SYRIANS BAROMETER 2020

Prof. Dr. M. Murat ERDOĞAN

"A FRAMEWORK FOR ACHIEVING SOCIAL COHESION WITH SYRIANS IN TURKEY"

SB 2020

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Prof. Dr. M. Murat ERDOĞAN

M. MURAT ERDOĞAN
SYRIAN BAROMETER-2020
FRAMEWORK OF LIFE IN HARMONY WITH SYRIANS

Syrians Barometer-2020 avaible online in Turkish, English and Arabic:
www.unhcr.org/tr/yayinlar / www.mmuraterdogan.com

Foreword

2020 was the ninth year of uninterrupted rise in forced displacement worldwide. Despite the pandemic, the number of people fleeing wars, violence, persecution and human rights violations in 2020 rose to nearly 82.4 million people. Today, one per cent of humanity is displaced, and there are twice as many forcibly displaced people than in 2011, when the total was just under 40 million. While most of those forcibly displaced are internally displaced persons, there were 20.7 million refugees under UNHCR mandate, 5.7 million Palestine refugees and 3.9 million Venezuelans displaced abroad. These numbers indicate that, despite the pandemic and calls for a global ceasefire, conflict continued to chase people from their homes.

The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic (Syria) stretched into its tenth year, with more than half of its population still forcibly displaced. Syria has been the main country of origin for refugees since 2014, and at the end of 2020, some 6.7 million Syrian refugees were hosted in 128 countries. Each number represents a real person, a girl or boy, woman or man, whose life has suddenly been torn apart through no fault of their own.

Since 2014, Turkey has been home to the largest refugee population in the world, with close to 4 million refugees and asylum-seekers, 3.7 million of whom are Syrians under temporary protection. Only some 1.36% of this population live in Temporary Accommodation Centres, while the vast majority live across Turkey's 81 provinces among the host community in urban, peri-urban or rural areas. Turkey's refugee response which is characterized by inclusion and its comprehensive legal framework for the Law on Foreigners and International Protection and the Temporary Protection Regulation, continued in 2020 to provide the basis for the registration, documentation and access to services, including health, education and social services.

In 2020, Turkey, like the rest of the world, was confronted with the COVID-19 pandemic, both a global health emergency and an unusual humanitarian challenge affecting everyone without discrimination. The pandemic obviously has an impact on the study given that Syrian Barometer aims at looking into social perceptions of both Turkish and Syrian communities through their life experiences which have been shaped and evolved over the years of living together. One of the most obvious findings of the Syrian Barometer 2020 is that solidarity with Syrians on humanitarian grounds has increased during the pandemic and that Turkish society has continued providing support to Syrians despite the social distancing practices. The study also finds a rise in Turkish society's social relations with Syrians compared to the previous year, showcasing the Turkish people's extended hospitality welcoming Syrians in an unfailing manner over nine years which is very important for the social cohesion between host and refugee communities. The study, over the years, has been one of the key and unique reference materials on social cohesion in Turkey, demonstrating changing dynamics both from the perspective of both Syrians and host community.

We hope that the Syrian Barometer 2020 research conducted after nine years of living together against the backdrop of the pandemic will inspire many who are interested in working in this field, lead other studies in the subject and contribute to the policy development. We would like to express sincere thanks to Professor M. Murat Erdogan and his team for their commitment and work with the study. We would also like to acknowledge the contribution made by the Academic Board to the Syrian Barometer 2020.

Philippe Leclerc
UNHCR Representative

Prof. Dr. M. Murat ERDOĞAN

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Until November 2017, he was a faculty member at Hacettepe University, also the founder and director of H.U.Migration and Politics Research Center (HUGO). Between December 2017 and May 2021, he served as the founding Director of the Turkish-German University Center for Migration and Integration Studies-TAGU. As of March 2020 Prof.Dr. Erdogan started to work Mülkiye Migration Research Center-MÜGAM at Ankara University, Faculty of Political Sciences.

A political scientist, migration and EU expert, Prof. Erdoğan is a graduate of Ankara University Institute of Social Sciences. He carried out the research of his PhD dissertation from Ankara University -- titled The Relationship between Turkey and European Union after the Cold War: Geo-Strategic Perspective: 1990-2005" -- as a Konrad Adenauer Foundation fellow at Bonn and Freiburg universities in Germany in 1994-1999. In 2000-2003, Erdoğan worked at the Press Section of Turkey's Embassy in Berlin, and later as an advisor at the Turkish Grand National Assembly's Commission on EU Integration (2004), also an advisor to the president of Turkish Higher Education Council, and to the Rector of Hacettepe University (2012-2016) as well. Prof. Erdoğan carried out studies as a visiting researcher with different fellowships at universities of Duisburg-Essen (2007), Berlin-Humboldt (2010), Oxford University (2012) and Johns Hopkins University's American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, AICGS (2014), and Humboldt University (2019).

His academic research interests include voluntary and forced migration, refugees, people of Turkish origin living abroad, EU, political cartoons, political behavior, Islamophobia, Germany and Turkish foreign policy. He conducts comprehensive and regular public opinion research, including the "Euro-Turks- Barometre" on Turkish diaspora in Europe, and the Syrians Barometer on Syrians in Turkey.

Prof. Erdoğan is a member of UNESCO-Turkey, board member of ISC of Metropolis International and President of IGAM-Academy.

Prof. Erdoğan's recent books include the following:

- Syrian Barometer-2019: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians In Turkey (2020) (in Turkish, English & Arabic)

- Demographical Development of the Syrian Refugee Population and its Potential Impacts on The Education, Employment and Municipality Services in Turkey in Near Future (& M. Çorabatır) (2019) (in Turkish&English)

- Göç Uyum ve Yerel Yönetimler (2019) (Migration, Integration and Local Goverments) (in Turkish) (2018)

- Syrians Barometer-2017: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey (2018)

- Syrian Refugees and Process Management of Municipalities: The Case of Istanbul (2017)

- Perspectives, Expectations and Suggestions of the Turkish Business Sector on Syrians in Turkey (2015)

- "Turkiye'nin Goc Tarihi: 14. Yuzyildan 21. Yuzyila Turkiye'ye Gocler" (with A. Kaya) (2015)

- "Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration" (2015)

- Turks in German Cartoons, 50 Jahre 50 Karikaturen/50 Years 50 Cartoons: Turken in Deutschland aus der Sicht Deutcher Karikaturisten (2012)

- Turks Abroad: Fifty Years of Migration and Integration (2010)

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Abbreviations

AFAD	: Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency, Turkish Ministry of Interior
AK PARTY	: Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
CHP	: Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)
DGMM	: Directorate General of Migration Management, Turkish Ministry of Interior
ECHO	: European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
ECHR	: European Court of Human Rights
EU	: European Union
FGM	: Focus Group Meeting
FRIT	: Facility for Refugees in Turkey
HDP	: Peoples' Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi)
HUGO	: Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Center Institute
IOM	: International Organization for Migration
LFIP	: Law on Foreigners and International Protection (Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu)
MEB-MoNE	: Turkish Ministry of National Education (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı)
MHP	: Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)
NGO	: Non-Governmental Organization
SB	: Syrians Barometer
ŞEY	: Conditional Education Support (Şartlı Eğitim Desteği)
SUY	: Social Cohesion Assistance (Sosyal Uyum Yardımı)
TAGU	: Turkish German University Migration and Integration Research Center
TEC	: Temporary Education Center
TNSA	: Turkey Population and Health Research, Hacettepe University Population Studies
TÜİK	: Turkish Statistical Institute
UN	: United Nations
UNHCR	: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WHO	: World Health Organization

SB-2020-TABLE 1: A Chronological Review of Recent Developments Concerning the Syrians in Turkey and International Protection		
DATE	**DEVELOPMENTS**	**# OF SYRIANS IN TURKEY**
25 March 2005	Turkey's National Action Plan Regarding the Absorption of European Union's Acquis on Asylum and Migration	
March 2011	Beginning of anti-administration demonstrations in Syria	
2011	Number of individuals under international protection and/or those applied for international protection in Turkey: 58.018	
15 March 2011	Beginning of pro-democracy, anti-administration demonstrations in Deraa, Syria	
29 April 2011	Arrival of the first Syrian group of 252 individuals in Turkey	**252**
April 2011		**252**
26 April 2011	Syrian Army enters Deraa, where the first demonstrations started	
October 2011	A "Temporary Protection" regime started to be implemented regarding Syrians	
January 2012		**14.237**
30 May 2012	Turkey demanded all Syrian diplomats in Ankara to leave the country	
30 June 2012	UN-backed Geneva Talks take place for the first time under the initiative of Syrian Action Group	
January 2013		**224.655**
11 April 2013	Law on Foreigners and International Protection enters into effect	
14.11. 2013	The Regulation on the Establishment, Missions and Working of the Provincial Organization of Directorate General of Migration Management is adopted	
16 December 2013	A Readmission Agreement is signed between Turkey and the European Union concerning the irregular migrants	
January 2014		**1.519.286**
22 January 2014	Second Round of Geneva Talks commences	
11 April 2014	As overseen by the LFIP, one year after the Law entered into effect, Directorate General of Migration Management becomes active	
22 April 2014	The Regulation on the Establishment, Management, Administration and Auditing of the Reception and Accommodation Centers and Repatriation Centers is adopted	
11 June 2014	IS takes control of Turkey's Consulate General in Mosul, Iraq	
28 June 2014	IS declares the establishment of an Islamic State and Caliphate	
10 August 2014	R. T. Erdoğan is elected President of the Republic of Turkey	
September 2014	Establishment of the Provincial Organization of Directorate General of Migration Management starts	
22 October 2014	The Regulation on Temporary Protection is adopted	
November 2014	IS attack on Kobane starts	

January 2015		**2.503.549**
18 April 2015	The works and proceedings previously conducted by the Directorate General of Security's Section for Foreigners are transferred to Provincial Migration Management Units	
September 2015	Daeth of Aylan Kurdi	
January 2016		**2.834.441**
January 2016	The Free Visa Agreement between Turkey and Syria is terminated	
15 January 2016	The Regulation on Work Permits of Foreigners Under Temporary Protection enters into effect	
25 January 2016	Third Round of Geneva Talks commences	
March 2016	EU-Turkey Statement on Refugees is signed	
17 March 2016	Regulation on Fight Against Human Trafficking and Protection of Victims is adopted	
17 March 2016	Regulation concerning the Implementation of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection is adopted	
26 April 2016	Regulation on the Working of International Protection Holders and International Protection Applicants is adopted	
August 2016	Operation Euphrates Shield commences	
January 2017		**3.426.786**
January 2017	The process of updating and completing the missing bits of the information that was collected from Syrians during their registration by the Police or Provincial Migration Management Directorates commences	
23-24 January 2017	The First Round of Astana Talks takes place under the initiative of Turkey and Russia	
January 2018		**3.623.192**
January 2018	Operation Olive Branch commences	
March 2018	The administration of the Camps is transferred from AFAD to DGMM	
January 2019		**3.628.120**
22 July 2019	Istanbul Governorate decides to expel from the city Syrians who are not registered or who are registered within different provinces	
6 December 2019	Revisions were made in LFIP with the Law numbered 7196 (Law Regarding Revisions of Some Laws and the Decree Law numbered 375)	
31 December 2019		**3.576.370**
28 February 2020	Turkey decided not to control its borders with Greece	
11 March 2020	World Health Organization declared "Pandemic". The first COVID-19 case was detected in Turkey.	
December 2020	Construction of a 837-kilometers-long wall is completed on the 911-kilometers-long Turkey-Syria border	
31 December 2020		**3.641.370**

Acknowledgements

INTRODUCTION

1

INTRODUCTION[1]

As the anti-administration demonstrations that started in March 2011 spiraled out of control and turned into a civil war encompassing all of Syria, the tragedy surrounding the plight of Syrians who had to escape from their countries to save their lives and sought asylum in neighboring countries has been continuing over 10 years. The number of people who were forcefully displaced in Syria, which had a national population of 22.5 million in 2011, has surpassed 13.5 million according to the data released in UNHCR 2020 Global Trends. Of this figure, 6.8 million escaped the country while 6.7 million became internally displaced persons within Syria.[2] More than 80% of Syrian refugees live in neighboring countries particularly including Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. Around 15% of Syrian refugees live in European countries, particularly including Germany and Sweden. It is still very difficult to be able to predict how the situation in Syria will unfold with any degree of certainty. However, significant changes can be observed in Syrians' possibility of motivation and tendency to return, both due to the current conditions in Syria and the fact that they have been establishing new lives for themselves in their countries of residence. This, in turn, demonstrates the necessity of undertaking serious planning and adopting large-scale policies in social, economic, political and security-related fields for the countries hosting large numbers of Syrian refugees, particularly including Turkey.

The High Commissioner for Refugees, Flippo Grandi, describes what is happening in Syria as "the biggest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time".[3] Sharing 911 km of land borders with Syria, one of the most significantly affected actors from this immense crisis is Turkey. The first mass movement of Syrians into Turkey took place with the arrival of a group of 252 individuals through the Cilvegözü border gate in Hatay, following which the mass movement of Syrian refugees into the country has continued until 2017 thanks to the "open door policy" implemented by Turkey.[4] According to the official figures provided by the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) of the Ministry of Interior, the number of Syrians "under temporary protection" is 3.641.370 as of 31 December 2020.[5] This figure, which corresponds to 4,38% of Turkey's national population,[6] dis-

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1. The "Introduction" and "Syrians Under Temporary Protection in Turkey" parts in this study were taken from the SB-2019 report, only with the update of developments that took place in 2019-2020.

2. UNHCR-Global Trends in Forced Displacement – 2020 2020 https://www.unhcr.org/60b638e37/unhcr-global-trends-2020, p.7 (Access: 01.05.2021) and IOM-World Migration Report 2020, p.43 (https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf) (Access: 01.12.2019)

3. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees-UNHCR: https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html (Access: 01.12.2019)

4. Even though Turkey is party to both 1951 Geneva Convention and 1967 New York Protocol Relating to Legal Status of Refugees, it retains the geographical limitation in the Convention. The national legislation has also been produced in this context and therefore Turkey only grants refugee status to individuals coming from Europe (interpreted as Council of Europe member countries) and carrying the conditions of a "refugee" described in the 1951 Convention. The Law on Foreigners and International Protection, which entered into forced in 2013, also adopted this approach while regulating the statuses of "refugee", "conditional refugee", and "subsidiary protection". The asylum-seekers arriving from Syria, on the other hand, were granted another protective status, namely "Temporary Protection". In the current legal framework, asylum-seekers arriving from outside of Europe are granted the "conditional refugee" status, upon assessment of their application and if they fulfill the criteria set by the 1951 Convention. This study, being fully aware of this legal context and its official definition of a refugee, prefers to use the concepts of "Syrians" or "asylum-seekers" to refer to the displaced Syrians arriving in Turkey since 2011. It also occasionally uses the concept of "refugee" to refer to Syrians due to the sociological context and the common use of the concept.

5. SB-2020 takes 3.641.370 as the refence number of Syrians Under Temporary Protection in Turkey. This figure was released by the Directorate General of Migration Management as of 31 December 2020.

6. This figure is calculated by dividing the number of Syrians Under Temporary Protection as of 31 December 2020 to the number of

plays a tendency to increase - albeit on a smaller scale compared to previous years. This increasing tendency is due mostly to the natural population growth (by births) of the Syrian community and despite those Syrians who acquired Turkish citizenship or voluntarily returned to Syria over the years. The number of Syrians scored a significant growth between 2011 and 2017, having stabilized at 3.5 to 3.7 million since then. The number of individuals under international protection has also significantly grown in the same period. Given that the total number of individuals 'under international protection' and those with an application for international protection in Turkey was 58.018 in 2011, the scope of the immense transformation that Turkey has undergone becoming the "country hosting the largest number of refugees in the world"[7] should be noted.

According to the UNHCR study entitled "Global Trends-2020", there are 6,7 million Syrian asylum-seekers living in 126 different countries around the world. In addition, 83% of these Syrians live in neighboring countries.[8]As of 31 December 2020, the number of Syrians in Turkey was 3 million 641 thousand, which corresponds to 54,7% of all Syrians who were forced to leave their country. Following Turkey were Lebanon with 13% (865 thousand), Jordan with 9,95% (662 thousand), (Northern) Iraq with 3,63% (242 thousand), and Egypt with 1,95% (130 thousand) of Syrian refugees. Approximately 15% of Syrian refugees live in European Union countries, other European countries, Canada, and USA. More than 70% of Syrian refugees in Europe live in Germany (572 thousand)[9] and Sweden (113 thousand).[10]

SB-2020-FIGURE 1: **Syrian Refugees by Country of Residence (6.6 Million / 31 December 2020)**

Turkish citizens as of the same date (83.154.997).

7. IOM World Migration Report 2020, s.40 https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf (Access: 18.04.2021)

8. UNHCR-Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2020 https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/60b638e37/global-trends-forced-displacement-2020.html (Access: 01.05.2021)

9. According to UNHCR-Global Trends-2020 data, 102,600 new asylum applications were made in Germany in 2020, among which Syrians ranked first with 34,400, Afghans with 9,900, and Iraqis with 9,800 (p.39). When UNHCR-Global Trends-2019 (p.40) and 2020 and 2020 data are evaluated together, Germany was the country with the highest number of asylum applications with 2.2 million between 2010-2020. Among this number, Syrians take the first place with approximately 635 thousand. Syrians are followed by Afghans (242,000) and Iraqis (213,000). (https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/5ee200e37/unhcr-global-trends-2019.html)

10. UNHCR provides and updates the figures in the regional countries in the context of 3RP. (https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria). However, there are problems related to accessing the figures in European countries, the USA, Canada. Therefore, the figures used here cannot be presented as absolutely accurate ones.

1. Refugee Law and the Legal Framework Concerning International Protection in Turkey[11]

The most important foundation of the Refugee Law is the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" (UDHR) which was adopted on 10 December 1948. Its Article 14, which states that "Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution", provides a framework for all national and international regulations. Specifically related to asylum-seekers and refugees, the legal background is set in international law by the 1951 "Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees" and its complementary 1967 "Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees". As of 2014, there are 144 state signatories of the 1951 Convention and 145 state signatories of the 1967 Protocol. According to this Convention, a refugee is a person who:

> *"owing to well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it".[12]*

According to United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) data, there are currently 82,4 million displaced people around the globe in various statuses. Among these, 26,4 million have the "refugee" status and approximately 4,1 million are "stateless", with the rest having other statuses.[13]

Unfortunately, the number of displaced people in the world is increasing every day. 30 new individuals are displaced every minute around the world. Of course, these figures are the ones which could be detected by the relevant UN bodies and the UNHCR itself present them by stating that "at least" these many people were displaced. Another significant fact is the injustice that exists in how the responsibilities and burden stemming from asylum-seekers and refugees are shared. The issue of fair burden-sharing and the efforts under UN leadership since 2016 to increase solidarity with refugee-hosting countries have culminated into the "Global Compact on Refugees". However, while such initiatives would certainly play a significant role in raising awareness concerning various inequalities, their effectiveness in implementation is expected to remain limited.

Turkey has moved in cooperation with the international community since the beginning of the process. Turkey, while having signed the Geneva Convention on 24 August 1951, retains the original geographical limitation of the Convention in order to reduce the risks stemming from its location in an unstable region.[14] In fact, originally there were two limitations in the Convention for all parties. The first limitation concerned the "time period" included in the Convention. Accordingly, the refugee status was meant for only the people who were displaced by "the events that occurred pre-1951". This limitation was lifted with the 1967 Protocol. The second limitation, which Turkey

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11. Information and explanations in this section have been partly derived from M.M.Erdoğan, Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration (2015), Bilgi University Press, p.43 et al.

12. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 1 (2) https://www.unhcr.org/4ca34be29.pdf (Access: 10.09.2019)

13. UNHCR, Figures at a Glance-2020 (https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html) (Access: 02.09.2019)

14. 951 Convention 1(B)

still retains, is the "geographical" one. Accordingly, the Convention originally applied the refugee status only to people who were displaced in Europe. Therefore, as it still retains the geographical limitation, Turkey only accepts refugees from Europe, technically from Council of Europe member countries. Today, there are only 4 countries (Turkey, Congo, Madagascar, and Monaco) still retain the geographical limitation from the original Geneva Convention of 1951. However, the fact that this limitation was not able to shield Turkey from mass inflows of asylum-seekers has become plainly obvious.

The first significant internal legal action concerning the asylum applicants in Turkey was adopted in 1994 through a Regulation. It was named "The Regulation Concerning Foreign Individuals who Applied to Turkey for Refugee Status or who Applied for a Residence Permit in Turkey to Apply Another Country for Refugee Status AND The Mass Movements of Asylum-Seekers That Arrive at Our Borders and Potential Population Movements". This Regulation, which has been controversial in terms of international law and which was the reason for many of the problems that were brought to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), was revised in 2006. The expectation from developing a comprehensive legislation that is in accordance with the international law has become more urgent and important, particularly in the context of membership negotiations with the EU. In the 2001 Accession Partnership Document, the demand for "lifting the geographical limitation to 1951 Geneva Convention and developing social support units for refugees" was included among "medium term" priorities under the title of "Expanded Political Dialogue and Political Criteria". This same demand was repeated, in a more detailed way, in the 2003 and 2006 Accession Partnership Documents. The last Accession Partnership Document, released by the EU in 2008, included these issues in its 24th Chapter and particularly emphasized the importance of "integrated border management", "de-militarization", and "lifting the geographical limitation". The "EU Council Directive", which was adopted by the EU in 2001 and which introduced the temporary protection status, was also embraced by the Turkish legislation. This Directive was adopted as an outcome of the developments that occurred in the Balkans in 1990s. This important EU document suggests that the main objective of temporary protection is to provide quick passage for asylum-seekers to safety and to secure their basic human rights. According to the EU Council Directive concerning the temporary protection status during mass inflows, temporary protection is overseen as an exceptional tool to be employed during mass inflows which put the asylum systems under strain, but without undermining or extorting the regular asylum procedures. In Turkey, one of the most important documents in this field is the "National Action Plan for the Adoption of the EU Acquis in the Field of Migration and Asylum" which was adopted in 2005.[15] This plan has also served as a significant background for the new and comprehensive law on migration in Turkey.

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15. The National Action Plan states in its introduction:
In parallel with the developments towards accession to the European Union and for the fulfillment of the legislative obligation on the European Union and the Member States, Turkish Government undersigned the Accession Partnership Document of 2001 and subsequently revised the said document on 19 May 2003. For this endeavor, Turkish Government follows a National Program for the adoption of the EU legislation… In order to comply with the EU Acquis (legislation) on Justice and Home Affairs in the field of migration and asylum, Turkey has formed a special task force where various state agencies responsible for border control, migration and asylum are represented. Turkey has established three different working groups in respective fields (borders, migration and asylum) for developing an overall strategy. As a result of activities carried out by the Special Task Force following papers have been produced; "Strategy Paper on the Protection of External Borders in Turkey" in April 2003, "Strategy Paper on Activities Foreseen in the Field of Asylum within the Process of Turkey's Accession to the European Union (Asylum Strategy Paper)" in October 2003, "Strategy Paper to Contribute Migration Management Action Plan in Turkey (Migration Strategy Paper)" in October 2003.

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a. Law on Foreigners and International Protection (2013)

It is well-known that there is a close relationship between the developments in the sphere of migration management in Turkey and Turkey's relations with the EU. After Turkey was declared a "membership candidate" by the EU in December 1999, the Turkish "National Plan" and EU's "Accession Partnership Document"[16] prepared in 2001 gave special emphasis on preparations for the full implementation of the Schengen Agreement, fight against irregular migration, and integrated border management issues. This document and the ones that followed frequently mentioned the issues of civilianization of migration management in Turkey and following a border management policy that is in tune with the EU's. In this context, the efforts to make a law on migration management and to create an institution in Turkey had begun much earlier than the Syrian crisis. The Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) numbered 6458 has entered into force on 11 April 2013 when published in the Official Gazette. Thereby, LFIP became the first comprehensive legislation on the topic and the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) was established under the Ministry of Interior. DGMM became active on 11 April 2014, bringing the Law fully into effect.

LFIP has brought some concepts related to international protection into Turkish legislation which had not existed before. In this context, it defined various types of international protection as "refugee", "conditional refugee", and "subsidiary protection". The mass inflows from Syria, which had started during the period of law's preparation, has also caused the "temporary protection" to be included in the law. LFIP defines these statuses in the following way:

> "**Refugee:** *A person who as a result of events occurring in European countries and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his citizenship and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it, shall be granted refugee status upon completion of the refugee status determination process." (LFIP-Article 61))*

Embracing the geographical limitation included in the 1951 Geneva Convention, LFIP defines "conditional refugees" in the following way:

> **Conditional Refugee: "***A person who as a result of events occurring outside European countries and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it, shall be granted conditional refugee status upon completion of the refugee status determination process. Conditional refugees shall be allowed to reside in Turkey temporarily until they are resettled to a third country." (LFIP- Article 62)*

16. Turkish Foreign Ministry: https://www.ab.gov.tr/katilim-ortakligi-belgeleri_46226.html (Access: 29.08.2019)

The number of individuals with the official "refugee" status was 28 as of 2019.[17]The more significant group in Turkey is obviously that of individuals who were displaced by events occurring outside of Europe. Reaching hundreds of thousands in number, these international protection applicants could get the status of "conditional refugee" in Turkey, if their applications are accepted. Those applicants who cannot be given the **conditional refugee status** but who nonetheless requires international protection are given the status of "**subsidiary protection**" as defined by LFIP's Article 63:

> **"Subsidiary Protection:** *A foreigner or a stateless person, who neither could be qualified as a refugee nor as a conditional refugee, shall nevertheless be granted subsidiary protection upon the status determination because if returned to the country of origin or country of [former] habitual residence would: a) be sentenced to death or face the execution of the death penalty; b) face torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; c) face serious threat to himself or herself by rea- son of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or nationwide armed conflict; and therefore is unable or for the reason of such threat is unwilling, to avail himself or herself of the protection of his country of origin or country of [former] habitual residence." (LFIP- Article 63)*

Regarding **mass migration movements, the approach of LFIP appears to be based on "t***emporary protection".*** The status of "temporary protection", which currently covers the Syrians in the country, is immensely important considering the ongoing mass migration movements in the region. Concerning temporary protection, the law includes the following:

> ***Temporary Protection:***
>
> *(1) Temporary protection may be provided for foreigners who have been forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country that they have left, and have arrived at or crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass influx situation seeking immediate and temporary protection.*
>
> *(2) The actions to be carried out for the reception of such foreigners into Turkey; their stay in Turkey and rights and obligations; their exit from Turkey; measures to be taken to prevent mass influxes; cooperation and coordination among national and international institutions and organizations; determination of the duties and mandate of the central and provincial institutions and organizations shall be stipulated in a Directive to be issued by the Council of Ministers. (LFIP- Article 91)*

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17. The TV speech by the Minister of Internal Affairs S.Soylu, dated 24 July 2019 on NTV (from 7 minutes 18 seconds onwards) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RSzHgMMIkxw (Access: 24.11.2019)

SB-2020-FIGURE 2: International Protection in Turkish Legislation

INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION IN TURKISH LEGISLATION

Law on Foreigners and International Protection (6458 / 4.4.2013) and Temporary Protection Regulation (6883/22.10.2014)

It can be observed that more protective policies are being adopted against refugees throughout the world. This situation, in turn, causes the countries neighboring or with geographical proximity to crises to be further negatively affected by mass inflows. As also stated by the UN, 86% of refugees live in developing or poor countries. The restrictive approaches of developed and rich countries, which are becoming increasingly more evident, can be seen from various data particularly including those on resettlement. The number of refugees who were resettled in 2020 was 34.400. This figure is one-third of that of its previous year.[18] This context inevitably affects Turkey's refugee policies in various ways as well. While Turkey has significantly improved its asylum system and become the country hosting the largest number of refugees in the world since 2014, it continues to implement the geographical limitation concerning refugees in Geneva Convention to which it has been a party. The long-standing discussions concerning this, however, appear to be sidelined by the Syrian crisis and Turkey's policies.

b. Principle of "Non-Refoulement" in LFIP

LFIP has openly defined and guaranteed the principle of "non-refoulement" regarding foreigners including those under international and temporary protection in accordance with Turkey's own law and its obligations under international conventions.

18. UNHCR-Global Trends in Forced Displacement – 2020, p.3. (https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html) (Access: 02. 06.2021)

Article 33 of the Geneva Convention, of which Turkey is a party, defines the principle of "non-re-foulement" in the following way:

"No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, member- ship of a particular social group or political opinion."

Turkey is also a party to the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which holds that:

"No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture." (Article 3/1)

LFIP has also endorsed this principle as laid out by the above-mentioned Conventions with an even wider scope:

"No one within the scope of this of this Law shall be returned to a place where he or she may be subject- ed to torture, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment or, where his/her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his/her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." (Article 4)

As part of Turkey's national legislation, the above-cited article places all foreigners, -and not only refugees, conditional refugees, or individuals under temporary protection- under its protection from being returned to a place where they may be subject to torture, inhuman treatment or degrading punishment.[19]

c. Temporary Protection Regulation[20]

Article 91 of LFIP defines "Temporary Protection" and states that the details of what this entails would be determined by the Cabinet of Ministers through a Regulation. This Regulation was adopted in 2014 and it entered into force on 22 October having been published in the Official Gazette.[21] Then, with Turkey's transition to the Presidential Government System on 9 July 2018, there have been revisions both in LFIP and the Temporary Protection Regulation.[22] The term "Council of Ministers" was replaced with "President" and the term "by the Council of Ministers" with "by the President" with the Article 71 of the Decree Law numbered 703 on 2 July 2018. In the same way, the term "Council of Ministers" in the Temporary Protection Regulation was replaced with "President" by the Presidential Decree published on 25 December 2019 in the Official Gazette numbered 30989. In this framework, Article 9 of the Regulation states that "Temporary Protection decision is taken by the President upon the proposal of the Ministry". The Paragraph 2 of Article 10 says "fol-

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19. A Decree Law numbered 676 on some changes in the Law numbered 6458 was adopted on 03.10.2016. A case was opened at the Constitutional Court regarding this Decree Law. The Constitutional Court decided on 30.05.2019 that this Decree Law in effect intervened with individuals' right to appeal in relation to inhuman treatment. It has further decided that this violation stemmed from a structural problem between several articles of the law and the Decree Law. (Constitutional Court [AYM], Y. T. Appeal. Number: 2016/22418, Decision Date: 30.05.2019)

20. Turkish Republic Official Gazette (22.10.2014): http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/10/20141022-15-1.pdf

21. A detailed discussion of the Temporary Protection Regulation was included in the study "Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration". The information included under this title is taken from the mentioned source.

22. The Updated LFIP as of June 2021: https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.6458.pdf (Access: 2 June 2021), the updated Temporary Protection Regulation: https://mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuat?MevzuatNo=20146883&MevzuatTur=21&MevzuatTertip=5 (Access: 2 June 2021)

lowing the temporary protection decision taken by the President, the individual decisions regarding those benefiting from temporary protection is taken by the Directorate General".

The Regulation included the requirement of "biometric" inputs of foreigners including taking finger prints and addresses to be saved in a separate system to prevent any current and future issues concerning registration. The right of foreigners to access to basic services and other social assistance programs is defined to be conditional upon them remaining in the cities where they are registered. According to the Regulation, the rules and procedures concerning employment and working of those under temporary protection would be determined by the Presidency, upon the proposals prepared by the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services having received the views of the Ministry of Interior. These foreigners are allowed to work only in the sectors, vocations and geographical regions determined by the Presidency. They need to apply to the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services to obtain a work permit.

The regulation clearly mentions the "non-refoulement" principle (Art.6) in line with the definitions laid out in the 1951 Convention (Article 3) and LFIP (Article 4). According to the Regulation, no one within the scope of this of this Regulation shall be returned to a place where he or she may be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment or, where his/her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his/her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

The Article 11 of the regulation is on how to terminate temporary protection. According to this:

"**ARTICLE 11-** (1) The Ministry may make a motion to the President for the termination of temporary protection. Temporary protection may be terminated by the decision of the President.

(2) The President may decide in the following ways after the decision on termination

a) Complete termination of temporary protection and repatriation of those who were under temporary protection,

b) Giving those under temporary protection the status of which they fulfill the criteria en masse or making individual assessments of their applications for international protection,

c) Allowing those who were under temporary protection to remain in Turkey under the conditions which would be determined by Law."

Termination or cancellation of temporary protection on an individual basis is regulated by Article 12 of the Regulation in the following way:

"**ARTICLE 12-** Temporary protection is terminated individually if those under temporary protection

a) Leave Turkey on their own accord,

b) Benefit from the protection of a third country,

c) Are accepted by a third country for humanitarian reasons or on resettlement grounds OR arrive in a third country,

ç) Die,

d) Obtain another legal way of residence in Turkey as defined by the Law,

e) Obtain Turkish citizenship."

Another reason for individual termination of the temporary protection was added with a revised Paragraph 3 in 2019, which included failure to fulfill "obligation to report" as a reason for termination:

> "(3) The Governorate terminates the temporary protection of those who fail to fulfill their obligation to report three times in a row without excuse. In the implementation of this paragraph the provisions of Article 13 are used."

d. The Status of Syrians in Turkey

The legislative and administrative regulations in Turkey obviously do not allow the Syrians to be defined as "refugees", both because they are not from Europe and because of the mass nature of the inflow. The public institutions and politicians in Turkey have refrained from using the concept of "refugee" and generally preferred to use the concepts like "foreigners of Syrian citizenship" or "Syrians arrived in Turkey to seek asylum". LFIP, which the Regulation used as a legal basis, defines temporary protection in its Article 91 in the following way:

> "(1) Temporary protection may be provided for foreigners who have been forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country that they have left, and have ar- rived at or crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass influx situation seeking immediate and temporary protection.

> (2) The actions to be carried out for the reception of such foreigners into Turkey; their stay in Turkey and rights and obligations; their exit from Turkey; measures to be taken to prevent mass influxes; cooperation and coordination among national and international institutions and organizations; determination of the duties and mandate of the central and provincial institutions and organizations shall be stipulated in a Directive to be issued by the Presidency."

The Temporary Protection Regulation, which entered into force on 22 October 2014 based on Article 91 of LFIP, has clearly defined the legal status of Syrians in Turkey. According to the Provisional Article 1 of the Regulation,

> "The citizens of the Syrian Arab Republic, stateless persons and refugees who have arrived at or crossed our borders coming from Syrian Arab Republic as part of a mass influx or individually for temporary protection purposes due to the events that have taken place in Syrian Arab Republic since 28 April 2011 shall be covered under temporary protection, even if they have filed an application for international protection. Individual applications for international protection shall not be processed during the implementation of temporary protection."

e. International Protection Applicants in Turkey

There has always been human mobility, on an individual or mass scale, towards Turkey due to its geographical location and the instability in the region. In addition, the intense and durable crises experienced in neighboring countries have significantly increased the number of displaced people moving towards Turkey. The statistics released by the DGMM in 2017 concerning the number of applications for international protection in Turkey between 2005-2016 amply demonstrate the remarkable increase (see Figure below). According to these figures, it is noteworthy that the cumulative number of applications by the year 2011, when the Syrians started to arrive in mass numbers, is only 58.018. The fact that the number including the international protection applicants and those under temporary protection has reached to millions in a matter of few years and exceeded 4 million by 2019 should be seen as a major reference in understanding the scale of the situation experienced in terms of management as well as its social implications.

SB-2020-FIGURE 3: **The Number of Individuals Applied for International Protection in Turkey, 2005-2020**

Note: DGMM used to provide the annual figures and cumulative sums together until 2016. However, since 2017 cumulative numbers are not provided. The Total figures for 2018 and 2020 are taken from UNHCR sources on those years.
Source: GİGM: http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/uluslararasi-koruma_0_378_4712_icerik (Erişim: 25.02.2021) ve
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCR%20Turkey%20General%20Fact%20Sheet%20September%202020.pdf

Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) Turkey Country Chapter 2020-21 gives the total number of international protection beneficiaries and applicants in Turkey in 2020 to be around 320 thousand. [23] While the DGMM annually announces the number of applications for international

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23. 3RP Turkey Country Chapter 2021-2022 (2021) https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2021/03/3RP-Turkey-Country-Chapter-2021-2022_TR-opt.pdf (Access: 25.04.2021) In UNHCR Turkey's 2017 data, the country distribution of those under international protection in Turkey is given as follows: A total of 368,400, with 170 thousand from Afghanistan, 142 thousand from Iraq, 39 thousand from Iran, 5,700 from Somalia and 11,700 from other countries. http://www.unhcr.org/tr/unhcr-turkiye-istatistikleri (Access: 20.10.2017)

protection (112 thousand in 2017, 114 thousand in 2018), total numbers of existing international protection beneficiaries are not shared. In this context, possibilities such as applicants' voluntary-return or migration to a third country may lead to changes in the total figures.[24] However, in March 2020, UNHCR-Turkey gave the total number of refugees and asylum-seekers registered in Turkey to be 330 thousand.[25]

The official records suggest that the total number of individuals under various international protection statuses in Turkey (including Syrians and non-Syrians) by the end of 2020 is over 4 million. This figure doesn't include those individuals residing in Turkey with a form of residence permit and the unregistered individuals/irregular migrants.

f. Irregular Migrants in Turkey

There is a remarkable increase in the number of irregular migrants in Turkey, particularly after 2015. According to data released by DGMM, more than 1 million 340 thousand irregular migrants, a majority of whom being from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan have been apprehended between 2015 and 2020. Around 70% of these irregular migrants were those who committed border violation, while 30% were Syrians who overstayed their visa or who departed from Turkey. According to the data released by the Migration Committee meeting held on 15 September 2021, the number of apprehended irregular migrants in Turkey until September 2021 was 1.293.662. The largest groups among the apprehended irregular migrants were Afghans (470 thousand) and Pakistanis (190 thousand). However, 195 thousand or 15% of these apprehensions were repetitive. According to the same declaration, 283.790 apprehended immigrants were deported back to their countries of origin between 2016-2021. Furthermore, it was reported that 2.327.000 irregular migrants were prevented from entry into Turkey since 2016.[26]

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24. DGMM: http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/goc-idaresi-genel-mudurlugu-istisare-toplantisi_350_359_10676_icerik (Access: 05.09.2017). The Minister of Internal Affairs S.Soylu gave the number of those under international protection to be "around 337 thousand" in a TV statement on 24 July 2019. He declared the number of people residing in Turkey with a residence permit to be 1 million 23 thousand. In combination, he suggested that the total number is around 4.9-5 millon: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RSzHgMMIkxw (ab to 7.08 second) (Access: 24.11.2019)

25. UNHCR declares this number to be 330 thousand. UNHCR-Turkey, September Operational Update: (https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/89474) (Access: 15.10.2021)

26. Statement by S.Soylu, the Minister of Interior, at the Migration Committee Meeting (15.09.2021) at haberler.com (https://www.haberler.com/icisleri-bakani-soylu-goc-kurulu-toplantisi-nda-14397037-haberi/

SB-2020-FIGURE 4: **Number of Apprehended Irregular Migrants in Turkey, 2005-2020**

*As of 14.04.2021

Source: DGMM: https://www.goc.gov.tr/duzensiz-goc-istatistikler (Access: 25.04.2021)

SB-2020-FIGURE 5: **Number of Apprehended Irregular Migrants in Turkey by Nationality, 2005-2019**

Source: DGMM: https://www.goc.gov.tr/duzensiz-goc-istatistikler (Access: 25.04.2021)

2. Social Acceptance and Social Cohesion

Syrians Barometer study aims to make an analysis of the current situation concerning the Syrians in Turkey and contribute in the processes of social cohesion through providing "a framework for peaceful and honorable coexistence". Mass human mobility brings with itself the issue of how to live together concerning the "native/home society" and the "newcomers"- in whatever way or for whatever reason they may have arrived in the country. In this context, it is important to provide a brief evaluation of the conceptual discussions on "social cohesion" (or similarly used concepts in the literature such as "integration", "harmonization" or "adaptation", etc.).[27] Such an evaluation is necessary to explain how the essential concept "social acceptance" is defined in this study, which is argued to serve as the basis for social cohesion.

As human mobility and mass movements have been intensifying, a number of concepts have been developed and discussed concerning how to ensure the cohabitation of social groups from massively different religious, cultural, and ethnic backgrounds "with the least amount of problems"; and how, if possible, this social diversity can be molded so as to produce "social benefits". Among these, the most popularly used concepts include integration,[28] harmonization, social cohesion, inclusion, adaptation, assimilation, acculturation, multiculturalism, interculturalism, and tolerance/toleration, among others. New concepts are emerging every day in this lively field as human mobility intensifies. For instance, while the number of international migrants was around 150 million in 2000, it has increased to 272 in 2020. In the same years, the number of refugees and internally displaced persons increased from 35 million to 71 million. The issues concerning social cohesion regarding Syrians in Turkey, the scale and pace of whose mass movement have been extraordinary, provide fertile ground for new conceptual discussions in this literature. In fact, they make having such discussions inevitable.

The main motivation of the concept of "social cohesion", which was used as the framework of this study, is similarly to prevent potential social, economic, and political problems; and if this is impossible, then, to minimize such problems and conflicts amongst the various social groups that are living together, while trying to increase the social benefits that could be accrued from the emerging social diversity. In the context of this study, the concept of "social cohesion" is used in an attempt to reveal the conditions of and the road map for the peaceful coexistence of foreigners (migrants, refugees, etc.), in other words the "others" who are in numerical minority in the society, and the rest of the society where they are not perceived as a "threat to social peace" and all segments of society live without conflict and tensions.

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27. For a recent and comprehensive review on "social cohesion", see IOM-World Migration Report 2020, p.185 et al. (https://publications. iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf) ve R. Bauböck –M.Tripkovic (Eds.) (2017) The Integration of Migrants and Refugees, An EUI Forum on Migration, Citizenship and Demography, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies) https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/45187/Ebook_IntegrationMigrantsRefugees2017.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y) (Access: 01.12.2019)

28. The IOM Migration Dictionary defines integration as follows: "The two-way process of mutual adaptation between migrants and the societies in which they live, whereby migrants are incorporated into the social, economic, cultural and political life of the receiving community. It entails a set of joint responsibilities for migrants and communities, and incorporates other related notions such as social inclusion and social cohesion. Note: Integration does not necessarily imply permanent residence. It does, however, imply consideration of the rights and obligations of migrants and societies of the countries of transit or destination, of access to different kinds of services and the labor market, and of identification and respect for a core set of values that bind migrants and receiving communities in a common purpose" https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms#Integration (Access: 31.12.2019)

As an inalienable part of migration discussions, the concepts of "integration", "harmonization", and "social cohesion" which have been more frequently used in recent years, are all produced in different contexts and with various priorities. However, the most popularly used and discussed concept of "integration" has been widely criticized for taking a static existing culture granted and assuming an organic national identity. In this context, the criticisms towards this concept include -at least- 4 main charges. The first criticism against the concept of integration relates to the problems created by the fact that the concept belongs to engineering/mechanical fields, instead of the social field, and was only later applied to this field to which it did not belong. Integration refers to the action or process of mechanically combining one thing with another to make a whole. Application of this concept to the social world would obviously be problematic. Another major criticism against integration derives from the "hierarchical essence" of the concept. This is also closely related to the third charge against the concept: "Integration into what, by whom, and how?". These questions relate to the inherent vagueness of the concept and their answers are inevitably political/ideological. The political power that manages the process, which is usually the state of the local society, defines integration in such a way that takes the "existing"- referring to the local society/culture - as primary and imposes that on the newcomers. What is more, this political process is usually shaped by security concerns and political anxieties. This perspective also leads the way for an understanding of "the locals have the right to determine the rules". Such an approach to integration as the newcomers adapting themselves to what is existing as the rule/necessary background to living together is thereby legitimized. And this is exactly where another significant problem related to the concept emerges: since integration is defined as a justified acceptance that the newcomers adapt themselves to what is existing, in time this could justify the expectation of "assimilation"[29] This is why, for many social scientists, integration is just a concealed stepping stone to assimilation.[30]

Perhaps the main agreement among the migration researchers is that there is no universally agreed upon definition of "social cohesion" or similarly developed concepts that would be valid for everyone, everywhere, and at all times. In the absence of such standard agreed upon definitions, there emerge many subjective and context-specific evaluations and conclusions concerning these concepts. "The Guidebook for Local Bodies and Operators on Integration of Immigrants in Europe"[31], which was published by the EU, states "that integration is a dynamic and two-way process involving mutual participation of immigrants and citizens; that education and employment are crucial for helping migrants to become active participants in society; and that as an essential requirement for integration, immigrants need to learn the language and history of the host society". While there is an emphasis on the rights and opportunities to be provided for the "newcomers", it can still be observed that the host society is prioritized.

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29. The book "Europe without an identity" written by Bassam Tibi, a German citizen of Syrian origin, contains very interesting hints regarding the discussions on the "hierarchical structure" of the concept of immigrant integration and the questions of "integration into what, integration into whom?" with its discussion on integration of Muslim immigrants in Germany and Europe and the proposed concept of "Leitkultur" ("lead culture"). See assam Tibi (1998) Europa ohne Identität? Leitkultur oder Wertebeliebigkeit, Siedler V.

30. For the approach of Prof. Dr. Nermin Abadan-Unat, one of the pioneering names of migration studies in Turkey, who often mentions that the concept of integration by its nature leads to assimilation and objects to this concept see N.Abadan-Unat, (2017) Bitmeyen Göç / Konuk İşçilikten Ulus-Ötesi Yurttaşlığa (Unending Journey: From Guest-workers to Transnational Citizens). Istanbul: Bilgi University Publishing, 3rd Edition

31. The Guidebook for Local Bodies and Operators on Integration of Immigrants in Europe http://www.ll2ii.eu/pdf/Guidebook_for_Local_Bodies_and_Operators_on_Integration_of_Migrants_in_Europe_TR.pdf (Access: 12.01.2020).

Demireva, in her study entitled "Immigration, Diversity and Social Cohesion", similarly suggests that there is no universal definition for "social cohesion" and that this concept is usually associated with concepts such as "solidarity", "togetherness", "tolerance" and "harmonious coexistence". Demireva here refers to the social order of a specific society and argues that "what proves the existence of social cohesion are a common vision and sense of belonging shared by all social groups in society; acceptance and appreciation of diverse backgrounds of different people; ability to provide similar opportunities to individuals coming from very different backgrounds; and the existence of strong and trust-based relations amongst people of diverse backgrounds at workplaces, schools, and neighborhoods".[32] This definition appears to enjoy widespread acceptance and it generally conforms to the "durable solutions" that the UNHCR offers regarding cases where prolonged refugee experiences: i.e. 1. "working for voluntary repatriation", 2. "attempting to resettle in a third country", and 3. "implementing local integration policies".[33]

Undoubtedly, the discussions on how to prevent conflict, dissipate tensions, and live together in peace have a long history among human beings going back to the times they started living in groups. However, beginning with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, gradual emergence of nation states and coming to prominence of national identities, partly through processes explained by Anderson in his "imagined communities"[34], brought a new dimension to these debates. As also suggested by Castles and Miller, prominent migration scholars and the authors of the seminal book "Age of Migration", human mobility and migration have existed in every period of human history, producing significant influences for human beings.[35] The authors suggest that the current age, defined by intense trans-border migrations, brings along two important questions for the states; one concerning the issue of "state sovereignty" and the other concerning "social transformation and social cohesion processes". They also argue that "trans-border migration does not only damage physical borders, but also emotional and cultural borders", highlighting the significant implications of migration. Even though migration brings some difficult and painful processes, it is now almost impossible to imagine a social structure that is completely cleansed from migration and its implications. As Faist argues, today many politicians around the world see migration as the "new normal".[36] Faist also emphasizes that the issue of social cohesion does not only concern people coming from outside of the borders. Accordingly, similar discussions concerning "social exclusion" and "social cohesion" take place within a country amongst citizens from different ethnic, religious, or cultural backgrounds.[37]

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32. N. Demireva (2017) Immigration, Diversity and Social Cohesion. Briefing, The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, also UNHCR: Solutions for Refugees (https://www.unhcr.org/solutions.html) and IOM World Report 2020-p.343.

33. UNHCR: Solutions for refugees (https://www.unhcr.org/50a4c17f9.pdf) (Access: 10.12.2019)

34. B.Anderson (2015) Hayali Cemaatler (Imagined Communities), Metis Yayınevi, İstanbul.

35. First published in 1993 by Castles and Miller, later editions of the book included contributions from Haas as well. For the most recent edition, see S. Castles, H. De Hass, and M. Miller (2018) The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, Sixth Edition, The Guilford Press.

36. T. Faist (2018) A Primer on Social Integration: Participation and Social Cohesion in the Global Compacts. (COMCAD Working Papers, 161). Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, Fak. für Soziologie, Centre on Migration, Citizenship and Development (COMCAD). https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-58138-7

37. OECD conducts the study "social cohesion index" to assess cohesion among the citizens of the same country and reveals interesting results: https://www.oecd.org/dev/inclusivesocietiesanddevelopment/social-cohesion.htm

There has been a wealth of studies as well as theories concerning the impacts of trans-border migration on the local societies. These studies elaborate on or emphasize different aspects of social cohesion. The Chicago School of Sociology is the first scientific theory on social cohesion in an urban context.[38] Established in early 20th century in the US which is a traditional country of immigration, the Chicago School has focused on inter- group relations in Chicago, where more than one third of the population was constituted by people who were born outside of America, with the ultimate aim of "building a unifying national identity". The Chicago School argues that social cohesion requires different groups living together to merge with one another. The famous concept of "Melting Pot" defends the process of different ethno-cultural and religious identities of immigrants to be melted in the same American pot to produce a single culture having somewhat distanced themselves from their such previous identities. In other words, it defends "assimilation" albeit in a different - and positive - conceptualization. This is because this school of thought as well as others influenced by it perceive the probability of immigrants keeping their pre-migration identities and cultures as a threat and danger for the social context in which they arrived. Developed by Bogardus in 1925, and used in the present study of Syrians Barometer, the "social distance scale" aims to understand the social life and social differentiations as well as to improve social relations.[39] One of the pioneering American urban sociologists, R. E. Park, argues in his theory of "Race Relations Cycle"[40] that social cohesion processes among different groups go through four different phases: "contact and establishing relations", "competition over scarce resources", "state's efforts to include the newcomers in the public space", and "accommodation or assimilation". However, the "melting pot" approach which produces assimilation and promises to be a "project of serenity" has not become as successful as expected. Instead of forgetting them to some extent, many immigrants displayed a tendency to hold firmly on to their identities to cope with the structural and psychological challenges produced by migration.[41] In other words, expectation of assimilation brought further segregation, increasing the potential for conflict.

As assimilationist theories had failed and "social diversity" increasingly turned into a defining characteristic of societies in every field, starting from 1960s, the assimilationist policies started to be rejected. They were replaced by "multiculturalism" in philosophy and "integration" in practice.[42] Based on the premise that different groups can live together in harmony[43], the concept of "multiculturalism" was first used by an education expert from New Mexico named A. Medina in 1957. Medina has presented multiculturalism as the "key for a successful life together" suggesting that a multi-lingual and multi-ethnic society requires multicultural perspectives and policies to live in

38 A.Kaya (2014) "Türkiye'de Göç ve Uyum Tartışmaları: Geçmişe Dönük Bir Bakış" (Migration and Integration Discussions in Turkey: A Look to the Past) , İdealkent Kent Araştırmaları Dergisi, Vol. 14, 2014, p.12

39. E.S.Bogardus (1925) "Social Distance and Its Origins." Journal of Applied Sociology 9 (1925): 216-226, and E.S.Bogardus (1947) Measurement of Personal-Group Relations, Sociometry, 10: 4: 306–311.

40. See, S.M.Lyman (1968) The Race Relations Cycle of Robert E. Park, The Pacific Sociological Review, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring, 1968), pp. 16-22.

41. A.Kaya, ibid. p. 13.

42. For a liberal perspective, see W. Kymlicka, (1995), Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford: Oxfod University Press.

43. B.Kartal ve E.Başçı, (2014) Türkiye'ye Yönelik Mülteci ve Sığınmacı Hareketleri (Refugee and Asylum Movements Towards Turkey), CBU Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 12 (2) pp.222.

peace and harmony. Multiculturalism can be defined as the "process or policy of maintaining and supporting the group identities of different cultural groups in a multicultural society". The "Canadian Multiculturalism Act" of 1971 had a significant effect on the popularization of the concept. With the Act, Canada defined the different cultures and cultural groups in the country as indispensable parts of its national heritage and a major richness of the country, announcing that each of them is morally equal in the eyes of the state. This approach gives official recognition to each cultural group, allows them to live their cultures in the sense of being able to freely carry out cultural practices, and hence, supports each group to build and manage their own places of worship or schools, and so on. Studies on immigrant integration have usually focused on the processes, thereby investigating the necessary conditions for or the minimum standards of cultural, legal or political integration. The main objective appears to understand the conditions in which the "newcomers" (immigrants) are brought to an equal position in education, working life, and enjoying the services provided by the state, without being excluded from public institutions.[44] Kaya highlights the significance and effectiveness of the state suggesting that "the issue of social cohesion has always been important for societies in which groups from different ethno-cultural and religious backgrounds live. The discussions concerning social cohesion are to a large extent based on the approaches of the receiving societies and states."[45] Providing one of the most familiar definitions of integration, Hynie suggests that "integration, in its broadest sense, refers to inclusion and participation, both socially and economically" and that it is a "process whereby both the receiving communities and the newcomers change, and change each other".[46] In their important paper entitled "Understanding Integration", Ager and Strang define integration in terms of "assumptions and practice regarding citizenship and rights; processes of social connection within and between groups within the community; and lack of structural barriers to such connection related to language, culture and the local environment" specifically emphasizing the importance of achievement and access across the sectors of employment, housing, education and health.[47] Jenson investigates the structural aspects of social cohesion in five dimensions: belonging/isolation (a cohesive society is one in which citizens "share values"), inclusion/exclusion (social cohesion is related to economic institutions, particularly the markets, and it requires capacity to include), participation/non-involvement (social inclusion requires involvement and participation in a wide array fields including politics), recognition/rejection (respect for plurality, tolerance, and recognition- individuals' feeling that others accept them and recognize their contributions are essential for social cohesion), and legitimacy/illegitimacy (social cohesion depends on maintaining the legitimacy of public and private institutions that act as mediators). [48] Bernard has added a new dimension, i.e. equality/inequality, to the five that were offered by Jenson.[49] Schmitt defines social cohesion in terms of goals to be attained. These goals include elimi-

44. See: A.Yükleyen & G. Yurdakul (2011) Islamic Activism and Immigrant Integration: Turkish Organizations in Germany, Immigrants & Minorities, 29:01, 64-85 .

45. A.Kaya (2014) "Türkiye'de Göç ve Uyum Tartışmaları: Geçmişe Dönük Bir Bakış" (Migration and Integration Discussions in Turkey: A Look to the Past) , İdealkent Kent Araştırmaları Dergisi, Vol. 14, 2014, p.12

46. M. Hynie (2018). Refugee integration: Research and policy. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 24(3), 265-276.

47. A.Ager & A.Strang (2008). Understanding integration: A conceptual framework. Journal of Refugee Studies, 21, 166-191.

48. J.Jenson "Mapping Social Cohesion: The State of Canadian Research", Canadian Policy Research Networks, Ottawa, 1998, p. 15

49. P.Bernard (2000) "Social Cohesion: A Dialectical Critique of a Quasi-Concept", Strategic Research and Analysis Directorate, Department of Canadian Heritage, Ottawa, s. 19.

nation of inequalities and social exclusion and strengthening of social relations, social interactions, and social ties.[50] Having emphasized trust, participation, and the willingness to help as important aspects of social cohesion, Chan's perspective on the concept is based on a dual framework. While "horizontal dimension" is related to cohesion amongst social groups, "vertical dimension" is related to state-citizen cohesion.[51] As Unutulmaz argues, however, all integration policies are ultimately the products of a "political vision" that is developed by the receiving country depending on its conditions, agenda, and capacity.[52]

One of the very important concepts in the context of social cohesion debates is "multiculturalism" and it has been subject to heavy criticism in Western Europe particularly in relation to Muslim immigrants. Here, it is important to differentiate the two meanings of multiculturalism: while in the sense of presence of multiple cultures in a society it refers to a social fact; the concept gains a normative substance in its second meaning asking for the recognition of equal moral value and standing of each culture.[53] However, multiculturalism in this latter normative sense and multiculturalist policies developed based on it have frequently been criticized for encouraging different communities to become inward-looking, closed groups and thereby leading to segregation instead of social cohesion. In the British context, one particular criticism was that multiculturalism had produced "parallel societies", living side-by-side but not sharing anything with one another.[54]

Attempts were made to resolve the problems encountered in the "assimilationist" and "multiculturalist" models through the employment of the concept of "integration". In this context, integration was offered as an ideal in-between approach where newcomers would join host society quickly and with equal rights through embracing the values of this society, whilst preserving their existing cultures. It needs to be noted that underlying all these discussions is the view that sees the society as an organic whole. However, in an age of globalization and communications, it should not be forgotten that individuals could foster more than one cultural belonging. The Commission on Integration and Cohesion, which was established in the UK in 2007, was a manifestation of this view which presented the concepts of integration and social cohesion as desired alternatives to the perils of multiculturalism and assimilation. In migration and social cohesion debates, there is a reductionist tendency to see all migrants as a single block with more or less homogenous experiences. However, immigrant communities are neither homogenous nor static entities, which mean that in addition to having significant degrees of inner diversity, they change over time. Therefore,

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50. B.Schmitt-Regina, Social Cohesion as an aspect of the quality of Societies: Concept and Measurement. EuReporting Working Paper No 14, Centre For Survey Research and Methodology, Mannheim, 2000, p. 28

51. J.Chan, Ho –pong to ve E.Chan, "Reconsidering social cohesion: Developing a Definition and Analytical Framework for Emprical Research", Social Indicators Research, 2006, 75(2), p. 294

52. On this subject, see: O.Unutulmaz (2016) Gündemdeki Kavram: Göçmen Entegrasyonu-Avrupadaki Gelişimi ve Britanya Örneği (The Hot Topic: Integration of Immigrants- Its Development in Europe and the Case of Britain), Gülfer Ihlamur-Öner, A.Ş. öner (eds.) Küreselleşme Çağında Göç Kavramlar ve Tartışmalar, İletişim Yayınları Istanbul, 2016, p. 157

53. See: N.Yurdusev: İflas eden çok kültürcülük mü yoksa Almanya mı? (Is it Multiculturalism that is failing, or is it Germany?) (https://www.dunyabulteni.net/iflas-eden-cok-kulturculuk-mu-yoksa-almanya-mi-makale,14912.html) (Access: 29.12.2019) Also, see: W.Kymlicka (1995).

54. The riots that erupted in England and UK government's commissioning of a report by Ted Cantle have become a significant turning point. The research conducted in the events and the ensuing publication of the "Cantle Report" in 2001 argued that state multiculturalism has caused segregation in society and created parallel societies, which lived side by side but never meaningfully interacted. See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/25_05_06_oldham_report.pdf (Access: 29.12.2019)

there are heterogenous and increasingly complex identity structures within migrant communities. Foroutan describes these with the notion of "hybrid identities". [55] This new reality further complicates the social cohesion processes, whereby new identities need to be defined again.

One of the most frequently discussed concepts within social cohesion debates is "belonging". While this concept can be defined in such a way to imply assimilationist expectations, it can also be seen as an opportunity for the newcomers and the local society to bind themselves together under a common culture and sense of belonging. Defining belonging with a dominant group would inevitably legitimize assimilationist policies and re-animate the hierarchical understanding for social cohesion. The lack of any belonging and "simply living on a land together", however, could lead to breakups, parallel lives, and even conflicts. The 3Bs, i.e. "Being / Belonging / Becoming" should be very carefully balanced so that a society that includes an emotional attachment and sense of ownership could be established in the face of diversity, without asking for assimilation. This should be done not with the state in the center of the process and through ideology and coercion, but with the society in the center and voluntarily. This could only be realized through a strong social acceptance.

Having paid significant efforts to establish its own migration management system since early 2000s, Turkey appears to address the issue of social cohesion for the first time with the adoption of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) in 2013. Recognizing the issue of social cohesion as an inalienable part of the process, the Law embraces a philosophical stance on the issue and declares that it draws a clear line between social cohesion and assimilation. The preference to use the concept of "social cohesion" in the Law can even be partly attributed to this clear rejection of assimilation given the above discussed criticism of the concept of integration being a sugar-coated version of assimilation. In its Article 96, LFIP assigns certain missions to the Directorate General of Migration Management in terms of social cohesion regarding immigrants: "The Directorate General may, to the extent that Turkey's economic and financial capacity deems possible, plan for activities for social cohesion in order to facilitate mutual harmonization between foreigners, applicants, and international protection beneficiaries and the society as well as to equip them with the knowledge and skills to be independently active in all areas of social life without the assistance of third persons in Turkey or in the country to which they are resettled or in their own country." The Law also establishes a Department of Harmonization and Communication within the Directorate General to carry out and coordinate activities related to harmonization of immigrants. The philosophical background of the adopted perspective is presented in the following way: "social cohesion is neither assimilation, nor integration. It is what emerges when the immigrants and the society understand each other on a voluntary basis."[56]

Many of these debates concerning the philosophical content of the concept, what exactly is meant by it, and how its practice in the real life is envisaged will most likely continue in the future. Developing new concepts related to these debates appears ambitious and naturally risky. This is both because of the fact that social cohesion is not something that is only related to migration and because

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55. See: N.Foroutan, I.Schäfer (2009) Hybride Identitäten – muslimische Migrantinnen und Migranten in Deutschland und Europa. In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (5/2009), pp. 11-18.

56. DGMM-Directorate General of Migration Management "Uyum Hakkında" (About Integration): https://www.goc.gov.tr/uyum-hakkinda (Access: 02.01.2020)

there are thousands of different social cohesion processes simultaneously underway all around the world. It is not possible, or realistic, to explain the social cohesion processes as experienced by the Syrians in Turkey, Turks in Germany, Somalians in Canada, Chinese in Japan, and Algerians in France with a single concept. In the face of these limitations and the risk of being seen as "too general", "vague" or "abstract", it has been inevitable for the Syrians Barometer study to offer a humble definition of the concept of social cohesion to explain how it is used and understood in this study as well as to provide it as a background concerning social cohesion policies and future projections. This definition endeavor tries to distance the concept from ideology and a hierarchical structure, and contains a foundational principle as expressed by Kant. Even though the Syrian Barometer research mainly aims to highlight social perceptions and social acceptance in the context of social cohesion rather than engaging in theoretical discussions, it also offers a definition of social cohesion in the light of Kant's maxim "I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law". This study defines **social cohesion as "the way of life in which different communities, whether came together voluntarily or involuntarily, could live in peace and harmony on a common ground of belonging where pluralism is embraced in a framework of mutual acceptance and respect."**

Social cohesion processes in the aftermath of mass forced migration involve many different conditions, actors, obstructions, opportunities, and principles. This study argues that one of the most sensitive and important issues concerning these processes is "social acceptance". It is important to note that the level of "acceptance" in a society differs significantly depending on the quality of migration. In other words, social cohesion processes of voluntary immigrants and asylum-seekers/refugees who were the victims of forced migration as well as the relations each could establish with the local society differ on many occasions, and therefore their presence in the society produces different outcomes. When we look at the main regions in which the 272 million international migrants and approximately 70 million refugees around the world live as of 2020,[57] we can clearly see the immense differences in the policies the developed countries adopt concerning these two different groups. As it is well-known, while 73% of the displaced people live in neighboring countries and 86% live in developing countries, only around 14% of the refugees live in developed countries. However, when it comes to voluntary migrants, or "economic migrants" as they are more frequently called in the literature, the figures change radically. This is clearly no coincidence. While regular and especially qualified immigrants are perceived as "added values" to their countries of residence, refugees and asylum-seekers are perceived as problems and risk factors. The respective state policies, in turn, are determined based on these perceptions. In this context, there is a clear need to increase and improve the social cohesion policies and their implementation concerning the high number of refugees.

What Turkey has lived since 2011 is an extremely intense forced migration experience on a mass scale. Turkey has found itself in a situation where it needs to develop social cohesion policies for millions of asylum-seekers.

57. UNHCR Global Trends-2018: https://www.unhcr.org/5d08d7ee7.pdf, (Access: 18.09.2019)

We can identify five different domains related to mass international migrations:

1. The policies and precautions adopted in the public sphere; border and process management,

2. The social solidarity and acceptance displayed by the host society,

3. The attitudes of the "newcomers",

4. The conditions in the origin country,

5. The approach of and the actions taken by the international community.

These domains, which are certainly inter-related and intersecting, play an especially vital role in overcoming the difficult times, undermining the potential problems related to living together, and even attempting to transform potential problems into potential benefits. In addition to these, there are some other factors that play significant roles in social cohesion processes:

"The motivations of the newcomers", in other words whether they are voluntary immigrants or refugees, appear as one of the most significant elements of the social cohesion process, as they shape the perceptions and reactions of the host society towards these groups. This is because while voluntary migration is perceived as manageable and orderly; asylum is perceived to bring along uncertainty, temporariness, unpredictability, trauma, and lack of documentation. This approach can also be seen in EU's "New Pact on Migration and Asylum", the first draft of which was published in September 2020.[58]

In this context, it is necessary to note the global effort displayed by the UN for migrants and refugees. The process that was initiated by the UN in 2016 in New York has produced two important international documents in 2018. These are entitled as "Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration"[59] and "Global Compact on Refugees"[60] . The reason for producing two distinct documents was the fact that migrants and refugees are subject to different regimes due to the differences in their respective legal frameworks and rights. Both of the Global Compacts emphasize the importance of fair burden-sharing, sustainable solutions, and naturally, social cohesion.

Actors: It is possible to identify six main actors as the determinants of the process of social cohesion: the host (local) society; host state institutions; "newcomers" (immigrants / asylum-seekers / refugees); international organizations, especially including ones that play a larger role concerning the refugees such as relevant UN institutions; NGOs; and lastly, the "origin country" institutions. Each of these actors has the potential, albeit at varying degrees, to facilitate or obstruct the social cohesion process and their coordination, or the lack thereof, is a very important determinant in the process.

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58. EU Commision (23.09.2020) New Pact on Migration and Asylum (https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/new-pact-migration-and-asylum_en). For an assessment on this, see K.Kirişci, M.M.Erdoğan,N.Eminoğlu (2020) The EU's "New Pact on Migration and Asylum" is missing a true foundation, November 6, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/11/06/the-eus-new-pact-on-migration-and-asylum-is-missing-a-true-foundation/

59. IOM: Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (2018) (https://www.iom.int/global-compact-migration)

60. UNHCR: Global Compact on Refugees (2018) (https://www.unhcr.org/the-global-compact-on-refugees.html)

Which one is more Effective: Cultural/Religious/Ethnic Closeness or Numerical Size? The cultural closeness or familiarity of the newcomers with the host society initially appears as an important factor. In other words, the higher levels of cultural closeness could facilitate the social cohesion process. It is clear that the religious and ethnic closeness, which found its manifestation in the then popularly used concepts of "Ensar and Muhacir"[61], was influential especially in the initial periods in ensuring a high level of social acceptance and solidarity displayed towards Syrians. However, this positive influence is increasingly overshadowed by rising numbers, perception of increasing tendencies to remain in Turkey permanently, and certain negative experiences regarding public services and employment. The local society seems to deliberately emphasize how "different" they are from the newcomers in an attempt to put a distance between the refugees and themselves.

Importance of the Numerical Size: In addition to the quality/status of the newcomers (i.e. whether they are immigrants, asylum-seekers or refugees), the numerical size of the group is also an important determinant in terms of the social cohesion process. While a reasonable number in comparison to the population size, economic situation, and administrative capacity of the country might make the process more easily manageable; when the number increases, with the growing anxieties of the host society, the process becomes inevitably more complicated. Failure of creating social cohesion and inability to manage the process, in turn, would lead the asylum-seekers to turn within themselves and become ghettoized, which in its turn would further exacerbate the anxieties of the host society. This vicious cycle could bring a number of serious problems including deterioration of public services, increasing trends in crime rates, job losses, and anxieties over identity. In addition, the newcomers increasingly experience the comfort and security of their growing numbers, expanding their living space while becoming more self-reliant as a community. Even though this process, sometimes referred to as "ghettoization" or "forming parallel societies" in the literature, appears to increase the security of the newcomers, it also leads to isolation and social segregation. This segregation might mean in some cases that the minority group might construct their cultural identities in opposition to the host society identities, seeing the latter as their "other".[62] Therefore, it can be suggested that the numerical size is a more effective factor than cultural closeness in the context of social cohesion processes in the medium and long terms.

Placement Policies and Local Governments: Many developed countries implement a planned policy of placement of asylum-seekers in the country. In Germany, for instance, there is a placement system called "Königsteiner Schlüssel" which is established on the basis of the federal state system to oversee a balanced geographical distribution of refugees in the country. In this way, the distribution of burden is largely balanced among states, cities, and districts. This, in turn, is an important advantage in migration management for the country. However, in cases of mass inflows and particularly for the neighboring countries, it becomes very difficult to centrally plan and implement a placement strategy concerning the refugees. When they first started to arrive since 29 April 2011, a majority of the Syrians were first admitted to the camps (temporary residence centers) in the cities neighboring Syrian border. At their peak, there were 26 camps with a capacity to host 270 thousand

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61. Both Arabic words, Ensar refers to the Muslims who helped Prophet Mohammed during his migration from Mecca to Medina; while Muhacir literally means Muslim migrant.

62. A.N.Yurdusev (1997). Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği (Emergence of the European Identity and the Turkish Identity), A.Eralp (Ed.), Türkiye ve Avrupa: Batılılaşma, Kalkınma, Demokrasi (Turkey and Europe: Westernization, Development, Democracy). Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 17-85.

refugees. However, as the number of Syrians kept growing, the Turkish state "tacitly permitted" the Syrians to move and settle wherever they wished. The fact that Syrians are scattered all across Turkey in a very unbalanced way became apparent with regular registrations. There emerged very significant discrepancies in the number of Syrian residents, not only among regions, but also among cities, districts, and even neighborhoods. Syrians have chosen where to reside on the bases of whether or not they have family members of friends living there, the working opportunities, and the living conditions. While the Syrians constitute 4,5% of the national population in Turkey, their respective proportions to the populations of different cities in which they live are extremely unbalanced. For instance, the Syrian residents living in the city of Kilis corresponds to over 80% of this city's population, this figure is 3,6% in Istanbul and 0,11% in Ordu. There are noteworthy differences in the number of Syrian residents living in different districts of the big cities. In Sanliurfa, for instance, while one of the 13 districts has 2 thousand Syrian residents, in another one the number of Syrian residents exceeds 80 thousand. Similarly, in Istanbul, while one of the 39 municipalities is home to less than 100 Syrian residents, there are over 70 thousand Syrians living in another one. It is crystal clear that this extreme imbalance makes it more difficult to manage the process. However, it can be suggested that the experience of "spontaneous placement" of Syrians in Turkey is highly noteworthy and it proved to be an effective factor that has led Syrians to feel secure and establish self-sufficient lives in Turkey. As suggested, the meaning and implications of rising number of asylum-seekers is different for the host society and for the asylum-seekers themselves. One of the important issues that need to be emphasized here concerns the risks that this model of unregulated settlement of refugees poses for local governments. In fact, in the absence of additional resources to be used for the refugees, the local governments that receive large numbers of refugees end up using the scarce, and at times already insufficient, resources to respond to the local challenges created by this inflow. Such cases will inevitably mean increasing tensions in the local contexts. In addition, in the absence of additional resources to be transmitted, there is an additional risk for the successful municipalities which can manage to process well and provide good services to turn into centers of attraction for even more refugees and additional burden.

a. Harmonization Strategy Document and the National Action Plan of Turkey (DGMM)[63]

Turkey's institutional approach to social cohesion in the context of migration places DGMM to its center. This is plainly mentioned by Article 96 of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection:

> *LFIP- Article 96 – (1) "The Directorate General may, to the extent that Turkey's economic and financial capacity deems possible, plan for harmonization activities in order to facilitate mutual harmonization between foreigners, applicants and international protection beneficiaries and the society as well as to equip them with the knowledge and skills to be independently active in all areas of social life without the assistance of third persons in Turkey or in the country to which they are resettled or in their own country. For these purposes, the Directorate General may seek the suggestions and contributions of public institutions and agencies, local governments, non-governmental organisations, universities and international organisations.."*

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63. In the English language of this document, DGMM uses "harmonization" ("Harmonization" Strategy and Action Plan") instead of "integration" or "social cohesion". For this reason, "harmonization" as "uyum" is generally used in this subsection.

The "Harmonization Strategy Document and the National Action Plan, 2018-2023"[64] , which outlines the perspective and strategy of the Turkish state, was prepared and published by the DGMM based on the above-mentioned article of the law. According to this document, "the mission" is "to regulate all aspects related to immigrants in a holistic approach based on a human rights perspective within the framework of Turkey's historical background and the national & international legislations in a way to establish harmonization and to manage inter-institutional coordination", while "the vision" is "to maintain harmonization through migration management that is human-oriented, transparent, and rights-based". It further states that the work is done "in a collaborative manner under the coordination of DGMM taking the views of relevant public bodies, municipalities, international organizations, civil society organizations, and foreigners living in Turkey in order to lay the foundations of an effective harmonization policy". Moreover, the document states that "through establishing effective coordination among institutions that provide services to foreigners, the quality of those services will be enhanced".

The document also touches upon the security aspect of the issue by stating that "harmonization of people living in the country will diminish their risk of marginalization, thereby providing an indirect support to public order and security".

"Harmonization Strategy Document and the National Action Plan, 2018-2023" can be considered as the most important official document regarding social cohesion. It defines social cohesion in the following way:

> "… harmonization is defined as the ability to develop a shared sense of belonging through facilitating the cultural, social, and economic inclusion of immigrants into the society in which they live; mutual recognition of differences in the framework of intercultural interactions, deliberations, and social dialogue; upholding respect and ensuring coexistence. Harmonization generally aims at the social acceptance of immigrants and a culture of coexistence. … [R]ecognition of linguistic, religious, and cultural differences of immigrants for them to participate in the social life without facing discrimination, and a healthy recognition of their identities and in short, social acceptance of diversity is important for social cohesion. In addition, … perception of immigrants as useful individuals by the society is very important for harmonization."

The Harmonization Strategy Document and the National Action Plan defines the general philosophy behind harmonization ("uyum") practices as follows:

> "The importance of harmonization policies as an integral part of effective migration management is further accentuated by the fact that there are millions of foreigners in different legal statuses, with different nationalities, having different cultures and faiths living in our country together with the Turkish society. To lay the foundations of an effective harmonization policy, a "Harmonization Strategy Document and the National Action Plan" has been prepared under the coordination of DGMM in a collaborative manner taking the views of relevant public bodies, municipalities, international organizations, civil society organiza-

64. DGMM (23.07.2020) Harmonization Strategy Document and the National Action Plan ı: 2018-2023 https://www.goc.gov.tr/kurumlar/goc.gov.tr/Yayinlar/UYUM-STRATEJI/Uyum-Strateji-Belgesi-ve-Ulusal-Eylem-Plani.pdf (Access: 02.03.2021)

tions, and foreigners living in Turkey. Coordination will be established among institutions that provide services to foreigners, thereby enhancing the quality of such services through these documents. Providing services that are needed will support the mutual harmonization of foreigners in our country and the society. With the harmonization of these individuals to our country, their risk of marginalization will decrease and this will indirectly support public orders and security".

Accordingly, the basic objective of social cohesion is to enable foreigners to get actively involved in all aspects of the social life, without the help of any third persons. The Harmonization Strategy Document and the National Action Plan states that "harmonization generally aims at the social acceptance of immigrants and a culture of coexistence", while identifying six thematic dimensions of the process: social cohesion, informing the migrants, education, health, labor market, and social support (social services and assistance).

It is extremely valuable not only that DGMM has prepared a Harmonization Strategy and Action Plan document, but also it has done so through widespread consultations with experts, academics, local governments, and NGOs. As it is known, one significant dimension of social cohesion processes regards the actions of the state and public institutions. However, the real determinant is the space that the society will open regarding social cohesion. In this context, it is vital that the state handles this issue with a medium to long-term perspective, drawing attention to various problems related to coordination. The fact that DGMM defines harmonization underlining such concepts as "social acceptance", "inclusion", and "belonging" while emphasizing the importance of "recognition of differences" and "culture of coexistence" provides evidence of the existence of a pluralistic and modern vision for harmonization.

Even though the general expectation and desire in Turkey regarding Syrians is for them to return to their homes, efforts for social cohesion have moved upwards in the agenda as their tendency to remain in Turkey has been getting stronger. In fact, a large number of projects targeting foreigners living in Turkey, particularly including Syrians, conducted by DGMM, MoNE, and the Ministry of Family and Social Services[65] are designed and implemented in the framework of social cohesion policies. While some of the policies are built upon an expectation of "temporariness" due to the dynamism of and uncertainties within the process, a "de-facto social cohesion policy" can be observed in many fields. A part of the work conducted in this context is defined on the basis of access to basic rights and freedoms instead of social cohesion, such as access to education of school-aged children.

Another important document in Turkey regarding these issues is the Eleventh Development Plan covering 2019-2023. This document frequently refers to "social cohesion of foreigners"[66] and a signs that as a duty to public institutions.[67]

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65. The Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services was separated into two separate ministries as the Ministry of Family and Social Services and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security on April 21, 2021.

66. The English version of the Plan uses different words for "social cohesion" as "integration" and "social adaptation", But remarkably, "harmonisation" is not used.

67. Republic of Turkey, Eleventh Development Plan (2019-2023): Art.96. "external migration increases and concentrates in certain provinces due to instabilities in the neighboring countries, effective policies are needed to address the population distribution and the integration of migrant population with urban life."

b. Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) Social Cohesion[68]

Another important document regarding social cohesion in Turkey is the "3RP Turkey Country Chapter 2021-2022". A general evaluation of the current situation, together with a brief assessment of the effects of the pandemic in the past year is presented in this document as follows:

> *"The comprehensive legal framework in Turkey concerning Syrians under temporary protection includes social cohesion components and efforts aimed at harmonization. The inclusive policy framework of the Government of Turkey and the generally welcoming attitude of host communities has proven crucial not only to reduce the marginalization of Syrians under temporary protection, international protection applicants and status holders, but also to foster positive relations with the host community. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has negatively affected many sectors of the society, and therefore investment in fostering social cohesion needs to be scaled up in 2021/22 to address the risk of growing social tensions. The loss of livelihoods and growing competition over jobs, misinformation and language barriers are among the primary factors affecting social cohesion in Turkey, requiring sustained and coordinated support."[69]*

The 3RP document emphasizes in its section on social cohesion that Republic of Turkey has adopted a Social Cohesion Strategy Document and the National Action Plan in 2018. It also mentions that social cohesion activities are encouraged to take place, both at the provincial and the national levels, between the host society and Syrians as well as international protection applicants and status holders under the coordination of DGMM. An inter-sectors framework has been developed in the context of 3RP regarding social cohesion, which was updated to be in harmony with the Social Cohesion Strategy Document and the National Action Plan. In the 2021/2022 period, 3RP partners will increase the awareness raising efforts, address the challenges related to misinformation that leads to social tensions, and support locally-managed interventions including the host society and opinion leaders.

The 3RP document further states that "the introduction of harmonization into Turkey's legal framework has allowed for the mainstreaming of social cohesion components into national service provision (such as health and education) by different public actors and processes. This helps increase the social and economic inclusion of persons under temporary and international protection to contribute to their self- reliance."

3RP document also suggests that "promoting self-reliance and resilience of Syrians under temporary protection, international protection applicants and status holders is a key element of social cohesion, made more important and challenging by the pandemic." Promising continued support

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Art. 546. "Social adaptation of migrants will be ensured; the capacity of migration manage- ment will be strengthened."; Art. 661.2. "The institutional structure of migration management will be strengthened to enhance the integration of foreigners in our country to social and economic life." See the whole document in English: https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Eleventh_Development_Plan_2019-2023.pdf

68. 3RP Turkey Country Chapter 2021-2022 https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/regional-refugee-and-resilience-plan-3rp-turkey-country-chapter-2021-2022-entr) (Access: 12.04.2021)

69. 3RP Turkey Country Chapter 2021-2022 https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/regional-refugee-and-resilience-plan-3rp-turkey-country-chapter-2021-2022-entr) (Access: 12.04.2021)

of the 3RP partners to livelihoods activities in all economic sectors, promoting access to formal education, vocational training and life-skills development as well as addressing barriers to the formal labor market; the document makes particular reference to local governments. It states that "Municipalities play a vital role in the implementation of social cohesion programs as they are at the center of community interactions and perceptions. Local service providers and facilities need further support (e.g. digitalization tools) to respond to the pressures of increased population numbers and counter negative perceptions among host community members. 3RP partners will continue supporting local institutions and civil society actors in taking up a leadership role in mediating and enabling dialogue between communities."

c. Social Acceptance and Social Cohesion in the Case of Syrians in Turkey

It is possible to suggest that the almost nine-year period with more than 3,6 million Syrians in Turkey was passed with "minimum conflict" and even that it was "quite successful". The public institutions in Turkey have paid extraordinary efforts to deal with this humanitarian crisis, the scope of which has gone beyond all the expectations in the beginning, in cooperation with many international organizations, especially including the UN institutions. It can be suggested that these institutions have done a very admirable and successful job given the unprecedented scale of the crisis and the many institutional disadvantages including the fact that main authority managing the process, the Directorate General of Migration Management, was established in 2014. The main point of criticism has been the lack of a more long-term strategic perspective and instead implementation of usually more short-term projects mostly in a "problem-solving" mentality, which is partly understandable given the dynamic nature of the whole process. The expectation in Turkey has been that the crisis in Syria would come to an end and the Syrians would return to their homes. This expectation has been the reason why the management of the process was built on a "short term" approach of "problem-solving". Despite this expectation of eventual "return", it can also be observed that an unnamed social cohesion policy has been implemented in the field with various institutional actors responding to the realities in the field.

Even though the concerns, anxieties, and complaints are becoming increasingly visible over the last few years, the levels of social solidarity and social acceptance have been extraordinarily high in Turkey. The total number of foreigners who applied for international protection and who are under such protection in Turkey was 58 thousand in 2011. With the arrival of Syrians, this figure has risen to over 4 million, accounting for more than 5% of the national population. This has inevitably led the issue of social cohesion to rise in the political agenda. Even though there was a "social shock" with almost all of the Syrians living and working side by side with the Turkish society, there hasn't been a serious tension or conflict in the country as of 2019. Undoubtedly, it can be suggested that the Turkish society needs to be given credit for this solidarity and success, which was initially based on religious/cultural closeness and the expectation of "temporariness". Even though there has been a considerable erosion in the level of social acceptance and an increase in society's concerns and the social distance between the Turkish society and the Syrians, there is still a high level of social acceptance. The facts that the issue of refugees still hasn't been politicized to an extent to dominate the Turkish politics and that the society still doesn't take their frustration on the subject out on the refugees themselves can be offered as evidences for this argument. While the details

will be presented and discussed in the following sections, two issues need to emphasized that are essential for creating the conditions for conflict-free life for Syrians and the rest of the society in Turkey. Two of the most significant fears in the face of such mass migrations are "loss of jobs and livelihoods due to the arrival of cheap labor" and "increase in criminality and insecurity". Generally speaking, neither has been experienced in Turkey. Syrians have both been able to stand on their feet and not created any major disturbances in the daily life- possibly with some expectations in border city contexts where the Syrians are mostly concentrated. To what extent and how long will these be sustainable remains to be seen. In any case, however, with all the potential and actual challenges, the past 9 years can be seen as a success, with the principle credit belonging to the solidarity and social acceptance displayed by the Turkish society.

Without a doubt, in the initial periods of the crisis and even until 2013, it wasn't expected either that the numbers would rise to their current levels or that the crisis in Syria would last this long. However, expectations were proven wrong. This has created unexpected conditions for Syria, Turkey, and the Syrians in Turkey. Turkey has adopted an "emergency", and even a "disaster management", approach and the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD)[70] assumed a central role in the process, including the establishment of the camps and provision of emergency services. Syrians who arrived between 2011 and 2013 were settled into these camps that were quickly formed or built. When the capacities of these camps became insufficient, Syrians started to settle by their own means outside of the camps, including cities that are not in the border region. This was the beginning of a county-wide spread of Syrians in a rather short while. Still, however, it can be suggested that until 2014 the factors that dominated Turkey's management of the process were "the direct link between the future of the administration in Syria and Syrians' return to their country", "emergency management", and "temporariness".

It is known that social cohesion policies are complicated, dynamic, and multi-faceted. In addition, there is a perceived risk that social cohesion policies might encourage permanent settlement, which in the Turkish case made them undesirable. In this context, it has been very difficult to make a definitive decision and develop a clear agenda for social cohesion. In contrast, very contradictory policies and discourses could dominate the agenda sometimes simultaneously (e.g. "encouraging voluntary return and taking necessary steps for return within Syria" and "developing social cohesion policies").

It needs to be stated that the main role and responsibility regarding Syrians in Turkey have been assumed by the Turkish society. Faced with a "social shock" created by an unprecedented mass inflow of millions of refugees in a very short period, Turkish society has displayed an unparalleled level of solidarity and sacrifice, which prevented many potential problems and kept the negative effects to a minimum. Despite growing concerns and complaints in the last years, the social acceptance and solidarity displayed by Turkish society has been remarkable. This is very valuable both for Turkish society and Syrians.

It can be said that cultural closeness played a positive role in increasing social acceptance in the in-

70. Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) was established by the Law numbered 5902 in 2009 under the Prime Ministry. With the institutional regulations in the framework of moving to a Presidential system, AFAD was placed under the Ministry of Interior by Presidential Decree numbered 4.

itial phases. It is, however, impossible to explain the high and sustained levels of social acceptance in Turkey with cultural closeness alone. Three important dynamics to account for this fact could be identified. The first one is the fact that Turkey has had a long and intense history of internal migration, which has led to a very mobile social dynamic. This extremely dynamic social structure is one of the factors that reduce the reactions and anxieties concerning the newcomers. The second important factor relates to a structural economic problem in Turkey: the existence of a large informal economy. Accounting for more than 36% of the national economy, the informal economy in Turkey has led Syrians create employment opportunities for themselves and earn a livelihood without causing loss of employment for the host society. While this can be seen as a positive development considering the scale of mass immigration, it needs to be stated that this is not sustainable in the long run. The SB research findings reveal that 37,9% of Syrians in Turkey are actively working. Even though this figure cannot be officially verified and therefore needs to be considered with caution, it does give us an important idea concerning the economic activity of Syrians. These findings show that Syrians have found themselves a space among more than 10 million Turkish citizens who are working in the informal economy

As another important factor in the overall process, it is necessary to mention "the performance of Syrians": they certainly need to be given credit for the relative lack of social problems in Turkey as they live without causing conflict. "Quickly increasing crime rates", a common fear among societies that receive mass immigration in a short time span, has not generally realized in Turkey. Syrians have both achieved to stand on their own feet and refrained from actions that could disturb the social peace. How sustainable all these will be is to be seen, however, it can be said that the past 10 years have been relatively successful due mostly to Turkish society's solidarity and social acceptance.

How the future will unfold concerning Syrians in Turkey will probably be determined more by the Turkish society than by the state policies. Therefore, it is necessary to highlight some social vulnerabilities prevalent in Turkey. There appears to be two major problem areas for Turkey which has received over 4 million refugees in a short period of time. The first of these is the fact that the issue at hand concerns refugees, not voluntary immigrants, and that both the Turkish society and the state were caught unprepared. The other one is the existing fragility and the recent state of "rage" within the Turkish society which runs the risk of getting worse with the newcomers. In 2018, a study in Turkey has developed a social cohesion index based on the social cohesion model of Eurofound and Bertelsmen Stiftung. Entitled "Social Cohesion in Turkey", the main components of social cohesion were argued to be connectedness, social relations and an understanding of common benefits. According to the findings of this study, while the sense of connectedness and social relations are strong in Turkey, the same cannot be said concerning trust and perception of justice. Finding a very positive approach to acceptance of differences, the research has suggested that the level of an understanding of common benefits, in contrast, was medium-to-low. A quote by F. Keyman in this study reveals that the issue concerns the Turkish society as a whole, and not merely related to newcomers or non-citizens: "Turkey appears to be a weak 'country of values' in creation of common values, participation in civil society, and trusting strangers. In this context, we can say that we are not living in a 'Turkey of values' but in a 'Turkey of identities'".[71] From this perspective, one can

71. A.Ataseven, C.Bakış, (2018) "Türkiye'de Sosyal Uyum" (Social Cohesion in Turkey), İstanbul Politikalar Merkezi, Istanbul.

speculate about the risk of developing new vulnerabilities in Turkey's social structure regarding the refugees in general and Syrians in particular.[72] A similar approach is evident in the article written by G. Sak in 2016 in which he discusses the fact that Turkey was placed 120th in a list of 155 countries compiled by OECD ranking social cohesion. Sak argues that this ranking reflected that there is a high potential for internal conflict in the society as well as that the social capital is very weak, meaning that significant problems could be experienced in the future.[73] Therefore, it is necessary to underline the risks posed by living with a new group of people who will likely be demographically significant in Turkey's future. It can be suggested that such risks are growing and a new social vulnerability is emerging to take its place among Turkey's existing ones. Furthermore, this new vulnerability has an additional quality that it is open to external manipulation. While it may not be possible to get rid of this completely, there are many steps that could be taken to reduce the potential negative impacts. There are significant responsibilities and duties for the state, the society, and the Syrians to create a harmonious common life in dignity.

Migration and social cohesion policies refer to a political vision. The objective may be, direct or indirect, assimilation of the newcomers or, sometimes, the existing society may be designed using the newcomers. However, it needs to be reiterated that this study does not use the concept of social cohesion in an ideological or hierarchical way. Instead, it employs an understanding of a pluralist society which can foster a common sense of belonging. Social cohesion inevitably has a subjective aspect. Therefore, while the newcomers usually believe that they have successfully adapted or integrated to the life in the new context, the host society usually holds a contradictory belief that the refugees have failed to integrate. The complex, multi-actor, and dynamic nature of the subject makes it even more difficult to develop a framework. Obviously, it is not possible to talk about a flawless social cohesion model or a flawless social cohesion policy. The essential issue is to get closer to a harmonious and peaceful life for societies having ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity. Therefore, it can be suggested that what this study attempts to develop is not a model, but a framework.

72. A.Ayşen & Ç.Bakış, ibid. pp.5.

73. G.Sak (2016) "Türkiye sosyal uyum endeksinde 155 ülke arasında 120'nci", TEPAV web page: https://www.tepav.org.tr/tr/blog/s/5513 (Access: 29.12.2019)

SYRIANS UNDER
TEMPORARY
PROTECTION IN
TURKEY

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I.   SYRIANS UNDER TEMPORARY PROTECTION IN TURKEY

1.   Numerical Data Concerning Syrians in Turkey

a.   General View

As stated, the first migrations from Syria to Turkey took place on 29 April 2011 when the first group of 252 Syrians arrived in Turkey. Syrians continued to arrive ever since albeit in gradually smaller numbers over the last few years. The number of Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey was 1 million 519 thousand in 2014, 2.5 million in 2015, 2.8 million in 2016, 3.4 million in 2017, 3.6 million in 2018, 3.576.370 in 2019, and 3.641.370 as of 31 December 2020.

SB-2020-FIGURE 6: **Number of Syrians Under Temporary Protection in Turkey, 2011-2020**

YEAR	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	
TOTAL NUMBER OF SYRIANS	14.237	224.655	1.519.286	2.503.549	2.824.441	3.426.786	3.623.192	3.576.370	3.641.370
NET NUMBER OF SYRIANS EACH YEAR	14.237	210.418	1.294.631	984.263	330.892	592.345	196.406	-46.822	65.000
POPULATION OF TURKEY (IN MILLIONS)	73.7	74.7	75.6	76.6	77.7	78.7	80.8	82.0	83.1
SYRIANS AS % OF TURKEY'S POPULATION	0,01	0,3	2,00	3,26	3,63	4,35	4,48	4,36	4.38

Source: DGMM: https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638 (Access: 20.04.2021)

While more than 95% of Syrians in Turkey are under Temporary Protection, there are 89 thousand Syrians who are residing in Turkey with a residence permit as of 31 December 2020. Moreover, some Syrians have been given Turkish citizenship, in an increasing pace in the past two years. This

number is 110 thousand as of December 2019.[74] In a news story attributed to a member of parliament in May 2021, the number of naturalized Syrians was stated to be 150 thousand.[75] However, more recently, there have been news, particularly in social media and mentioned by Syrians, that naturalization of Syrians has been stopped. As it is known, Syrians can obtain Turkish citizenship either through marriage, continued residence in Turkey for at least 5 years, or making a certain level of investment in Turkey. Another alternative path is "exceptional citizenship". The Temporary Protection Regulation, which determined the status of Syrians in Turkey, clearly states that living in Turkey under this status will not give individuals to apply for Turkish citizenship.[76] In this context, Syrians living in Turkey obtain citizenship through the "exceptional citizenship" path. However, information regarding the processes and the numbers is limited.

SB-2020-FIGURE 7: Syrians in Turkey and Their Statuses[77] (31 December 2020)[78]

RESIDENT PERMIT %2,34 89.754

CITIZEN (DOUBLE) %2,86 110.000

TEMPORARY PROTECTION 94,79 % 3.641.370

Source: DGMM- (https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638)   https://www.goc.gov.tr/ikamet-izinleri , (Access: 15.01.2021)

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74. Minister of Internal Affairs S.Soylu declared this number to be 100 thousand at a TV program on CNN-Turk. HABERTÜRK TV-20.08.2019: https://www.haberturk.com/son-dakika-bakan-soylu-dan-onemli-aciklamalar-2514831 (Access: 22.08.2019).

75. Milliyet (09.05.2021) '150 thousands Syrians were given citizenship' (https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/150-bin-suriyeliye-vatan-daslik-verildi-6501330) (Access: 02.06.2021)

76. Temporary Protection Regulation: ARTICLE 25 (1) "Temporary protection identification document shall grant the right to stay in Turkey. However, this document shall not be deemed to be equivalent to a residence permit or documents, which substitute residence permits, as regulated by the Law, shall not grant the right for transition to long term residence permit, its duration shall not be taken into consideration when calculating the total term of residence permit durations and shall not entitle its holder to apply for Turkish citizenship."

77. "Naturalized Syrians" were included in this table among "Syrians in Turkey" to be able to make evaluations regarding social cohesion. In addition, it is known that, with only few exceptions, Syrians who obtained Turkish citizenship retains their Syrian citizenship.

78. As of December 2021, the status and numbers of Syrians in Turkey are as follows: Temporary Protection: 3,739,240, Residence Permit: 103,655, Citizenship: 180,000 (Source: DGMM: https://en.goc.gov.tr/temporary-protection27 (Acsess: 19.12.2021) (The number of citizenship is taken from the press release.)

An important characteristic of Syrians in Turkey is the fact that they became "urban refugees", particularly since 2013. As of 31 December 2020, only 1.59% (58.935) of Syrians in Turkey live in 7 camps located in Hatay, Kilis, Adana, Kahramanmaras, and Osmaniye. The number of Syrians living in the camps continues to decrease. In other words, Syrians live in cities all around Turkey as urban refugees.

b. The Process of Registration, Updating and Reliability of Numbers

There has been a constant trend of increase in the number of Syrians in Turkey since 29 April 2011, except for a decrease[79] stemming from the updating process in 2019. In the process of registration, DGMM worked in close cooperation with the UNHCR. In the registrations conducted on POLNET in which DGMM was not involved, there were certain hesitations stemming both from organizational issues and the massive scale of the inflows. DGMM attempted to overcome such hesitations, clarify the records, and increase the accuracy and reliability of the data by a software they developed called "GÖÇNET". With this new system in place, not only did new individuals start to be registered in a healthier manner, an updating effort started on 1 January 2017 concerning the up to 2.7 million registrations conducted between 2011 and 2016 by different institutions and in various ways. The biggest project of updating the registrations, which was conducted under the cooperation of DGMM-UNHCR and took 2 years to complete, played a decisive role in clarifying the data related to Syrians in Turkey. Through this: (i) registration conducted in provinces were centralized in a database over POLNET, (ii) finger prints were taken as part of registrations, (iii) an identification number is generated for each registration, (iv) those registered were issued "secure ID cards", and (v) a wide range of demographic and socio-economic data was collected from Syrians through a form that contained around 90 information sections, with a number of "mandatory fields". All this information was structured in such a way to allow for efficient tracking and regular updates. Provincial Migration Management Directorates are able to track changes related to the births, marriages, divorces, education lives, and access to health services of Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey. It also produced more reliable data concerning the number of Syrians in Turkey, eliminated duplications, and allowed for keeping the data up-to-date through this very dynamic process.

This process involved updating the previously collected data from 2 million 834 thousand registered Syrians as of 1 January 2017 as well as the first-time registrations of those Syrians who had remained unregistered up to that date, who had newly arrived as well as of babies born to Syrian parents in Turkey. During various encounters with them, authorities from DGMM suggested that the new registration numbers were 517 thousand (415 thousand new registrations and 102 thousand newborn babies) in 2017, 397 thousand (284 thousand new registrations and 113 thousand newborn babies) in 2018, 300 thousand (193 thousand new registrations and 107 thousand newborn babies) in 2019. In total, there were over 1 million 214 thousand newly registered and newborn (892 thousand new registrations and 322 thousand newborn babies) Syrians were taken under registration as people under temporary protection in the years 2017, 2018, and 2019.

Another comprehensive field study concerning Syrians under temporary protection, international

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79. The first and only exception has been the year of 2019, which has displayed the first decrease of around 120 thousand in the number of Syrians under temporary protection in an update released on 27 December 2019. The update work conducted in the last week of 2019 took place in relation to those Syrian individuals that have the status of temporary protection whose registration was not updated in the previous 1 year and therefore whose registration was turned into "passive". When these individuals update their personal data by going to the Provincial Migration Management Directorates, their registrations of temporary protection are re-activated and presented in the official statistics. In this way, the probability of those individuals whose registration was turned into passive to leave Turkey was controlled and reliability of data is ensured.

protection applicants, and irregular migrants in Turkey was conducted under the cooperation of DGMM and IOM in 2018 and 2019, entitled "Migrant Presence Monitoring" (MPM).[80] The study was conducted in 25 cities, including Istanbul. Even though this research excluded some important cities hosting around 1.1 million Syrians such as Hatay, Kilis, Adana, Mardin, Osmaniye, Kayseri, and Ankara; while the findings showed that Syrians in Turkey are very mobile, they also largely confirmed the DGMM figures concerning where Syrians live. While according to DGMM data there were 2 million 230 thousand registered Syrians in the cities covered by MPM research, the study found that the total number of Syrians living in these cities were 2 million 245 thousand. However, the figures suggested by DGMM were not matched to those found by MPM in some cities, especially including Istanbul, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Izmir, and Bursa. While there are 496 thousand Syrians registered in Istanbul according to DGMM figures, the MPM study has found that 961 thousand Syrians were living in this city. This study also confirmed that a significant number of Syrians, while being registered in border region cities like Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, Hatay, and Kilis, live in big metropolitan cities especially including Istanbul. In this context, the study revealed, for instance, that 236 thousand Syrians lived in Şanlıurfa where 477 thousand are registered and 323 thousand Syrians lived in Gaziantep as opposed to the 406 thousand registered in the city.

Therefore, the GÖÇNET registration system of DGMM which is constantly updated, the registration updating project conducted by DGMM and UNHCR, and the findings of the MPM field study conducted by DGMM and IOM show that, while there is a high degree of mobility of Syrians among cities, the figures provided by DGMM concerning the number of Syrians in Turkey are largely accurate.

c. **Distribution of Syrians in Turkey by Cities**

The distribution of Syrians in Turkey by cities is known through their registration data. However, the number of registered Syrians in a city and the number of Syrians who actually live in that city might differ. As a result, while more Syrians live in the big cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, and Adana than the number of registered refugees in these cities; it is the other way around in border cities such as Hatay, Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, and Kilis where a fewer number of Syrians live compared to the number of registered Syrians. According to the registration-based data as of 31 December 2020, the largest number of (518,519) Syrians live in Istanbul. The registered Syrian residents of Istanbul account for 3.34% of city's population. In terms of absolute numbers, Istanbul is followed by Gaziantep where 449 thousand Syrians live (21,73% of its population), Hatay with 433 thousand Syrian residents (26,62% of its population), and Şanlıurfa with 421 thousand registered Syrians (20,33% of its population). In terms of the percentage of population, Kilis is the city with the largest Syrian community. With a local population of 142 thousand, Kilis is home to 105 thousand Syrians. In other words, the number of Syrians in Kilis corresponds to 74,04% of this city's population. The number of Turkish cities with more than 100 thousand registered Syrians is 10. Considering the fact that many of these cities already had various structural problems, arrival of large numbers of Syrians has led to an increase in poverty as well as some problems regarding access to public services.

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80. IOM-Turkey: https://turkey.iom.int/migrant-presence-monitoring (Access: 21.02.2020).

SB-2020-FIGURE 8: Top 10 Cities in Turkey with Syrian Residents (31.12.2020)

DGMM: https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638 (Access: 05.01.2020)

The distribution of Syrians in Turkey by cities of residence displays significant discrepancies among different cities. Compared to their populations, there are 12 cities that have a higher percentage of Syrian residents than the Turkey's overall average, which is 4.38%. These 12 cities, ranked by percentage of Syrian residents to city's population, are Kilis (%74.04), Hatay (%26.62), Gaziantep (%21.73), Şanlıurfa (%20.33), Mersin (%12.09), Adana (%11.27), Mardin (%10.61), Osmaniye (%8.85), Kahramanmaraş (%8.05), Bursa (%5.84), Kayseri (%5.60), and Konya (%5.28).

SB-2020-FIGURE 9: **Distribution of Syrian Refugees in the Scope of Temporary Protection by Province**

DISTRIBUTION OF OF SYRIANS UNDER TEMPORARY PROTECTION BY YEAR								
NO	PROVINCE	REGISTERED	POPULATION	COMPARISION PERCENTAGE WITH PROVINCE POPULATION	NO	PROVINE	REGISTERED	PROVINCE	COMPARISION PERCENTAGE WITH PROVINCE POPULATION
	TOTAL	3.747.734	84.680.273	4,43%		TOTAL	3.747.734	84.680.273	4,43%
1	ADANA	256.196	2.263.373	11,32%	42	KAHRAMANMARAŞ	96.014	1.171.258	8,20%
2	ADIYAMAN	23.081	632.148	3,65%	43	KARABÜK	1.617	249.287	0,65%
3	AFYONKARAHİSAR	12.435	744.179	1,67%	44	KARAMAN	932	258.838	0,32%
4	AĞRI	1.289	535.644	0,24%	45	KARS	183	281.077	0,07%
5	AKSARAY	4.042	429.069	0,94%	46	KASTAMONU	2.757	375.582	0,73%
6	AMASYA	1.246	335.331	0,37%	47	KAYSERİ	83.173	1.434.357	5,80%
7	ANKARA	100.812	5.747.325	1,75%	48	KIRIKKALE	1.943	275.968	0,70%
8	ANTALYA	3.079	2.619.832	0,13%	49	KIRKLARELİ	1.055	366.363	0,28%
9	ARDAHAN	114	94.932	0,13%	50	KIRŞEHİR	1.386	243.544	0,82%
10	ARTVİN	87	169.543	0,04%	51	KİLİS	106.863	145.836	73,28%
11	AYDIN	8.432	1.134.031	0,74%	52	KOCAELİ	56.481	2.033.441	2,78%
12	BALIKESİR	5.061	1.250.610	0,40%	53	KONYA	125.341	2.277.017	5,42%
13	BARTIN	371	201.711	0,18%	54	KÜTAHYA	1.975	578.640	0,34%
14	BATMAN	13.997	626.319	2,54%	55	MALATYA	31.006	808.692	3,91%
15	BAYBURT	56	93.042	0,07%	56	MANİSA	14.228	1.450.659	0,98%
16	BİLECİK	658	228.334	0,28%	57	MARDİN	91.503	862.757	10,61%
17	BİNGÖL	1.632	283.112	0,60%	58	MERSİN	241.043	1.891.145	12,75%
18	BİTLİS	1.182	352.277	0,34%	59	MUĞLA	11.613	1.021.141	1,14%
19	BOLU	4.470	320.014	1,40%	60	MUŞ	1.643	405.239	0,40%
20	BURDUR	8.837	273.716	3,23%	61	NEVŞEHİR	13.334	308.001	4,33%
21	BURSA	184.065	3.147.818	5,85%	62	NİĞDE	6.351	363.725	1,91%
22	ÇANAKKALE	5.123	557.276	0,92%	63	ORDU	873	760.872	0,13%
23	ÇANKIRI	815	195.515	0,41%	64	OSMANİYE	42.890	553.012	7,76%
24	ÇORUM	3.413	526.282	0,65%	65	RİZE	1.333	349.662	0,35%
25	DENİZLİ	14.038	1.051.056	1,34%	66	SAKARYA	15.608	1.060.876	1,47%
26	DİYARBAKIR	24.325	1.791.373	1,35%	67	SAMSUN	10.362	1.371.274	0,76%
27	DÜZCE	1.703	400.976	0,42%	68	SİİRT	4.748	331.390	1,43%
28	EDİRNE	1.091	413.215	0,26%	69	SİNOP	331	216.408	0,15%
29	ELAZIĞ	11.385	588.088	2,04%	70	SİVAS	3.557	636.121	0,56%
30	ERZİNCAN	134	237.351	0,07%	71	ŞANLIURFA	424.307	2.143.020	20,01%
31	ERZURUM	1.164	756.893	0,15%	72	ŞIRNAK	14.912	546.589	2,73%
32	ESKİŞEHİR	6.157	898.369	0,68%	73	TEKİRDAĞ	12.553	1.113.400	1,13%
33	GAZİANTEP	461.613	2.130.432	21,67%	74	TOKAT	1.189	602.567	0,20%
34	GİRESUN	379	450.194	0,08%	75	TRABZON	3.643	816.684	0,45%
35	GÜMÜŞHANE	250	150.119	0,14%	76	TUNCELİ	32	83.645	0,06%
36	HAKKARİ	5.102	278.218	1,83%	77	UŞAK	3.209	373.383	0,86%
37	HATAY	431.213	1.670.712	25,93%	78	VAN	3.365	1.341.015	0,19%
38	IĞDIR	80	203.159	0,04%	79	YALOVA	3.324	291.001	1,15%
39	ISPARTA	8.076	445.678	1,81%	80	YOZGAT	5.472	418.508	1,31%
40	İSTANBUL	534.130	15.840.900	3,40%	81	ZONGULDAK	718	589.684	0,12%
41	İZMİR	145.266	4.425.789	3,28%					

by the date of 03.03.2022

DGMM: https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma (Access: 05.01.2021)

SB-2020-FIGURE 10: Syrian Residents as Percentage of City Population–December 2020

(Cities that have either 100 thousand Syrians or more than Turkey's average)

d. **"Urban Refugees"**

One of the most significant characteristics of Syrians in Turkey is that they have turned into "urban refugees", especially since 2013. As of 31 December 2020, only 1.62% (58,935) of the total number of 3 million 641 thousand Syrians in Turkey live in the 7 camps located in the following 5 cities: Hatay (3), Kilis, Adana, Kahramanmaras, and Osmaniye.

SB-2020-FIGURE 11: Number of Syrians in Temporary Accommodation Centers (31 December 2020)

PROVINCE	NAME OF TEMPORARY SHELTER CENTERS	TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL
ADANA (1)	Sarıçam	16.889	16.889
HATAY (3)	Altınözü	2.437	8.272
	Yayladağı	3.317	
	Apaydın	2.518	
KAHRAMANMARAŞ (1)	Merkez	9.648	9.648
KİLİS (1)	Elbeyli	8.192	8.192
OSMANİYE (1)	Cevdetiye	8.195	8.195
TOTAL		51.196	
NUMBER OF SYRIANS UNDER TEMPORARY PROTECTION THAT NOT IN THE SCOPE OF SHELTER CENTERS			3.696.538

* by the date of 03.03.2022*

DGMM: https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638 (Access: 05.01.2021)

e. Distribution of Syrians in Turkey by Age and Sex

It can be noted that the average age of Syrians in Turkey is almost 10 years younger than that of the Turkish society. According to 2018 data, the average age of Turkish population was 31.7 while the average age of Syrians under temporary protection was 22.54. By the end of 2020, the average age of Syrians has further decreased to become 20.23. Turkish population, to the contrary, appears to have further aged with an average age of 32.7.

The number of Syrian babies born in Turkey increases day by day since 2011.[81] This increase in the number of births, which can be seen as an indicator of normalization in the lives of Syrians, has particularly accelerated since 2016. According to data provided by the Ministry of Health, there were 116 thousand Syrian births in Turkey between 2011 and 2015; 82.850 in 2016; 111.325 in 2017, 113 thousand in 2018; 107 thousand in 2019[82] , and 101 thousand in 2020.[83] Therefore, according to official data, the number of Syrian babies born in Turkey was more than 625 thousand by the end of 2020.

As stated, the number of Syrians in the 0-4 age group most of whom were born in Turkey was 519 thousand as of 31 December 2020. According to the Turkey Population and Health Research (TN-SA)[84] conducted by Institute of Population Studies at Hacettepe University in 2018, the fertility rate in Turkey is 2.3. The highest regional fertility rate in Turkey is in Eastern Anatolia, which is 3.2. The total fertility rate among Syrians in Turkey is 5.3. It is also observed that 93% of Syrian births in Turkey take place at a health facility.

The number of Syrian children aged 5-17, in other words those who are in the "mandatory schooling age", is around 1 million 197 thousand as of 31 December 2020.

The Syrian population in the active working ages (15-64) is around 2.2 million.

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81. According to the information provided by the Ministry of Health, the number of Syrian babies born in Turkey was 198.948 as of 31 December 2016. BY 30 September 2017, this number has increased to 276.158. Source: Presentation by Migration Health Department of Directorate General of Public Health, Ministry of Health (Hacettepe University- 16 October 2017).

82. President R.T.Erdoğan suggested at the Global Refugee Forum organized in Geneva on 17 December 2019 that around 516 thousand Syrian babies were born in Turkey in the past 8 years. See: (https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/113993/kuresel-multeci-forumu-nda-yaptiklari-konusma.) (Access: 09.01.2019)

83. The number of Syrian babies born in Turkey in 2020 (101. 203) was provided by DGMM.

84. Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies (2019) http://www.hips.hacettepe.edu.tr/nufus_arastirmalari.shtml (Access: 10.04.2021)

SB-2020-FIGURE 12: Distribution by Age and Sex of Syrians Under Temporary Protection in Turkey (03.03.2022)

DISTRIBUTION BY AGE AND GENDER OF REGISTERED SYRIAN REFUGEES RECORDED BY TAKING BIOMETRIC DATA

AGE	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
TOTAL	2.016.767	1.730.967	3.747.734
0-4	256.392	239.289	495.681
5-9	296.207	278.495	574.702
10-14	229.471	215.857	445.328
15-18	141.101	121.816	262.917
19-24	273.654	206.585	480.239
25-29	233.243	166.598	399.841
30-34	167.072	122.842	289.914
35-39	130.231	100.202	230.433
40-44	88.326	74.694	163.020
45-49	61.127	59.524	120.651
50-54	46.155	45.162	91.317
55-59	36.378	36.613	72.991
60-64	23.574	24.550	48.124
65-69	15.455	16.665	32.120
70-74	9.419	10.373	19.792
75-79	4.527	5.511	10.038
80-84	2.461	3.310	5.771
85-89	1.173	1.701	2.874
90+	801	1.180	1.981

* by the date of 03.03.2022*

Source: DGMM- http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/gecici-koruma_363_378_4713_icerik (Access: 03.03.2022)

The sex distribution of Syrian population in Turkey, similar to those observed in Lebanon and Jordan, is quite interesting. 1 million 964 thousand or 54% of the Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey are male while 1 million 677 or 46% are female. The age group in which the sex distribution is the least balanced is 19-29. In this age group, males constitute 57.3% while females make up of 42.7%.

SB-2020-FIGURE 13: Population Pyramid of Syrians in Turkey (31.12.2020)

Source: Figure by Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Ali Eryurt (Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies)

As can be seen in Figure-13, in every age group between 0 and 54 Syrian males are more populous than females. The difference is very large in the 20-34 age group. The largest difference between sexes can be observed in 25-29 age group, where there are 141 Syrian males for every 100 Syrian females.[85]

SB-2020-FIGURE 14: Population Pyramid of Syrians in Turkey (31.12.2020)

Figure : Associate Prof. Mehmet Ali Eryurt (Population Studies Institute, Hacettepe University)

85. Special thanks are in order to Assoc. Prof. Mehmet Ali Eryurt (Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies) for these figures.

2. Syrians in Turkey and Education[86]

There are four main issue areas related to the education of Syrians in Turkey. The first one of these relates to the general educational attainment level of Syrians. The second issue is the access to education of Syrian children and youth, while the third and the fourth concern higher education, and language and vocational education, respectively.

a. General Educational Attainment Level of Syrians in Turkey

The general level of educational attainment is very important concerning social cohesion processes regarding Syrians as well as the future education policies that regard their access to education in Turkey. The existing data on this subject, limited as it is, suggests that the average level of educational attainment is significantly below the Turkish national average. To emphasize, this is extremely relevant for the social cohesion and education policies. One of the most important implications of the level of education in the community is apparent in the support that the families display to their children's education. Similarly, level of education could play an important role in terms of learning Turkish, entrepreneurship, participation in social life, and ability to acquire local values and norms. Moreover, efficiency of vocational training courses designed for adults, which are very important for social cohesion, is also closely related to the educational attainment levels.

The overall illiteracy rate in Turkey, according to 2019 data, is 2.8%; it is 0.8% among men and 4.7% among women.[87] As of 31 December 2020, information regarding the general education level of Syrians in Turkey, who correspond to 4.38% of the national population, is quite scarce. Perhaps the only relevant official data released to this day was within *"First Stage Needs Assessment Covering 2016-2018 Period for Syrians with Temporary Protection Status in Turkey"*[88], which was published by the Ministry of Development in the framework of "Turkey-EU Statement on Refugees"[89] negotiations.

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86. For the information used in this section see: M.M.Erdoğan and M.Çorabatır (2019) "Suriyeli Mülteci Nüfusunun Demografik Gelişimi, Türkiye'deki Eğitim, İstihdam Ve Belediye Hizmetlerine Yakın Gelecekte Olası Etkileri" (Demography of Syrian Refugees and Potential Impacts on Education, Employment and Municipal Services in Turkey), GIZ, Quadra Program.

87. The city in Turkey with the highest rate of illiterate residents is Şanlıurfa with 10%. TÜİK: https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Kategori/GetKategori?p=Egitim,-Kultur,-Spor-ve-Turizm-105 (Access: 01.05.2021) and Anadolu Agency: https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/okuryazar-olma-yanlarin-yuzde-85-2si-kadin/1504120 (Access: 08.09.2019).

88. Ministry of Development: First Stage Needs Assessment Covering 2016-2018 Period for Syrians with Temporary Protection Status in Turkey, March 2016, S.6.

89. "18 March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement" (https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/),/ (https://www.mfa.gov.tr/implementation-of-turkey_eu-agreement-of-18-march-2016.en.mfa)

Source: First Stage Needs Assessment Covering 2016-2018 Period for Syrians with Temporary Protection Status in Turkey, Ministry of Development, March 2016, p.7

According to this March 2016 study that was based on the data provided by DGMM, 33% of Syrians in Turkey were illiterate while 13% were literate but not graduated from any formal school. Another 26,6% in this study were marked as "no response". This shows, unfortunately, a significant lack of education. However, it has been frequently suggested that this information obtained in 2016 might not be very reliable and there might be significant errors in the figures due to some technical difficulties and intensity experienced during the collection of data. Syrians Barometer-2017 has found that 18,5% are illiterate and another 11,8% are literate but not graduated from any school. Similarly, "2016 Research on Health Context of Syrians in Turkey" conducted by AFAD and WHO has found that 14,9% of Syrians have no official education and 14,3% have a lower than primary school level of education.[90] According to a Hacettepe University IPS research in 2018, those with no primary school diploma constitute 35% among men and 40% among women in the Syrian community in Turkey.[91] In the Syrians Barometer-2019 research, on the educational attainment level of the Syrian households, the findings are as follows: 8,2% are illiterate, 16,7% have not finished primary school, 31,7% are primary school graduates, 22% are middle school graduates, 11,4% are graduates of high-schools or equivalent, 2,7% are graduates of junior college or vocational schools, 7% are with an undergraduate degree, and 0,3% are with graduate degrees. In other words, a total of 24,9% of Syrians appears to be illiterate or without a primary school degree in this study. In the framework of SB-2020 study, the share of illiterate Syrians was found to be 9% while 17.5% of Syrians appear to be literate but not graduate of any school. Therefore, 26.5% of Syrians are found to be without a school education as of 2020.

To better understand the general picture, information from pre-war Syria released by the Turkish Ministry of National Education (MoNE) would be helpful. Accordingly, the schooling rate in Syria before 2011 was 92% at the primary school level, 69% at the middle-school level, and 26% at the

90. Assoc. Prof. Mehmet Ali Eryurt -Hacettepe University, Institute of Population Studies: 2016 Research on Health Context of Syrians in Turkey, AFAD-SB-WHO.

91. This study has found that those with no primary school diploma constituted 14% among men and 25% among women. 2018-TNSA, http://www.hips.hacettepe.edu.tr/tnsa2018/rapor/2018_TNSA_SR.pdf (Access: 04.12.2019)

high-school level. In the same period in Turkey the schooling rate at the primary school level was 99%, at the middle-school level 93%, and at the high-school level 70%. In other words, while the average schooling rate in Syria was 62,3%, it was 87,3% in Turkey in the same period.[92] Furthermore, the schooling rate was even lower in North Syria, from where a majority of the Syrians in Turkey came. Therefore, all these indirect data bits confirm one another to show that the general picture concerning the level of education of Syrians in Turkey is not very bright.

SB-2020-TABLE 2: Educational Attainment Levels of Syrians (SB-2019-SB-2020)

Educational Attainment of Individuals in the Household (Aged 6+)				
	SB-2019 (May 2019)		SB-2020 (December 2020)	
	#	%	#	%
Illiterate	436	8,2	513	9,0
Literate but no formal education	891	16,7	995	17,5
Primary school	1690	31,7	2167	38,1
Primary education/middle school	1170	22,0	1082	19,0
High school or equivalent	608	11,4	532	9,4
2-year associate degree	141	2,7	110	2,0
Undergraduate	373	7,0	279	4,9
Master/PhD	15	0,3	6	0,1

The illiteracy rate in Turkey was 2.8% in 2019, which shows a significant disparity compared to the share of those who are illiterate among Syrians.

b. School Age (5-17 Years of Age) Syrian Children in Turkey

Education of Syrian children in Turkey is of vital importance both for preventing lost generations from emerging and for any vision of a future peaceful cohabitation to be realized. According to data from DGMM and MoNE, the number of school age Syrian children, i.e. 5- to 17year-olds, is 1 million 197 thousand in Turkey as of 31 December 2020. This number constitutes 32.87% of all Syrians under temporary protection in the country. Turkey has been displaying a huge effort in the face of this unprecedented and massive number, which had put significant strain on the capacity of national education. The numbers of schooled Syrian children for the past few academic years are as follows: 230 thousand in 2014-2015, 311 thousand in 2015-2016, 492 thousand in 2016-2017, 610 thousand in 2017-2018, 643.058 in 2018-2019, and 686 thousand in 2019-2020. The number reached in the 2020-2021 academic year is 774.257. While 98.5% of these students are enrolled in public schools, 1.5% of them (10.801 students) receive education at the Temporary Education Centers (TECs), where the language of education is Arabic with intense Turkish language courses. According to the most recent available data, 64.68% of the Syrian children in this age group have been schooled. In terms of different levels of education, schooling rates differ significantly: it is 27.26% at kindergarten, 79.86% at primary school, 78.65% at middle-school, and 40.14% at high-

92. Syrians Barometer-2017, pp.44, Syrians Barometer-2019, pp.127.

school levels.[93] One very clear problem related to education of Syrian children in Turkey is dropping out of school, known that, in the face of the COVID-19 which was declared a global pandemic by WHO in March 2020, closure of schools and moving to distant education in Turkey affected the access to education and achievement levels of Syrians quite negatively.

SB-2020-FIGURE 16 : Number of Syrian Students with Access to Education in Turkey by Years

Yıllara Göre Ülkemizde Eğitime Erişimi Sağlanan& Sağlanamayan Geçici Koruma Altındaki Öğrencilerin Sayıları ve Oranları

*Açık okullara kayıtlı 34,027 öğrenci e okul sistemine dahil edilmiştir.
**15- Mart -2021 e okul ve YÖBİS verileri

Source: MoNE Directorate General of Lifelong Learning: https://hbogm.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/2021_03/18104635_Mart_internet_bulteni_.pdf (Access: 01.05.2021)

The Syrian school age children who receive education in Turkey appear quite balanced in terms of their gender distribution. Of the total 684.728 Syrian students, 49,18% are girls and 50,82% are boys.

93. Ministry of National Education, Directorate General of Lifelong Learning: https://hbogm.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/2019_11/06141131_11Ekim2019internetBulteni.pdf (Access: 05.12.2019)

SB-2020-FIGURE 17: Schooling Numbers and Rates of Syrians by School Grade (April 2021)

Eğitim Kademelerine Göre Okullaşma

%27,26
OKUL ÖNCESİ
17,830   16,866
▪ ÖĞRENCİ SAYISI: 34,696
▪ ÇAĞ NÜFUSU: 127,264

% 40,14
LİSE
54,648   57,092
▪ ÖĞRENCİ SAYISI: 111,740
▪ ÇAĞ NÜFUSU: 278,405

%79,86
İLKOKUL
182,349   171,263
▪ ÖĞRENCİ SAYISI: 353,612
▪ ÇAĞ NÜFUSU: 442,817

%78,65
ORTAOKUL
139,998   134,211
▪ ÖĞRENCİ SAYISI: 274,209
▪ ÇAĞ NÜFUSU: 348,638

Source: MoNE Directorate General of Lifelong Learning: https://hbogm.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/2021_03/18104635_Mart_internet_bulteni_.pdf (Access: 01.05.2021)

c.   Regulations of Ministry of National Education Concerning Education of Syrians in Turkey

MoNE has made several regulations concerning the education of Syrians from the beginning. The first major step was the adoption of "MoNE Regulation on Secondary Education Institutions" on 7 September 2013. This Regulation, in its 29th Article, under the title of "Students of Foreign Nationality", has made the first comprehensive regulations related to this field.[94] With the process moving very quickly, the Ministry issued a new Circular in September 2014 entitled "Education Services For Foreign Nationals", which has lifted the requirement of a residence permit for Syrian children's registration to a school. The Regulation on Temporary Protection, published in the Official Gazette on 22 October 2014, regulates education-related issues in its 28th Article. Here, education is defined as a right for those under temporary protection and the MoNE is authorized to coordinate and audit policies. The 35th Article of this Regulation on the "limitations on the enjoyment of rights" is quite noteworthy. This article states that "Those who partially fail to fulfill their obligations or who couldn't fulfill their obligations in the determined time frame would be warned by relative authorities; legal and administrative action would ensue for those who fail to comply". Having said this, however, the Article goes on to single out "emergency health services" and "education": "Those who fail to fulfill their obligations could face complete or partial restrictions in enjoying their rights, except for education and emergency health services."[95] In addition, MoNE has implemented a "High School Proficiency and Equivalency Exam for Foreign Students" in June 2015.[96] As a result, the successful ones of 8.500 attendees were issued a certificate of equivalency or graduation diplo-

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94. MoNE Regulation on Secondary Education Institutions: http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2013/09/20130907-4.htm (Access: 03.07.2019)

95. Temporary Protection Regulation http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/files/03052014_6883.pdf (Access: 03.07.2019)

96. MoNE: http://www.meb.gov.tr/suriyeli-cocuklarin-egitimi-icin-yol-haritasi-belirlendi/haber/11750/tr (Acess:03.07.2019)

mas by MoNE. Those who already graduated from high schools were given the chance to enroll to various universities in Turkey.

There were other significant steps taken for Syrian students in Turkey by MoNE in 2016. The first of these was an agreement concluded with the EU Turkey Delegation which devoted 300 million € from the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT) to be spent for education expenses. An even more important step was taken in August 2016 when he MoNE had finalized a "road map" for the education of Syrian children in Turkey. Here, a remarkable change of approaches is apparent compared to 2011-2015 period. This road map that was adopted by the Ministry also established a new institutional framework with the formation of a "Department of Migration and Emergency Education" under the Directorate General of Lifelong Learning.[97] The new planning has established full inclusion of Syrian children into Turkish education system as the main objective and regulated the rights of refugees in the national education framework as well as the various services to be offered to them. As a natural result of this, gradual elimination of TECs, where education is offered in Arabic and using a Syrian curriculum, within three years to be completed in 2020.

There is an urgent need to build additional capacity including additional teachers, classrooms, and school buildings to be able to provide a high-quality education for the Syrian children without causing the local society to suffer. Such a capacity building and improvement of existing capacities is essential to minimize the risk of lost generations as well as to prevent social tensions that might arise as a result of deteriorating education services. However, it is obvious that this would take a lot of time and resources to accomplish. MoNE data concerning current education practices in Turkey suggests that an average classroom would serve 30 students and an average primary school has a capacity of 720 students, with one teacher to be employed per 20 students. These figures clearly demonstrate that integrating the 1 million 47 thousand Syrian children into formal education in Turkey would require, among other things, a lot of new classrooms and teachers. Obviously, education also brings a significant cost to the state's budget. According to Turkish Statistical Institute calculations, the average cost of a primary school/middle-school/high-school student in Turkey was 8.111 TL in the year 2017.[98] On the basis of this figure, it could be suggested that the total cost of schooling for the 684 thousand Syrian children in Turkey has been 5,5 billion TL, which was around 873 million € according to December 2019 exchange rates (6,3 TL=1 €). This would show the scale of the financial cost on Turkey's budget, only looking at one public service sector, i.e. education.

Another component of the additional costs would relate to the aforementioned need to increase the number of teachers, classrooms, and schools. The July 2017 needs-analysis exercise conducted by MoNE includes both the accumulated general needs and the city-based needs. The most striking bit of information in this analysis was that there was a need for 1.189 new schools to cater to the needs of 856 thousand school age Syrians at the time, while the number of planned new schools to be built in the framework of EU-funded projects was 183, accounting only for 15,3% of the need.[99]

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97. TUİK (Turkstat): http://www.meb.gov.tr/suriyeli-cocuklarin-egitimi-icin-yol-haritasi-belirlendi/haber/11750/tr (Access: 03.07.2019)

98. MoNE- Presentation on "Education Services towards Students under Temporary Protection" by the Department of Migration and Emergency Education, Directorate General of Lifelong Learning, Ministry of National Education. July 2017 (PPP: Slide 37). (Access: 11.07.2019)

99. For the purpose of supporting the education infrastructure for Syrians under temporary protection, it is planned to transfer EU funds in the context of FRIT (150 million Euros constructing 75 reinforced concrete school buildings), in the context of MADAD2 (68 million

According to this exercise, the number of school age Syrian children in Şanlıurfa was 142.042 at the time with 197 new schools needed. However, in October 2018 the number of school age children has grown to 152.742 and the needed number of new schools increased to 212. The number of new schools to be built in the framework of EU projects, in the meantime, remained unchanged at 14. Of course, there are new schools that are planned or built by the MoNE, private sector or other charitable donors. However, it is plainly obvious that it will take quite a long time for the whole need to be satisfied.

The "Department of Migration and Emergencies Education" was established within the Directorate General of Lifelong Learning with the MoNE "road map" dated August 2016.[100] A very comprehensive project concerning education of Syrians, Project on "Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into the Turkish Education System" (PICTES), implemented by MoNE and supported by the EU was also conceived within the framework of March 2016 Statement and started on 3 October 2016. The expected outcomes of the project included "increasing Syrian children's access to education", "improving the quality of education provided for Syrian students", and "enhancing the operational capacity of educational institutions and staff members".[101] There is a significant risk that without such capacity enhancement, merely schooling Syrian children in Turkey would produce negative influences on the education system. Therefore, prevention lost generations without making the local children suffer from a decrease in quality of education requires taking such issues concerning capacity into consideration.

Another important initiative in 2017 by the MoNE in cooperation with international actors has been the introduction of the "Conditional Cash Transfer for Education" (CCTE), which proved to be an important financial assistance for the poor Syrian families. The program started in May 2017 financed in the amount of 66,5 million USD.

Conditional Cash Transfer for Education

This program is implemented to encourage access to education of school age Syrians in Turkey. In fact, the program has been implemented by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies since 2003, which in principle was open to non-citizens as well but in practice almost exclusively benefited by Turkish citizens. The process of incorporating Syrians and other refugees in the country has been accelerated in 2017 by the Ministry in close cooperation with United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), MoNE, Turkish Red Crescent, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), and the Norwegian government. CCTE payments are made per individual student once every two months on the condition that they regularly attend school from kindergarten to the end of high-school. Girls receive a larger support than boys.[102] Eligible families can apply to benefit both

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Euro constructing 30 school buildings- reinforced concrete and prefabricated), and in the context of additional FRIT funds (45 million Euro constructing 46 prefabricated schools). Presentation on "Education Services towards Students under Temporary Protection" by the Department of Migration and Emergency Education, Directorate General of Lifelong Learning, Ministry of National Education, July 2017 (PPP-Slide 36)

100. MoNE: http://www.meb.gov.tr/suriyeli-cocuklarin-egitimi-icin-yol-haritasi-belirlendi/haber/11750/tr (Access: 13.07.2019)

101. MoNE: https://pictes.meb.gov.tr/izleme/ (Access: 13.07.2019)

102. The supports are in the amount of 35 TL for male and 40 TL for female students at the primary school level and at the high school level they are 50 TL for both male and female students. See: UNICEF-Turkey http://unicef.org.tr/files/editorfiles/ccte_brosur_TR_250817_printer(1).pdf (Access: 20.10.2017)

from CCTE and SUY/ESSN programs. According to data shared by UNICEF, the number of Syrian students that has benefitted from this support as of September 2019 was 525 thousand.[103]

d. Syrians in Turkish Higher Education System

The number of Syrian students, some of whom being university drop-outs from Syria and others graduated from Turkish schools to proceed to higher education, enrolled in Turkish universities has been steadily increasing.[104] The number of Syrian students who were enrolled to around 121 public and 57 private universities in Turkey was 14.747 in the 2016-2017 academic year, 20.701 in 2018-2019, 27.606 in 2018-2019, and 37.236 in 2019-2020. In the 2019-2020 academic year, 23.823 (63.97%) of Syrian students at Turkish universities were male while 13.413 (36,02%) were female.[105] Syrian students are at the top of the list of foreign university students in Turkey, whose total number is around 185 thousand. Syrian students at the public universities do not pay any tuition fees. In the 2017-2018 academic year, there were 410 doctoral and 1.650 graduate students among Syrians. There are many national and international institutions, especially including the Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), who provide scholarships to Syrian students. Among these EU support, DAFI, HOPES, and SPARK scholarships have a special place. According to existing studies, however, only around 15% of Syrian university students receive a scholarship.

The Turkish state and its relevant institutions, MoNE and Higher Education Council (YOK), have been making significant efforts to increase the number of Syrian students in Turkish higher education. There appear to be four main reasons for this strategy:

1. To provide a peaceful and honorable future for the Syrian youth who had escaped war and destruction in Syria; prevent lost generations from emerging; developing human capital

2. To help Syrian university students to create bridges between the more than 3.6 million Syrians and the Turkish society, thus making them important actors of a peaceful future together

3. To make them contribute in Turkey

    To help them assume a pivotal role in the reconstruction of Syria should they return to their country of origin özel rol üstlenmeleri

103. UNICEF-Turkey: Statistical Report on the Education of Children Under Temporary Protection in Turkey (2020-2021) https://www.unicef.org/turkey/media/10711/file/Ge%C3%A7ici%20koruma%20alt%C4%B1ndaki%20%C3%A7ocuklar%C4%B1n%20e%C4%9Fitim%20istatistikleri.pdf (Access: 01.05.2021)

104. M.M.Erdoğan, A.Erdoğan, B.Yavçan, T.H.Mohamad (2019) Elite-Dialogue-II: "Elite Dialogue-II: Project on Dialogue with Syrian Refugees in Turkey through Syrian Academics and Graduate Students", TAGU-TMK.

105. There were 185 thousand international students in Turkey in the 2019-20 academic year, 119 thousand (65%) of whom are male and 65 thousand (35%) female. Higher Education Council-YÖK: https://istatistik.yok.gov.tr/ (Access: 01.05.2021)

SB-2020-FIGURE 18: Syrians in Higher Education

It is important to note that international institutions play an important role in this process, particularly through financial assistance. It is, however, essential that this role needs to be strengthened and made sustainable. Preventing lost generations from emerging and developing human capital are common interests for everyone concerned.

e. Turkish Language Courses and Vocational Training

Turkish language teaching is a very important topic for the Syrians in Turkey. For the first time, Turkey has found itself in need of developing large scale language education modules intended for foreigners. MoNE has recruited 5.959 temporary education personnel, 5.468 of whom Turkish language teachers and 491 Guidance and Psychological Counseling personnel, to be employed for "Teaching Turkish to Foreigners" in 2017. These new personnel were given a special training for two weeks before commencing their missions. 925.000 prints of specially developed "Turkish Education" sets, which were prepared by Yunus Emre Institute, were distributed to Syrian students.

The Public Education Centers also developed age-specific "Turkish Language for Foreigners" modules. The language courses at these Centers were applied for 6-12, 13-17 age groups and adults at A1, A2, and B1 language proficiency levels using modules developed by the Ministry. Between 2014 and 2020, 496.739 Syrians have attended Turkish language courses. 203.414 (40,95%) of these Syrians were men while 293.325 (59,05%) were women.

The Directorate General of Lifelong Learning at the Ministry of National Education makes a considerable effort to increase the participation of Syrians to Turkish language education and vocational training courses. In the same period between 2014 and 2020, total number of Syrians at all age

groups who attended Turkish language and other courses offered by the Ministry through these Centers was 1.806.529.

3. Livelihood Sources of Syrians in Turkey[106]

One of the most sensitive issue areas in mass migration contexts concerns working. The local society is worried that the newcomer immigrants/refugees, who would often assume the role of "cheap labor", would take their jobs and incomes. This is not a completely unsubstantiated expectation. Especially in contexts where there is high unemployment, this concern against the newcomers could be even higher. Turkey has not experienced any significant concern against "incoming foreigners" until 2011. Arrival of Syrians starting from 2011 has brought this "phenomenon" to the agenda of Turkish society. As a natural outcome of receiving in a short while a remarkable number of asylum seekers, whose number corresponds to more than 5% of the national population, the issue of employment has come to the fore. A TISK report[107] in 2015 revealed that laborers who were scared due to the fear of losing their jobs in the face of a huge supply of cheap labor were not the only ones who were concerned in Turkish economy. Employers were found to be worried as well concerning the potential negative effects this mass inflow of asylum-seekers could have through the informal economy. The corporate businesses mentioned the difficulties of competing against cheap labor and production in the informal economy, and suggested that it would be better for the economy if the Syrians would be permitted to work. Here, a stark difference emerges between such corporate businesses which cannot employ foreign workers without a work permit and the non-corporate, smaller businesses which can, partly or wholly, engage in activities in the informal economy. The second stark contrast can be observed among workers and can be said to be class-based. Those who work as non-skilled, manual laborers are much more strongly against giving Syrians the right to work than highly-skilled individuals.

This issue became increasingly important particularly since 2013. Until 2013, a much smaller number of Syrians were in Turkey and they generally stayed in camps. Therefore, approaching to the issue with an emergency management mentality, the Turkish state provided for all basic needs of Syrians in the country. However, as the number of Syrians in Turkey kept increasing and Syrians who lived outside of the camps started to outnumber those in the camps, a new era has begun since the end of 2013. This transformation whereby Syrians started to live in urban centers also de facto brought them into economic activity.

In the absence of central planning concerning where Syrians would live in the country, they primarily preferred to move to such urban centers where they can work and where their relatives or acquaintances lived.

a. Regulations Concerning Right to Work

The "Regulation Concerning Work Permits of Foreigners Under Temporary Protection", which was

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106. For the information used in this section see: M.M.Erdoğan and M.Çorabatır (2019) "Suriyeli Mülteci Nüfusunun Demografik Gelişimi, Türkiye'deki Eğitim, İstihdam Ve Belediye Hizmetlerine Yakın Gelecekte Olası Etkileri" (Demography of Syrian Refugees and Potential Impacts on Education, Employment and Municipal Services in Turkey), GIZ, Quadra Program.

107. M.M.Erdoğan and C.Ünver [2015] Perspectives, Expectations and Suggestions of the Turkish Business Sector on Syrians in Turkey, TISK.

prepared based on the 29th Article of "Regulation on Temporary Protection", entered into force on 15 January 2016. According to this legislation, regulations concerning working of Syrians under temporary protection are as follows:

1. Duration Condition: To have remained in Turkey with the temporary protection status for at least 6 months

2. Location Condition: Working is only possible in the city where the individual is registered, apart from exceptional cases

3. Quota: The number of workers under temporary protection cannot be more than 10% of the total number of workers at a business (if the citizens do not apply to a vacancy notice in 4 weeks, the quota can be surpassed)

4. Employer Condition: Application for the work permit must be made by the employer with whom the foreigner under temporary protection will work

5. Wage Condition: A wage under the official minimum wage cannot be paid

6. İŞKUR: Foreigners under temporary protection can participate in the courses and pro grams organized by İŞKUR

7. Exception: An exception to the requirement of a work permit can be issued by provincial governorates for those who will work in seasonal agricultural and husbandry workers.

8. Limitation: Syrians cannot apply to jobs and occupations which are exclusively limited for Turkish citizens by law.

This Regulation has been a very important step allowing Syrians under temporary protection to legally work in Turkey. However, it has had a limited impact on formalizing the Syrian labor that is employed in the informal economy. The number of work permits issued to citizens of Syrian Arab Republic was reported to be 34.573 (31.526 men, 3.047 women) in the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services report entitled "Foreigners' Work Permits".[108] According to 2019 data released by the Ministry, the total number of work permits issued to foreigners was 145.232, of which 63.789 belonged to the citizens of Syrian Arab Republic. It is also known that the number of Syrians in Turkey with a residence permit is 95 thousand.However, there is no indication as to how many of these are Syrians under temporary protection and how many are individuals with residence permit in Turkey. Two separate UNHCR publications both report higher figures. A document released in August 2019 suggests Turkey had issued 80 thousand work permits[109], while another document dated 2020 reports that a total of 132.497 work permits were issued.[110] It appears that these figures do not match with those released by the Ministry. It is possible that this mismatch might arise from the yearly renewals of permits by the same individuals.

108. T.C. Ministry of Labor and Social Security: Work Permits of Foreigners https://www.csgb.gov.tr/media/31746/yabanciizin2018.pdf and https://www.csgb.gov.tr/media/63117/yabanciizin2019.pdf (Access: 10.04.2021).

109. Update: Durable Solutions for Syrian Refugees (July-August 2019) https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/70892

110. UNHCR- 3RP Regional Strategic Overview (2020) https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/73116 (Access: 02.05.2020)

A large part of Syrians in Turkey work in construction, production, and service sectors. In a noteworthy manner, it is observed that Syrians play a rather less active role in the agriculture and husbandry fields. In line with EU policies, some well-thought incentive policies that is supported by the EU could significantly contribute in employment and social cohesion in Turkey.[111]

b. Social Cohesion Assistance Program (SUY/ESSN)

Some financial support programs for Syrians have started with the resources that were devoted by the EU through the March 2016 Turkey-EU Statement that committed the EU to transfer 3+3 billion Euros over the following 4 years to Turkey to be used for Syrian refugees. One such significant program is the Social Cohesion Assistance Program (SUY) which was organized as part of EU's "Emergency Social Safety Net for Refugees in Turkey" (ESSN). Turned into the world's largest cash transfer program, ESSN has become a significant source of relatively stable financial income for a large number of Syrian and other refugees in Turkey since 2016.[112] ESSN program provides a monthly cash payment of 120 TL (13 € [113]) per person to foreigners under international protection in Turkey who live outside of camps. The amount of ESSN support was raised to 155 TL (16€) in April 2021. Also, an additional support can be provided on a family basis in every three months. The support is provided through KIZILAYKART after an "evaluation of neediness"[114] is conducted. ESSN program, widely known as "Kızılay Kart", is financed by EU's ECHO office. The program is implemented by Turkey's Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services[115], Turkish Red Crescent, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC); while DGMM and Directorate General of Population and Citizenship Affairs of the Ministry of Interior assume supportive roles.[116]

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111. For an important study on this subject, see: K:Kirişçi How the EU can use agricultural trade to promote self-reliance for Syrian refugees in Turkey, Brookings Institute-TENT Foundation. (https://www.tent.org/resources/self-reliance-for-syrian-refugees/ Access: 01.04.2021)

112. EU Turkish Delegation: https://www.avrupa.info.tr/tr/turkiyedeki-multeci-krizine-avrupa-birliginin-mudahalesi-710 (Access: 12.12.2019)

113. 1 euro is 9.1 TL as of 31 December 2020.

114. In this assessment, the following were considered to be in need: families with 4 or more children, families with a high number of "dependent" individuals (i.e. those families with 1.5 or more dependent individuals per healthy member), single parents of at least one minor child, families with disabled members, individuals with more than 40% disability, single women, senior individuals of 60 years of age or older who lives alone. There are also who were included by the initiatives of Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations. This last group contained 28.312 individuals accounting for 1,7% of SUY beneficiaries as of December 2019.

115. According to the decision published on 21 April 2021 in the Official Gazette, the Ministry of Labor and Social Services was divided into two: Ministry of Family and Social Services and Ministry of Labor and Social Security. ESSN Program is relevant for both Ministries. It is not clear what kind of a division of labor will take place between the two as of April 2021.

116. In the first period of implementation (2016-2019) of ESSN, implementing partners included UN World Food Program (WFP) and supporting institutions included firstly the Prime Ministry and then AFAD, as a unit of Ministry of Internal Affairs.

SB-2020-FIGURE 19: SUY/ESSN INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE (2020)

Between December 2016 and December 2020, ESSN program has provided over 1 billion Euro (approximately 9.4 billion TL) of financial assistance to a total of 1.817.031 individuals under international protection at 321.151 households. 89,6% of these, i.e. 1.610.859 individuals at approximately 285 thousand households, are Syrian. As of January 2021, the numbers of ESNN beneficiaries with other nationalities are as follows: 110 thousand Iraqis (6,7%), 63 thousand Afghans (3,2%), and 3.556 Iranians (0,2%). This support, even though it is not sufficient in itself, is an extremely important resource for the refugees who live in urban settings to pay for costs like rent, electricity, water, and transportation.

As stated above, ESSN program provides a significant regular financial support for over 1.6 million or 44,2% of Syrians under temporary protection and for 176 thousand or 50% of foreigners with other nationalities under international protection in Turkey. However, it should not be forgotten that the remaining 2.3 million individuals under temporary or international protection do not receive this support. In addition, the payment of 120 TL per person per month is far from being sufficient in urban contexts.[117] In this context, it becomes mandatory for Syrians and other refugees to work for a living, whether or not they benefit from the ESSN program. Furthermore, ESSN program started in December 2016 and the number of its recipients only gradually increased reaching 1.1 million by 2018, 1.5 million by 2019, 1.7 million by December 2019, and 1.8 million by 2020; which shows that a very large number of Syrians had to provide for themselves by working from the start, as Syrians started to arrive in the country since April 2011.

117. The average size of households for Syrians under temporary protection was calculated to be 5.8.

Another significant contribution of the ESSN program has been its indirect effect for the cities hosting large concentrations of refugees through the cash inflow that it caused. This has played a significant role in the strengthening of local economies through external support. For instance, for the city of Gaziantep, where 252 thousand refugees benefit from the ESSN program, this means a monthly inflow of 30 million TL and an annual inflow of 363 million TL. Sanliurfa receives an annual inflow of 258 million TL through 179 thousand beneficiaries, while Hatay receives an annual inflow of 241 million TL through 167 thousand recipients. This proves that ESSN supports are not only essential for its direct recipients, but they are also a limited yet valuable resource for local economies.

SB-2020-FIGURE 21: SUY Support by Nationality of Beneficiaries (Top 4)

c. Informal Economy and Syrians

As already mentioned, it is almost impossible for the Syrians who live outside of camps to sustain their lives without working. It is known that even those Syrians who benefit from the ESSN support that started at the end of 2016 to receive a monthly payment of 120 TL per person and whose number has reached 1 million 610 thousand by 2020 also mostly work. It is not possible to access official data concerning this issue by its very nature. It can be deduced that informal economy creates a significant opportunity and space for Syrians to be able provide for themselves. While the existence of a large informal economy is neither acceptable nor sustainable in the long run[118], in a country with a high unemployment rate like Turkey, it is next to impossible to create sufficient formal employment opportun ities for Syrians in the short and medium run. It can be suggested that this situation is one of the factors that help maintain the level of "fragile" social acceptance still relatively high.[119]   According to TUIK data in 2020, 30,59% of actively working Turkish citizens are not covered by any social security institution. It is recorded in the agriculture sector at 83,46%.[120]In other words, around 7-9 million Turkish citizens out of the 30 million "labor force" are working "informally". It is exactly this large informal economy that has allowed Syrians to find space for working. Large-scale field studies such as Syrians Barometer find that 30-40% of Syrians appear to be actively working. Therefore, it can be assumed that 1 million to 1.4 million of the 3.6 million Syrians in Turkey are working. These studies find that more than 30% of Syrian respondents report that they are working even within the camps. Given the fact that there are 630 thousand Syrian households in Turkey, even when it is assumed that only 1 person per household is working, it means that at least 630 thousand Syrians are actively working. With the low level of wages, it is obvious that only one working member would not be enough for the family. Therefore, even if a vast majority of them are working in the informal economy, it can be predicted that around 1.3 million Syrians are working in Turkey.

It can be suggested that the informal economy, which already was a structural problem of Turkish economy, has grown a little with the arrival of Syrians. Working informally obviously leads to a serious exploitation of labor as well as being unacceptable in terms of labor rights and unsustainable for the national economy. However, it has been because of the existence of this informal economy that Syrians have been able to sustain their livelihoods without causing any significant levels of economic displacement of Turkish citizens. Even though unemployment rate in Turkey has increased to 13.2% as of 2020 with 4.5 million Turkish citizens looking for employment, it wouldn't be realistic suggest that this dramatic increase has been caused by the arrival of Syrians- with some exceptions at the border cities. This is because of the fact that Syrians have been able to find themselves space in the large informal economy which already included over 7-9 million Turkish citizens.

118. F.Oğuz, et.al. (2020) Transition to Formal Economy First Phase Impact Analysis Study (Kayıtlı İstihdama Geçiş Programı Birinci Faz Etki Analizi Çalışması),
International Labor Organization – Ankara. (https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/---ilo-ankara/documents/publication/wcms_764195.pdf) (Access: 05.01.2021)

119. M.M.Erdoğan (2018), Syrians Barometer: A Framework For Achieving Social Cohesion With Syrians. İstanbul Bilgi University Publishing, İstanbul

120. Social Security Institution Informal Economy Employment Rate (http://www.sgk.gov.tr/wps/portal/sgk/tr/calisan/kayitdisi_istihdam/kayitdisi_istihdam_oranlari/kayitdisi_istihdam_orani) (Access: 07.07.2019).

According to January 2020 TUIK data[121], labor force participation rate among Turkish citizens is 54,9% (74,6% among men and 35% among women). It is reasonable to expect that this rate would be lower among Syrians due to the language barrier and cultural differences. In any case, all the projections conclude that there are 1 to 1.3 million Syrians in Turkey who are actively working, who are increasingly becoming self-sufficient and less in need of financial help from the state, and making a significant contribution to the Turkish economy.

d. Entrepreneurship

Syrian entrepreneurs undoubtedly play a special role in the economic integration of Syrians as well as in the economic contribution that Syrians make in Turkey. Syrians can establish their own businesses in accordance with Turkish Commercial Law.[122] In officially registered businesses in Turkey, the business owner can apply for a work permit. More than 55% of businesses established by Syrians in Turkey are "micro" scale establishments employing less than 5 people. Even though many of them are micro level businesses that can only finance themselves, there is a clear trend of increase in the number of Syrian businesses in Turkey. The greatest number of foreign businesses that were established in Turkey in 2017 and 2018 belonged to Syrians. According to a statement made by the Ministry of Commerce, as of 26 February 2019, the number of companies with at least one Syrian partner is 15.159.[123] Adding those businesses that were established informally, it can be predicted that the number would be much higher. Among most common businesses are wholesale commerce, real estate, and construction. It is noteworthy that more than 55% of Syrian businesses in Turkey engage in exports to countries in the region, particularly including Syria. According to data provided by UNHCR, the total capital of Syrian entrepreneurs in Turkey at the end of 2018 reached 400 million USD.[124]

e. COVID-19 Pandemic

COVID-19 Pandemic, which was declared as such on 11 March 2020 by WHO, has in many ways negatively influenced the lives of refugees around the world and in Turkey. In the absence of official data shared with the public, it is predicted that, in terms of health issues, the Syrian population in Turkey was affected by the pandemic similarly to the Turkish population. In fact, it can be expected that it might have been hit a bit less harshly because of its younger demography. However, the main challenges have been experienced in job losses and education. Many Syrians have lost their jobs as they were usually working irregularly and without social security. Moreover, since they were employed in the informal economy, they were unable to benefit from various financial supports the state provided to compensate the negative effects of the pandemic. As it will be presented in the relevant section, SB-2020 research has found that the number of Syrian individuals who had lost their jobs was very large. One in three working Syrians has lost their job, the number of Syrians working for a monthly salary has decreased, and those working for short-term casual works increased.

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121. TUIK: https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Isgucu-Istatistikleri-2020-37484 (Access: 01.05.2021)

122. According to a TEPAV research, there are over 15 thousand companies established by Syrians, which employ at least 44 thousand Syrians.   See: https://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1533018887-4.TEPAV_Suriye_Sermayeli_Sirketler_Bulteni___Haziran_2018.pdf (Access: 16.09.2019). Also: Hürriyet Newspaper (06.09.2019): "Patron da çalışan da Suriyeli... Suriyelilerin kurduğu veya ortak olduğu 15 bin şirkette 44 bin Suriyeli çalışıyor." (Both the boss and the worker are Syrians: 44 thousand Syrians are working at companies established or partnered by Syrians) http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/patron-da-calisan-da-suriyeli-41322721 (Access: 16.09.2019)

123. CNN-TÜRK: https://www.cnnturk.com/ekonomi/bakan-pekcan-15-bin-159-suriyeli-sirket-var (Access: 16.11.2019)

124. UNHCR- Update: Durable Solutions for Syrian Refugees: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/70892 (Access: 02.05.2020)

SYRIANS BAROMETER 2020

JUSTIFICATION
AND RESEARCH
INFORMATION

3

I.   SYRIANS BAROMETER-2019 JUSTIFICATION AND RESEARCH INFORMATION

SYRIANS BAROMETER (SB) research is conceived of as a regularly held study to be simultaneously conducted on Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey and the Turkish society. The most comprehensive study in its field, SB is based on survey research conducted on large representative samples, which is further complemented with focus group discussions. The present study is structured as a continuation of three previous studies, "Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration" published in 2014 and two "Syrians Barometer: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey" studies published in 2017 and 2019. SB aims at drawing attention to the social realities in the field, deliberately trying to stay away from the contentious politicized debates, while striving to analyze the mutual social perceptions and, crucially, the changes and developments in these perceptions. In this context, the study also endeavors to reveal and discuss the existing experiences and relationships in the field, future projections and concerns, and prospects for social cohesion. It is not possible, of course, to suggest that the findings of this study's survey and focus groups can be directly generalized to the entire populations. In other words, what is presented here as the views of the "Turkish society" or "Syrians in Turkey" are obviously the views of the participants of this research and can only be related to the wider populations in a limited manner, as neither is a homogenous and static community. This study strives to present the most accurate picture that is possible in a social scientific context with the most diligent application of research, data collection, and analysis methods. Even so, however, the final product is ultimately derived from fieldwork and will inevitably have certain limitations.

It is planned to repeat this study, the main objective of which is to provide a "a framework for achieving social cohesion with Syrians in Turkey", once every year. It is expected and hoped that this study would provide reliable data on a regular basis for the relevant public institutions, the interested researchers, academics, civil society organizations, and international institutions as well as producing a useful resource for data-based policies.

Mass migration movements create concerns among receiving societies. This is particularly the case when refugees are the subject. This is reflected in the fact that while developed and high-income income countries host more than 80% of international immigrants, these same countries are much more reluctant in receiving refugees.[125] Partly as a result of this, only 15% of refugees are able to arrive in such developed, high-income countries.[126] This observable difference concerning migrants and refugees is also visible in the context of social cohesion policies, which prove to be more complicated and challenging in the case of refugees than migrants. It can be suggested that social cohesion discussions as well as initiatives are increasingly becoming commonplace in Turkey and that what is at issue in the Turkish context is almost exclusively refugees. Particularly considering the large numbers of refugees and quick pace with which they had arrived in Turkey, "social cohesion policies regarding refugees" (instead of "social cohesion policies regarding regular immigrants") prove to be an additionally challenging topic by its very nature.

The field study of SB research includes surveys and focus group discussions. The research questions were formed by the TAGU team and project advisors, while the analysis of the findings and the pre-

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125. The top 10 countries hosting most immigrants are: USA (50.7 million), Germany, Saudi Arabia, Russia, United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia, and Italy- World Migration Report 2020, p.10.
The top 10 countries hosting most refugees are: Turkey, Pakistan, Uganda, Sudan, Germany, Iran, Lebanon, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Jordan - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees-UNHCR: https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/ (Access: 15.01.2021)

126. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees-UNHCR: https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html (Access: 15.01.2021)

paration of the report was conducted by TAGU. The field implementation of the surveys was conducted by Ankara Centre for Social Research (ANAR), one of the most experienced institutions in this sector. Working on comprehensive and representative samples, face-to-face surveys were conducted in 26 cities with 2.259 Turkish citizens and in 15 cities with 1.414 Syrian households between 10 and 25 December 2020. The survey conducted with a 95% confidence level. The confidence interval was ±2,06 for Turkish citizens and ±2,6 for Syrians. In total, 20 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted: 10 with Turkish citizens and 10 with Syrians in 5 different cities (Ankara, Istanbul, Gaziantep, Hatay, and Sanliurfa). The part on Syrians included only the individuals under temporary protection who live outside of camps in Turkey. In other words, Syrians that live in camps (temporary accommodation centers) and Syrians who remain in Turkey with other statuses (e.g. residence permit holders, naturalized citizens, etc.) are outside of the scope of this study.[127]

Dates of Research Application

Survey:

Syrians : 10 December 2020-12 January 2021 (CAPI- Computer assisted personal interviewing)

Turkish Citizens: 10-25 December 2020 (CAPI- Computer assisted personal interviewing)

Sample, Confidence Level and Interval

The survey on the opinions of the Turkish society on Syrians took the average size of Turkish households to be 3,4 in accordance with TUIK 2018 data. Therefore, the number of households was calculated by dividing the population by this average: 82.003.882 / 3,4 = 24.118.789. The sample size, in turn, was calculated on the basis of these figures on a 95% confidence level and ±2,06 confidence interval to be 2.271.

The survey questionnaires for Turkish citizens were administered in the city centers of 26 cities in NUTS-2 level, with individuals of 18 years of age or older who have the capacity to understand and answer the questions. In the selection of individual respondents simple random sampling was used and the number of surveys to be conducted in each city was determined according to their respective populations. The selection of households to conduct surveys was done applying the random walk rule by the city field managers. Maximum effort has been paid to ensure proportional representation of different sex, age, educational attainment, and occupational groups since the study aimed to include these as potentially relevant categories for analysis.

The survey on Syrians, on the other hand, was conducted as household research. In this framework, a survey questionnaire was applied face to face to Syrians living outside of camps. The surveys were conducted with one competent individual from each household. The average size of Syrian households is taken to be 6 in determining the research universe. Total number of Syrian households in Turkey is calculated by dividing the Syrian population by this number: 3.475.327 / 6 = 579.221 (DGMM:09.05.2019). The sample size, in turn, was calculated on the basis of these figures on a 95% confidence level and ±2,06 confidence interval to be 1.414.

Therefore, the survey on Syrians was applied on 1.414 households in 15 cities. Through this survey, information of 6.953 Syrians who live in these households was collected.

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127. As of 31 December 2020, the total number of Syrians who stay at one of the 7 Temporary Residence Centers in 5 cities in Turkey has dropped to 58.935. This figure corresponds to 1,61% of the Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey. See, DGMM, https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638 (Access: 05.01.2021).

Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

OdIn total 20 FGDs, 10 with Turkish citizens and 10 with Syrians under temporary protection, were conducted in 5 cities (Istanbul, Ankara, Hatay, Gaziantep, Sanliurfa). Each FGD included 6 to 10 participants and all were recorded upon obtaining participants' informed consent. There were a total of 141 participants in the FGDs including 80 Turkish citizens and 61 Syrians. FGDs were conducted between December 2020 and January 2021. The data collected from FGDs was analyzed using the qualitative analysis software MAXQDA.

SB-2020-TABLE 3: SB-2020 Focus Group Discussions (20 FGDs, 80+61=141 FGD Participants)

		Turkish Citizens	Syrians	Total
Metropolitan Cities	**Istanbul**	Artisans-Workers (8)	Artisans-Workers (5)	6
		Unemployed Youth (9)	Students (6)	
		Women (8)	NGO Workers (6)	
	Ankara	Students (8)	Students (7)	4
		Civil Servants (12)	Women (6)	
Border Cities	**Hatay**	Artisans-Workers (8)	-	3
		Students (9)		
		Teachers (8)		
	Gaziantep	Women (6)	Women (6)	5
		Unemployed Men (5)	Artisans-Workers (6)	
			NGO Workers (5)	
	Sanliurfa	-	NGO Workers (7)	2
			Women (7)	
Total		10	10	**20**
Number of Turkish FGD participants: 80 (10 FGDs / average participant number: **8**)				
Number of Syrian FGD participants: 61 (10 FGDs / average participant number: **6.1**)				

SB-2020 study has used a mixed research methodology employing a range of data collection and analysis techniques:
- •A detailed literature review,
- • A review of existing statistical data, including official sources and others,
- • Examination of relevant legal texts,
- • Review of SB-2017 and SB-2019 data to prepare/update survey questionnaires
- • Conducting the comprehensive SB surveys:
    - o Using Computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI):
        - • Survey on Syrians (15 cities): 10 December 2020 – 12 January 2021
        - • Survey on Turkish citizens (26 cities): 10-25 December 2020
- • Conducting Focus Group Discussions
    - o 20 FGDs (10 with Turkish participants + 10 with Syrians), in 5 cities
- • Sharing the research findings with the SB-Academic Advisory Board and receiving their input.

As the above time frame demonstrates, the bulk of data collection from the field took place between December 2020 and January 2021. The findings of the study naturally reflect and represent the context of the time that the data was collected.

TURKISH SOCIETY
(CITIZENS OF
REPUBLIC OF TURKEY)

RESEARCH
FINDINGS

4

III-SB-2020: TURKISH SOCIETY (Citizens of Republic of Turkey)

Syrians Barometer is one of the most comprehensive research studies conducted in Turkey that investigate both the Turkish society and the Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey. The most important characteristic of this type of a study is that it allows one to track various changes and transformations. In this framework, SB will be repeated in the next years using the same model of research and asking, to the most extent, the same questions. This study uses data from three previously conducted studies by M. Murat Erdogan, "Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration" that was published in 2014, SB-2017, and SB-2019, as reference points. Some data and findings from the 2014, 2017, and 2019 studies are presented here in comparison to the findings of SB-2020 to allow interested researchers to engage with all the data from these studies. The survey findings are presented both through absolute number of respondents and percentages. In addition, in the analysis and presentation of the responses to some specific questions, particularly when responses are collected on a "Likert" scale for more advanced comparison, a special system of point-based assessment is also used.[128]

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128. In some of the questions that used a 5-point Likert scale, a scoring was conducted in order to simplify the presentation of the findings and make it easier for them to be comparatively analyzed. This scoring was done in the following way: A point-score from 1 to 5 was assigned for each response option on the relevant scale, i.e.
1= Very insufficient/ completely disagree/ not worried at all, etc.
2=Insufficient/ disagree/ not worried, etc.
3=Neither sufficient, nor insufficient/ neither agree, nor disagree/ neither worried, nor not worried, etc. 4=Sufficient/ agree/ worried, etc.
5=Very sufficient/ completely agree/ very worried, etc.
6= No idea/ Don't know
7= No response
When calculating the scores, the numerical codes were given weight in the following way:
1→1, 2→2, 3→3, 4→4, 5→5, 6→0, 7→0
Using these weights, arithmetic mean was calculated for every relevant statement/question.
These calculations were made automatically on the SPSS software.
Lastly, depending on the scale used in each statement/question, the scoring was evaluated to be either on the "negative" or "positive" side of the scale.
a) 0,0-2,99: Negative side- i.e. Insufficient, disagree, not worried, etc.
b) 3,0-5,0: Positive side- i.e. Sufficient, agree, worried, etc.

III-A. SB-2020: TURKISH SOCIETY (Citizens of Republic of Turkey) RESEARCH PROFILE

1. Research Background and Profile

The Survey on Turkish citizens was conducted in 26 cities with 2.259 individuals. Specific quotas have been applied for geographical regions, socio-economic status, sex, and age groups. The Survey sample was designed as a representative one on the basis of Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) Level 2 (NUTS-2), which was determined by TUIK.[129] The surveys were conducted through Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing-CAPI. The confidence level of the research is %95, and the confidence interval is ±2,06.106

SB-2020-TABLE 4: SB-2020 City-Based Turkish Society Sample

	Cities						
		#	%			#	%
1	İstanbul	358	15,9	14	Trabzon	74	3,3
2	Ankara	133	5,9	15	Kayseri	68	3,0
3	Adana	110	4,9	16	Konya	66	2,9
4	İzmir	109	4,8	17	Van	64	2,8
5	Bursa	103	4,6	18	Mardin	63	2,8
6	Kocaeli	102	4,5	19	Tekirdağ	59	2,6
7	Şanlıurfa	97	4,3	20	Balıkesir	58	2,6
8	Manisa	92	4,1	21	Kırıkkale	55	2,4
9	Hatay	92	4,1	22	Malatya	49	2,2
10	Antalya	87	3,9	23	Erzurum	45	2,0
11	Samsun	82	3,6	24	Zonguldak	44	1,9
12	Aydın	82	3,6	25	Ağrı	44	1,9
13	Gaziantep	80	3,5	26	Kastamonu	43	1,9
Total						2259	100,0

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129. Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics-NUTS used by EU countries was accepted as a result of studies under the law 2002/4720 in line with Turkey's EU integration process. NUTS serves as a guide for the standardization and reliability of research conducted in Turkey. Depending on the subject and purpose of the study, the relevant level (1,2, or 3) is selected. For the SB study, NUTS-2 (IBBS-2, Level-2) covering 26 cities was used within the framework of universal reliability and validity rules.

To be able to provide a more thorough and accentuated analysis, the findings from this representative sample were further broken down into various categories based on sex, age group, geographic location (i.e. border cities / metropolitan cities / others)[130], educational attainment, and ethnic origin. Where relevant and significant, cross-tabulations are presented to show differences in data according to these categories.

SB-2020-TABLE 5: **Profile and Demographic Characteristics of Participants in SB-2019 Survey on Turkish Society**

	#	%		#	%
Sex			**Region**		
Female	1116	49,4	Border Cities	442	19,6
Male	1143	50,6	Metropolitan Cities	600	26,5
Age Groups			Other Cities	1217	53,9
18-24	697	30,8	**Occupations**		
25-34	512	22,7	Private Sector Employee	531	23,5
35-44	494	21,9	Artisans/Tradesmen	405	17,9
45-54	330	14,6	Housewife	366	16,2
55-64	162	7,2	Student	349	15,5
65 and above	64	2,8	Unemployed	189	8,4
Educational Attainment			Retired	117	5,2
Illiterate / Literate but not graduate of any school	53	2,4	Public Sector Employee	113	5,0
Primary school graduate	436	19,3	Self-Employed	110	4,9
Middle-school graduate	346	15,3	Businessperson	57	2,5
High-school or equivalent graduate	938	41,5	Other	10	0,4
University graduate / holder of graduate degree	486	21,5	No Answer	12	0,5

In the upcoming data tables on "occupations", answers "Other" and "No answer" are not presented due to very low number of these answers.

5 of the 26 cities in which the survey was conducted (i.e. Adana, Sanliurfa, Hatay, Gaziantep, Mardin) are located close to Turkey's Syrian border and host very large numbers of Syrians compared to their populations. Therefore, data collected from these "border cities", where dynamics of cohabitation can be observed most clearly, is compared with data collected from other cities. Among the remaining cities, 3 (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir) were selected as the "metropolitan cities" and 18 constitute the category of "other cities" (i.e. cities that are not metropolitan and not located at the border) to give a fuller representation of Turkey. 20,3% of the surveys were conducted in the border cities while 26,4% and 53% of the surveys were conducted in the metropolitan and other cities, respectively.

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130. In SB-2017, the regional/geographical categorization only included a binary distinction between "border cities" and "other cities". In SB-2019, Turkey's biggest cities of Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara were also grouped together and the new regional category of "metropolitan cities" was added.

SB-2020-TABLE 6: Survey Sample by Regions

Region	Border Cities	Other Cities			
		Metropolitan Cities	**Other (non-metropolitan and non-border) Cities**		
Cities	Adana	Ankara	Ağrı	Kastamonu	Manisa
	Gaziantep	İstanbul	Antalya	Kayseri	Samsun
	Hatay	İzmir	Aydın	Kırıkkale	Tekirdağ
	Mardin		Balıkesir	Kocaeli	Trabzon
	Şanlıurfa		Bursa	Konya	Van
			Erzurum	Malatya	Zonguldak
Number of Surveys Conducted	**442**	**600**	**1.217**		
Survey Rate %	**% 19,6**	**% 26,5**	**% 53,9**		
	% 19,6	**% 80,4**			

In addition to the surveys, a more in-depth understanding of the attitudes, experiences, and expectations of Turkish society was sought through conducting FGDs. While representativeness was not aimed in the FGDs, a significant degree of diversity was intended so that different opinions and experiences of various groups of specific attention would be obtained. Therefore, instead of inviting random groups, each FGD aimed at bringing together individuals with specific profiles.

The gender aspect was given particular attention and a large number of FGDs were conducted with women. The reason for this was the desire to be aware of gender-specific experiences as well as to include women's perspectives, expectations, and opinions. Besides women, FGDs included groups of teachers, students, workers and artisans, and NGO workers. The FGDs were voice-recorded, after having obtained prior informed consents of all participants, to be later fully transcribed for analysis.

Focus Group Discussions

10 FGDs were conducted with Turkish participants in four cities, as detailed below. There was a total of 80 participants. Differently from the previous studies, all the FGDs except for two in Gaziantep were conducted online due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Thereby, participants were protected from health risks while preventing potentially lower participation numbers due to health concerns.

To effectively and systematically analyze the comprehensive and qualitative data collected through FGDs, a qualitative data analysis software, namely MAXQDA, was used. In this context, the full transcript of each FGD was uploaded to the program to be coded by a list of codes and sub-codes.

Later, retrieving the coded segments of texts across all FGDs allowed a thorough and comparative analysis of the collected data, including specialized analyses based on the FGD type and city.

In the present SB-2020 study, data and findings from both the surveys and the FGDs were used in conjunction with one another. The empirical base of the study was provided by the survey findings while FGD data was instrumental in interpreting various findings and reaching a deeper under-standing.

SB-2020-TABLE 7: **FGDs with Turkish Participants**

Region	Cities	FGD Group	Total
Metropolitan Cities	İstanbul	Artisans-Workers (8)	3
		Unemployed Youth (9)	
		Women (8)	
	Ankara	Students (8)	2
		Civil Servants (12)	
Border Cities	Hatay	Artisans-Workers (8)	3
		Students (9)	
		Teachers (8)	
	Gaziantep	Women (6)	2
		Unemployed Men (5)	
Total Number of Turkish FGD Participants: 80 (10 OGG, average number of participants: 8)			

III-B. SB-2020- TURKISH SOCIETY RESEARCH FINDINGS

1. Turkish Society and Spatial Proximity with / Awareness of Syrians

SB research, which aims to develop a comprehensive understanding of the field and then to pro-vide a conceptual vision for social cohesion, started with a question on how much Turkish society and Syrians shared their physical living spaces. As already mentioned, only 1,6% of Syrians in Turkey live in camps while the vast majority of the remaining population live in urban places. There is, however, a remarkable degree of difference regarding the population density of Syrians amongst different regions, cities, districts, and even neighborhoods. This is why the survey began with the question "Are there Syrians living in your neighborhood/district/region?" This question is doubly important both as a question on level of awareness and as a potential variable the influence of which on later questions bears significance. In all three SB surveys, the total share of those who responded with "yes, there are a few" and "yes, there are many" was around 80%. In SB-2020 this figure is 78,4%. This high percentage is, in fact, a significant indicator of Syrians and Turkish society living together in cities. Sharing physical spaces with Syrians is not peculiar to border cities, but it

is observed in other big cities as well. However, it is noteworthy that this combined percentage has decreased around 5% from SB-2017 (82,1%) and SB-2019 (83,1%). It can be interpreted partly as a sign of "desensitization" and partly as a result of the effects of public health precautions including curfews etc. which made Syrians less visible.

SB-2020-TABLE 8: **Are there Syrians living in your neighborhood /district /region?**

	2017		2019		2020	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Yes	1715	82,1	1890*	83,2*	1772*	78,4*
No	297	14,2	311	13,7	422	18,7
No idea /No response	77	3,7	70	3,1	65	2,9
Total	**2089**	**100,0**	**2271**	**100,0**	**2259**	**100,0**

* Yes" category presents the sum of "Yes, there are many" and "Yes, there are a few" responses.

FGD Findings: Spatial Proximity with / Awareness of Syrians

In line with the survey findings, a large number of FGD participants reported that there are Syrians living and working around them, and that they see Syrians frequently in their daily lives. As to be expected, this was mentioned more frequently in the border city FGDs. In fact, there was not a single FGD participant in border cities who did not mention that they live and/or work together with Syrians or that their kids go to school with Syrian students.

Participants in the metropolitan city FGDs, on the other hand, reported encountering Syrians more on a casual basis in their daily lives. This could be due to the relatively much larger Syrian populations living in border cities as well as due to the fact that people in metropolitan cities might be relatively more used to living with ethnic and cultural diversity. In fact, FGD participants in metropolitan cities frequently mentioned about their experiences with Turkmens and Somalians in this context.

2. **How do Turkish Society See the Syrians?**

It is important to look at how various communities see or define each other in order to understand their social encounters and interaction. Therefore, SB research includes this question of definition. In this context, the respondents were given a list of 10 concepts and asked which concepts best reflected their view of Syrians. They were given the chance to provide multiple responses. In SB-2017 the top answer to this question was that "They are victims who escaped persecution/war" with 57,8%. This option had significantly regressed to become only the fourth most frequently mentioned answer with 35% in SB-2019. The responses that appeared to be at the top were those

that reflect perceptions of threat, social distance, and anxieties.[131] In SB-2020, the "victims" perception appears to have gone up to the top again. However, other concepts that reflect various anxieties continued to be frequently mentioned. Women, young people in the 25-34 age group, and respondents in the border cities appear to be the top amongst the groups that perceive Syrians as victims.

SB-2020-TABLE 9: **Most appropriate expressions to describe Syrians (Multiple Responses)**

		2017		2019		2020	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
1	They are victims who escaped persecution/war	1208	57,8	794	35,0	863	38,2
2	They are burdens on us	899	43,0	896	39,5	755	33,4
3	They are people who did not protect their homeland	-	-	940	41,4	559	24,7
4	They are dangerous people who will cause us a lot of troubles in the future	814	39,0	954	42,0	518	22,9
5	They are guests in our country	424	20,3	495	21,8	512	22,7
6	They are our brothers and sisters with the same religion	433	20,7	446	19,6	366	16,2
7	They are exploited people as cheap labor	298	14,3	308	13,6	290	12,8
8	They are beggars/people who entirely rely on assistance	509	24,4	343	15,1	257	11,4
9	They are different from and strangers to us	376	18,0	448	19,7	206	9,1
10	They are harmless people	306	14,6	158	7,0	165	7,3
11	Other	15	0,7	42	1,8	14	0,6
	No idea/ No response	32	1,5	20	0,9	33	1,5

It can be observed from the table that the trend in 2019 where 2017 findings significantly changed appears to once again change directions. In this context, when the findings from all three studies are observed, there seems to be a regularly decreasing trend in responses that see Syrians as "beggars", "burdens on us", and "brothers and sisters with the same religion". There is a slightly increasing trend in responses suggesting "they are guests in our country". There is also a significant decrease in the share of the response "They are dangerous people who will cause us a lot of troubles in the future" between 2019 and 2020, from 42% to 22.9%. There are other noteworthy changes in other responses, as well. This can be partially explained by "habits" and "the changed priorities with the pandemic process".

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131. The question in Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration-2014: 2014 was asked with a single response option and the first was "People fleeing from persecution" (41.1%) alırken, followed by "guests in our country" (% 20.8), "brothers and sisters with the same religion" (12.1%) "burdens on us" (20.1%), "They are beggars/people who entirely rely on assistance" with 5.9%.

SB-2020-TABLE 10: Most appropriate expressions to describe Syrians (Multiple Responses%)

	They are victims who escaped persecution/war	They are burdens on us	They are people who did not protect their homeland	They are dangerous people who will cause us a lot of troubles in the future	They are guests in our country	They are our brothers and sisters with the same religion	They are exploited people as cheap labor	They are beggars/people who entirely rely on assistance	They are different from and strangers to us	They are harmless people	Other	No idea/ No response
Sex												
Female	40,8	33,3	21,0	20,7	25,2	15,2	12,9	10,5	9,9	8,2	0,5	1,8
Male	35,7	33,5	28,4	25,1	20,2	17,1	12,8	12,2	8,4	6,4	0,7	1,1
Age Group												
18-24	38,0	32,7	19,7	20,4	25,3	13,9	15,5	10,5	8,5	7,6	0,1	2,6
25-34	41,0	31,4	24,0	21,9	24,0	16,6	15,4	10,7	9,2	7,6	0,4	1,0
35-44	39,1	33,0	27,9	25,1	21,1	16,8	9,9	11,7	8,3	6,5	0,8	0,8
45-54	36,4	38,5	26,1	21,5	20,0	16,7	11,5	12,1	8,5	7,0	1,8	1,2
55-64	32,7	37,0	34,0	32,1	19,8	18,5	8,0	12,3	16,7	9,9	0,6	1,2
65 +	34,4	25,0	31,3	26,6	17,2	25,0	4,7	17,2	6,3	3,1	-	-
Educational Attinment												
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	39,6	37,7	13,2	13,2	26,4	26,4	24,5	5,7	3,8	9,4	-	-
Primary School	39,0	31,4	30,0	26,8	20,0	20,4	8,0	10,6	9,6	6,9	0,7	1,4
Middle-School	38,4	31,5	25,1	22,3	18,5	16,8	9,8	12,4	9,0	9,0	0,6	0,9
High-School or equivalent	37,5	34,0	23,3	23,1	23,7	14,4	14,2	11,8	9,5	6,8	0,9	1,7
University/ Graduate Degree	38,5	35,0	23,7	20,6	25,7	14,4	15,4	11,1	8,6	7,2	0,2	1,6
Region												
Border cities	43,2	28,7	31,0	22,9	11,1	5,2	14,9	1,8	6,6	5,4	0,2	1,6
Other cities**	37,0	34,6	23,2	22,9	25,5	18,9	12,3	13,7	9,7	7,8	0,7	1,4
Metropolitan cities	29,8	40,7	15,5	18,7	19,5	11,0	8,5	14,8	7,5	6,7	1,5	2,3
Non-metropolitan cities	40,5	31,6	27,0	25,1	28,4	22,8	14,2	13,1	10,8	8,3	0,3	1,0
Occupations												
Private sector employee	34,7	35,2	25,6	24,3	19,8	11,1	10,7	14,1	9,4	7,7	0,8	0,9
Artisan/Tradesman	41,0	29,9	27,4	21,2	22,5	20,2	9,6	9,1	7,7	4,2	0,5	0,5
Housewife/girl	43,7	33,6	25,1	21,3	23,0	22,7	12,0	9,6	8,7	9,3	0,3	1,4
Student	36,7	31,8	21,5	23,8	26,4	12,9	20,1	9,7	12,9	8,9	0,3	2,6
Unemployed	40,2	36,5	20,6	19,6	23,8	16,9	15,3	13,8	4,2	6,9	0,5	1,6
Retired	29,9	33,3	36,8	30,8	17,1	17,1	7,7	11,1	17,9	7,7	2,6	0,9
Public sector employee	39,8	31,9	20,4	25,7	29,2	13,3	15,0	12,4	8,0	3,5	0,9	2,7
Self-employed	34,5	43,6	23,6	20,9	20,9	14,5	11,8	10,9	5,5	6,4	0,9	1,8
Business person	40,4	28,1	21,1	19,3	29,8	15,8	12,3	14,0	3,5	12,3	-	-
General	**38,2**	**33,4**	**24,7**	**22,9**	**22,7**	**16,2**	**12,8**	**11,4**	**9,1**	**7,3**	**0,6**	**1,5**

When the findings of SB-2017, Sb-2019, and Sb-2020 are considered together, it is possible to observe that the sentiments of social conscience and solidarity are mentioned simultaneously with those of discomfort and anxieties regarding the future. This complicated situation is obvious in SB-2020 findings where right after the response that "they are victims" come "they are burdens on us", "they are people who did not protect their homeland", and "they are dangerous people who will cause us a lot of trouble in the future". Considered together, these findings show that while there is very clearly "emotional affinity" and feelings of pity/conscience, there is also widespread anxieties in the society.

The perception that Syrians are "victims who escaped persecution and war" appears to be particularly strong among women and respondents living in the border cities. The perception that "they are burdens on us", in turn, is stronger in the metropolitan cities and among self-employed people. Among the respondents who are illiterate and above the age of 65, the perception that Syrians "are our brothers and sisters with the same religion" was mentioned more frequently than other groups.

When the responses to this question are considered in conjunction with whether or not the respondents report living in close proximity to Syrians, it would be possible to detect some trends. Accordingly, those who reported that there aren't any Syrians living in their region/city/neighborhoods appears to more strongly support the perception that they "are victims who escaped persecution and war". However, those living in places with Syrians appear to give the responses that "they are burdens on us", "they are people who did not protect their homeland", and "they are dangerous people who will cause us a lot of trouble in the future" more frequently.

This seems to show that the sentiments of compassion are stronger among the respondents who don't experience living together with Syrians, while negative perceptions towards Syrians are stronger among those respondents living together with Syrians. Therefore, it can be deduced that the expectation that closer contacts and daily encounters would positively influence mutual perceptions might not be realized in all contexts. In fact, the data appears to suggest that sometimes "getting to know the other" through physical closeness and daily interactions may strengthen the negative perceptions.

Most appropriate expressions to describe Syrians (Multiple Responses %)/

Are there Syrians living in your neighborhood /district /region?

	Most appropriate expressions to describe Syrians (Multiple response %)	In the neighborhood/town you live in				
		Are there any Syrians?				
		Yes, there are many	Yes, there are a few	No	No idea/ No response	General
1	They are victims who escaped persecution/war	33,6	37,3	47,9	49,2	38,2
2	They are burdens on us	38,8	31,0	27,0	36,9	33,4
3	They are people who did not protect their home-land	28,6	21,8	23,9	20,0	24,7
4	They are dangerous people who will cause us a lot of troubles in the future	27,9	20,7	19,4	10,8	22,9
5	They are guests in our country	19,0	24,8	26,5	16,9	22,7
6	They are our brothers and sisters with the same religion	11,5	18,0	21,1	21,5	16,2
7	They are exploited people as cheap labor	10,6	15,6	10,4	20,0	12,8
8	They are beggars/people who entirely rely on assistance	11,7	10,9	11,6	12,3	11,4
9	They are different from and strangers to us	10,7	9,6	5,5	4,6	9,1
10	They are harmless people	6,2	9,8	4,7	4,6	7,3
11	Other	1,0	0,2	0,5	1,5	0,6
	No idea/ No response	0,6	1,4	2,6	6,2	1,5

FGD Findings: How Syrians are Perceived

The question of perception is, obviously, extremely subjective. It can be shaped by a large number of factors including geographical context, personal characteristics, experiences, level of educational attainment, occupation, and so on. If a general or "average" perception is to be deduced from the FGDs, however, we can say that it is predominantly negative. This is particularly the case in the border cities compared to metropolitan ones. Therefore, the findings of the FGDs will be presented in two parts.

One significant observation concerning the participants' perceptions of Syrians is that they are more general and macro-level compared to those reported in border city FGDs, which tend to be more personal, particular, and micro-level. This could be explained, on the one hand, by the fact that they have less frequent and less intense interactions with Syrians; and, on the other hand, by the fact that Turkish people in large cities seem to obtain their information concerning Syrians from media and social media outlets.

- "I would say 'victims'. At first, they were victims of a war and now they are victims because they don't know their rights and don't speak the language." (Ankara-Student)

- "They are being abused! Both in political discourse by the opposition as well as ruling party politicians and social life by employers and landlords, etc." (Ankara-Student)

- "They are traumatized, socially excluded, and discriminated against. I would say that they are stuck in between and seen as the 'other'." (İstanbul-Artisans/Workers)

It needs to be noted, however, that participants in these FGDs also mentioned quite negative perceptions concerning Syrians. So, one shouldn't conclude that there is a liberal, sympathetic, and compassionate view of Syrians.

"I can think of one: ungratefulness. We do many things for them but they don't appreciate them." (İstanbul-Women)

"Recklessly procreating and too relaxed/comfortable." (İstanbul-Women)

There is a more negative perception among the FGD participants in the border cities. Moreover, as mentioned above, the perception appears to be more personal, particular, and concrete compared to the one usually found in large cities. Four major themes can be identified concerning how Syrians are perceived by the participants in Hatay and Gaziantep: (i) difference, (ii) the negative effects of Syrians on the city and the country, and (iii) resistance/closeness to change.

(i)

- "Their way of life is very different from ours. Their clothes are different, their culture is different, their language is different…" (G.Antep-Unemployed)

- "Their dresses are very different. Especially women's. They have burqas and face veils… Things you didn't use to see in Hatay…" (Hatay-Artisans/Workers)

- "They are very different from us concerning their culture and traditions." (G.Antep-Women)

(ii)

- "At first, I also thought that they were victims. But now they are in more advantaged position than us. I don't think that they are victims anymore." (Hatay-Students)

- "Some people still call them victims after so many years. The Turkish state and the nation did what it could. If they are still victims, they need to look into the mirror to see who is responsible." (G.Antep-Women)

- "Some people see them as victims but I don't agree. I don't think they are victims or they are desperate. They earn the same wages plus they receive a lot of financial support." (Hatay-Teachers)

(iii)

- "They are very relaxed and careless. Instead of trying to fit in with their new surroundings, they try to transform it into what they are used to. For example, instead of learning

Turkish, they open cafes and such where they can speak Arabic. I mean, they don't make any effort to adapt." (Hatay-Students)

- "They are closed to new things. They are not open to learning. They don't even know how to say 'good evening' in Turkish. It's been 10 years that they are in Turkey. They should have been used to Turkey by now but nothing changes." (Hatay-Students)

- "I would say that they are very resistant. Resistant to change, resistant to new things, resistant to getting closer with the Turkish society." (Hatay-Teachers

3.   **The Adjectives / Labels that Fit Syrians According to the Turkish Society**

When the adjectives and labels suggested by the Turkish society to describe Syrians are considered, it can be seen that there is a significant social distance and prejudice, which was also evident in both SB-2017 and SB-2019, that continued in SB-2020, albeit at a slightly smaller degree. The survey has found that Turkish respondents refrain from describing Syrians using positive adjectives such as "hard-working", "clean", "polite", "trustworthy", and "nice". They tend to use more negative adjectives and labels in this context. This is another indicator of the "social distance".

In SB-2020, the most frequently given response was "unreliable/dangerous" with 50,2%. Among the positive labels, the most frequently mentioned one was "hard-working" with 18,6%.

SB-2020-TABLE 12: To what extent of Syrians in Turkey do the following characteristics fit? (%)

		None of them	Minority of them	Minority + None	Half of them	Majority of them	All of them	Majority + All	No idea/ No response
1	Unreliable/ Dangerous	13,9	9,9	**23,8**	19,4	26,6	23,6	**50,2**	6,6
2	Rude	14,8	10,9	**25,7**	18,3	27,9	22,0	**49,9**	6,1
3	Distant	15,6	9,1	**24,7**	21,5	26,1	21,1	**47,2**	6,6
4	Lazy	19,7	11,4	**31,1**	19,3	24,4	19,9	**44,3**	5,3
5	Bad	15,6	11,2	**26,8**	22,8	23,7	19,3	**43,0**	7,4
6	Hard-working	42,4	16,8	**59,2**	18,3	12,6	6,0	**18,6**	3,9
7	Friendly	44,5	19,1	**63,6**	19,5	8,1	2,3	**10,4**	6,5
8	Nice	42,3	18,4	**60,7**	23,8	8,3	1,7	**10,0**	5,5
9	Kind	51,9	18,9	**70,8**	16,9	6,0	1,6	**7,6**	4,7
10	Reliable	53,5	17,5	**71,0**	15,6	5,2	1,2	**6,4**	7,0

It can be observed that the general trends remain throughout the SB research series. There are, however, little decreases in all the negative characterizations and, similarly little, increases in the positive ones.

SB-2020-TABLE 13: **To what extent of Syrians in Turkey do the following characteristics fit? (Scored)**

		SB-2017	SB-2019	SB- 2020
1	Unreliable/ Dangerous	2,9	3,3	3,2
2	Rude	2,8	3,3	3,1
3	Distant	2,8	3,1	3,1
4	Bad	2,7	3,1	3,0
5	Lazy	2,8	3,3	3,0
Average Score		Average Score	2,5	2,5
6	Hard-working	2,0	2,0	2,1
7	Nice	1,9	1,7	1,9
8	Friendly	1,9	1,7	1,9
9	Kind	1,7	1,7	1,7
10	Reliable	1,7	1,6	1,6

3,0-5,0

0-2,99

When the responses are cross-tabulated according to sex, age, educational attainment, and region of the respondents, the picture does not change significantly. The most significant divergence can be observed in border cities, where the respondents have been living with Syrians for a long time. For instance, while the overall average score for the response "Unreliable/Dangerous" is 3.2, it is 3.4 for the respondents from border cities. Similarly, the Turkey average score for "Rude" is 3.1, while the same is 3.4 in border cities. In positive characterizations, respondents from border cities responded either at the average or below.

SB-2020-TABLE 14: To what extent do the following qualities describe Syrians in our country? (Scored) (For other versions of cross-tabulations with this question, see Additional Tables)

	Unreliable/ Dangerous	Rude	Distant	Bad	Lazy	Hard-working	Nice	Friendly	Kind	Reliable	Average Score
Sex											
Female	3,2	3,1	3,0	2,9	2,9	2,1	1,9	1,8	1,7	1,6	2,4
Male	3,2	3,2	3,1	3,0	3,0	2,2	1,9	1,9	1,7	1,6	2,5
Age Groups											
18-24	3,2	3,2	3,1	3,0	2,9	2,1	2,0	1,9	1,8	1,7	2,5
25-34	3,1	3,0	3,0	2,8	2,8	2,2	1,9	1,8	1,7	1,6	2,4
35-44	3,2	3,2	3,1	3,0	3,1	2,0	1,9	1,8	1,7	1,6	2,4
45-54	3,1	3,1	3,0	3,0	3,1	2,1	1,9	1,9	1,7	1,6	2,5
55-64	3,3	3,4	3,3	3,2	3,1	2,2	1,9	2,0	1,9	1,7	2,6
65+	3,1	3,1	2,9	3,0	2,8	2,0	1,7	1,7	1,7	1,5	2,4
Educational Attainment											
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	2,9	2,8	2,6	2,7	2,6	2,1	1,9	1,8	2,0	1,7	2,3
Primary school	3,2	3,1	3,1	3,1	2,9	2,2	1,8	1,9	1,7	1,6	2,5
Middle-school	3,3	3,2	3,2	3,1	3,1	2,1	1,9	1,9	1,7	1,6	2,5
High-school or equivalent	3,2	3,2	3,1	3,0	3,1	2,1	1,9	1,8	1,7	1,6	2,5
University/ Graduate degree	3,0	3,0	3,0	2,8	2,8	2,0	2,0	1,8	1,7	1,6	2,4
Region											
Border cities	3,4	3,4	3,3	3,4	3,0	2,1	1,6	1,6	1,5	1,5	2,5
Other cities	3,1	3,1	3,0	2,9	3,0	2,1	2,0	1,9	1,8	1,7	2,5
Metropolitan cities	3,3	3,3	3,2	3,2	3,3	2,0	2,0	2,0	1,8	1,7	2,6
Non-metropoli-tan cities	3,0	2,9	2,9	2,7	2,8	2,2	2,0	1,9	1,8	1,6	2,4
Occupations											
Private sector employee	3,4	3,3	3,3	3,2	3,1	2,0	1,8	1,8	1,6	1,5	2,5
Artisan/ Trades-man	3,1	3,1	3,1	2,9	2,9	2,3	2,0	2,0	1,8	1,7	2,5
Housewife/girl	3,1	3,0	2,9	2,9	2,9	2,1	2,0	1,8	1,8	1,7	2,4
Student	3,1	3,1	2,9	2,9	2,9	2,1	2,0	1,8	1,8	1,7	2,4
Unemployed	3,1	3,1	3,0	2,9	2,9	2,1	1,8	1,8	1,6	1,5	2,4
Retired	3,4	3,5	3,4	3,2	3,3	2,1	1,8	1,8	1,6	1,5	2,6
Public sector employee	3,0	2,9	2,9	2,8	2,8	2,0	1,7	1,6	1,5	1,5	2,3
Self-employed	3,2	3,1	3,0	2,9	2,7	2,1	2,0	2,0	1,7	1,7	2,4
Businessperson Businessperson	3,4	3,3	3,1	3,2	3,2	2,0	1,9	1,9	1,8	1,9	2,6
General	3,2	3,1	3,1	3,0	3,0	2,1	1,9	1,9	1,7	1,6	2,5

Note: For the occupation: "Other" and "No response" are not presented in the table due to their negligible numbers.ir.

FGD Findings: The Adjectives / Labels that Fit Syrians According to the Turkish Society

Supporting the survey findings, it is found that negative labels have been used more intensively and frequently by FGD participants. Here as well, there is a significant rift between the perceptions of metropolitan city and border city participants. While participants from metropolitan cities predominantly mentioned adjectives revolving around Syrians' perceived victimhood, those from border cities displayed a more negative attitude.

> - The concepts that come to my mind are 'homeless' [in the sense of without a homeland] and 'foreigner'. Also maybe 'deprived of rights'. (Ankara-Student)

> - I would say 'victims'. At first, they were victims of a war and now they are victims of discrimination. (Ankara-Student)

> - They are traumatized and psychologically damaged people. … They are desperate because they came into the unknown. … They are displaced people. … They are a source of cheap labor. (Ankara-Civil Servants)

> - They are traumatized, socially excluded, and discriminated against. … They are poor people. …I would say that they are stuck in between. … They are seen as the 'other'. (İstanbul-Artisans/Workers)

> - They are very relaxed and careless. Instead of trying to fit in with their new surroundings, they try to transform it into what they are used to. I mean, they don't make any effort to adapt." (Hatay-Students)

> -They are closed to new things. They are not open to learning. They don't even know how to say 'good evening' in Turkish. It's been 10 years that they are in Turkey. They should have been used to Turkey by now but nothing changes. (Hatay-Students)

> I would say that they are very resistant. Resistant to change, resistant to new things, resistant to getting closer with the Turkish society. (Hatay-Teachers

4. Perception of Cultural Similarity

The role played by cultural similarity between a host/local society and newcomers (migrants or refugees) both in the period of arrival and later in years of living together has been an important topic in the migration studies literature. Despite sharing a significant common history and 911 kilometers of land borders as well as a common religion observed predominantly by both societies, Sb research has consistently found that the Turkish society places a significant social distance between them and the Syrians. While the political discourse makes frequent references to "religious fellowship", "neighborhood", and "common history", it appears that these are not fully embraced by the society. When asked the question "To what extent do you think Syrians in Turkey are culturally similar to us?", the combined share of those replied with "they are not similar at all" and "they are not similar" is 77,6%. Those who suggested that "they are similar" and "they are very similar"

constitute only 8,8% of the respondents.[132] Even though the percentage of respondents that suggest a significant cultural difference changes over the years, it is remarkable that the lowest figure is over 75% which manifests a strong cultural rejection. To be more precise, those who claimed that Syrians are not culturally similar to Turkish society was 80,2% in SB-2017, 81,9% in SB-2019, and, with a small decrease, 77,6% in SB-2020. Another noteworthy observation is that the percentage of the response "they are not similar at all" has been in an increasing trend rising from 40,8% in SB-2017, to 50,5% in SB-2019, and to 52,1% in SB-2020. The highest percentage of respondents who believed that Syrians are culturally similar in all three studies has been 8,8%.

SB-2020-TABLE 15: **To what extent do you think Syrians in Turkey are culturally similar to us (SB-2017/SB-2019/SB-2020)**

	2017			2019			2020		
	#	%		#	%		#	%	
Not similar at all	853	40,8	80,2	1147	50,5	81,9	1177	52,1	77,6
Not similar	823	39,4		712	31,4		575	25,5	
Neither similar, nor not similar	185	8,9	8,9	196	8,6	8,6	253	11,2	11,2
Similar	152	7,3	7,8	153	6,7	7,0	192	8,5	8,8
Very similar	10	0,5		7	0,3		7	0,3	
No idea/ No response	66	3,1	3,1	56	2,5	2,5	55	2,4	2,4
Total	2089	100,0		2271	100,0		2259	100,0	

When the responses to this question were broken down demographic and socio-economic categories of the respondents, very similar reactions are observed. However, it is observed that those who suggest that Syrians are not culturally similar are more heavily concentrated among women, those in the 35-44 age group, those who are illiterate or literate but not graduate of any school, and those who work as private sector employees. The more striking finding is in the "border cities". Since these cities are located at the Syrian border, they have linguistic, religious, traditional, and cultural characteristics that are quite close to Syrians'. However, the share of respondents from these cities who say "Syrians are not culturally similar" to them is a staggering 83,4%, while the Turkey average for this answer is 77,6%. In the same way, the percentage of those who said "they are similar - very similar" is below the overall average. This surprising finding was also obtained by the Şanlıurfa Barometer study.[133] It is noteworthy that while this perception of "dissimilarity" was below the national average in SB-2019, it increased a year later. This can be seen as proof that as interactions in a shared life increase, it can also lead to alienation and othering. More importantly, it draws attention to the possibility that migration and social cohesion policies based on a perceived cultural similarity would not produce the expected outcomes. The discourse of cultural similarity

132. In the 2014 study, "Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration", the rate of those who "completely disagreed" with the statement "I believe we are culturally similar with Syrians" was 45,3%, while 25,3% "disagreed" with this statement (in total 70,6%). The total share of those who "agreed" and "completely agreed" with the statement was 17,2%. By region, those who disagreed was 75,6% at the border cities and 69,6% at the other cities. See: pp.139

133. Sanliurfa Barometer study was conducted by Sanliurfa Governorate with the cooperation between GAP Regional Development Administration, UNHCR, and Turkish-German University Migration and Integration Research-TAGU with the chairmanship of M.M.Erdogan in 2018.

and closeness does play a positive and significant role in the early stages of mass human mobility. "Helping out brothers and sisters in a difficult situation" does work as strong motivator. As the duration of stay is prolonged and the numbers grow, however, this perception of cultural similarity and its positive contribution both grow dimmer.

SB-2020-TABLE 16: **To what extent do you think Syrians in Turkey are culturally similar to us? (%)**

	Not similar at all	Not similar	Combined not similar	Neither similar, nor not similar	Similar	Very similar	Combined similar	No idea/ No response
Sex								
Female	50,7	28,8	**79,5**	9,6	8,2	0,3	**8,5**	2,4
Male	53,5	22,2	**75,7**	12,8	8,8	0,3	**9,1**	2,4
Age Groups								
18-24	49,8	28,4	**78,2**	11,3	8,0	-	**8,0**	2,5
25-34	49,2	27,7	**76,9**	11,7	9,0	0,4	**9,4**	2,0
35-44	58,1	22,7	**80,8**	9,1	7,7	0,6	**8,3**	1,8
45-54	51,8	22,7	**74,5**	13,0	8,8	-	**8,8**	3,7
55-64	53,7	21,6	**75,3**	11,7	9,9	0,6	**10,5**	2,5
65+	51,6	20,3	**71,9**	10,9	10,9	1,6	**12,5**	4,7
Educational Attainment								
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	49,1	37,7	**86,8**	5,7	7,5	-	**7,5**	-
Primary school	56,7	22,5	**79,2**	8,0	9,2	0,2	**9,4**	3,4
Middle-school	52,6	24,9	**77,5**	13,6	5,2	1,2	**6,4**	2,5
High-school or equivalent	51,8	24,9	**76,7**	11,2	9,7	0,2	**9,9**	2,2
University/ Graduate degree	48,6	28,2	**76,8**	13,0	8,0	-	**8,0**	2,2
Region								
Border cities	67,6	15,8	**83,4**	7,7	8,1	0,2	**8,3**	0,6
Other cities	48,3	27,8	**76,1**	12,1	8,6	0,3	**8,9**	2,9
Metropolitan cities	48,8	26,8	**75,6**	13,2	8,3	0,5	**8,8**	2,4
Non-metropolitan cities	48,1	28,3	**76,4**	11,5	8,7	0,2	**8,9**	3,2
Occupation								
Private sector employee	56,3	24,5	**80,8**	8,9	8,1	0,2	**8,3**	2,0
Artisan/ Tradesman	53,3	22,0	**75,3**	14,3	8,1	0,2	**8,3**	2,1
Housewife/girl	50,0	30,3	**80,3**	7,4	9,0	0,5	**9,5**	2,8
Student	45,6	27,8	**73,4**	14,6	9,7	-	**9,7**	2,3
Unemployed	48,1	31,7	**79,8**	9,5	6,9	-	**6,9**	3,8
Retired	61,5	13,7	**75,2**	12,8	7,7	-	**7,7**	4,3
Public sector employee	47,8	31,0	**78,8**	13,3	6,2	-	**6,2**	1,7
Self-employed	58,2	15,5	**73,7**	13,6	10,0	1,8	**11,8**	0,9
Businessperson	52,6	22,8	**75,4**	10,6	14,0	-	**14,0**	-
General	**52,1**	**25,5**	**77,6**	**11,2**	**8,5**	**0,3**	**8,8**	**2,4**

Another important issue is whether the Turkish society perceives the presence of Syrians as a positive contribution to cultural diversity and richness. When asked to what extent they agreed with the statement *"Syrians are culturally enriching us"*, a huge 87,5% of the respondents disagreed. Even though there seems to be a slight decrease in this figure from SB-2019, it is still a very high percentage showing that Turkish society does not appear to believe that Syrians would play an enriching role for culture in Turkey.

