





**Inter-Agency
Coordination**
Lebanon

LCRP 2017 – Q1 FINANCIAL TRACKING

LCRP 2017 – Q1 FUNDING STATUS (OVERVIEW)



LCRP 2017 – Q1 FUNDING STATUS (BY SECTOR)




* US\$ 4.6 million was reported as received but not yet allocated to a sector

** Protection sector funding is a combination of General Protection (US\$15m), SGBV (US\$4.7m) and Child Protection (US\$9.75m).

LCRP 2017 Q1 VS LCRP 2016 Q1 (BY SECTOR)


(millions USD)




* Energy & Water were combined as one sector last year and thus comparison is only possible as the combination of the two sector.

LCRP 2017 Q1 VS LCRP 2016 Q1 (OVERALL TOTAL)

In amount of funding received
(millions USD)



Coverage of the total appeal amount



THANK YOU.



Key Social Stability Trends with Focus on Recent Labour Protests

Inter-sector meeting, 5 May 2017

Key Social Stability Trends 2017

1) Sense of insecurity and lack of interaction between communities are two key proximate causes of conflict.

Presence of IS are usually a source of tensions: Tensions are not necessarily a question of the absolute number of refugees or the resident/refugee ratio but of their visibility and locations

2) Competition for jobs is perceived as the most important conflict driver between communities.

3) These perceptions increasingly manifest themselves in practice with an increase in protests against Syrian labour competition and closure of Syrian-owned shops in several municipalities across Lebanon since the beginning of 2017

Key Social Stability Trends 2017

4) Most community tensions are intra-Lebanese but there is a risk that they will be projected onto the Syrian presence when conflict incidents occur.

Examples: In Bekaa, the perception of Syrians as a security threat has been instrumentalized in family or land disputes. This involves amongst others giving false information to security forces about 'suspicious Syrian activities' leading to their evictions to harm their landlord or employer (Conflict Analysis Report March 2017)

b) The host community is deeply divided between those benefitting from the refugees' presence and those who bear the brunt of increased resource and livelihood pressure associated with the refugees' presence

Example: Khirbet Daoud and El Bire under the umbrella of the Dreib El Awsat union of municipality issued a statement in March 2017 threatening to evict their refugee population if the UN does not provide more infrastructure support within three months. Yet, the statement is contested in the community as many host community members benefit from the refugees' presence through rent payment and cheap agricultural labour (Local Tension Mapping and Media Monitoring)

Key Social Stability Trends 2017

5) The refugee presence is increasingly being politicized and this will likely worsen with the upcoming parliamentary elections

Examples: Municipalities have threatened to evict refugees if they do not receive more aid (Khirbet Daoud, El Bire, Minyara) or to only accept new refugees if they receive particular support projects (Madjal Anjar)

It is not always clear to what extent labour competition related protests are orchestrated by the municipalities to receive more aid.

Labour Protests: Key Features

When?: Since the beginning of 2017

Where?: In more than 32 municipalities affecting rural as well as urban municipalities of different sectarian backgrounds and political affiliations in **Mount Lebanon** (Beirut Southern Suburbs, Iqlim Al-Kharoub), **Bekaa** (Ali El Nahri, Ghazze, Majdal Anjar, Zahle), **Baalbek** (Al Ain, Laboue, Nabi Osmane, Jdeideh) and in the **North** (Zgharta, Tripoli)

What?: Small-scale protests (40 to 100 protesters) against Syrian shops and Lebanese businesses employing Syrians

How?: Online mobilization via whatsapp, facebook groups

Addressed to whom?: Municipalities, Minister of Labour

Labour Protests: Key Features

1) Municipalities have reacted differently to these protests:

- a) Imposing regulations and taxes on Syrian shops (e.g. Majdal Anjar)
- b) Enforcing blanket closures of all Syrian shops in the area (e.g. Hadath, Naame in Mount Lebanon)
- c) Selected closure of specific shops (Tripoli and Al Beddawi)
- d) Threatened closure but shops reopened under Lebanese sponsorship/ownership (Bisarieh and A'aqbieh in the South)

→ The nature of the municipal response appears to be mediated by host community divisions

Labour Protests: Key Features

2) The timing of the protests is interesting because...

a) Concerns about Syrian-owned businesses and labour competition have been simmering for a long time

b) There has been no change in the law (Ministry of Labour's decision of 31 January 2017)

Labour Protests: Key Features

3) What explains the timing then?

- a) More political impetus behind the decision through greater inspection of foreign labour practices/companies by the Ministry of Labour
- b) Parliamentary elections (speculative)
- c) Seasonal effects: Higher unemployment rates during the winter period may have fueled frustration (speculative)

Labour Protests: Key Features

4) How many Lebanese have been losing their jobs to Syrians?

a) ILO (December 2016): Only one in six Syrian refugees are working. 88,5% are male. About two-thirds of working Syrian refugees reported **working less than 15 days**.


b) LBC (2 May 2017): The number of workers who have been arbitrarily laid off from their jobs at various institutions in 2016 is estimated **at 12 thousand employees**.

