2025. While there is optimism about its continuation, the possibility of renewed violence could further disrupt humanitarian access, displacement patterns, and overall food security, necessitating robust preparedness and contingency measures.
- **Political developments:** The election of a new president on 9 January 2025, has initiated a process of political transition, with the upcoming nomination of a new prime minister and the formation of a government pending parliamentary confidence. Monitoring this process is essential to evaluate its effects on governance, economic recovery, and the ability to stabilize social and humanitarian conditions. Any delays or challenges in forming the government could exacerbate the already fragile socio-political environment.
- **Humanitarian and social assistance:** The continuation of assistance cuts, including insufficient transfer values and limited funding for essential programs like SRSN and AMAN, combined with elevated costs of living, risks exacerbating food insecurity for vulnerable populations. The effectiveness of humanitarian interventions must be closely monitored to mitigate further deterioration in household food access and resilience.
- **Prices:** While informal exchange rate stability persists, market prices for staples and essential non-food commodities remain high due to multiple factors, including disrupted supply chains, elevated transportation costs, and inflationary pressures linked to the ongoing reconstruction efforts and continued dollarization. Any potential further internal or external shock might lead to further price increases, rendering prices of food staples and essential non-food commodities beyond manageable.
- **Non-food expenditures:** The continued adjustments of essential non-food services prices, due to the ongoing dollarization in the country, as well as any potential new tariffs that might be introduced, may further increase the stain on households' purchasing power and expenditures in the coming year.
- **Nutrition:** In addition, monitoring of malnutrition is also necessary. The results from the first ever Integrated Micronutrient, Anthropometric and Child development Survey already highlight areas for intervention and can help the Ministry of Health and Nutrition partners ascertain the opportunity to conduct an IPC Acute Malnutrition (AMN).

## Risk factors to monitor

- Increased inter-community tensions and refugee dynamics
- Security situation, border and regional developments
- Renewed currency depreciation and exchange rate evolution
- Inflation and commodity prices both on the local and international markets.
- Market functionality
- IDPs and displacement dynamics

# PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY

The IPC Acute Food Insecurity analysis was conducted for two time periods: 1) Current period: October 2024 – November 2024; 2) Projected period: December 2024 – March 2025. The analysis covered all 26 districts of the country. Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees have been analysed separately at the district level for 22 districts, while a unit of analysis was created clustering the districts of Sour, El Nabatieh, Bent Jbeil and Marjaayoun for both Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees separately. Palestine refugees were analysed as one unit of analysis at the national level including Palestine Refugees in Lebanon (PRL) residing in camps, PRL residing outside camps and in gatherings, and Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS). A two-day training was provided by IPC Global Support Unit (GSU) experts and the co-facilitators of the IPC analysis (in preparation for their IPC level 2 certification) on the 14 and 15 November 2024, and the analysis was conducted between 18 November and 4 December 2024.

Both the training and analysis were held in Beirut, Lebanon with a hybrid modality (both online and in-person). The workshop was attended by 65 experts including Technical Working Group (TWG) members and analysts from UN organizations, local and international NGOs, technical agencies, and governmental institutions. Members have local expertise which better supported in understanding the overall context to ensure a contextualized and accurate reflection of food insecurity needs in Lebanon. The data used in the analysis was organized according to the IPC analytical framework and entails food insecurity contributing factors, outcome indicators, and multiple secondary sources.

The main sources of data used for the analysis of outcome indicators included:

1. Lebanon Vulnerability Assessment / Lebanon Household Survey conducted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), and the World Bank and including data from January till May 2023;
2. Mobile Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping (mVAM) conducted by the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) with data from November 2023 till October 2024 for the Lebanese residents as per the below:

    a. Data from May till October 2024 for the following districts: Akkar, Baabda, Baablbek, Beirut, El Meten, El Minieh-Dennie, Saida, Tripoli, Zahle and the cluster of Bent Jbeil, El Nabatieh, Marjaayoun and Sour;

    b. Data from April till October 2024 for the districts of Aley and Chouf:

    c. Data from March till October 2024 for the district of West Bekaa;
3. Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA) by REACH/UNOCHA including data from July to September 2023;
4. The Vulnerability Assessment for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR) conducted jointly by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), UNHCR and WFP including data from June and July 2024;
5. Palestine refugees High Frequency Monitoring Survey conducted by The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) including data from March 2023.

Historical trends as per the IPC protocols were applied for the analysis of Lebanese residents in the following districts, using data from the mVAM between November 2023 and October 2024, LVAP and MSNA: Bcharre, El Batroun, El Hermel, El Koura, Hasbaya, Jbeil, Jezzine, Keserwane, Rachaya and Zgharta.

The review and contextualized Livelihoods Coping Strategies module has been utilized in this round of analysis, ensuring results are coherent with the Lebanon context. Humanitarian Food Assistance data was provided by the Food Security and Agriculture cluster with the support of all reporting partners.

