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Protection Monitoring

Situation of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon

2nd Quarter 2026

Methodology

Since 2019, UNHCR – in partnership with multiple organizations – has conducted monthly Protection Monitoring (PM) surveys with Syrian refugees across Lebanon. As of January 2024, this activity was centralized and implemented by INTERSOS, with a representative sampling methodology based on the presence of the Syrian refugee population at both national and governorate levels. PM surveys aim to gather information on refugees' situation, analyze protection trends, assess gaps, and inform responses. This supports evidence-based advocacy and programming under the Lebanon Response Plan (LRP) and incorporates UNHCR's Age, Gender, and Diversity approach to identify vulnerabilities. Referrals for specialized services are made based on the needs identified.

The present report analyzes protection trends affecting Syrian refugees in Lebanon during the second quarter of 2026 (April-June). The PM data was gathered through two primary methodologies:

- **Household Surveys (HHS): 2,506 HHS** were conducted across all governorates in Lebanon, covering **12,250** household members including youth, women-headed households, and households with older persons or persons with disabilities (PWD). Of these, 26% were in person and 74% remote via phone.
- **Key Informant Interviews (KII): 208 KIIs** (67% male, 33% female) were conducted to verify findings, complement quantitative data, and provide deeper qualitative insights.

Additionally, PM outcomes are validated by triangulation with community sources, field expert insight, protection observations, UNHCR monitoring of protection incidents, also displacement and cross-border movements, and a range of secondary data published by other UN or INGO partners during the reporting period.

The escalation of hostilities on 2 March 2026 resulted in the displacement of refugee households (HHs) across Lebanon, with families seeking safety and support in other parts of the country or, in some cases, returning to Syria. The displaced refugees were systematically reached through UNHCR's Displacement Refugees Tracking Tool (DRTT) where their needs were identified and addressed through referrals to humanitarian assistance and hence this group was not covered through the PM surveys. This approach was introduced in Q12026 and continued throughout Q2 2026, with data collection divided between regular PM surveys and DRTT surveys. The analysis of DRTT data is included in the present report, to illustrate the specific needs and protection situation of secondarily displaced refugees. In total, **470 HHs** have been assessed under DRTT in Q2.

Key Highlights

- **Legal residency remains the most critical protection concern**, with 82% of refugees aged 15+ lacking valid legal residency, limiting freedom of movement, access to livelihoods and services, and increasing fears of arrest, detention, and deportation.
- **The March 2026 escalation has evolved into a protracted protection crisis**: an estimated 136,000 Syrian refugees were displaced in Lebanon, and by the end of Q2, 42% remained displaced, highlighting continued obstacles to return and recovery.
- **Returns to Syria remain cautious despite significant cross-border movements**: more than 491,000 Syrian nationals departed Lebanon for Syria between March and June 2026, yet intentions to return fell from 15% in January to 7% in June. Conditions inside Syria, particularly access to housing (34%) and livelihoods (33%), remain key determinants of return decisions.
- **Economic vulnerability remains widespread and is driving protection risks**: while 74% of Households reported income-generating activities, employment remains largely informal and insecure. 79% of HHs were unable to meet more than half of their basic needs, 45% relied on debt, and 91% carried outstanding debt.
- **Access to shelter and essential services remains constrained**: More than half (52%) of renting HHs were unable to pay their latest rent installment, while 53% of HHs could not access healthcare, primarily due to cost (95%). Food, shelter, and healthcare remain the most urgent needs.

- **Child protection concerns persist despite a decline in reported child labor:** the proportion of HHs reporting child labor fell from 26% to 20%. School attendance also declined from 42% to 40%, while school dropouts increased from 2% to 4%.
- **Community relations remain generally stable:** most HHs (94%) reported no increase in tensions with host communities, while support from host communities increased from 8% in Q1 to 23% in Q2. However, localized tensions related to employment, housing, services, and aid distribution persist.
- **Psychological distress continues to rise:** 43% of respondents reported psychosocial distress, up from 38% in Q1, with economic hardship identified as the primary driver by 77% of affected households.

Operational Context:

Despite the ceasefire initially announced on 16 April 2026 and subsequent diplomatic efforts, the **humanitarian and protection situation in Lebanon remained highly fragile** throughout Q2. Although the intensity of hostilities declined compared to March, repeated airstrikes, shelling, displacement orders and localized military operations continued, particularly across South, El Nabatieh, Bekaa, and Beirut's southern suburbs. Continued insecurity, Israeli military presence in parts of southern Lebanon, and widespread contamination by unexploded ordnance delay recovery, restrict humanitarian access, and prevent safe and dignified returns of internally displaced populations, including Syrian refugees. Significant funding shortfalls increasingly constrained the delivery of protection, shelter, health, GBV and child protection services. By mid-June, the revised Lebanon Flash Appeal remained only one-third funded while the needs remained high and the reduced response capacity widened humanitarian gaps.¹

During Q2 2026, Lebanon's humanitarian context was increasingly characterized by a **severe and deteriorating protection crisis**, driven by continued hostilities, sustained and recurrent displacement, worsening economic vulnerability, damage to critical infrastructure, and growing constraints on access to basic services and humanitarian assistance. The cumulative effects of insecurity, displacement, livelihood disruption, and social strain heightened protection risks across affected populations and further undermined prospects for safe, voluntary, and sustainable return and recovery.²

For Syrian refugees, these developments **compounded pre-existing vulnerabilities** associated with prolonged displacement, poverty, dependence on humanitarian assistance, and limited livelihood opportunities, while increasing pressure on host communities and local service providers.³ Also, documentation requirements, legal residency challenges, and restrictive administrative measures continued to disproportionately affect refugees, limiting freedom of movement and access to employment, essential services, and humanitarian assistance while reinforcing protection risks and social exclusion. Prolonged displacement, conflict, and declining livelihood opportunities further eroded household resilience. Increasing reliance on debt and negative coping strategies including child labor, exploitative work, and reduced spending on food, healthcare, and education coincided with growing humanitarian needs and declining response capacity.

Secondarily **displaced refugees' movements** throughout Q2 were characterized by repeated and non-linear displacement rather than large-scale durable returns to the pre-conflict places of residence. Many refugees undertook temporary "go-and-see" visits or adopted split-family arrangements while assessing security conditions, affordable housing availability, and access to livelihoods and services. Repeated displacement became more common as insecurity, housing shortages, and financial constraints prevented many refugee households from either sustaining displacement or returning safely.