Labour Protests: Key Features

5) How big is the 'problem' of Syrian shops?

- a) In the 2016 USJ survey, **8% of Syrian refugees** indicated that they owned a business.
- b) 2013-2014 Lebanon Enterprise Survey: **'The inflow of Syrian refugees has led to an increase in Syrian-owned informal firms, but there is little evidence that they have displaced Lebanese firms'**

FIGURE 2.30 Creation of Informal Firms in Lebanon, by Owner's Nationality, 1984–2014



Source: 2013–14 Lebanon Enterprise Survey on the Informal Sector.

Q&A Labour Protests

- **I. Applicable Legal Framework**

1) What decision has MoL issued that many protests refer to? 31 January 2017 decision 1-41 on *'businesses, occupations and crafts, and jobs that must be limited to Lebanese only'*.

2) Is this decision new? No

3) Can Syrian refugees work? Syrians can work in the sectors of construction, agriculture and environment. Syrians can possibly work in other sectors as well, like other foreigners.

4) Can Syrians/refugees own a shop? No, the board of any Joint Stock and Limited Liability companies needs to have a majority of Lebanese nationals.

Q&A Labour Protests

5) What kind of regulations/fees can municipalities issue for businesses and Syrian workers?

- **Taxes/regulations:** No specific powers on regulating businesses besides health and safety regulations as well as taxes
- **Shop closures:** The procedure to follow would be an inspection of businesses by the MoL inspectors, a report of their illegal situation, followed by a request by the Minister of Labour to the Governor of the area to close the shops through a judicial police (not clear that includes municipal police)

Q&A Labour Protests

II. Current demonstrations, municipal measures and procedures to follow by partners

7) What should partners do/who should they should contact if a demonstration against refugees-owned shops in their area of intervention unfolds?

- → Immediately inform inter-agency & social stability co-chairs of the respective area (see annex 1).
- → Collect and pass on as much information as possible regarding the demonstrations (who?, how many?, why?, municipalities' reaction, host communities' position etc)

Q&A Labour Protests

8) Who should intervene and what solutions should be proposed?

- **Joint outreach by the sector co-chairs and partners working in the area** to show a united front and also give a full overview of ongoing interventions and support
- **Governors:** In most cases, the co-chairs would actually go first to the governor rather than outreaching directly to municipalities, and some governors have already requested partners to go through their office in such cases.

Q&A Labour Protests

9) Where can partners find information on the support that was already provided to municipalities?

- through [the map and table of support provided by the social stability sector to municipalities](#)
- Contact the social stability coordinators (contacts provided in the Q&A)

Escalation of violence

Trigger

Conflict events
(Lebanon Support Conflict Map)

Proximate

Sense of security and inter-group relations

Inter-community contact - Sense of safety and security - Concern over prolonged presence of refugees - Quality of relations between communities and level of prejudice - Propensity for collective action

Protection

Evolving

Trust in institutions & local community

Protection

Refugee population pressure
(Vulnerability Map)

Basic needs and livelihoods

(Change in status)

Basic Assistance, Education, Water, Health, Food Security, Livelihoods, Shelter

Capability and fairness of services and interventions

Basic Assistance, Education, Water, Health, Food Security, Livelihoods, Shelter

Structural

Tension and resilience landscape
(history of conflict, pre-disposition to accept refugees)

Protection

Methodology & Sampling Frame


Table A.2: Interviews Allocated
by Governorate (*muhafaza*)

Vulnerability	Interviews	Expected ME
Beirut	324	±6.0%
Bekaa	564	±4.5%
El Nabatieh	420	±5.2%
Mount Lebanon	1380	±2.9%
North	696	±4.1%
South	684	±4.1%
Baalbak-Hermel	450	±5.1%
Akkar	486	±4.9%
Total Sample	5004	±1.5%

Table A.3: Interviews Allocated
by District (*qade*)

District	Interviews	Expected ME
Akkar	486	±4.9%
Aley	204	±7.5%
Baabda	366	±5.6%
Baalbek	420	±5.2%
Bcharre	30	±19.6%
Beirut	324	±6.0%
Bent Jbeil	84	±11.7%
Chouf	288	±6.3%
El Batroun	78	±12.2%
El Hermel	30	±19.6%
El Koura	78	±12.2%
El Meten	336	±5.9%
El Minieh-Dennie	186	±7.9%
El Nabatieh	204	±7.5%
Hasbaya	54	±14.6%
Jbeil	60	±13.9%
Jezzine	54	±14.6%
Kesrwane	126	±9.6%
Marjaayoun	78	±12.2%
Rachaya	42	±16.6%
Saida	360	±5.7%
Sour	270	±6.5%
Tripoli	222	±7.2%
West Bekaa	192	±7.7%
Zahle	330	±5.9%
Zgharta	102	±10.6%
Total Sample	5004	±1.5%

Figure B.3: Cadasters Selected for Survey Sample Map



THANK YOU!