Moreover, other data sources providing information regarding the food insecurity contribution factors have been included such as UNHCR protection monitoring for the second quarter of 2024; Overview of communal relations in Lebanon (Tension monitoring) conducted by UNDP; Monthly Market monitors by WFP; Market Functionality Index Assessment by WFP; Displacement Tracking Matrix by IOM; and Lebanon IPC Gender Study by OXFAM.

Assessing the levels and the broader mitigating effect of Humanitarian Food Assistance (HFA) is a key component of an IPC analysis, as IPC is a snapshot analysis and integrates all aggravating and mitigating factors relevant to the current and projected situation. The IPC protocols are not designed (nor should they be used) to assess or evaluate the impact of any humanitarian food assistance on food insecurity, or to monitor achievements towards program level goals.

HFA that can be considered for an IPC analysis includes direct resource transfers that aim to reduce food gaps, protect, and save lives and livelihoods. Only transfers that are intended to have an immediate positive effect on access to food were considered in the analysis.

## Limitations of the Analysis

The IPC analysis for this round faced several limitations, encompassing technical, procedural, and contextual challenges that influenced the depth and comprehensiveness of the findings. These limitations include:

**Evolving population figures and displacement dynamics:** The fluidity of population movements, both within Lebanon and across its borders, complicated the analysis. Discrepancies in population estimates, coupled with the absence of updated official figures, necessitated reliance on the population numbers endorsed by the LRP and inter-agency coordination systems. This decision, while pragmatic, underscores the inherent uncertainty in displacement and population data during such volatile periods.

**Data gaps in specific districts:** Limited sample size or timing of some data didn't allow to apply normal IPC protocols in certain districts. Alternative IPC protocols, such as historical trends or and clustering approach were considered to ensure a representative and reliable assessment. However, such adjustments may have influenced the granularity of findings for some regions specially for the clustered areas.

**Midway assumption adjustments:** The analysis spanned from 18 November to 4 December 2024, a period marked by the announcement of the ceasefire on 27 November2024. This last-minute development necessitated an update to the projection period assumptions on the day of the ceasefire, based on the limited information available at the time. The assumptions, particularly concerning displacement trends and the political deadlock, were reflective of the most recent data at that point. However, the highly fluid context made it challenging to anticipate how the situation would evolve, adding a layer of uncertainty to the projections.

**Hybrid participation challenges:** Due to the prevailing security situation in the country, analysis sessions were conducted in a hybrid format, with some participants attending in person and others joining remotely. This setup posed challenges during discussions, particularly in ensuring seamless communication and engagement for online participants, who sometimes faced difficulties following the dialogue and contributing effectively during the sessions and plenary meetings. The hybrid format and extended analysis timeline also impacted institutional participation. Some stakeholders faced challenges in dedicating consistent time and resources to the sessions, impacting the breadth of insights contributed during the analysis.

**Timing of outcome Indicator Data Collection:** Most outcome indicators were collected before the conflict escalation, thus not fully capturing the impact of events from late September to the end of November 2024 on food security. To address this gap, the analysis incorporated key contributing factor data collected during the conflict, including displacement trends, market functionality, economic impacts, and access to services, which enabled a robust inference to provide a reliable snapshot of food security situation for both current and projection periods.

Despite these limitations, the IPC TWG employed rigorous protocols and methodologies to ensure the analysis's reliability and relevance. Continuous monitoring and future IPC analyses will be critical in addressing these gaps and refining the understanding of food security dynamics in Lebanon.

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### What is the IPC and IPC Acute Food Insecurity?

The IPC is a set of tools and procedures to classify the severity and characteristics of acute food and nutrition crises as well as chronic food insecurity based on international standards. The IPC consists of four mutually reinforcing functions, each with a set of specific protocols (tools and procedures). The core IPC parameters include consensus building, convergence of evidence, accountability, transparency and comparability. The IPC analysis aims at informing emergency response as well as medium and long-term food security policy and programming.

For the IPC, Acute Food Insecurity is defined as any manifestation of food insecurity found in a specified area at a specific point in time of a severity that threatens lives or livelihoods, or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration. It is highly susceptible to change and can occur and manifest in a population within a short amount of time, as a result of sudden changes or shocks that negatively impact on the determinants of food insecurity.

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This analysis has been conducted under the patronage of the Ministry of Agriculture. It has benefited from the technical and financial support of the United Nations World Food Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organization in Lebanon.

Classification of food insecurity was conducted using the IPC protocols, which are developed and implemented worldwide by the IPC Global Partnership - Action Against Hunger, CARE, CILSS, EC-JRC , FAO, FEWSNET, Global Food Security Cluster, Global Nutrition Cluster, IFPRI, IGAD, Oxfam, SICA, SADC, Save the Children, UNDP, UNICEF, the World Bank, WFP and WHO.

### IPC Analysis Partners: