ANALYSIS OF SOLUTIONS PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING IN URBAN CONTEXTS

Case studies from Nairobi-Kenya and Mogadishu and Baidoa-Somalia

ReDSS
Unlocking Protracted Displacement

Photo by: *©Axel Fassio - Local market in Garowe, Puntland, Somalia.*

ABOUT THE REGIONAL DURABLE SOLUTIONS SECRETARIAT (ReDSS)

The Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS) was created in March 2015 with the aim of maintaining a focused momentum and stakeholder engagement towards durable solutions for displacement affected communities in East Africa. ReDSS is composed of a core group of 12 NGOs: ACTED, CARE International, Concern World Wide, DRC, INTERSOS, IRC, Mercy Corps, NRC, OXFAM, World Vision, Refugee Consortium of Kenya, Save the Children International with IRC, NRC and DRC forming the steering committee. The Secretariat is not an implementing agency but a coordination and information hub acting as a catalyst and agent provocateur to stimulate forward thinking and policy development on durable solutions for displacement affected communities in East and Horn of Africa. It seeks to improve durable solutions knowledge and learning to inform better programing and policies. ReDSS research and analytical work is always conducted through a participatory process engaging displacement affected communities and experts to review and comment on findings from the onset.

ABOUT TANA COPENHAGEN

Established in 2006, Tana Copenhagen is a leading Danish consultancy company that specialises in providing advisory and technical services in the entire programme cycle to a range of clients consisting of bilateral donors such as Sida, Danida and DFID, multilaterals including the UN, World Bank and the EU, as well as a range of international NGOs. The primary areas of work are:

- Aid delivery in fragile states – from relief and stabilisation to reconstruction and development;
- Peace and security – with an emphasis on conflict prevention and ensuring that security is aligned with human rights;
- Civil society – with an emphasis on capacitating rights holders.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS

Area-Based Approach
An approach that defines an area, rather than a sector or target group, as the main entry point. Area-based approaches have three defining characteristics: they are geographically targeted, and adopt a multi-sectoral, participatory approach. All stakeholders, services and needs are mapped and assessed and relevant actors mobilized and coordinated within it. (ReDSS)

Durable Solutions
A durable solution is achieved when the displaced no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement. It can be achieved through return, local integration and resettlement. (IASC framework)

Early Solutions
Early solutions planning encompasses steps to build the self-reliance and resilience of refugees and host communities, as well as prepare refugees for future durable solutions, in the early stages of displacement. For the purposes of this report, the timeframe for "early solutions planning" covers actions that can be taken pre-displacement, as well as during the first 3 years of an influx of refugees. (ReDSS)

Host communities
The local, regional and national governmental, social and economic structures within which refugees live. (UNHCR)

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human – made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border. (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement)

Livelihoods
A combination of the resources used and the activities undertaken in order to live. Resources include individual skills (human capital), land (natural capital), savings (financial capital), equipment (physical capital), as well as formal support groups and informal networks (social capital). (DFiD)

Local Integration
Local integration as a durable solution combines three dimensions. Firstly, it is a legal process, whereby refugees attain a wider range of rights in the host state. Secondly, it is an economic (material) process of establishing sustainable livelihoods and a standard of living comparable to the host community. Thirdly, it is a social and cultural (physical) process of adaptation and acceptance that enables the refugees to contribute to the social life of the host country and live without fear of discrimination. (Fielden/UNHCR)

Protracted Displacement
Situation Situations where the displaced "have lived in exile for more than 5 years, and when they still have no immediate prospect of finding a durable solution to their plight by means of voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement". (UNHCR)

ReDSS Durable Solutions Framework
A rapid analytical tool to assess to what extent durable solutions have been achieved in a particular context. The Framework contains 30 indicators that relate to a) Physical Safety – protection, security and social cohesion/ b) Material Safety – access to basic services, access to livelihoods, restoration of housing land and property/ c) Legal Safety – access to documentation, family reunification, participation in public affairs, access to effective remedies and justice

Refugee
A person who "owing to well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country" (Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1A(2), 1951)

Resilience
Resilience is the ability of countries, communities and households to manage change, by maintaining or transforming living standards in the face of shocks or stresses – such as earthquakes, drought or violent conflict – without compromising their long-term prospects. (DFID) Urban resilience is increasingly being used to describe the attributes of the urban system that are needed to deal with environmental disasters, conflict and financial crises (Leichenko, 2011; Meerow et al., 2016).

Resettlement
The transfer of refugees from an asylum country to another State that has agreed to admit them and ultimately grant them permanent settlement. (UNHCR)

Reintegration
The achievement of a sustainable return to country of origin i.e. the ability of returnees to secure the political, economic and social conditions to maintain their life, livelihood and dignity. (Macrae/UNHCR)

Self-Reliance
The social and economic ability of an individual, household or community to meet basic needs (including protection, food, water, shelter, personal safety, health and education) in a sustainable manner and with dignity. (UNHCR)

Social Cohesion
The nature and set of relationships between individuals and groups in a particular environment (horizontal social cohesion) and between those individuals and groups and the institutions that govern them in a particular environment (vertical social cohesion). Strong, positive, integrated relationships and inclusive identities are perceived as indicative of high social cohesion, whereas weak, negative or fragmented relationships and exclusive identities are taken to mean low social cohesion. Social cohesion is therefore a multi-faceted, scalar concept. (World Vision)

Transitional Solutions
A framework for transitioning displacement situations into durable solutions, requiring a partnership between humanitarian and development actors, refugees and host communities, and the participation of local actors through area-based interventions. Transitional solutions seek to enhance the self-reliance of protracted refugees, IDPs and host communities alike. (ReDSS 2015)

Urban systems/ networks
Urban environments are complex systems, meaning that different networks and communities co-exist and interact at different moments and in different places. This interconnectedness means that work in one system, for instance economy and livelihood, affects other systems such as infrastructure and services or space and settlement (Campbell, 2016)

ACRONYMS

AS	Al-Shabaab
CAP	City Action Plan
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
DRA	Department of Refugee Affairs
EU	European Union
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
GoK	Government of Kenya
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDP	Internally Displaced Population
IGAD	The Intergovernmental Authority on Development
KII	Key Informant Interview
MCH	Maternal and Child Health
MHPSS	Mental Health and Psychosocial Support
NDP	National Development Plan
RAS	Refugee Affairs Secretariat
ReDSS	Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
VSLA	Village Savings and Loans Associations
USLA	Urban Savings and Loans Associations
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

INTRODUCTION

This study, conducted between November 2017 and January 2018, explores progress made in 'solutions-oriented' responses to urban displacement in the Horn of Africa, building on ReDSS previous Solutions analyses[1] and Early Solutions studies[2] that recommended to further investigate solutions in urban context. The cases studied included refugees in Nairobi, Kenya and IDPs and refugee-returnees in Mogadishu & Baidoa in Somalia. Stepping off of a series of well-established principles for effective urban response; combined with equally well-articulated recommendations for what constitutes good solutions-oriented programming in displacement crises, the study explored three lines of questioning: what is the current situation for these displacement affected populations, what is being done about this and what could be improved. Comparing and contrasting the actual response to both the realities of the affected population and the theoretical principles of 'good practice', recommendations for adaptations are made with the aim of continuing to improve solutions-oriented results in urban displacement crises in the Horn of Africa.

OBJECTIVE AND RATIONALE

This study aimed to better understand and address displaced people's vulnerabilities and aspirations in urban centres and to challenge practitioner's assumptions to rethink support for displaced people in urban centres in more sustainable and empowering ways, using people centred approaches. As such, it was constructed around three core questions:

1. **What is the current situation:** This line of questioning explored the lived experiences, including the vulnerabilities and aspirations of urban refugees and host populations in Nairobi and both long and short-term IDPs, refugee-returnees, and host communities affected by forced displacement in Mogadishu and Baidoa.
2. **What is being done:** This line of questioning explored the response assumptions, logic, strategies and action of a range of actors including humanitarian, development, authorities, the affected communities themselves, as well as private sector and diaspora vis-a-vis the challenges to and opportunities for effective collective solutions-oriented responses.
3. **What can be done differently:** This line of questioning explored how the learning from the above can be applied at the operational level in order to adapt current-day action to improve the impact of solutions-oriented programming in urban displacement crises.

METHODOLOGY

A steering committee composed of IRC, NRC, OXFAM, World Vision, INTERSOS, Samuel Hall provided overall strategic direction, oversight and technical guidance to the research process. A literature review was conducted during the inception period, in which some of the core principles and best-practices of urban response and some of the latest analysis of 'solutions-oriented' programming were extracted. This informed the basis for the empirical data collection process, which adopted a micro-level lens.[3] Kenya and Somalia were selected as case-studies. In Nairobi, the researcher engaged with refugees and host populations while in Mogadishu and Baidoa, a range of displacement affected populations including hosts, refugee-returnees, newly arriving IDPs, and IDPs facing protracted displacement were drawn into the process. In total, 130 interviews were conducted with 260 individuals. This included: 22 interviews conducted at the regional/global level (largely by skype), 56 interviews conducted in Nairobi and 52 interviews conducted in Somalia.[4] The preliminary findings and recommendations were reviewed through two validation workshops, one in Baidoa and one in Nairobi.

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

Although the findings of this study are embedded within the larger reality, in prioritizing a micro-level perspective and a perceptions-based analytic approach, this study does not focus on the macro-level policy environment. This study builds on extensive research done to date on both urban issues and solutions-oriented response. To maintain a relatively comprehensive overview, many of these threads are referenced, but not all are explored in depth. The study was designed to be highly participatory, taking a bottom-up, qualitative, perceptions-based approach. While generating rich detail and nuance, such processes are time consuming. Further, the rigour of such studies is achieved through 'triangulation' and 'direct observation'. In this sense, the urban realities themselves created challenges for the study. Being dispersed among the local host population, urban displaced populations are comparatively difficult to access in situ. Security constraints, especially in Somalia, further limited the opportunities for direct observation.[5] Thus, given the methodology and the breadth of issues explored, the time-frame for the study was limited. Moreover, given the different political contexts of Kenya and Somalia and the varied characteristics and experiences of the displacement affected populations the case studies comparisons are often drawn at a broader level.

THEORY OF CHANGE

The urbanization of displacement is on the rise. Being perpetuated by a complex inter-play between conflict, poverty and climate change, urbanization is increasingly becoming central for operational actors. It has called traditional ways of working into question.[6] In the absence of political solutions, the global response to displacement crises has long tended to rely almost exclusively on humanitarian action. The inadequacies of the 'care and maintenance' strategies are well recognised,[7] with a shift to 'social cohesion and self-reliance' being widely recommended.[8] Indeed, with poverty being recognised as concentrated especially in protracted humanitarian crises,[9] which also tends to feature large-scale displacement, displacement is now seen as 'both a humanitarian and a development challenge',[10] or more specifically 'primarily a development and political challenge with humanitarian elements'.[11] As such, a wide range of actors are now called upon to collaboratively combine development, human rights, peace & security, and disaster risk reduction strategies to tackle urban displacement crises.[12] Importantly, there is also an ever-more explicit commitment of 'working towards solutions from the outset' of such crises.[13] This section briefly sketches the specificities of urban response and solutions-oriented programming, establishing the conceptual frame for the study.

Urban Response[14]

With 60% of the global refugee caseload being located in urban centres,[15] working effectively in such contexts is critical. Although these urbanization rates are not necessarily reflected in the Horn of Africa due to widespread encampment policies, Kenya nevertheless hosts some 65,000 urban refugees (or 13% of its total refugee population).[16] In Somalia, the urbanization of Internally Displaced Populations (IDPs) is a significant trend.as seen in Somalia. With the country hosting over 2 million displaced individuals, including both newly and protracted internally displaced, refugee-returnees and some refugees,[17] the primary internal displacement tend is from rural to urban centres.

Responses to urban displacement crises need to be fundamentally different than the traditional rural or camp responses. This is due to the 'distinctive' characteristics of urban contexts that include: the scale; density; economic systems and livelihood strategies; resource availability; and governance systems.[18] Formal governance, economic, technical, infrastructural and social systems are more complex and inter-mingled; there is greater social diversity and relatively less social cohesion, due to populations being dispersed and people having higher levels of mobility than in rural areas.[19] Therefore urban settings generate distinct operational opportunities and challenges, calling for distinct approaches.

During the past 10 to 15 years, recommendations have emerged regarding effective response, detailing how these particular characteristics of urban settings can be best capitalised upon to ensure maximum impact. Some of the key strategic approaches include:

- **Collaborative Approach:**[20] and the need to work with large and diverse network of stakeholders and systems, with strategic engagement with municipal authorities being especially highlighted.[21] In developmental contexts, it is stressed that the state should play the lead role in such approaches.
- **'Whole of Society' Approach:**[22] which, although state-centric, also seeks to draw upon a far wider spectrum of actors who could contribute to solutions-oriented responses, including local and municipal authorities as well as Civil Society,[23] the private sector[24] and others.
- **Area-Based Approach:** comprising people-centred, multi-actor, multi-sectoral approaches designed to capitalize upon the strengths and opportunities (and mitigate the challenges and threats) that are unique to the given area, all of which are identified through careful local analysis.[25]
- **Use of existing systems:** reflecting a shift away from 'direct provision of services' towards supporting and investing in existing infrastructure & capacity to create mutually beneficial impact.[26]
- **Adaptive Management Approach:** which fosters creative bottom-up problem solving[27] and responsiveness to the complex and dynamic contexts,[28] enabling responders to capitalize upon emerging opportunities.[29] In addition to changes in programme design, this also calls upon donors to devise more flexible multi-year funding mechanisms.[30]

Urban displaced tend to organize themselves in distinctly different ways than rural displaced. Typically dispersed and merged with the urban poor, both host and displaced populations risk being marginalised and excluded from essential services.[31] Thus, urban displacement operational strategies should aim to:

- Generate a 'mutual benefit': for both hosts and displaced populations.[32]
- Merge humanitarian and developmental logic from the outset[33]
- Restore 'autonomy'[34] through self-reliance and resilience strategies, as opposed to simply 'addressing needs'.[35]

Recognising that 'well-being' is a far broader concern than simply economic,[36] insight into the experiences and aspirations of displacement affected populations in urban settings is critical to contribute to a more holistic experience of dignity.[37] This softer aspect calls for more proactive:

- Incorporation of the principles of participation and accountability:[38] and more proactive inclusion of these 'likely-to-be marginalized groups' into city planning and policy-making processes.[39]
- Support to 'bottom-up', community-based and 'auto-generated' solutions.[40]
- Integration of peace-building logic:[41] and the proactive promotion of micro-level social cohesion[42] to overcome host populations' fears of increased competition;[43] or xenophobia.[44]

Underpinning all of this is the need for more comprehensive and nuanced analysis by the operational teams. Capitalising upon opportunities within an operational context requires an in-depth understanding of the local realities[45] and of both the vulnerabilities and capacities of displacement affected populations.[46] All responses to urban displacement crises must be forward looking, constantly seeking to build towards durable solutions.

Durable Solutions[47]

Technically, a durable solution is achieved when displaced persons 'no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement'.[48] This includes the three options of:[49]

- return and sustainable reintegration at the place of origin;
- sustainable local integration in areas where the displaced take refuge; and
- relocation and sustainable integration in a third location[50]

The IASC Framework for Durable Solutions for IDPs points out that the achievement of these solutions, which is seen as a process in which displacement-specific needs are gradually reduced, requires that a number of conditions be progressively put in place.[51] In efforts to operationalise this framework, the Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS) has developed a 'solutions framework' for displacement affected communities.[52] It organises the IASC criteria into the three themes of:

- Physical Safety: highlighting protection, safety and security, and social cohesion;
- Material Safety: highlighting adequate standards of living, access to economic opportunities, and restoration of housing land and property; and
- Legal Safety: highlighting access to documentation, family reunification, participation in public affairs, access to effective remedies and justice.

Solutions-oriented programming aims at the progressive restoration of these conditions, building the potential for displaced individuals to restore their lives and move beyond their displacement experience. Importantly, when considered through a perceptions-based lens, the idea of what constitutes a durable solution varies significantly according to perspective.[53] While authorities typically focus on 'return to the place of origin', the preference from the perspective of the displaced individual tends largely to be local integration.

A recent IRC/ReDSS study on early solutions[54] underlines the fact that despite 'the unlikelihood of return or resettlement in the early stages of displacement', it is typically the case that 'solutions planning is most commonly initiated after displacement becomes protracted'.[55] As such, more than 80% of the world's refugees exist in a state of protracted displacement, and this is especially so in the Horn of Africa.[56] This continues to be so, despite the recognised shift away from 'care and maintenance' to 'social cohesion and self-reliance' strategies.[57]

Indeed, emphasizing that 'IDPs should not have to wait until a conflict is fully resolved or all impacts of a disaster have ceased before they can begin rebuilding their lives', Dr. Kaelin, as the UN Special Advisor on Internally Displaced Persons in Somalia, stresses that steps must be taken to support IDPs to 'move toward achieving self-sufficiency and improving their living conditions pending ultimately finding durable solutions'.[58] He expressly states that 'those who do not want to return to their place of origin should be supported to find durable solutions through local integration or permanent settlement elsewhere in the country'.[59] It is emphasized that change 'requires political resolve, long-term investments and a multi-sectorial rights and needs based programming' in order to both prevent further forced displacement as well as to support countries and communities that host refugees 'to improve asylum space, integrated access to services, inclusive economic opportunities and infrastructure for all'.[60] Politically, the 2016 New York Declaration on addressing large movements of refugees and migrants[61] and the 2017 Nairobi Declaration on Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees and reintegration of returnees[62] are important political milestones for re-focusing attention on protracted crises. The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) which is seen as the means

for bringing these declarations to life,[63] and the Global Compact on Refugees which is seen as means through which international solidary and response can be strengthened,[64] are important macro-level mechanisms for operationalizing commitments made in the Declarations.