Cross-border movements between Lebanon and Syria also continued throughout the quarter, with more than 491,265 Syrian nationals crossing from Lebanon to Syria since March 2026.⁴ However, these movements did not translate into durable returns, as challenges with access to housing, land and property, livelihoods and education continued to prevent sustainable reintegration. At the same time, around 132,000 Syrians who arrived following the political changes in Syria since December 2024 continue to remain in Lebanon, facing persistent legal, economic, and protection challenges.

While the intensity of active hostilities remained quite intense in April 2026, the end of Q2 marked a shift from an emergency displacement crisis to a protracted humanitarian crisis.

In Q2, the Lebanese authorities continued to implement measures aimed at regulating the presence and movement of Syrian nationals, including enforcement of residency requirements, increased municipal oversight, and security measures targeting individuals without valid legal status. On 25 June 2026,⁵ the General Security Office (GSO) extended the [deadline for work and sponsorship-based regularization](#) of legal residency for Syrian nationals until 30 September 2026. The extension provided Syrians working in Lebanon with additional time to obtain work permit or sponsorship-based residency, reducing immediate risks of irregular stay and enforcement measures. However, it prolonged uncertainty for those unable to meet the requirements, and maintained pressure on working refugees to transition to labor-based legal status, potentially affecting their access to protection mechanisms and increasing dependence on employers or sponsors.

Situation of post-December 2024 arrivals

What began as an emergency influx in December 2024 has, eighteen months later, evolved into a [protracted displacement situation](#), with the number of post-December 2024 arrivals in Lebanon remaining mainly intact. More than 132,000 Syrians who fled following the change of government in Syria remain in Lebanon, with the largest concentrations in Bekaa and Baalbek/Hermel, followed by Akkar, with smaller numbers in Beirut/ Mount Lebanon (BML) and South often due to secondary movements after initial displacement. While they arrived seeking immediate safety, findings indicate that legal insecurity, lack of documentation and severe barriers to employment and access to basic services and humanitarian assistance on par with the long-staying Syrian refugee population continue to hinder their ability to achieve stability and self-reliance.⁶

We did not come looking for assistance; we came because we no longer felt safe in our homes. - Syrian community leader, Al-Rihaniyeh, Akkar

[Legal status and residency remain the primary protection concern](#) among post-December 2024 arrivals. Consequently, fear of detention and deportation due to lack of documentation to prove their stay in Lebanon continues to limit freedom of movement and access to employment, healthcare, education, and humanitarian assistance, while also discouraging interactions with authorities. These risks were particularly acute in Hissa (Akkar) and Jabal Mohsen (Tripoli), where Key Informants (KIs) reported heightened protection concerns, with many individuals restricting their movements for fear of arrest or deportation. In Jabal Mohsen, these vulnerabilities were further exacerbated by overcrowding following the arrival of IDPs from southern Lebanon.



Several families lost their civil documents during displacement, making it difficult to access services or prove family relationships. - Lebanese Community leader in Zabboud, Baalbek/Hermel

Key informant interviews conducted in Q2 identified [housing insecurity](#) as another protection concern, driven by rising rental costs, overcrowded living conditions, and limited livelihood opportunities. These challenges were particularly evident in Jabal Mohsen (North) and Hissa and Masoudiyeh (Akkar), where post December 2024 arrivals reported difficulties securing and maintaining adequate housing. KIs in Riyak (Bekaa) reported in June that post-December 2024 arrivals face heightened protection risks compared with longer-term refugees. KIs also reported that socioeconomic pressures and competition over limited resources have contributed to tensions between post-December arrivals and host communities.

Limited livelihood opportunities also contribute to tensions between long-term Syrian refugees and post-December 2024 arrivals. Similarly to long- refugees, many post-December 2024 arrivals had to choose informal employment where they faced exploitation, including wage theft, underpayment, and harassment. Women and girls reported heightened risks of sexual harassment in the workplace, while people with disabilities (PwD) and minority groups experienced discrimination and exclusion from employment opportunities. KIs in Tabbaneh

and Rachine (North) reported [competition over scarce employment opportunities](#) between the two groups negatively affecting social cohesion.

The 2026 conflict further exacerbated vulnerabilities among post-December 2024 arrivals by triggering secondary displacement and repeated movements in search of safety. These displacement dynamics compounded existing socioeconomic pressures, including high rental costs, overcrowded and inadequate shelter conditions, risk of eviction, and limited capacity to meet basic needs. Financial constraints and a lack of viable shelter alternatives compelled some individuals, particularly men, to remain in areas affected by hostilities, heightening their exposure to protection risks. Limited awareness of available humanitarian services further impeded access to assistance, while concerns over renewed hostilities continued to undermine perceptions of safety and stability.⁷

Returns and cross-border movements

As of June 30, 2026, a total of [655,732 Syrians known to UNHCR](#) have been confirmed or presumed to have returned to Syria since January 2025. Among these, 78,128 Syrians were supported by UNHCR to return to Syria, including 60,836 through the Voluntary Return Program and 17,292 under the Return due to Force Majeure (RFM) program, while 577,604 spontaneously returned to Syria.⁸

Since the escalation of hostilities in Lebanon on 2 March 2026, Syrian authorities estimated that [581,409 Syrian nationals crossed from Lebanon into Syria](#), while Lebanese General Security Office recorded [491,265 Syrian departures](#) through official crossing points between 2 March and 26 June 2026⁹. The discrepancy between Syrian and Lebanese figures indicates that tracking remains challenging. Cross-border movements to Syria included both conflict-driven departures and previously planned returns, involving both UNHCR-registered refugees and other Syrians residing in Lebanon under various visa and sponsorship arrangements or returning after temporary visits.

[Return dynamics remain highly fluid](#), characterized by ongoing new movements, cautious returns, and persistent protection risks. Many HHs continue to undertake exploratory visits before deciding on permanent return, a trend also flagged through community sources, with insecurity, movement restrictions, damaged infrastructure, and limited access to services and livelihoods continuing to hinder safe and sustainable returns¹⁰. UNHCR border monitoring observed a slight increase in daily crossings during June, exceeding 4,500 Syrians per day. As the increase coincided with the end of the academic year and the beginning of the summer season, it may partly reflect seasonal mobility patterns rather than a major change in return intentions.

Notwithstanding the scale of return movements observed since January 2025, PM surveys¹¹ indicate that [intentions to return declined](#), falling from 15% in early January 2026 to 7% in June 2026. This is consistent with reports from community sources, which suggest that most refugees remain undecided and continue to monitor conditions before making a final choice. Although intentions to return remain a useful indicator, they do not necessarily result in actual movements, reflecting the gap between aspirations and the realities that influence decisions.

[Conditions inside Syria remain the primary factor](#) shaping return decisions, cited by 98% of respondents. Access to adequate housing has emerged as a minimum prerequisite for return, with one-third (34%) of refugees reporting that shelter-related concerns would cause them to reconsider returning. Similarly, access to livelihoods remains key, with 33% reporting that economic opportunities significantly influence their decision-making. Safety and security considerations also play a role. These perceptions are increasingly influenced by information shared by individuals who have returned to Syria and subsequently re-entered into Lebanon, reinforcing concerns regarding conditions on the ground and the sustainability of return.

KIs confirmed the above findings that although the majority of Syrian refugees wish and ultimately intend to return to Syria, [returns currently remain limited due to concerns over destroyed housing, lack of livelihoods, and limited access to basic services and insecurity](#). KIs also noted cases of spontaneous returns outside formal UNHCR mechanisms, often driven by economic hardship, eviction risks, or to assess conditions in Syria. In Mejdlaya, some HHs adopted split-family return strategies, while KIs in Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel reported cases of refugees returning to Syria but subsequently returning to Lebanon after finding conditions unsuitable for sustainable move back to Syria.

PM surveys further clarify that among HHs intending to return during Q2, over half (51%) reported planning to return within one to three months, representing an increase from 40% in Q1 and indicating a shift toward

medium-term return planning. A further 9% intended to return within three to six months, while another 9% planned to return within six to twelve months. Similar to Q1, financial assistance remained the primary support needed to facilitate return (36%), followed by transportation support (34%) and housing assistance (18%). Most households (93%) reported intending to return to their areas of origin, most commonly to Aleppo (27%), Homs (24%), Idlib (16%), and Damascus (12%) with 95% reporting intentions for permanent return.

Everyone hopes to return to Syria one day, but the biggest obstacles are housing, livelihoods, and the cost of starting all over again. - Syrian refugee in North

Displacement within Lebanon/ Secondly Displaced Refugees

The March 2026 escalation has [increased protection risks for Syrian refugees](#). Monitoring finds that they have faced additional challenges compared to Lebanese IDPs due to legal status constraints, including fear of arrest, movement restrictions, and barriers to accessing assistance or safer locations. Limited inclusion in the initial emergency response, such as access to collective shelters (CSs) left many refugees reliant on overcrowded informal settlements, unfinished buildings, rented accommodation, or host communities. Protection concerns included eviction risks, discrimination, labor exploitation, family separation, psychosocial distress, disrupted education, and heightened GBV risks. Following the ceasefire, many refugees remained displaced, with precautionary returns often reversed due to insecurity, damaged housing, limited services, and rising rents. Persistent legal residency barriers, socioeconomic hardship, and uncertainty over assistance continued to constrain both return and local integration options, leaving many refugees in prolonged vulnerability.

The UNHCR self-reporting survey conducted throughout June 2026 provided indications of the level of displacement among Syrian refugees. While 280,000 refugees resided in areas impacted by hostilities, some 172,000 reported to UNHCR that they were [directly impacted by the conflict](#) as they were residing in locations that were affected by two or more airstrikes, shelling or relocation orders. It is estimated that some [136,000 refugees have been internally displaced since the escalation of hostilities](#). At the end of Q2, 42% of these refugees [remained displaced](#) while 37% consequently [returned to their pre-conflict locations](#). In terms of the response, as of end of Q2, more than 26,000 displaced refugees have been individually assessed and referred to services by UNHCR and partners, 24% of them were persons with serious medical conditions, 9% PwD, 7% single-parent or caregiver households and 4% children at risk.

The findings of the UNHCR survey point to [continued displacement-related vulnerabilities](#), including reliance on rented accommodation, instances of no accommodation or collective shelter arrangements, and a [high proportion \(53%\) of children among affected individuals](#). Reported intentions further suggest that many HHs (55%) may remain in displacement locations in the near term, underscoring the need for sustained monitoring, protection follow-up, and targeted assistance, particularly regarding access to housing, given that all 18 refugee-designated collective sites are expected to close by the end of July 2026. High rents, overcrowding, exploitative rental practices, and limited housing options increase protection risks and repeated secondary displacement for refugees.

Syrian IDP households are mainly composed of women and children, as many men remain in the South for work, increasing safety risks for those living without male family members. - Male Lebanese KI, Chouf district

Analysis of UNHCR needs assessments conducted since the onset of hostilities indicates that, by the end of Q2, nearly half (45%) of displaced refugees were residing in rented accommodation, while 37% were staying with friends or relatives. A further 8% were accommodated in CSs, and almost 10% reported having no shelter arrangement. The predominance of rented accommodation also suggests increasing pressure on refugee household finances and a potentially growing reliance on cash-based support to sustain tenure and prevent

further displacement. The majority of assessed HHs (75%) remained displaced elsewhere within Lebanon at the time of needs assessment, while approximately 16% were displaced within their governorate of origin.

At the end of Q2, Mount Lebanon hosted the largest share of displaced refugees (26.6%), followed by Bekaa (19%), South (13.8%), North (12.3%) and Akkar (9.9%). District-level data showed significant concentrations in Zahle, Baabda and Saida, reflecting continued movement towards areas perceived as offering greater accommodation opportunities and access to services.

Food assistance emerged as the most frequently reported need (45%), followed by shelter support (27%), protection services (18%) and hygiene items (14%). These findings indicate that substantial humanitarian needs remain among surveyed HHs, particularly in relation to food security and access to housing. Consistently with these needs, cash assistance was the most requested form of service (79%), substantially exceeding all other forms of support. This indicates that HHs increasingly prioritize flexible assistance to cover basic needs, including rent, food, transportation and other essential expenditures.

Onward Movements


Irregular maritime movement remained low in Q2. According to IOM, irregular travel of Syrians by sea as of June 2026 accounts for only 1% of all Syrian exits from the country, consistent with Q1.¹² Across all locations, KIs reported no confirmed cases of irregular onward movement by sea or air during Q2. However, discussions and inquiries related to irregular migration have reportedly become increasingly frequent. In Q2, UNHCR's National Call Center received 23 calls related to onward movement intentions. The highest number of calls was recorded in May, indicating a temporary increase in interest in potential onward movements

KIs in Qab Elias/Bekaa reported that some individuals had been actively seeking information on opportunities to leave Lebanon, including through irregular pathways, driven by limited livelihood opportunities and deteriorating socio-economic conditions. Similarly, KIs in Qobbeh and Bireh (Bekaa) noted increasing interest in irregular sea migration, particularly through potential departures from Akkar coast and Tripoli, despite widespread awareness of the associated risks. In ML, while no departures were reported, the KI in Nahr Ibrahim indicated that some displaced Syrians, particularly minors, had considered attempting irregular boat journeys from Syrian ports toward Türkiye or Europe. These attempts were reportedly prevented or discouraged by their parents, suggesting that although discussions around irregular migration are emerging, actual onward movements remain limited.

Administrative measures and protection environment


29% of HHs reported being subjected to at least one administrative measure in Q2. The prevalence has increased steadily over the quarter, rising from 24% in April to 29% in May and 34% in June. Reported measures included arbitrary municipal taxes and fees, movement restrictions such as curfews, checkpoint enforcement, and increased security patrols. In total, UNHCR recorded 149 incidents of administrative measures across Lebanon (177 in Q1), with the highest concentration reported in North and Akkar (55%), followed by South and BML (21% each), and Bekaa (4%).¹³

Reported administrative measures



In Q2, taxes and fees continued to be the most commonly reported administrative measure (11%), similar to Q1. However, the geographic distribution shifted. Reports declined slightly in Akkar (by 27% - a 5% decrease from Q1) and in the Bekaa (by 18% - a 3% decrease from Q1) and in Baalbek (by 14% - a 9% decrease from Q1), while no significant reports of imposed taxes and fees were recorded in BML, South or Nabatieh. As in Q1, municipal and waste management fees were among the most frequently reported charges, particularly in areas hosting large refugee populations.

Arbitrary taxes and fees




Movement restrictions, including curfews, remained the second most reported administrative measure (8%), although prevalence was highly concentrated in areas affected by insecurity and recent conflict. In South and Nabatieh, where communities have experienced heightened security measures and increased military and security presence, 19% of HHs reported facing movement restrictions. Checkpoints and increased security patrols were reported by 6% of HHs. The localized nature of these restrictions suggests that administrative measures were closely linked to prevailing security conditions, but their impact remained disproportionate for refugees due to existing vulnerabilities related to residency status and socio-economic dependency.



We limit our contact with the host community and restrict our movements to avoid tensions. - Syrian KI, El Meten district

Municipal-level measures also remained a significant concern. While municipalities retain authority to implement local regulations, including curfews and administrative requirements, inconsistent application across locations has resulted in a fragmented protection environment, with refugees facing different restrictions depending on their area of residence. KIs reported localized curfews in several areas, including Chhim and Dakoue. In Menieh, North, KIs reported that fear of arrest at checkpoints and movement restrictions have limited Syrians' ability to travel to Beirut and Jbeil for work, forcing some to rely on seasonal agricultural employment. In Saghbine (Bekaa), KIs reported that municipal curfew violations may result in the confiscation of vehicles and motorcycles, while KIs in Achrafiyeh (BML) noted that many refugees are unable to register their motorcycles due to documentation barriers, considerably constraining their mobility.

Localized curfews and checkpoint restrictions prevent refugees from accessing employment, especially for those engaged in informal labor requiring early morning or late evening travel. In some municipalities, restrictions on movement and increased scrutiny at checkpoints reportedly resulted in refugees avoiding certain areas or reducing their mobility due to concerns about documentation checks and potential arrest.



Protection Trends

Social cohesion and community tensions

Community relations remained generally stable in Q2 despite ongoing socioeconomic challenges, displacement, return movements, and the evolving post-emergency context. Most assessed HHs (94%) reported no increase in tensions with host communities, although this represents a slight decline from Q1 (98%). Reports of violence or social tensions remained limited (3%), suggesting that while widespread intercommunal tensions were not reported, localized frictions persisted. KIs consistently linked these localized tensions to rising living costs, limited employment and livelihood opportunities, housing shortages, increased rental prices, and pressure on public services.

Qualitative findings indicated that relations between refugees and host communities were generally characterized by coexistence and day-to-day cooperation. Positive relations were most commonly reported in areas where refugees had established long-term social and economic ties with host communities. In several locations, HHs described increased solidarity during periods of insecurity, including support through food sharing, transportation, temporary accommodation, informal financial assistance, and livelihood opportunities.

Reflecting these trends, the proportion of HHs reporting awareness of support provided by host communities increased from 8% in Q1 to 23% in Q2.


Informal support mechanisms played an important role in helping HHs cope with reduced humanitarian assistance and continued economic hardship. Support included access to information on available services (27%), rent reductions or delayed rental payments (23%) and obtaining essential items on credit (19%).

At the same time, support within refugee communities remained an important coping mechanism. HHs frequently rely on family and community networks for information-sharing, temporary accommodation, financial assistance, and support to displaced. These informal networks remained critical in helping vulnerable HHs manage ongoing economic pressures and reduced humanitarian assistance levels.

Similar to Q1, political, cultural and religious differences remained the most frequently reported driver of tensions (49%), while competition over lower-skilled employment (24%) and access to services (10%) also remained recurring concerns, with slight increases compared to Q1.

Most tensions between Syrian refugees and the host community are driven by limited job opportunities and competing economic interests. - Syrian KI (displaced refugee), Beirut district

Main Sources of Inter-Community Tensions



In addition, as per UNDP's Tensions Monitoring System,¹⁴ the fluid displacement and return environment observed during Q2 contributed to both solidarity and tension. While communities often supported displaced HHs through informal assistance, the pressure placed on housing, shelters, services, and local resources increased the risk of localized friction between affected populations and host communities.

KIs reported incidents of verbal harassment, stigmatization, social exclusion, and pressure on refugees to return to Syria. Refugees also reported challenges accessing rental accommodation, with some landlords prioritizing Lebanese households affected by the conflict. Post-Dec 2024 arrivals generally faced greater difficulties securing housing and establishing community networks compared to long-term refugees.

When some young people see that someone is Syrian, they make fun of them and say: "Hey, Syria!". - Syrian head of household, Bqosta

Perceptions of unequal access to humanitarian assistance continued to affect community relations. KIs, particularly in hard-to-reach areas in South (Ain Qania, Fardis, Chebaa, Qlayaa, and Rmeish), as well as Saida, BML (including Hamra, Borj Hammoud, Aalmet, Joub Jannine, Ain Zebde, and Zouq Bhanine), North (particularly Mina), and Bekaa (Riyak) reported concerns over perceived disparities in assistance. Refugees reported that Lebanese IDPs were prioritized for shelter and assistance, while some host community members perceived Syrians as receiving a disproportionate share of aid. Although these perceptions varied by location, they contributed to localized mistrust and tensions around assistance distributions. Tensions Pulse reporting


throughout Q2 highlighted also that narratives surrounding aid distribution, particularly during periods of displacement and return, continued to influence trust between communities and humanitarian actors¹⁵.

