



JUNE HIGHLIGHTS:

Employment rates for Syrian refugees in the KRI appear, on average, to be higher than for displaced Iraqis and impacted communities. For example, in Erbil governorate 80% of male refugees aged between 15 and 64 are employed. This compares with rates of 53% for male IDPs and 70% for men from the host community. In Dohuk governorate, the employment rate for male refugees is 75%, compared with 63% for men from the host community and internally displaced men.

However, such figures should not be read to mean that refugees in general have more financial security than IDPs. Refugees do not have the benefit of access to elements of Iraqi state support that many IDPs do, such as grants made to displaced families, the Public Distribution System, and salaries for those with public sector jobs (which generally continue to be received, despite displacement). Reported figures for employment are based on samples and household surveys, and probably obscure under-employment.

The livelihoods vulnerabilities of Syrian refugees and impacted communities in Iraq in 2017 and beyond are multiple. If livelihoods opportunities do not improve, the debt vulnerability of refugees is likely to increase. Already, in 2015 and 2016, the largest share of refugees' average personal debt was incurred for domestic consumption costs, rather than the purchase of long-term assets as was the case for impacted communities. Compared with impacted communities and IDPs, refugees are still particularly vulnerable to exploitative and abusive employment practices. The very low levels of enrolment for refugees in secondary education limit the employment prospects of these refugees joining the workforce.

Furthermore, employment levels among women in general, and among young men, are much lower than the overall employment rates. Recent surveys indicate that in Erbil only 7.6% of women refugees are employed, compared with a rate of 16.4% for women in the impacted communities. In Erbil only 33% of young men (aged 15-24) in IDP, refugee and impacted communities are employed. For many refugees, the types of employment they find are low-paying and insecure. Half of employed refugees and IDPs in Dohuk governorate work in construction, and daily waged labour in agriculture is the second most common job for refugees and IDPs.

Beyond the present, there are risks and challenges for the coming years, regarding jobs and livelihoods for refugees and impacted communities. There is the risk that refugees become locked in a cycle of inferior access to services and inferior work and life opportunities. At the same time, there is the risk that resentment towards refugees and IDPs alike will increase, encouraged by erroneous and unchallenged assumptions about the capacity of the labour market to absorb new

By 30 June 2017, 242,558 Syrian refugees (79,573 households) live in Iraq:

- 97% = 234,262 live in Kurdistan Region-Iraq (KR-I): Erbil Duhok and Sulaymaniyah.
- 3% = 8,296 Live in other locations in Iraq.
- 62% = 150,585 live in non-camp/urban areas.
- 38% = 91,973 live in 9 camps (Basirma, Darashakran, Kawergosk, Qushtapa camps in Erbil, Domiz I and II, Akre, Gawilan camps in Duhok, Arbat Camp in Sulaymaniyah).



Women refugee started her small business sewing at home, with support from REACH.

Livelihoods Funding Status



NEEDS ANALYSIS:

The focus of livelihoods aid has previously been on emergency livelihoods support, for example through creating short-term work opportunities (often labelled cash-for-work) on small community projects, with efforts being made to shift to investing in sustained employment opportunities. The balance needs now to be the other way round, with the primary focus on generating sustained employment and livelihoods opportunities, and building the ability of refugees and impacted communities to generate opportunities and take advantage of them.

Livelihoods-linked social cohesion measures include integrating various groups along a single value-chain, promoting joint innovation or entrepreneurship, and fostering inter-community economic activity. Furthermore, the direct interventions will be undertaken to strengthening community-based social mechanisms, facilitating dialogue and mediation in communities identified to be most vulnerable to conflicts, and promoting inter-group interactions through community projects.

IRAQ RESPONSE INDICATORS: JUNE 2017