SB-2020-TABLE 17: To what extent do you agree with the following statement concerning the impact of Syrians living in Turkey? (%)

"Syrians are culturally enriching us"

	Completely Disagree	Disagree	Combined DISAGREE	Neither agree, Nor disagree	Agree	Completely Agree	Combined AGREE	No opinion/ No response
SB-2017	52,8	31,8	84,6	7,7	5,7	0,5	8,2	1,5
SB-2019	79,3	11,1	90,4	**3,3**	3,7	0,6	4,3	**2,0**
SB-2020	68,1	19,4	**87,5**	5,8	4,8	0,5	**5,3**	1,4

FGD Findings: Perception of Cultural Similarity

In line with the survey findings, a large majority of the FGD participants, particularly including those in the border cities, appear to believe that Syrians are not culturally similar to Turks, at all. In fact, one consistent theme in the border FGDs was, no matter what the actual question at that point would be, that Syrians have an extremely different culture. Moreover, it was repeatedly and often harshly suggested that their culture was in many ways backward and inferior compared to the Turkish culture.

It needs to be noted that many participants, particularly at the metropolitan FGDs, raised objections to this question rightly suggesting that neither the Syrian community nor the Turkish society is culturally homogenous. On the contrary, both contain remarkable degrees of ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity. Obviously, what was intended by the question is not to claim or impose cultural homogeneity to these diverse communities, but to investigate participants' perceptions at a most general and abstract level. It is interesting to note that many participants seem to object to the notion of a single 'Turkish culture' while embracing a quite reified and homogenous idea of 'the Syrian culture'.

-There is a big diversity among the Syrians- Arabs, Turkomans, etc. The cultural structure in Turkey is also very heterogeneous. (Ankara-Civil Servants)

-We have a very cosmopolitan social structure with people from many different cultures. Therefore, they are culturally similar to some of these people and are very different from others. (İstanbul-Women)

As already mentioned, a majority reported believing not only that Syrians are culturally very dissimilar from Turkish society, but also that their culture is quite contradictory with and inferior to the Turkish one. One can immediately detect a modernist understanding of cultural progress, where cultures are often placed on a linear continuum ranging from 'less developed', 'backward', 'inferior' or 'primitive' cultures to 'more developed', 'advanced', 'superior' or 'civilized' ones. It appeared from most FGDs, and again more particularly in the ones in border cities, that there is a significant perception that Turkey being a more advanced country, Turkish culture is not only very different from but also more advanced than the Syrian culture.

-The dominant gender roles are very different for us and them. Particularly Syrian women are affected very negatively by this. We are not an entirely secular society and we have problems regarding gender issues, as well. We can say we are in a tiny bit better position than the Syrians. (İstanbul-Artisans/Workers)

-They are not similar at all and they are not trying to become similar. Effort is very important and they are displaying none of it. (Hatay-Students)

-The way they dress, table culture, the cuisine, etc... they have nothing to do with us whatsoever. They are awake at nights and asleep during the day, for example. (Hatay-Artisans/ Workers)

Before moving to the perceived cultural similarities with Syrians, it is important to underline an important point. In several places above, a quite common perception among the participants of metropolitan city FGDs was presented, which was that Syrians are culturally more similar to people in Turkish cities that are located in the eastern and south-eastern parts of the country. As can be seen from the testimonies above, the participants from two such cities clearly and firmly reject such an argument. Those who most aggressively rejected such an argument and who argued the exact opposite point that they are culturally very different from Syrians were the participants from Hatay- a city that shares a long history with Syria and that hosts a large Arabic-speaking native population. Very briefly, this outright rejection of cultural similarity and emphasis on the many cultural differences perceived between Syrians and the Turkish society suggests a deliberate attempt to put distance between the two communities.

Some participants, in turn, suggested that there are significant similarities between the Syrian and Turkish cultures that include the cuisines, religion, and lifestyles. Accordingly, these similarities are a natural outcome of a common past during the Ottoman times as well as geographical proximity. It needs to be highlighted once more that this argument was made more frequently by the participants living in metropolitan cities, while most of those in border city FGDs stood firm on their insistence of cultural difference.

5. Interactions and Communication with Syrians

The number of Syrians under temporary protection has exceeded 4,38% of Turkish population as of December 2020, while only 1,61% of the Syrians live in camps. However, it is known that there are significant differences concerning the respective Syrian populations among regions, cities, districts, and even neighborhoods. The available data shows that the society is very much aware of Syrians and cohabitation is already underway. Beyond this awareness, however, when the "quality and intensity of relations" are concerned, a significance distance is observed. This study shows that social relations of almost all sorts are increasing between Syrians and the Turkish society. This increase is due to a growing fluency in Turkish language amongst Syrians and their increased involvement in the working life either as workers or entrepreneurs. Interestingly, social problems and fighting are also on the increase. This shows the complicated nature of social life.

SB-2020-TABLE 18: Please state whether or not you have ever established the following types of social relationship with Syrians? (%)

(For other versions of cross-tabulations with this question, see Additional Tables)

		2017			2019			2020		
		Yes	No	No idea/ No response	Yes	No	No idea/ No response	Yes	No	No idea/ No response
1	To have a conversation	46,1	53,0	0,9	38,0	61,5	0,5	48,4	50,6	1,0
2	To shop (from a Syrian)	26,5	72,7	0,8	19,6	79,9	0,5	27,4	71,3	1,3
3	To establish a business relationship	15,6	82,8	1,6	12,2	87,3	0,5	19,6	79,0	1,4
4	To be friends	14,2	84,0	1,8	12,1	87,5	0,4	21,3	77,5	1,2
5	To have a problem*	10,6	87,2	2,2	12,9	86,7	0,4	19,7	79,0	1,3
6	To fight*				7,7	91,9	0,4	13,2	85,7	1,1
7	To flirt	3,4	94,9	1,7	0,6	99,0	0,4	4,9	93,8	1,3
8	To get married	2,9	95,6	1,5	0,4	99,2	0,4	4,9	93,9	1,2
9	Support/ Solidarity	-	-	-	-	-	-	30,5	67,9	1,6
* "To have a problem" and "to fight" were included within a single statement in SB-2017.										

When the demographic profiles of the respondents are considered, slight differences appear depending on sex, age groups, educational attainment, occupations and regions. Similarly, positive and negative divergence in the experiences can be observed among respondents from border cities where large Syrian communities live the most densely. For instance, while positive social relations such as friendship or establishing business relationships are more frequently reported by respondents in border cities, negative ones such as experiencing problems or fighting also appear to be more intensively experienced in these cities. However, it needs to be noted that these differences do not constitute major deviations from the national averages in this question.

FGD Findings: Interactions and Communication with Syrians

FGD participants were asked what sort of social experiences they have had and relationships they have established with Syrians. As to be expected, the participants who reported having the most frequent and intense relations were those from the border city FGDs.

As mentioned, the border cities are where the visibility of Syrians is increasing every day, naturally affecting the perceptions. However, as the testimonies above indicate, the fact that cities like İstanbul and Ankara are more metropolitan places also appears to affect people's perceptions. Since other communities are living in these cities like Somalians for a long time, people appear to consider Syrians' presence more naturally.

> *- I cannot say I have regular relations or interaction with Syrians. I attended an Arabic course at TÖMER about 6 years ago. There we had two Syrian teachers who would come for speaking classes. One was a very-well educated lawyer and the other was a teacher. The lawyer left his family back in Syria. He wanted to use Turkey as a stepping stone to get to Europe and then bring his family. The other one had two wives back in Syria and he said he wanted to marry a Turkish woman to stay in Turkey permanently. And he was trying his luck with the teachers at the course and they asked him to stop coming eventually. (Ankara-Civil Servants)*

The last contribution above is quite telling. It displays some of the stereotypes about Syrians commonly mentioned by Turkish participants, particularly in the metropolitan cities. Most strikingly in this example is the dual perception of Syrians: there are some decent ones, who are well-educated and not very different from us, and then there are those who have multiple wives and who are culturally very different from us. It goes on to suggest that the ones in the first group wish to go to Europe while Turkey will end up with those in the second group. In fact, the argument that 'Europe already tricked us and got the best Syrians while leaving us with the uneducated and poor' is repeated numerous times in response to many different questions.

In the border cities of Hatay and Gaziantep, the experiences described by the participants almost always have this emphasis on 'Us versus Them'. It appears to underline the above-made point that in these cities Syrians are singled out as the foreign community. It also appears to be the case that, much more than the participants of İstanbul and Ankara FGDs, participants in these discussions perceive a lack of trying on the part of Syrians to adapt to life in Turkey and form good relations with the native population. As will be presented in the next section, this also reflects on the perception of Syrians as 'ungrateful' and 'irresponsible'. The underlying logic in the FGDs in these border cities appears to suggest that 'we helped them by opening our doors, so now they need to show gratefulness to us and it is their responsibility to make an effort to adapt, e.g. by learning the Turkish language.'

> *We had some Syrians working with us in my previous job. But they would usually remain within their group and didn't communicate with us. We didn't have any problems but we didn't have a relationship either. (G.Antep-Unemployed)*

> *-I am a housewife. I see my Syrian neighbors all the time but Syrian women don't speak the language so we can't really communicate. We don't have much of good neighborly relations for this reason. (G.Antep-Women)*

A significant number of FGD participants, both Turkish and Syrian, suggest that Syrian children who started school in Turkey or joined Turkish national education at a young age are much better adapted to life in Turkey (this is discussed more thoroughly in the various sections on social cohesion). The most significant reason for this perception appears to be related to the Turkish language. Accordingly, young Syrian children learned Turkish at school and made Turkish friends. Moreover, they are perceived to have adapted to the 'Turkish culture' and local way of life.

> -I don't have Syrian friends but my kids do. They have good communication with the Syrian children in their classes. And they also spend time together outside. In the beginning, we were concerned but now we don't worry about this. My children even learned some Arabic words. But, the classrooms got too crowded and the quality of education suffered. (G.Antep-Unemployed)

> -We occasionally send food to each other [with Syrians] through kids. But we don't visit each other's houses. Our husbands don't have any communication with each other anyway and we cannot talk to the women because they don't speak the language. **The children are like a bridge between us.** (G.Antep-Women)

6. Support to Syrians

It is obvious that there was a considerable degree of social solidarity and support towards Syrians by the Turkish society since the arrival of first Syrian groups in 2011. Independently from the support services provided by Turkish public institutions, this solidarity and support has become more visible particularly with Syrians living outside of the camps and in urban places. To better understand the quality of and changing trends in the attitudes towards Syrians, it is important to collect data on the support "in cash or in kind". The survey respondents, thus, were asked "Have you ever provided in cash or in-kind assistance to Syrians (except for giving money to beggars)?". While the share of the respondents who said "yes" was 34,1% in SB-2019, it increased to 40,5% in SB-2020. [134] A demographic breakdown of responses doesn't appear to yield any significant and meaningful differences. The most noteworthy finding could be that the support provided by the respondents in the border cities is below the overall average.

SB-2020-TABLE 19: Have you ever provided in cash or in-kind assistance to Syrians (except for giving money to beggars)?

	2019		2020	
	#	%	#	%
Yes	774	34,1	914	40,5
No	1446	63,7	1237	54,7
Don't remember/ No response	51	2,2	108	4,8
Total	**2271**	**100,0**	**2259**	**100,0**

134. In the 2014 study "Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration", those who stated that they have provided assistance to Syrians was around 30%. See: p.129.

SB-2020-TABLE 20: Have you ever provided in cash or in-kind assistance to Syrians (except for giving money to beggars)? (%)

	Yes	No	Don't remember/ No response
Sex			
Female	38,5	56,5	5,0
Male	42,3	53,1	4,6
Age Groups			
18-24	32,9	59,0	8,1
25-34	41,8	53,9	4,3
35-44	46,6	50,8	2,6
45-54	43,0	55,2	1,8
55-64	43,2	53,7	3,1
65+	45,3	46,9	7,8
Educational Attainment			
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	43,4	50,9	5,7
Primary school	44,3	52,3	3,4
Middle-school	38,4	58,4	3,2
High-school or equivalent	39,6	55,9	4,5
University/ Graduate degree	39,9	52,7	7,4
Region			
Border cities	39,8	52,9	7,3
Other cities	40,6	55,2	4,2
Metropolitan cities	37,7	59,7	2,6
Non-metropolitan cities	42,1	53,0	4,9
Occupation			
Private sector employee	36,9	58,6	4,5
Artisan/Tradesman	49,4	48,4	2,2
Housewife/ girl	41,3	54,6	4,1
Student	34,1	59,3	6,6
Unemployed	34,4	58,7	6,9
Retired	40,2	56,4	3,4
Public sector employee	45,1	45,1	9,8
Self-employed	42,7	55,5	1,8
Businessperson	52,6	45,6	1,8
General	**40,5**	**54,7**	**4,8**

It was observed in the previous studies that there had been a decreasing trend in the support provided by Turkish society to Syrians, which had been at a remarkable level particularly in the first years with a growing realization that Syrians were going to be permanent in the country. However, with the influence of the pandemic, it appears that the level of support has grown again. The 914 respondents who said that they have provided a form of assistance to Syrians were further asked how they provided the assistance. Since Syrians had to struggle with more severe economic challenges amidst the pandemic for the past 1 year, the below question was also considered to understand more about the dynamics of solidarity during the pandemic.

When asked "Have you provided in cash or in-kind support to Syrians in the past 1 year?", 79,7% of the respondents replied affirmatively. While there is no significant difference in different demographic groups, it can be noted that the average support provided to Syrians in the past year in border cities is below that of the overall average.

SB-2020-TABLE 21: Have you provided in cash or in-kind support to Syrians in the past 1 year?

	#	%
Yes	728	79,7
No	174	19,0
Don't remember/ No response	12	1,3
Total	**914**	**100,0**

* Results from those respondents who said "Yes" to the question "Have you ever provided in cash or in-kind assistance to Syrians (except for giving money to beggars)?".

SB-2020-TABLE 22: Have you provided in cash or in-kind support to Syrians in the past 1 year? (%)

	Yes	No	Don't remember/ No response
Sex			
Female	78,4	19,8	1,8
Male	80,8	18,4	0,8
Age Groups			
18-24	79,5	17,5	3,0
25-34	76,2	22,0	1,8
35-44	81,3	18,3	0,4
45-54	83,8	16,2	-
55-64	75,7	24,3	-
65+	82,8	17,2	-
Educational Attainment			
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	69,6	30,4	-
Primary school	77,7	20,7	1,6
Middle-school	85,7	14,3	-
High-school or equivalent	77,9	20,2	1,9
University/ Graduate degree	82,0	17,0	1,0
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	75,6	22,7	1,7
Region			
Border cities	75,6	22,7	1,7
Other cities	80,6	18,2	1,2
Metropolitan cities	80,5	17,3	2,2
Non-metropolitan cities	80,7	18,6	0,7
Occupation			
Private sector employee	78,1	20,4	1,5
Artisan/Tradesman	83,0	16,5	0,5
Housewife/ girl	73,5	24,5	2,0
Student	79,0	17,6	3,4
Unemployed	84,6	15,4	-
Retired	80,9	19,1	-
Public sector employee	82,4	17,6	-
Self-employed	83,0	17,0	-
Businessperson	76,7	20,0	3,3
General	**79,7**	**19,0**	**1,3**

Note: : Results from those respondents who said "Yes" to the question "Have you ever provided in cash or in-kind assistance to Syrians (except for giving money to beggars)?".

Those respondents who replied "no" were further asked the question "why haven't you provided any support to Syrians?". The most frequently given response was "I didn't want to give support", followed by "I have preferred to provide support to our own citizens that are in need" and "I don't believe that they need support", respectively.

SB-2020-TABLE 23: Why haven't you provided any support to Syrians? (Multiple Responses)

		#	%
1	I didn't want to give support	595	42,2
2	I have preferred to provide support to our own citizens that are in need	332	23,5
3	I don't believe that they need support	261	18,5
4	They are already receiving support from many institutions	217	15,4
5	I don't have sufficient financial resources to give support	204	14,5
6	I couldn't find a way/ an opportunity to help	172	12,2
7	Providing support to them would make them lazy, I wouldn't want them to get used to it	43	3,0
8	Other	7	0,5
	No idea/ No response	33	2,3

* Results from those respondents who said "No" to the questions "Have you ever provided in cash or in-kind assistance to Syrians (except for giving money to beggars)?" and "Have you provided in cash or in-kind support to Syrians in the past 1 year?"

7. Social Distance

Measuring the social distance between the Turkish society and Syrians under temporary protection whose number has surpassed 3,6 million was determined as one of the key objectives of Syrian Barometer research. The concept of "social distance", developed by Emory S. Bogardus in 1925, provides a very useful tool for discussing the terms of social cohesion.[135] The scales applied regularly by the Syrian Barometer research to measure social distance are important to uncover dynamics of living together. In calculating a social distance measure with Syrians, Cluster and Discriminant analyses were used. In this framework, scoring was conducted by assigning "1" to those who said "I agree", "0" to those who said "I partly agree", and "-1" to those who said "I disagree". Next, the average score for each question was calculated to reach the overall social distance score. In this calculation, considering the distribution of the data, the "Cluster analysis" was used to form 5 groups. The appropriateness of these groups was confirmed by the "Discriminant analysis". A strong corre-

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135. E.S.Bogardus (1925) "Social Distance and Its Origins." Journal of Applied Sociology 9 (1925): 216-226.

lation of 98,5% was found between the scoring and these 5 groups.[136] To measure social distance, the respondents were given 10 statements in this context and asked to state to what extent they agreed with each of these. The findings suggest that a significant social distance put forth by Turkish society towards Syrians continues to exist, even though there is a slight decrease in SB-2020. To be more precise, the social distance score of -0,51 that was calculated in SB-2019 decreased to -0,42 in SB-2020, which is still in the "distant" category.

SB-2020-TABLE 24: **SB-2020-Social Distance Groups**

	#	%	Social Distance Score
Very distant	792	35,2	-0,99
Distant	589	26,2	-0,62
Neither distant, nor close	428	19,1	-0,11
Close	282	12,6	0,38
Very close	156	6,9	0,86
General	**2247**	**100,0**	**-0,42**

Scores bt -1,00; -0,80 Very Distant	Scores bt -0,79; -0,40 Distant	Scores bt -0,39; -0,19 Neither Distant, Nor Close	Scores bt -0,20; -0,69 Close	Scores bt -0,70; -1,00 Very Close

When the details of social distance findings are considered, the highest degree of acceptance appears to concern education. Here, the statement "It wouldn't disturb me if Syrian children would enroll to the same school as my children" returned the highest percentage of agreement with 37%. This was followed, with decreasing support, by "working in the same work place", "living in the same building", and "living in the same neighborhood", respectively. The social distance is the biggest, in turn, regarding "getting married" (for self, children, and/or siblings of the respondents) and "forming a business partnership" with Syrians. When the SB-2019 and SB-2020 data are compared, it is observed that social distance was slightly reduced on all statements except for "forming a business partnership".

136. For more details on Cluster and Discriminant Analysis See: C Fraley and A.E.Raftery (1999) Software for Model-Based Cluster and Discriminant Analysis (http://132.180.15.2/math/statlib/S/mclust/old/mclust.pdf)

SB-2020-TABLE 25: **To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (%)**

			I Disagree -	I Partially Agree -/+	I Agree +	No idea/ No response
	It wouldn't disturb me if Syrian children would enroll to the same school as my children	**2020**	**43,7**	**16,3**	**37,0**	**3,0**
		2019	52,0	13,2	32,3	2,5
	It wouldn't disturb me to work with a Syrian in the same work place	**2020**	**48,1**	**17,1**	**32,4**	**2,4**
		2019	56,3	12,6	28,2	2,9
	Bi It wouldn't disturb me to live with a Syrian in the same building	**2020**	**53,4**	**17,9**	**26,5**	**2,2**
		2019	60,4	14,8	23,3	1,5
	It wouldn't disturb me if some Syrian families would settle down in the neighborhood that I live	**2020**	**53,0**	**18,2**	**26,3**	**2,5**
		2019	59,4	14,2	24,7	1,7
	I can be friends with a Syrian	**2020**	**54,7**	**17,8**	**25,6**	**1,9**
		2019	61,1	15,4	21,8	1,7
	It wouldn't disturb me to settle down in a neighborhood where the majority of residents are Syrian	**2020**	**62,3**	**14,5**	**20,9**	**2,3**
		2019	70,5	11,3	16,7	1,5
	I can form a business partnership with a Syrian	**2020**	**72,7**	**12,1**	**11,9**	**3,3**
		2019	75,3	10,2	12,1	2,4
	I can form a business partnership with a Syrian	**2020**	**77,4**	**9,5**	**10,4**	**2,7**
		2019	81,3	8,5	8,2	2,0
	I would allow my child to get married with a Syrian	**2020**	**78,7**	**9,4**	**9,3**	**2,6**
		2019	81,5	8,5	7,6	2,4
	I can get married with a Syrian	**2020**	**84,7**	**6,1**	**6,6**	**2,6**
			86,9	6,6	5,0	1,5

When SB-2017, SB-2019, and SB-2020 findings are considered, the social distance towards Syrians displayed by the Turkish society falls in the category of "distant" in all three studies. However, it is noteworthy that while the respondents in the "very distant" group constituted 36,1% of all respondents in SB-2017, it increased to 51% in SB-2019, and decreased again to 35,2% (-0,99 points) in SB-2020.

SB-2020-TABLE 26: Social Distance Groups*

	SB-2017			SB-2019			SB-2020		
	#	%	Social Distance Score	#	%	Social Distance Score	#	%	Social Distance Score
Very distant	748	36,1	-0,95	1157	51,0	-0,97	792	35,2	-0,99
Distant	555	26,8	-0,51	347	15,3	-0,55	589	26,2	-0,62
Neither distant, nor close	363	17,5	-0,02	383	16,9	-0,10	428	19,1	-0,11
Close	220	10,6	0,44	244	10,8	0,36	282	12,6	0,38
Very close	186	9,0	0,88	135	6,0	0,87	156	6,9	0,86
General	**2072**	**100,0**	**-0,36**	**2266**	**100,0**	**-0,51**	**2247**	**100,0**	**-0,42**

*Some individuals who didn't provide answers to the social distance questions (17 in SB-2017, 5 in SB-2019, and 12 in SB-2020) were not included in the social distance groups.

SB-2020-FIGURE 22: Social Distance between Turkish Society and Syrians

	-1		0		1
	Very Distant	Distant		Close	Very Close
SB-2017		▲-0,36		▲0,51	
SB-2019	▲-0,51				▲0,74
SB-2020					▲0,71
		-0,42▲			
	▲ Turkish Society			▲ Syrians in Turkey	

The social distance scale applied here shows that there is a considerable social distance put forth towards Syrians. It is observed that social distance grows in older age groups and as the educational attainment level gets lower. Similarly, women seem to place a larger social distance than men. However, the most striking findings regarding social distance can be seen in the border cities. While the overall combined share of "very distant" and "distant" is 61,4% for Turkey, the same share is 71,2% in the border cities. It is noteworthy that the relative cultural closeness with Syrians in the region does not reduce social distance. In fact, to the contrary, a significantly larger social distance is measured in these cities.

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SB-2020-TABLE 27: Social Distance Groups (%)

	Very distant	Distant	Neither distant, nor close	Close	Very close
Sex					
Female	34,9	26,7	19,8	12,8	5,8
Male	35,6	25,8	18,3	12,3	8,0
Age Groups					
18-24	31,2	27,2	20,6	16,7	4,3
25-34	33,1	26,8	21,8	11,4	6,9
35-44	39,4	24,6	18,1	10,4	7,5
45-54	37,1	26,1	14,9	10,3	11,6
55-64	42,2	24,2	14,9	10,6	8,1
65+	37,1	29,0	19,4	9,7	4,8
Educational Attainment					
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	41,5	28,3	9,4	9,4	11,4
Primary school	43,3	24,8	15,5	8,8	7,6
Middle-school	39,3	24,1	17,4	12,5	6,7
High-school or equivalent	32,8	27,3	18,8	14,2	6,9
University/ Graduate degree	29,2	26,7	24,8	13,1	6,2
Region					
Border cities	50,1	21,1	14,7	9,3	4,8
Other cities	31,6	27,5	20,1	13,3	7,5
Metropolitan cities	35,8	27,5	15,0	12,8	8,9
Non-metropolitan cities	29,5	27,5	22,6	13,6	6,8
Occupation					
Private sector employee	37,2	26,5	18,2	11,3	6,8
Artisan/Tradesman	35,7	22,8	17,9	14,2	9,4
Housewife/ girl	41,6	24,0	18,4	8,8	7,2
Student	26,9	28,1	22,3	17,8	4,9
Unemployed	34,0	31,9	18,1	12,8	3,2
Retired	40,9	27,8	12,2	12,2	6,9
Public sector employee	34,5	25,7	19,5	11,5	8,8
Self-employed	31,5	31,5	22,2	9,3	5,5
Businessperson	26,3	21,1	26,3	15,8	10,5
General	**35,2**	**26,2**	**19,1**	**12,6**	**6,9**

Note: 12 people were not included in the grouping because they did not answer the social distance questions.

FGD Findings: Social Distance

In the FGDs the same hypothetical questions were posed, but unlike the surveys, this time the respondents were asked to explain their answers. The most intimate type of relationship inquired in this context was marriage, which initiated some of the most heated discussions. The significant dividing line between the metropolitan and border city FGDs seems to continue here: a majority of the participants in the metropolitan cities replied that as long as they think the person was desirable based on personal qualities, they would marry them, irrespective of nationality. In contrast, a slimmer majority in the border city FGDs suggested that they would not marry a Syrian person because of the perceived cultural differences. In most FGDs, it needs to be highlighted, there were participants who responded positively and negatively to this question.

> -As long as we get along well, why not? … It doesn't matter which nationality the other person has, if I feel good about it, I would marry them. … I have people in my family who have married foreign spouses. So it wouldn't be a problem for me. (Ankara-Students)

> -[All participants except one] It wouldn't be a problem if I love him/her. (Ankara-Civil Servants)

> -I don't think we could get along. I am from Sivas and my spouse is from Ankara. Even we have some cultural conflicts at home. It would be so much worse with someone from another country. But of course, love is blind. (Ankara-Civil Servants)

> -I wouldn't want it. This is someone I don't know from a different country. I wouldn't be able to trust them. Maybe after getting married he is going to steal my stuff. (Hatay-Artisans/Workers)

The next question, i.e. whether the participants would want to do business/work with Syrians, seem to have split the groups into two. On the one hand, some suggested that they would not mind doing business or working with Syrians, as long as they find someone they can trust. Some participants even added that it might even be preferable in that a Syrian partner might be good to attract business from Syrians. The other major group, on the other hand, said that they would not want to do business with Syrians. For reasons, the most frequently mentioned one was a lack of trust in Syrians. Additionally, some people suggested that their decision was because of Syrians insecure legal status.

> (+)

> -I would want it because they are hardworking and honest people who do their jobs well. (Ankara-Civil Servants)

> -There are very talented and qualified ones among them. A Syrian employee was working with my mother [at a hairdresser]. She spoke English and French. So if it is someone skilled and qualified like this, why not. (Hatay-Students)

> (-)

> -I think I wouldn't want it because there are some legal discrepancies in their status in

Turkey. I would be afraid of being negatively affected by these. If that person just left the country, what could I do legally. (Ankara-Civil Servants)

-It is not easy to do business with them. For one thing, these people are not citizens, they are refugees. If we were to have a problem, how can we protect ourselves? (G.Antep-Unemployed)

-I wouldn't want to do business or work with Syrians while Turks are unemployed. I would want my own people to work and earn money. (Hatay-Students)

A very large majority of FGD participants said that they would have no problems befriending Syrians. A small number of participants mentioned the difficulties of this happening due to language problems and cultural differences, yet almost no one put forward a categoric rejection.

The opinions about being neighbors with Syrians were more diverse. While there were some participants, particularly in the metropolitan cities, who suggested that they wouldn't mind having Syrian neighbors; there were also some who said that they would not prefer having Syrian neighbors. The reasons suggested for not wanting Syrian neighbors included the perceptions about Syrians that they have very large households, they are noisy, and they are not considerate of others. Some participants also mentioned that they would feel insecure living with Syrians as their neighbors. Those who said that they wouldn't mind having Syrian neighbors usually provided some caveats.

(+)

-If it is not an area where they live in very large numbers, it wouldn't be a problem for me. When they are few in numbers they adapt to their environment, but when they are too many it becomes unlivable. (Ankara-Civil Servants)

-If it is not a large family and if they speak Turkish, I would want it. (Ankara-Civil Servants)

-I already have Syrian neighbors. We do not communicate much. But there are Turkish neighbors who get along with them very well. They visit each other, their children play together. (G.Antep- Unemployed)

(-)

-I wouldn't want it from all the things I heard about them being noisy. (Ankara-Civil Servants)

-I would be hesitant. They live as very large families. They make too much noise. And their sleep patterns are upside down, they don't go to bed until very late at night. (İstanbul-Unemployed)

-I wouldn't want them as neighbors. And I wouldn't rent out my house to them. I think they are not clean and they live as too many people in a single home. (İstanbul-Women)

Lastly, the participants were asked whether they would want their children to be educated in the same classes as Syrian children. A majority of the participants replied affirmatively, suggesting that they wouldn't mind having Syrian students in the same classes as their children, as long as the

Syrians were not the majority. People who mentioned their hesitation as well as those who gave a negative response all explained themselves by referring to perceived risks to the quality of education their children would receive. Accordingly, when there are Syrian students in the classroom who would necessarily suffer due to language challenges and other reasons, the teachers would have to lower the overall level, which would hurt Turkish students' academic prospects. In other words, no participant challenged the right of Syrians to receive education in Turkey.

(+)

-My kid studied with Syrians. Last year, 15 students were Syrian in a class of 35. She learned different things from them. She learned what a war was, saw their psychology. Learned about different cultures. These were all positive things. (Ankara-Civil Servants)

-If they are all starting from the beginning, then no problem. (Hatay-Students)

-If the capacities of the school and the teacher are sufficient, it wouldn't create any problems. (G.Antep-Women)

(-)

-99% of families don't want their kids to be in the same class as Syrians when registering. They ask the number of foreign students, first thing. They try to get their children to classes with very few Syrian students and if they cannot manage, then they change schools. And the remaining 1% who don't do this are people who are not interested in their children's education. The reason for this is that Syrian students are placed in all grades and a great part of them don't speak Turkish. The younger ones, who start from scratch, know Turkish. Those in other grades don't know the language and they come with 0 education. The teachers have to adopt a special approach to get to these students, which is seen as a disadvantage for the Turkish students. (Ankara-Civil Servants)

-I wouldn't want it but not because they are Syrian. Education was affected. The difference between the academic levels of children is too large. How should the poor teacher give education to all of them? I think it would be better if they separated the classes. (G.Antep-Women)

8.   **Livelihood Sources: How Syrians in Turkey earn their living**

It is observed in many studies on social cohesion that a significant part of the complaints by the host societies against newcomers stems from the actual or perceived "financial burdens" created by them. In other words, support by public institutions financed by the taxes of citizens could invite criticisms as well as leading to negative perceptions. This issue is accentuated in Turkey where there is a significant lack of reliable information regarding Syrians. In fact, SB studies have uncovered that despite years of living together with Syrians, Turkish society has insufficient information regarding the livelihoods of Syrians, which is mostly based on prejudices and misinformation. One of the most important issues in this context is the widespread belief about "state's financial involvement", which hardly reflects the actual situation. When the Turkish respondents were asked the question

"How are the Syrians in Turkey making their living?", more than 80% of the respondents included "through assistance of the Turkish state" in their responses in all three SB surveys (SB-2017: 86,2%; SB-2019: 84,5%; SB-2020: 80,6%). Apparently, there is a trend of slight decrease in this perception.

SB-2020-TABLE 28: **How are the Syrians in Turkey making their living? (Multiple Responses)**

		2017		2019		2020	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
1	Through assistance from the Turkish state	1801	86,2	1918	84,5	1820	80,6
2	By begging	1359	65,1	1231	54,2	1199	53,1
3	By working	1040	49,8	1155	50,9	1123	49,7
4	Through support from charitable people	666	31,9	478	21,0	478	21,2
5	Through NGO (associations/ foundations) support	170	8,1	218	9,6	201	8,9
6	Through support from international organizations/ foreign states	101	4,8	181	8,0	152	6,7
7	Other	-	-	22	1,0	41	1,8
	No idea/ No response	19	0,9	31	1,4	41	1,8

The second most frequently given response is "by begging". There was a strong perception in this regard particularly between 2011 and 2014. This was because Syrians started to settle in urban centres and people started witnessing Syrian children and adults begging on the streets during these years. While this situation has been mostly taken under control by the public institutions, a large percentage of respondents, i.e. 53,1%, appears to keep believing that begging constitute a major source of livelihood for Syrians.

It is noteworthy that the belief that Syrians in Turkey make their living by "working" was manifested at around 50% in all three SB studies (SB-2017: 49,8%; SB-2019: 50,9%; SB-2020: 49,7%). However, as it can be seen in relevant sections below, the number of Syrians who receive support from various public institutions, including the ESSN support, accounts for around 40% of all Syrians. Even though SB research as well as other studies, particularly those conducted by IOM, show that Syrians predominantly work for their livelihood, the widespread perception among Turkish society has it differently. The respondents from the border cities, probably because of their personal experiences and observations, tend to believe that Syrians are making their living by working and the share of the response that they make a living through state's support is 5 percentile lower than the overall average.

SB-2020-TABLE 29: How are the Syrians in Turkey making their living? (Multiple Responses %)

	Through assistance from the Turkish state	By begging	By working	Through support from charitable people	Through NGO (associations/ foundations) support	Through support from international organizations/ foreign states	Other	No idea/ No response
Sex								
Female	79,8	54,0	49,9	23,3	9,3	7,1	1,3	2,2
Male	81,3	52,1	49,5	19,1	8,5	6,4	2,4	1,4
Age Groups								
18-24	75,0	52,1	49,2	18,7	10,6	8,2	1,0	2,2
25-34	83,0	53,3	49,8	22,3	7,2	6,8	1,8	1,0
35-44	81,6	52,8	49,2	21,5	8,1	5,7	2,0	1,6
45-54	84,8	53,9	52,4	21,2	9,7	6,1	2,4	1,8
55-64	85,2	53,1	48,1	27,8	8,0	6,8	4,3	1,9
65+	79,7	59,4	48,4	20,3	7,8	1,6	-	6,3
Educational Attainment								
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	79,2	54,7	39,6	26,4	3,8	11,3	-	1,9
Primary school	84,4	54,4	52,8	23,4	6,2	3,9	2,8	2,1
Middle-school	77,7	52,3	45,4	18,5	8,7	6,6	2,0	1,4
High-school or equivalent	79,6	51,8	52,2	19,6	10,1	7,8	2,0	1,6
University/ Graduate degree	81,1	54,7	46,3	23,5	9,7	6,8	0,6	2,3
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	75,3	44,3	60,0	8,1	3,6	10,0	4,3	1,4
Region								
Border cities	75,3	44,3	60,0	8,1	3,6	10,0	4,3	1,4
Other cities	81,8	55,2	47,2	24,3	10,2	5,9	1,2	1,9
Metropolitan cities	81,8	47,8	48,5	14,8	8,5	3,2	1,8	2,0
Non-metropolitan cities	81,8	58,8	46,6	29,0	11,0	7,3	0,9	1,9
Occupation								
Private sector employee	83,2	54,2	47,8	18,5	9,2	5,6	2,6	1,5
Artisan/Tradesman	78,8	49,6	52,6	17,5	5,7	4,9	1,7	0,7
Housewife/ girl	83,3	53,8	52,2	26,8	7,9	6,8	1,6	2,2
Student	75,9	50,7	53,0	24,6	13,2	11,2	1,1	1,7
Unemployed	77,2	55,6	38,6	14,8	9,0	7,9	-	3,2
Retired	85,5	61,5	49,6	20,5	8,5	3,4	5,1	1,7
Public sector employee	87,6	62,8	51,3	31,9	7,1	3,5	-	-
Self-employed	74,5	48,2	48,2	18,2	10,0	6,4	1,8	3,6
Businessperson	78,9	43,9	50,9	21,1	10,5	10,5	3,5	-
General	**80,6**	**53,1**	**49,7**	**21,2**	**8,9**	**6,7**	**1,8**	**1,8**

9. Looking at the Society from Outside

Survey respondents were asked some questions designed to understand how they would see their own society from an external perspective. The most frequently given response in all three SB studies to the question "How is our society treating Syrians in Turkey?" is "Turkish society has embraced Syrians". The share of the respondents who gave this response was 32,9% in SB-2017, 29,1% in SB-2019, and 35,8% in SB-2020.[137] Although another 'positive' response in this question, "Turkish society is doing everything it can for Syrians" was ranked second in SB-2017 (32,6%) and SB-2019 (30,8%), it retreated to third place in SB-2020 with a share of 18,9%. Conversely, the response "Syrians are exploited as cheap labor", which was ranked third in SB-2017 and SB-2019 receiving agreement from around 18% of respondents, climbed to second place with an increased share of 25,1%. The shares of the responses "Our society looks down on Syrians" and "Our society treats Syrians badly" are 8,9% and 7,4%, respectively. This can be interpreted as an indication of Turkish society's remarkable degree of support to Syrians as well as the existence of a self-critical view.

SB-2020-TABLE 30: **Which one of the following statements best reflects how our society treats Syrians? (%)**

(For other versions of cross-tabulations with this question, see Additional Tables)

		2017		2019		2020	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
1	Our society has embraced Syrians	687	32,9	660	29,1	809	35,8
2	Our society is exploiting Syrians as cheap labor	391	18,7	410	18,0	568	25,1
3	Our society is doing everything it can for Syrians	681	32,6	699	30,8	428	18,9
4	Our society looks down on Syrians	144	6,9	137	6,0	200	8,9
5	Our society treats Syrians badly	121	5,8	131	5,8	167	7,4
6	Other	-	-	-	-	23	1,1
	No idea/ No response	65	3,1	234	10,3	64	2,8
Total		2089	100,0	2271	100,0	2259	100,0

137. Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration Researchı-2014: "Turkish society embraced Syrians" "Those who agree: % 78, those who disagree: % 9,8.

10. Anxieties: Security, Serenity and Social Acceptance

It is clear that Turkish society has displayed an exceptionally high degree of "acceptance" and "solidarity" towards Syrians. It is becoming equally clear that it simultaneously has serious anxieties regarding them. As underlined and substantiated by SB-2017 and SB-2019, the "high level yet fragile support" appears to be turning into "toleration" due to these concerns and anxieties. As the crisis, which was expected to be quickly resolved in 2011, got prolonged and the numbers reached beyond millions in a short while, it can be observed that feelings of solidarity are getting weaker while anxieties are mounting. SB research attempted to uncover the reasons, types, and scope of the anxieties that Turkish society has regarding Syrians.