Legal residency and civil documentation

Q2 indicated that the lack of legal residency remains one of the **most critical protection concerns** affecting long term Syrian refugees and post-December 2024 arrivals across Lebanon. Consistent with Q1, the proportion of individuals aged 15 and above without valid legal residency remained high at 82% in Q2. The gender distribution also remained largely unchanged, with women and men experiencing similar levels of residency insecurity (49% each).

While the majority of refugees reported possessing some forms of basic identity documentation, **access to the documents required for residency regularization**, particularly valid passports and proof of legal entry, remains a key obstacle. Between Q1 and Q2, the proportion of refugees holding a Syrian national ID increased from 62% to 71%, while reliance on Syrian civil extracts or family booklets decreased from 29% to 21%. However, access to documents required for residency procedures remained limited. Only 1% of refugees reported holding a valid Syrian passport in Q2, compared with 2% in Q1, while the proportion holding expired passports declined from 4% to 2%. The proportion of individuals reporting no documentation remained unchanged at 1%.

Household Concerns on Legal and Civil Documentation



The proportion of HHs with **children born in Lebanon** remained unchanged in Q2 (68%). While the proportion of children holding Lebanese birth certificates **increased from 81% in Q1 to 90% in Q2**, reliance on birth notifications decreased from 10% to 4%. In Q2, a small proportion of HHs reported holding birth documents issued in Syria (3%) or birth certificates issued through the Syrian Embassy (3%). Nevertheless, 1% of children remained without any form of birth documentation in both quarters, leaving them at risk of statelessness and reduced access to rights and services.

While legal and civil documentation assistance remained available in many parts of the country despite escalation, transportation costs, distance to service providers, unclear procedures, and limited-service provision impacted the access of refugees to legal services.

Q2 further highlighted the persistent **barriers preventing refugees from obtaining legal residency**. The most frequently reported obstacles were the **inability to secure a sponsor** (26%), **insufficient financial resources** to complete the residency process (25%), and **irregular entry into Lebanon** (17%). Other reported barriers included the inability to afford sponsorship costs (if ineligible for fee waiver) (13%), lack of required documentation (10%), delays in obtaining UNHCR housing attestation appointments (2%), waiting for GSO appointments (1%), and previous deportation orders (1%). These findings are consistent with Q1.

KIs further highlighted that **delays in obtaining UNHCR appointments** for file renewal or housing attestations required for GSO procedures continue to hinder residency renewal. According to the VASyR results, this issue has consistently been reported by 2% to 5% of refugees as a challenge over the years. The highest proportion was recorded in 2022, when 5% of refugees identified it as their main challenge. In 2025, the figure was 2%.

Expired residency may result in fines reportedly exceeding LBP 5 mln, which most refugees are unable to afford, increasing the likelihood of remaining without legal status. Although the GSO extended the work/sponsorship based legal residency regularization period for Syrians until September 2026, obtaining and renewing work or sponsorship-based residency remains challenging.

KIs consistently identified legal status and documentation constraints as among the main factors shaping protection risks across assessed locations. Across multiple locations including Hissa (Akkar), Dhour El Hawa, Zehriyeh, Aaba, Saadnayel, Al Ain, Jabal Mohsen (Tripoli), Maqne, and Hermel, KIs reported that refugees, particularly adult men, continued to fear arrest, questioning, or deportation while passing through checkpoints or travelling outside their immediate areas of residence and communities. These restrictions led many HHs to intentionally restrict their movements as a protective coping strategy, affecting their ability to seek employment, access essential services, and engage with humanitarian or administrative processes.

Without legal residency, people are afraid to move because they don't know if they will be stopped at the next checkpoint. - Syrian community leader, Akkroum Akkar

In Deir El Ahmar (Rachaya), permanent checkpoints reinforced fears of movement restrictions, although no direct arrests were reported. Similarly, in Bazbina (Akkar), KIs linked the lack of legal documentation to broader socioeconomic pressures, including declining humanitarian assistance and reduced access to services, noting that these factors had contributed to some refugees returning to Syria.

Even refugees with legal papers are worried about deportation after any security measures. - KI Syrian concierge, North


Communities with higher levels of legal documentation and more stable living conditions reported comparatively lower protection risks. In both Khirbet Rouha and Mdoukha (Rachaya), most refugees reportedly possess valid legal documentation, enabling safer movement and reducing exposure to protection risks. In Mdoukha, many refugees have also lived in the area since before 2011 and secured more stable housing arrangements, further contributing to a relatively stable protection environment compared to locations where residency insecurity remains widespread.

Access to Shelter, Basic Services, and Livelihoods

Shelter Conditions and Access

Although the proportion of HHs reporting concerns related to eviction declined from 31% in Q1 to 24% in Q2, PITT data recorded an increase in eviction-related incidents, including both eviction notices and implemented evictions: eviction notices increased from 367 to 566, while individual evictions rose from 100 to 284. This reflects the different nature of the two data sources: the PM surveys measure the prevalence of perceived eviction risk across the refugee population, whereas UNHCR's Protection Incidents Tracking Tool (PITT) captures individual cases reported through protection channels (NCC, case-management). The increase in PITT incidents suggests that eviction-related challenges became more severe among affected HHs in Q2, despite a lower overall proportion of HHs reporting eviction concerns. These findings indicate that **housing insecurity remained a significant protection concern**.

The reduction in average monthly rent levels from USD 262 to USD 117 between April and June slightly improved affordability for many refugees. However, by the end of Q2, 52% of HHs reported being unable to



pay their most recent rent instalment, indicating that [reduction in rental costs alone was still insufficient to address their ability to secure and maintain adequate housing](#). Continued difficulties in meeting rental obligations placed many families at risk of eviction, displacement, or reliance on precarious shelter arrangements.

KIs reported that shelter conditions deteriorated in several locations as Collective Shelters (CSs) reached near full capacity following increased displacement, leaving some displaced families with limited alternatives. As a result, many Syrian displaced resorted to [informal and inadequate accommodation](#), including unfinished buildings, informal tented settlements, vehicles, and public spaces. Housing insecurity was further compounded by reported exploitative rental practices, including significant rent increases, requests and conditions of multiple months' rent in advance, and other conditions that created additional barriers for refugees already facing financial hardship and further increasing the risk of eviction and repeated displacement.

[Discriminatory practices](#) affecting refugees' access to shelter were also reported across multiple locations. KIs noted that CSs prioritized Lebanese IDPs or imposed documentation requirements that excluded many refugees. In addition, movement restrictions linked to irregular legal status further constrained refugees' ability to access safer accommodation or relocate to safer areas. Consequently, many refugees remained reliant on overcrowded, substandard, or insecure housing arrangements, increasing their exposure to protection risks and repeated displacement.