More operational is the IGAD plan of action,[65] within which a monitoring mechanism has been developed, with respondents reporting that 'the region has taken this very seriously andan important momentum has been established'. However, operational actors stress that the thinking must go beyond 'business as usual' with new ways of working being tested and refined to ensure that displacement is addressed differently. As such, there is a concentrated intent to capitalize upon these macro-level processes and commitments 'to work towards solutions from the outset of a refugee situation',[66] with emphasis being placed on 'early solutions planning' and the importance of prioritizing self-reliance and resilience of both refugees and IDPs.[67]

Solutions-oriented programming is grounded in the intent to reduce barriers to displacement affected populations' efforts to strengthen their resilience and to strengthen progress towards achieving the conditions necessary for bringing the displacement crisis to an end. It aims to find 'interim, transitional solutions that can pave the way for durable solutions to be reached'.[68] Recalling the section above, it is reiterated that this must be done through engagement with local government, other operational actors and the private sector,[69] while enhancing humanitarian-development collaboration, and including peacebuilding efforts.[70]

CHAPTER 1: WHAT IS THE CURRENT SITUATION?

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This chapter sketches some of the key elements impacting on the lived experiences of people affected by urban displacement. Considered especially through the perspective of refugee and host populations in Nairobi and IDPs, refugee-returnee and host populations in Baidoa and Mogadishu, it explores the experiences of physical, material and legal safety (according to the ReDSS solutions framework[71]) and particularly explores the relationships between displaced people and their hosts, especially in relation to the notion of 'social cohesion'.

PHYSICAL & LEGAL SAFETY IN URBAN DISPLACEMENT

Displacement is a primary means that people at risk adopt in efforts to keep themselves safe. As such, the level of safety they experience within their place of refuge is a critical consideration. However, the idea of protection, from the perspective of displaced populations is relative. Often having fled deadly threats, lower level threats, even if serious, are often dismissed. This section explores experiences of physical safety from the perspective of the urban displaced in both Somalia and Nairobi.

Somalia

IDMC notes that in Somalia 'conflict and violence, slow and sudden-onset natural and environmental hazards, food and livelihood insecurity, weak governance and underdevelopment all play a part in perpetuating the displacement cycles'.[72] Despite the intensive rural to urban displacement trend, with many respondents explaining that this is driven by the search for greater security, the protection environment remains very precarious. Even in urban contexts, significant protection risks abound, with sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) being highly prevalent.[73] Indeed, agreed that urban IDPs are especially exposed to insecurity, a group of Mogadishu host respondents reported that they are vulnerable to SGBV 'due to their poor shelter conditions'. Land issues and forced evictions in urban centres have emerged as a critical protection issue that imposes devastating consequences in the lives of displaced populations through perpetuating cycles of displacement.[74] Further, risks occurring within the domestic environment are high, with domestic violence, child forced labour, early and forced marriages and denial of basic rights such as education being widely noted. Many also highlighted concerns about forced recruitment,[75] allegedly carried out by both Al-Shabaab (AS) and Government Forces, reporting that avoiding this risk was an important factor pushing people to flee the rural areas, while equally preventing the likelihood of returns. So how does protection work for urban displaced?

Legal Safety

If Human Rights, as an articulation of legal protection, are understood as the state being the primary duty bearer and the citizen being the rights holder, the limited capacity of the Somali state makes the realization of rights problematic.

Although the central role of national and local authorities in addressing internal displacement is very well established,[76] limited state capacity was repeatedly underlined during this study, also by government respondents themselves.[77] For example, stating that 'the government has limited capacity to deliver basic services' a local analyst[78] asked 'who are IDPs going to complain to about their rights'? Management of land issues is yet another example of these shortfalls.

Housing, land and property rights are critical in the Somali displacement crisis. Insecure access to land has emerged as a central protection issue for displaced populations, with some stating that without addressing the core issue of land, 'nothing will change, we will just keep repeating cycles of re-displacement'.[79] In this, many commented that 'the government has limited capacity to ensure adequate land for the IDPs due to lack of land regulations'. Suggesting that 'the power is with the land owner', local authorities are seen as unable to regulate land issues. As such, it was widely suggested that the most feasible avenue for addressing this issue is to focus energies at the policy and legislative levels, with calls for international actors to push for improved laws.

The state bears the primary duty to protect its citizens and should be supported to take leadership role through continuous capacity strengthening.

Physical Safety

The fact that people's experience of insecurity is relative, is especially evident in relation to physical safety. Despite describing inadequate shelters and consequent exposure to physical threat, a leader of new IDPs settlement in Baidoa quickly dismissed these threats as something little compared to what they had fled, asserting that 'we are safe here'. Similarly, despite 'sleeping in the streets', a woman in Mogadishu who had just been 'evicted' from a demolished IDP settlement, reported that 'there is no problem as the police patrol at night hence there are no other risks'. While this reflects an extreme capacity for tolerance, it also reflects the adaptability to the local reality. For example, one observer in Mogadishu reported that 'the police are present, they don't work intensively, but they have some impact through their presence. They cause some deterrence'. Accepting the limited capacity of the security sector in Somalia this woman wasted no energy on aspirations. More concretely, NGO support in Baidoa has led to the development of three new police stations in strategic locations. Claiming that 'people have good relations with the police', the Mayor said that 'now the police can help to maintain security'. However, the expectations still remain very low. With a group of IDPs describing the police as 'ok' because 'they don't bother us, they don't violate our rights', positive protection is beyond their expectations. More fundamentally, people report a far greater reliance on their traditional leaders. Recalling that Somalia has been without formal institutions for years, the Chairperson of the community elders in Baidoa explained that traditional governance institutions have long been filling the gaps left by the formal government. Many respondents agreed that they are solidly mandated by their communities to resolve local conflict and disputes.

Kenya

While the state capacity and formal systems are in place in Nairobi, restrictive policies and difficulties with documentation leave urban refugees vulnerable. Previous research indicates that women and younger girls and boys are especially at risk of physical and sexual violence, abuse and exploitation both in the public and domestic spheres.[80] It is also noted that some elements within the police force are a source of harassment to refugees in Eastleigh with many reporting that regardless of their legal status' they were regularly 'victims of verbal, physical and sexual violence' as well as being 'systematically threatened with detention and targeted for extortion'. These trends continue today.

Legal Safety

For the majority of Nairobi refugees involved in this study, documentation was the central concern. While the Kenyan Refugee Affairs Secretariat (RAS) indicates that the refugee's documents are 'the first line of protection for refugees in Kenya', refugees report significant vulnerability associated with inadequate documentation.[81] While experts indicate that refugees should be receiving their basic documents within a six-month period, the reality is that at least 60% of the refugees interviewed reported having either expired documents or 'appointment papers' indicating that their case is pending with either UNHCR and/or the RAS. This is seen by many as leaving them exceptionally vulnerable to police harassment.

Physical Safety

Problems with the police, including harassment, demands for bribes, arrests and detention are often connected to lack of documentation. However, while inadequate documentation leaves refugees open to such exploitation, countless respondents underlined that despite the status of their documents, they are still vulnerable to harassment. Agreeing that 'it is common that police ask the refugees for documents', an Eritrean respondent in Jamhuri estate added that 'even if you have good documents, they just tell you to go back to the camps'. A confident young Somali man who speaks English very well also observed that 'the police especially harass the people who don't speak Kiswahili or English. These people always struggle to defend themselves'. Others reported that 'the police especially take advantage of the poor refugees, whom they easily capture and release only when they pay' Great Lakes refugees report relatively similar experiences. However, also reporting security problems which stem from their country of origin, they systematically indicated that they do not go to the police, underlining a lack of trust. Stating that the police believe that 'we as refugees are bringing problems into their country', they concluded that 'they will do nothing when we report a case'. Moreover, many pointed to the risk of being arrested themselves.

The issue of the notion of 'protection' being relative is again highlighted. Despite this harassment, refugees widely indicated that they had come to Nairobi for the security. Somali refugees for example stated that 'one of the greatest values of being in Nairobi is the security'. When asked about the apparent contradiction, respondents again dismissed the local harassment as 'something small', explaining that 'harassment is our daily activity, but at least we are not being killed every day'. There is nevertheless, little trust in the formal system for positive protection. Refugees are far more inclined to rely upon internally generated protective strategies. This reflects earlier research, which suggests that effective protection is heavily influenced by 'individuals' choices and positions in social and institutional networks', arguing that 'invisibility and a form of silent integration is often a conscious and more effective protection strategy'.[82]

Indeed, avoidance emerges as the primary auto-protection tactic that people described, as indicated by a Burundian man who said that 'I always try to avoid the police; if they know you are a refugee, they will just try to arrest you'. A group of Somali refugees explained that 'all day we live in fear of the police, we must stay very attentive looking out for security personnel, so after 6:00 PM we must just stay in our homes'.[83] These strategies typically draw upon the collective effort, relying on good communication channels within their community.[84] Alternatively, the challenge is confronting but mitigating the risks, with an elderly Somali man explaining that 'I always carry something extra in my pocket in case the police will take whatever they can get'. The objective is to escape the problem while paying the smallest bribe possible. However, in both cases, while physical safety is aided, these strategies undermine material well-being.

MATERIAL SAFETY IN URBAN DISPLACEMENT

According to the ReDSS Solutions framework, material safety concerns access to basic services, economic opportunities and housing land and property issues. The household level economies of the majority of urban refugees and IDPs in the contexts studied are based on a complex combination of informal activities.[85] They typically draw upon a diversity of largely cash-based subsistence activities to patch a household income together. The core activities, including casual wage labour and 'self-employment' initiatives, are similar across all three contexts, and are inherently unreliable. Quite predictably, they include hairdressing, beauty and cosmetics, house cleaning and laundry services and small-scale hawking for women. Men typically engage in physical labour, mechanics, construction, tailoring, crafts and hospitality services, according to what is available.[86] Supplementing this are remittances, support through religious institutions, borrowing and credit and stop-gap community-based social safety nets, all discussed further below. Expenses, which typical exceeding the collective household income, are necessarily made elastic, with one poor host respondent in Baidoa explaining that 'I spend according to what I have each month'. While rent, food and school fees are seemingly fixed costs, actual expenditures may vary according to funds available.

Community solidarity & remittances – important in all contexts studied

A multitude of factors converge at the household level to make it difficult for a large part of displacement affected populations in urban settings to establish and maintain self-reliance. Bureaucracy, lack of information, and language barriers combine to restrict their ability to claim entitlements, to access basic services, or to capitalize upon opportunities. Nevertheless, recent research indicates that 'even under the most challenging constraints, people find ways to engage in creative problem-solving',[87] with social safety-nets and remittances being some of the most fundamental expressions of this. A strong 'community collective' is apparent in all contexts studied and among essentially all of IDP and refugee groups who participated in this study. Such solidarity is especially apparent in the case of Somali refugees, with respondents describing a strong cultural tradition of 'helping someone else to succeed if you have been able to succeed'. In this spirit, it is widely reported that 'the Somali refugees collect together, they work together and they tend to help each other to do well'. This is critically important as a social safety-net. For example, when a single woman with four children was locked out of her house because she had failed to pay the rent, her neighbours did a community collection and paid the rent owing. Rather than expecting to be repaid, this support is seen as a means of building 'social capital', reflecting the logic that 'today I help, because tomorrow I might be in need'. While other refugee groups describe similar solidarity mechanisms, the inevitable limitations of these mechanisms in such circumstances is also highlighted, with some noting that 'in difficult times, everyone wants only to look after themselves'. Very similar sentiments were expressed by respondents in Somalia. As such, remittances emerge as another social safety-net.

Remittances have long been identified as an important element in displacement economies.[88] These mechanisms are clearly very familiar in both Somalia and with most refugee groups in Nairobi,[89] being especially associated with people who have relatives' over-seas. Noting that 'Somalis are everywhere in the world now', a Community Leader explained that 'you can just call a relative as this is very common and part of the Somali culture. People will quickly send 50-100 USD'. Similar indications are made in Somalia, as well as by Southern Sudanese, Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi, who also report many relatives' over-seas. Also, important in each of these latter communities, is significant support availed through religious institutions as is evidenced in the household economy details available in annex 2B. Nevertheless, the feasibility to work to establish self-reliance remains a central concern, and this plays out differently in each context.

Kenya

From a policy perspective, the right to work is widely considered as critical to supporting refugees in establishing self-reliance. Despite employment rights of refugees being relatively clearly articulated legally,[90] they are typically only minimally realised at the domestic level.[91] In the case of Nairobi, there is a lot of discussion about the right to work, which implicitly highlights access to formal sector employment. However, with the 2006 Kenya Refugee Act stating that refugees are 'subject to the same restrictions as are imposed on persons who are not citizens of Kenya',[92] a 'Class M' work permit is required, which is granted in line with the 2011 Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act.[93] In this refugees require official documentation. However, as alluded to above, it has long been recognised that many refugees lack the official documents that they need to obtain work permits.[94] This was again resoundingly re-iterated in this study.

In terms of economic opportunities, these document-related constraints limit refugees to the informal sector. However, depending on definitions and sources, the informal sector accounts for between 35 to 70% of employment in Kenya as a whole.[95] As such, noting that 'formal employment is too difficult to get due to lack of formal papers', a number of operational respondents question the focus on obtaining formal work permits, rather stressing the pragmatics of working effectively within the informal sector. They suggest that 'self-employment in the informal sector is a more realistic avenue to pursue. However, even this is limited by local dynamics, with the County Council reportedly imposing regulations that especially force refugee women doing petty-trade (e.g.: as seen in Eastleigh) out of marketable spaces. Refugee respondents facing this problem reported that 'if the County Council catches us 'hawking', they will confiscate all of our stock and make us pay a fine before returning it'.[96] Refugees are often unwilling to report this cases for fear of further victimisation.. Explaining that 'they think we are a threat to their security', these women speculated that 'the County Council would say that they are assuring the security by regulating the business environment'. This harassment has imposed significant limitations on especially the lowest level of subsistence traders, with avoidance strategies causing them to limit the areas and times they work so as to dodge these authorities, while limiting their

income potential.

In a similar line, Refugee Community Leaders also reported that 'we do not go directly to the County Council', with some explaining that while 'a relationship does exist with the County, it is not a strong one' adding that 'neither side has been very willing or interested in this'. They systematically stated that when they have problems they would rather go directly to UNHCR, RAS or NGOs. Nevertheless, some suggested that NGOs could play a role in strengthening the dialogue with municipal actors, adding that they had already asked NGOs to do so, 'but none have responded'. From the other perspective, personnel within the County Council indicated that for the most part, refugees do not make use of their services, suggesting that if they do come to their offices, they don't identify themselves as refugees. They claimed that the refugees isolate themselves, failing to engage with their local environment. At the same time, the relationship between the refugee and host populations also plays an important role in this. While these vary significantly from one sub-context to the next, it was fairly widely noted by refugees that 'the host population blames refugees for a lot of things', with a group from Great Lakes stating that 'they say that we make things in the market expensive, that we have caused hunger here in Kenya and that we are taking their jobs'. Indeed, this was especially evident in Ruiru, where large Southern Sudanese and Ethiopian refugee populations are hosted. Here a host respondent indicated that the relationships remain good 'as long as they don't do anything to disturb us and they comply with the rules', adding that 'the refugees should conduct themselves like we do it here'. At the same time, refugees in the area reported that they 'fear that the Kenyans will kick them out if they try to compete', stating that 'the refugee businesses that have been tried here have collapsed due to the competition and have caused a lot of tensions, so now people don't try for businesses'. As such, refugees in the area exist in a distinctly 'insular' and relatively passive manner.

In Eastleigh, while there is very strong solidarity among the Somali refugee and the Somali-Kenyans who also inhabit that area, there is distinct resentment among at least some of the non-Somali Kenyans. A kiosk-owner for example noted somewhat resentfully that Somali refugees are now kiosk owners 'because their families give them money', adding that because of this family support, 'refugees can sell things at a cheaper price, we can't compete with their prices'. He further lamented that 'because they have money, they don't complain about high prices, they just pay and this makes all the prices in the market go up. The cost of living has become very difficult because of these refugees'. Others agreed that 'hosts resent that refugees distort the market', with a local NGO respondent explaining that 'if the daily rate for wage-labour is 400 KSH/day and refugees accept to do the same work for 200 KSH/day, this causes problems for the livelihoods of the local poor'. This reflects expert observations that displaced people are not necessarily the most vulnerable urban residents.[97] It also sheds light on just how inter-mingled the refugee and especially poor host populations are in urban settings and the high risks for discord, with many respondents noting that 'the common circumstance of the local poor and the refugees creates tensions because they are competing over the same opportunities'.[98] This is particularly evident among the youth. For example, pointing out that unemployment rates among urban Kenyan youth are as high as 80%, professional observers underlined the inevitable competition and thus resentments growing between Kenyan and refugee youth populations. These dynamics play out differently in Somalia, especially due to different identity and solidarity dynamics.

Somalia

Given that the vast majority of the displacement affected population in Somalia are Somali nationals, the issues of formal documentation and the legal right to work are far less limiting. Moreover, given the more extreme levels of under-development and the more fundamental lack of economic and resource opportunities, combined with relatively persistent levels of acuity, meaningful opportunities for local communities, whether hosts or displaced, are even more scarce. As such, NGOs play a far more direct role in influencing the household economy (e.g.: through unconditional cash transfers) and access to essential services (e.g.: through direct provision of services). Moreover, competition for scarce resources thus plays out very differently.

Housing, land and property

As indicated above, access to land and housing is a critical issue in the displacement crisis in urban centres in Somalia. Pointing to 'continuous evictions' as a major challenge, many respondents argued that durable solutions are not possible in these urban settings without reliable access to land. Adding that 'durable solutions require stability of residence', others underlined that 'we can only think of local integration if we think about stopping these forced evictions. With housing certainty, people could become integrated into the local context, they could then go to seek daily labour and become independent, but without that, they are struggling every day'. However, as alluded to above, while landlord/rental agreements are regularly being revoked and IDP settlements are regularly destroyed, the government has been limited in protecting the basic rights of the affected populations. Indeed, respondents suggested that the problem of forced evictions is 'becoming rampant', with some suggesting that this could become an even bigger concern in Baidoa than what is already seen in Mogadishu. Particularly highlighting the uncertainty provoked by insecure land tenure, one analyst asked 'without a reliable residence and without shelter stability, what can people do'? He stressed that 'people don't know what the next day holds, they have no assurances, they have no certainty, and they cannot think of a future, they are constantly focused on immediate survival concerns'. Another analyst pointed out, 'people's self-reliance is constantly undermined as there is always a new crisis which pushes people backwards six months. Indeed, such repeated displacement progressively erodes the independent capacity of those affected on many levels.

