



Qualitative Research on Social Tensions in Lebanon

Round 2, Year 1

Acknowledgements

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RCA was originally an initiative of the Swedish Embassy in Bangladesh where it was first commissioned in 2007 and has since been adopted in different context in different countries. A team of Lebanese and Syrian researchers undertook the data collection for this study, supported by the Empatika study leadership team. The dedication of the team members in taking part in this study and carrying out their work with professionalism, motivation, and respect for their host communities, is much appreciated.

Most importantly, this study was only possible thanks to the many families, neighbours, and communities who welcomed our researchers into their homes and shared their lives with them for a short while. We are grateful to them for this opportunity and for openly sharing their lives, activities, perspectives, and aspirations.

Disclaimer:

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Identifying features have been removed to protect the identities of individuals photographed.

Acronyms

ARK Group DMCC	A development consultancy responsible for carrying out routine perception surveys of Syrians and Lebanese related to social tensions
IS	Informal settlements
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
LBP	Lebanese pound
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
USD	United States Dollar
RCA	Reality Check Approach
LTi	Long Term Inhabitants
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières also known as Doctors Without Borders
MoPH	Ministry of Public Health
<i>mukhtar</i>	An official that is elected by the locals of each locality during municipal elections to conduct local administrative tasks and social leadership
NGOs	Non-governmental organisations



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Executive Summary

Introduction and Approach

A 'Tensions Monitoring System' has been established by UNDP, UNHCR and other partners to analyse and provide feedback on intercommunity relations. A key element of the monitoring system is the ARK Group DMCC-implemented Regular Perception Surveys (RPS) on social tensions throughout Lebanon, which have been conducted in five waves. These studies examine perceptions of social stability and tensions between Lebanese host communities and Syrians. To complement the RPS and deepen the tensions monitoring system, UNDP commissioned this qualitative immersion research to gather rich insights from Syrians and Lebanese host communities. This report presents the findings of the second study round carried out in July 2019 from four Governorates. The first study round was completed in February and March 2019 in four different Governorates.

This immersion research adopted the Reality Check Approach (RCA) whereby researchers live with families and participate in their everyday lives for several days and nights. It relies on frequent, iterative, and informal conversations with families, their neighbours, and people they interact with in their everyday lives augmented by direct observation and experience. This round included six locations total, including two urban locations in or near Beirut.

Researchers lived with 26 families (9 Syrian and 17 Lebanese) and had conversations with over 1078 people including neighbours, local business owners, street vendors, service providers, shop

owners, and landlords. Of these Syrian families, 2 lived in ITS and 7 in rented accommodation.

Findings

Consistent with round one, **social capital** was high among Syrians across all locations. Social capital between Syrians and Lebanese was lowest in Beirut, while in other locations, established relationships between LTI Syrians and Lebanese helped build trust. Though newcomers are the object of suspicion, connections between refugees and LTI Syrians help ensure their acceptance locally. This was particularly true in Shia communities, where refugees had been largely accepted if they were known and if they followed the rules set by the community regarding religion and politics. This differed from round one locations, where LTI Syrians considered the large number of unknown Syrians to be competition. Unlike round two locations, the large number of Syrians living in round one locations also meant that Syrian newcomers did not need the support of trusted LTIs in order to live in a given area.

In some locations where Syrians and Lebanese had established working relationships, this led to high levels of trust, interdependence, and partnership between these groups. In other locations, though Lebanese may have interacted less often with Syrians, relationships between these groups were nevertheless cooperative and rarely characterised by tension, except in one Christian location near Beirut.

Both Syrians and Lebanese considered the quality of **healthcare** and public hospitals in particular to

be poor, as such, they only went when required and often paid through insurance or UN benefits. Otherwise, Syrians and Lebanese preferred the convenience and lower costs of local clinics and pharmacies. Lebanese did not complain about crowding in hospitals, though cited inefficiencies as contributing to multiple hours of waiting times. Both groups spoke of the need to use connections to access public hospitals in the event that a patient did not have health insurance. Unlike in round one, many Lebanese participants had health insurance. Perhaps relatedly, in this round subsidies received by Syrians were not a source of jealousy or tension among Lebanese we met.

Education was also not a source of tension between Syrians and Lebanese¹. Afternoon shifts were being run in public schools for Syrians in all locations, though many Syrians said those with 'connections' could also access the morning shifts. Syrian parents tended to view the morning shift as more favourable, in some cases because they were perceived to have better teachers, and for others because they preferred for their children to interact with Lebanese and learn French and English. A number of Syrian families cited transport subsidies as a key factor helping them access schools, and many withdrew their children from school once the subsidies were cut. Though some Syrian refugees aspired to high levels of education, most considered it more advantageous to work as both tertiary education and jobs requiring higher education are largely unavailable to Syrians in Lebanon.

Garbage disposal and other **environmental health factors** were prominent issues in location A and B, and less so elsewhere. Though some Lebanese did blame Syrians for this, most blamed local governments. Mayors in certain locations outside Beirut framed challenges with garbage in terms of Syrian population pressure, though these views were not echoed by Lebanese families. Syrian families we lived with were aware of these narratives and took particular care to dispose off their garbage responsibly.

Compared to round one, **aid** was less relevant as a factor in driving social tensions as fewer Syrians received aid from the UN. Though a number of entitlements for Syrians have ended, the lack of transparency around these cuts and eligibility

¹ As of 2019, economic pressure has led to more than 20,000 students to shift from private schools into public schools which actually started to create pressure on the education system in Lebanon. Considering the limited capacities of schools more pressure is expected on this sector. Source: UNDP.

criteria creates confusion and opportunities for misinformation, including rumours that Syrians receive more than they currently do. Though this view only affected Syrian-Lebanese relations in a minority of instances, perceptions of fairness related to aid did emerge within the Syrian community, based on the view that some individuals received support that they did not deserve.

When considering **work**, the official regulations limiting Syrian work to a small number of sectors and limitations on business ownership by Syrians meant that roles within these sectors were highly stratified. Lebanese tended to own businesses, which were often managed or led in large part by LTI Syrians, who sometimes also oversaw the work of Syrian refugee employees. Examples of competition between these groups was limited primarily to small-scale, often informal business, though in both urban locations near Beirut it extended to low skilled jobs. Unlike round one, Lebanese often acknowledged the importance of Syrians to the economy, either as customers or employees.

The **new work regulations** most concerned Syrians in Beirut, while those in other study locations included in round two with closer connections to the community considered them less likely to be enforced. Lebanese employers shared these concerns: in most cases they viewed both work permits and hiring Lebanese workers to be too costly, and often shifted their Syrian employees to more covert working conditions. Syrian workers were fired only where employers felt regulations would be enforced. This was predominantly in Beirut and on main roads outside, as otherwise the common view is that these regulations can easily be circumvented with connections or political protection. Only a few Lebanese we met supported these regulations, particularly those already sharing anti-Syrian sentiment, though more viewed them as a symptom of populist politics. International firms had already taken steps to replace Syrian workers with Lebanese, though smaller firms who had done this found this challenging. Even where enforcement is unlikely, Syrians feel increasingly vulnerable to unequal treatment by Lebanese employers.

The fact that specific political parties controlled study locations outside Beirut was perceived to provide a measure of **safety** for both Lebanese and Syrians living in these locations. Syrians living here made special efforts to be accepted within these communities, and once they were could move and interact freely. This contrasted with Beirut, where

Syrians took clear steps to control their movements. For Lebanese in these locations, safety often meant separation from outsiders, while for Syrians this meant protection of Lebanese security forces and not going back to Syria. Though Lebanese cited specific sources of insecurity like inter-family disputes, almost no participants cited an incident that had occurred to themselves or someone they knew.

When considering **the future**, Syrian refugees generally wanted to return to Syria, but this sentiment was not expressed with the same urgency as those living in informal settlements in round one. It was strongest among refugees in location A and B, who were increasingly pessimistic about the opportunities for themselves in Lebanon. Syrians considering returning home had no concrete plans to do so and worried universally about if and how their safety could ever be guaranteed, as well as potential conscription obligations. Lebanese were largely pessimistic about Lebanon's economy and political environment but did not often link this to the presence of Syrians. Lebanese generally accepted and, especially in the South, welcomed LTI Syrians as permanent parts of their communities. Though Lebanese here supported the repatriation of refugees, this was not discussed with a sense of urgency.

Implications

A number of implications emerge from these findings. First is that the combination of **social bonds, pre-existing relationships, and low population pressure contributed to relationships of trust** between these communities. LTI Syrians often functioned as a bridge between Syrian refugees and Lebanese, and ensured new arrivals were both known within and knew the rules of the established hierarchy they were entering. This may introduce an additional angle that can be used when analysing these factors using the RPS data.

Study findings also suggest a number of implications related to work restrictions, including the importance of political economy when considering their practical effects. The uncertainty surrounding these restrictions suggests the need for clear and well-disseminated information on the new requirements, obligations, and consequences to be shared in a trusted form. Reducing the cost of work permits or the cost of updating registration documents for Syrians may address Lebanese economic and

security concerns while also providing a measure of protection for Syrians.

Additionally, the highly localised and short-lived nature of inter-community conflicts suggests that monitoring such events may provide limited insight into the factors shaping relationships between Syrians and Lebanese. The study identified a number of examples of communities that had moved past specific incidents, suggesting that such cases may provide insight into community coping strategies.

Beyond this, these findings suggest that tensions may not be fueled by competition for resources, but rather are the product of popular narratives that blame Syrians for many challenges facing Lebanon and the Lebanese. Addressing this requires more facts about the use of resources and challenges in service provision to be shared more widely. This is particularly true given the efforts made by Syrians to stay under the radar and conform to established social and economic hierarchies.

The lack of informal settlements in all study locations covered in this round further facilitated this relationship building, as it allowed for daily interactions between Syrians and Lebanese. Such regular interaction also helped reduce misconceptions and rumours related to Syrians. This highlights the importance of work that seeks to encourage such interaction in building relationships. This insight also suggests that settlement patterns are likely more relevant to the frequency of interactions between Syrians and Lebanese than population pressure alone.

Lastly, these findings highlight a number of areas where RPS analysis may be deepened. This includes analyzing respondent views toward Syrians in the context of their income and education status. Also, given how study findings contradict RPS findings related to tensions being driven by low-skilled jobs, it might be helpful to frame questions around competition in terms of particular jobs rather than an overarching high-skill and low-skill categorisation.



R-100
ALL PURPOSE

MAGNUM
PRODUCTS

Ready Mixed
Joint Compound
PROFESSIONAL FORMULA

Introduction

This report presents the main findings from the second round of the Qualitative Research on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon using the Reality Check Approach (RCA), conducted in July 2019 in the governorates of Beirut, Mt. Lebanon, Baalbek, Nabatieh and South Lebanon. This study builds on round one of data collection, carried out in February 2019 in four locations. This study was commissioned by UNDP to supplement the existing quantitative data on this topic to better understand relations between Lebanese and Syrians living in Lebanon.

Background

Lebanon hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees per capita in the world; it has also been the recipient of one of the largest per capita aid and support packages since 2016. Though there is a long history of Syrian presence and migration in Lebanon, Syrian refugees started arriving in large numbers at the outbreak of the Syrian War in 2011. By 2013 the number of Syrian refugees living in Lebanon had begun to mount, reaching over one million Syrian men, women, and children by current estimates.

Syrians live across Lebanon, with the largest settlements established in the Bekaa valley and in Northern Akkar. Despite intensive diplomatic and resourcing efforts to protect Syrian refugees, recent reports suggest that their socio-economic position remains fragile². Key socio-economic indicators have been declining steadily since 2016; over half live in extreme poverty and more than 75%

² Uzelac, A and Meester, J, July, 2018 'Is there protection in the region? Leveraging Funds and Political Capital in Lebanon's Refugee Crisis' Conflict Research Unit of Clingendael

live below the poverty line³. Indebtedness (to buy food, pay rent and health expenses) is very high, averaging nearly USD 800 per household. Existing data suggests that these factors have led Syrian refugee households to sell houses and land in Syria, along with household and productive assets, leading to an increase in children working (20% of 15-17 year old youth work⁴). These challenges are compounded by the fact that an estimated 76% of Syrian refugees over the age of 15 do not have legal residency, limiting their freedom of movement and access to jobs, along with their ability to engage with public services and government functions, including obtaining documents like birth, marriage, and death certificates.

Additionally, 36% of Syrian households do not have a working member⁵. Of those who do work, only 32% report doing so regularly. Most refugees work in construction, agriculture, transport and catering sectors. Of these, construction and agriculture are traditional areas of employment, which attracted Syrian migrant workers before the crisis and are not generally seen as competition for poor Lebanese. Syrians are viewed to be in competition with Lebanese workers in the transport and catering sectors, which are among the country's lowest paid (USD 200/month)⁶.

³ Estimated at USD 3.84 per person per day

⁴ 101 Facts and Figures on the Syrian Refugee Crisis, (p45) Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and the International Affairs Office, American University of Beirut, 2018

⁵ Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, 2017

⁶ UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR) 2018, preliminary results, presented on July 23, 2018 in Beirut, Lebanon.

Existing data and media reports suggest that Lebanese citizens have been affected by the influx of Syrians in a number of ways, with particular effects felt by nearly one million Lebanese who are near or below the poverty line. Data suggests that the perceived strain on public services and public spaces caused by Syrian refugees has contributed to a rise in tensions and resentment among host populations. This resentment is thought to be exacerbated by the fact that 87% of Syrian refugees and 67% of poor Lebanese are living in the same 251 cadastres, which were already the poorest in the country prior to the influx of Syrian refugees⁷.

Research commissioned by UNDP suggests that tensions between refugees and host communities appear to have worsened in recent months and emanate from four main factors: (i) economic concerns (often manifest in a sympathy for the plight of refugees but concerns about economic pressure borne by host communities), (ii) sectarian concerns, (iii) demographic concerns (Syrians are mostly Sunni and increased Sunni population is perceived to pose a threat to the Shia and Maronite Christian populations), and (iv) security concerns (unsubstantiated claims of terrorist ' sleeper cells ' of Syrian men). Recent perception studies⁸ indicate that Syrians feel increasingly unwelcome.

Many view the decisions passed by the Government of Lebanon in Spring 2019 as indicative of the mounting anti-Syrian sentiment. This includes requirements that Syrians obtain official and costly work permits, without which Lebanese businesses that employ Syrians stand to face substantial fines. These measures also require Syrians to demonstrate their arrival in Lebanon prior to April 24, 2019 in order to be able to obtain legal residency. Syrians who arrived in Lebanon after this date, as well as those who entered unofficially and thus are unable to prove their date of entry, may face deportation. Together with the new moratorium on permanent structures in informal settlements and an order to destroy all existing structures, these measures are interpreted by some as efforts to make Syrians lives increasingly uncomfortable and perhaps encourage return.

A 'Tensions Monitoring System' has been established under the auspices of UNDP, UNHCR,

⁷ 101 Facts and Figures on the Syrian Refugee Crisis,(p41) Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and the International Affairs Office, American University of Beirut, 2018

⁸ Ground Truth Solutions –Mixed Migration Platform ' Refugee Perceptions, Lebanon, round 2' August 2017

and other partners to provide feedback on inter-community relations and emerging trends characterising this complex scenario. The system uses a number of different data sources for regular analysis and updates, and provides decision makers with a current pulse on the situation. A key element of the monitoring system is the quarterly series of Routine Perception Surveys (RPS). These have been conducted 5 times to date in May 2017, September 2017, January 2018, June 2018, and March 2019. They include data from surveys of 5000 people across 18 districts on perceptions of social stability and tensions between host communities and refugees.

Purpose of this study

UNDP has requested longitudinal qualitative research to supplement RPS and its other streams of data specifically to gather insights from **refugees and Lebanese host communities themselves**. This citizen-generated data is '*crucial to unpack how inter-community tensions are related, why changes have been observed and how incidences could be mitigated*'⁹.

With an understanding of community tensions as, '*a state of community dynamics which may lead to disorder, threaten the peace and stability of communities, or raise the levels of fear and anxiety in the whole, or a part of, the local community*',¹⁰ this study aims to provide insights into these dynamics that quantitative surveys are not able to uncover.

The purpose of this study, therefore, is to:

- Complement the existing longitudinal quantitative and perception surveys
- Unpack the complex situation of Syrian and Lebanese relations
- Provide rich contextual detail and to 'put a human face on the data collected'.

In order to meet these research objectives, this study will be carried out in yearly rounds, each covering between four and six unique study locations across Lebanon, to be visited on an annual basis. Revisiting locations will allow for an understanding of change over time and help researchers build deeper rapport with communities.

⁹ TORs Qualitative Research on Social Tension throughout Lebanon using the Reality Check Approach, page 1

¹⁰ Institute of Community Cohesion (iCoCo)

Methodology

This study uses the Reality Check Approach (RCA), a form of immersion-based research that aims to surface rich *and in-depth insights* by living with people in their own homes for several days and nights and experiencing their everyday lives. The approach extends the tradition of listening studies and beneficiary assessments by combining elements of these approaches with researchers living with people whose views are being sought. In this case, researchers lived with Syrian refugees and host communities.

The RCA derives credibility and meets robustness and rigour requirements through triangulated, multi-layered informal interactions across multiple locations and spaces, and a collective pooling of unfiltered insights, privileging emic (insider) perspectives. Using RCA allows for informal interaction with families in their own spaces, with the people they interact with at work, market or socially, and with service providers, enabling triangulation of the information shared.

Based on this approach, this study employed the following research tools during the immersion:

Informal conversations: Given the importance of the need to diminish power distance and reduce disruption to normal life in conducting an RCA, formal data collection instruments were not used. Instead, the core of RCA was informal conversations which were used iteratively and widely to optimise opportunities for triangulation. These conversations were spontaneous and took place throughout the course of ordinary days while household members and the researchers jointly undertook chores and normal daily activities.

Observation: As RCA researchers lived with families within communities, they observed daily life in context, importantly at different times of the day (and night) and within different spaces and situations. This allowed researchers to observe differences between reported and actual behaviour, especially around tensions between different groups in the community, neighbourly relations, safety and security, job competition, financial concerns, and service provisions. Researchers also observed youth's daily life, children's schooling, and how families spend their time day to day.

Experience: RCA is based on the premise that experiential knowledge is a critical element of evaluation producing people-centred accounts. During the course of immersions, researchers visited key points of service, usually with their hosting families but sometimes alone. These places were mentioned in conversations. Visiting them or experiencing the service provided an opportunity for experiential triangulation of the insights. For example, researchers accompanied families to their place of business to observe their interactions with other members of the community.

2.2 Study Locations

The second round of year one of the study was conducted in six locations. This selection, along with the locations from round one, was based on a number of key characteristics as agreed with UNDP, including:

- Mixture of high and low Syrian presence
- Mixture of informal tented settlements (ITS) presence and absence
- Diversity of confessional backgrounds

- Areas with strong historical relationships between Lebanese and Syrians.

Based on the above criteria, a long list was developed by reviewing overlapping areas between the ‘Most Vulnerable Localities in Lebanon’¹¹ map and the ‘Mapping of Risk and Resources (MRR)’ map¹². This process also considered the UNHCR mapping of ITS¹³. Together, these maps illustrate areas of both high and low refugee pressure, locations with the highest population of deprived Lebanese and refugees, and areas perceived to be the most risky. This process yielded a long list of potential study locations that meet the location selection criteria. A Lebanese security expert reviewed this list and provided a risk rating for each location. Using this rated list and based on the criteria discussed with stakeholders, the following locations were chosen for this round of study, illustrated in Table 1. To maintain anonymity, these locations are referred to using a letter code, also presented below.

Table 1: Alignment of study locations to selection criteria

Location reference name*	Governorate	High/low Syrian Presence	Presence of ITS	Confessional backgrounds of majority		Strong historical relationship
				Lebanese	Syrian	
Location A	Mt. Lebanon	Low	No	Christian	Sunni	yes
Location B	Beirut	High	No	Sunni	Sunni	No
Location C	Baalbek	high	Yes	Shia	Sunni	yes
Location D	South	high	No	Shia	Sunni	yes
Location E	Nabatieh	low	No	Shia	Sunni	yes
Location F	South	high	No	Shia	Sunni	yes

* Actual place names have been omitted to protect study participants

¹¹ <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/45715>

¹² http://40.71.92.5:8080/lhsp/portal/mrr_cluster_results.php

¹³ <https://unhcr.carto.com/builder/130e4572-12d6-4b3c-97c7-5645328a3435/embed>



Researcher helping to wash dishes for the family she lived with.

2.3 Study Team

The study team comprised 14 researchers, including five Syrian, and nine Lebanese researchers (see Annex 1). Researchers lived in each study location in sub-teams of four to five, which included a mix of men and women as well as Syrian and Lebanese.

2.4 Study Participants

Researchers lived with a total of 26 households in which nine were Syrian and 17 were Lebanese. Host households were selected purposively based on scoping and informal discussions in the family and community. All host households were required to have at least two generations living together and be the same nationality as the researcher (i.e., Lebanese researchers staying with Lebanese households and Syrian researchers staying with Syrian households).

A household is defined as the families with whom the researcher stayed overnight, had close interaction and spent most time. Of the nine Syrian host households, two lived in informal settlements and seven lived in rented accommodation.

Researchers also spent time with their immediate neighbours, and had further detailed conversations with them, and other opportunistic conversations with members of communities including local business owners, street vendors, service providers, shop owners, and landlords. Table 2 below provides an overview of these individuals.

Table 2: Individuals interacted with during the research

	Intention	Total Syrian	Total Lebanese
Host households	Close interactions, observations, and conversations with all members of the family to get comprehensive understanding of context, and understanding choice and behaviour at household level	9 families	17 families
Focal households	Less detailed interaction than host household, mostly conversations to explore diversity of family experience, perspectives, different views, common issues, and to triangulate the host household insights	354 people	317 people
Community members	Opportunistic engagements through informal conversations to explore their role, multiple perspectives, and understanding context for triangulation	63 people	128 people

The team had extended conversations over the period of four nights and days with a total of 1,078 people. The details of study participants can be found in Annex 3.

Further details on the study process are provided in Annex 4.

2.6 Ethical considerations

The RCA team adheres to the highest ethical standards during data collection.

As per American Anthropological Association Code of Ethics, RCA adopts an ethical obligation to people '*which (when necessary) supersede the goal of seeking new knowledge.*' Researchers '*do everything in their power to ensure that research does not harm safety, dignity, and privacy of the people with whom they conduct the research*'¹⁴. Researchers asked people's verbal consent to be able to use their stories and insights, and assured people that they would keep their sharing off the record if they did not provide their consent. Researchers then signed a declaration stating they

¹⁴ American Anthropological Association (AAA) Code of Ethics, (1996: p. 2)

had received people's verbal consent to share the insights in the collaborative analysis process. All the researchers were required to undergo Child Protection and Data Protection training module in the level one training and study briefing and signed the Child Protection and Data Protection policies as part of their contracts. All data (written and visual) is coded to protect the identity of individuals, their families and communities. As a result, the exact locations and identities of households and others are not revealed in this report.

To ensure that host households did not incur costs resulting from hosting a researcher, at the end of the immersion, each researcher discreetly left basic food items for each host household. As team members also help in domestic activities and do not disturb income-earning activities, families do not incur any direct or indirect costs of hosting researchers.

2.7 Study Limitations

As with all research, this study has a number of limitations which are detailed below.

First, while the research team intended to stay with equal numbers of Lebanese and Syrian host households, the actual number included more Lebanese families than Syrian families. This resulted largely from a challenge in recruiting sufficient number of Syrian researchers and ensuring their availability throughout the study. In addition, in a couple of locations, the maximum number of Syrians permitted to conduct the study was reduced due to administrative approvals. In order to mitigate this challenge, researchers were instructed to identify nearby Syrian households as focal households to ensure that relationships of trust were built with these families and that their perspectives could also be included in the study in equal measure. This also complements the round one study, which included a larger number of Syrian households as compared with Lebanese.

Second, in some of the locations researchers remarked that there were relatively few children and young people present in the community. Though researchers made special effort to engage with youth, in many cases this limited researchers' level of interaction with people of this age group in this location. As such the perspectives contained in this report are largely those of adults unless otherwise noted.

Similarly, since this round was conducted during summer break, researchers were not able to visit schools in any of the locations as they were closed or interact with teachers. Perspectives regarding education are therefore limited to those of the households.

Third, in location E, the Syrian researchers largely remained inside the host household and felt they could not interact with other families around them. This was due in large part to their perceptions of local anti-Syrian sentiment. Researchers here spent all their time with all members of the host household and accompanied their families to their places of work in order to gather maximum insights possible. This dynamic is explored in depth later in the report.

Lastly, as with all qualitative research, the findings contained in this report are not intended to be generalised beyond the study population. Rather, they are intended to provide deeper insight into the dynamics that characterise a number of specific locales and are triangulated in such a way to maximise the internal validity of the findings. Though these findings may be used to inform analysis related to the study locations and locations of a similar profile, they should not be generalised beyond this.

2.7 Structure of the Report

This section provided an introduction and methodology used in this study. The following section presents the specific context of the study locations followed by key findings of the study related to Syrian-Lebanese relationships, basic services related to health, education and environmental health, aid, work and changing legal environment, security and future aspirations. The report concludes with implications drawn from the findings with relevance to programming, and future research.

Findings

Context

This section provides details on each of the six study locations. As specific locations are kept confidential, we refer to location code for each one. Table 3 includes demographic description and contextual information specific to each study location.

Syrian presence

In Location A, people discussed the *'changing identity of the community,'* noting that the number of Syrians had increased substantially since 2014. Here, some have purposely chosen to live in the politically controlled part of the community where default protection is provided to those who are known and trusted because they are beyond the jurisdiction of the government.

Most Syrians in location B fled here at the start of the war in Syria. There are parts of the community where *'every single building has at least one Syrian family'*. Though the number of Syrians continues to rise, so do the number of Lebanese who come to the area from the South because the rents are considered relatively cheap.

Location C has two large Syrian camps which grew from camps established by those who began working in construction and seasonal agriculture decades ago. The inhabitants are primarily members of a close-knit nomadic tribe. Those we met did not have residency but many had UN cards. With long-term connections to the construction industry, some Syrians are relatively well-off and own construction equipment and cars.

Syrians have been living and working in location D for at least 50 years. The large numbers who live here now are mostly families of agricultural seasonal workers who came following the onset of the Syrian crisis. Many live in dilapidated rented accommodation or on the land they work on.

Location E comprises a mostly middle-class Lebanese area interspersed with some wealthy families all living in their own homes. The few Syrians that reside here live in rented accommodation.

In location F, we lived within communities of Syrians who occupy Government land or take care of land left by wealthy Lebanese emigrants. These Syrians lived alongside and worked in what were described as *partnerships* with farming (less well off) Lebanese. These arrangements extend back over two decades and are built on mutual trust. The small increase in Syrian refugees in the area is almost entirely due to families joining these LTIs. While some former agricultural tool sheds (semi-permanent tented structures) have been converted into living accommodation, most live in rented accommodation. Those who came here after 2012 did so because they knew other Syrians here.

How people view their community

People shared that location A has changed considerably over the last decade (and particularly the last four years) and increasingly those who can afford to move elsewhere have done so. Though rents are increasing, this location is still considered a cheap area to rent accommodation, and therefore attracts people on low incomes and from diverse



Table 3: Description of Study Locations

Location	Urban/rural	Religion/ethnicity	Livelihoods	Main problems noted by people met	Syrian presence
A	Urban	Lebanese Christian/Armenian and smaller Kurd population. Smaller Lebanese Muslim Shia area separated by bridge Syrians, Bangladeshis, Nepalis, Filipinos, Ethiopians	Diverse- shops, factories, restaurants, services (tailoring, metal-work, laundry, electrical etc)	High rents Pollution Garbage in part of the community	Mostly refugees who arrived after 2011 Increasing Parts of the community said to be >60% Syrian All live in rented accommodation
B	Urban	Sunni Lebanese and Syrian Minority Shia Few Palestinians	Diverse-shops, restaurants, transport, construction, cleaning, security services professions such as nurse, and teachers	History of conflicts between political factions Increasing rents	Mostly refugees who arrived after 2011 By 2015, people say equal numbers of Syrian and Lebanese All live in rented accommodation
C	Rural	Muslim Shia Lebanese Small number of Christian (Maronites and Catholics) Lebanese (40-50 homes) Few Muslim Sunni Syrians	Agriculture (tobacco, potatoes, wheat, vegetables) Army is a major employer Shops, construction	Inter-tribal conflicts Water shortages Power cuts	9000 refugees. (Supposedly 1000 Syrians displaced from a camp due to an incident have recently moved in). Approx. 5% of the summer population Most live in camps- all had long term associations with the area
D	Urban	Muslim Shia Lebanese Muslim Sunni Syrians -many examples of being married with Shia Muslims	Formerly agriculture (fruit) & fishing, increasingly construction, shops, small factories, transportation, mechanics & other services Many Lebanese live and work abroad (Africa/Germany)	Power cuts & cost of electricity Lebanese youth unemployment Fear of Israeli aggression	'Influx' of Syrian refugees -two large camps since 2011. Estimates suggest ~40% of population of which 2/5 are refugees Others live in rented accommodation or in smaller groups of tents on agricultural land where they work.
E	Rural	Muslim Shia Lebanese Few Muslim Sunni Syrians	Agriculture (fruit, tobacco & wheat), small businesses, shops, professions such as teacher, nurse and civil servants	People shared few complaints 'we have jobs, homes and are satisfied'	Relatively small numbers of refugees (1000; <7% of population) arrived mainly in 2009 and 2014 because rents here are considered cheap All live in rented accommodation
F	Rural/ Peri-urban	Muslim Shia Lebanese Few Muslim Sunni Syrians	Agriculture (predominantly bananas, cash crops) Small business Many Lebanese work in Africa	Power cuts. Part of the area stayed comprises illegal squatting so there is shared fear of eviction and no services are provided here	Few Syrian refugees arrived in 2012 to join existing LTI families only <10% community Live on the agricultural land they work on or some rented accommodation



People complained about overcrowded and poor condition of buildings and homes (Location B).

nationalities. Facilities are many (and cheap) and there are work opportunities in the many local factories. This means that people feel like they do not have to go out of the area. The Syrians we stayed with shared that they felt unable to mix with the Lebanese community and felt increasingly uncomfortable, especially because of verbal abuse from the Christians who had previously been welcoming. Christians we interacted with often spoke about feeling superior to the Syrians and talked often about how the two groups differed in both culture and class, which they did not like. They seemed to accept other nationalities more readily. All share concerns about environmental health and security.

People in location B see their community as run down and over-populated but now in transition as new modern construction is taking place. Despite modernisation, they feel they have maintained a traditional lifestyle and some described this as a close and closed community, almost an island surrounded by communities of different religious and political views. The Lebanese we met are Sunni and 'love the place' but feel they cannot easily go out of the area. Syrians also like the community because it is the 'heart of the Sunni community.' All shared that it is a neglected area with little government investment; 'government only works at election time... not to help people' (Lebanese family) and 'they fix things and plant trees at election time, otherwise they don't do anything until the next election and the trees die' (Lebanese man, 51).

Lebanese living in location C generally view it as the 'best place to live' especially as they enjoy strong

and close knit family ties and value strong family roots. It is seen as a peaceful and secure place 'whenever you pass a checkpoint and you say where you live, they let you pass right away because they know we are peaceful people' (municipality official). Families live here throughout the year and they take pride in the fact that they remained in their homes even during the war. While recognising that the Governorate is generally portrayed as deprived and neglected with little government investment, they feel their own community is better. LTI Syrians we met who had lived there for decades agreed with this view. Lebanese people commonly contrasted the state of this community with the direction they felt Lebanon was going, noting that 'we love the community but hate that it is in Lebanon'.

Location D is a large community which is said to be thriving relative to other areas in Lebanon, and particularly compared to other areas in the South. It is growing economically and new investment in property and business is testament to this. Lebanese see the community as socially aware and characterised by a strong sense of co-operation, including both NGOs and community projects for those in need. Lebanese here describe this community as 'the safest place in the South' (Lebanese man) because of the protection of the political parties. LTI Syrians have also benefited from the improved local economy. There has been a big influx of Syrian refugees, many of whom live in buildings, which are in very poor condition, and some live and work on previously fallow agricultural land.

The Lebanese in location E view themselves as a closed community, living away from big cities,

crowds and noise but where their basic needs are met; *'we have everything we need here'* (Lebanese mother, 46) and *'we have a good living condition, we are satisfied with what we have, why would we want more?'* (Lebanese mother, 62). Neither rich nor poor, they see themselves as having an acceptable level of well-being which is better than most other Lebanese. For Syrians, the rents are cheaper than Beirut but the small numbers of Syrians means there is less social life. All felt the environment was peaceful and surrounded by green space, *'we only need to go out of the community for banking'*.

Lebanese shared they love the coastal area of location F with views of the sea. It also has a strong sense of patriotism built from their past victory over occupying forces. It is viewed as a safe, clean and beautiful area with a strong sense of community, especially among the older people who have stayed while the younger generation live and work abroad. For Syrians, the agricultural potential is promising and natural resources make it a preferred place to live.

Relationships

Consistent with the first study round, relationships between Lebanese and Syrians are largely circumscribed by employer/employee, landlord/tenant and market dynamics, with little social mixing. Unlike in the first round locations, the confessional differences between Syrians (largely Sunni) and Lebanese (largely Shia) in the South mean that they do not worship together. In many locations Sunnis shared that there was no mosque for them to attend, while in location F there was a separate Sunni mosque. In location C, there are only Shia mosques and Catholic and Maronite churches and in location A, churches and Shia mosque. This is consistent with RPS findings (with the exception of location D), where relatively low proportions of respondents interacted at religious events (6% to 32%).

The worst inter-communal relations were felt in the location A and location B where there was overcrowding and no history of working relationships and connections, unlike the study locations outside Beirut.

Location A is home to a diverse mix of people although there are some demarcations. For example, the Armenian area is separated from the mainly Sunni Muslim area by a bridge and both are separated from a largely Shia area. The whole

RPS Findings

Wave 5 findings show that the most common place where Syrians and Lebanese interact across all locations is 'on the street' (84% to 96%) followed by 'at work' (43% to 77%). Overall, small percentages reported interactions at the 'municipality or neighbourhood' or at 'organised activities', which is consistent with our findings.

However, location D was an outlier with respect to these figures with at least 72% of respondents reporting interacting in all locations. This is inconsistent with our findings, but may be impacted by the relatively high concentration of Syrians in this area. Similarly, some figures for location E also do not correspond to our findings such as the low proportions interacting while paying rent (20%) and the high proportions interacting in social circles (68%), but this may also be skewed by the relatively low proportions of Syrians living here.

Wave 5 summary findings report, 2019

Table 4: RPS Findings Wave 5 - % respondents that have had inter-community contact daily, regularly, and sometimes in the following places

Location	At work	Social circles	Paying rent	In the street	Religious events	Activities organised	Municipality or neighbourhood
A and B	58%	79%	41%	96%	32%	26%	18%
C	43%	28%	29%	96%	6%	20%	16%
D	77%	76%	75%	84%	72%	77%	76%
E	43%	68%	20%	93%	19%	47%	54%
F	65%	70%	50%	94%	32%	28%	33%

* Wave V survey findings. (2019). UNDP & RPS Interactive Dashboard. Host-Community and Syrian Refugee Communal Relations in Lebanon.

area has historically been home to many different nationalities and religions (including Bangladeshis, Indians, Ethiopians, Nepalis, Kurds and Syrians) and signs in shops are in multiple languages. Consistent with RPS findings, high proportions of Syrians and Lebanese here reported interacting on the street (96%).

However, though the RPS notes high proportions of respondents identified interacting in social circles in location A and B (79%), this was not the case in this location and demonstrates that there can be important localised differences. Many shared with us that earlier good relations are beginning to crack. Some felt that *'there were too many foreigners'*. Armenians, in particular, told us many are moving out of the area if they can because of concerns of the breakdown in social relationships. However, others who wanted to move out are constrained by costs, especially high rents elsewhere. Syrians shared that they felt discriminated against, *'Armenians won't even say good morning to you'*. They noted that relations had changed in the last four years and hostility from Armenians had increased since the numbers of Syrians, especially those who wore traditional Syrian dress, had increased in the area. One Syrian family we lived with who has two young sons said they no longer went out of their home except to do urgent errands *'because we don't feel comfortable anymore'* and the boys go to school outside the area to avoid discrimination felt in the neighbourhood. Another Syrian family said they no longer frequent the local Internet store because *'of bullying'*. There are playgrounds and football pitches nearby but they were not much used. Other recreational opportunities all require payment and so poor families cannot afford these.

RPS findings

Consistent with our findings, Wave 5 findings show that slightly higher proportions (9% to 22%) of Syrians view current relations between Lebanese and Syrians as positive, as compared with Lebanese. Syrians may view these relations as more positive when comparing them to inter-community relations in Syria, or when comparing their own community to other places where they had heard of anti-Syrian incidents through the media. Syrians were often more predisposed to viewing Lebanese positively than Lebanese were to Syrians. As such, Syrian views were often impacted by actual interactions and incidents, while Lebanese views were also impacted by media and popular perceptions.

The fact that relations were generally viewed least positively in location A, B and C is also consistent with our findings. Though the very high proportion (100%) of Syrians in location E who view relationships with Lebanese as positive is not consistent with our findings. High levels of response bias, including a concern for voicing negative views of Lebanese may skew this response, as could a low number of respondents.

Wave 5 summary findings report, 2019

Location B comprises both Sunni and Shia families living densely in both mixed and homogeneous communities. There is a checkpoint between

the predominantly Shia area and the rest of the community. All the Syrians in this study location area are refugees and many Lebanese families moved here from the mountains and South because rents are considered cheap and the location is central.

People told us that the area used to be more integrated and had a sense of community, but this has been lost with the influx of both Syrians and Lebanese from outside. One family we lived with who have adult children who spent much of their lives in Syria and identify as Syrian felt that the Lebanese did not like them *'because we are immigrants'* even though the mother (Palestinian/Jordanian) has better relations than most here because she lived in the area earlier. However, some Syrians have positive relationships with their employers and told us they could get advances on their wages and were trusted to repay and interacted socially. As such, the RPS finding of 79% of respondents interacting at social circles is more appropriate to this location than the location A. There is a park close by with a football field but this area has become a place primarily for jogging and not for sports, which include social interaction.

Location C has the greatest proportion of Syrians compared to the other locations outside Beirut in this round of the study. Most of this population lives in two large camps. The numbers are proportionally higher in winter as the Lebanese population increases in the summer. The Lebanese live on one side of the main road and are separated into Muslim and Christian areas with no socio-economic differences apparent in the two areas, although the latter area is much smaller and all the families here are related to one another. Researchers noted that *'They really take pride in the harmony between the religious communities and in the fact that the Christians did not flee in times of war, even though the area is mostly Muslim. Everyone agrees this is one of the safest areas to live in regardless of religion'* (Researcher notes). There is no *'culture of public spaces'* in either area. The park, which includes a playground, has *'not been used for two years'* and is fenced and overgrown. Lebanese children seem to be discouraged from playing together outside as exemplified by an incident we witnessed where their makeshift play area in an abandoned house was demolished. In this case some of the anxieties were around Muslim children playing games, which the Christian families, who instigated the demolition, disapproved of. Children in the Syrian camp play only with each other.

As noted above, the Syrians mostly live in two camps (approximately 100 and 150 tents) with just a few LTI Syrians living in rented accommodation. One camp where we lived comprises members of an extended family from Idlib. This camp was established more than thirty years ago for seasonal agricultural and construction labour. Rent is paid to the Lebanese landowner but is very low and can be negotiated if tenant is working on his land. Families joined these seasonal workers about nine years ago and now stay permanently throughout the year. We were told that the families were semi-nomadic and lived in tents in Syria as well. Most of the men have more than one wife and their families live in separate tents. These families minimise contact with Lebanese in the town. Syrian families we stayed with spent their social time with each other and in contact with their families in Syria (e.g. *'my mother was on WhatsApp all the time speaking to her mother and sister in Syria'* (Researcher notes). They shared that they prefer to stick with their family whom they can trust.

RPS Findings

Analysis carried out as part of Wave 5 found a strong correlation between rates of inter-community interaction and (a) Lebanese prejudice, (b) Lebanese reports of 'the return of Syrian refugees' as a possible peace factor, and (c) negative assessments of the quality of relations between both communities.

Consistent with these findings, this study also identifies inter-community interactions as a factor that shapes other aspects of peace. However, the nature and depth of relationships, particularly relationships of mutual trust and interdependence were often more strongly associated with these factors, rather than interactions alone.

Wave 5 summary findings report, 2019

Location D comprised *'two totally separate communities'* (Researcher notes). One was more urban and home to less wealthy Shia Lebanese and the other comprised of working agricultural families who were both Lebanese and Syrian. The Syrian presence prior to 2005, it was explained, enabled Syrians to establish businesses in the town. There are still many LTI Syrian families living in rented accommodation. Many LTI Syrians work with Lebanese as partners rather than the more typical relationship of owner/manager. The relationships are strong and built on work co-operation. For example, a struggling Lebanese butcher worked together with a Syrian baker who had access to customers and they have built their businesses side by side. The Lebanese subsequently helped the Syrian with his residency papers. Many Lebanese

expatriates have left their land in the care of Syrians to cultivate. Some Syrians gave examples of Lebanese landlords being lenient about unpaid rent.

Syrian families working in agriculture had been former seasonal workers mostly in the fruit industry, *'Syrians have been here forever' – at least 50 years'* (elderly Lebanese man) when this area was just fields. Some of these former seasonal workers live in tents (with zinc roofs) in small groupings (up to ten tents) but most live in rented apartments belonging to Lebanese, often on ground floors and windowless basements of former shops.

The connections between Lebanese and Syrians here were described as good, *'these are our Muslim brothers, God gives us blessing'* (a group of young Lebanese men talking about Syrians). The relationships are built on work co-operation. Unlike other locations, LTI Syrians here have not felt the need to adopt the local dialect to fit in and feel accepted. The only tension stems from suspecting newcomers of being members of rebel groups in Syria. This is especially felt because some Lebanese families have lost family members fighting in Syria and attribute this loss to these groups. This often was explained in terms of distrusting refugees but having good relations with LTI Syrians.

Generally, both Lebanese and Syrians see this area as beginning to do well economically as there has been recent investment which contributes to people's positive outlook, *'we have everything we need here, we don't need to go anywhere'* (Lebanese family dependent on fishing and tourism). Syrians, both LTI and refugees, had adopted the local accent and although they identify as Sunni, none of those we met prayed regularly, women did not cover their heads completely, and relationships between men and women were less constrained than other areas. Even though some of the rental accommodation is sub-standard with water and sewage problems, Syrians shared that they do not complain. The public football field has been paved over by the municipality limiting further the potential for joint recreational activities.

Syrians we met in location E were LTI or seasonal worker families and so were well known and trusted. They explained that nobody came from Syria without knowing someone living there already. Large numbers of family members joined their families in 2009 and these families and those who came later benefit from the connections established

long before they arrived and the advice they provide (e.g. *'don't talk about politics and don't throw garbage'* (Syrian man, 40). Despite being Sunni in a Shia area, they shared that *'as long as you don't talk about religion or politics and respect Shia symbols, people are very nice'* (Syrian man, 46). One Syrian family who came in 2009 noted that *'Lebanese were kind to Syrians. They had no problem with us unlike in Beirut. This village was nicer to us'* (Syrian father, 40). He explained this because Lebanese who had sought refuge in Syria during the 2006 conflict, albeit for a few months, had been able to empathise more with the Syrian need to seek refuge than others in Lebanon.

RPS findings

Wave 5 findings indicate that the majority of Lebanese respondents in all locations (52% to 86%) considered *'relationships with Syrians who have lived in our area before the Syrian war to be much better than with those who came afterwards.'*

Consistent with our findings, this was the highest in location E (77%) and location D (86%). Here, Lebanese had strong, established relationships with Syrians who came to these areas decades ago, but were most inclined to distrust Syrians who came recently, often based on their religious affiliation.

Wave 5 summary findings report, 2019

Lebanese living in the area are mostly relatively well-off and own their own homes and are rather similar socio-economically ('middle class'). Relations between Lebanese and Syrians are mainly limited primarily to interactions in shops and in the workplace. However, they are generally described as good and epitomised by the following comment *'we don't have problems with Syrians. It is normal for them to live here. When one incident happens everyone is hated (for a while) but then people forget'* (Lebanese woman). This idea was echoed by one of the Syrian families we lived with who talked about a rape episode involving a Syrian man, *'after which we all stayed at home for six days because we were scared'* and advised other Syrian families to do the same. Once the family of the rapist was expelled, calm and normal relations were restored.

The Syrian families we interacted with felt that the media portrays them in a bad light and problems, which are real and acknowledged in Beirut are generalised across the country, *'Lebanese are right to complain – it is their country but this is affecting all Syrians everywhere'* (Syrian father, 40). However, there are still some Lebanese that prefer to avoid relationships, e.g. *'I have Syrian neighbours but I*

don't want to know anything about them. I don't care about them' (Lebanese mother, 46). Others also noted that there were simply no relations with Syrians. As noted later in the education section, there had been positive attempts to integrate Syrian school children by combining the morning and afternoon shifts at the school but this had been abandoned because of differences in English or French competency. A kindergarten does, however, cater for both Lebanese and Syrian children together. Young Lebanese and Syrian boys play football together sometimes in mixed teams sometimes playing against each other.

In location F, those Lebanese and Syrian families living in close proximity and in a mixed community on the government-owned land had closer relationships than we have observed elsewhere, sharing many of the same fears of eviction, the struggles with the downturn in agricultural economy and a need to share agricultural know-how. Tents that had previously been used to store farming equipment have now been converted into homes for Syrians. The relationship was unusually often referred to as *'partnership'* and some relationships span over three decades. Children of Lebanese and Syrian families play and hang out together, often enjoying recreation in the farmland, at the beach or lake. Inhabitants of this area describe more of a *'village feeling'* and like to spend time together. Syrian families also talked about calling on the help of Lebanese in times of crisis, such as one family we lived with who recalled asking their Lebanese neighbour to borrow their car to take their sick child to the hospital.

However, much of the neighbourhood nearby is dominated by homes of wealthy expatriate Lebanese living in Africa and is only occupied in the summer. The houses in this area that are occupied throughout the year are home to elderly Lebanese who have been living there for decades. They interact daily with each other and those we met said they were unconcerned about the presence of Syrians, mainly because they have little interaction (nobody here rents out to Syrians and there are no Syrians walking on the street). They also indicated that the news media depicts Syrians unfairly. However, we also met a few Lebanese who held resentment against Syrians because their young (Shia) men were *'dying for them in Syria'*. Nobody talked about the differences between Shia and Sunni (there were both Shia and Sunni mosques) and mixed marriages were not unusual.

Box 1: Partnerships

'My' Syrian father has been working in Lebanon for more than thirty years having studied accounting in a Lebanese University. He used to split his time between Lebanon and Syria working around agricultural seasons but moved permanently ten years ago. He contacted a Lebanese university friend and started okra farming together with knowledge he brought from Syria. They work together on the land and split the profit 50:50 at the end of the season. He eventually brought his family over to live with him four years ago.

Researcher notes, location F.

Basic Services

Unlike the first round of the study conducted in north and central Lebanon where healthcare had been the main talking point, there was no universal priority problem related to basic services shared across study locations. In location B, the main problem that emerged from discussions was water and sanitation. In location A, it was pollution and garbage. In location C, location D, and location F, power cuts were of the greatest concern. Though in some cases Lebanese attributed these concerns to Syrians, in most cases they were often shared by Syrians and Lebanese. This contradicts RPS findings, which identify that very high proportions of Lebanese (84% to 99%) agreed that Syrian refugees were placing 'too much strain on Lebanon's resources.'

RPS findings

Wave 5 findings show that at least 84% of Lebanese across locations felt that 'the presence of Syrian refugees in this community is placing too much strain on Lebanon's resources.' Though generally lower proportions of Syrians shared this view, the proportion of Syrians who did was very high in location E (100%) and location A and B (74%).

Wave 5 summary findings report, 2019

Healthcare

Though healthcare was the biggest priority and greatest concern in round one of this study, it was much less of a concern for both Lebanese and Syrians in this study round. This difference is related to insurance coverage as well as access to healthcare for Lebanese facilitated by political connections.

Most people outside of Beirut were located far from hospitals. People universally preferred private hospitals or non-state armed group-owned

and managed hospitals over those managed by the government (see Table 5).

Even though the provision of healthcare was less of an issue in this round, consistent with round one findings, **people here generally also found healthcare to be both expensive and poor quality.** As a result, both Lebanese and Syrians shared that they avoid or delay seeking healthcare services in all but serious conditions. People's views of local hospitals including some local private ones were dire. For example, it was said that '*if you use (local hospitals) you will get in and die*' (Lebanese mother, location C). For serious ailments people nearly always travel out of their locality; one person in location C quipped that '*we go to Zahle and Zahle people go to Beirut for healthcare*'. Lebanese with insurance feel they have more choice about where to go and usually travel out of their locality to seek better services; '*as insurance pays for everything, so I go to the best hospital in town*' (Lebanese mother, location A). A Lebanese family in location B shared that before they got insurance (paid by the father's employer) it was really hard to get a place in a hospital '*even if it was empty*'.

RPS findings

Wave 5 findings show that nationally, 48.3% rated the quality of health services as 'poor' or 'very poor', though pressure on health services, regionally and geographically, was more difficult to determine, with many persons utilising such services likely to seek care, especially hospital care, outside of the area where they resided.

Wave 5 summary findings report, 2019

Buying medicines directly from pharmacies is regarded as the most efficient and cost effective way to avail healthcare. Most Lebanese and Syrians chose to go to pharmacies to ask their opinion before taking their ailments to specialists. Though all do this, this option was particularly important to Lebanese without insurance and Syrians without UN health benefits. Public hospitals are the least preferred across all locations, though Syrians with UN registration do use these providers to access the UN subsidised services.

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You get what you pay for'.

- Lebanese family in location F commenting on health services

Table 5: Health providers available, by study location

Location	Public hospital	Private hospital	Other local hospital	Hospital outside the area	NGO clinics	Doctors clinics	Public clinic	Pharmacies
A	Many, accessible			Private hospital just outside	MSF	Armenian-only clinic	Many	Many
B	Many, accessible	One				3 private clinics		Many
C	None			Two private hospitals near Private hospital			MoPH supported	Four on main road
D	None in the community			Two public hospitals nearby Private hospitals	Voluntary Civil Defence Centre	Many	MoPH supported	At least 50
E	One small	Run by non-state armed group		Hospital		1) Family owned 2) Communist party supported	MoPH supported-considered very poorly resourced	Four on main road
F	None	1) <i>Only for emergencies</i> – provides referral to Saida or Sour & regarded as poor quality 2) Another small private hospital	In Palestinian camp (closest)- <i>poor quality</i>	Private hospital Hospital run by non-state armed group		None Only in Sour	None	Many 'Every 35mins'

* Provider preferred by families shaded blue

Box 2: State of healthcare

There are many options for primary healthcare; doctors' private clinics where a consultation usually costs about USD 50-70; health centres where the same doctors practice once or twice a week.

Consultation may cost USD 10, but the waiting time will be long. A number of NGO or foundation-based clinics which are free. Most people (Lebanese and Syrian) we met indicated that the amount of money you have determines where you go rather than what nationality you are.

Researcher notes, location A.

Table 6: RPS Findings: Wave 5 - % respondents that worry (often, all the time, and sometimes) about access to medical care or medication for themselves or others in their household

Location	Syrians	Lebanese
A and B	87%	73%
C	88%	67%
D	90%	50%
E	100%	92%
F	98%	60%

* Wave V survey findings. (2019). UNDP & RPS Interactive Dashboard. Host-Community and Syrian Refugee Communal Relations in Lebanon.

Consistent with the RPS data, Syrians we met almost universally worried about access to and affordability of healthcare. Though UN subsidies do help address this to some extent, Syrians with UN health cover shared that while maternity services are universally covered, other services, including emergency care are increasingly being cut, *'fewer and fewer things are covered'* (Syrian man, location F). Those with UN insurance cover shared different interpretations of the percentage which is subsidised (ranging from 50% in location C, 70% in location E, 80% in location D, to 90% in location A and B). Some Syrians receiving this benefit considered the process for claiming subsidies to be complicated and preferred to seek care from local pharmacies and clinics. Private health clinics are regarded as good and relatively less costly, often only requiring payment for treatment (not for diagnosis). The convenience of attending such facilities for Syrian families often outweighs the advantage of getting UN subsidies, which are only available for public hospitals. Those without UN registration have limited options, as public hospitals require documentation. They therefore also prefer to go to pharmacies and private hospitals.

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My family complained about the high cost of medicines. 'My' dad said that everything the pharmacy sells is expensive, even a headache pill. He said it was especially difficult for someone like him who does not get a salary but depends on daily labour. He said he hoped nothing bad would happen to his children as when they get sick 'you have to afford to take care of them'.

- Researcher notes from living with a Syrian family in location F.

Medicine and services in Syria are cheaper and both Syrians and some Lebanese shared they take advantage of this when possible. For example, one Syrian family we lived with in location E shared that they have friends in Bekaa who make regular trips to Syria and bring back medicines and that there are even drivers who will take specific orders to collect medicines from Syria and bring them back to Lebanon. Another Syrian family contrasted Syrian health services with those in Lebanon. She claimed that Lebanese services were

inefficient, doctors had poor attitude, and that care in Syria was better and cheaper. Lebanese who also opted for medicines from Syria or Turkey said the same. Poor Lebanese in location D were also said to make trips to Syria for medicines. We met a Lebanese here who organises dentistry and plastic surgery trips to Syria for Lebanese and separately met people who had done just that. Some Syrians and Lebanese felt that while the cost of healthcare in Syria is lower, the quality is also inferior.

Among LTIs, some have their own private health insurance provided by sponsors/employers. For example, we met a mechanic and a baker whose employers contributed around 180,000 LBP/month for their insurance, though this was not common.

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People are afraid to be sick'.

- Syrian father, location A.

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It is dangerous to get sick in Lebanon because it costs so much (even with UN subsidy)... You can do anything just don't get sick'.

- Syrian family, location D.

A small number of Christian health charities operate in location C as well as in location E and provide free medicines, especially for chronic illnesses. The Red Cross was also active in location C.

Affordability of healthcare was a less common concern among Lebanese we met. This is consistent with the RPS findings, which shows that between 10 and 38% fewer Lebanese have these concerns than Syrians in a given location.

In some locations insurance provided by the army or government jobs helped address this. In others, social services provided by non-state armed group were valued as a way to meet healthcare needs. A number of Lebanese families we lived with in location E had health cards from a non-state armed group for which a monthly fee is charged in exchange for subsidised medicines, check-ups, and some hospital care. Other Lebanese here shared that they get special treatment as party members or as relatives of 'martyrs' for chronic conditions such as diabetes

and liver disease. In location D, the 'Voluntary Civil Defence Centre' works with over 130 volunteers including over 80 nurses and offers first response services and primary healthcare, vaccinations, conducts health campaigns, and provides transport to referral centres and appointments out of the area for both Lebanese and Syrian refugees.

Overall, crowding in public hospitals was not identified as a major issue facing Lebanese or Syrians. In location F, location C, and location B, it was said that waiting times could be long, but people tended to associate this with inefficiency, lateness of doctors, or insufficient staffing rather than demand pressure. However, as is also noted in RPS findings, the fact that Lebanese often chose to visit hospitals in the next largest city may contribute to experiences of crowding and long wait times, rather than the presence of Syrians.

Lebanese people commonly highlighted the importance of using connections to access hospital services, particularly if one does not have insurance or other social assistance. However, this was not the case in location C and location F. In location C, most Lebanese had medical insurance based on party affiliation, their employer or the military. The suggestion is that in the other locations where fewer people had insurance, political and personal connections enable those without insurance to jump the waiting queues, which people said could otherwise be 3-5 hours long. A Lebanese family in location B said they were guaranteed a hospital bed for free any time at the nearby public hospital because they have connections. Another Lebanese woman in location A shared that she had once waited 4-5 hours even though the ward at the public hospital was not full until she called her 'connections,' after which she was immediately given a bed. A Lebanese man shared an almost identical story from his experience in the same neighbourhood.

The connections also facilitate access to services, which have been denied to Syrians. For example one Syrian family shared that their son who was suffering panic attacks was initially denied admission at a private hospital, and was only admitted later after a Lebanese Haji intervened on their behalf. Medical students we met here gave another perspective to the use of 'connections' and suggested that intimidation of health staff by politically affiliated groups was used to secure medical services in some hospitals.

Unlike the earlier round of the study, the UN health subsidies for Syrians did not emerge as an area of tension or jealousy. Lebanese neither mentioned them nor complained about them when we introduced the subject. Only in location D did we hear both less wealthy and better-off Lebanese complaining that Syrians get healthcare for free '*and we have to pay a lot to get something decent*'.

Education

This section provides an overview of people's perceptions of the quality of education services available in the area and provides information on access constraints faced by Syrians and Lebanese. The following table provides a summary of the available schools in all study locations.

Consistent with RPS findings, people's views on the quality of education available locally varied by location, with the lowest proportions in location E viewing education as 'poor' or 'very poor' (3%). The next lowest proportion was in location A and B (19%), where many people appreciated the large number of options they had available to them. In location D and location F relatively low numbers also viewed education available as 'poor' or 'very poor', which was consistent with the generally positive views people shared about these services.

In all study locations, the schools run an afternoon shift system to accommodate the Syrian children. In location A, classes in the afternoon are double the size of the morning shift with children sharing desks. Several people here told us that Syrian children might enrol in the morning shift '*if you have a connection.*' Syrians who had done this indicated that Lebanese parents do not object. Syrian children attending the morning shifts adopt Lebanese accents (to fit in) and indicated they had good relations with Lebanese children inside and outside school. In location D, a few LTI Syrian children were included in the morning shift, though unlike the afternoon shift, their parents paid for the cost of transportation.

Some Lebanese noted that teachers were rude to the Syrian children in the afternoon shifts here. In location B and location F, the teachers were described as tired in the afternoons. In location E, there had been an experiment three years ago to integrate Syrians into regular school but it had failed, people told us, mainly because of poor French and English competence levels among the Syrians.

Table 7: Education providers available, by study location

Location	Schools	Higher education	Special arrangements for Syrians	Special arrangements for Lebanese
A	Public primary and public secondary schools Several Armenian-only schools Variety of other private schools- some religious based but open to all	None in the area but easily accessible	Afternoon shifts Transport subsidies stopped	
B	Many private schools Public schools Islamic religious school for boys	Technical college Universities	Two UN-supported schools (one primary and one secondary open to all*) NGO schools	
C	Public school to Grade 9 (poor reputation) Two private schools		Special tented school for camp children aged 5-7 (but described as 'only for play') Afternoon shift in a school outside of the community- uniforms paid for	Public school-No requirement for uniforms Provided free books
D	Three public schools (good reputation) Two private schools	Not in the area	Afternoon shifts Supposed to wear uniform but no checks Provided bags & books	
E	Two public schools (primary and secondary)	Technical vocational skills college	Afternoon shifts	
F	Public school to Grade 9 (very good reputation)	No higher education in the area	Afternoon shift started 2-3 years ago- plans to focus only on basic education not the Lebanese curriculum.	Political parties provide education assistance for some

* Although open to all, Lebanese families do not send their children here.

One of 'our' Syrian fathers in location E said his ten-year-old son is the only Syrian enrolled in the morning shift at the public primary school. He explained that he prefers the morning shift as it allows his son to interact with Lebanese friends and is also pleased that he is learning English and French. While some Syrian children attending the morning shift continued to receive support from the UN in the form of books and fees (location A, location B, location E), others stopped receiving after they enrolled in the morning shift. Syrian students in the morning shift who do not wear uniforms said they did not feel any discrimination as a result of this special treatment.

Apart from concerns about teachers being tired¹⁵, which affected the Syrian children mostly in the afternoon shifts, there was little other concern expressed about schools by Lebanese and Syrians. In location E, one Lebanese family we lived

¹⁵ In location A there were some examples of additional teachers, including Syrian teachers, employed for the afternoon shift to alleviate this problem.

with was pleased that there were children of other nationalities in their class and actively promoted friendships. In location F, where the school was rated very highly, there were very few complaints from Lebanese about the strain on resources that Syrians cause; *'it is not our problem to take care of these people, we already have problems in our country'*. However, this was not the case where Lebanese and Syrians were living close and working together. Across all study locations there was no concern about over-crowding in schools although Syrian children in location F and location A were accommodated in large classes of over 35. Having gained trust with the families we lived with, we specifically asked children about relationships at school and whether they were bullied. Except in the location A and B, bullying was said to be absent.

Syrian family attitudes towards educating their children varied considerably by family. Mothers typically encourage schooling in Syria and make the school-related decisions where schooling is free. However, fathers become involved in the decision when costs are involved.

Most Syrians note that higher education in Lebanon was not available to them due to the cost. One Syrian family in location D said they could not afford for their children to attend universities in Lebanon and that their refugee status meant that they could also not return to Syria to avail the free education there. As a result they and other families try to arrange apprenticeships with mechanic shops, bakeries or in supermarkets for their children who are as young as 12-13. Beyond being a practical choice, for boys, leaving school for work is often associated with being more masculine and brings pride to the parents knowing that the child is learning a trade for their future. Though this was less common for Lebanese, in location D, Lebanese boys typically do not complete school after grade nine, as they preferred to join the army or take up business. *'The certificate will be on the wall, but it is not useful'*, said one Lebanese parent in reference to a school diploma. This family echoed others in this area where there were no job opportunities for those with an education. Syrians here did not see education as being linked to future job prospects.

Syrians spoke of increasing administrative barriers to accessing school. Syrian families we lived with mentioned that Syrian children need to provide a UN card to register in school as well as a record of their previous education attainment from Syria. The latter can be difficult without a contact that can facilitate this in Syria, and was said to cost around USD 40. Official registration has declined with the costs involved and affects enrolment. However, in location D the need for papers was waived for attendance at the afternoon shift.

A number of Syrian families spoke of transport subsidies as essential for allowing them to send their children to school. One Syrian family we lived with in location A has recently stopped sending their boys (ages 10 and 11) to school because UN has withdrawn transport subsidies (LBP 60,000/month). There were complaints from Syrian parents about the afternoon shift (referred to as *'this stupid night shift system'*) in location F especially since transport subsidies were removed and children had to return home walking after dark (classes finish at 7pm). This led to some Syrian families here to stop sending their children to school. Some Lebanese complained about Syrian school children returning from school after dark suggesting it made them feel unsafe. In location D, the camp-based children continue to go to school since removal of the transport subsidy as the families jointly rent a bus.

Environmental health

This section explores the problems that Syrians and Lebanese experience relating to the environment. Though the most common issue cited across locations is the presence of garbage, the popular narrative of Syrians contributing to this was rarely mentioned.

The problem seemed most acute in location A and B, but was localised to particular neighbourhoods and streets within them. However, across the country, people seemed to have grown accustomed to the recurring problem of garbage removal and in most cases, people blame the municipality.

Garbage

Overall, garbage disposal was mentioned as a problem largely in location A and B. Despite hearing a few blaming comments such as *'Syrians throw garbage into the street'* (Lebanese woman location A), most shared that there has been a garbage issue for a long time and long before Syrians came in large numbers.



A Lebanese man I met blamed Syrians for the garbage on the streets. But this photo is taken in front of the police station and no Syrians frequent this area (Researcher notes, location A).

In location A, we experienced that there really is a problem not only with the large amounts of garbage in the street but also the concomitant smell and many rats. However, this problem was nothing of the scale we observed in Akkar.

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Look at the garbage, smell the street, how can we ever get used to it?'

- Syrian man (36), location A.


//

I live in a big garbage dump'.

- Syrian man (42), location A.

In location A, Lebanese and Syrians alike blamed the 'politicians' and 'corruption' for the lack of efficient garbage collection services. There was also concern that Syrians 'benefit from the garbage' by sorting through for plastics to sell for recycling and making more of a mess with their rummaging. Overall, **people did not see garbage as a source of tension but rather that some found it easy to blame Syrians.**

In location B, we observed garbage spilling out of bins and some complaining there had been no garbage collections for over a month. While main roads were clear, side roads were 'full of trash'. The lack of services has led people to burn trash and some suggested this had exacerbated respiratory tract conditions. Nevertheless, people complained less than in location A, and in some areas 'nobody spoke about it unless I asked' (Researcher notes). Some blamed the municipality for 'not caring' but others linked poor services to lack of political patronage.



Researcher photo of garbage in location B.

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Because of the 1.5 million Syrians we have a garbage crisis. Here we have 200 Syrian families, that means 2000 Syrians'.

- Lebanese man (51), location F.

However, even in locations where garbage was not an obvious issue, some Lebanese asserted that Syrians are to blame for this. However, living for some days in this community it was clear that this estimated number of Syrians was an exaggeration, and that the area was 'very clean, no trash lying around and no smell' (Researcher notes, location F). Others living in the area actually remarked unsolicited how clean their neighbourhood was and applauded the municipality for taking action. Some Lebanese living here shared that they had seen there were garbage problems in other parts of Lebanon and subscribed to the popular view that the 'Syrians are to blame', despite not experiencing a problem themselves.

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Lebanese don't throw garbage, it is the Syrians who do this'.

- Lebanese man (35), location F.

In location C, high-level officials told us that 'Syrians produce 50% more trash than Lebanese per day' and that the extra garbage generated huge cost to the municipality. The town and the Syrian camp we stayed in were both very clean. Syrians shared that the amount of garbage collected weekly from the camp is exaggerated, and we observed that the garbage removal trucks were not full. People here were happy with the municipality's management of garbage and with a recycling plant nearby and regular collections, there was little recourse to burning trash. Although the officials linked garbage disposal problems to the Syrians, no Lebanese we met in the community shared this view.

In location E, nobody complained about garbage ('you see that this place is very clean') and we observed that trucks were collecting garbage daily and even side streets were clean. The reliable collection partly paid for by Municipal household taxes of USD 20/month meant there was no need

to burn trash, although some Lebanese took trash outside of the town to burn. People recognised that their municipality was better than others in this regard. However, some suggested that although the town itself was clean the trash was simply dumped on the outskirts.

Garbage management seems to be most problematic when the responsibility for addressing it is unclear. For example, in the part of location A regarded as *'having no government control'*, and where people live illegally on government land such as location F, the community was left to manage garbage themselves. This contrast was visible in location F. As noted previously, this location was very clean except for the illegally occupied land, which sits on the border of a number of municipalities. This led to some confusion as to who is responsible for garbage collection. Families we lived with here shared that as is common, the garbage had not been collected for 20 days so they will burn it. In location A, youth volunteers had been mobilised to collect garbage and in other parts, private trash collectors with carts operated at a cost to the household of USD 10/month.

As a result of media coverage of problems with garbage collection and disposal, many Syrian families we interacted with said they took special steps to ensure they would not be blamed for creating garbage. This was similar to our experience in the first round of the study, especially in Akkar, where Syrian families went to extra trouble to dispose of trash thoughtfully. In location E, a Lebanese family commented on the extra efforts Syrian families were making to ensure there were no complaints and the Syrian families we stayed with confirmed that they take their trash to the designated spots at the end of the street. In location D, it was the Lebanese areas that suffered from garbage problems with a lot of trash strewn alongside the roads and many flies and the Syrian area was *'very clean by comparison'* (Researcher notes).

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My Syrian family (parents with six children aged 3-15) takes a lot of care with their garbage. They told me they want to ensure the image of Syrians is that they are clean. They pay LBP 65,000 per year to the municipality to collect their garbage'.

- Researcher notes, location D.

Sewage

Although drains smelled in location A and B especially after rainfall, in some other study locations sewage disposal was a major problem. The worst situation was in location D, where we observed and smelled sewage everywhere. Sewage leaked on to the road and the beach as a result of what people described as poorly designed culverts and efforts to avoid polluting the Litani River. People shared *'the river (Litani) is clean but the sea is dirty'*. Lebanese fishermen complained that the sea is badly polluted, fish are dying and fishing was discouraged. All the Lebanese here blamed the sewage problem on Lebanese. One Lebanese mother (63) we stayed with indicated that she felt nothing would work to improve the sewage situation, *as 'people here are filthy'*. Syrians themselves felt that the sewage issue had been used as an excuse to evict Syrians from the vicinity of the Litani River, which they felt was unfair.

In location C, people complained about the sewage treatment plant and rumours were rife that corruption has led to poor management of the plant. The *'treated'* water, which smells bad, is used for irrigation.

Syrians living in a camp here complained most about the dust in summer and the mud in winter, which they felt they could not easily resolve. In location D, Syrian families shared that they are not concerned by the air pollution generated from the ironworks nearby (smoke and strong smells) *'as long as they have somewhere to live.'*



The municipality burns trash outside the town (location D).

It was noted across locations that evictions related to environmental protection issues were perceived as always being directed towards house owners and family homes and never towards businesses. Despite probing, no one we met had heard that polluting industries might be evicted too.

Aid

In contrast to the findings from the first study round, **Lebanese did not view aid provided to Syrians as a source of jealousy or tension.** This topic was never brought up spontaneously by Lebanese, and was rarely discussed at all by anyone unless we introduced the topic. There are a number of reasons for this: (i) apart from location A, B and C, the concentration of Syrians living in our study locations was much lower than in the first round; (ii) Syrian refugees in the non-Beirut locations are known by their connections to LTI Syrians and looked upon with more empathy than the masses of refugees in the North; (iii) there are fewer poor Lebanese living in these areas and, where there are, they often work in partnership with similar status Syrians (e.g. in location F); (iv) with fewer large camps in the areas (except location C) and scattered rental accommodation people say there was never as much UN aid provided as in the North and central areas; (v) aid that was previously provided has been subject to increasing cuts since the beginning of the year so there is less to be jealous about and; (vi) there are few or no NGOs active in the areas of the study outside Beirut.

Both location A and B have a number of local and international NGOs working within the communities, which provide health services in particular. However, both Syrians and Lebanese in location B noted that services of many of these organisations had been cut recently because of the economic crisis. With the exception of location A and B, there is less visible support provided to Syrian refugees than in most of the round one study areas in North and central Lebanon, where we observed many signboards promoting aid programmes.

This relative lack of NGOs may be the result of the social, political, and financial constraints to their activities in these areas, including a prohibition on funding from USAID in some areas. In two locations researchers did not observe and families did not mention any NGO operating (location E and location F), while in location C and location D, there were no NGO offices but some activity had taken place. Though in location C, a Lebanese man

explained that projects were only permitted which focussed on assistance to Lebanese. In location D, NGO activity linked in some way to UN (for example UN accredited Abaad (Resource Centre for Gender Equality) provided child protection training and help with registration of Syrians and the UN-supported Association of Human Earth provided English language courses for refugees). In location C, a Christian NGO provides medicines for both Syrians and Lebanese with chronic ailments and Catholic Order of Malta provides similar services. There had also been 'awareness raising' courses including one on peace building and Lebanese volunteers had provided skills training to Syrians in the camps which, according to one Lebanese man we met '*improved relations*'. With the cuts in UN funding, it was explained that those NGOs who were dependent on these resources have cut staff and projects drastically. In location F, UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon) provides annual grants for small community projects such as street lighting, provision of books, and computers for schools.

In the locations where Syrians live in small informal settlements or where they rent, they say UN provides very little assistance (nothing or just health subsidy). One Syrian family we lived with in location F described how they had specifically asked UN for food aid and health subsidies, though they had never heard back following an assessment visit.

In order to preserve refugee status, the wives and families of Syrian workers are UN registered but the working members of the family have dropped their refugee status in order to be eligible for sponsorship and work permits. There was concern about the difficulties encountered in having to renew UN registration every month in person, so UN registration had lapsed for many and consequently access to any aid was greatly limited.

In location C, where the Syrian camps are large, UN aid was still being provided, despite cuts elsewhere. One Syrian family we lived with in the camp said they got food aid every month but were concerned that the municipality removed the canned goods and items of value before distributing. They also received money monthly credited to a card to pay for supermarket goods but explained that they can exchange for cash (with a small 'administration charge') at the supermarket. One of the Syrian families we lived with in location A described how they were informed by SMS in early 2019 that their UN support would be cut off. They verified this

information with others through Facebook. The family officially complained and were asked to attend an interview where it was explained that they are no longer qualified, as others were more deserving. They noted that this included the loss of school transport subsidy, which led to them withdrawing their sons from school.

In locations where Syrian refugees were receiving aid, Lebanese people we met were largely sympathetic. This was the case in location E, where there are very few refugees. Here, one Lebanese person mentioned, Syrian refugees *'are poor people and have a hard time and we know what it is like when people run away from war, so we don't have any issue with them getting support'*. The fact that in RPS findings the highest proportion of Syrians view unfair aid distribution as a tension factor is in location E (33%) may indicate that Syrians here (who were often LTI) may have internalised the popular opinions on aid shared in the media by Lebanese elsewhere. These figures may also be driven by the views of LTI Syrians, who may resent those receiving aid.

Similarly, in location C, where there are large Syrian camps, Lebanese we met had seen queues of Syrian refugee families collecting money from ATM machines, which they assumed to be UN support. Lebanese here shared sentiments such as *'God helps all people'* and that it was understandable that everyone needs to find a way of living.

However, in other cases, Lebanese people spoke more harshly. Lebanese families in Christian part of location C were more derisive, saying *'umum provides, umum provides'* and *'Syrians don't need to work because the UN gives them everything'* and denied the idea that subsidies had been cut when we tried to engage on this topic¹⁶. In location A, we heard some of resentment among Lebanese; *'why do Syrian (refugees) have cars?'; 'they (Syrians) get food vouchers and sell them... and then ask to borrow rice from a neighbour'; 'they get rice, oil, sugar, tuna, beans from umum and then sell it'; 'both parents have jobs and yet they get aid'; 'it is better they (Syrians) get aid than steal jobs'*. In some cases, Lebanese in location A and B vastly exaggerated the amounts of aid Syrian families were allegedly receiving and had not heard of recent cuts. Nevertheless, the research team in location A felt that this was a minority view and the people who

expressed these views could not provide concrete examples. In location D, a Lebanese woman had established a programme of providing winter clothes to Syrians but faced some criticism along the lines *'why should I bring my gloves for Syrians when they get things from the UN?'*

Though resentment among Lebanese was relatively low, resentment within the Syrian community among those who did not receive support was significant. For example, many Syrian refugees in location D felt that they had been by-passed and only those with connections had received aid. However, in location C LTI Syrians complained that they were doing the same menial agricultural work as refugees but could not get cash support, *'we are Syrians in need too.... It is unfair to give to some and not to others'* (LTI Syrian farm worker).

Information

Many people in the South locations commented that the TV channels they watch are owned or sponsored by political parties. *'All Lebanese news channels tailor their news based on the needs of their party'* (Lebanese man (51), location F), *'all channels are political so they don't say what is really happening'* (Lebanese woman (32), location A) and *'we don't trust the media in Lebanon – each channel has its own politics'* (Syrian family, location E). These are therefore either trusted implicitly or dismissed depending on the political affiliations of viewers. One Lebanese father in location E says he purposely watches all six news channels in order to get a more balanced view of what is going on. Others also shared that they *'don't believe anything unless they check carefully'*. Few watch news channels from other countries. Others confine their TV watching to entertainment and do not bother to watch the news, preferring to get news face to face from people they trust or who have direct knowledge and experience.

Facebook and WhatsApp are both much used by Lebanese and Syrians (especially younger people) alike for keeping up to date with news and keeping in touch with family. Our observations suggest that most who use Facebook for news follow pages that coincide with their own views and prejudices. In some places, there are location-specific news pages, which provide alerts on incidents or local news, and are often more trusted than national news. Some Syrian families we lived with have access to specific

¹⁶ The assistance given to Syrian is being revised on a yearly basis taking into consideration the targeting formula.

sites with alerts about checkpoints. Others are in WhatsApp groups specifically focusing on news about job opportunities, the new regulations, and arrangements for voluntary return to Syria. Those Syrian families who are anxious to return get daily updates on prices of daily goods, safety and mobility in Syria. Others like to keep up with developments in Syria but LTIs we met in location F were not interested in Syrian politics. We met both Syrians and Lebanese who had set up fake Facebook accounts in order to communicate more openly.

“

My Syrian family said, 'they are sending Syrians back to Syria' but when I asked them who 'they' are, they had no answer except that 'people say this'. They were panicked and had not bothered to check the information. Sometimes this is because they are numbed by everything that has happened to them and feel that they have nothing left to lose. They simply accept further bad news without question. But others do take the trouble to check. For example, there was information circulating that about 200 Syrians who had been sent back and many Syrians phoned General Security to verify this. They were told that this was not true'.

- Researcher notes, location B.

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Chatting to a Syrian, he showed me a message on WhatsApp which was purportedly from the UN regarding forced return of Syrians to Syria. Although it had no logos or links and was obviously a scam to me, the man believed it. He showed me many others from different sources and wasn't sure what to believe and how to check if things were true or not'.

- Researcher notes, location B.

Many people spoke about the fake news and scams that were common on social media, including scams related to offers of work for Syrians. As fake news is common, many were not even sure that the new regulations regarding work permits were genuine. There have been posts circulated on social media suggesting that there are deals that can be struck with the General Security regarding Syrian registration. There is another that suggests the kefala system is about to end and another that indicates that the central bank was bankrupt. People felt it was really difficult to navigate this kind of fake news. News about deportations of Syrians has caused considerable concern but some see this as a means 'to scare us' (Syrian construction workers, location E). Syrians we talked with in location A said that they cross check everything with their workmates and relatives. Some shared they think that all the news on Facebook is fake.

The messaging app Telegram was used by some Syrians to communicate with relatives in Syria because of the restrictions on use of WhatsApp in Syria but other use similar app platforms which are not blocked, including dating apps, to communicate.

There was no mention about information received by Syrians from UN despite asking specifically about this.

Box 3: How the source of informal information shapes the narrative

One study location was near a village that has been featured frequently in the news. People were keen to tell us about what had happened but each of our researchers who stayed in different areas of this location were told different versions of this story. Lebanese in one area said that a fire had broken out in the IS and the local civil defence services were very late in attending the fire. This was framed as discrimination and a fight ensued at the site with rumours that someone had been killed. Another version shared by Lebanese was that one tent was burned but that the fight broke out between a Lebanese Christian and Syrians because of insults to a Syrian woman in the camp. Shots were fired and someone was now in intensive care. Another Lebanese shared that it was not the camp but a field, which caught fire. The civil defence attended this fire but were tardy in putting it out so there was a lot of smoke and a Syrian threw a rock at the fire-fighters in protest. Subsequently the camp was evicted, and the neighbouring fields burned. The Syrian view was that a fire in the field spread to the IS and following efforts to put it out, a fight ensued which led to the eviction of the camp dwellers.

Combined researchers notes

Work

The declining state of the economy is affecting everyone

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The country is dying'.

- oft heard lament in location D.

The state of the economy (and explicitly 'the deficit') was much talked about by both Lebanese and Syrians we lived with and interacted with; 'This year has been bad for everyone' (Lebanese fruit farmer, location F) particularly bemoaning that they can no longer export their fruit to the Gulf since they cannot use Syria as a transit country. Lebanese in location D had a similar complaint, noting that this shift had negatively affected their fruit and vegetable businesses.

//

The war in Syria put Lebanon in jail'.

- Lebanese agriculture exporter (location F) talking about the continuing constraints on export because of Lebanon's geographic position.

People also noted that the cost of goods, utilities and taxes had risen while wages had not, leading many to borrow money from family and friends. In location B, all those we met felt that 'the economy will continue to get worse', pessimism mostly shared elsewhere. As a result, local demand/markets for goods had also declined, which people felt would only be worsened by the announcement from the Government that civil service salaries will be reduced.

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Before for USD 100 we could live for two weeks now this lasts only two days'.

- Lebanese family, location B.

Most people we interacted with felt that businesses struggle regardless of who owns them or is employed by them. A Lebanese woman who worked in a pharmacy in location E shared that she had lost

her job recently purely because of the economic climate and we got the impression in location C and location D that many Lebanese as well as Syrians were looking for jobs. Lebanese generally blamed politicians for this and rarely connected their struggles to Syrians. This view contrasts with the first round of our study where 'people were quick to attribute the economic and jobs situation to recent Syrian arrivals and competition for work' (Round one report, p. 33). The difference may be partially explained by the fact that two of the round one study locations (South Akkar and Bekaa), are home to some of the highest numbers of Syrian refugees and South Akkar is one of the poorest locations.

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I spent time at construction sites. In one site the Lebanese landowner and Syrian construction workers were chatting together and sharing how difficult it is these days to get work and provide for the family. It was a shared concern'.

- Researcher notes, location D.

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I asked a Lebanese shop owner about available jobs. She knew I was Syrian, and she was very sympathetic to the fact that I was apparently searching for work. She felt many people, Lebanese and Syrian, were facing a hard time economically'.

- Researcher notes, location C.

Competition for work

Overall, very few Lebanese people we met had direct experience competing for jobs with Syrians. The only category where competition was observed was in establishment of small businesses such as small restaurants, cafes, grocery shops, and street vendors. This is consistent with the RPS, which finds that almost no Syrians or Lebanese identified competition for high skilled work, with the exception of in location A and B.

Table 8: RPS Findings: Wave 5 - % respondents that said yes to the following sources of tension between Syrians and Lebanese in their community

Location	Syrians	Lebanese
A and B	49%	60%
C	22%	49%
D	0%	35%
E	44%	93%
F	5%	32%

* Wave V survey findings. (2019). UNDP & RPS Interactive Dashboard. Host-Community and Syrian Refugee Communal Relations in Lebanon.

As we found in the first study round, the stratification of jobs between Syrian and Lebanese meant that areas of direct competition for jobs were very narrow. This was particularly true outside of urban locations in location A and B. A much-repeated comment across study locations was that *'Syrians do the jobs that Lebanese don't want to do'* and *'Syrians fill a resource gap... doing jobs that need to be done'* (many, location B). For example, Syrian construction workers in location D and location E mostly worked under Lebanese supervisors. Agriculture in location C, location D and location E was structured such that Lebanese were landowners, managers, and supervisors and Syrians worked in the fields sometimes as employees, day labourers or renting the land (with the exception of location E). In location C, Syrian seasonal workers had traditionally undertaken agricultural work long before the influx of refugees and Lebanese we interacted with universally noted that *'only Syrians accept to work in the fields'* and were thankful that they have Syrian workers.

“

'My' Lebanese family has a Syrian family living next door in a tent. They have been there seven years. The land is Government owned so both families are there illegally. The Lebanese family buys the farming inputs and owns and runs the mechanical equipment such as tractors. The Syrian family does all the manual labour. At the end of the harvest they split the profits 50:50. Others in the area said they have similar arrangements'.

- Researcher notes, location F.

RPS findings

According to Wave 5 findings, higher proportions of Lebanese consistently consider competition for lower skilled work a source of tension than do Syrians. The fact that more Syrians feel this way in locations where more Lebanese also feel this way may indicate that these views may be interdependent. The finding that high proportions of Lebanese (93%) and Syrians (44%) in location E feel this way in particular may suggest that this question captures people's sense tension or competition, rather than their actual experiences of competition.

Wave 5 summary findings report, 2019

“

You will never see a Lebanese picking up potatoes'.

- Lebanese Man, location C.

In location A, there were a number of small factories owned and managed by Lebanese and most of the workers were Syrian with some Lebanese. In the hospitality industry, a hierarchy also tends to operate. So, for example, a Lebanese restaurant owner in location D, like others we met elsewhere, shared that he only employed Syrians to prepare hookahs as having Lebanese waiting staff was better for the image of the restaurant.

Basis of stratification of work

The main justifications for stratified work explained to us by Lebanese and Syrians alike were (i) historical organisation of seasonal labour from Syria (mostly agriculture and construction, some hospitality) (ii) lower wages accepted by Syrians and (iii) perceived better work ethic of Syrian workers/better employability.

(i) Historical organisation of seasonal labour from Syria

As we observed in the agricultural areas in the first round of the study, Syrians have been undertaking seasonal work in Lebanon for decades, including providing manual labour. This arrangement is both well-defined and trusted. **As families of seasonal workers have joined them in Lebanon after the Syrian crisis began, the networks established by previously seasonal workers provide a way for refugees to access work in this sector, which is often unskilled labour managed by more established Syrians.** The special dispensations for

agricultural, construction, and hospitality sectors, which traditionally have not required work permits, continue to provide work opportunities for refugees.

(ii) Lower wages accepted by Syrians

As found in the earlier study (Round one study report, p.35-36), **Syrians are often paid less than Lebanese.** Lebanese and Syrians alike explained this using common arguments related to a willingness to accept low wages and meagre legal protections as well as a lack of other work options. For example, in location A the same construction jobs were offered to Syrians at USD 25/day and at USD 35/day for Lebanese, *'because they simply won't work for less'*. Similarly, a young Lebanese mother shared, *'Lebanese girls would never accept the USD 500/month to work as a shop assistant that Syrians accept'*.

As noted in the earlier study, Syrians often shared that they accepted lower wages because they did not have work permits and have few options for work outside of the construction and agricultural sectors. While in some cases these arrangements were established and trusted, in others, Syrians we met said they do not trust their employers to pay them on time (location A). We noted however, that other groups also get paid less than Lebanese men for the same work and these include other foreign workers, Doms and some Lebanese women. In one location an International company had fired Syrian workers because of the new regulations requiring work permits for foreign workers and employed Doms as they were prepared to accept the lower wages.

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Blame the (Lebanese) bosses not the Syrians for the low wages'

- Lebanese woman, location D.

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Syrian construction workers I met complained about the site supervision and this was irrespective of it being a Lebanese or Syrian supervisor. Both, they feel, cheat them and don't pay fairly'

- Researcher notes, location C.

Box 4: 'Syrians will work for less'

A Lebanese woman was the only one I met here who told me that she felt that since more Syrians had come there was indeed more job competition. She said her Lebanese boss offered her and her friends lower wages (USD 10/day to pick and pack fruit and vegetables, half what they had before) and only the Syrians were prepared to work for this amount, so the Lebanese workers left.