All Syrians returned to Kfaremen even though it is still not safe, but we were afraid that landlords would rent our houses to Lebanese when they return, especially since many houses were destroyed. - Syrian returnee to Kfaremen, Nabatieh

Access to Services and Basic Needs

Refugees continued to face constraints in accessing essential services and meeting their basic needs: 79% of HHs reported being [unable to cover more than half of their basic needs](#) (82% in Q1). This marginal improvement did not translate into meaningful reductions in vulnerability, as limited income, living costs, and insufficient coping capacity continued to affect households' ability to access essential goods and services.

[Priority needs remained unchanged](#) from Q1, with food and nutrition (35%) and rent and shelter (32%) identified as the most urgent needs, followed by healthcare and medication (19%). [Healthcare also remained the least accessible service](#), reported by 28% of HHs, while education (9%) and legal services (7%) were identified less frequently. Qualitative findings indicate that access to healthcare was particularly challenging in several conflict-affected areas due to reduced functionality of hospitals and primary healthcare centres, shortages of essential medication, and the high cost of transportation and treatment. These barriers disproportionately affected older persons, PwD, and individuals requiring regular or specialized medical care due to complicated medical conditions.

KIs across all regions highlighted that [humanitarian assistance remained insufficient](#), unevenly distributed and unable to meet the scale of needs. Refugees frequently perceived that assistance was prioritized for Lebanese IDPs, while refugees living outside CSs were often less visible in response efforts and relied heavily on informal community support. At the same time, access to specialized services, including Mental Health and Psycho-social support, child protection, and GBV services, remained limited despite continued and increasing needs due to displacement and subsequent factors including overcrowded shelters.

We have noticed a reduction in humanitarian services since the change of the regime in Syria. - Syrian KI, North Lebanon

Beyond financial hardship, [access to services](#) continued to be affected by multiple barriers, including high transportation costs, insecurity, damaged infrastructure, legal documentation concerns, and fragmented service provision. Information about available assistance was primarily shared through informal channels, such as word of mouth and community networks, creating challenges for refugees with limited social connections or mobility constraints to identify and access services. The provision of humanitarian assistance was described by refugees as overstretched and insufficient to meet the scale of needs, particularly in conflict-affected areas in South.

W *We have no other choice but to stay here in danger, trapped without proper food, medicine, or electricity. We are just praying that this ends soon. - Syrian, head of household, Kfaremen, Nabatieh*

Access to Livelihoods

Employment continues to be characterized by **informality, insecurity, and low earning potential**. Similar to Q1, 74% of HHs reported engaging in income-generating activities. However, employment remained largely informal. Most HHs relied on occasional or seasonal work (43%), while reliance on **regular part-time employment increased** from 31% in Q1 to 40% in Q2. **Regular full-time employment declined** from 25% to 17% over the same period, suggesting a shift towards other forms of work, such as part-time or temporary.

The sectors in which refugees earned an income have not changed in Q2. **Construction remained the primary source of income** (46%), while engagement in agriculture increased from 17% to 26% and reliance on service-related activities declined from 40% to 24%. These findings indicate that refugees continue to rely primarily on sectors characterized by informal employment arrangements, seasonal and unstable work opportunities, limited social protection coverage, and higher occupational safety and health risks.

Qualitative findings indicate that livelihood opportunities were affected in Q2 by the combined effect of ongoing insecurity, displacement, and the prolonged economic crisis. KIs indicated that many refugees lost their jobs following displacement, while those who remained employed experienced fewer working days, reduced wages, and declining income as conflict disrupted economic activity. At the same time, rising living costs in certain areas further eroded refugees' purchasing power, leaving many unable to meet their basic needs despite continued participation in the labor market.

Displacement also reshaped local labor market dynamics. KIs reported that many refugees displaced from South Lebanon and Beirut relocated to northern parts of the country in search of employment, contributing to an oversupply of labor in areas where livelihood opportunities were already limited. Increasing competition for jobs, especially in agriculture, affected both refugees and Lebanese host communities. Agriculture, traditionally an important source of seasonal employment, became less viable as rising production costs reduced profitability, leading many farmers to reduce cultivation and further limiting work opportunities.

Economic vulnerability remained widespread. Nearly half of HHs (45%) reported relying on debt to meet their basic needs, reflecting the inability of irregular and low paying employment to generate sufficient income to cover essential expenses. Humanitarian assistance therefore continues to play an important role, with 50% of all respondents reporting receipt of some sort of assistance in 2025. However, among HHs facing barriers to assistance, 57% cited insufficient humanitarian resources, highlighting the persistent gap between growing needs and available support.

Access to Healthcare

Access to healthcare **remained one of the most critical concerns** in Q2. Similar to Q1, 53% of HHs reported being unable to access healthcare services. Affordability continued to be the primary barrier, with 95% of HHs unable to access healthcare, citing the cost of consultations, treatment or medication as the main reason, while only 5% reported the absence of health facilities in their area. These findings indicate that financial constraints, rather than the availability of services, continue to be the principal factor limiting access to healthcare.

Qualitative findings indicate that these financial barriers were compounded by significant geographic and conflict-related disparities in healthcare access. KIs reported that in conflict-affected areas in South, particularly in hard-to-reach locations, access to functioning primary healthcare centers remained limited, while insecurity and high transportation costs further reduced the ability to reach available services. For refugees, access was further constrained by the lack of coverage for war-related medical expenses, leaving many to bear the full cost of care, seek lower-cost alternatives or forgo treatment altogether.

Across several governorates, KIs also reported persistent shortages and high costs of medication, limited availability of medical equipment, and inaccessible health facilities. These barriers disproportionately affected older persons, PwD, and individuals requiring continuous treatment. In some locations, refugees resorted to

community fundraising to cover hospital expenses or informal support networks to finance hospital and treatment care.


The persistently high levels of household indebtedness further illustrate the financial pressures undermining access to medical care. Similar to Q1, 91% of HHs reported carrying existing debts. [Borrowing was primarily used to meet essential survival needs](#), including food (45%), and housing and accommodation (41%) while 12% HHs reported taking on debt to cover healthcare expenses. With limited income and competing priorities, many refugees faced difficult trade-offs between paying for healthcare and meeting other essential needs, increasing the likelihood of delayed treatment, interrupted care, or unmet health needs.