More broadly, with self-reliance being undermined, these people are increasingly forced to seek more direct support from the host population (e.g.: direct hosting), drawing even more heavily on the above described solidarity mechanisms, which themselves are becoming eroded. With IDPs in both Mogadishu and Baidoa reporting that 'locals are welcoming the IDPs, a group of IDPs in Mogadishu indicated that 'they give us food and they let us stay under their trees when we are evicted from IDP sites'. Support is especially strong in Baidoa. Pointing out that 'they are all from the same community' an NGO respondent explained that 'here there is no conflict, people share all of their resources'. However, with a government official pointing out that 'a good portion of the host population is also very poor', it is extremely relevant that respondents estimated that some 50% of households are hosting displaced individuals. This again has potentially extreme implications for the host population. The risk is that host households, whom are themselves very poor, quickly exhaust their essential assets. Being all too aware of this, local respondents underlined that these social support systems work less well when so many people are in dire economic circumstances, explaining that 'if they are all extremely poor, no one has reserves to help the other one'. Observers thus worry that these mechanisms are being stretched to their limits, suggesting 'they are too extended and they are becoming too unreliable'. This is especially worrying in relation to the protracted nature of the displacement crisis. When asked about the impact that IDPs have had on their lives, a group of host respondents in Mogadishu clearly referenced this burden of support stating that 'now the IDPs are trying to integrate locally, we think this is much better, they can look after themselves, then the host population is no longer responsible for them'. However, this again spotlights questions regarding self-reliance, with economic opportunities also being key to this.

Access to Employment & the Right to Work

In contrast to the fundamental limitations that refugees in Nairobi face in terms of access to employment, respondents repeatedly acknowledged that all Somali citizens have an equal right to work, even if they are IDPs. As such, the economic limitations faced relate more to availability of employment opportunities and skills and capacities, as opposed to issues of formal documentation and legal rights to work. Indeed, the lack of transferable skills is a critical issue, especially for those IDPs displacing from rural localities to urban centres. As a group of host respondents in Mogadishu noted, 'the main problems for IDPs includes a lack of employment because they lack relevant professional skills and training'. They thus stressed that without support to overcome these limitations, these IDPs are destined to remain reliant on aid. In this they highlighted the importance of NGO support both at the level of addressing essential needs (e.g.: through unconditional cash transfers); as well as highlighting the importance of building people's potential for self-reliance. However, noting that NGOs focus their support especially with the newest displaced, acknowledging this breadth of engagement, a government official pointed out that 'in some cases IDPs are receiving better support than the host population' suggesting that 'this is now causing tensions between these populations'.[99] However, this is

but one line along which tensions are emerging.

Local respondents indicated that competition is increasing on many levels as the urbanization of this displacement crisis increases. For example, a government representative stated that 'this is creating too much competition over too few jobs'. Illustrating the constraints, a group of protracted IDPs in Baidoa reported that 'we would prefer to work, but we keep failing to get work'. Agreeing that 'the opportunities are now very limited', new IDPs in Baidoa, added that 'now there are too many people trying, this has also reduced the daily rates'. At the same time, market prices have also reportedly increased, with host women noting a doubling of the cost of essential food-stuffs over the past year. Increased competition over scarce resources is also evident in relation to water and sanitation, with local respondents reporting that 'today you can stand in the line for water for the whole day and still fail to get any', with others adding that the drought has also exacerbated this. Similarly, medical services are reportedly 'overwhelmed', with respondents explaining that 'the hospital is working fulltime, but they have too many people; you can wait the whole day and still not have services'. However, on the positive side, new access to Maternal and Child Health (MCH) services is appreciated, especially the mobile clinics that have been established by NGOs specifically for IDPs, but which locals are also able to utilise. In the face of such competition for scarce resources, it is notable that at least within homogenous communities, respondents adamantly deny that tensions exist between the hosts and IDPs/returnees, despite repeated probing of likely points of strain. Respondents seemingly sincerely stressed that 'no one can control these problems'. Concluding that 'we don't know what will happen tomorrow; maybe we will have problems and we will need help from these people', the will to help is again clearly motivated by an intent to build up social capital in an extremely unpredictable environment in which support from those around you is one of the most prevalent coping mechanisms. As such, the issue of social cohesion is critical to understanding how displacement affected communities manage.

SAFETY IN SOCIAL COHESION

According to the ReDSS solutions framework, the issue of social cohesion is considered as an aspect of physical safety. However, the above indicates that it is influenced by a wide range of factors, and thus is explored here as a separate consideration. According to the definition provided in the Glossary, while in one sense it refers to the state of relationships between/among individuals and groups within a given context, or so-called horizontal relationships, social cohesion also concerns the vertical relationships between these individuals/groups and the institutions that govern or influence their environment.[100]

Especially when reflecting on the local level, some argue that the well-being of the individual, in a psychosocial sense, sits at the core of social cohesion[101] – while social cohesion itself has significant implications on individuals' well-being. However, recognising that well-being encompasses elements beyond physical and economic security, recent research calls for responders to contribute to a more holistic experience of hope and dignity.[102] For example, explaining that 'life is precarious, we cannot expect to go home, we are left with no hope', a refugee respondent stated that 'it is something very bad to suffer without hope, we need to have some hope, without that we might want just to die'. Reflecting on the dire circumstances of refugees, a host respondent tied this back to self-reliance, stating that 'when hope is undermined, this is devastating; it cripples one's self-sufficiency'. This illustrates how the ideas of both self-reliance and resilience are grounded in the broader notion of well-being, which is also deeply influenced by the state of relationships or social cohesion. As illustrated above, the urban context is especially noted for the fact that it forces differentiated populations into intense proximity and interconnectedness.[103]

As indicated, the presence of displaced populations can aggravate the circumstances of especially the poor hosts, who are often already marginalized and facing dire circumstance.[104] As such, it has been long reported[105] that host populations fear increased competition over available jobs and basic services,[106] with tensions easily emerging as a result.[107] While the above explores this within a relatively homogenous population, it tends to play out more starkly in Nairobi.

While respondents from both refugees and host populations indicate that 'all is good, we get along'; tensions are readily noted with a group of Great Lakes refugees for example stating that 'as a refugee you have to fear

everyone'. In this sense, refugees generally conclude that 'relations are good only as long as there are no tensions. With tensions the refugees will quickly be blamed', creating a situation in which refugees feel that they are forced to quickly 'give in' whenever a problem emerges. As one group stated, 'we don't argue; we don't push anything; we just give in; as a refugee you have to run away from any problem'.

More generally, as alluded to above, many refugee respondents note 'jealousies', especially highlighting that 'Kenyans say we came here for a hand-out'. Indeed, many host respondents speculated that refugees receive money from many sources including their own people, religious institutions, the government and the UN and from NGOs. Indeed, while a Burundian refugee observed that 'they think we are becoming rich by being here as refugees', host respondents readily indicated assumptions that refugees are either wealthy or are becoming so through their circumstances. For example, commenting on the fact that they can afford to live in Jamhuri, a host respondent speculated that 'refugees have a lot of money. I don't know from where, but as a Kenyan I can't afford the rent in this area but they manage to pay. I don't know how'. While doubt, suspicion and fear risk exacerbating tensions and xenophobia,[108] in Kenya this is further amplified by the current political rhetoric.

Indeed, reflecting reports by Amnesty International that 'xenophobic and racist discourse has been normalised in many countries, with certain media outlets and politicians blaming refugees and migrants for economic and social problems',[109] it is widely noted that Kenyan politicians have provoked these local-level tensions through 'co-opting refugees as a political issue'. The linking of especially Somali refugees to terrorism has escalated local-level mistrust and tensions,[110] with many local and refugee respondents both pointing out that 'now when people think about refugees, they immediately think about terrorism'.[111] A local analyst reported that 'this bad-will has sparked a growing xenophobia among the host population'. Recalling that a recent IPSO report indicated that as much as 69% of the Kenyan population believe refugees are a primary source of insecurity in Kenya, he argued that 'the 'securitization' rhetoric has increasingly turned the Kenyan population against refugees'.[112] As such, the need to proactively promote social cohesion is highlighted.

Operational actors are systematically encouraged to proactively invest in promoting peaceful co-existence, trust and positive inter-reliance[113] through inclusive and participatory, activities that facilitate cooperation and collaboration between host and refugee community-based groups.[114] However, while there has been a lot of reflection on social cohesion both at the local level as well as the need for a national level effort to create a counter-narrative to the 'securitization of the refugee issue', in Kenya, this has not yet been operationalised. The issue also generally plays a secondary role in Somali programming as well. As such, the next chapter looks more extensively at what is being done in relation to the challenges that displacement affected populations face and the core recommendations regarding what constitutes effective solutions-oriented response to urban displacement crises.

CHAPTER 2: WHAT IS BEING DONE?

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WHAT IS BEING DONE?

While the previous chapter sketched some of the primary issues that urban displacement affected communities are confronted with, this chapter explores what is being done both in relation to these issues as well as the principles and best practices of urban solutions-oriented response outlined in the introduction. It again is perception-based. The first section outlines the range of strategies that are described by operational actors. It then looks at how these strategies are operationalised.

RESPONSE STRATEGIES SKETCHED

Given the challenges at hand, a multitude of individual response strategies were described in this study by a range of actors (e.g.: including humanitarian, development, government and affected populations themselves) responding to the challenges of urban displacement crises. The strategies range from auto-protection strategies generated by the populations themselves, to addressing immediate humanitarian needs, building self-reliance and resilience and influencing the broader context within which this is taking place (e.g.: engaging in city planning as a means of managing the city's capacity to absorb large displaced populations). While no one actor engages in the complete breadth of strategies, the collective effort reflects a comprehensive intent to contribute towards the gaining of incremental progress towards durable solutions to urban displacement. Based on their comparative advantages, different actors have engaged with different strategies. The 'pure' humanitarian actor engages with the individual-centric strategies that are represented in the foreground of the

Solutions-Oriented Strategies Applied by Responders

Engaging in urban development - city planning

Supporting National Development Plan

Social Protection

Early Recovery

Building resilience

Building self-reliance

Addressing essential needs

accompanying schematic; while 'purely' development actors emphasize systems-based approaches, illustrated as the backdrop of the schematic. Those strategies in the centre of the schematic can be operationalised by multitudes of actors according to their expertise, comparative advantage and skills they have on ground. Thus, concrete implementation of this schematic unfolds very differently in each context.

One of the key influencing factors is the capacity and role of the state. For example, with formal systems for

delivering essential services existing in Kenya, operational actors can focus their efforts on facilitating refugee access to these systems, while direct response can be focused on supporting the system more holistically, thus creating a mutual benefit for both refugees and host populations. This enables responders in Nairobi to dedicate more of their efforts to self-reliance strategies, delivering what some refer to as 'bundles' of services which are designed to tackle barriers and limitations such as language, skills, or documentation deficits.[115]

In Somalia, while development actors highlight state-building, systems-based and 'social protection' strategies, humanitarian actors engage more extensively in the direct addressing of essential needs, including the provision of basic health care, education, water and sanitation, unconditional cash transfers, food security and livelihoods and protection.[116] However, in recalling assertions that the traditional 'care and maintenance' approach has 'largely failed' to achieve durable solutions,[117] these efforts are systematically described as being embedded within an intent to support the self-reliance and resilience of displacement affected populations. Referred to as a 'layering' of strategies, this reflects the spirit of 'early recovery', which is described as 'gradually turning the dividends of humanitarian action into sustainable crisis recovery, resilience building and development opportunities'.[118] However, this 'layering' strategy has proven difficult to operationalise.

ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL SERVICES

As discussed, analysts repeatedly state that 'the crisis-based models of "direct service delivery" familiar to humanitarians are often inadequate in complex urban ecosystems'.[119] Describing direct service delivery as 'neither responsive nor effective in urban areas', experts typically argue that 'the most efficient response to the needs of the displaced is to promote their inclusion and integration by scaling up existing services and markets'.[120] However, in reality, the feasibility of this depends largely on the extent to which such services exist.

In Nairobi, where access to essential services exist, this principle has been well headed. Further, recalling the fact that it is often difficult to distinguish between the host and refugee communities,[121] the recommendation to seek a mutually beneficial impact is at the centre of such efforts. Observing that 'they all go through a very nasty situation', operational actors in Nairobi stressed that 'we must be asking how we can also help Kenyans in the same circumstances'. In this, host participants are reportedly included in even the more individual-based responses, with one NGO stating that 40% of their training spaces are allocated to host recipients. More generally, NGOs report investing in both the existing education and health systems. Concluding that 'there is no other way', one respondent suggested that 'when the hosts feel better about their own services, they will allow refugee kids to also join; they can appreciate that they live together with the refugees in one environment'.[122] This can also contribute to the 'social cohesion' interests discussed above.

From the perspective of refugees, it is agreed that access to essential services in Nairobi is in principle in place, although the costs for both education and anything beyond essential health care are often described as prohibitive. For example, one community leader reported that 'if you have a more complex medical problem, this system will not help'. However, many hosts report the same constraints. Similarly, a group of Southern Sudanese youth lamented the fact that their access to education is precarious because of their inability to pay fees. They again agreed that 'this is probably also a problem for Kenyan youth' as well. As such, while a request for NGOs to assist with these fees was a fairly constant request, in almost all refugee communities, the collective effort and the diaspora were important sources of funds, helping to tackle these challenges.

In Somalia, local analysts underlined that 'access to essential services, even in Mogadishu, is not easy; there are no public health and education services; what exists are private and they are expensive'. Moreover, the absence of national or state regulations and standardisation generates extreme variations in the quality of services provided. Thus, locals explained that 'there are two systems here; services are private, or they are provided by NGOs. The government provides no health services themselves. If you have money you can pay, otherwise the NGO services are there'. Indeed, noting that 'the needy can't afford these private services', it is reported that the poorest of both the locals and the IDPs rely upon the MCH services, which are supported by the NGOs. However, it was also reported that 'although this is free, it is a very limited service'. Similarly, education services are privatized, with the fees and quality varying widely. IDPs very much appreciated the fact that education is sometimes provided by NGOs, although the quality of these schools is also reportedly

low. While it is noted that host populations benefit especially from the above-mentioned MCH services, the idea of 'creating a mutual benefit' is understood more generally in relation to direct assistance. For example, host respondents in Baidoa estimated that as much as 50% of the host population, who for the most part are very poor themselves, have benefitted from NGO support, including through improved essential services, but also trainings, cash transfers and small grants for starting small businesses as well as through direct employment for some. More broadly, due to cultural practices of sharing, the benefits of especially material support are typically wide-reaching, albeit spread very thin. While these responses to essential needs are largely 'vulnerability-based', self-reliance and resilience strategies are different.

OPERATIONALIZING SELF-RELIANCE AND RESILIENCE PROGRAMMING

As established in the introduction, efforts to support displaced individuals to regain their autonomy, self-reliance and resilience is widely promoted as a central solutions-oriented strategy.[123] Thus, considering displaced populations through a 'capabilities' lens, highlights their agency, potential and freedom to choose.[124] Indeed, the notion of 'early recovery' discussed above, provides a frame for combining the two, aiming both to reduce needs and vulnerabilities of affected communities, while simultaneously working to strengthen their capacities and enhance resilience.[125] However, as these are relatively complex notions, the following box explores different understanding of them.

Exploring the notions of Self-reliance and Resilience

While self-reliance is about people's capacity to help themselves to meet their basic needs in a sustainable manner with dignity,[126] it is embedded within the larger notion of resilience, which was generally described by respondents as the capacity of the concerned population to 'cope-up and absorb shocks'; or the ability to absorb and recover from shocks, while positively adapting or 'thriving in spite of shock'. Community-level resilience is understood as reflecting 'positive collective functioning',[127] which recalls for example, the above-discussed social-safety mechanisms. In this sense, operational actors described resilience programming as 'enhancing the community's capacity' stressing that it builds upon 'people's coping mechanisms and adaptive capacity' stating that such programming 'supports communities to use their own resources to improve their circumstances'. In Mogadishu, self-reliance was described as 'having a place to live and having a source of income'. In Baidoa, an NGO respondent stressed that 'it depends on a person's ability to produce'. In Nairobi, refugees associated the notion with working hard to meet your own needs. One refugee described it as 'struggling for myself to meet my bills', stating that I am self-reliant 'when I can pay my own money for the expenses I have, when I can achieve this on my own'. Others agreed that it is 'when I am working and I can sustain myself'. Others added 'it is when you make no pleas to anyone for help'.

With many experts stressing that solutions-oriented programming should 'depend on the specific context in which a solution is sought',128 the operationalization of these strategies play out differently in each context.

Kenya

As discussed, programming in Nairobi is grounded in the fact that the state is relatively functional and systems for delivery of essential services exist, thus allowing greater focus on self-reliance efforts. This focus is also strongly influenced by Kenya's urban refugee policy, which assumes that urban refugees are able to sustain themselves (i.e.: are self-reliant). Indeed, a government official indicated that those urban refugees who prove to be other than self-sufficient (i.e.: they appeal for assistance) 'must be taken back to the camps'.[129] As such, much of the urban refugee programming in Nairobi is constructed intensively around self-reliance strategies and this is the kind of support refugees are asking for.[130]

Indeed, in this context, operational actors define self-reliance firstly as 'a mind-set', claiming that refugees in Nairobi have undergone a significant attitude shift in recent years that has seen them move away from 'dependency' and expecting 'hand-outs', towards this attitude of self-reliance. In this, it is suggested that they

now realise that 'NGOs are trying to support them to do things for themselves'.

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Changing Attitudes, Beliefs and Behaviour

Seeing 'self-reliance' firstly as a 'mind-set' spotlights the social change processes that underpins such programming. Aimed at changing attitudes and beliefs as a means of prompting behaviour change, such processes are distinctly different from technical activities that are more typical of humanitarian sector. Describing these social approaches as necessarily 'participatory', an operational respondent stressed that 'the population needs to be engaged at a concept level, they need to appreciate these ideas'. Adding that 'these issues are complex; they take time to really understand', one group of respondents noted that 'the longer you stay with a community, the better you can understand them, the better they can understand you and you can build an understanding together'. Thus, reiterating that 'behaviour change is slow, we cannot see an impact in a few years' these actors reported that 'as people are convinced, they can change their practices', adding that 'we must move at their pace'.

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More concretely, operational actors in Nairobi described a range of self-reliance activities, although for the most part, the focus is on training (e.g.: language, skills, financial management, etc); and financial support to stimulate independent productive capacity (e.g.: micro-enterprise grants). However, with different NGOs reporting reaching between 80-300 individuals per year, this programming is small-scale vis-à-vis the estimate 65,000 urban refugees in Nairobi, and largely individualized. Indeed, due to a lack of contact with them, many refugees participating in this study were unable to describe what NGOs do. Complaining that 'it is not easy to get access to NGO services', a notable number of refugees complained that 'we make the effort to visit their office; but they can just ignore you'. Others complained about asking for help but getting no response. Many stated that 'you can register and then you will have no response; they always say they are coming back and then you don't see them again'. As such, many refugees in Nairobi were critical of the manner of engagement, reporting a sense of dismissal. Many also highlighted the 'false promises', stating that 'details are taken and promises are made, they put you on a waiting list', but they lament the lack of follow-up.

Documentation

One factor in this is documentation, which has been discussed extensively. The lack of formal documents has wide reaching implications for refugees, including making it more difficult to access NGO support. While many of the most vulnerable refugees lack formal documents, this very fact makes it difficult for NGOs to support them to develop their self-reliance capacity. While self-reliance support often comprises facilitating the access of such refugees to technical and skills training, the national training institutes, with whom NGOs often collaborate, typically require formal documentation. The manager of a state-based technical training institute confirmed that 'if the documents of a refugee are expired, then we cannot agree to accept them here'. Moreover, such trainings are typically combined with efforts to link refugees with work opportunities, although such attachments also typically require a number of formal documents. NGOs widely noted that 'potential employers ask for a work permit. When the refugee says they don't have one, the employer is not willing to take the risk'. Students also require a formal student's pass, with operational actors noting that 'to get any of these, the refugee needs an alien card, which many do not have'. As such, it is quickly evident that while the lack of formal documentation influences a refugee's access to the formal work market, it also has significant implications on broader 'self-reliance' opportunities available to them. Nevertheless, because of the difficulties they have faced as a result of accepting refugees lacking formal documentation, a number of these NGOs finally report that refugee participants selected for self-reliance training programmes 'now must be registered refugees with proper ID. One respondent specifically stating that 'It is the responsibility of the refugee to make sure they have good documents', which seems to be a problematic position given that it is the formal documentation system failing these refugees.

Indeed, refugees are especially frustrated by the fact that 'NGOs tell us that if we don't have proper documents they can't help us'. Although NGOs suggest that they can facilitate refugee access to either RAS or UNHCR, refugees report that this facilitation seldom materialises. Moreover, they describe RAS as 'a problematic place

for refugees', while UNHCR is seen as being inaccessible. A sense of being disrespected is systematically associated with both RAS and UNHCR, with both described by refugees as being disinterested and dismissive. One frustrated individual captured the general sentiment when lamenting that 'there is no access to these people for help, we cannot ask questions, we have no voice with them, they have a lot of bureaucracy and systems but it seems they don't want to help the refugees'.

On the other hand, those individuals who were accepted as participants very much appreciated the fact that 'NGOs provide training for skills like tailoring, cooking, hair dressing, mechanics, computers, business skills'. Others highlighted that 'the main thing NGOs do is to help people start small businesses. They do business training and give loans'. In this light, especially recipients of such support stressed that 'when people are trained, when they can receive grants, this helps them get started; this can help people to become self-reliant'. Demonstrating this, a female recipient of training and small grants reported that 'NGOs used to pay school fees but now they help people to get into trading so they can pay for school fees themselves'. Other women indicated that 'we have learned how to save from the training; now women are paying for their children's school fees and medical bills themselves'. Thus, in line with the above claims of the 'attitude shift', all of these activities are widely appreciated as being very much in line with their priorities. Indeed, even those who had not yet received assistance stressed that 'we don't even want money; we want the knowledge, we need to speak the language and we want the documents translated so we can have the opportunity to work'. Thus, the intent of the programme is on track. However, almost all respondents expressed varying degrees of frustration with NGO's limited engagement. Those who had received support stated that 'NGOs help, but it is not enough.

Reach & Scale

Many refugees were frustrated with both the reach and the scale of the NGO effort. Some complained that 'there are many people with needs, but they only work with a few'. Others added that 'the NGOs have called us together, they promised to help us but they have now helped less than 10 or 15 people'. Others reported that 'NGOs come and talk to 300 people but finally, they work with only 2 people. This is frustrating us, it leaves us with no hope'. In this, indicating that 'we don't know how participants are selected' many suggested that 'it is by luck and by chance'. Thus, many called for NGOs to 'increase the chances', pointing to the need to scale-up and reach more direct beneficiaries, with especially male respondents stressing that more people need to be provided with 'better opportunities'.

They more specifically complained about the scale of the support, emphasizing the need for especially the financial in-puts to be 'more meaningful', claiming that 'the financial in-puts provided by NGOs are too small to be life-changing'. This complaint was widely reiterated. Even operational respondents themselves agreed that often 'the grants provided are too small to make a meaningful difference'. Instead of the typical 250-300 USD provided, the call is for 'something substantial like 5,000 USD. This can enable refugees to properly rent a stall, buy stock, get a licence' adding that 'starting a proper business is costly; otherwise it is just small activities'.

Alternatively, women recipients were for the most part happy with the relatively viable subsistence capacity achieved through NGO support (e.g.: acquiring stock for small-scale hawking, street-side vending, etc.). However, it was widely agreed that 'such businesses cannot grow as they are too small and there is no profit margin. , They only cater to the needs of their immediate family with these kinds of activities'. It was also noted that the potential to accumulate savings is hampered by restrictive county-council by-laws and associated 'fines'. Any unanticipated shocks quickly push these individuals into the 'red'. Thus, it was widely agreed that the 'self-reliance' that NGOs are supporting in Nairobi is on the right track but so far 'fragile', with participants recommending that NGOs increase the size of the loans they provide, as well as the number of people they reach.[131]

Reframing refugees as a benefit

This can also be tied to the broader objective of shifting the impression of refugees from 'burden' to 'benefit'. While refugees are largely seen by their hosts as a burden, research increasingly demonstrates that 'host economies benefit when refugees work'.[132] In this line, respondents of various perspectives in this study were adamant that refugees in Nairobi come with significant capabilities and could and indeed do make a significant

contribution. For example, the economic contribution generated in Eastleigh is widely acknowledged.[133] Readily acknowledging that 'refugees are an important aspect of our economic environment', a number of Kenyan professionals pointed out that 'refugees contribute to building our economy, some pay taxes and all of them are buying consumables that have been taxed', with some concluding that 'we are benefitting a lot from them'.

Indeed, looking to the future and the 2030 development vision for Kenya,[134] a senior official in a national training institute observed that 'refugees could be important in the development of the country's economy; we need them as part of our work force'. In this line, others stressed that 'we need to better identify and capture the skills of refugees and think about how these can be capitalized upon right from the beginning. Indeed, while NGO respondents repeatedly claimed that 'refugees have many untapped capacities, it is equally agreed that 'this potential is not yet being nurtured'. A refugee himself argued that 'there are so many skills here among the refugees, but they are not given the space to be expressed' adding that 'even if you have the correct profession, you will not have the chance to work', recalling the above discussion on documentation. Some national authorities agreed that with proper documents, 'refugees could be even greater direct contributors to the Kenyan economy through employment, taxes, and market stimulation'. Clearly, there is a lot to be done to better capitalise on this potential.

Somalia

In Somalia, self-reliance programming plays out differently again. Although the aim is to adopt the above described 'layered' approach, a weak state and under-development means that even the most essential services are largely absent. Rather than simply facilitating access, responders are often directly delivering essential services. As such, proportionally less energy is dedicated to self-reliance and resilience activities, which respondents described as improved housing options, support to livelihoods, skills development, and human rights training. This is compounded by the fact that few developmental actors are able to maintain a presence on ground, thus the relatively limited development activities are largely carried out by humanitarian organizations. As opposed to be system-based, such activities tend to be small-scale, local, punctual problem-solving efforts such as establishing individual boreholes, single police stations, individual school structures, market spaces; or the repair of delineated stretches of a road. However, all too often, even these relatively limited 'developmental-oriented' activities are usurped by emergency action, with humanitarian actors regularly being pulled back into their core activities of saving lives and addressing essential needs.

While the 'layered' strategy discussed above highlights the intent to progress as quickly as possible towards self-reliance and community-based resilience activities so as to support rapid recovery from repeated shocks and to prevent 'back-sliding', the hard-earned incremental progress is nevertheless repeatedly undermined by recurrent acute incidents. As such, skills training for example, has actually 'reached only small numbers of people' and has become a 'secondary' strategy. Actual programming tends to be needs-based as opposed to capacities-based, with vulnerability factors including extreme poverty, lack of economic opportunities, lack of family support/remittances, the number of children and the severity of the needs within the household dictating participant selection and response. However, a District official in Mogadishu captured the deeper dilemma when he speculated that 'people can be made self-reliant if they are equipped with marketable skills such as tailoring, cooking, waiting, beauty and hairdressing', concluding that 'IDPs who lack these skills will remain reliant on assistance'.

Nevertheless, the affected populations in both Mogadishu and Baidoa are generally very positive about the work that NGOs do on their behalf. When asked what NGOs do, respondents typically cite long lists of activities, including things like the provision of solar lamps, child friendly spaces, child dignity kits, psycho-social support, housing support and cash transfers. Indeed, cash programming is central.

Given that the urban economy is largely cash-based, cash programming has long been recommended in urban crisis settings.[135] It is widely suggested that cash programming can 'enable beneficiaries to meet a diverse array of recurring needs across a variety of sectors whilst contributing to market recovery'.[136] Being key to the promotion of self-reliance, cash is generally seen as an empowering kind of intervention that supports people at risk to exercise choice and thus protect their dignity. Moreover, the urban context generally makes cash interventions quite feasible, with network coverage and developed financial services.[137] As such, cash programming is an important part of the response in urban Somalia, with many respondents reporting that 'NGOs are providing some small cash support to those who are considered the most vulnerable'. With authorities suggesting that 'cash is one of the most important responses available', some authorities claimed that 'we have pushed NGOs to give cash'. Nevertheless, over-reliance on cash is criticized, with one NGO respondent stating that 'on-going cash assistance can generate dependency like any other form of assistance'. Complaining that unconditional cash transfers are simply too passive, some operational actors stressed that when grounded in self-reliance and resilience programming, small cash grants of some 300-500 USD per recipient, and provided with financial management training to kick-start small businesses have more important impacts. However, even with this, as in Nairobi, recipients complained that some 1000-3000 USD is required to make a meaningful change, reporting that these smaller amounts tend to be lost in addressing daily needs. Indeed, most underlined that there is no escaping the need to address the most immediate expenses.

As such, local respondents were generally positive about the NGO response, stating that 'they are doing good work, we appreciate them'. However, they nevertheless consistently stressed that 'NGOs need to try to do more'. Indeed, operational actors regularly lamented that the number of individuals with extreme needs far exceeds the response capacity.[138] As such, being particularly 'needs focused', both the affected population and officials regularly underlined the need to especially focus on the acute aspect of the crisis. Indeed, many officials indicated that the immediate priority is 'to address the day-to-day needs of the IDPs'.[139] Observing that 'NGOs want to transition away from humanitarian activities towards resilience' a State level authority in Baidoa argued that 'the current situation doesn't allow for that', concluding that 'the NGOs should continue their emergency response'. He added that recent community consultations highlighted humanitarian priorities such as food, water and sanitation, shelter, health, education and livelihoods. However, as indicated above, NGOs are also criticized for 'only doing something small while failing to address anything deeper'. As such, the same Mayor also stressed that 'resilience programming is very important because livelihoods have been undermined'.

Thus, few are clear on the relative priorities. This poses critical challenges to the intended 'layered' strategy. Despite calls to prioritise self-reliance activities, operational humanitarian actors see themselves as being repeatedly forced into responding to essential needs. Stating that 'we are always dealing with a new crisis', actors in both Mogadishu and Baidoa lamented that 'it is very rare that we are able to engage in 'developmental' activities'. One added that 'in Baidoa we are not talking about durable solutions, this is the epicentre of the displacement, we are receiving many IDPs. We are hardly even talking of livelihoods, we are focused on life saving activities'. Thus, while indicating that 'the development discussion is always there', these actors state that 'the magnitude of the crisis over-rides the developmental aspect', asserting that 'in such circumstances, we can't be thinking of development; saving lives is the priority'. With self-reliance being seen as central to 'solutions-oriented' programming, this is quite sobering. This challenge is seen as revolving around the issues of state capacity and the relationship between humanitarian and development logic.

LINKING HUMANITARIAN & DEVELOPMENT LOGIC & THE STATE

While responses to displacement crises have traditionally relied extensively on humanitarian response, today development actors are specifically called upon to tackle medium-term socioeconomic issues, in efforts that are seen as 'complementary to, but distinct from' the humanitarian approach.[140] Indeed, concern over the lack of economic development, the lack of infrastructure, the absence of essential public services and the limited capacity of the state dwarf the humanitarians' punctual 'development-oriented' efforts described

above. However, this also alludes to the core differences in the two approaches, with differences in working assumptions, principles, and mandates underpinning the stubborn conceptual and operational gaps that divide them.[141] These have long been debated.[142]

From the developmental perspective, which is especially keen to position the government at the centre of the development process, the humanitarian approach in Somalia is seen as problematic. Pointing out that 'while acute crises keep multiplying and humanitarian actors are never able to move beyond these', development actors argue that the current humanitarian approach 'lacks the space to think in broader terms'.[143] Being especially concerned about the relatively superficial engagement with the state authorities, development actors lament that 'humanitarian actors often don't think of working with the government'. Others point to insufficient efforts 'to build the bridge between the state and the population'. Moreover, as opposed to responding directly to essential needs, development actors indicate that they would rather think about 'how we can work with the government to expand their capacity to provide such services themselves'. Indeed, thinking about this as part of a 'Whole of Society' approach, which aims to promote a collaborative effort, they argue that the formal authorities must be at the heart of this approach.[144] This again has different implications according to the context.

Somalia

Engagement with the national, state and district level authorities in Somalia is comparatively common due to the fact that intensive state-building activities are on-going. Indeed, a number of external observers agreed that the 'emphasis on engagement with government actors, at both the local and national level, has been on the increase during recent years'. However, the capacity of the government remains very limited. For example, while a group of female host respondents in Mogadishu agreed that in theory it is the role of the government to support people at risk, they stressed that 'this is missing; the government is not supporting people as required; there are major gaps'. Indeed, it has been noted earlier that because people have been long without formal governance and leadership, many have far more trust in their local (traditional) leaders. As an NGO respondent stated, 'local leaders are supreme here; you can do nothing without involving these leaders'. Thus, although both State and District authorities report having direct engagement with the displaced populations, greater confidence is put in these local leaders.

Moreover, local respondents also indicated that, next to their traditional leaders, the locals prefer to deal with NGOs as opposed to government officials, with many complaining that the government officials 'do not do work like the NGOs; it is the NGOs who bring us food, water, shelter and health care'. While acknowledging that 'they are doing their best', a group of IDP Leaders in Mogadishu agreed that 'the government doesn't really get involved in humanitarian activities, they can't add very much'. Even host respondents noted that 'the government is not helping us like NGOs, they are not providing us with assistance, it is the NGOs who are filling the gaps'. NGO respondents confirmed that for the most part, 'NGOs deliver the essential services. As such, development actors stress that 'people need to relearn that the government is relevant for them', indicating that 'we are trying to demonstrate that the Government has capacity'. In this, they especially highlight the need to recreate the relationship between the citizen and the state, explaining for example that they have been trying to help the formal authorities to 'become more legitimate' vis-à-vis the citizens by supporting city councils to engage more robustly with the local leaders.[145]

At the same time, many humanitarian actor's express reluctance in taking on what they referred to as 'a state-building role'. For some, the concerns relate to the 'humanitarian principles', with one actor arguing that 'as a humanitarian organization, we can't fully engage with the state, we need to preserve our independence, we need to respect the humanitarian principles'. Indeed, experts agree that 'in many instances, humanitarians need to be all but invisible, promoting rights indirectly to avoid political ire and popular backlash'.[146] Others point to more operational and governance issues. Further, reflecting observations by Pantuliano et al. that NGOs are often hesitant to engage with authorities due to fear of politicisation and risks of corruption,[147] others suggested that 'NGOs doubt the government for mismanagement and corruption.

Many respondents in this study spontaneously stressed that progress is being made, with one NGO group in Mogadishu stating that 'comparing today with 2011, there is a difference', but they highlighted that the government is still very weak. In Baidoa, NGO respondents also agreed that 'the government is not like they were even one year ago; today you can see a change'. Another stated that 'comparing 2012 to 2017, they are not the same, today it is much better, things are changing step by step; we can see improvements coming slowly'. But all underlined that this is a slow and arduous process.