Researcher notes, location D.

Syrians we met also provided additional explanations for this difference in wages. For example, a well-qualified Syrian engineer said he was paid half as much as his Lebanese colleagues to do the same supervision job, despite working longer hours. He noted that the Lebanese had to pay taxes, municipality fees, and other costs, which he did not. Other Syrian workers we met also noted that they might work for less than Lebanese co-workers because they got other benefits. For example, a Syrian factory worker said he was paid USD 13/day compared to USD 20/day for Lebanese but was happy with this as he got his accommodation provided at the factory and reliable work. Others also noted that those working without work permits do not pay tax and some other costs. *'I have a work permit and have way more costs than a Syrian without one... it makes sense they get paid less'* (Palestinian construction worker, location B). We also heard Lebanese justify this difference in wages because they claimed Syrians also received the *'UN subsidy'* although did not know what this entailed specifically (location C).

(iii) Perceived better work ethic of Syrians

Apart from recognising that Syrian workers could be employed more cheaply than Lebanese, **Lebanese also commonly commented that Syrians were more willing to work and had higher standards of workmanship.** For example, in location D, one Lebanese said that a Syrian lived nearby was the only person he would allow to clean his beach front property, saying *'No Lebanese would have done this as well.'* He paid him USD 50 rather than the USD 10 he originally asked for. Another Lebanese shared how impressed he was with the repair work carried out by an LTI Syrian on his old Audi, *'his work is so good, nobody else would be able to do this as the engine is so complicated'*. Others here said that construction work carried out by Syrians was better quality than Lebanese. In location E, a Lebanese

family trying to construct a new home shared that they would rather employ Syrians as *'the Lebanese will take twice as long and complain all the time'*. Other Lebanese in the same location also echoed those views saying that the construction work of Syrians was always better than Lebanese implying that reasons for job competition have more to do with Syrians' ability and willingness to work and Lebanese lack thereof than other factors.

In location B, a Lebanese meat wholesaler said he had invested in training Syrians *'who are keen to learn. No Lebanese have ever wanted to learn this in all the years I have been doing this'*. In location C, a Lebanese owner of an electrical business said, *'Lebanese are very lazy. Syrians wake up early, respect time and come to work punctually. I have to call the Lebanese and they don't wake up'*. Similarly, here a Lebanese restaurant owner shared that when he had advertised for staff no Lebanese wanted the work. A frustrated restaurant owner in location A replaced all his Syrian staff with Lebanese because of the new regulations imposed since April (see below) but fired them all after two days *'because they refused to deliver food to the sixth floor'*.

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'My' Lebanese brother said that if he employs a Syrian as a labourer to build a wall he will take 20,000LL/day but 'A Lebanese will want 50,000LL and complain''.

- Researcher notes, location E.

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Syrians are used to working from a very young age and they are very hard working'.

- Lebanese boss, location B.

//

Syrians do everything, there is no job they won't do'.

- Lebanese, location D.

Many Lebanese noted that Lebanese generally do not desire jobs involving skilled or unskilled labour. For example, while in the past, youths might have been encouraged by their parents to work as mechanics or in construction as teenagers, they now expect to get 'better' jobs in offices. A Lebanese father (32) in location B who is employed as a security guard echoed many others we interacted with by sharing that Lebanese *'don't want to do hard work like construction which Syrians do'*. Lebanese in location D shared similar sentiments, for example, a Lebanese woman shopkeeper endorsed others when she told us *'Lebanese wouldn't work in construction'*. In location C, several Lebanese shared that Lebanese would not *'go to the fields'* some said because *'they are lazy'* and others said, *'because of ego'*. A Lebanese shopkeeper in location B shared that even his own son would not manage the family shop because *'he wants to relax'* and so he has employed a Syrian instead. A common view among Lebanese across study locations was that *'Lebanese are pickier (about what work they do)'*.

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I like to work with my brain, but most Syrians have no problem doing anything. He might be a doctor, but you will see him working in a workshop. This is nothing to do with the war. This is because Syrians have always been poor (and will do any work)'.

- Syrian man (39) cement worker location B.

Table 9: RPS Findings: Wave 5 - % respondents that rate establishment of businesses as a tension factor

Location	Syrians	Lebanese
A and B	60%	64%
C	3%	8%
D	0%	14%
E	0%	1%
F	5%	7%

* Wave V survey findings. (2019). UNDP & RPS Interactive Dashboard. Host-Community and Syrian Refugee Communal Relations in Lebanon.

Perceived competition-small enterprises

While the stratification of jobs and differing work ethic and aspirations meant that most Lebanese and Syrians we met felt there was very little actual job competition between them, the exception to this was between small-scale enterprises. This is consistent with findings in the first study round, for example, in location C, Lebanese vegetable shop owners complained that Syrians undercut prices especially as they often sold directly on the street without the expense of shop overheads, or saved money by buying less fresh stock later in the day. Syrians were sometimes described as more enterprising transporting their vegetables to other markets to search for better prices while the Lebanese relied only on their fixed shops. Interestingly, the establishment of a business was not commonly identified as a source of tension in the RPS, except in location A and B.

Rather than tensions around competition for work between Lebanese and Syrians we found intra-Syrian competition for work. Some LTI Syrians complained about refugees competing for their work in both location D and location C. Often this competition was related to the establishment of small enterprises.

RPS findings

Wave 5 findings indicate that very few Syrians (0% to 5%) and Lebanese (7% to 14%) view the establishment of business as a tension factor across locations. As this study identified some competition in small-scale business, this inconsistency may be explained by the fact that Syrians often work as vendors or in very informal businesses, rather than in more formal or established businesses. Similarly, even when Syrians established businesses, Lebanese often 'owned' them legally, which may have also removed the sense among respondents that this was an area of competition or tension.

Wave 5 summary findings report, 2019

Box 5: Views misrepresented

A Lebanese senior municipality official specifically suggested we talk to a Lebanese woman green grocery shop owner. He said, 'she hates Syrians as she is losing so much money' because of the competition. We ended up living with her and had an opportunity to discuss how she really feels. Quite contrary to the view of the senior official she said she felt Syrians 'are our brothers.... They have been coming here to farm our fields for a very long time' and is very thankful of this. She did acknowledge that perhaps since they started to sell vegetables she is making less income but overall she felt positively about them.

Researcher notes, location C.

Box 6: Comparing businesses-like with like

I met a Lebanese man who owns a fabric shop. He imports his fabric from Spain and faces considerable import costs. He says that Syrian fabric shops sell Syrian fabric and there are '167 secret roads to bring goods from Syria'. He says he has many more expenses than a Syrian shopkeeper including high tertiary education costs for his children. Syrian shopkeepers sleep in their shops, he says. So, this is a kind of competition, he feels, but on the other hand they are selling very different quality goods to different customers. He acknowledges it is not a real comparison.

Researcher notes, location B.

Box 7: 'Syrians are professional'

Chatting with one Lebanese older man he said that he felt that shops opened by Syrians in the last few years had resulted in Lebanese shops closing. He felt this was reasonable as 'Syrians do better work' and cited examples of sweet making and woodwork. He said Syrians deal with the customers 'with love and respect'. He felt the woodwork was cheaper and better quality than produced by Lebanese. He described how the Syrians are professional and customers prefer to buy from them.

Researcher notes, location B.

Women and youth working - competition?

Across the study locations in the South and outside Beirut, women (Lebanese or Syrian) rarely worked. We came across just a few cases of Lebanese women who worked in small family businesses, NGOs and in traditional service jobs such as teaching and nursing. Of all the 51 women met in location F, only one worked (in a small NGO income generating project). However, by contrast in location E there were many working Lebanese women. Pro-rata incomes were often similar to those earned by Syrian men (i.e. less than Lebanese men doing the same work), though many women work part-time. Only in location C did Syrian women work in agriculture, mostly harvesting vegetables. These were refugees and worked 3 hours/day in the mornings (earning about USD 2/hour)

These gendered views were also reflected in parents' views of work for boys. Across locations, Syrian parents commonly shared that they thought work to be good for boys (12-18 years), and often preferable to attending school. These boys often worked for both Lebanese and other Syrian employers, and generally earned little pay for long hours (USD20/week).

Is there competition in higher paid work?

In the study locations outside of Beirut, Lebanese men were mostly employed in professions where there were few or no opportunities for Syrian employment. For example, in location F, many Lebanese men are working abroad, largely in Africa, which provides financial resources without job competition. Of those remaining, most Lebanese men of working age commute to the closest major town to work. The small number of shops and hospitality outlets in the locality are owned by Lebanese and employ relatives in small numbers with only a few employing Syrians (and a few Bangladeshis). Similarly, in location E, most Lebanese men worked in 'the cities' and so families shared that they were *'fine with Syrians working here, as it was not competition'*.

There were many small shops and businesses run by individual Lebanese sometimes with help from relatives and comments like, *'It is ideal that my kids can work here'* were often shared. There are strictly enforced regulations about Lebanese ownership of retail outlets here. In location C, the most preferred employment for Lebanese men (and some women) is in the Army. So, like the other two locations, in all conversations we had in location C, there was no sense that there was job competition between Lebanese and Syrians. There were also many small shops owned and managed by Lebanese with Syrians either only stacking shelves or cleaning or in some cases dealing with customers, but we never observed them as cashiers. In both location F and location C, nearly all taxis were operated by Lebanese, with restrictions apparent on Syrians.

In location F, LTI Syrians sometimes work in *'partnership'* or *'collaboration'* with Lebanese; *'Lebanese have the machines and Syrians have the expertise'*. This is in contrast to what we have observed elsewhere where Lebanese owned the business as *'sleeping partners'* or as the *'legal face'* with Syrians managing them entirely. Syrians explained that this arrangement was often facilitated when either the LTI Syrian or Lebanese had the *'right connections.'*

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I met an LTI Syrian who established the carpentry shop together with his Lebanese partner more than ten years ago. He gets paid like an employee but 'well and fair' and he feels like he is self-employed'.

- Researcher notes, location F.

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Some LTI Syrians with political connections had been able to run shops officially owned by Lebanese'.

- Researcher notes, location C.

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As Syrians cannot own shops and restaurants, they have a Lebanese 'partner' who fulfils all the legal obligations including responsibility for paying tax, municipality taxes and utilities. This is something LTI Syrians do and is based on trusted relationships with the Lebanese owners'.

- Researcher notes, location A.

Occasionally, we met Syrians who had been well educated, which led them to secure work with more responsibilities. For example, one, who was a trained engineer, had secured construction work in location A and gets paid USD 800/month. We also met a Syrian who became a supermarket cashier because he had a business degree and factory supervisors in location A who had previously done similar work in Syria.

||

We met one Syrian who is, unusually, employed 'front of house' working as a cashier in a large supermarket. He explained that he studied business in Syria, and this is why he got the job while all other Syrians working there only stack shelves'.

- Researcher notes location F.

Access to jobs for Syrians which involved direct interaction with customers (e.g. shop assistants, waiters) often depended on whether the candidate could speak with a Lebanese accent and dressed in a way typical of the area. For example, we met an LTI Syrian waiter in location D who is the only Syrian employed front of house because *'he looks like a Lebanese and dresses stylishly'*. Employment here and elsewhere was based more on socio-economic status and appearance rather than nationality.

Views on Syrian contribution to the economy

Whereas in the first round of the study we rarely came across Lebanese who felt that Syrians contributed to the local economy even when their own businesses clearly benefitted from Syrian customers, in locations outside Beirut, many Lebanese expressed this view. For example, a Lebanese clothing shopkeeper in location E said that *'more Syrians than Lebanese buy clothes from me'*. Syrian families we lived with here said they preferred to shop at the Lebanese supermarket because it had a wider variety of goods than the Syrian owned shops. LTI Syrians here also noted that the UN subsidies were spent in Lebanese shops and queried why Lebanese would complain about this. In location B, we met landlords who acknowledged that they made good money from renting to Syrian families.

Box 8: Economy depends on Syrians

'My' Syrian brother is a translator and I had many conversations with him. He says that Lebanon has many economic issues and is sympathetic to the view that the influx of Syrians has made things harder. He said there was a campaign on the Internet encouraging Syrians to strike for three days to demonstrate how much the Lebanese economy depends on them. He felt that was an appropriate non-violent way to get this message across

(Researcher notes, location E).

'I blame the Government; the economic problems didn't arise from Syrians. Their presence only made it worse, but it is the Government's fault'.

Lebanese man (51) now dependent on his eldest son who works as a cashier in a supermarket (location B).

Changing Legal Environment

Since the first round of the study, a number of new regulations around foreigner residence and work have taken effect. This second round of the study purposely sought to gather insights into the impact of these among Lebanese and Syrian populations.

Overall, knowledge and concerns among both Syrians and Lebanese related to these regulations were much greater in location A and location B than in the South. There had been more overt action taken on these regulations in Beirut, while in the South people shared that these regulations are less likely to be enforced in these areas.

Legal Registration

The Higher Defence Council made a decision in mid-April 2019 to deport Syrian refugees who enter Lebanon through unofficial border crossings after 24 April 2019. This decision has worried many of those who entered before this date but cannot prove that they did so. This clamp down was felt most strongly among Syrians we interacted with in location A and B where checks were perceived to be enhanced. This contrasted to study locations in the South, where Syrians we met mostly felt secure since they were known, and some had 'connections.'

Many of the Syrians we met, both LTI and more recent arrivals, said they have not been able to renew their residency documentation primarily because of costs. Having no documents to prove residency before April 2019 made them feel especially vulnerable.

In location A and B, Syrians are numerous and often less connected. For example, two Syrian men in location A with whom we spent considerable time shared that they had stopped travelling outside of their community because they were now scared of checkpoints. There were many rumours circulating among Syrians here that military cars were patrolling and *'picking up Syrians who could not show papers.'* Several outside of Beirut talked about the importance of having Lebanese accents, especially when stopped at security checkpoints.

In location D in particular, where curfews still exist, Syrians, both LTI and refugees, felt that it was more difficult to move around as checkpoints were checking not only for UN registration but for sponsorship papers too. There were rumours shared on social media that people stopped at these checkpoints were arrested and sent back to Syria, but no one knew of a specific instance when this had occurred.

As more Syrian refugee men told us they were actively trying to ensure they could continue work by getting work permits, this has led to them making sure that their accompanying families are registered with the UN through their wives names,

allowing them to maintain refugee status.

There was much uncertainty regarding the situation with construction and agricultural work, which has previously had special dispensations for employment. A Lebanese contractor in location B said he was very afraid he would lose all his Syrian workers because of the tighter controls on residency. *'If they return to Syria, nobody (else) would accept working in the way they do'*. Similarly, a Lebanese meat wholesaler in the same location with Syrians comprising two-thirds of his nearly 70 strong workforces said he would have to close his business if Syrian workers left. He says he would not be able to afford to sponsor so many Syrian workers. In location E, we were told that since most Syrians there work in construction and *'don't need papers'*, the regulations will not make any difference. But it was also pointed out that in this community, it was irrelevant what the Government said as the municipality and *'political party'* was in control.

Sponsorship

There were varied experiences of sponsoring. A Syrian mechanic in location E shared that his Lebanese boss not only sponsored him but also paid for his motorcycle. He gets paid more than other mechanics, both Syrian and Lebanese because he is a supervisor. By contrast, this man's brother who works in a Lebanese owned coffee shop says that his boss refuses to sponsor him even though he does the work of multiple people (including as a cashier).

Employers cited costs as the primary reason they did not want to sponsor employees, though estimates of these costs varied. In location D, the official costs were estimated to be around USD 300 (comprising USD 200 general security payment, USD 33 payment to notary, USD 17 payment to *mukhtar* to check if papers are in order) but a further amount for the sponsor, which can be anything up to USD 1000. This fee was generally paid by the Syrian worker to the sponsor as compensation for the effort involved in securing sponsorship, including providing the necessary paperwork and keeping taxes up to date. In location C, it was said that to get a sponsor it would cost a minimum of USD 1600. In location A, we were told that it costs USD 200 for the sponsorship and then a further USD 1300 for the *'work approval'*. In location B, the quoted figure was USD 4300 to get a work permit for working in construction. These costs were seen as prohibitive.

In location A, a Syrian clothing factory worker we lived with said that his boss would not sponsor him as there were *'too many employees and it would be too costly'*. He was jealous of other Syrian friends whose bosses had sponsored them because they wanted to *'be legal'*. Another impediment is the documentation needed by the employer to support the sponsorship including full registration of the business, up-to-date tax returns and others. Some Syrians we met said that they were prepared to pay the costs of sponsorship, but their bosses did not agree. Some felt that some *'well connected'* business owners refused to facilitate sponsorship because they did not feel there would be any consequences for them not sponsoring them and that they knew this would give their employees more options for work. In location D, it was said that *'if a Lebanese boss wants the Syrian employee to stay, he will stay'*.

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The Lebanese boss of a mechanic's business says that he 'loves' his young Syrian employee as he is an experienced and good worker and will 'make the papers for him'. He is actively managing a work permit for the 25-year-old and will also manage the sponsorship, though he is worried about this process'.

- Researcher notes, location D.