In both SB-2017 and SB-2019, anxieties in every field were found to be on a rising trend. In SB-2020, however, a slight decrease was observed in these anxieties. While the overall level of anxiety was calculated to be 3.2 in SB-2017, it increased to 3.6 in SB-2019. In SB-2020 this score declined to 3.5.[138] These figures already display a high level of anxiety. More importantly, the anxiety levels are rising. However, like previous studies, SB-2020 has found that Syrians do not seem to be aware of Turkish society's anxieties. In other words, it appears that Syrians either don't feel or are ignoring the anxieties of Turkish society. This finding also shows that despite the existence of harsh discourses and anxieties, there is a different reality being experienced in the daily life where social acceptance is still strong even if it is in the form of toleration.

SB-2020-TABLE 31: **To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding Syrians? (Scored)**

		2017	2019	2020
1	I am worried that Syrians will become citizens*	-	3,5	3,8
2	I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	3,4	3,8	3,7
3	I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	-	3,7	3,6
4	I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	3,3	3,6	3,6
5	I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	-	3,5	3,5
6	I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	3,4	3,7	3,5
7	I think that Syrians will harm our society	3,3	3,6	3,5
Average Score		3,2	3,6	3,5
8	I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	3,1	3,5	3,4
9	I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	2,9	3,4	3,0

0-2,99   3,0-5,0

* In SB-2019, this statement was "I think that they will become citizens and play a role on deciding Turkey's destiny and future".

138. SB-2017 included 6 statements on anxieties over Syrians in different areas, while SB-2019 and SB-2020 included 9.

It appears that the strongest concern/anxiety within Turkish society regarding Syrians concerns "citizenship". While the most significant concern in SB-2017 and SB-2019, "Syrians will harm Turkish economy", remains at a very high level with a score of 3.7 (72,3%), it appears that prospects of Syrians obtaining Turkish citizenship has topped it in 2020.

The four main concerns/anxieties that often emerge in the aftermath of incidents of mass human mobility include "loss of jobs", "increase in the crime rates", "deterioration of public services", and "corruption of identity" are all posed as questions to Turkish respondents. As can be seen in the table below, Turkish society appears to be least concerned with losing jobs among these four, which is ranked 7th among 9 statements. The anxiety score for this statement is 3.4 with 62,6% of respondents sharing this concern. Surely, this still manifests a very high level of concern/anxiety, suggesting that more than 62% of Turkish society are worried that they might lose their jobs because of Syrians. What is interesting, however, is that concerns such as Syrians will "harm the economy" (72,3%), [139] "harm the socio-cultural structure" (68,1%), "cause deterioration in public services" (67,9), "corrupt the identity of Turkish society" (65,6%), and "cause crime rates to increase" (63,6%) all outrank the fear of losing one's job.

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139. Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration-2014:
"I think that It is damaging Turkey's economy to take care of this many asylum-seekers"
Combined Agree: 70,8% / Combined Disagree: 21,4%
"I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution" Combined Agree: 62,3% / Combined Disagree: 23,1%
"It may lead to big problems if Syrians stayed in Turkey"
Combined Agree: % 76,5 / Combined Disagree: 16,5%

SB-2020-TABLE 32: **To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding Syrians? (%)**

		Completely disagree	Disagree	Combined Disagree	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	Combined Agree	No idea/ No response
1	I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	8,2	7,5	**15,8**	8,3	37,1	37,2	**74,2**	1,7
2	I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	7,9	8,8	**16,7**	9,1	43,8	28,5	**72,3**	1,9
3	I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	9,5	9,6	**19,0**	9,9	43,0	25,1	**68,1**	2,9
4	I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	8,1	10,0	**18,1**	10,9	42,5	25,5	**67,9**	3,0
5	I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	10,4	11,6	**22,0**	10,2	40,2	25,4	**65,6**	2,2
6	I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	8,9	10,1	**19,1**	14,3	38,5	25,1	**63,6**	3,1
7	I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	12,6	12,0	**24,7**	11,0	39,2	23,4	**62,6**	1,8
8	I think that Syrians will harm our society	11,4	11,6	**23,1**	12,9	40,1	22,3	**62,4**	1,7
9	I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	21,5	16,7	**38,2**	14,0	30,8	15,1	**45,8**	1,9

It has been found that individuals in the border cities are significantly more worried that other respondents. This holds true for all 9 statements attempting to measure anxiety. In fact, the average anxiety score for border cities is 3.9, while the Turkey average is 3.5. No other demographic group has an anxiety score that is higher than 3.6. In addition to showing the higher level of anxiety and tensions in the border cities, this finding is also important given the generally accepted argument that these cities are more culturally similar for Syrians than other regions. However, it appears that individuals living in these cities are more worried about Syrians "harming the socio-cultural structure in Turkey" and "corrupting Turkish identity" than they are about losing their jobs. This shows that the relationship between the assumed cultural closeness and social cohesion processes might not be as direct as it may be expected.

SB-2020-TABLE 33: To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding Syrians? (Scored)

(For other versions of cross-tabulations with this question, see Additional Tables)

	I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	Suriyelilerin toplumumuza I think that Syrians will harm our society	I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	Average Score
Sex										
Female	3,8	3,7	3,6	3,5	3,5	3,4	3,4	3,4	2,9	3,5
Male	3,8	3,7	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,6	3,5	3,4	3,0	3,5
Age Groups										
18-24	3,7	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,4	3,4	2,8	3,4
25-34	3,8	3,8	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,5	3,4	2,9	3,5
35-44	3,9	3,7	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,5	3,1	3,6
45-54	3,9	3,7	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,4	3,4	3,0	3,5
55-64	3,9	3,7	3,5	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,5	3,0	3,5
65+	3,8	3,7	3,2	3,3	3,3	3,5	3,4	3,4	3,0	3,4
Educational Attainment										
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	3,7	3,6	3,2	3,2	3,4	3,4	3,4	3,3	3,3	3,4
Primary school	3,9	3,8	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,7	3,5	3,6	3,1	3,6
Middle-school	3,8	3,7	3,7	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,5	2,9	3,5
High-school or equivalent	3,8	3,7	3,6	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,4	3,4	3,0	3,5
University/ Graduate degree	3,8	3,7	3,5	3,6	3,5	3,4	3,4	3,3	2,8	3,4
Region										
Border cities	4,1	3,9	4,0	4,0	4,0	4,0	3,8	4,0	3,4	3,9
Other cities	3,7	3,6	3,5	3,4	3,4	3,4	3,4	3,3	2,8	3,4
Metropolitan cities	3,7	3,6	3,5	3,5	3,4	3,5	3,3	3,5	2,9	3,4
Non-metropolitan cities	3,8	3,7	3,4	3,4	3,4	3,4	3,4	3,2	2,8	3,4
Working Status										
Private sector employee	3,9	3,8	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,0	3,6
Artisan/Tradesman	3,7	3,7	3,5	3,5	3,4	3,5	3,4	3,2	2,8	3,4
Housewife/ girl	3,8	3,6	3,5	3,4	3,5	3,5	3,4	3,5	3,1	3,5
Student	3,8	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,4	3,4	2,9	3,5
Unemployed	3,8	3,7	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,5	3,4	3,6	2,9	3,5
Retired	3,9	3,8	3,5	3,7	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,2	3,6
Public sector employee	3,9	3,8	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,6	3,5	3,4	3,0	3,6
Self-employed	4,0	3,8	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,5	3,1	3,6
Businessperson	3,7	3,5	3,4	3,6	3,3	3,4	3,3	2,9	2,7	3,3
General	3,8	3,7	3,6	3,6	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,4	3,0	3,5

11. Experiencing "personal harm" from Syrians and things "heard"

a. Experiencing Actual Harm

It is important to analyze the relationship between the anxieties regarding Syrians in the society and the experiences that would justify such concerns. Given that 57,4% in SB-2017, 61,1% in SB-2019, and with a significant decline, 45,8% of the respondents in SB-2020 agreed with the statement "I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children", it was inquired whether any actual harm was experienced by the respondents. In this context, the respondents were asked the question "have you experienced any harm from a Syrian in the last 5 years?" Those who replied affirmatively to this question constitute 11,4% of the respondents in SB-2020. The same share was 9,4% in SB-2017 and 13,7% in SB-2019. The share of those who reported that their family has experienced harm was 7,7% in SB-2017, 8% in SB-2019, and 6,8% in SB-2020. The number of respondents who said "yes" to the question "have you experienced harm to someone in your personal environment" was much higher accounting for 38% in SB-2017, 34,7% in SB-2019, and 30,8% in SB-2020. It is noteworthy that there has been a consistent decline in this question.

SB-2020-TABLE 34: **In the last 5 years, have you experienced the following caused by a Syrian? (%)**

(For other versions of cross-tabulations with this question, see Additional Tables)

	2017			2019			2020		
	Yes	No	Don't remember/ No response	Yes	No	Don't remember/ No response	Yes	No	Don't remember/ No response
Personal harm	9,4	90,4	0,2	13,7	86,0	0,3	11,4	87,8	0,8
Harm to someone in your your family	7,7	92,0	0,3	8,0	91,1	0,9	6,8	92,4	0,8
Harm to someone in your personal environment	38,0	57,4	4,6	34,7	63,5	1,8	30,8	67,3	1,9

There doesn't appear to be significant differences in this question depending on the demographic profiles of the respondents. Findings from the border cities could be expected to differ from the rest, however they do not. The only considerable differentiation is observed based on sex. The share of women who reported having experienced actual harm is 7,9% while the same is 14,9% among men.

b. Types of Harm Experienced

To better understand the anxieties, an additional question was asked in SB-2019 and SB-2020 regarding the type of harm that was reported. The respondents who said that they or someone from their family / personal environment were further asked "what kind of harm" they have experienced. They were given the chance to provide multiple responses on a list of 9 items. The majority of the responses appear to concentrate on 4 types of harm, which are "theft" (SB-2019: 43,5%; SB-2020: 47,9%), "bullying/harassment" (SB-2019: 40,5%; SB-2020: 45,4%), "violence" (SB-2019: 38,2%; SB-2020: 40,7%), and "unrest/noise" (SB-2019: 38%; SB-2020: 36,7%).

Available data that can be reached through official means, albeit limited, shows that crime rate amongst Syrians is well below average. However, this study finds that on average one in ten people reports having experienced "personal harm". Among these people, 40,7% suggest that they have experienced "violence". Undoubtedly, violence could be emotional as well as physical.

It is interesting that among types of harm experienced "loss of a job" was listed only as sixth, both in SB-2019 and SB-2020. This finding supports the argument that Syrians have not yet played a significant role in the loss of job of Turkish citizens.

SB-2020-TABLE 35: **What kind of harm have you experienced because of a Syrian? (Multiple responses)**

(For other versions of cross-tabulations with this question, see Additional Tables)

		2019		2020	
		#	%	#	%
1	Theft	386	43,5	385	47,9
2	Bullying/Harrasment	360	40,5	365	45,4
3	Violence	339	38,2	327	40,7
4	Unrest/Noise	337	38,0	295	36,7
5	Occupation of property	87	9,8	119	14,8
6	Loss of a job	57	6,4	45	5,6
7	Disruption of family order due to affair/marriage	45	5,1	22	2,7
8	Financial/economic damage	17	1,9	9	1,1
9	Other	48	5,4	12	1,5
	No idea/ No response	8	0,9	8	1,0

FGD Findings: Perception of Harm Suffered from Syrians

Since there is this general tone of discomfort and complaining from Syrians, more strongly in the border cities but also evident on a more general level in the metropolitan cities, the participants were asked whether they endured any direct harm from Syrians. Three findings are significant. Firstly, most of the 'harm' that is reported from Syrians is endured by and heard from others. Secondly, the perception that Syrians are harmful is significantly stronger in border cities. In fact, in quite a few of the Ankara and İstanbul FGDs, particularly including those conducted with young students, no one mentioned having experienced any harm from Syrians.

> -Many Syrians are living in Pendik. I witnessed their nonchalant attitudes while using public transportation. Not directly towards me, but this is what I observed. They had some cards in their hands and were riding public busses without paying anything. (İstanbul-Women)

> -There is a Syrian consulate in Nişantaşı, where my workplace is. There are dozens of Syrians there every day and I feel very uncomfortable when I am walking around there. Their attitudes are really annoying. There was even a photographer there who was at a point of closing his shop because of Syrians. (İstanbul-Women)

Third and lastly, the reported harm perceived to have received from Syrians is growing. While the first two of these findings are in line with the findings of the earlier round of FGDs conducted for SB-2019, the third one suggests that there might be a trend in the extent and intensity of the perceived damage from Syrians. For instance, while the FGDs in 2019 mostly listed things like crowdedness in the parks and similar public places, loud noises from Syrian neighbors late at night, and some indirect suggestions of increasing inflation and difficulty to find work for Turkish people; the participants more frequently mentioned things like severe crime including theft, fraud, and even murder this time around on top of the aforementioned.

> -There was this elderly man who was a farmer. He found a Syrian woman to marry. The woman asked for a lot of money and gold. Then, after spending one week with him, she left with all the money. (Hatay-Artisans/Workers)

> -We hear from around, from the TV. There are those who murder people, who steal stuff, who fight… But people from our nation also do these things. There are good and bad people in every nation. (G.Antep-Women)

12. Right to Work and Anxiety over Loss of Jobs

During mass migration inflows, anxiety over loss of jobs in the face of newly arrived cheap labor emerges in all receiving societies. This plays a significant role in galvanizing reactions against the newcomers. While this had been a widespread concern among Turkish society in the early years, it appears that it increasingly tends to become less of a priority. In other words, even though Syrians predominantly live and work in urban centers, the fear of losing jobs doesn't seem to be among the major anxieties. Naturally, such effects on the local population are felt more intensely in the border cities that are more densely populated by Syrians, compared to the overall average.

A regulation on the working of Syrians was introduced on 15 January 2016.[140] This regulation has allowed Syrians, upon the application of employers, to be employed with social security and not be paid less than the minimum wage. However, the number of Syrians officially employed on the basis of this regulation has remained quite low over the years. According to data released by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, there are interesting fluctuations in the number of work-permits issued to citizens of Syrian Arab Republic (i.e. those under temporary protection and those with residence permit) between 2011 and 2019.

SB-2020-TABLE 36: Number of work-permits issued to citizens of Syrian Arab Republic, 2011-2019[141]

YEAR	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Work-Permits	85	219	70	2.541	4.019	13.288	1.601	31.526	63.789

2019 Report on Work-Permits declares that 63.789 permits were issued to Syrians. However, since this figure also includes Syrians living in Turkey with residence permits, the number of Syrians under temporary protection that are issued a work-permit is unclear. Besides, even when it is assumed that all 63.789 work-permits were issued to Syrians under temporary protection, this figure only corresponds to less than 10% of Syrians who are actively working in Turkey.

SB studies show that at least 1 million Syrians are actively working in Turkey. However, a relationship between this and the rising unemployment in Turkey cannot be established. This has a lot to do with one of Turkish economy's most significant structural problems: a large informal economy. It is understood that most Syrians create themselves a space within this informal economy, thereby imposing a limited negative impact on the local labor force. This is why the fear of losing one's job ranks quite low among the anxieties of Turkish society.

The respondents were asked the question *"What kind of an arrangement should be made concerning the working of Syrians in Turkey?"*. When the responses in SB-2017, SB-2019, and SB-2020 are considered together, it is found that the response *"Under no circumstances should they be allowed to work/given work permits"* is consistently ranked at the top. While 54,6% and 56,8% of the respondents gave this response in SB-2017 and SB-2019, respectively; this share has slightly decreased to 49% in SB-2020.[142] The second most popular response in this question, also consistently in all three surveys, was *"They should be given work permits to work only in specific jobs"* (SB-2017: 29,8%; SB-2019: 21,4; and SB-2020: 24,4%). The least popular response, "*They should be given permanent work permits to work in any job"*, had the support of 5,5% of respondents in SB-2017, which first slightly dropped to 3,8% in SB-2019 and then increased to 7,4% in SB-2020.

140. Regulation on Foreigners Under Temporary Protection (15.01.2016) https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/3.5.20168375.pdf (Access: 22.05.2021), Also see: General Directorate of International Labor Force (Uluslararası İşgücü Genel Müdürlüğü), Manual for Work Permits of Foreigners under Temporary Protection
https://www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr/medias/6248/gkkuygulamarehberi1.pdf (Access: 22.05.2021)

141. Labor and Social Security Ministry (2020) Yabancıların Çalışma İzinleri-2019 / Work Permits of Foreigners-2019 https://www.csgb.gov.tr/istatistikler/calisma-hayati-istatistikleri/resmi-istatistik-programi/yabancilarin-calisma-izinleri/ (Access: 22.05.2021)

142. Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration-2014: Working Rights: Under no circumstance they should be allowed to work (47,4%), They should be given temporary work permits to work only in specific jobs (29,5%), They should be given temporary work permits to work in any job (13,2%), They should be given permanent work permits to work in any job (5,4%), they should be given permanent work permits to work only in specific jobs (4,5%).

In sum, Turkish society still appears to be highly concerned about giving work-permits to Syrians, with half the society objecting to this. It is interesting, however, that the same significant part of the society is simultaneously aggrieved by the widespread discourse of "Syrians are living off the support by Turkish state" thereby constituting a heavy burden on the Turkish taxpayers and by the prospects of Syrians having work-permits in Turkey.

SB-2020-TABLE 37: **What kind of an arrangement should be made concerning the working of Syrians in Turkey?**

	2017		2019		2020	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Under no circumstances should they be allowed to work/given work permits	1141	54,6	1290	56,8	1107	49,0
They should be given work permits to work only in specific jobs	621	29,8	487	21,4	552	24,4
They should be given temporary work permits to work in any job	169	8,1	336	14,8	363	16,1
They should be given permanent work permits to work in any job	115	5,5	85	3,8	168	7,4
Other	-	-	-	-	13	0,6
No idea/ No response	43	2,0	73	3,2	56	2,5
Total	**2089**	**100,0**	**2271**	**100,0**	**2259**	**100,0**

* The 2017 value of "They should be given work permits to work only in specific jobs" is calculated by adding "They should be given temporary work permits to work only in specific jobs" and "they should be given permanent work permits to work only in specific jobs".

SB-2020-TABLE 38: What kind of an arrangement should be made concerning the working of Syrians in Turkey? (%))

	Under no circumstances should they be allowed to work/given work permits	They should be given work permits to work only in specific jobs	They should be given temporary work permits to work in any job	They should be given permanent work permits to work in any job	Other	No idea/ No response
Sex						
Female	48,6	25,2	16,4	6,5	0,4	2,9
Male	49,4	23,7	15,7	8,3	0,8	2,1
Age Groups						
18-24	38,0	32,0	18,7	6,9	0,3	4,1
25-34	45,3	28,1	16,4	8,0	1,0	1,2
35-44	57,7	18,4	13,8	7,7	0,8	1,6
45-54	57,6	18,2	13,9	9,1	0,0	1,2
55-64	61,7	14,8	15,4	5,6	1,2	1,3
65+	54,7	15,6	15,6	3,1	-	11,0
Educational Attainment						
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	64,2	18,9	9,4	5,7	-	1,8
Primary school	61,7	15,4	13,5	6,7	0,9	1,8
Middle-school	50,6	22,0	17,1	7,2	0,6	2,5
High-school or equivalent	44,7	27,6	16,5	8,4	0,1	2,7
University/ Graduate degree	43,2	28,8	17,5	6,6	1,2	2,7
Region						
Border cities	68,8	13,8	11,1	3,8	-	2,5
Other cities	44,2	27,0	17,3	8,3	0,7	2,5
Metropolitan cities	47,5	28,7	12,3	8,7	0,8	2,0
Non-metropolitan cities	42,6	26,2	19,7	8,1	0,7	2,7
Occupation						
Private sector employee	52,5	22,4	15,1	7,5	0,4	2,1
Artisan/Tradesman	51,6	20,7	15,3	10,6	0,7	1,1
Housewife/ girl	54,1	22,4	15,3	5,7	0,3	2,2
Student	34,1	33,5	18,9	7,7	0,6	5,2
Unemployed	41,8	33,9	15,9	4,2	-	4,2
Retired	59,8	17,9	13,7	3,4	1,7	3,5
Public sector employee	48,7	28,3	16,8	5,3	-	0,9
Self-employed	55,5	17,3	18,2	8,1	0,9	-
Businessperson	45,6	14,0	22,8	15,8	1,8	-
General	**49,0**	**24,4**	**16,1**	**7,4**	**0,6**	**2,5**

A closer inspection of those who replied with "Under no circumstances should they be allowed to work/given work permits" suggests that the most concerned groups include women, those over the ager of 35, and those with the lowest level of educational attainment. The biggest reaction, however, appears to be coming from the border cities, where the share of respondents giving this answer was 68,8% which is almost 20 percentiles higher than the national average. It is obvious that job losses because of the arrival of Syrians can be felt much more strongly in this region and that reflects on respondents' preferences regarding work permits of Syrians.

13. Opening Workplaces / Entrepreneurship

Entrepreneurship plays an important role for Syrians' self-reliance and economic inclusion. Entrepreneurship means that the person provides employment firstly to him/herself and, then, to others. Such enterprises could range from employing only one person to employing hundreds and even thousands of people. It needs to be noted, however, that there is a strong societal opposition to Syrians' opening their own businesses / workplaces. In fact, as discussed in the previous section, while the share of respondents that suggest that "under no circumstances should Syrians be given work permits" was 54,6% in SB-2017, 56,8% in SB-2019, and 49% in SB-2020; the share of those who suggested that Syrians definitely shouldn't be able to open workplaces was 67,2% in SB-2019[143] and 55% in SB-2020. This shows a stronger refusal on the prospects of Syrians to open workplaces than on their prospects to be employed as workers. This can be interpreted as an indirect indication of the refusal of Syrians' permanence in Turkey.

SB-2020-TABLE 39: **Under which conditions should Syrians be able to open workplaces?**

	#	%
They definitely shouldn't	1253	55,5
Only for specific work fields	257	11,4
Only if they will open large workplaces where Turkish citizens will also work	79	3,5
Only if they pay their taxes	564	25,0
They should be able to open any type of workplace in any work field	60	2,6
Other	2	0,1
No idea/ No response	44	1,9
Total	**2259**	**100,0**

143. In SB-2019, the relevant response was formulated as "it definitely shouldn't be allowed".

SB-2020-TABLE 40: Under which conditions should Syrians be able to open workplaces? (%)

	They definitely shouldn't	Only for specific work fields	Only if they will open large workplaces where Turkish citizens will also workabilmeliler	Only if they pay their taxes	They should be able to open any type of workplace in any work field	Other	No idea/ No response
Sex							
Female	55,6	11,4	3,4	25,3	1,8	0,2	2,3
Male	55,3	11,4	3,6	24,7	3,5	-	1,5
Age Groups							
18-24	47,2	15,5	5,5	26,7	2,0	0,1	3,0
25-34	54,7	13,1	2,3	25,4	2,9	0,2	1,4
35-44	62,8	7,7	1,0	24,9	2,6	-	1,0
45-54	61,5	7,0	3,9	23,6	3,3	-	0,7
55-64	58,0	10,5	4,9	22,2	2,5	-	1,9
65+	57,8	6,3	4,7	17,2	4,7	-	9,3
Educational Attainment							
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	64,2	9,4	0,0	18,9	3,8	-	3,7
Primary school	63,1	7,8	2,3	22,0	3,0	-	1,8
Middle-school	59,0	12,1	4,0	21,1	2,6	-	1,2
High-school or equivalent	52,6	11,8	3,8	27,3	2,5	0,1	1,9
University/ Graduate degree	50,8	13,4	3,9	26,5	2,7	0,2	2,5
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	73,5	7,0	0,9	15,6	1,6	-	1,4
Region							
Border cities	73,5	7,0	0,9	15,6	1,6	-	1,4
Other cities	51,1	12,4	4,1	27,2	2,9	0,1	2,2
Metropolitan cities	55,7	10,8	5,0	25,0	2,2	0,2	1,1
Non-metropolitan cities	48,8	13,2	3,7	28,3	3,3	0,1	2,6
Occupation							
Private sector employee	59,1	12,2	2,1	21,8	2,8	0,2	1,8
Artisan/Tradesman	57,8	7,4	5,2	26,2	3,0	-	0,4
Housewife/ girl	58,5	10,7	3,0	23,5	2,7	-	1,6
Student	45,0	14,9	4,3	29,8	1,7	-	4,3
Unemployed	50,8	16,9	3,2	23,3	4,2	0,5	1,1
Retired	62,4	7,7	4,3	19,7	2,6	-	3,3
Public sector employee	53,1	10,6	0,0	33,6	0,9	-	1,8
Self-employed	59,1	12,7	3,6	22,7	1,9	-	-
Businessperson	50,9	1,8	10,5	33,3	3,5	-	-
General	**55,5**	**11,4**	**3,5**	**25,0**	**2,6**	**0,1**	**1,9**

In terms of demographic characteristics, it can be suggested that the refusal for Syrians to open workplaces is the highest among the middle-aged and the least educated respondents. However, the real divergence can again be found in the border cities. While the overall average for the response "they definitely shouldn't" is 55,5%, it is 73,5% in the border cities.

FGD Findings: Opinions on Syrians' Economic Activities

Similar to the findings of SB-2019 FGDs, the most central issue of discussion in this part was the issue of informal or unregistered employment of Syrians. A vast majority of participants suggested that the state needs to take swift steps to fight this situation. Most of these participants justified their opinion by referring either to the economic cost of this situation for the Turkish state or the disadvantaged position this puts Turkish workers. Some objected to the informal employment of Syrians because they thought it was causing exploitation of Syrians, who became deprived of any social security and abused by their employers.

-They should be able to work under humane conditions. It is not right for them to earn less money for the same work. The state must protect their rights. (Ankara-Students)

-They already work, whether the state allows them or not. They satisfy the cheap labor needs of the employers without social security. A mapping exercise needs to be made and statistical data should be produced. Who do we have, what skills they have, which areas they tend to work in?... They could be directed to employment according to this. It needs to be controlled and they need to be added into the system. (Ankara-Civil Servants))

-When they work informally, people are getting increasingly poorer. When you employ a Syrian for cheaper, it makes Turks to be left unemployed. This has a very detrimental effect on the Turkish economy, which had already been suffering from unemployment. Informal employment needs to be stopped. Let them work, but work regularly informal employment. (İstanbul-Women)

-There is an unfair competition between us, which was strengthened by COVID. For example, let's look at the number of Syrian and Turkish workers who lost their jobs because of the COVID. I think more Turks lost their jobs than Syrians. (G.Antep-Unemployed)

-If you don't let them work, you will have to provide support to them yourself. Let them work but let them work officially. It should be audited as vigorously as our people are being audited. When they work unofficially, they keep receiving financial aids and they don't pay any taxes. (Hatay-Artisans/Workers)

14. The Future: "Will Syrians Return?"

In 2014, when there were just 1.6 million Syrians in Turkey, the survey found that 45,1% of Turkish respondents reported believing that all Syrians in the country will return.[144] In SB-2017, 70% of the Turkish respondents reported that they expect all or most Syrians to stay in Turkey, while only 6,7% said "almost all of them will return". A similar picture was repeated in SB-2019, where only 10% of the respondents suggested that they believed most Syrians will return ("Majority of them will return, less than half will stay" (6,4%), "Almost all of them will return, only few will stay" (2,8%), "All of them will return" (1,8%)). This combined share has further dropped to 7% in SB-2020, while 47,4% said "none of them will return" and 32,9% said "Even if some of them return, majority of them will stay". Adding to this the 10,9% of the respondents who suggested that "Half of them will return, half of them will stay", it appears that 90% of Turkish society believe that at least half of Syrians will remain in Turkey in the future. In other words, while the objections to Syrians' becoming permanent in Turkey has been growing, the hope and belief that Syrians will return is also waning.

SB-2020-TABLE 41: **Do you believe that Syrians in Turkey will return to their country when the war is over?**

		2017		2019		2020	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
1	None of them will return	793	38,0	1106	48,7	1070	47,4
2	Even if some of them return, majority of them will stay	679	32,5	674	29,7	744	32,9
3	Half of them will return, half of them will stay	238	11,4	203	8,9	247	10,9
4	Majority of them will return, less than half will stay	189	9,0	145	6,4	103	4,6
5	All of them will return	-	-	42	1,8	53	2,3
6	Almost all of them will return, only few will stay	141	6,7	63	2,8	-	-
7	Other	-	-	-	-	1	0,1
	No idea/ No response	49	2,4	38	1,7	41	1,8
Total		**2089**	**100,0**	**2271**	**100,0**	**2259**	**100,0**

The most skeptical group regarding Syrians' eventual return appears to be those living in the border cities. While the overall share of the answer "None of them will return" is 47,4%, it is 62,2% in the border cities.

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144. Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration-2014:
"There are over 1,5 million Syrian asylum-seekers in Turkey at the moment. Which of the following statements best describes your opinion on the return of Syrians after the war is over?":
I expect all of them to return (45,1%)
I expect less than half of them to stay in Turkey (9,4%)
I expect all of them to stay (12,1%)
I expect more than half of them to stay in Turkey (15,7%)
I expect at least half of them to stay (%17,6).

SB-2020-TABLE 42: Do you believe that Syrians in Turkey will return to their country when the war is over? (%)

	None of them will return	Even if some of them return, majority of them will stay	Half of them will return, half of them will stay	Majority of them will return, less than half will stay	All of them will return	Other	No idea/ No response
Cinsiyet							
Female	48,8	33,4	10,3	3,3	2,2	0,1	1,9
Male	45,9	32,5	11,6	5,8	2,5	-	1,7
Age Groups							
18-24	45,5	32,6	12,1	3,4	4,0	0,1	2,3
25-34	46,5	35,7	10,9	3,5	1,6	-	1,8
35-44	53,0	28,5	10,7	5,7	1,2	-	0,9
45-54	48,5	33,9	9,4	5,8	1,8	-	0,6
55-64	41,3	38,3	9,9	6,2	1,9	-	2,4
65+	40,6	29,7	10,9	6,3	3,1	-	9,4
Educational Attainment							
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	49,1	37,7	9,4	1,9	-	-	1,9
Primary school	47,0	34,4	9,6	4,6	1,8	-	2,6
Middle-school	48,3	31,2	11,0	6,1	2,0	-	1,4
High-school or equivalent	47,1	32,7	11,5	4,3	3,0	-	1,4
University/ Graduate degree	47,3	32,7	11,1	4,3	2,1	0,2	2,3
Region							
Border cities	62,7	22,9	6,3	4,5	1,8	-	1,8
Other cities	43,6	35,4	12,0	4,6	2,5	0,1	1,8
Metropolitan cities	54,8	30,0	9,5	4,0	0,7	-	1,0
Non-metropolitan cities	38,1	38,0	13,3	4,8	3,4	0,1	2,3
Occupation							
Private sector employee	53,1	30,1	10,9	2,6	2,1	-	1,2
Artisan/Tradesman	50,4	26,7	13,6	6,9	1,2	-	1,2
Housewife/ girl	43,7	40,7	9,3	2,2	1,9	-	2,2
Student	42,7	33,8	12,0	4,9	4,9	-	1,7
Unemployed	43,9	38,1	11,1	3,7	1,1	-	2,1
Retired	44,4	33,3	10,3	7,7	2,6	-	1,7
Public sector employee	46,0	38,9	7,1	2,7	1,8	-	3,5
Self-employed	50,0	27,3	6,4	9,1	3,6	-	3,6
Businessperson	45,6	28,1	15,8	10,5	-	-	-
General	**47,4**	**32,9**	**10,9**	**4,6**	**2,3**	**0,1**	**1,8**

FGD Findings: Will Syrians Return?

In line with the survey findings, SB 2020 FGDs also observed that a vast majority of the participants believe that most Syrians in Turkey will remain in Turkey in the long term. In fact, FGDs show that people's expectation of return is steadily decreasing. Still, however, a significant number of participants seem to believe that large numbers of Syrians might return, depending on the future developments and policies.

>-If Turkey could manage to implement effective policies and if it can establish communication with the Syrian state, a majority of them can be convinced to return. – Only those with very bad economic conditions will return – There are those who love Syria, who consider themselves as proud Syrians, and who want to return. These people will return, sooner or later. (Ankara-Civil Servants)

>-If everything turns to normal and becomes stable, they would return. They left their country involuntarily escaping a war. Therefore, when it is solved, they would return. I think 50% will return. But the young ones would remain or they might try to get to Europe. (İstanbul-Unemployed)

A majority of the participants seem to believe that most Syrians will stay in Turkey no matter what happens in Syria. They explained their opinion mostly by referring to the fact that Syrians have been living in Turkey for a long time now having established lives here. In addition, many participants also referred to their conviction that Turkey is a much more developed and better country to live in compared to Syria. Accordingly, most Syrians will simply prefer to live in Turkey, again, irrespective of what happens in Syria.

>-Those who created a life for themselves, who opened a business, who obtained citizenship would not return. They think that Turkey is a country offering much better opportunities and a higher level of welfare. Therefore, I think, at least 70% would stay and the 30% who have homes and relatives back in Syria might return. (Ankara-Civil Servants)

>-Especially those young people and middle-aged ones who established a life here would not return. Even if the war ends, it would take a long time to reconstruct Syria and make it stable again. Only those above a certain age might return. (İstanbul-Artisans/Workers)

>-They receive all kinds of assistance and support. They go to Syria during religious festivals to visit and then come back to continue living here. They are very comfortable, why would they return? (G.Antep-Unemployed)

15. **"Where Should Syrians Live?": "Are We Ready for Living Together?"**

Turkish society appears to be very much aware of the fact that prospects of Syrians' long-term presence in the country are growing. Almost 90% of the society seems convinced that at least half of Syrians will stay in Turkey. It should be noted that, however, despite this acknowledgement of permanent stay, the will and desire for living together is extremely weak. In other words, there appears to be a case of "involuntary acceptance" in Turkish society regarding Syrians.

In this context, responses given to the question "*where should Syrians live?*" are very interesting. In a context where more than 98% of Syrians are already living with the Turkish society all across the country, the statement "*they should live with Turkish society wherever they want*" was respectively supported by the 7,9%, 5,3%, and 6,8% of the respondents in SB-2017, SB-2019, and SB-2020. In addition to this, 6,1% of the respondents in SB-2020 (together with 7,7% in SB-2017 and 5,5% in SB-2019) suggested that "*Syrians should be distributed around Turkey in a balanced way*". These tow responses make up on average close to 15% of respondents. This means that, while 90% of Turkish society believes that Syrians will permanently remain in the country, 85% suggest that Syrians should either be returned or segregated instead of living together with them.[145] The below listed answers to this question appears to indicate that the Turkish society is neither ready nor willing for a life together with Syrians. Strikingly, the answer "*They should definitely be sent back*" becomes consistently more popular in every consecutive survey. The most frequently given response in SB-2017 and SB-2019, i.e. "*They should be sent to safe zones to be established in Syria to live there*", appears to be losing its popularity. Similarly, options including establishing camps or special cities for Syrians appear to be in decreasing trends.

SB-2020-TABLE 43: **Where should Syrians in Turkey live?**

		2017		2019		2020	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
1	They should definitely be sent back	240	11,5	568	25,0	1083	48,0
2	They should be sent to safe zones to be established in Syria to live there	781	37,4	1017	44,8	735	32,5
3	They should be able to live in any city they want	166	7,9	120	5,3	153	6,8
4	They should be distributed around Turkey in a balanced way	161	7,7	126	5,5	138	6,1
5	They should only live in camps	587	28,1	341	15,0	70	3,1
6	Special cities should be established for them in Turkey	100	4,8	54	2,4	24	1,1
7	Other	-	-	-	-	12	0,5
	No idea/ No response	54	2,6	45	2,0	44	1,9
Total		**2089**	**100,0**	**2271**	**100,0**	**2259**	**100,0**

Similar to many previous questions, the results in the border cities are noteworthy. There is a significantly stronger support, almost by 20%, in the border cities for the statement "They should definitely be sent back" (67,4%). The popularity of the responses involving establishing safe zones, in return, is around 10% less popular compared to the overall averages.

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145. Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration-2014:
"Asylum-seekers should only reside at the camps in Turkey": Agreed: 73,3% / Disagreed: 19%
"Asylum-seeker should reside at the camps that will be established within the buffer zone to be established in Syrian territories near border" Agreed: 68,8% / Disagreed: 18,1%.

SB-2020-TABLE 44: Where should Syrians in Turkey live? (%)

	They should definitely be sent back	They should be sent to safe zones to be established in Syria to live there	They should be able to live in any city they want	They should be distributed around Turkey in a balanced way	They should only live in camps	Special cities should be established for them in Turkey	Other	No idea/ No response
Sex								
Female	48,5	34,6	6,2	5,0	2,5	1,0	0,3	1,9
Male	47,4	30,5	7,4	7,2	3,6	1,1	0,8	2,0
Age Groups								
18-24	42,5	37,9	5,5	7,2	2,7	1,1	0,7	2,4
25-34	44,9	33,4	6,8	7,2	3,3	2,0	0,4	2,0
35-44	52,0	29,6	8,3	3,8	3,6	0,2	0,6	1,9
45-54	54,2	26,1	7,6	5,8	3,6	1,2	0,3	1,2
55-64	52,5	30,2	6,2	6,8	2,5	0,6	0,6	0,6
65+	56,3	29,7	6,3	3,1	-	-	-	4,6
Educational Attainment								
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	62,2	20,8	7,5	5,7	3,8	-	-	-
Primary school	55,3	26,6	6,2	5,0	4,4	0,7	0,2	1,6
Middle-school	49,1	32,9	8,4	3,5	2,9	1,4	0,3	1,5
High-school or equivalent	44,5	35,8	6,6	6,8	2,5	1,1	0,9	1,8
University/ Graduate degree	45,7	32,5	6,4	7,6	3,3	1,2	0,4	2,9
Region								
Border cities	67,4	19,9	5,4	2,9	1,6	0,5	0,2	2,1
Other cities	43,2	35,6	7,1	6,9	3,5	1,2	0,6	1,9
Metropolitan cities	44,8	31,5	6,7	7,7	5,5	1,3	1,5	1,0
Non-metropolitan cities	42,4	37,6	7,3	6,5	2,5	1,2	0,2	2,3
Occupation								
Private sector employee	50,8	31,5	7,2	4,9	3,4	0,8	0,4	1,0
Artisan/Tradesman	47,4	31,6	9,1	5,9	2,7	1,2	0,5	1,6
Housewife/ girl	54,4	27,6	8,5	4,6	3,0	0,5	-	1,4
Student	39,3	41,8	6,3	5,7	2,9	1,1	0,9	2,0
Unemployed	43,4	37,6	2,6	10,1	2,1	1,6	-	2,6
Retired	51,3	32,5	4,3	6,8	1,7	-	0,9	2,5
Public sector employee	46,0	31,9	4,4	6,2	5,3	0,9	0,9	4,4
Self-employed	51,8	25,5	5,5	6,4	3,6	1,8	1,8	3,6
Businessperson	38,5	29,8	7,0	12,3	5,3	3,5	1,8	1,8
General	**48,0**	**32,5**	**6,8**	**6,1**	**3,1**	**1,1**	**0,5**	**1,9**

16. A Look on Common Social Life

As it was presented above, a very large majority of Turkish society believes that most Syrians will stay in Turkey permanently. In SB-2020, this majority has grown as large as 90%. Despite this common belief, however, the lack of support to the statement "We can live together with Syrians in serenity" manifests the existence of widespread anxieties concerning the future and "involuntary acceptance" of living together. Those who "completely disagreed" and "disagreed" with this statement constituted 77,9% of the respondents in SB-2020. The same "combined disagree" share was 75% in SB-2017 and 82,6% in SB-2019. The share of those who either "completely agreed" or "agreed" with this statement changed between 8% and 12 % (SB-2017: 11,4%, SB-2019: 8,6%, SB-2020: 10,5).[146] When the responses are scored, a similar picture of anxiety emerges in a more striking manner.