This is also an issue of having the right actors engaged. Recognising the limitations of their non-state-centric approach, humanitarian NGOs have called for more extensive engagement by development actors. As one such respondent stressed, 'State-building needs proper investment in governance capacity. This needs a transformative process; we as humanitarian NGOs work in a much smaller manner, we engage with line ministries to inform them of our activities, we do some technical training, we collaborate on beneficiary selection, we provide strategic material in-puts but this is not the systemic transformation that is required'. Thus, while humanitarian actors reiterate that 'we need development actors to step up', there is also a strong call for humanitarian actors to engage more concertedly with formal institutions and 'support them to take responsibility for their roles' as opposed to substituting for them. Indeed, in asking 'how long can we keep supporting humanitarian NGOs to carry the IDPs into the future' a local analyst asserted that 'something fundamental needs to change'. He asserted that 'NGOs must collaborate with the government in this development work, without this they are taking on the role of the government; they are not giving the space to the government to take up its role'. Indeed, some development respondents suggested in this line, that 'if humanitarian actors can only do pure humanitarian action, maybe they should leave the context'. However, with few development actors sustaining a permanent presence on ground, the actual development effort in Somalia is seen as 'minimal'. Thus, stressing that 'humanitarian actors can't continue to stretch their coverage further into development', an external humanitarian expert asserted that 'development actors need as well to reach out to bridge the gap'.

From the perspective of government officials, they agree that while it is the government's responsibility to address the displacement crisis, 'NGOs should be assisting us in this. Their projects should correspond with the priorities of the government'. More specifically, both Federal and State level officials described their current role as oversight and coordination but indicated that they are progressively taking up their leadership role, stressing that their role in the future will consist of 'making sure that NGO projects correspond with their priorities'

While the role and responsibilities of the state authorities in creating the conditions for resolution of displacement crises are very well articulated,[148] the limited state capacity continues to hamper solutions-oriented progress. For example, lamenting that 'with ten years of reflections, we have no real solutions today', a sceptical municipal level official observed that 'many ideas about durable solutions have been floated in Somalia; yet today, there is still no implementable policy'. Indeed, describing 'durable solutions' as 'something like a dream for the future' a group of IDP leaders in Mogadishu stressed that 'durable solutions require peace and security, but we know the government has limited capacity to ensure security'. The state's incapacity to assure peace and security is a central failing, but so is the individual capacity of different levels of government to work collaboratively.

Many respondents noted a lack of clarity regarding division of responsibility among government officials. Overlap and confusion exist between ministries and departments, with the inter-connections between the Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Interior & Local Governments, the District Commission/Mayor, State Commission on Refugee-returnees and IDPs, Ministry of Resettlement, and the federal counterparts not always being very clear. Many government respondents themselves alluded to the fact that 'the role and relationships between the Federal, Regional and local municipalities are not yet very clear'. As a Ministry representative observed, 'there are conflicting mandates, they overlap, the differentiation of roles and responsibilities is not yet very clear. This is still being figured out'. This was particularly evident among the many actors with mandates related to 'Durable Solutions'.

Nevertheless, one important positive step forward is the National Development Plan (NDP). The importance of

incorporating displacement issues into national development planning has been well noted.[149] The production of the NDP is seen as an important step in this direction, with both NGOs and government officials seeing it as providing a framework for achieving durable solutions. However, while described as being technically strong, the NDP is seen as lacking national/local ownership, thus efforts to bring it to life at the operational level include the establishment of State-level development plans, as well as a Community Action Plans (CAP) at the district level. Indeed, recognising that with as much as 60-80% of the current urban IDP caseload indicating intensions to integrate locally, these urban centres face critical absorption challenges, the CAP is meant to establish a bottom-up participatory framework that aligns the local level priorities with the State and NDPs and should provide guidance on this absorption challenge. As such, city planning becomes a central concern within solutions-oriented programming, with NGOs being encouraged to align their activities with the CAP.

These efforts also mirror assertions that urban displacement crises are an opportunity to prompt 'open discussions and collaboration that can strengthen the provision of public services by creating more resilient, sustainable, and inclusive systems'.[150] The proactive inclusion of both refugee and host populations in city planning and policy-making processes is widely recommended in urban solutions-oriented programming.[151] In this line, development actors who are the main facilitators of the CAP process, report that participation and inclusive planning is central to the process. They, reiterate that such 'inter-communal processes can create inter-reliance across otherwise separated groups; it can create bonds between groups that may otherwise be antagonistic', recalling the social cohesion impact.

However, the realisation of these objectives proves not so easy to achieve. For example, although it is relatively new, the CAP process in Baidoa is already being criticised for focusing largely on the formal authorities, thus being seen as lacking a sincere intent to be collaborative and inclusive of especially the affected population. This recalls earlier observations that social-cohesion efforts are seldom in the foreground of operational efforts. While the importance of these efforts is repeatedly noted, programme designs do not necessarily aim explicitly at achieving social cohesion outcomes.

More broadly, this illustrates the complexities of the multiple approaches that are meant to contribute to solutions-oriented programming in urban settings. It also illustrates the breadth of action that NGO actors are engaging in at the local level – which many are finding to be somewhat bewildering for some. In addition to doing emergency humanitarian action, these same actors are called to engage in the development of the CAP and reflect on city planning as part of the displacement response. Wondering if it all fits, one respondent noted that 'while we have some people who do not have enough food or basic health care; at the same time, we are also thinking about how the town should be expanding'. This offers a brief insight into the dynamic complexities that front-line operational actors confront on a daily basis. These complexities play out quite differently in Nairobi, where the state apparatus is in place and is relatively functional, although the policy environment is very restrictive.

Kenya

The current refugee policy environment in Nairobi is seen as a critical constraint to the potential for refugees to achieve meaningful self-reliance. With many operational respondents reporting a 'tightening' and 'decreasing' of the asylum space, the freedoms of refugees are tightly constrained. Despite recognising the need for advocacy for creating a more positive policy environment, it is also noted that even a series of court proceedings challenging such policies,[152] have reportedly been ignored. As such, operational actors report that despite extensive advocacy efforts, 'the results at the policy level are slow; today we can see little change'. The implications of this have been explored in different sections of the report. This section looks more specifically at the NGO engagement with the issues related to the police and the municipal authorities.

Legal & Physical Safety

In response to the police harassment discussed above, both NGOs and RAS report conducting training with the police department in efforts to promote greater respect of refugee rights. While agreeing that 'this requires more support and investment', RAS is confident that progress has been achieved. NGO respondents were less convinced. While noting that important energy has been invested in training officials on laws and policies,

the extent to which such learning has actually influenced their conduct and 'respect' of refugees remains questionable. As one NGO respondent stated, 'the capacity of authorities has been built up; but their attitudes are not changing'. As such, NGO respondents recognise that technical capacity-strengthening on its own does not necessarily lead to the required attitude shifts that will better ensure respect and protection of the rights of refugees. Stressing that 'we still need to better understand how this works; we are still asking how we can bring these ones on board; especially those who work directly with the refugees; how can we change their ideas about what is right'?

Refugees themselves believe that significant work is yet to be done, stating that 'the police need to be better informed about the rights of refugees so they can engage with us as human beings'. While they report 'some progress' in some places where 'NGOs have done a lot of training with the police', this is nevertheless very relative.

Importantly, the authorities have quite a different perspective on this issue. When asked about this alleged police harassment, one government official described such incidents as 'subjective', arguing that 'the police are just doing their job asking for the ID'. He added that 'not all the security concerns of refugees are real. Sometimes they just want resettlement which makes us wonder if their security claims are valid. We don't take these reports at face value, we always try to verify them'. This reflects observations made in a recent study of refugee economies in Addis Ababa, which noted that 'many local officials do not recognise the challenges of urban refugees'.153 In the face of these shortfalls, NGOs again get pulled into unrealistic roles.

When asked who protects refugees, a refugee Community Leader explained, 'the first line of protection is the Community Leaders, the second line is UNHCR and NGOs, the third line is the police, quickly adding that the latter 'has its problems'. While NGOs are in no way able to substitute for the police's role in ensuring physical security, in a number of cases, refugees facing security threats nevertheless report being 'referred to NGOs for protection'.

In one sense this refers to legal aid, which refugees were widely appreciative of, with people from all refugee communities suggesting that 'some NGOs can protect refugees because they have lawyers who can represent the refugee on things like arrests'. Others added that these NGOs are 'good' because 'they come and help people to be released' from their arbitrary arrests. However, an equal number of respondents more despondently reported, that 'they can't help much against these problems', either because they are too infrequently available, or simply because they have limited influence with the authorities.

Legal Aid in Nairobi

A legal aid respondent argued that 'legal representation at the local level should be the bedrock of NGO activities in Nairobi, refugees need legal coverage', he noted however he reported that 'this is not seen as a priority, legal aid is the activity that gets the least funding because refugee well-being is understood as livelihoods, now donors are pulling back from these refugee issues in Nairobi.154

However, these referrals do not simply concern legal aid. With many refugee respondents reporting that 'the police say they are not responsible for refugee security because we are not Kenyans', these referrals also concern actual physical safety. While the above government official stressed that 'the police cannot be referring security issues to NGOs, this is not the position of the government. It is the mandate of the police to protect all individuals within the jurisdiction of Kenya', it is the police themselves who are often making these referrals.

Within these distortions regarding the role and responsibilities of state-mandated actors, and the expectations that are transferred to NGOs, an NGO respondent working on the promotion of Human Rights noted that 'we are asking how to inform refugees about their rights'. In an environment in which the primary threats are posed by these formal actors, the aspirational idea of human rights is difficult to transmit. It is concrete realities

that matter in such circumstances. For many, the Municipal authorities are seen as an alternative avenue to explore.

Municipal Authorities

Global urban experts argued in this study that 'some of the most creative solutions are being developed at the very local level; it is at this level that the greatest degree of flexibility can be leveraged'.[155] This is especially relevant in Nairobi due to the process of 'Devolution' which took place in relation to the 2010 Constitution.[156] Others argue that it is only through 'local literacy' and 'back routes to rights', working with local and municipal actors that rights and protection of refugees can be achieved. [157] This suggests that the 'most effective forms of engagement with local authorities often come when humanitarians recognize local authorities' interests and incentives and develop strategies to align them with protection concerns'.[158] However, research suggests that there is often a lack of expertise or capacity or both on the part of the implementing actors 'to work across different forms of aid or to coordinate their activities' especially with the local level authorities.[159] Capacity shortfalls are also noted within these actor who should be supported to lead such collaboration in their efforts to include refugee issues into their planning and prioritisation. As such, urban experts underlined that 'typically, the municipality is not really linked into the NGO response', and this is again evident in Nairobi.

While the municipal level authorities are well engaged in practical processes of facilitating refugee access to essential services, they are not necessarily recognised as potential solvers of refugee problems. Further, as discussed earlier, refugees themselves reportedly see the County Council more as a threat than an opportunity. Moreover, refugee leaders report having little engagement with them, stating a clear preference to deal directly with RAS, UNHCR or NGOs. Moreover, although the county level personnel interviewed in this study demonstrated a generic level of will to engage with displacement, they were exceptionally uninformed, reflecting expert observations that even when hosting large refugee populations, 'municipalities commonly have little thinking on refugees'. Thus, despite experts' repeated calls for NGOs to help municipalities to integrate displacement issues into their local planning,[160] these micro-level linkages are tenuous and the authorities are not well drawn into the refugee problem. This recalls the importance of the 'Whole of Society' Approach.

BROADER COLLABORATION – THE 'WHOLE OF SOCIETY' APPROACH

While the State and especially municipal level actors sit at the heart of this approach, a singularly state-centric approach is obviously limited, whether due to limited capacity, will or both. Thus, the 'Whole of Society' approach seeks to draw upon a wide range of additional stakeholders, including civil society, diaspora, private sector actors and others, to encourage them to contribute, according to their interests and comparative advantages, to a broad collective solutions-oriented effort.[161] Calls for this broader collaborative effort are also typically coupled with a call for 'localization' or an 'area-based' approach.[162] Core to this is the capacity to conduct an adequately refined analysis of the context under consideration, in order to identify the systems, networks, structures and actors to capitalize upon, while also identifying the challenges and opportunities that are inherent to the context.

While important progress is being made in this direction, urban experts in this study especially noted that due to the density and complexity of urban settings, the analytic demands are significant, underlining that such processes 'are not as easy as people might think'. Some research experts noted challenges related to 'methods' of collecting information and conducting analysis, emphasizing the 'need to avoid being simply extractive', while equally calling for more qualitative approaches that access peoples' experiences, aspirations and desires as opposed to assessing their needs for example.

Moreover, it was widely highlighted that one of the most under-estimated elements is the additional time such processes take. A number of front-line operational actors noted that 'this type of work is very difficult; the necessary consultations are very time-consuming; we often have to explain things that even we don't know'. In this line, a number of the global experts emphasized the fact that such engagement 'does indeed increase process time; it takes time; such engagement is not a quick process', further adding that such processes

'are not always easy', suggesting that often, 'the specialised skills required are not necessarily there within the existing team'. Moreover, while noting that 'creating space for dialogue among diverse actors engaging in the collaborative approach is important', these same respondents asserted that 'constructing actionable plans from such discussions is no simple task'. This alludes to the challenges of translating ideas and words into concrete action. In any case, the challenges and opportunities related to the potentially wide diversity of actors who could contribute to the collective response to urban displacement varies from one location to the next. The following briefly sketches some of the more important elements.

National Institutions Network

In Nairobi, the effort to coordinate, align and collaborate with a diversity of operational actors is gaining momentum. In this, an impressive central-level network of actors is emerging. As technical and vocational training is at the heart of the self-reliance strategy, this network is being built around a number of national technical and industrial training institutes. This includes the Technical & Vocational Education and Training Authority (TVETA), which is a state corporation intended to be the leading national authority in regulation, quality assurance and accreditation of technical and vocational and training.[163] The National Industrial Training Authority (NITA)[164] which is responsible for providing industrial training; developing trainings; and integrating labour market information into skills development, has been an important entry point for promoting the notion of including refugees into the national development plan. Similarly, as a state institution designed to be a Centre of Excellence in industrial research, technology and innovation, NGOs have been facilitating refugee access to trainings provided by the Kenya Industrial Research and Development Institute (KIRDI)[165] on 'entrepreneurial skills' and technical issues including: food preservation, textiles and chemical technology (including making hand soap, body lotions, dish & clothes washing soap, fabric softener; shampoo, etc).

In addition to the training services, these experts themselves have added the evolution of NGOs' strategic approach.[166] They may also play an important role in terms of influencing the inclusion of the urban refugees into the national development plan.[167] In this line, the Kenyan National Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KNCCI)[168] is also being drawn into the effort. With a representative stressing that 'we need to work to move the refugees out of the realm of 'petty' into proper feasible productivity; then they can make a real contribution', this relationship is seen as a critical avenue for helping refugees to broaden their economic opportunities, with channels for meeting potential employers, and gaining access to new markets being anticipated. However, they are also an important avenue in relation to illustrating refugees as a benefit, with a respondent noting that 'refugees could be an important commodity for Kenya, they can be good for our economy, we have to demonstrate that refugees can be a source of revenue for the state; Kenyans could benefit from refugees paying taxes'. Underlining the need 'to demonstrate their relative economic relevance' she stressed that 'if refugees are productive, they can be seen as contributors as opposed to a destructive force'. The questions are 'how can we better empower these people; how can we help them to connect? Thus, the importance of the private sector in any such 'collaborative' effort is again highlighted.

Private sector

Nairobi responders indicate that 'there is a growing interest to get engaged from within the private sector'. However, within such a dense and diverse city, the private sector is very diverse and complex. For example, there is a lot of diversity in relation to economic opportunities, with a Somali-Kenyan shop-owner in Eastleigh, who hires 8 refugee staff and is also mentoring a youth in business management, indicated that 'we do not look at papers, we hire people as they are able'. However, the more formal the actor, the more important formal documents become, with one NGO respondent stating that formal 'private companies would like to hire refugees but many fear for their reputation. As potential employers, they need to see a proper work permit even if refugees have skills; they need these formal documents to provide access to employment'. This reflects the private sector interest in capitalizing upon this potential work force, while preserving their reputation and legal integrity. It was thus suggested that 'these actors don't want to be accountable for the refugees; they don't want to be legally liable'. Indeed, pointing out that 'there are risks of exploitation; these ones are there for-profit', some operational actors pointed to a dearth of analysis regarding the motivation and objectives of formal private sector actors, thus underlining the need to proceed with caution. Concluding that 'NGOs bear the duty to protect their beneficiaries against these risks', one respondent asserted that 'NGOs need to think

more carefully about the terms of engagement with private sector actors'.[169]

In Somalia, the private sector has long been presumed to be vibrant. The earlier discussed stereotypes about Eastleigh and assumptions that 'Somalis are good at business; they know how to make money' re-enforce this. Describing the Somali context as 'a rare example of private-sector resilience' the World Bank reports that the private sector generates some 90% of the country's GDP, while remittances from overseas amount to some 1.4 billion each year.[170] Domestic mobile-money transfers are said to average 1.2 billion USD per month.[171] It is further noted that 'entrepreneurs in Somalia and abroad continue to innovate and adapt in a country void of regulatory frameworks or government oversight'. While the above sums are staggering, these funds and/or the referenced innovation has not yet been pulled comprehensively into the response to the displacement crisis. However, NGOs do engage quite extensively with mobile-money service providers, who are foundational to ensuring the feasibility of the extensive unconditional cash transfer programming that takes place in the country.[172] More generally, humanitarians describe the private sector as being 'not well organized'. Further, while agreeing that 'the money coming into Somalia is significant' some suggested that this also 'is not structured'. Suggesting that 'the private sector is functioning, but it is not comprehensive', a district level government official in Mogadishu agreed. Alternatively, suggesting that 'the private sector is busy pursuing lucrative contracts; they are busy building small gated cities for the diaspora who are planning to return', a Regional government official concluded that 'they have little interest in the humanitarian sector', suggesting that solutions-oriented programming actually have to compete with such interests.