Box 9: Strong anti-Syrian views

*'My' Lebanese Christian mother (27) of three small children has very strong opposition to Syrians. She does not work, and her husband is poorly paid preparing chickens for consumption. She rarely watches TV, so her opinions are shaped by conversations with her own wider family and her dissatisfaction with her own life. She thinks that the Syrian crisis has had very serious effects on the quality of life. She listed a number of grievances; that Syrians would *'work for anything'* and are not concerned about hours or wages; that Syrian families can have an income of USD 3000 per month through making their children earn (instead of going to school) and getting support from UN; that the increased workload for teachers with double shifts means teachers are tired and less active; that waiting times for vaccinations for children have increased because of the large Syrian families; she distrusts Syrians and blames them for the drug dealing and rapes she hears happen in the nearby community; she avoids the discount supermarket because *'it is full of Syrians'*. She is very happy about the new regulations introduced by the Ministry of Labour to only give work to Syrians with work permits. But she still believes that Syrians will not return to Syria *'because they will never make as much money as they make here'*.*

Researcher notes, location A.

Work permits

In mid-April 2019, the Higher Defence Council adopted a decision to limit Syrians working without permits. Specifically, it targets Syrian and Lebanese informal enterprises that employ Syrian refugees and gave notice to formal businesses to regularise all workers by mid-June 2019, so all foreign workers are either sponsored (legal residency and work permission) or have work permits.

Many Lebanese employers we met were frustrated by the new regulations mandating foreign workers be sponsored with work permits. This was felt especially in location A and B where there had been more active enforcement. A Lebanese factory owner in location A complained that *'I will have to pay double for everything, have to pay insurance and will have lower productivity if I employ Lebanese'*. He and others noted that if they cannot employ foreigners then prices would rise.

Some Lebanese bosses were *'scared of the fines'* (reportedly USD 1500 per worker and one month's closure (location A) that can be imposed for violating these regulations, and some have pre-emptively fired their Syrian workers. For example, one Syrian father (36) we lived with was fired from the repair shop where he was working in May and now supports himself by doing *ad hoc* electrical repairs. Syrians were asked to leave their work and had to then search for work in factories and businesses where the *'boss has connections so no one will check the workplace'*. For example, like others we met, LTI Syrian deliverymen without work permits in location B explained that *'the owner is well-connected, and nobody can kick you out because of this'*. Syrians we met here said they intended to keep working until they were *'kicked out... because we have nothing else we can do'*. Families outside of Beirut had heard of the crackdown on Syrian workers in location A and B and many shared their concerns about their own family members searching for work. In location E, some had heard from contacts in Beirut that ID papers are confiscated at check points in exchange for a green card which is valid for 5 days after which one has to bring proof of a sponsor. Some have consequently moved out of Beirut searching for work through networks living in communities where the rules are less zealously implemented or finding work in agriculture or construction which is still perceived as *'legal'*.

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We saw many signs saying 'if you love Lebanon, employ a Lebanese' or 'The way forward is to employ someone from your own country' in shop windows'.

- Researcher notes, location B.

We observed many retail outlets in location A displaying signs in their windows declaring that they were seeking Lebanese staff. Syrians we met in location A felt that the regulations were specifically targeted at Syrians even though the regulations refer to all foreign workers. *'The municipality started closing the shops owned by Syrians and the Lebanese started firing the Syrians who don't have legal work papers'* and as a result some felt safer living and working in the part of the community *'where no government operates'* (see above). During our stay a Syrian in location E received a phone call from a friend, an LTI Syrian who operated a successful grocery shop in Beirut for nearly forty years. This friend had offered to pay a substantial bribe because the Ministry of Labour had refused to licence his shop, which is profitable enough to justify the cost of the bribe.

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One Syrian guy I chatted with who works in a coffee shop said that his employers had wanted to fire him after the introduction of the new regulations. But he told them that they would not find a Lebanese who would do the same work for the same rate. He ended up keeping his job which pays USD 400/month'.

- Researcher notes, location B.

Some Lebanese felt that the regulations were introduced as a populist political move and not necessarily what was best for Lebanon, e.g. *'The regulations are bad for the economy, but it is popular to be seen to restrict Syrians'* (Lebanese man). Others framed this in terms of labour rights as a young mother in location A who employed a Syrian without a work permit in her small laundry business said, *'People who are legal have more rights'*. She is actively using *'connections'* to secure her employees registration, *'but it depends how*

much this will cost. Syrians we stayed with in location B and location E mentioned an Internet campaign which encouraged Syrians to stage a 'walk out' of work to protest these new regulations and remind people how important Syrians were to the economy of the country.



A sign seen in a shop window. In black it says, 'we need a lady to work'. In red it says 'Lebanese'.

Box 10: Unfair competition

My mother (32) has two teen children and runs a local laundry. She firmly believes that businesses should be legal and so should the status of employees. She feels that her Syrian employee of several years should have a work permit and is actively pursuing this through using what she refers to as 'connections'. She felt that if she does this and her business is fully legal (meaning she pays municipal taxes and her utilities) then she should not be up against competition from similar businesses that operate illegally. She feels these businesses should be closed down.

Researcher notes, location A.

Various Lebanese employers in location A and B had adopted different tactics to circumvent these new restrictions including moving Syrians to work out of sight (e.g. kitchens, stock rooms, basements) and changing the hours Syrians work to avoid the times when patrols were most likely to take place. Some had put up signs in their retail windows advertising for Lebanese workers in an effort to foil inspections. Other Lebanese were remaining in their retail outlets during working hours in order to cover for Syrians in their employ. While there was considerable concern about these new regulations in Beirut and particular concern about being seen to

operate in 'public places' legally, they were mostly shrugged off by Lebanese business owners we met elsewhere.

The exception outside of Beirut was international firms and NGOs, which had already taken steps to hire Lebanese workers in place of Syrians. In location D, we also heard about a high-profile supermarket, which hired only Syrian staff previously but has now fired them all. Rumours suggested this was because the shop was on the main road and visible to the public. However, other Lebanese here shared that the new regulations would not affect their employment of Syrians *'this is our territory, no one would have the courage to come here and enforce such rules'*. LTI Syrians who run a well-loved bakery in location D have the needed 'connections' to remain unaffected but another has been harassed and forced to register the business in the name of the Lebanese neighbour and share the profits. Some LTI Syrians without work permits or whose work permits had lapsed shared that they had sufficient connections to feel confident that they would not lose their jobs. In location E, Syrians felt that their jobs were safe *'if you have good relations with Lebanese'*. In location F, there was little concern about the new regulations as they felt Lebanese bosses would be protected and if there were police raids *'we will be warned beforehand'*.

||

A large international factory employed 320 Syrian workers before the new regulations but has fired them all. They employed Lebanese in these vacancies but found that most quit within a day or two. Subsequently, they have hired naturalised Doms and maintained a permitted 10% of the workforce for foreign workers some of whom were said to be Syrians with work permits. The factory has notices outside indicating that they only hire Lebanese. The Syrians who lost their jobs now do daily waged work in agriculture and construction'

- Researcher notes, location D.

However, some perceived the new regulations as being misused to close down competitive businesses. So, for example in location D, a Syrian-

owned supermarket was closed down without notice on the premise that workers did not have work permits but another, also Syrian owned supermarket (rumoured to have connections) continues to operate down the street. The former supermarket displays a sign in the window indicating that the owners have lodged a court appeal on the decision.

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The regulations are a good idea. Workers should be legal, they should have work permits. But the permits are too costly for Syrians. They should be able to stay. It should be easier to get the permits'.

- Lebanese man (51), location B.

Some Lebanese families we interacted with welcomed the new regulations related to foreigners working. For example, a young Lebanese mother of three in location A whose husband has a low waged job selling poultry said the *'decision of the Ministry is really good as there will be less competition'*. In the same location, Lebanese indicate that they were pleased that Syrian shops would be closed but then expressed ambivalence about the new regulation affecting their ability to hire Syrians who they felt were preferable to Lebanese workers. In location D, some unemployed Lebanese had recently benefitted from vacancies in bakeries and restaurants resulting from sacking Syrians without work permits. However, some Lebanese told us that the new regulations would mean that Syrians would work illegally for even less pay, making the labour market even more competitive (e.g. in location E).

Security

Consistent with RPS findings, high proportions of both Syrians and Lebanese considered their communities to be 'safe' during the day and at night. As noted above, living in a community controlled by a political party is perceived and valued by residents as providing security. Flags are prominent and tacit displays of control and residents feel confident of the security this control provides them. For example, in location E, Syrians and Lebanese alike talked about feeling safe and about the ease of movement they enjoy within the controlled area. The feeling of safety is such that residents in location F and location D walk on the

streets late at night and sleep with their doors open (*'even when there are no men staying in the home'* (women, location D).

As is shown in the RPS data, lower proportions of both Syrians (66%) and Lebanese (48%) in location A and B considered their communities to be 'safe' as compared with other locations, though overall people said they felt safe. However, our findings suggest that this varies significantly by neighbourhood, and as in other locations, is also influenced by the nature of local political authority.

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It is safe here... if you have connections you know the people around you, there is no fighting. This makes you safer.'

- Reported conversation in researcher notes, location D.

Researchers noted that while there were very few restrictions on mobility and people shared they felt safe in the four study locations outside of Beirut. However, it was different in Beirut. Those in Beirut who did not live within localised political spheres of control talked about feeling quite insecure, relying only on Government sponsored security while those in politically controlled areas benefit from the security provided by the political party. location B was talked about as a 'dangerous area' by some referring to drugs and other crimes but more because of political and religious tensions and being harassed or intimidated for being different. Syrian and Lebanese Sunni families we lived with here felt safe as long as they lived within a Sunni neighbourhood. Syrians and Lebanese alike in location B like the army providing security but dislike the General Security whom they distrust and feel harass people unnecessarily. Some of the fear of the General Security among Syrians is from bad experience of the equivalent forces in Syria.

Outside of Beirut, residents in study communities shared how much they liked their communities and that they provided all they needed. Much of their contentment was related to feeling safe. In location F, people liked the quiet streets, clean air and sea views and felt their community was one of the best in the South to live in. Though flags of two political parties are prominent throughout the community, one is specially attributed to providing security so *'you don't see strangers walking around'*. Residents did not feel their own mobility was in anyway

constrained but drew comfort from knowing that movements of outsiders were under surveillance. *'There is no other party that can provide us with this. We can't trust anyone right now'* (Lebanese man, 51). Only Syrian families (no single men) are allowed to rent in the community and in specially designated areas leading some Lebanese to make comments similar to this, *'we have no foreigners (outsiders) in the village'* implying the Syrians who are there are fully accepted.

Table 10: Official and unofficial curfews in study locations

Location	Are there curfews?
A	None
B	None but self-imposed restrictions on travel since new regulations
C	Official 8pm curfew for IS inhabitants but not necessarily followed or enforced
D	Official 8pm curfew initiated 2017, relaxed to 10pm
E	none
F	none

In location C, Lebanese we interacted with said that this town was much safer than neighbouring villages and attribute this to the municipality who do regular checks. Researchers commented that it was so safe that *'You see girls walking alone at night'* (researcher observation). There is a curfew imposed purely on those Syrians living in the camp and Lebanese Christians we lived with felt that this *'made it safer'*. No police patrols enforce this curfew and most people ignored it. However, the real security threat feared by Lebanese living here was inter-family disputes not the presence of Syrians. Whilst incidents of this kind date back as much as ten years ago, the fact that *'they are above the law'* affects people's sense of security.

In location E, political parties were credited with providing security. One Sunni Syrian family we lived with said that they found the community welcoming once it was established that they had come legally. People said that they were also lenient about illegal entry if they were satisfied that they had no criminal record or affiliations with rebels (there were cautionary tales shared of alleged rebels having been caught and dealt with). This welcome came with protection and security. Similarly, location D was described as the *'safest place in Lebanon'*. Sunni Syrians, somewhat counter-intuitively, said they felt safe because it was a Shia area. This was explained in terms of them having been *'checked out'* and

RPS findings

Overall, Wave 5 finds that higher proportions of Lebanese consider the 'presence of Syrian refugees in this community has contributed to more incidences of crime and violence' than do Syrians, with a difference ranging from 17% to 60% between the two groups. These figures were particularly high among Lebanese in location A and B (93%) and location C (88%).

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confirmed not to be associated with rebel groups in Syria and being accepted as *'brother Muslims'*. *'God will not leave anyone'* (Syrian family with six children under 15, location D). The safety of Syrians is perceived to be guaranteed by the lack of influence of central government in these communities. They felt protected from being *'kicked out'*. However, it was also explained that Syrian families are very wary to keep their political opinions to themselves, all have connections to Syrians who lived and worked here before and are respectful of the political parties' control. *'As long as you are polite, don't speak about politics or religion, you are safe'* (Sunni Syrian family comprising widowed mother and two sons in their 30's, location E).

People often expressed fear about living near to Palestinian camps. For example, in location F, people said that they heard disturbances there and suspected they had weapons. They nevertheless felt safe because of the presence of the army. Security in location F is often framed in terms of the insecurity felt as recently as 2006 because of the war. People shared that there are still unexploded mines and grenades in the area.

Future

Syrian refugees we met in the first-round study shared an overwhelming sense that their status in Lebanon is temporary. The majority of these families lived in IS and were marking time waiting to return to Syria when it was safe to do so. In this second round in the South, **Syrian families talked less about the urgency of returning and many indicated that they were comfortable and safe living in Lebanon for the time being. Some even shared long term aspirations to stay. However, those we lived with in Beirut saw little future in remaining in Lebanon and, like those in the north, mostly wanted to return.**

While several of the Syrian families we lived with had vague plans to return to Syria, only a few had concrete plans (see Box 11). The main push factor

for Syrians we met in location F was the economic downturn in Lebanon which has resulted in fewer employment opportunities and less income from selling goods and produce. Two Syrian families (one in location F and the other in location D) were especially concerned about their children's education. While the family in location F has missed out entirely on education, the family in location D worries that tertiary education is too expensive in Lebanon and without this they may not be able to get good jobs. Another Syrian family in location B also shared concerns about their three children *'living far from their own country, in a strange community'* and believe education is better in Syria.

Others wanted to return to a less liberal culture (especially as experienced in Beirut) such as one Syrian father in location A who felt concerned about his daughters (aged 2 and 4) growing up in such an atmosphere. Another Syrian father in location B felt that Lebanese lack moral standards and he wants his five-year-old to be raised in Syria where *'we are more family-oriented'*. By contrast, some Lebanese indicated that they did not think Syrians wanted to go back as they enjoyed the more liberal culture in Lebanon (location B).

As we found in the first study round, Syrians were mostly concerned about the lack of guarantees of safety were they to return to Syria. *'How can we trust the Syrian Government after what happened that we can cross back over the border without danger? No one can give us assurance that we will be safe.'* (Syrian man, location F). Another Syrian family in location E is especially concerned about returning because of the circumstances around the death of their father in Syria five years ago. Another Syrian family in location D said that they did have land to farm back in Syria but were not sure they would be *'safe from Government'* and yet another family here were also concerned and knew that their house had been destroyed.

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Syria will never be the same. We have nothing to do there, so I don't want to go back.'

- Syrian construction worker (40), location E.

Other Syrians noted their biggest fear in returning was conscription for men. Because of this, despite the decision of the family in location F to go back

(see box), the eldest son (24), an agricultural worker who has married, will not return with them. He needs to work so cannot use the pursuit of education as a reason to avoid military service. Others who have already served their time in the army remain worried that they will still be conscripted on return and having left Syria that there might be repercussions to face. However, we did meet a family whose two sons had purposely returned to join the military, though this was said to be rare.

Concerns about ways to earn money back in Syria were common. Some Syrians shared that they had established businesses in Lebanon which they did not want to give up. This was especially the case for a young woman (30) who had co-founded a new coffee shop in location D and knows she would not be allowed to run her own business like this in Syria. LTI Syrians in location C had no intentions to leave Lebanon. Others were simply worried that there was no way to earn back in Syria like a family of four who all live and work in a factory in location A say they would return to Deraa now if there were jobs.

In location E some Syrians we lived with and interacted with indicated that they wanted to go to a third country to reside and were hoping for placements in Europe or Canada through the UN.

Box 11: Plans to return to Syria

'My' Syrian father (61) has lived and worked in Lebanon for thirty years and feels it is his country. His family came to join him when the crisis started. He is now worried about his seven children aged 7-24 who are not in school and have missed out on education. He himself is well educated and wants to get them back into school as soon as possible and definitely within the next two years. Their hometown is Deir Al Zour which is now considered safe to live in, but he has heard that their house has been destroyed. He plans to rebuild as *'it will be better than living in a tent'*. He plans to send the family back first so they can resume schooling while he continues to earn to support the re-establishment. He says other Syrian families are not so serious to return, as they fear they have nothing to go back to.

Researcher notes, location F.

Box 12: we have a future in Syria but not yet

'My' Syrian family feels there is no future in Lebanon as they cannot afford an apartment, cannot open shops or run a business. They feel the future for their three children (7-13) should be in Syria, but this is not possible under the current regime. So, in the meantime, despite their strong desire to return and rebuild their country, they feel it is unsafe to do so. *'We don't have any options but to stay here. Work to eat only as we cannot save'*

Researcher notes, location D.

In location C, some expressed hopes of going to Australia but couched in terms of a stopgap before returning to Syria when it was safe. Most based these desires on a vague understanding of the UN system of resettlement using information from social media. As we heard in the first round of the study, a significant desire was for Syrian families to stay together.

Given evidence of successful reconstruction in the south of Lebanon following the war with Israel, some Lebanese felt optimistic for recovery in Syria, 'I have heard plans for reconstruction (in Syria), money will come from somewhere' (Lebanese man (66) retired office worker, location E).

