



CCCM CLUSTER  
SUPPORTING DISPLACED COMMUNITIES  
[www.cccmcluster.org](http://www.cccmcluster.org)

# FACTSHEET

## Myanmar

April 2017

[www.shelterficcmmyanmar.org](http://www.shelterficcmmyanmar.org)



### KEY FIGURES

Total people displaced Rakhine & Kachin/Shan  
**219,849**

99,242 Kachin/Shan (includ. Boarding Schools)

120,607 Rakhine

Cluster target population (IDPs and host)


**205,250 IDPs** (residing in) camp/camp-like

**13,503 IDPs** (residing with) host families

Camps or camp-like settings

**Rakhine: 36**

**Kachin/Shan: 161**



### KEY DOCUMENTS

Humanitarian Needs/Response Plan 2017

<http://www.sheltercluster.org/rakhine-and-kachinshan-shelter-nfi-cccm-cluster/library/humanitarian-country-team-3>

Cluster Analysis Reports

<http://www.sheltercluster.org/library/data-analysis-kachinshan> (Kachin/Shan)

<http://www.sheltercluster.org/library/cluster-data-analysis> (Rakhine)

Kachin/Shan Camp Profiling (Rounds 1 to 5)

<http://www.sheltercluster.org/hub/kachinshan>

Rakhine Camp Site Profiles

<http://www.sheltercluster.org/hub/rakhine>

2015-2016 Rakhine CCCM Cluster Strategic Outlook

### KEY CLUSTER PARTNERS

**National** UNHCR  
IOM

#### **Kachin/Shan**

- KBC
- KMSS
- Shalom
- NRC

#### **Rakhine**

- LWF
- DRC
- NRC
- RI

### KEY DATES & RESPONSIBILITIES

- Activation of the CCCM Cluster: **January 2013**
- Leadership: **UNHCR**
- **UNHCR** also leads **shelter & NFI** Cluster and **Protection Sector**

### CONTEXT

Breakdown of a ceasefire agreement in KACHIN State in 2011 caused waves of displacement with over 90,000 IDPs dispersed across 150+ camps or camp-like settings, including areas of Northern Shan State (Shan). An additional 7,000 IDPs are staying with host families. About 50% of camps are located in non-government controlled areas (NGCA) with very limited access.

In RAKHINE State, displacement occurred in 2012 due to inter-communal clashes and burning of houses. From an initial caseload of 140,000+ IDPs in 2013. 2015 20,000+ persons were able to vacate their temporary shelter and assisted to build their own individual houses through a process of owner-driven construction. 60% in their place of origin, 40% in new locations. This resulted in the number of camps (or camp-like settings) decreasing from 67 to now being 36. Still, 120,000 IDPs reside in camps where overcrowding and lack of privacy remain huge problems and in structures that were originally designed and built in 2013 to be temporary and last two years. During the rainy season conditions worsen as there are inadequate drainage systems. Significant restrictions on freedom of movement limit access to livelihoods, healthcare, food, education and other basic services. This also affects parts of the non-displaced population.

### PRIORITIES

KACHIN/SHAN Key priorities remain 1) **humanitarian assistance being well-managed and coordinated**; 2) **participatory and community-based development approaches are integrated into planning and implementation**; and 3) **when return or relocation is possible, IDPs are well-prepared to rebuild their lives permanently within a reasonable amount of time and be able to contribute to social cohesion**. Many shelters that were built before Cluster activation did not meet minimum standards/guidelines, significantly. Addressing these needs plus the fact that unless solutions are found it remains a perpetual cycle of replacing sub-standard/no longer habitable temporary shelters. Need for mass blanket NFI distributions have passed but some NFIs for vulnerable cases continue.

RAKHINE While through Cluster partners and their camp management activities there is good coverage of over 90 per cent of the IDP caseload, the **need to reform the Camp Management Committees (CMCs) remains the single biggest and most persistent challenge**. The **CMC's responsibility fails to be enforced, they are appointed not elected, fail to be representative of their residents and have proved corrupt, violent, block humanitarian assistance, prone to extortion and yet benefit from impunity**. Constructive engagement/advocacy with the government continues as to *how* they could be reformed but tangible action is critically dependent upon the authority of the State. NFI needs are more acute due to over-crowded conditions, severe restrictions on freedom of movement and access to basic services. Most temporary shelters have been subjected to a 4<sup>th</sup> rainy season, which results in massive temporary shelter repair and maintenance needs of US\$3.9 million. 60 per cent raised has/or is being implemented. A gap of US\$1.3 million remains.

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### Coordination

At the national and sub-national level the Cluster has four key priorities:

- Strategic guidance;
- Determining needs,
- Coverage of needs, both operational and adequate resources, notably funding;
- Equity of assistance; adherence to standards, including building national capacity.

Overall it remains a operationally centric Cluster with delivery against the needs as its *main* priority.

### Funding & Staffing

As Lead agency UNHCR has (since Cluster inception) funded the vast majority of camp management activities across Rakhine, Kachin/Shan. In Kachin/Shan partners are local (faith-based) NGOs (see overleaf). Rakhine State (a vastly different context) partners are international NGOs (see overleaf). It remains significantly *more* challenging to raise funds for Kachin/Shan than Rakhine.

UNHCR supplies the bulk of staff at national and sub-national level, which at the operational level includes many national colleagues whose day-to-day roles are critical. Consistent with its operational focus, the staffing structure is light at the national level in Yangon, one dedicated person with far *more* resources deployed to the sub-national/operational level. The Cluster also benefits from IOM support plus from standby partner the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). Their support is vital to the success of the Cluster.

### Information Management

Information management capacities exist at national and sub-national level. The field generates regular data, which is shared at the national level for triangulation and wider dissemination. See overleaf (and website links) for some of the key information management products.

A JIPS initiated camp profiling exercise for Kachin/Shan in 2013 has proved successful to the point that it has been conducted another 4 times. Similar efforts are underway for Rakhine State, again directly supported by JIPS and co-led by DRC and the CCCM Cluster: <http://www.sheltercluster.org/rakhine/library/camp-profiling-2016-2017-jips>.

### Security & Other Issues

Security and access remain issues in both areas but in Kachin/Shan the situation is much more acute with low-level conflict particularly prevalent during the dry season months. In 2016/17, access to both government and non-government controlled areas has decreased even more while bureaucratic hurdles increased. In Rakhine State the Camp Management Committees remain the single biggest challenge (see overleaf for more details).