Diaspora

As discussed, the Diaspora play an important role in urban displacement responses. They are regularly drawn upon as an important source of both private and public financial resources. While one-to-one remittances are reportedly an important aspect of the household economy in both Somalia and Nairobi, the diaspora also reportedly plays an important role in terms of skills & technical transfer; business support and engagement; and support as NGOs in Somalia. They are recognised as playing an important role in the Somali state-building exercise, with technical experts and academics having been drawn into the consultation and drafting of the NDP for example. Indeed, while appreciating that 'they have already made an investment', some officials indicated that 'we are encouraging them to get even more involved'. For the most part, the engagement of the Diaspora locally is made through personalised connections. However, global-level actors are currently studying the European Diaspora system to determine if it could be supported to work more effectively in relation to the international aid architecture, thus avoiding working at cross purposes, while maximising the contributions made.[173]

ADAPTIVE & FLEXIBLE PROGRAMMING

Given the combined acute and chronic needs of displaced populations, and the protracted-ness of such crises, short-term humanitarian funding is recognised as inadequate, with funding mechanisms themselves long limiting the move away from 'care and maintenance' type programming.[174] Multi-year and flexible funding has long been recommended,[175] as has the call for adaptive programming,[176] which allows for responsiveness according to realities as they unfold on the ground.[177] These are demands placed on donors. Operational respondents in this study also called for donors 'to better sync-up with the ground reality' reporting that 'they often come in with distorting priorities', with respondents in Somalia for example, complaining that 'some donors want to focus only on emergencies'. However, important evolution both in relation to donor attitudes, as well as funding mechanisms is evident.

The multi-year funding mechanisms that are especially adopted in Somalia are showing important signs of creating space for some distinctly different programming. Especially important is the allowance of a prolonged inception period, in which creates the space for more meaningful participation by the people on whose behalf the programme is being designed; and the integration of humanitarian and development logic from the outset. It also creates the time, space and resources to do the necessary assessment required for an 'area-based' approach, which requires careful analysis of the context and the challenges and opportunities inherent to it. This is also foundational to the 'Whole of Society' approach. More specifically, noting that this period allows for

understandings to be better developed at the beginning, respondents explained that 'as communities better understand the process, they can propose ideas. This draws them into the project as a partner; they become more invested'. Recalling the earlier discussions about self-reliance being a 'mind-set', it is suggested that such engagement also helps communities to learn about their own capabilities. Closely related is the increased receptivity among donors to responsive programming which allows for adaptations including the reallocation of resources, according to a changing context.

Nevertheless, while progress is being made, complaints abound in both Nairobi and Somalia over the fact that responses are perpetually inadequate in relation to the magnitude of the need. For example, explaining that 'funding constraints' are one of the primary limitations to expanding the impact for refugees in Nairobi, many operational actors pointed out that 'UNHCR's budget is being cut by 40%'. Tellingly, a national staff who is in regular direct contact with the beneficiary populations, and who has regularly had to explain to them why her NGO is unable to help them in the face of dire circumstances, explained programming shortfalls away with the sentiment that 'beggars have no choice'. Another operational respondent added that, although we have the facts and figures on the ground, the donor perspective is always different, we just have to accept what they decide, even if it is little for these people'. Development actors similarly indicate that as much as local analysis can demonstrate the need for certain action, 'it is always the donors who set the response agenda'. Thus, even more progress is required in this line.

CHAPTER 3:
WHAT CAN
BE DONE
DIFFERENTLY?

CHAPTER 3: WHAT CAN BE DONE DIFFERENTLY?

This chapter provides a summary of the challenges and opportunities for improved solutions-oriented responses to urban displacement. It outlines brief conclusions and a series of operationally targeted recommendations.

CHALLENGES & OPPORTUNITIES

This section summarizes some of the main challenges and opportunities that have been observed from the micro-level perspective in relation to solutions-oriented programming in urban displacement crises. It presents: conceptual; contextual; and operational challenges and opportunities.

In-house opportunities and challenges

The conceptual frame regarding the specificities of urban response as well as solutions-oriented programming is well developed and continues to be increasingly nuanced. Furthermore, the specificities of urban response and the need to be solutions-oriented from the outset of urban displacement crises has gained solid traction at the policy level - through the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants and the Nairobi Declaration on Somali Refugees. While these may largely influence only at the level of political discourse, they do establish a frame of reference. More concrete is the CRRF and the Global Compact, along with the IGAD Plan of Action, which are seen as the means for making the declarations more tangible. Some high-level advocacy that keeps evolving the thinking and engagement is tied to operational realities and has a local impact. For example, the relatively recent visit of Dr. Walter Kaelin to Somalia was reported by many as shifting the thinking of especially national authorities regarding solutions-oriented planning (e.g.: it was especially noted for putting 'local integration' more directly on the agenda). Indeed, these global to regional to local connections should continue to be sought out and capitalised upon to promote political will through the most current evidenced-based recommendations.

More tangibly, extensive on-going operational research, for example that which is facilitated by ReDSS in the region, serves to facilitate a progressive nuancing of the understanding of what constitutes effective solutions-oriented response to urban displacement. Strong regional collaboration among the ReDSS members, various research institutes invested in the region, donors and other stakeholders has created a fertile environment for reflections on durable solutions as well as the specificities of urban responses.

However, this study specifically adopted a micro-level lens, focusing especially on the lived experiences of people living the experiences of urban displacement; and on especially the frontline operational actors who engage most directly with the displacement affected population and the other actors involved. It is apparent that this global or macro-level conceptual richness is not necessarily reaching these front-line actors.[178] In some cases, operational actors were unable to differentiate urban from rural response strategies.

Moreover, some respondents indicated that the notion of durable solutions is 'absolutely not' understood clearly, with a global level observer suggesting that 'it is a just phrase that is floating in the air', adding that for many the concrete or tangible reality 'is very vague'. Similarly, a field level development actor agreed that 'there is a lack of coherence in how people think about durable solutions; people do not follow the idea in a holistic sense'. As discussed in the previous chapter, respondents underlined that 'there are many gaps in the understanding among different officials'. This applies to both the police and the Municipal authorities in Nairobi, and a range of different government actors in Somalia. Finally, NGO respondents themselves underlined that 'there is a lot of confusion' among themselves on how to operationalise the notion of durable solutions.

While the issue of durable solutions has stimulated rich discussions at the local level, with little guidance, there is naturally a diversity of interpretations and perspectives. There is potential for this richness to evolve into confusion and frustration if guidance is not injected soon. Indeed, operational actors in both Mogadishu and Baidoa demonstrated a strong interest to engage in such reflections, but are calling for guidance, with some suggesting that ReDSS could facilitate this. It is important to acknowledge that these actors are in not just waiting for guidance. They are very engaged with these issues on a daily basis and are forced to think creatively and find solutions to the challenges they confront. They are reflecting among themselves, with local authorities

and with the affected population, and are generating a richness of reflections, analysis and recommendations from their local perspective (e.g.: gained through dialogue with the at-risk populations; operational analysis; and locally generated knowledge). However, this is not yet being capitalized upon in a holistic manner, largely because local-level actors report difficulties in conveying this information in a meaningful way to their senior colleagues. Complaining that their input is often overlooked by senior personnel (e.g.: on claims that 'this does not fit donor criteria'), they report difficulties in being heard and influencing decision-making and conceptual processes at that level. There is a challenge in ensuring that information flows effectively from the macro to the operational space, and vice-versa.

Closely related to this is the 'translation' challenge. The process of translating the many complex ideas that underpin urban-based solutions-oriented strategies into concrete action is currently under-estimated especially, in terms of the time, expertise and resources these processes require. One aspect of this relates to the fact that urban programming focuses less on direct implementation of technical programmes (e.g.: WASH, MCH, etc.), and prioritises the facilitation of what are often complex social change processes. This approaches complements the very positive shift away from 'care and maintenance' to self-reliance and resilience programming, with the earlier discussion about self-reliance being a 'mind-set' underlining this. While some respondents suggested that they know how to do such programming 'because it is just people talking to people', others underlined the challenges. For example, given the protracted nature of the different displacement crises under consideration, much of the affected populations have a long history with humanitarian aid. Thus, they themselves have to learn/accept the different approach as well. The consequent challenges are especially apparent in Somalia, with both affected population and officials continuing to prioritise humanitarian action, and humanitarian actors are repeatedly pulled into prioritising acute response. On the other hand, important progress in this line has indeed been achieved in Nairobi, with the refugees' expectations today being very much in line with the self-reliance approach. Therefore there may be some value in studying the Nairobi effort with the aim of gaining some insights into enhancing such efforts in Somalia.

Inherent in the shift towards self-reliance programming is the move away from vulnerability-based programming towards capabilities-based programming, which requires a distinctly different kind of engagement with the affected populations.. Indeed, in both country contexts, it is noted that analysis of the 'capacities' of refugees, returnees or IDPs is generally weak. While some aspects have recently been given more attention and are evolving (e.g.: analysis of the diaspora), others are understood only opportunistically. For example, the social safety-nets in both contexts are identified as key final stop-gaps. However, in neither case are these mechanisms well understood. This is despite growing concern in Somalia that these mechanisms are being over-stretched. To some degree, this shortfall reflects the fact that vulnerability and needs-based assessment (i.e.: the traditional humanitarian assessment approach) is fundamentally different than capacity-based analysis.

Another aspect of this 'translation' challenge returns us to the social change processes. All such activities are constructed around elements such as meaningful participation; accountability; respect of dignity; empowerment. While such 'soft' principles have long underpinned humanitarian action, they have proven to be difficult to operationalise.[179] In this study, a number of local-level NGO respondents emphasized that 'this work is very difficult, consultations are very time-consuming' adding that 'we often have to explain things that even we don't know'. While the operationalisation of such processes often requires particular skills and expertise, they are also typically very time-consuming. These factors are currently significantly under-estimated.

More broadly, while effective solutions-oriented responses to urban-based displacement crises highlight both 'area-based' and 'Whole of Society' approaches, the operationalization of these approaches relies upon the comprehensiveness and the level of accuracy and nuance to which the opportunities and challenges within the context are analysed. While these responsibilities are pushed to the frontline operational team, few reported receiving training or technical support to undertake such analysis. Yet The demands are substantial, ranging from assessing existing systems to studying various actors within the private sector to creating space for and facilitating collaboration between a diversity of actors, including the state. While periodic technical experts are sent to support these operational teams, more substantive support and in-house localised skills-development is required. Moreover, stressing that these processes 'are not always easy', global assessment experts again especially underlined that such processes 'increase process time; these are not quick processes'.

Contextual opportunities and challenges

Collaborative solutions-oriented programming requires a coherent vision of the end goal. Currently, there are fairly significant disconnects between what the authorities define as a durable solution to the displacement crises they are responsible for addressing versus conceptual ideals and the ideas of the people living these crises. Typically, the authorities focus on 'returns to the place of origin'; while the displaced, whether IDPs, returnees, or refugees, largely emphasize local integration. While some progress has been made on this in Somalia (e.g.: through the recent visit of Dr. Kaelin for example), there is need for open dialogue with to ensure that local integration is more centrally on the agenda in Somalia. Operationally, while there is some dynamic thinking about what this entails, more intensive technical support and guidance is needed.

In Kenya, while promotion of local integration need to be approached from multiple angles at the policy level, receptivity is expected to be limited. However, opportunities for finding local level ad hoc solutions are currently under-explored, with the County Council inadequately drawn into the collaborative approach. There is a significant opportunity to work more strategically with local level authorities to support them to integrate refugee issues directly into their analysis and planning. Importantly, the opportunity to engage more directly with these actors is also identified by the refugee leaders themselves.. Indeed, it may well be through engagement at this level that the most substantial overcoming of the refugee challenges can be found. While advocacy with both RAS and UNHCR is required regarding the documentation issues, more pragmatic solutions may be found in collaboration with the local authorities.

One of the main challenges is generating good will among the various authorities who interact with the refugees at the local level. For example, while NGOs report progress with the Municipal authorities and the police in promoting awareness of the rights of refugees, this has not necessarily influenced change in attitude towards the refugees. Thus, it is acknowledged that a different kind of engagement is required to generate the requisite will to change behaviours.

In addition displaced populations engage in a number of 'auto-protection' strategies, which could be studied in more depth to determine how the more constructive strategies could be supported. These mechanisms are a part of the broader social safety-net mechanisms that almost all displaced communities reported employ. In both Somalia and Nairobi, these mechanisms are widespread and are widely referenced. In Somalia they are believed to be under significant stress due to the protracted nature of the crisis

More broadly, while many claim that displaced populations bring important capacities with them, this has been poorly assessed in all cases. As such, most hosts perceive displaced populations as a 'burden', generally assuming their impact is negative. At the same time, many operational actors argue anecdotally that refugees have a positive, especially economic impact on their host environments. Thus, there is a need to invest in identifying these capacities, as well as quantifying their economic impact in urban contexts. These factors are potentially powerful evidence for advocacy efforts and shifting the impression of refugees as a 'burden' to a 'benefit'. More operationally, greater awareness of these capacities generates an opportunity f a different kind of programming. While this will enhance the current programming in Nairobi, building humanitarian action in Somalia on the capacities of the target populations may be a way of shifting the focus on emergency response, into more tangible self-reliance programming.

This also ties in with the importance of prioritising social cohesion efforts. While this is recognised as relevant in both contexts, it exists as a peripheral programmatic element.. In Kenya, it has been explored in terms of needing to generate a counter-narrative to the 'securitization' rhetoric that surrounds refugee issues in Nairobi, but it has not been operationalized. This study has confirmed that while there is a reasonable level of 'tolerance' between host and displaced populations, tensions sit just below the surface. These are potentially dangerous in volatile contexts and they undermine opportunities for both communities. Attitudes of tolerance create the space to bring these communities together to enhance their understanding of each other. Indeed, strategic efforts to enhance their inter-reliance could go some way in enhancing the inter-communal cohesion. 'Whole of Society' opportunities and challenges.

The 'Whole of Society' Approach defines the collaborative effort required to deliver more effective solutions-

oriented response to urban displacement. It is widely agreed that the state sits at the heart of this approach, and a diversity of actors can then be drawn in to contribute to the response effort according to their capacities and interests. The intent to work with the state in each context has different implications. While in Kenya, receptivity regarding refugee issues is currently quite challenging at the national level, many believe that there are important opportunities to be explored, developed and capitalised upon at the municipal levels as discussed above.

Closely related, is the opportunity that exists in Kenya to work with existing systems. Although refugees complain about the costs and the quality in various cases, they do acknowledge that at least essential needs are addressed through their facilitated access. NGOs highlight that they have been able to support these systems more holistically as a result. Realising this principle in Somalia is far more difficult, due to the lack of infrastructure and weak state capacity. Indeed, these realities often force NGOs to dedicate significant energies to direct service delivery, thus undermining their capacity to engage with self-reliance and resilience programming. This is often exacerbated by recurrent episodes of acute insecurity as well.

In Somalia the challenge is most immediately related to the capacity of the state, although there are also important policy issues to be pursued (e.g.: ensuring that local integration is more solidly on the agenda). Indeed, an underpinning element in this, is the fact that the local/traditional leaders have long been filling the gap in the absence of the state, and now the population express minimal confidence in the formal authorities, having a far stronger relationship with these informal actors. Indeed, they also seek out NGOs before they consider to go to the state authorities. As such, the relationship between the state and citizens needs to be rebuilt. While NGOs call upon development actors to engage with these challenges, they themselves call upon NGOs to do so.

Some interesting opportunities are available to be capitalised upon in relation to the relationship between development and humanitarian actors in Somalia. While there are critical challenges due to the fact that many development actors are struggling to maintain a permanent on-ground presence, opportunities emerge due to the fact that those who are on ground are in direct interface with the humanitarian actors. While there are critical challenges in terms of mutual understanding, the fact that they are in the same space, working in close proximity with the same at-risk population creates an important opportunity to tackle the lack of understanding among each other and figure out in very concrete terms how to collaborate more effectively in such contexts. Moreover, especially the CAP process could serve as an important process that brings these two different types of actors together in a common space and a collaborative process with both the authorities as well as the local population.

The idea of promoting broader collaboration creates a multitude of opportunities, especially in relation to the private sector and the diaspora, although these elements were not explored in detail in this study. While this broader collaboration is readily seen as offering significant potential richness, it must be acknowledged that the identification and drawing in of these diverse actors requires time, resources and specialised skills. Once identified, operational actors must also have the skills to analyse the diverse interests and motivations of such actors in order to manage potential risks (e.g.: of exploitation) in relation to responsibilities for 'duty of care' vis-à-vis the populations at risk. Currently, the level of specialization required to do so is being developed in a somewhat ad hoc manner.

The 'area-based' approach is also central to improved response. Currently, this approach is being applied relatively coincidentally. For example, in Nairobi interventions are concentrated within areas where the different refugee groups have concentrated. While it is quickly apparent that each of these sub-contexts are fairly dramatically different, there has been little concentrated sub-context analysis aimed at establishing a holistic understanding of the opportunities and challenges (e.g.: including potential actors to draw into the collective effort). In Somalia there is a similar coincidental concentration, in this case largely determined by security and access issues. But again, this has not been engaged within a more focused and strategic manner to capitalise upon all of what each sub-context has to offer. Indeed, it is arguable that the area-based approach particularly exists as a concept and has yet to be operationalised in a meaningful manner with strategic intent. However,

responders aware of the approach were particularly enthusiastic especially regarding the platform that such an approach would create, as a means for drawing a diversity of actors together to reflect on the given context.

Finally, important opportunities are emerging as a result of evolving funding mechanisms (especially observed in Somalia), which are making the required time, space, and resources available to substantively change how response to protracted displacement crises is implemented. Fundamental is the engagement with multi-year funding that is taken out of the formerly strict humanitarian versus development frames. This has allowed for an extended inception period, which creates the feasibility of operational actors engaging in the comprehensive participatory analytic processes described above. This will go far in terms of identifying and capitalising upon local opportunities and mitigating challenges. Moreover, increased flexibility in terms of the utilisation of committed resources is going far in terms of enabling flexible programming that is responsive to the shifting contextual realities. Arguably corresponding with the restrictive policy environment in Kenya, this evolution is not evident in Nairobi. Indeed, there is rather indication of reverse trends. As such, there may be an opportunity to better study the dynamics as they unfold in Somalia and seek for opportunities to cross-fertilise Nairobi donors.