”

We are very optimistic, not like other Lebanese'.

- Lebanese woman restaurant owner, location E.

Lebanese families were on the whole rather pessimistic about their futures. They mostly complained about the state of the economy but did not tend to frame this in terms of Syrian refugees adding to the burden or job competition.

They shared they were mostly pessimistic not only about the economy but the political environment. Lebanese families supported by remittances from Lebanese diaspora relatives indicated that they were content to stay in their homeland (location F) and observations suggest that many of these families had a reasonable standard of living. Some others had aspirations to leave because 'the (Lebanese) Government is taking the country down a hill' (Lebanese fisherman who is pressuring his son to live abroad, location D). However, others said they loved their country especially in location C. Researchers noted that this was exceptional in their experience as the usual narrative they had heard

elsewhere is a desire to leave. It was also contrary to their pessimism in general, which they shared with other Lebanese.

Our findings are consistent with the RPS findings which find that relatively low proportions of Syrians (0% to 31%) considered the 'return of Syrians to their home as a factor that might facilitate good relations.' Across study locations there were no examples of Syrian families who have returned to Syria to live. Syrians did not express an urgency to do so due to tensions with Lebanese, and outside of Beirut there was little talk about the need for repatriation among Lebanese. They shared that the refugees would eventually mostly return, and they fully accepted that LTI Syrians are part of the community. In location D, we met young Lebanese who shared how they felt sorry for Syrian refugees and the treatment they had received. They felt that if they were not needy they would have returned by themselves. Some differentiated between refugees and others who worked.

Some felt that the former, whom they assumed to be supported by aid, should leave, making comments such as 'we already have our own problems' (small business owner woman (32), location A). There were many positive feelings shared about those who work. For example, a Lebanese Shia family in location F wanted the Syrian agricultural workers to stay as they were more experienced, and they contributed to the economy. Many in this area feel they are in partnership with Syrians.

RPS findings

Based on Wave 5 findings, the proportion of Lebanese who believe that the 'return of Syrians to their home might facilitate good relations between Syrians and Lebanese in their area' varied significantly across locations (32% to 74%). Interestingly, these figures were among the lowest in locations with a higher concentration of refugees such as location A, location B, location D and location F.

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Implications

The findings of this study raise a number of implications related to relationships between Syrians and Lebanese. Some findings resonate with those from the earlier round of the study conducted in March 2019 in the north and central areas but others are different because of the different context and therefore lead to specific new implications. Insights from the second round also elicit implications relating to the changed national context especially in relation to the regulations introduced since April 2019.

Unlike round one where Syrians in many locations lived in or near large settlements, in this round Syrians largely lived alongside Lebanese in their communities, or in small separate settlements nearby. Though in some instances there were sizeable Syrian communities, the level of 'population pressure' present in these locations is much less than in round one locations. Decades of seasonal work provided the basis for the connections many Syrians had in the communities in the South, as well as a basis from which refugees could more easily form connections with Lebanese. Unlike round one, study locations where many Syrians settled due to their close proximity to the border, these connections often drew Syrian refugees to these locations. Location A and B are more similar to those we lived in during round one, serving as a magnet for many families from different areas. This contrasts with the strong connections in the other four locations outside Beirut that drive settlement. In these, LTI Syrians helped ensure that refugees were 'known' to Lebanese residents, which facilitated their acceptance in the community. These connections also ensured that refugees understood the established rules and hierarchies

in each community, which formed the structure for relationships between Lebanese, LTI Syrians and Syrian refugees. The fact that Syrians we met almost universally conformed to this hierarchy and followed these rules further facilitated positive relationships. **This provides insight into the connection between variables explored in RPS studies like 'pre-existing relationships' and 'social bonds,' though also highlights the significant overlap between these concepts.**

The lack of informal settlements in all study locations covered in this round further facilitated this relationship building, as it allowed for daily interactions between Syrians and Lebanese. Such regular interaction also helped reduce misconceptions and rumours related to Syrians. **This highlights the importance of work that seeks to encourage such interaction. This insight also suggests that settlement patterns are likely more relevant to the frequency of interactions between Syrians and Lebanese than population pressure alone.**

Though the same strong bonds (internal/bonding social capital) among Syrians identified in round one were also present in these study locations, **there was no evidence that social bonds translated into positive or negative collective action.** Such collective identity and action was perceived as a potential form of vulnerability for refugees—an identifiable target. It was also seen in terms of a threat to the position of LTI Syrians, whose connections refugees often relied on. Rather, Syrian refugees we met accepted their position because they simply did not have another option.

The fact that Lebanese families we met in this round had their basic needs met also shaped their views toward Syrians. Stable income, housing and often insurance meant that aid or medical subsidies provided to Syrian refugees were not a source of jealousy among Lebanese. While in some instances the theme of equality identified in the first round emerged when Lebanese spoke about Syrians, Lebanese were more sympathetic toward refugees than resentful. The deeper relationships between Syrians and Lebanese in these locations as compared with round one may have also moderated such jealousies. **Analysis of RPS data to explore the extent to which characteristics of Lebanese respondents like educational attainment and employment status influence views on and relationships with Syrians may help further substantiate these findings. Integrating additional questions into the RPS related to whether respondents pay rent or have health insurance would further support this.**

Though overall systems are in place to support Syrian refugees to access health and education services, findings indicate that support for transportation plays a particularly influential role in whether or not Syrian children attend school. While some Syrian parents do prioritise their children's education, the lack of access to higher education and future jobs requiring schooling in Lebanon leaves most with the view that work is more important. Though many Syrian refugees are not making long-term plans for their futures in Lebanon, such obstacles nevertheless make it even harder for them to do so for their children.

The theme of uncertainty emerged in discussions with Syrians about many aspects of their present and future. Such uncertainty is typified in the diverse experiences of the enforcement of the new work regulations, which was determined in large part by the political economy of each location, including Beirut. This uncertainty required Syrians to rely on their relationships with Lebanese and other Syrians to assess if and how these will be enforced. Information shared on social media by Syrians across Lebanon both also supported this assessment and provided the basis for rumour and misinformation. **Further studies that aim to gauge public levels of knowledge of these regulations and policies among both Lebanese and Syrians may provide further insight into the extent to which these views are based on fact.**

Regardless of enforcement, the existence of the regulations created new vulnerabilities for Syrians. They fear having to accept potentially lower wages or working in secret and therefore with even less protections than before. Such vulnerability was compounded by the view that these regulations were symptomatic of increasing anti-Syrian sentiments nationally and the increasing willingness of politicians and lawmakers to act on these sentiments. These concerns made many Syrians increasingly cautious in their interactions with unknown Lebanese and authorities, particularly in Beirut. The fact that many Lebanese shop owners took steps to appear to conform to the regulations while privately taking steps to subvert them both reinforces the public narrative of anti-Syrian sentiment and contributes to the uncertainty surrounding their enforcement.

This established set of rules combined with the new work regulations means that the space for competition for work between Lebanese and Syrians has become increasingly narrow. **However, areas where Lebanese do face some competition from Syrians like small-scale business are the same ones that are also likely to be affected by the increasing cost of labour due to the regulations. This has negative implications for both Syrian workers and Lebanese business owners.** Our conversations in the study suggest that perceptions around job competition are much more nuanced and future studies can better understand the issue around competition if questions include particular job categories rather than categorising jobs into higher and lower skilled.

Fears and uncertainty regarding these regulations among small business owners we met were heightened by the increasingly pessimistic views on the economy. Most Lebanese we met expected the effect of these regulations to be more negative than positive, as there were relatively few Lebanese employed in jobs once held by Syrians, except in large firms. Though a small number of Lebanese we met supported these regulations, these reinforced their pre-existing anti-Syrian views.

The theme of uncertainty was also linked to the topics that people worried most about. Though both Syrians and Lebanese worry about security, similar to the round one findings, Syrians and Lebanese in these locations rarely identified any incident that happened to themselves or someone they knew. Though some people did identify locations they did not feel to be safe to visit or walk

at night, this vulnerability was based primarily on gender rather than nationality. Lebanese views of security were instead based much more on memory of the 2006 war, as well as fighting among local Lebanese families, rather than the presence of Syrians. The exception to this was the sense in some communities that Syrian refugees may be aligned to Da'esh, though this concern was based on both events in other locations in Lebanon and local political allegiances, rather than direct experience.

Feelings of security among Syrians were also shaped by the overarching fear of being 'forced' to return to Syria before they are ready. Here too, the theme of uncertainty emerges, as many Syrians had a sense that this could result from being 'picked up' by Lebanese authorities, but had little information of how and under what circumstances this may occur.

This suggests the importance of engaging with both memory and context when attempting to measure the dimensions of security, along with the inherent challenges of comparing locations with diverse histories and frames of reference.



Annex 1

Study team

Team leaders

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Annex 2: Areas for conversation

Access and use of health facilities

Basis of choice of health providers (cost, convenience, trust etc). Access but not used, why? Healthcare costs. Healthcare quality. Reasons for poor quality. Politicization of healthcare (who gets/who does not). Pressure on health services- problem or not? Access /use of Syrian medicines

Perceptions on health subsidies for refugees; outcomes of subsidies (e.g free maternity); inefficient social security/insurance; reasons why avoid public facilities.

Subsidies adequacy, reimbursement issues. Access (cost, transport, paperwork, behaviour of staff etc).

Extent of tensions around healthcare provision.

Work / earning a living

Availability of jobs for unskilled/semi skilled. Reasons for shrinking opportunities. Barriers to getting work (lack of networks, skills) Reality of competition for work- what sectors? What jobs?-examples. Legal protections.

Perceptions on wages, terms, type of work acceptable for Syrians. Other support (e.g UN), less costs (education, health, recreation) for Syrians. Benefits of Syrian workers.

Limitations accessing work (permits, connections, risks, types of work). Perceptions of work undertaken. Who works and why?

Extent of tensions around genuine competition for work/ earning a living. Balance with contribution to economy.

Access and use of school facilities

Costs of schooling (burden- uniform, fees, activity costs, transport, snacks, educational resources) Perceptions of quality of teaching & reasons for this. Perceptions of quality of infrastructure & reasons. Discrimination (socio-economic, language skills, help at home)

Quality deterioration and reasons, distribution of resources & education support, perceptions of fairness; views on shift system

Educational support adequacy; overcrowding; poor quality teaching & reasons; views on shift system. Extent of tensions around school provision.

Environmental health

How much of a priority is this issue? Key concerns (pollution, garbage, sewage disposal, smell, hygiene, affects on agriculture/fishing, allergies/respiratory problems, limits to recreation). Reasons for these problems.

Knowledge, experience and views of evictions (IS, businesses etc) based on environment protection.

Extent of genuine tensions around environmental health issues.

Information sources / flow

Most used sources of information (TV, Newspapers, radio, social media (esp Whatsapp), 'word of mouth', religious institutions, internet, gossip, UN/NGOs/GOL). Which sources are trusted/ not trusted? WHY? Views on social media use/abuse.

Information/use of means of communication (news, fake news, jobs, socialising, entertainment, security updates, in touch with family, prices, politics, harassment, hate speech). Perceptions of types of information. Trust. Usage (regularity, ease of access, restrictions). How do they navigate access to information, filter fake news, scams etc.

Cost of living

Views of Lebanon economy- recent changes which affect people. Cost trends for basic items, rents, utilities, tax. Reasons for price increases. Ways of managing higher COL- use of savings, reducing consumption, sale of assets, loans & credit.

Syrians as tenants, customers. Views on Syrian goods/competition with Lebanese goods. Purchasing behaviour.

Preferences for sources of goods, changes in consumption patterns

Perceptions of who is most affected, has ability to cope with rising COL. Source of tension.

Recent regulations / restrictions

Extent of knowledge and experience of recent changes (evictions, deportations, increased crackdown on legal documentation, renting to single families, not selling property (vehicles, buildings etc) to foreigners, demolition of 'hard structures' in IS, closure of Syrian-run businesses, enhanced checkpoint checks, curfews). Municipality- specific regulations. Increasing costs of maintaining work permits. Source of information on recent changes. Views of these changes – purpose/ intention

Reduction/cessation of UN support for refugees/ diversion of funds to Lebanese e.g infrastructure. Crackdowns on NGO operations (impact on jobs, programmes).

Opening of Jordanian border; work permit provision for all with one Lebanese parent; changing requirements of kefala system; more jobs advertised 'Lebanese only'

Feelings about these changes- pros and cons.

Feelings about these changes- pros and cons

Effects of these changes on relations.

Futures

Personal/family aspirations. Community /national aspirations. Views on repatriation of Syrians. Conditions needed to achieve this. Time needed for this. Likelihood of realisation of aspirations. Feelings about the future (optimism/pessimism). Barriers preventing positive change.

Annex 3: Study participants

CATEGORY	MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE
	Syrian		Lebanese		Palestinian		Armenian	
Host Family								
children under 5 years old	8	1	5					
children aged 5-12	11	4	9	3				
children aged 12-18	13		6	4				
Adults (18 - 35 y.o.)	10	21	15	16	1			
Adults (36 - 50 y.o.)	8	1	19	13				
Adults over 50	7	5	7	6				
Neighbours								
children under 5 years old	10	5	7					
children aged 5-12	31	28	16	5				
children aged 12-18	25	10	21	14	2			
Adults (18 - 35 y.o.)	73	48	66	59	3	2	1	
Adults (36 - 50 y.o.)	43	37	51	40	3		1	2
Adults over 50	26	18	23	15	4			
Others								
Aid worker – international org			2	1		1		
Aid worker – local org/NGO		2	3	4				
Health worker		7	2	2				
Teacher		2	1	4				
Lebanese army			19					
ISF								
Private security	2							
Religious Leader	1		3					
Municipality head	1		4					
Municipality officers	3	2	8	2				
Community leaders (Shawish/ Mukhtar)	7		1		1			
Transportation Service Provider	6		34					
Kiosk/food seller/beverage seller	28	2	27	9				
Other community members				2	2	1		
Total	313	193	349	199	14	4	2	2
					1076			

Annex 4: Study process

As per RCA best practice, this study was implemented following a five-phase approach, detailed below.

1. Design:

Study design was carried out between July and August 2019 in close cooperation with UNDP. This included a consultation with the Social Stability Working group as well as research firms in Lebanon with experience carrying out relevant work. The outcome of this process is captured in the Revised Study Design submitted to UNDP.

2. Training and briefing:

The first training and study briefing was carried out in February 2019. Additional researchers were recruited and trained for this round in July 2019. All selected researchers completed the RCA Level 1 training facilitated by international RCA researchers with extensive experience of immersion research in other countries. The Level 1 training emphasized the good practice of reflexivity, understanding and mitigating researcher bias and judgement, maintaining informality and ethical considerations in conducting this kind of work. A detailed session on risk and security along with a specific session on child protection were also included. The training included a two-day/one night immersion in Bekaa, where researchers applied in-classroom learning directly in the field. One day of reflection followed the two-day immersion to internalize lesson learns, both from in-classroom training and field immersion.

After the completion of Level 1 training, all study team members participated in a study briefing to familiarise themselves with the specific goals and processes related to this study. This included development of the areas of conversation (see Annex 2), clarification of the selection criteria to be used in identifying host households, as well as study logistics and management.

3. Immersion:

Researcher sub-teams then carried out four-night immersions in each location. Team members entered the communities independently on foot to

keep the process 'low key'. They then spent time going around the communities getting to know people and being known, as well as making the purpose of the study clear. Having understood the purpose of the study, all researchers were invited to stay with families in the area. During immersions, researchers participated in the daily lives of their host household and community, building insights over the course of the immersion through iterative conversations, with the family and surrounding community, observation and participation.

To illustrate context and findings, photos were taken with people's consent. Whenever possible, families and neighbours were encouraged to make visuals while chatting with the researchers to elaborate their stories. For example, children made drawings of extended families and some family members made maps to explain places they frequently visited. Researchers did not take formal notes during this process, but did keep field diaries to record specific quotes, figures or impressions where necessary.

4. Debriefing:

A two-day debriefing was held for each sub-team immediately after their immersion. This took the form of a facilitated discussion led by the study Team Leaders, during which time the researchers reflected on their experiences and conversations from the immersion, according to the areas of conversation. The team was asked to repeatedly take the position of the study participants, and to identify the emerging narratives to ensure that researchers did not overlay their own interpretations on the findings. This process enables extensive triangulation as the same themes emerge and are explored by different researchers from different perspectives, different locations, times and research methods (observations, conversations, experiences, visual and photographs). This process also reflects how each researcher engaged with people to ensure that the key elements of this approach were practiced. In total, the study team spent twelve full days de-briefing with the team leaders.

The team also spent time to archive the other data collected from the field and reflect further on household and village information, ensuring all

items were appropriately coded and categorised. All discussions were recorded in detailed debriefing notes which, along with photographs, visuals and field notes from the immersion, formed the 'data set' or basis of information from which study findings were drawn.

5. Analysis:

Following the debriefing, the team leader and co-team leaders then analysed the full data set. This process followed a grounded theory approach, which includes four stages: (i) Familiarisation (immersion in the findings); (ii) Identification of themes and; (ii) Charting (finding emerging connections). The conventional fourth step is 'interpretation' which RCA purposely eschews in order to maintain closeness to what people themselves share. Four different researchers undertook the analysis to independently identify key themes, ensuring the validity of the overall thematic structure and resulting findings. The key emerging narratives from this process were used as a basis for the report writing.