Child Protection

The escalation of the conflict and repeated displacement shaped child labor dynamics throughout Q2, particularly in the governorates most affected by hostilities, including South, ML, and Bekaa. The proportion of HHs reporting children engaged in child labor [decreased from 26% in Q1 to 20% in Q2](#). However, this reduction should not be interpreted as an improvement in children's protection. Rather, it reflects the disruption of livelihood opportunities resulting from continued insecurity, repeated displacement, and conflict-related economic shocks. As many refugees relocated or experienced multiple episodes of displacement, this most likely positively influenced the lower level of children's engagement in labor in Q2.


Significant geographic disparities were observed across governorates. The lowest prevalence of child labor was reported in conflict-affected governorates of South and Bekaa, where only 3% of HHs reported children engaged in work, compared to 29% in North, Beirut and ML. Qualitative findings suggest that these lower rates reflect the reduced local livelihood opportunities as well as are probably caused by self-imposed restrictions on movements and considerable displacement of refugee families with children. KIs in the South, particularly in Nabatieh and Marjeyoun and Bekaa (Chamestar), corroborate these assumptions reporting that child labor was largely absent because ongoing insecurity and displacement, movement restrictions, and the deterioration of local markets had eliminated work opportunities for both adults and children.

Child labour by governorate in Q2



During Q2, the perceived risk of child labor remained a persistent protection concern, increasing from 20% in April to 23% in May before declining to 18% in June 2026. The rise in May suggests heightened household economic pressure during the early post-ceasefire period, while the slight decrease in June indicates some easing of reported risk, though levels remained concerning.

Perceived risk of child labour in Q2




[Insufficient household income was the primary driver of child labor](#) (63%), followed by caregivers being physically unable to work (13%), underscoring the reliance on children as a coping mechanism in financially vulnerable households. This aligns with community reports indicating that worsening economic conditions and limited livelihood opportunities for adults were key factors contributing to children's involvement in work.

Syrian IDPs are doing everything they can to keep a roof over their heads. Many children work to help pay the rent because without that income, the family risks losing its home. – Syrian refugee community member/ IDP), El Meten district

Compared with Q1, Q2 showed a **decline in street-based child labor**. Street work decreased from 29% in Q1 to 9% in Q2, while the proportion of children exposed to high-risk street work environments declined from 35% to 17%. These changes may reflect the broader impact of the evolving security situation, including periods of heightened insecurity and movement restrictions that are likely to have reduced opportunities for street-based economic activities. However, the findings should not be interpreted as an improvement in children's protection outcomes, as they occurred within the context of continued economic hardship, limited livelihood opportunities, and persistent reliance on negative coping mechanisms among refugees.

Street working children and high risk environments



Education


The escalation of the security situation affected the education sector in Lebanon, particularly in South, Beirut, ML, and Bekaa. Many public schools **remained closed or were repurposed** as CSs for IDPs¹⁶. Among assessed HHs, the proportion of children attending school declined slightly from 42% in Q1 to 40% in Q2, while the proportion of children reporting to have recently stopped attending school increased from 2% to 4%. These findings suggest that, despite being collected among HHs not displaced by the escalation, children's access to education continued to be affected by the broader consequences of the conflict, compounded by ongoing economic hardship. These trends were further validated by community sources, which reported that access to education remained disrupted due to insecurity and uncertainty about the safety of sending children to school, while legal residency and documentation barriers, weak internet connectivity, electricity cuts, overcrowding, and limited access to devices continued to constrain remote learning opportunities.

Many Syrian IDP children dropped out of school after education shifted online, as families were unable to provide enough devices for their children to access learning. - Female Syrian refugee community member - Meten district

Distance to schools also became **a more significant barrier** in Q2 with the proportion of HHs identifying this constraint increasing from 19% in Q1 to 24% in Q2, reflecting reduced access to affordable and reliable transportation and broader disruptions to service accessibility.

Qualitative findings indicate that the impact of the escalation on education was considerably more pronounced among displaced refugees. Across the country, KIs reported that many Syrian children had dropped out of school during the conflict due to multiple barriers. These included the shift to online learning, which many families were unable to support because of limited access to electronic devices and reliable internet connectivity, as well as the inability to cover education related expenses such as internet fees. KIs also noted that many displaced refugees could not afford transportation costs for children to travel between their areas of displacement and their schools if in person classes resumed.

Education indicators Q1 vs Q2



Displaced Syrian refugees cannot afford education costs such as internet or transportation from displacement areas to their places of origin if schools reopened, making it difficult for children to continue learning. – Female refugee community leader, Maten district

Gender-Based Violence

Reported GBV concerns remained low in household-level data, with only 1% of assessed HHs reporting perceived GBV-related concerns. However, KIs and other community-based sources consistently indicated that women and girls continue to face heightened protection risks linked to displacement, deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, and inadequate living arrangements.

Domestic violence is rarely reported, as many women fear retaliation from their husbands and believe they will not receive adequate support. – Female refugee community member, El Meten district

Across assessed locations, KIs reported increased exposure to domestic violence, harassment, and other forms of violence against women and girls. Verbal harassment was reported in Nahr Ibrahim, Abou Samra, Qobbeh, Mennieh, and Tleil, with respondents noting restrictions on women's and girls' freedom of movement, particularly after dark. In Katermaya, Majdelyoun, Dalhoun, Bekaa, Baalbek-Hermel, Saida, Ain Qania, and Jezzine, domestic violence was identified as a growing concern, reportedly driven by financial strain, overcrowding, and displacement-related stress.

These findings are consistent with GBVIMS comparative analysis covering March to May 2026, which recorded a sharp increase in reported GBV incidents following the escalation of conflict in March. Women and girls represented the majority of survivors, while intimate partner violence accounted for nearly nine in ten reported incidents. Psychological violence and physical assault remained the most frequently reported forms of GBV.¹⁷

Economic hardship, displacement, and deteriorating living conditions were consistently identified as **key drivers of intra-household violence and family tensions**. Similar concerns were reported in Jounieh, Baddawi, Mazboud, Baysour, Ain Qania, and Saida, where overcrowding, lack of privacy, inadequate shelter conditions, and financial pressures were perceived to increase stress and tension within households.

Women and girls were also reported to face risks of harassment, exploitation, and discrimination in public spaces, workplaces, domestic work environments, and while accessing services. KIs highlighted instances of verbal and physical harassment, exploitative labor conditions, gender-based discrimination, excessive working hours, and low wages, particularly affecting women engaged in agricultural and informal work. Female-headed households, divorced women, and women employed in private households were identified as being at heightened risk. In Hissa (North) and Nahr Ibrahim (BML), concerns were additionally raised regarding potential sexual exploitation and abuse linked to access to services and public facilities.