CONCLUSIONS

Building on the core principles and best practices for solutions-oriented response to urban displacement crises, which were sketched in the introduction, this study has looked at the extent to which these have been operationalised in relation to the lived experiences of displacement in each context studied. In terms of case studies, it looked at refugee and host populations in Nairobi and refugee-returnees, new and long-term IDPs and hosts in both Baidoa and Mogadishu in Somalia. While promising progress has been achieved, critical challenges remain. Indeed, there is significant potential and opportunities which are not being fully capitalised upon. The study adopted a micro-level lens and spotlighted the local level, focusing on the people living the displacement experience and the frontline operational actors. This perspective reveals that rather than needing to fundamentally alter the existing response framework, there is a need to better translate the existing ideas into practice. This requires more proactive and intensive engagement especially at this micro-level. While concepts and approaches are evolving rapidly in the macro spaces, this fails to reach the frontline operational actors.

However, as they work together with the affected populations, a greater understanding of the ideas of self-reliance and resilience is taking hold and the populations themselves are accepting and indeed calling for such support. This less so in Somalia where the lack of infrastructure and recurrent acute shocks make it difficult for such engagement to take meaningful hold, when essential needs are not adequately addressed. This illustrates the fact that durable solutions will not be achieved through such programming alone. These actions need to be embedded within the larger political effort that aims to establish the broader conditions of security and essential infrastructural development. Thus, while significant progress has been made recently, it is still the case that these on ground activities do not substitute for political action.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND WAY FORWARD

These recommendations build upon the general recommendations for improved solutions-oriented response to urban displacement that are sketched in the introduction and reflect the most central elements that emerged during this study.

Correlate in-house skills & capacities with growing demands

Operational demands in urban displacement settings are increasingly complex, with highly specialised expectations being placed on the front-line operational actors. In a notable number of cases, operational personnel stated that they are sometimes explaining things to the populations they work with that they themselves are not sufficiently aware of. The technical support and training of these individuals must keep pace with the demands placed upon them. In practical terms this can include the secondment of technical staff and both external and on the job trainings. However the primary objective must be to ensure that the complex approaches of urban response specificities and solutions-oriented programming are effectively applied to the realities of the operational environment. This requires that assessment skills are adapted to include both qualitative and quantitative, while shifting from vulnerability-based needs assessment to capacity-based assessment.

As has been argued, operational approaches are increasingly focused on 'how' things are done, putting social change processes at the heart of the effort. Thus, operational personnel require training in social change ideas. More concretely, concepts such as participation, empowerment, dignity, and accountability need to be broken down into concrete operational components. For example, see Arnstein's ladder of participation,[180] and the empowerment schematic above.[181] Further, operational teams need far greater technical support to think through how the context-specific challenges they face can be tackled through the application of the principles and good practices discussed throughout this document. For example, the process of durable solutions has different interpretations in both Somali contexts, which is a rich field of reflections, but without more concrete

guidance on how to operationalise these processes, the diversity of thinking could result in tensions that will reduce the capacity for actors to work together effectively. It is important to avoid disconnected thought processes, where for example the macro-level thinking evolves without inclusion of the micro-level actors and vice versa. This collaboration should be prioritised within the operational environments so that conceptual development is better grounded in operational realities. This calls for mechanisms to be put in place to ensure that micro-level observations, analysis and recommendations are able to influence the macro-level processes and are given adequate consideration. Equally, careful consideration is required to determine to what extent the local population needs to be brought into these reflections. As has been highlighted, self-reliance is a 'mind-set', and requires changing attitudes and beliefs. This objective of changing attitudes and beliefs should be highlighted as an explicit outcome in itself. This will better ensure that adequate time, space and resources are allocated to the operationalizing of social change processes, that are currently under-estimated and that these processes become priority actions.

Apply 'Area-based' & 'Whole of Society' approaches more strategically

While these approaches are central to effective solutions-oriented response to urban displacement crises, they remain rather vague concepts, especially for front-line staff who are responsible for operationalising them. Again, the analytic demands associated with these processes are currently under-estimated. Although they are indeed being operationalised to some extent, much of this is coincidental. For example, area-based approaches appear to be applied in both contexts, but this is due to the fact that refugees concentrate in certain areas in Nairobi; and are dictated by access and security issues in Somalia. The spirit of area-based approach is to adapt programming according to the opportunities and challenges that exist in the given context. As such, the programming should be developed following an intensive context analysis, which given the density and complexity of these urban sub-contexts is typically no easy thing. It requires specialised skills. However, local operational staff must be involved in such an analytic process as they will track the changing trends in the context and adapt the activities accordingly. For example, working with existing systems is a primary recommendation. While this is relatively straight forward in Nairobi, this is far more complex in Somalia. It requires intensive capacity and quality analysis of systems that exist, so as to avoid exposing at-risk populations to harm. While this should be done, it requires the adequate technical resources, time and prioritisation to ensure that it happens to the extent each sub-context requires.

The principle of developing a collaborative network is similar and could be identified as an objective that requires specialised personnel and dedicated time and resources, especially at the outset of the programme to identify potential collaborative partners and analyse their skills, capacities and interests. However, maintaining and developing these relationships also requires time and resources throughout the intervention. For example, one of the most important opportunities that can emerge from the area-based approach is that it creates a 'platform' which brings to together a diversity of actors with different capacities to discuss the collective response. In concrete terms, this means building a different kind of coordination mechanism.

Prioritise localised operations

Local level operational efforts are always embedded within a larger framework that addresses the broader political and policy environment. The practical activities must be strongly linked in, to ensure that advocacy messages reflect the issues on ground and are effectively evidence based. This recommendation sets the foundation for a localised operational approach. For example, in Nairobi, this entails engaging more intensively with the Municipal authorities as one of the main entry points, with the aim of drawing them more intensively in the refugee situation.. Experts assert that it is at this level that leverage can be generated, and creative solutions can be found. It is also noted that the closer that people are to the refugees, and the more they know about them as individuals, the more engaged they become with the concerns of refugees in a humanistic manner. As such, it is important that NGOs facilitate relationship-building between refugees and the County Council. Recalling that refugees largely see these actors as a threat, this reaffirms the centrality of social change processes discussed above. Given that these relationships can be challenging, the relationship building approach could draw from peace-building practices that highlight the need to first address misunderstandings and mistrust (often separately), and then progressively construct more positive understanding of each other, which creates the foundation for engaging in collective activities that create inter-reliance and eventually trust.

These processes are again quite long-term and require specialised skills. However, there is a level of receptivity on both sides and an opportunity for cross-fertilisation from one sub-context to the next across Nairobi. Once some degree of trust is established, protection issues could be addressed at this level. Indeed, a similar approach could be applied with the police, in this case framed as 'community-policing', which although having many different approaches, is generally a police-based approach that aims to support the police to build closer ties with and work more closely with the community. Again, peace-building agencies have developed different methods and approaches to facilitating this. Such an approach requires that more positive relationships are constructed between the police and the refugees and the host population themselves should be drawn into these processes. It is at this level, where the constraints and vulnerabilities that come with inadequate refugee documentation can be addressed, if not formally, in a pragmatic manner with facilitation from legal aid actors.

In Somalia this would play out quite differently, being more concerned with overcoming the humanitarian/ development divide and drawing both traditional and formal authorities as well as the affected populations together. While the divisions between these stakeholders are discussed extensively in the report, it is essential that mechanisms that enables these actors to draw together to work more collaboratively in favour of the displacement affected population is established. As indicated, Somalia (especially Baidoa) provides a specific opportunity given that all of the actors are on ground in a common space, all working on a common issue. The commitment to 'collaborate' as an objective in itself, needs to be stated by all, and then facilitation expertise needs to be made available to figure out concretely how the skills and comparative advantages of each stakeholder can be capitalised to create the greatest positive impact for the population of concern. The CAP could serve as a potential framework around which this collaborative process could be constructed. This would draw all actors into a central process, thus in addition, support the larger state-building process as well.

Make social cohesion a more strategic objective

Threats to social cohesion, especially among the host and displaced populations abound as has been discussed throughout the report. However, although operational actors acknowledge the importance of the issue, there is limited evidence of social cohesion objectives being explicitly sought. Social cohesion objectives and activities should be more explicitly articulated in project design, with specific indicators and outcomes being more clearly stated so as to ensure this intent is brought to the foreground of operations as opposed to remaining as a vague thought. Existing activities should be adapted to more intentionally contribute to the social cohesion objective. This includes adding a social cohesion dimension to economic strategies. For example, many peace-building strategies use inter-reliance at the market as a means of building inter-reliance and trust between formerly contesting communities. Alternatively, refugees in Nairobi suggested cultural-based trade fairs that serve both to enhance understanding of each other, while stimulating economic opportunities. Additionally, stand-alone social cohesion strategies designed to address specific points of contention should also be more systematically undertaken to promote a greater understanding, confidence and trust between the host and displaced populations. However, this requires carefully analysis of the points of tension within each 'area' as this varies significantly according to the circumstances of the relationship. For example, tensions between Somali refugees in Eastleigh with the Kenyan Somali hosts are going to be very different than those between the Ethiopian and Southern Sudanese refugees in Ruiru and their hosts, who have very little basis for relationship beyond proximity and where the sense of competition for scarce resources and economic opportunities is high. Again, in Somalia, these tensions vary according to the clan dynamics of the sub-context.

However, it is critical to explore the issues that create tension in each context beyond these more tangible elements, because with perceptions of threat being socially constructed, they can potentially grow from a number of unpredictable starting points. Once the points of tension are understood, proactive measures can be developed to overcome them. The strategy must be two-fold in that it should alleviate the points of tension and generate more positive sentiments among individuals or groups. Such strategies could reference especially the community-based dimensions of psychosocial support that aims to restore and foster hope at both the individual and collective levels.[182]

These measures address only the 'horizontal' aspect of social cohesion (i.e.: relationships between individual and groups). The vertical aspect concerns relationships between these individuals and the institutions governing them. This aspect varies significantly from one context to the next and within the sub-contexts. In Nairobi, the relationship with especially the Municipality and the Police sit at the heart of this. While the above has touched on this to some extent, it is worth reiterating that the issue of 'resect of dignity' is very much rooted in attitudes and beliefs. As NGO respondents noted, despite training officials in technical elements such as the laws protecting the rights of refugees, they did not necessarily change their attitude and conduct towards these individuals. Generating change at the level of behaviour requires engagement at the level of these softer elements illustrated in the accompanying schematic.[183] In Somalia, the challenge is that people have more confidence in their Traditional Leader and NGOs than formal authorities. As has been discussed in the report, careful consideration should be given to more strategically rebuilding the relationship between the state and its citizens, the basis of which is depicted in the accompanying schematic.[184]

From another angle, the reframing of displaced populations as a 'benefit' as opposed to the 'burden' they are typically assumed to be is critical. This is discussed extensively throughout the report. It is widely recognised that displaced can bring a range of assets to urban economies, stimulating consumption and innovation and offering employment to local people.[185] By issuing work permits, recognising skills and helping people access jobs and training, it will be possible to recognise the potential contribution of displaced populations and reduce the damaging impact of higher levels of unemployment and sub-employment. This recalls the earlier discussions concerning the assessment capacity of operational actors and their ability to identify and capitalise upon the capacities that displaced populations bring with them. While this is more limited in Somalia because many of the displaced are coming from rural to urban centres and they thus lack transferable skills, these actors nevertheless have other types of skills such as leadership, facilitation, etc. Returnees particularly have well developed skills as a result of accessing training in the refugee camps. In Nairobi, the refugees in each sub-location have a range of skills that remain largely unassessed. Moreover, despite being viewed largely as economic competitors, even local actors recognise that they play an important role in market stimulation. These factors need to be proactively captured both for the purpose of capitalising upon them in terms of programming, but this is a critical piece of evidence that can be used to shift the attitudes of hosts. For example, if the market value and taxation revenue potential was quantified for the Kenyan authorities, this might be a factor that could begin to influence the shrinking asylum space. More broadly, it could inform the counter-narrative that is so badly need vis-à-vis the 'securitization' of the refugee issue in Nairobi.

Continue to evolve 'Adaptive Programming'

Adaptive programming is a style of programme design and management that moves away from the linear cause and effect' logframe, and rather focuses at the level of outcomes, with inputs, activities and outputs remaining relatively flexible so as to allow the actual operations to adapt to the changing dynamics of what are often volatile contexts. Operational actors need to engage in this programme management approach more substantively. However, donor mechanisms need also to be adapted accordingly. Very positive progress in this line is evident in Somalia, with much of the funding being availed on a multi-year commitment, thus avoiding the humanitarian/development divide that short-term funding cycles tend to exacerbate. Moreover, these funding models also tend to allow for a prolonged inception phase, which is critical to realising the demands regarding collaborative process, working with existing systems, and building on the capacities of the people of concern. In order to do so, the time and resources, as well as prioritization of such processes must be endorsed by donors and the programme cycles must accommodate them. Indeed, such analytic processes as well as coordination (e.g.: in relation to the area-based platform); as well as the increased emphasis on social change processes, may well call for quite new roles in the field, which will require funding. Moreover, activities such as relationship-building and promotion of social cohesion are relatively intangible and with impact proving difficult to measure in quantitative terms. Thus, while operational actors need to enhance their qualitative assessment capacities, donors need to be more receptive to such data as evidence of programme impact. While there is a certain receptivity to such elements in the Somali context, the donor trends in Nairobi seem to be progressing in the opposite direction. As such, operational actors and researchers should invest in studying the impact that these changes have generated in Somalia as a means of generating an evidence-based argument for encouraging more positive change in Nairobi.

ANNEXES

List of organisations/ networks/consortia/coordination mechanism consulted

Organisation/ Network/ Consortia/ Coordination	Type of organisation	Country
ACTED	Non-Governmental Organisation	Somalia
ADESO	Non-Governmental Organisation	Somalia
Action for Relief and Development (ARD)	Non-Governmental Organisation	Somalia
Benadir Regional Administration	Government Agency	Somalia
Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS)	Resilience Consortium of NGOs led by the NRC	Somalia
COOPI	Non-Governmental Organisation	Somalia
Dahabshiil	Private sector, Banking	Somalia
Danish Demining Group	Non-Governmental Organisation	Kenya & Somalia
Danish Refugee Council Diaspora Programme	Non-Governmental Organisation	Global
Danish Refugee Council Kenya	Non-Governmental Organisation	Kenya & Somalia
DFID Nairobi	Donor Agency	Kenya
District Commissioner Baidoa	Government Agency	Somalia
ECHO Kenya	Donor Agency	Kenya
ECHO Somalia	Donor Agency	Somalia
EU Delegation in Kenya	Donor Agency	Kenya
GREDO	Non-Governmental Organisation	Somalia
Hebrew Immigration Aid Society (HIAS)	Non-Governmental Organisation	Kenya
IGAD	Intergovernmental Organisation	Regional
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centrer (IDMC)	IDP monitoring organisation led by NRC	Global
International Medical Corps	Non-Governmental Organisation	Somalia
International Organisation for Migration	UN Agency	Somalia & Kenya
International Rescue Committee	Non-Governmental Organisation	Somalia & Kenya
INTERSOS	Non-Governmental Organisation	Somalia
IRC New York - Urban Global	Non-Governmental Organisation	Global
IRW	Non-Governmental Organisation	Somalia
Joint IDP Profiling Services (JIPS)	Interagency service	Global
Kenyan Industrial Research & Development Institute (KIRDI)	National research institute	Kenya
Kenyan National Chamber of Commerce & Industry	National non-profit private sector	Kenya
Ministry of Interior and Local Government; South West State	Government Agency	Somalia
Nairobi City County, Ward Administrator	Government Agency	Kenya
National Commission for Refugees and IDPs (NCRI)	Government Agency	Somalia
National Industrial Training Authority (NITA)	National training authority	Kenya
NIS Foundation	Non-profit foundation	Somalia
Norwegian Refugee Council Kenya	Non-Governmental Organisation	Kenya & Somalia
Oxfam	Non-Governmental Organisation	Kenya

REACH	Joint Initiative of IMPACT, ACTED and UNOSAT	Somalia
Refugee Affairs Secretariat Kenya (RAS)	Government Agency	Kenya
Refugee Consortium of Kenya (RCK)	Non-Governmental Organisation	Kenya
Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat	Consortium of NGOs	Regional
Save the Children International	Non-Governmental Organisation	Somalia
SOAS	University	International
Somali Stabilization Fund	Multi donor agency	Somalia
Somalia Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management	Government Agency	Somalia
SWS Commissioner for Refugee-returnees & IDPs	Government Agency	Somalia
Technical & Vocational Education and Training Authority (TVETA)	National training authority	Kenya
UN Habitat Somalia	UN Agency	Somalia
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Kenya	UN Agency	Kenya & Somalia
World Bank	Donor Agency	Somalia
World Vision International	Non-Governmental Organisation	Kenya and Somalia
Xavier Project	Non-Governmental Organisation	Kenya

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ENDNOTES

1   Studies available at http://regionaldss.org/index.php/research-and-knowledge-management/redss-solution-analyses/somalia-solutions-analyses/#

2   Available at http://regionaldss.org//wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Early-Solution-Planning-Report-December-2016.pdf

3   In this case, the 'micro' refers to the level of lived experience as opposed to the formal macro level. It especially focuses on the individual. Organizationally, it refers to the front-line operational actors as opposed to those located in HQ or global level, who are more generally responsible for decision-making, operational guidance, and standards and concept development.

4   Details of these interviews are available in annex 2

5   Most interviews were conducted in 'out of context settings' (e.g.: office, community centres, etc).

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9   Sida, 2016, p.03. Bridging the humanitarian-development divide.

10   World Bank, 2017, p.2. Forcibly Displaced.

11   Kalin & Chapuisat, 2017, p.02. Breaking the Impasse

12   Ibid, p.05.

13   UN, 2016, para 75. New York Declaration; see also: IRC/ReDSS 2016, p.17. Study on Early Solutions planning.

14   For more details, please see the Inception Report in Annex 1

15   UNHCR 2017, p.55. Global Trends.

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25   IRC 2017, p.03. Urban area-based approaches in post-disaster contexts; Parker & Maynard, 2015, p.11. Humanitarian response to urban crises.