Negative coping strategies further reflected these protection risks. In BML, Bekaa, and Baalbek-Hermel, women and girls reportedly restricted their movement, including avoiding travelling alone after dark. In Hebbariye, Nabi Shit, and Hermel, KIs reported concerns regarding early marriage as a coping mechanism adopted by some households facing severe financial hardship.

Shelter conditions continued to exacerbate GBV risks, particularly in CSs. Overcrowding, lack of privacy, inadequate lighting, shared sanitation facilities, and insufficient safety measures were reported as undermining the safety and dignity of women and girls. While some shelters had mitigation measures in place, overcrowding continued to contribute to household tensions and heightened risks of domestic violence. The reported exclusion of some refugees from CSs further increased exposure to potentially unsafe accommodation arrangements.

Discrimination, verbal harassment, and limited acceptance of displaced Syrians in Jounieh, particularly affects women wearing hijab, and is linked to differences in religious background. – Female Syrian refugee community leader - Kesserwan

Women and girls with disabilities faced compounded protection risks during displacement. According to the UN Women and LUPD Gender and Disability Alert,¹⁸ the loss of accessible infrastructure, assistive devices,

caregiving support, and community networks increased exposure to GBV, exploitation, and abuse while simultaneously limiting access to protection, complaint, and sexual and reproductive health services. These risks are likely underreported due to barriers to disclosure and limited disability-disaggregated data. This is further supported by broader assessments indicating that many CSs remain inaccessible for persons with disabilities, with inadequate sanitation facilities, limited privacy, and weak referral pathways increasing protection risks, particularly for women and girls with disabilities.¹⁹

Mental Health and Psychosocial Support

The escalation of hostilities affected the mental health and psychosocial wellbeing of refugees, including those who remained in areas of conflict. The crisis compounded the impacts of previous conflicts and Lebanon's protracted socioeconomic deterioration, with repeated displacement, loss, insecurity, and uncertainty contributing to increased psychosocial distress and protection concerns.


KIs identified persistent insecurity, uncertainty regarding the future, financial hardship, family separation, and the broader impacts of displacement as the primary sources of stress. The proportion of respondents reporting psychological distress increased to 43% in Q2, compared to 38% in Q1 and 18% in Q4 2025. While levels of distress were highest immediately following the escalation and declined after the ceasefire, findings suggest that **psychosocial needs remain elevated** due to ongoing protection risks and socioeconomic pressures. Qualitative findings from the national MHPSS coordination group similarly highlighted fear, hypervigilance, exhaustion, hopelessness, social withdrawal, and isolation as common emotional responses, reflecting the cumulative impact of repeated displacement and prolonged uncertainty.

BML recorded the highest proportion of respondents reporting psychological distress (57%), likely reflecting the concentration of displaced populations, high living costs, increased pressure on services, and housing and livelihood challenges. North and Akkar and Baalbek-El Hermel followed at 32% each, where economic hardship, limited livelihood opportunities, and continued uncertainty remained significant stressors. South and Nabatieh reported the lowest proportion of respondents reporting distress (12%). However, this should not be interpreted as an absence of psychosocial needs and may reflect differences in reporting patterns, coping mechanisms, or the prioritization of immediate survival concerns over the disclosure of emotional distress.

We keep our displacement status private and avoid attracting attention, as we do not feel fully accepted here. – Female Syrian refugee community member, Nahr Ibrahim, Jbeil

Across all governorates, **economic hardship remained the principal reported driver of psychological distress** (77%), consistent with Q1. This underscores the extent to which financial insecurity continues to affect mental wellbeing beyond the immediate impact of the escalation. Personal and family-related problems increased from 13% in Q1 to 16% in Q2 and were particularly prominent in North and Akkar (23%), suggesting that prolonged financial strain and uncertainty are increasingly affecting family dynamics and household coping capacities. Community sources similarly linked elevated levels of stress, anxiety, and psychological distress to repeated displacement, ongoing insecurity, and deteriorating economic conditions.

Top contributors to Psychological Distress



These findings were also consistent with the IOM MHPSS Needs Assessment,²⁰ which identified socioeconomic hardship as the primary driver of psychological distress, followed by conflict-related experiences, family conflict, caregiving burdens, discrimination, chronic illness, disability, and barriers to accessing healthcare. The assessment highlights the interconnected nature of protection, health, and socioeconomic challenges affecting refugee wellbeing.

For more information, please contact arjupin@unhcr.org

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- ¹ [DFS, Lebanon Crisis Situation Analysis \(Period: 22/06/26 - 28/06/26\) - June 2026](#)
- ² [OCHA revised Flash Appeal: Lebanon, March-August 2026 \(June 2026\)](#)
- ³ [Middle East Situation - UNHCR Revised Emergency Appeal for Lebanon \(March to August 2026\), 09 June 2026.](#)
- ⁴ As per Lebanese GSO, see [UNHCR Facilitated Return of Syrian Refugees - Lebanon - June 2026](#).
- ⁵ [UNHCR, GSO announcement on work permits and sponsorship visas - March 2026.](#)
- ⁶ [Summary of Findings from the 2026 Participatory Assessment with Post-December 2024 Arrivals from Syria, 22 July 2026.](#)
- ⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸ [UNHCR Facilitated Return of Syrian Refugees - Lebanon, June 2026](#)
- ⁹ [UNHCR Facilitated Return of Syrian Refugees - Lebanon, June 2026](#)
- ¹⁰ [UNHCR, Middle East Situation Lebanon - Flash Update #13, June 2026](#)
- ¹¹ [UNHCR, Syrian refugee Return: Snap Return Intentions, perceptions and a Qualitative Analysis, June 2026.](#)
- ¹² [IOM, Lebanon - Cross Border Movement \(18 - 27 June 2025\).](#)
- ¹³ Since January 2026 UNHCR launched the Protection Incidents Tracking Tool (PITT) that allows to systematically collect data about incidents that may have protection implications.
- ¹⁴ Tensions Monitoring System, Tensions Pulse, April - June 2026.
- ¹⁵ [Tensions Monitoring System, Tensions Pulse, 11-17 April 2026.](#)
- ¹⁶ [Public schools were closed and repurposed as collective shelters for IDPs.](#)
- ¹⁷ [UNFPA GBVIMS Comparative Narrative Analysis for April and May 2026 - July 2026.](#)
- ¹⁸ [UN Women – LUPD Gender and Disability Alert](#)
- ¹⁹ Ibid, relevant collective shelter accessibility assessments.
- ²⁰ IOM MHPSS needs assessment, presented at the PWG on 07 July 2026.