26   Global Alliance for Urban Crises, 2016. Urban Crises: Recommendations.

27   World Vision, 2016, p.04. Making Sense of the City

28   IRC 2016, Adapting Aid.

29   IRC 2016, p.07. Brief: Urban Response Practitioner Workshop

30   DFID 2012, p.02. Building Resilience in DRC; Hinds 2015, p.02. Relationship between humanitarian and development aid; see more recently: UN, 2016, para 38. New York Declaration.

31   World Vision, 2016, p.03. Making Sense of the City; World Bank (b), 2017, p.06. Cities of Refuge in the Middle East

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36   Kirbyshire et al. 2017 p.13. Mass displacement and the challenge for urban resilience

37   Easton-Calabria, 2017. Refugee Self-Reliance; see also: IASC 2007. MHPSS Guidelines.

38   See for example: Red Cross/Red Crescent & NGO Code of Conduct; the Core Humanitarian Standard; and more recently commitments emerging from the 2016 World Humanitarian Standard; and Berg et al. 2013. Cash and vouchers.

39   World Vision, 2016, p.03. Making Sense of the City; World Bank (b), 2017, p.19. Cities of Refuge in the Middle East

40   Betts, Bloom & Weaver 2015 p.02. Refugee Innovation

41   See for example: UN, 2016, para 85. New York Declaration.

42   World Vision, 2016, p.04. Making Sense of the City

43   Arnold-Fernández, E & S. Pollock, 2013. Refugees' rights to work.

44   Kirbyshire et al. 2017 p.16. Mass displacement and the challenge for urban resilience; Amnesty International 2015, p.07. A Conspiracy of Neglect.

45   Global Alliance for Urban Crises, 2016. Urban Crises: Recommendations.

46   World Vision, 2016, p.04. Making Sense of the City; Betts et al., 2014 p.04. Refugee Economies; Betts, Bloom & Weaver 2015 p.02. Refugee Innovation.

47   Please see further discussions on this in Annex 2.

48   More specifically, such solutions for refugees are achieved when they can once again enjoy the protection of a state in a durable and effective manner, whether through voluntary return to their country of origin, integration in their host country, or resettlement to a third country. Please see the 1951 Refugee Convention, p.15 article c.

49   IASC 2010, p.A-1. IASC Framework on Durable Solutions

50   In the case of refugees, durable solutions more specifically comprise of: return to their country of origin; local integration into the country in which they have sought refuge; or resettlement to a third country. See: UNHCR Solutions at: http://www.unhcr.org/solutions.html

51   IASC, 2010, p.07. Framework on Durable Solutions; see also: ReDSS Solutions Framework at: http://regionaldss.org/index.php/research-and-knowledge-management/solutions-framework/

52   Please see: http://regionaldss.org/index.php/research-and-knowledge-management/solutions-framework/; also see the Glossary of Key Terms in this document.

53   This is further developed in annex 2

54   IRC/ReDSS, 2016 p 39 study on Early solutions planning available at http://regionaldss.org/index.php/research-and-knowledge-management/redss-solution-analyses/somalia-solutions-analyses/#

55   IRC/ReDSS, 2016 p.07. Study on Early Solutions Planning

56   Crawford et al. 2015, p.11. Protracted Displacement; see also: UNHCR, 2004, p.01. Protracted refugee situations

57   World Bank, 2015, p.02. Eastern Africa HOA Displacement Study.

58   Kalin & Chapuisat, 2017, p.06. Breaking the Impasse

59   Ibid

60   ReDSS 2017 p.01. ReDSS Brief – CRRF Process.

61   Available at: http://refugees-migrants-civilsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Outcome-document-of-the-high-level-plenary-meeting-of-the-General-Assembly-on-addressing-large-movements-of-refugees-and-migrants-A.pdf

62   Available at: https://www.igad.int/communique/1519-communique-special-summit-of-the-igad-assembly-of-heads-of-state-and-government-on-durable-solutions-for-somali-refugees

63   See UNHCR at: http://www.unhcr.org/593e5ce27

64   See UNHCR at: http://www.unhcr.org/towards-a-global-compact-on-refugees.html

65   Available at: https://www.igad.int/attachments/article/1519/Annex to the Declaration -Final Plan of Action 11.04.2017.pdf

66   UN, 2016, para 75. New York Declaration.

67   IRC/ReDSS, 2016. Study on Early Solutions Planning.

68   ReDSS & Samuel Hall, 2015, p.09. Devolution in Kenya

69   IRC/ReDSS, 2016. Study on Early Solutions Planning.

70   UN, 2016, para 37. New York Declaration.

71   Available at: http://regionaldss.org/index.php/research-and-knowledge-management/solutions-framework/

72   Please see: http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/somalia

73   UNOCHA reports that 'women and girls are frequently victims of GBV within IDP communities, including rape and sexual assault, raising grave concerns about the safety and security in IDP sites'. See: UNOCHA, 2017, p.33. Humanitarian Needs Overview

74   From January to August 2017 more than 100,000 persons have been evicted throughout Somalia, representing a 15 per cent increase in forced evictions compared to the same period in 2016. See: UNOCHA, 2017, p.34. Humanitarian Needs Overview

75   UNOCHA, 2017, p.13. Humanitarian Needs Overview

76   See for example: Brookings, 2005. Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility.

77   A government respondent agreed that protection is difficult because there are no laws in place', adding that state capacity is also very limited.

78   'Local analyst' is a generic term used throughout this report to refer to a diversity of local actors whose capacity, position and/or expertise enabled them to provide more than insight into the lived experience, but also a broader critical analysis.

79   Poor land administration and a lack of land management systems, limited access to justice, poor legal and policy frameworks, and weak institutions are all listed as structural impediments to land tenure security and the perpetuation of this aspect of the crisis. See: UNOCHA, 2017, p.34. Humanitarian Needs Overview.

80   Kirbyshire et al. 2017 p.14. Mass displacement and the challenge for urban resilience.

81   For a recent and detailed account of these documentation issues, please see: NRC, 2017. Recognising Nairobi's Refugees.

82   Landau & Duponchel, 2011, p.02. Laws, Policies, or Social Position?

83   Similar observations are made by Kirbyshire et al. 2017 p.18. Mass displacement and the challenge for urban resilience.

84   Community networking is critical, with early warnings often being generated from within. A Community Leader explained that within his community 'the network is very strong; people will help each other' adding that 'we have developed a watsap group so people can be informed'.

85   The household level economics of Nairobi urban refugees and Somalia urban displaced are sketched further in annex 2.

86   Similar trends were reported in a recent study in Addis Ababa. See: Brown et al. 2017, p.02. Refugee Economies.

87   Betts, Bloom & Weaver 2015 p.03. Refugee Innovation

88   Pantuliano et al. 2012, p.54. Urban vulnerability and displacement; Brown et al. 2017, p.02. Refugee Economies

89   Remittances are estimated to amount to more than one billion USD per annum in Somalia by the Federal Government of Somalia, 2017, p.38. National Development Plan 2017-2019.

90   Arnold-Fernández & Pollock, 2013. Refugees' rights to work; Zetter et al. 2017 p.1. Refugee's Right to Work and access labor markets.

91   Kirbyshire et al. 2017 p.10. Mass displacement and the challenge for urban resilience; Brown et al. 2017, p.03. Refugee Economies.

92   See: The Kenya Refugee ACT section 16.4

93   See: The Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act 2011, www.nairobi.diplo.de/contentblob/3356358/ Daten/ 1788002/d_KenyanCitizenship_No12_of_2011.pdf

94   Pavanello et al. 2010, p.22. Hidden and exposed; NRC, 2017. Recognising Nairobi's Refugees.

95   See for example: World Bank 2013, p. 147. Skills development in the Informal Sector.

96   Reportedly the last such incident according to one group was less than one month earlier.

97   See for example: Landau & Duponchel, 2011, p.02. Laws, Policies, or Social Position?

98   An Ethiopian refugee in Eastleigh specifically noted 'growing tensions between the Somali refugees and Kenyans who are newly coming into the Eastleigh markets, especially at the level of hawkers'.

99   On the positive side, a wealthier group of hosts noted the increased job opportunities have come with the increased NGO activities, which they say has helped the host population to better support the IDPs, explaining that 'with these increased incomes, we have more resources to share'.

100 Please see: World Vision & Guay, 2015. Social Cohesion for a related literature review

101 See for example: IASC 2007. MHPSS Guidelines.

102 Easton-Calabria, 2017. Refugee Self-Reliance. These issues are also captured through a Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS) approach. Please see: IASC 2007. Guidelines on mental health and psychosocial support.

103 World Vision, 2016, p.03. Making Sense of the City; World Bank (b), 2017, p.06. Cities of Refuge in the Middle East

104 World Vision, 2016, p.03. Making Sense of the City

105 Tandon, 1984, cited in Pantuliano et al. 2012, p.54. Urban vulnerability and displacement.

106 Arnold-Fernández, E & S. Pollock, 2013. Refugees' rights to work.

107 Arnold-Fernández, E & S. Pollock, 2013. Refugees' rights to work; see also: Pavanello & Montemurro, 2010. Displacement in Urban areas.

108 Kirbyshire et al. 2017 p.16. Mass displacement and the challenge for urban resilience.

109 Amnesty International 2015, p.07. A Conspiracy of Neglect.

110 Sa'Da & Bianchi, 2014. Perspectives of refugees on returning to Somalia

111 Especially Somali refugees are associated with 'the Westgate incident', which refers to a September 2013 Al-Shabaab attack on the Nairobi Westgate Shopping Mall.

112 Indeed, host respondents in Ruiru for example spontaneously stated that 'we don't agree to have those ones here; we don't know if they are genuine or if they are al-Shabaab'.

113 World Vision, 2016, p.04. Making Sense of the City

114 Kirbyshire et al. 2017 p.19. Mass displacement and the challenge for urban resilience.

115 One of the main 'direct services' widely provided is emergency legal aid, especially in relation to the above-discussed arbitrary arrests and other police harassment of refugees in Nairobi.

116 Notably, for the World Bank, 'social protection' also includes activities such as: cash for work and public works designed to provide emergency income and livelihood support, as well as cash transfers and vouchers that can help ensure that populations gain access to essential services. World Bank (b), 2017 p.20. Cities of Refuge in the Middle East

117 Kalin & Chapuisat, 2017, p.07-10. Breaking the Impasse; World Bank, 2015, p.02. Eastern Africa HOA Displacement Study.

118 Please see the Global Cluster on Early Recovery, GCER, 2013, p.01. Implementing early recovery.

119 IRC 2017, p.03; 'Public Service Delivery in Contexts of Urban Displacement'.

120 World Bank (b), 2017 p.10. Cities of Refuge in the Middle East

121 Ibid, p.58.

122 At the same time, some responders explained that such efforts are sometimes constrained by donor criteria which pre-determines beneficiary selection.

123 See for example: DFID 2012, p.01. Building Resilience in DRC; Sida, 2016, Bridging the humanitarian-development divide; Betts & Collier, 2017, p.10. Refuge.

124 In this document, the notion of 'capabilities' is taken to reflect the basic question of: 'what is each person able to do and be? Please see: Nussbaum, 2011, p.18. Creating Capabilities.

125 Blay, 2017 p.01. Durable Solutions in Practice.

126 Please see the Glossary of Key Terms in this document.

127 Sausa et al, 2013, p. 246-7. Individual and collective dimensions of Resilience within political violence

128 Blay & Crozet, 2017, p.II. Durable Solutions in Practice.

129 Confirming that 'refugees know this is the policy', operational actors highlight that this compounds the challenges of understanding urban refugee vulnerabilities in that it motivates particularly vulnerable individuals to remain invisible.

130 Responders described self-reliance as 'people being able to accumulate wealth and productive assets to sustain themselves'.

131 However, as one NGO respondent stated, 'this is expensive; we need donors to agree'.

132 Arnold-Fernández & Pollock, 2013. Refugees' rights to work; Kirbyshire et al. 2017 p.15. Mass displacement and the challenge for urban resilience; Betts et al., 2014 p.05. Refugee Economies.

133 See for example: ReDSS & Samuel Hall, 2015, p.17. Devolution in Kenya

134 See reference to the 2030 vision at: https://www.kirdi.go.ke/index.php/core-divisions/vision-2030

135 British Red Cross 2012, p.08. Learning from the City; see also: Berg et al. 2013. Cash and vouchers; Urban Crises: Recommendations. Global Alliance for Urban Crises, 2016.

[136] Smith & Mohiddin, 2015, p.08. A review of evidence of humanitarian cash transfer programming

[137] Ibid

[138] This recalls an acknowledgement by the New York Declaration of 'a significant gap between the needs of refugees and the available resources' (see: para 86).

[139] One such respondent also underlined the importance of 'city planning' in relation to the capacity of urban centres to absorb the large-scale displaced populations.

[140] World Bank, 2017, p.1. Forcibly Displaced; see also: Sida, 2016, p.03. Bridging the humanitarian-development divide.

[141] Hinds 2015, p.02. Relationship between humanitarian and development aid.

[142] See for example: DFID 2012, p.02. Building Resilience in DRC; Hinds 2015, p.03. Relationship between humanitarian and development aid; UN, 2016, para 85. New York Declaration.

[143] As alluded to above, a number of NGO respondents lamented precisely the same thing.

[144] See Glennie & Rabinowitz 2013, p.11. Localizing aid; also see: IRC 2017, p.05, Public Service Delivery in Contexts of Urban Displacement; and IRC 2016. Learning from Lesbos

[145] This point was specifically highlighted by World Bank (b), 2017 p.21. Cities of Refuge in the Middle East.

[146] Kihato & Landau, 2017, p.02. Stealth Humanitarianism.

[147] Pantuliano et al. 2012, p.16. Urban vulnerability and displacement: a review of current issues.

[148] Deng, 1998. Guiding Principles, Principle number 28; see also: Brookings, 2005. Addressing Internal Displacement

[149] UNHCR, 2003, p.04-5. Framework for Durable Solutions; JIPS, 2016, p. 06. Internal Displacement Profiling; See also: Kalin & Chapuisat, 2017, p.06. Breaking the Impasse

[150] IRC 2017, p.05, 'Public Service Delivery in Contexts of Urban Displacement'

[151] World Vision, 2016, p.03. Making Sense of the City

[152] See for example: http://www.icj-kenya.org/jdownloads/Legal Opinions/legal_memo_on_repatriation of refugees.pdf; or http://www.icj-kenya.org/news/latest-news/91-court-decision-positive-to-realisation-of-refugee-rights

[153] Brown et al. 2017, p.03. Refugee Economies.

[154] Some donor respondents alluded to the idea that, as the national authorities lack receptivity, they themselves become more restricted in their engagement options.

[155] Indeed, urban experts suggested that 'when an NGO arrives to an urban centre, they should immediately check to see if the city has a master plan; they should determine the extent to which refugees are incorporated into the city planning'.

[156] ReDSS & Samuel Hall, 2015. Devolution in Kenya.

[157] Kihato & Landau, 2017, p.02. Stealth Humanitarianism.

[158] Ibid

[159] Hinds 2015, p.03. Relationship between humanitarian and development aid.

[160] See for example: ReDSS & Samuel Hall, 2015, p.16. Devolution in Kenya

[161] 2017, article #7. Nairobi Declaration; UN, 2016. New York Declaration, paragraph 69.

[162] Steets, 2011, p.40. Donor strategies for addressing the transition gap.

[163] Please see: http://www.tvetauthority.go.ke/

[164] Please see: http://www.nita.go.ke/

[165] Please see: http://www.kirdi.go.ke/

[166] One group argued that a strategic 'refugee training plan' should be developed, explaining that different individuals should be trained on different aspects of the value chain (e.g.: including production, packaging, marketing, sales, administration, maintenance of equipment, etc.) so as to create a production capacity that is sustainable through the collective effort.

[167] Language limitations are noted as a constraint in all such trainings.

[168] Please see: https://portal.kenyachamber.or.ke/

[169] Of course, the private sector issues and interests extend far beyond employment opportunities, however, exploring the wider issues was beyond the scope of this study.

[170] Tilmes, K. 2017. Helping Somalia attract private investment.

[171] Ibid

[172] Hormuud actually offers to help 'manage welfare/humanitarian activities'. See: https://www.hormuud.com/business/ services/evc-plus.aspx

[173] The Diaspora Emergency Action and Coordination (DEMAC) project is a channel through which this is taking place. Funded by ECHO and implemented by Danish Refugee Council, AFFORD-UK, and the Berghof Foundation, it aims to improve diaspora emergency response capacity and coordination with the humanitarian system. Please see: http://www.demac.org/sharing-knowledge/demac-publications

[174] Streets, 2011, p.36. Donor strategies; see also: Kalin & Chapuisat, 2017, p.07. Breaking the Impasse

[175] DFID 2012, p.02. Building Resilience in DRC; Hinds 2015, p.02. Relationship between humanitarian and development aid; see more recently: UN, 2016, para 38. New York Declaration.

[176] Urban experts assert that 'flexible and adaptive programming is especially required in the urban setting'.

[177] Steets underlines the importance for responders to 'organize their work according to the evolving needs of affected populations rather than abstractly defined assistance forms'. See: Streets, 2011, p.11. Donor strategies.

[178] 'Macro' is used in this sense to refer to HQ, regional, or global level actors, as opposed to micro-level actors who are those who are located at the ground level, primarily responsible for operationalizing the response.

[179] See for example: Core Humanitarian Standard at: https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/

[180] Source: http://www.participatorymethods.org/sites/participatorymethods.org/files/Arnstein ladder 1969.pdf

[181] Source: https://d2gg9evh47fn9z.cloudfront.net/thumb_COLOURBOX14991790.jpg

[182] IASC 2007. Guidelines for Psychosocial support

[183] Source: https://www.chesterfieldroyal.nhs.uk/images/About-Us/Dignity-Respect.PNG

[184] Source: https://bravogirl97.diplomaplus.net/image/full/229620.gif?1317460976

[185] See Crips et al., 2012.

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