SB-2020-TABLE 45: **To what extent would you agree with the following statement? (%)**

"We can live together with Syrians in serenity"

	Completely disagree	Disagree	COMBINED DISAGREE	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	COMBINED AGREE	No idea/ No response
SB-2020	60,7	17,2	**77,9**	10,4	9,3	1,2	**10,5**	1,2
SB-2019	70,8	11,8	82,6	7,0	7,7	0,9	8,6	1,8
SB-2017	46,5	28,5	75,0	11,8	10,3	1,1	11,4	1,8

The findings from all the questions concerning living together with Syrians similarly reflect a pessimistic and worried picture. Turkish society's level of agreement with the below statements are as follows: *"We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees"*- 18%, *"Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy"*[147]- 7,5%, and *"Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us"*- 5,3%. However, when these figures are compared with those of SB-2019, a slight increase can be observed in the level of agreement.

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146. Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration-2014: "It would cause big problems for Syrians to stay in Turkey": Agreed: 76,5% / Disagreed: 16,5%

147. Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration-2014: "Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy": Agreed: 7,5%.

SB-2020-TABLE 46: To what extent would you agree with the following statements concerning the effects of Syrians living in our country? (Scored)

		SB-2017	SB-2019	SB-2020
1	We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	2,4	1,8	1,9
2	We can live together with Syrians in serenity	1,9	1,5	1,7
3	Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	1,7	1,4	1,5
4	Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	1,6	1,3	1,5
	0-2,99	3,0-5,0		

SB-2020-TABLE 47: To what extent would you agree with the following statements concerning the effects of Syrians living in our country? (%)

	Completely disagree	Disagree	COMBINED DISAGREE	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	COMBINED AGREE	No idea/ No response
2017								
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	34,2	20,3	54,5	12,5	23,9	6,8	30,7	2,3
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	46,5	28,5	75,0	11,8	10,3	1,1	11,4	1,8
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	54,1	27,9	82,0	8,3	7,4	0,8	8,2	1,5
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	52,8	31,8	84,6	7,7	5,7	0,5	6,2	1,5
2019								
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	60,8	10,1	70,9	5,6	18,3	2,7	21,0	2,5
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	70,8	11,8	82,6	7,0	7,7	0,9	8,6	1,8
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	77,5	9,9	87,4	4,3	5,5	0,5	6,0	2,3
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	79,3	11,1	90,4	3,3	3,7	0,6	4,3	2,0
2020								
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	53,7	17,4	71,1	8,5	12,8	5,4	18,2	2,2
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	60,7	17,2	77,9	10,4	9,3	1,2	10,5	1,2
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	67,4	17,5	84,9	5,8	6,7	0,8	7,5	1,8
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	68,1	19,4	87,5	5,8	4,8	0,5	5,3	1,4

SB-2020-TABLE 48: To what extent would you agree with the following statements concerning the effects of Syrians living in our country? (Scored)
(For other versions of cross-tabulations with this question, see Additional Tables)

	We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	Average Score
Sex					
Female	1,9	1,7	1,5	1,5	1,6
Male	1,9	1,7	1,5	1,4	1,7
Age Groups					
18-24	1,8	1,7	1,4	1,4	1,6
25-34	2,0	1,8	1,5	1,5	1,7
35-44	2,0	1,7	1,6	1,5	1,7
45-54	2,0	1,7	1,6	1,5	1,7
55-64	2,0	1,6	1,6	1,5	1,7
65+	2,1	1,8	1,6	1,4	1,7
Educational Attainment					
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	1,9	1,9	1,7	1,5	1,7
Primary school	2,1	1,7	1,6	1,5	1,7
Middle-school	2,0	1,7	1,5	1,4	1,6
High-school or equivalent	1,9	1,7	1,5	1,4	1,6
University/ Graduate degree	1,8	1,8	1,5	1,5	1,6
Region					
Border cities	1,7	1,4	1,3	1,3	1,4
Other cities	2,0	1,8	1,6	1,5	1,7
Metropolitan cities	1,8	1,7	1,6	1,5	1,7
Non-metropolitan cities	2,0	1,8	1,5	1,5	1,7
Occupation					
Private sector employee	1,9	1,6	1,4	1,4	1,6
Artisan/Tradesman	2,0	1,7	1,5	1,4	1,7
Housewife/ girl	2,0	1,8	1,6	1,6	1,8
Student	1,7	1,7	1,5	1,5	1,6
Unemployed	1,8	1,8	1,5	1,4	1,6
Retired	2,0	1,6	1,6	1,4	1,7
Public sector employee	2,0	1,7	1,4	1,5	1,7
Self-employed	1,9	1,5	1,5	1,4	1,6
Businessperson	1,9	1,8	1,6	1,5	1,7
General	1,9	1,7	1,5	1,5	1,6

FGD Findings: Can Turkish Society live together with Syrians in serenity?

FGD participants were asked about their more general expectations concerning the future of Syrians. In particular, they were asked whether they expect a peaceful and harmonious future with Syrians in Turkey. As could be expected from the earlier discussions, the various anxieties and concerns regarding the future were more dominant here. There were a significant number of participants who suggested that mutual adaptation to this social reality will inevitably take place, sooner or later. In other words, they expect a peaceful future at some point, after probably experiencing some problems along the way.

> -A peaceful cohabitation is possible with right policies. The younger generations will be much better educated. It also depends on a better and more prosperous economy. (Ankara-Students)

> -We were not a peaceful and harmonious society by ourselves anyway. So, it wouldn't be any worse than it is now. But the younger generations of Syrians will get used to Turkey more and more in time. Both sides will get used to each other's culture. (İstanbul-Artisans/Workers)

> -We will somehow get used to one another. It would be much faster if there were no negative political discourses. (İstanbul-Unemployed)

> -The new generations will grow up with this new reality. When we were born there were no Syrians. But our children will be born into this society and they will consider this as normal. So the new generations would live in peace and harmony. (Hatay-Students)

> - We are getting integrated into each other... Whether we realize this or not, whether we want it or not, it is already happening. I don't know how harmonious it would be but it will be peaceful as we get more used to it. (Hatay-Artisans/Workers)

Those less optimistic participants, in contrast, seem to foresee a much more troublesome and potentially conflictual future. They also suggested that social cohesion might have progressed in the future, but the potential political, social, cultural, and security-related risks are so great that they don't expect a peaceful and harmonious cohabitation in any foreseeable future.

> -They have a very high fertility rate, which means that their share in the population will grow in time. This will amplify the already existing concerns. - The Syrians aren't much aware of the extent of discrimination against them yet. But they will be in time. This will increase the likelihood of social segregation. (Ankara-Students)

> -As their population grows, they will pose important national security risks. These will include the risk of intervention from outside, terrorist organizations, etc. (Ankara-Civil Servants)

> -The political discourses polarize us. I think it will only grow in time. We are a society which already doesn't have a positive perspective on foreigners. (İstanbul-Unemployed)

> -The anti-Syrian reactions will increase the visibility of other minority groups and will also

cause an increase in the reactions against them. I even expect clashes. (İstanbul-Unem-ployed)

-If the current policies continue, I am pessimistic. Because the current policies push Syrians to become the "Others" of the society. If the fact that social cohesion requires a mutual transformation, then it could be possible to leave together in peace. (İstanbul-Women)

-As long as they don't abide by the rules of this society, there is no possibility of peace. They have established their order here. There is no peace of mind at the moment and I think it will get worse. (Hatay-Artisans/Workers)

17. Social Cohesion and Syrians in Turkey

Syrians Barometer, at its heart, is a study that aims to uncover the existing context in terms of social cohesion. The concept of social cohesion, as reviewed above, is an extremely complicated sociological concept that brings together subjective and objective elements. In this context, social reactions and perceptions are as, if not much more, important as the decisions and policies of the state. Therefore, it is very difficult to measure the existence or level of social cohesion among different social groups that ended up living together. "Social acceptance", in this context, appears as the most important ground on which to seek social cohesion.

It is known that the concept of social cohesion is interpreted differently by the host society and the newcomers. Therefore, even though the collected data does give us some hints, it is nor sufficient to measure the level and quality of social cohesion. The responses provided for the question "To what extent have Syrians integrated into Turkish society/Turkey?" show that the Turkish society is quite pessimistic about the issue of Syrians and social cohesion. While only 3,1% of Turkish society believes That Syrians have completely integrated and 13,3% believes that they have "integrated to a large extent"; the share of those who suggest that they have integrated to "a little extent" (22%) or "haven't integrated at all" (47,9%) is in total 69,9%. In SB-2019 the latter was 64,4%. Thus, it appears that even though the duration of living together is prolonged, Turkish society's skepticism about Syrians' integration is getting strengthened. In contrast to this, when Syrians are asked whether they think they have integrated, a completely different picture emerges (See SB-2020-TABLE-113). This point is exactly where the questions "integration to what, integration to whom" become relevant. It also needs to be mentioned here that there are other examples around the world where the "newcomers" consider themselves to be "well-integrated", while the host society see them as "unintegrated".[148]

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148. The Euro-Turks-Barometer study on the social cohesion processes of Turks in Europe has found that Turks consider themselves to be very- well integrated to the countries in which they live. See: M.M Erdoğan (2013) Euro-Turks-Barometer. http://fs.hacettepe.edu.tr/hugo/dosyalar/ETB_rapor.pdf (Access: 12.10.2019)

SB-2020-TABLE 49: **To what extent have Syrians integrated into Turkish society/Turkey?**

	2019		2020	
	#	%	#	%
None at all	1050	46,2	1081	47,9
To a little extent	413	18,2	497	22,0
Neither they have, nor they haven't/ Partially*	452	19,9	248	11,0
To a large extent	248	10,9	300	13,3
Completely	52	2,3	69	3,1
No idea/ No response	56	2,5	64	2,7
Total	**2271**	**100,0**	**2259**	**100,0**

* In SB-2019, this answer was formulated as "Neither they have, nor they haven't" while it was "Partially" in SB-2019

When the demographic and socio-economic profiles of the respondents are considered, it appears that those who more than averagely believe that Syrians have not been integrated include women, those in the 35-44 age group, primary school graduates, private sector employees, and those who are self-employed. Similarly, the share of those who believe that Syrians haven't integrated is significantly higher in border cities (75,8%) compared to overall figure (64,4%)

SB-2020-TABLE 50: To what extent have Syrians integrated into Turkish society/Turkey? (%)

	None at all	To a little extent	Neither they have, nor they haven't	To a large extent	Completely	No idea/ No response
Sex						
Female	46,1	22,8	12,2	13,3	2,7	2,9
Male	49,5	21,2	9,8	13,3	3,4	2,8
Age Groups						
18-24	44,6	25,0	12,6	11,9	3,0	2,9
25-34	45,3	22,7	12,7	14,8	2,1	2,4
35-44	52,6	18,4	9,1	13,2	3,6	3,1
45-54	49,7	18,5	10,6	14,8	3,6	2,8
55-64	51,9	24,1	6,2	13,6	3,1	1,1
65+	46,9	25,0	7,8	7,8	3,1	9,4
Educational Attainment						
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	49,1	24,5	7,5	11,3	1,9	5,7
Primary school	52,5	17,0	10,6	13,1	3,0	3,8
Middle-school	50,9	19,4	8,9	14,2	3,8	2,8
High-school or equivalent	45,0	24,3	11,5	13,8	3,2	2,2
University/ Graduate degree	46,9	23,7	12,1	12,1	2,5	2,7
Region						
Border cities	57,0	18,8	6,1	12,7	3,6	1,8
Other cities	45,6	22,8	12,2	13,4	2,9	3,1
Metropolitan cities	44,0	24,5	11,8	15,2	3,0	1,5
Non-metropolitan cities	46,4	21,9	12,3	12,6	2,9	3,9
Occupation						
Private sector employee	52,9	20,2	9,6	12,8	2,4	2,1
Artisan/Tradesman	46,4	19,3	10,6	17,5	4,9	1,3
Housewife/ girl	48,1	20,8	10,4	13,9	3,3	3,5
Student	40,7	26,6	14,3	12,0	2,3	4,1
Unemployed	46,6	25,4	11,6	10,6	2,1	3,7
Retired	51,3	25,6	8,5	6,8	2,6	5,2
Public sector employee	45,1	29,2	11,5	11,5	1,8	0,9
Self-employed	52,7	14,5	9,1	15,5	3,6	4,6
Businessperson	47,4	19,3	14,0	14,0	5,3	-
General	47,9	22,0	11,0	13,3	3,1	2,7

FGD Findings: Definition of Social Cohesion and Syrians' Integration to Turkey

In FGDs, it was aimed to learn, first, how the participants defined social cohesion and, then, to what extent they thought Syrians have integrated into the Turkish society, judging against whatever criteria they had in mind. It appears that there is significant diversity in how people perceive and define social cohesion. While for some participants social cohesion has a quite practical and instrumental definition such as acquiring the ability to speak the local language and abiding by the norms of everyday life by the newcomers; for others, social cohesion appears to require a deeper and more subjective personal transformation necessitating the immigrant to foster a sense of belonging. For most participants, integration of an immigrant community can be said to have taken place on a collective level when either (i) the new group is no longer perceived as alien or different and when both sides perceive one another as 'normal' OR (ii) there is no conflict or tension between the host society and the newcomers, supported by sufficient interaction and meaningful communication.

> *-Social cohesion has happened when the migrants are no longer identified as foreign. And this should be mutual, I mean they shouldn't see the local population as foreign, either. (Ankara-Students)*

> *-Social cohesion, to me, means immigrants' embracing and respecting the local culture and values. (Ankara-Students)*

> *-I see social cohesion as mutual acceptance. Both sides need to accept and embrace the other. When they look at each other, they should say 'yes we are different, but we live together, we have to accept one another. For the behaviors to become similar, you need to wait 100-200 years. I don't think that is necessary. (Hatay-Students)*

> *- I think, if we are to talk about social cohesion, we need to talk about social cohesion of everyone. I mean, if we only talk about integration of Syrians, then we are actually talking about assimilation. (Istanbul-Women)*

After discussing the definition of integration/social cohesion, the issue of how Syrians in Turkey adapt to Turkey and Turkish society was discussed. A clear majority of participants appear to believe that Syrians, or more accurately most Syrians, have not integrated into Turkey. It is possible to suggest, however, that the number of participants who argued that social cohesion is growing is increasing compared to SB-2019. To be clear, these participants do not claim that all Syrians have integrated perfectly, either. Instead, their narrative is much more positive and optimistic regarding the future compared to the majority of participants who appear to provide an outright rejection that social cohesion is being established.

When the arguments of the participants who claim that social cohesion hasn't taken place are concerned, several significant differences emerge between the border cities and metropolitan cities FGDs. Firstly, it can be suggested that most participants in the metropolitan cities seem to interpret social cohesion in a more practical way emphasizing the importance of language and lack of conflict. A vast majority of border city FGD participants, in contrast, appear to have a much more loaded understanding of social cohesion, emphasizing cultural differences, lack of social interaction, and growing segregation in the local contexts.

-Even when we move from one city to another, it takes us some time to adapt. So, I don't think that they have integrated yet, more time is necessary. It takes at least 20 years for a society to change. (İstanbul-Women)

-I don't think that they have integrated. Their level of education, the place of women in the family, how they raise their children… There is a major language barrier. They cannot explain themselves at the hospital, supermarket, or the justice hall and this is what makes them locked up in their homes. If you don't leave your house, you cannot integrate into the society. (İstanbul-Artisans/Workers)

- They created their neighborhoods and live in them. They have their markets and everything. They live much better than us. It is almost as if we became second class citizens here. (Hatay-Artisans/Workers)

A second significant difference concerns how participants explain the lack of social cohesion. While a majority of participants in metropolitan cities argue that the responsibility to ensure social cohesion should not be left solely on the shoulders of Syrians, those in border cities seem to believe that it is, in fact, the responsibility of the newcomers to learn, change, and adapt. Participants of the metropolitan FGDs mostly argued that social cohesion would take place if there is a policy facilitating it. In addition to the lack of a successful social cohesion policy, some participants also suggested that the context of discrimination and exclusion targeting Syrians is an important reason why social cohesion couldn't yet take place. Moreover, many participants in these FGDs also suggested that social cohesion should not be thought of as a one-sided process. Instead, they argued, it should be a two-way street, where both the Syrians and the Turkish society need to put an effort and change mutually.

- What is necessary is not Syrians to transform. Both sides need to transform together. But the two sides are quite isolated from one another. (Ankara-Students)

- We lack a social cohesion policy. Social cohesion is very difficult without such a general framework. (Ankara-Civil Servants)

- There are problems in the process of teaching them language, which prevent social cohesion. I don't think we had really focused on teaching them Turkish. (İstanbul-Unemployed)

- If I can't safely let my wife or daughter go outside alone, then there is a problem. If they cannot go to the park without me, then there is a problem. You go there and see lots of men sitting around in the park until such late hours of the night. Who are these people? You can't know. (G.Antep-Unemployed)

Importantly, among those who claim that most Syrians haven't integrated into Turkey, there is a significant number of participants who differentiate the Syrian children from the adults. Accordingly, while the level of integration of adults looks very bleak, there is a more positive picture concerning the children and some youngsters. Participants often made this distinction and said the children were doing much better, they speak Turkish, and interact with Turkish friends implying much better integration.

> *- Especially for older Syrians, it is really difficult to learn Turkish, which is making integration very difficult. But then there are the kids who go to school here, who speak Turkish very well. That is good for social cohesion." (İstanbul-Unemployed)*
>
> *- The children integrated well. Most of them were born here anyway. They speak Turkish, they understand everything. They act as translators for their parents whenever necessary." (G.Antep-Unemployed)*

There is, lastly, a smaller group of participants who argued that social cohesion is emerging and many positive changes could be identified. These participants explicitly emphasize that they are aware of the fact that it is not complete or perfect. Yet, they argue, it is happening and there are reasons to expect that it will continue to happen.

> *- I think, there are signs of social cohesion. The number of intermarriages increased. The daily life practices are aligning with those of Turkish society. Economic integration is progressing. I think for now it is positive but there is a long way to go. (Ankara-Students)*
>
> *- I think we have integrated to them. For example, many Syrians are living in Sultanbeyli and there are so many Arabic signs on the shops. I see that the residents there got used to this and they are not bothered by this. There is acceptance." (İstanbul-Artisans/Workers)*

18. How do Syrians Treat Turkish Society According to Turkish Society?

Survey respondents were asked to reflect on some positive and negative statements concerning how they think Syrians see and treat Turkish society. The responses on four positive and two negative statements plainly reflects a widespread refusal and negative attitude regarding Syrians. At the top of the list was the statement "Syrians do not like Turkish society at all", which received the support of 34% of the respondents, rising from 30,9% in SB-2019. Another popular response was "Syrians are exploiting Turkish society" which was endorsed by 33,2% of the respondents. While the statement "Syrians are making an effort to integrate into Turkish society" received the support of 8% of the respondents, all the other positive statements were quite unpopular with less than 6% of the respondents.

SB-2020-TABLE 51: Which of the following statements best describe how Syrians treat Turkish society?

	2019		2020	
	#	%	#	%
Syrians do not like Turkish society at all	702	30,9	769	34,0
Syrians are exploiting Turkish society	731	32,2	751	33,2
Syrians are grateful to Turkish society	132	5,8	214	9,5
Syrians are making an effort to integrate into Turkish society	302	13,3	180	8,0
Syrians love Turkish society very much	66	2,9	119	5,3
Syrians are treating Turkish society with respect	90	4,0	70	3,1
Other	-	-	17	0,7
No idea/ No response	248	10,9	139	6,2
Total	**2271**	**100,0**	**2259**	**100,0**

In terms of demographic groups, it appears once again that respondents from the border cities diverge from the overall averages. People from this region seem to be even more pessimistic and negative. For instance, the share of respondents that suggested "*Syrians do not like Turkish society at all*" is a vast 60,6%.

SB-2020-TABLE 52: Which of the following statements best describe how Syrians treat Turkish society?

	Syrians do not like Turkish society at all	Syrians are exploiting Turkish society	Syrians are grateful to Turkish society	Syrians are making an effort to integrate into Turkish society	Syrians love Turkish society very much	Syrians are treating Turkish society with respect	Other	No idea/ No response
Sex								
Female	32,4	34,5	10,3	8,6	4,6	2,8	0,6	6,2
Male	35,6	32,0	8,7	7,3	5,9	3,4	0,9	6,2
Age Groups								
18-24	32,4	32,0	10,9	7,6	5,7	3,0	1,1	7,3
25-34	31,8	37,7	9,0	8,6	4,5	2,1	0,4	5,9
35-44	38,3	32,6	6,5	9,1	4,5	4,3	0,3	4,4
45-54	33,6	31,2	9,4	7,6	6,7	3,6	0,9	7,0
55-64	37,0	30,9	11,7	6,8	4,9	3,1	0,6	5,0
65+	31,3	32,8	15,6	3,1	6,3	-	1,6	9,3
Educational Attainment								
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	34,0	37,7	7,5	5,7	5,7	7,5	-	1,9
Primary school	36,5	32,3	8,9	6,9	6,2	2,5	0,7	6,0
Middle-school	38,4	31,2	7,8	7,5	4,0	3,5	1,2	6,4
High-school or equivalent	32,8	33,7	10,2	8,1	5,5	3,3	0,4	6,0
University/ Graduate degree	31,1	34,2	9,9	9,3	4,7	2,5	1,2	7,1
Region								
Border cities	60,6	16,1	7,0	2,3	4,3	3,8	-	5,9
Other cities	27,6	37,4	10,1	9,4	5,5	2,9	0,9	6,2
Metropolitan cities	28,2	38,5	10,7	7,0	5,2	3,0	0,8	6,6
Non-metropolitan cities	27,3	36,9	9,8	10,5	5,7	2,9	1,0	5,9
Occupation								
Private sector employee	38,0	33,7	9,4	5,5	4,0	3,4	0,8	5,2
Artisan/Tradesman	36,8	28,9	8,1	12,3	6,4	2,5	0,7	4,3
Housewife/ girl	29,0	38,8	10,9	7,4	5,7	3,6	-	4,6
Student	29,5	34,1	11,7	9,7	4,3	1,7	0,6	8,4
Unemployed	34,9	32,8	10,6	5,8	4,8	1,6	1,6	7,9
Retired	38,5	28,2	7,7	5,1	7,7	3,4	2,6	6,8
Public sector employee	32,7	36,3	6,2	10,6	3,5	3,5	-	7,2
Self-employed	31,8	29,1	8,2	4,5	8,2	6,4	1,8	10,0
Businessperson	36,8	29,8	5,3	7,0	8,8	5,3	-	7,0
Genel	**34,0**	**33,2**	**9,5**	**8,0**	**5,3**	**3,1**	**0,7**	**6,2**

19. How Significant a Problem are Syrians?

Like all societies, Turkish society has various problems. These could be said to include the fight against terror, economic troubles, and complications in foreign policy, among others. To under-stand whether or not issue of Syrians is perceived by the Turkish society as a major problem, SB research included the question "Among the top 10 problems of Turkey, how would you rank the priority of the issue of Syrians?" In SB-2019, those who considered Syrians to be Turkey's "first", "second" and "third" most important problems had a combined share of over 60%. In SB-2020, this has reduced to 52,3%. The numerical average in this question was calculated to be 3.8. This shows that Turkish society considers Syrians to be among the top 3-4 problems of the country. Those who believed that "Syrians are not a problem/The issue of Syrians wouldn't be in the top 10" were 5,6% of the respondents.

SB-2020-TABLE 53: Among the top 10 problems of Turkey, how would you rank the priority of the issue of Syrians?

	2019		2020	
	#	%	#	%
1st rank	617	27,2	418	18,5
2nd rank	325	14,3	340	15,1
3rd rank	426	18,8	422	18,7
4th rank	196	8,6	212	9,4
5th rank	191	8,4	278	12,3
6th rank	64	2,8	106	4,7
7th rank	61	2,7	80	3,5
8th rank	44	1,9	61	2,7
9th rank	17	0,7	37	1,6
10th rank	115	5,1	116	5,1
Syrians are not a problem/The issue of Syrians wouldn't be in the top 10	123	5,4	126	5,6
No idea/ No response	92	4,1	63	2,8
Total	2271	100,0	2259	100,0
Average*	3,3		3,8	

* The Average is calculated only with the data from respondents that gave a numerical rank.

Once again, the most significant difference is found among respondents from the border cities. While the Turkey average regarding the rank of "problem of Syrians" is 3.8, it was calculated to be 3 in border cities. More importantly, there appears to be a change in this region from the earlier study. In SB-2019, the average in border cities was the same as the Turkey average, which were

both 3.3. In SB-2020, however, while the Turkey average decreased in importance to 3.8, the average in border cities increased to 3. This can be seen as yet another indication of the growing discomfort in the cities where Syrians are most densely populated.

SB-2020-TABLO 54: Among the top 10 problems of Turkey, how would you rank the priority of the issue of Syrians?

	Average		Average
Sex		**Region**	
Female	3,7	Border cities	3,0
Male	3,8	Other cities	4,0
Age Groups		*Metropolitan cities*	3,7
18-24	4,2	*Non-metropolitan cities*	4,1
25-34	3,9	**Occupation**	
35-44	3,5	Private sector employee	3,6
45-54	3,5	Artisan/Tradesman	3,9
55-64	3,0	Housewife/ girl	3,5
65+	3,1	Student	4,3
Educational Attainment		Unemployed	3,9
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	3,3	Retired	2,8
Primary school	3,2	Public sector employee	3,9
Middle-school	3,6	Self-employed	3,7
High-school or equivalent	3,9	Businessperson	3,6
University/ Graduate degree	4,1		
General			**3,8**
Note: Averages are calculated only with the data from respondents that gave a numerical rank.			

20. Political Rights and Citizenship

While the SB surveys indicate that around 90% of Turkish society believe that at least half of Syrians will permanently stay in the country, there are significant objections and anxieties regarding giving Syrians political rights and Turkish citizenship. In fact, as discussed above under the heading "Anxieties: Security, Serenity and Social Acceptance", one of the main anxieties voiced by Turkish society

is the prospects of Syrians obtaining citizenship. SB research also included specified questions on political rights and citizenship to obtain a deeper understanding. The respondents were asked the question *"What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding Syrians and political rights?"*. 83,8% of the respondents replied with *"they should not be given any political rights"* in SB-2020. The share of this response was 85,6% in SB-2017 and 87,1% in SB-2019. Since the link between political rights and citizenship might not be known by everyone, a second question on citizenship was posed. When asked the question *"What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding Syrians and Turkish citizenship?"* and given the chance to provide multiple responses, 71,8% of the respondents suggested "none of them should be given citizenship" (SB-2017: 75,8%; SB-2019: 76,5%). On the opposite end of the spectrum, 3,6% of the respondents said *"they should all be given citizenship"* (SB-2017: 4%; SB-2019: 1,5%).[149] The options that included *"conditional support"* for granting Syrians citizenship such as "being educated", *"being born in Turkey", "being an ethnic Turkoman"* or *"being young"* drew support from around 25% of the respondents. This combined share was 17,3% in SB-2017 and 19,2% in SB-2019. . When we add the proposition *"Let them all be naturalized"* to conditional citizenship, the total rate was 21.3% in 2017, while this rate decreased to 20.7 in 2019.[150] This table shows that Turkish society has serious anxieties regarding the citizenship policy of Turkey, which appears to cut across political orientations.

SB-2020-TABLE 55: **What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding Syrians and political rights?**

	2017		2019		2020	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
They should not be given any political rights	1789	85,6	1979	87,1	1892	83,8
They should be allowed to both vote and be candidates in all elections	33	1,6	67	3,0	95	4,2
They should be allowed to vote only in local elections	96	4,6	61	2,6	93	4,1
They should be allowed to vote in all elections	84	4,0	67	3,0	82	3,6
They should be allowed to both vote and be candidates only in local elections	25	1,2	6	0,3	19	0,8
Other	-	-	-	-	8	0,4
No idea/ No response	62	3,0	91	4,0	70	3,1
Total	2089	100,0	2271	100,0	2259	100,0

149. Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration-2014:
"Syrian asylum-seekers should be given Turkish citizenship": Agreed: 7,7% / Disagreed: 84,5%

150. Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration-2014: "Let them all be naturalized" Yes: % 7,7 / No: % 84,5.

SB-2020-TABLE 56: What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding giving Syrians Turkish citizenship? (Multiple responses)

		SB-2017*		SB-2019		SB-2019	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
1	None of them should be given citizenship	1584	75,8	1737	76,5	1621	71,8
2	Those who have been living in Turkey for a certain time period should be given citizenship	153	7,3	135	6,0	223	9,9
3	Those who were born in Turkey should be given citizenship	101	4,8	48	2,1	184	8,1
4	Well-educated ones should be given citizenship	124	5,9	114	5,0	180	8,0
5	Those who know/learn Turkish should be given citizenship	47	2,2	9	0,4	106	4,7
6	Turkish-origin ones/Turkomans should be given citizenship	63	3,0	53	2,3	91	4,0
7	Young ones should be given citizenship	11	0,5	-	-	82	3,6
8	Those who got married to a Turkish citizen should be given citizenship	-	-	65	2,9	55	2,4
9	All of them should be given citizenship	84	4,0	35	1,5	19	0,8
	No idea/ No response	61	2,9	75	3,3	45	2,0

Unsurprisingly, respondents from the border cities appear to differ from the rest regarding their views on political rights and citizenship. While the overall share of "They should not be given any political rights" is 83,8% and that of "None of them should be given citizenship" is 71,8%; these are 90% and 82,4%, respectively, in border cities.

SB-2020-TABLE 57: What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding Syrians and political rights? (%)

	They should not be given any political rights	They should be allowed to both vote and be candidates in all elections	They should be allowed to vote only in local elections	They should be allowed to vote in all elections	They should be allowed to both vote and be candidates only in local elections	Other	No idea/ No response
Sex							
Female	82,4	3,8	4,9	3,9	1,0	0,4	3,6
Male	85,0	4,6	3,3	3,3	0,7	0,4	2,7
Age Groups							
18-24	80,9	2,9	6,5	3,3	1,4	0,3	4,7
25-34	86,7	4,5	2,5	2,9	0,8	-	2,6
35-44	86,4	3,8	3,0	3,6	0,8	0,7	1,7
45-54	81,8	6,1	4,2	4,5	0,3	0,6	2,5
55-64	85,2	5,6	3,1	3,1	-	0,6	2,4
65+	76,6	6,3	1,6	9,3	-	-	6,2
Educational Attainment							
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	75,5	5,7	13,2	3,8	-	-	1,8
Primary school	84,6	5,3	3,0	4,1	0,2	0,2	2,6
Middle-school	82,7	4,6	4,9	3,8	1,2	0,3	2,5
High-school or equiva-lent	82,8	4,1	4,2	3,7	1,3	0,4	3,5
University/ Graduate degree	86,4	3,1	3,5	2,9	0,4	0,4	3,3
Region							
Border cities	90,0	2,9	0,9	3,4	-	0,2	2,6
Other cities	82,2	4,5	4,9	3,7	1,0	0,4	3,3
Metropolitan cities	82,8	3,7	4,3	4,2	1,2	0,3	3,5
Non-metropolitan cities	81,9	4,9	5,2	3,5	1,0	0,4	3,1
Occupation							
Private sector employee	86,1	4,3	3,4	2,4	1,1	0,4	2,3
Artisan/Tradesman	85,4	5,7	3,2	3,7	0,2	0,2	1,6
Housewife/ girl	79,2	5,5	5,7	4,6	0,5	0,3	4,2
Student	81,9	2,6	6,0	2,9	0,6	0,3	5,7
Unemployed	85,2	1,6	2,6	5,3	2,1	-	3,2
Retired	83,8	7,7	0,9	4,3	-	-	3,3
Public sector employee	89,4	0,9	1,8	4,4	0,9	-	2,6
Self-employed	85,5	3,6	4,5	1,8	-	2,7	1,9
Businessperson	75,4	5,3	7,0	7,0	5,3	-	-
General	**83,8**	**4,2**	**4,1**	**3,6**	**0,8**	**0,4**	**3,1**

SB-2020-TABLE 57: What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding Syrians and political rights? (%)

SB-2020-TABLE 58: What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding Syrians and political rights? (Multiple responses - %)

	None of them should be given citizenship	Well-educated ones should be given citizenship	Those who have been living in Turkey for a certain time period should be given citizenship	Those who were born in Turkey should be given citizenship	Those who got married to a Turkish citizen should be given citizenship	Turkish-origin ones/ Turkomans should be given citizenship	All of them should be given citizenship	Those who know/learn Turkish should be given citizenship	Other	No idea/ No response
Sex										
Female	72,7	9,1	8,7	8,2	5,2	3,7	2,4	2,2	0,8	2,7
Male	70,9	10,6	7,6	7,7	4,2	4,4	4,8	2,7	0,9	1,3
Age Groups										
18-24	66,4	11,3	10,0	9,8	4,9	4,9	2,2	2,4	1,3	3,0
25-34	70,5	11,7	6,8	8,4	6,1	4,9	3,9	2,3	0,6	1,2
35-44	75,9	8,9	8,1	7,5	3,2	4,0	3,6	2,8	1,0	1,2
45-54	75,2	7,0	8,5	4,8	4,8	2,1	5,8	1,8	0,3	0,9
55-64	77,8	9,3	3,7	6,8	3,1	2,5	4,3	3,1	0,6	1,9
65+	75,0	3,1	7,8	7,8	6,3	1,6	4,7	1,6	-	9,4
Educational Attainment										
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	66,0	7,5	9,4	17,0	9,4	1,9	1,9	1,9	-	3,8
Primary school	78,2	5,3	6,4	6,4	2,8	1,1	5,7	1,6	0,5	2,1
Middle-school	74,6	6,9	7,8	7,8	2,9	3,2	4,0	0,6	0,6	2,0
High-school or equivalent	70,3	10,7	8,8	7,8	5,0	4,7	2,8	2,9	1,3	2,1
University/ Graduate degree	67,5	14,8	8,4	8,8	6,6	6,2	3,3	3,7	0,6	1,4
Region										
Border cities	82,4	4,8	5,0	5,2	2,9	2,0	3,4	0,9	0,2	1,6
Other cities	69,2	11,1	8,9	8,6	5,1	4,5	3,7	2,8	1,0	2,1
Metropolitan cities	73,8	9,7	9,3	6,0	2,2	1,7	3,3	3,5	1,0	1,3
Non-metropolitan cities	66,9	11,8	8,7	9,9	6,6	5,9	3,9	2,5	1,0	2,5
Occupation										
Private sector employee	72,9	8,5	7,3	5,5	3,0	3,8	4,3	2,8	0,6	1,9
Artisan/Tradesman	74,6	8,1	7,2	5,9	3,2	2,7	5,7	2,5	0,7	0,7
Housewife/ girl	73,5	7,4	9,8	9,8	6,0	3,3	3,3	1,6	0,5	3,8
Student	64,5	15,2	12,3	10,3	7,4	5,2	2,0	1,7	0,9	2,9
Unemployed	73,5	10,1	6,9	10,6	4,2	4,8	0,5	3,7	1,1	0,5
Retired	78,6	7,7	1,7	6,0	5,1	0,9	6,0	-	-	1,7
Public sector employee	70,8	15,9	4,4	9,7	8,0	8,8	2,7	4,4	0,9	-
Self-employed	73,6	9,1	10,0	9,1	2,7	5,5	1,8	1,8	1,8	0,9
Businessperson	61,4	10,5	10,5	7,0	3,5	5,3	5,3	5,3	3,5	1,8
General	**71,8**	**9,9**	**8,1**	**8,0**	**4,7**	**4,0**	**3,6**	**2,4**	**0,8**	**2,0**

FGD Findings: Views on Political Rights for Syrians

It appears from the FGDs that most participants support, or at least not object to, giving Syrians substantial social, economic, and cultural rights. However, when the discussion comes to political rights, the tone changes dramatically. Most participants, both in the metropolitan and border cities, reject the notion of giving Syrians political rights. This is particularly the case regarding Syrians right to be elected to political offices. When it comes to giving Syrians some more minor political rights such as establishing associations or the right to petition, participants particularly in metropolitan cities are more open. There were even some participants who supported giving Syrians the right to vote in the local elections. But when it comes to entering the Turkish parliament or being mayors of cities, it is completely the opposite. It should be noted, however, that giving Syrians Turkish citizenship appears to be acceptable to many participants, if and only if it is based on serious criteria. It should also be noted that the tone is, again, much stricter in the border cities. For one thing, a large number of participants appear convinced that citizenship and the right to vote in Turkish elections have already been granted to most Syrians.

-*"It may be given based on some criteria such as knowing the language, professional experience, and education. … Only those who were born here should be granted this right"(Ankara-Students)*

- *Even if they don't become citizens, Syrians legally residing in Turkey should be able to obtain the right to vote in the local elections. This may help their integration. (İstanbul-Artisans/Workers)*

-*The right to vote in local elections may be given to them. But the right to be elected shouldn't be given. (İstanbul-Women)*

- *If they will live in this country, they should have political rights. But when we grant citizenship to them there should be some criteria. If they live and work in this country, if they pay taxes, if they fulfill their responsibilities, they should be able to vote in elections. But they should not be able to be elected or establish political parties of their own. (Hatay-Artisans/Workers)*

- *Even those who become citizens should have to wait for a while before they have political rights. This is because they have a very large population. There should be an intermediary process, in which they integrate into society. After seeing that they have integrated, maybe. (Ankara-Civil Servants)*

- *Whether they stay or leave, they should have only whatever rights are available to non-citizen foreigners. (G.Antep-Unemployed)*

-*I wouldn't want it, they are too many. Think about them having their member of parliament… We already have a chaotic system. (Hatay-Artisans/Workers)*

21. The Views on Education Opportunities for Syrian Children

As the prospects of Syrians' permanent stay in Turkey get stronger, the issue of education become more prominent. As of December 2020, the number of Syrian school-aged children (5 to 17 years of age) is 1.197.124.[151] 64,5% or 773.040 of these children have access to school.[152] It is, however, also a fact that there are lost generations who don't have access to any formal education. The number of Syrian children with no access to schooling in Turkey is 424 thousand. There are significant ongoing efforts to improve this situation. Undoubtedly, schooling more than 773 thousand children is a remarkable success as well as being a major source of cost. Considering that the annual cost of a primary-school student in Turkey is calculated to be 11 thousand TL[153] ,, annual cost of 773 thousand students for Turkey is between 750 million to 1 billion €. Furthermore, it shouldn't be forgotten that this issue brings with itself other non-financial risks including over-burdening the education system.

According to SB-2017, SB-2019, and SB-2020 data, Turkish society displays a high degree of "sensitivity" regarding the education of Syrian children. The survey respondents were asked the question "What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding education of Syrian children in public schools in Turkey?". There was a significant increase in the percentage of respondents who suggested *"they should be able to freely enjoy education opportunities at all levels including university education",* which rose to 29,9% in SB-2020 from 9,5% in SB-2017 and 6% in SB-2019. The statement *"they should be able to freely enjoy the 12-year mandatory education"* drew support from 23% of the respondents. Around 16-17% of the respondents in SB-2020 and SB-2019 argued that *"they shouldn't be able receive any education"*, decreasing from 25,7% in SB-2017.

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151. Turkish Ministry of National Education's Directorate of Life Long Learning (2021) https://hbogm.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/2021_05/21110500_MayYs2021_internet_bulteni_.pdf (Access: 23.05.2021)

152. 8,437 registered students, 1.09% of the total, are in YOBİS system, Temporary Training Centers.

153. "Öğrenci başına kamu harcaması göstergeleri" okul öncesi için 11 bin TL, ilköğretim için 13 bin TL, ortaöğretim için 8.900 TL olarak hesaplanmaktadır. Bkz.: ERG-Eğitim Reformu Girişimi (2021) Eğitim Yönetişimi ve Finansmanı Eğitim İzleme Raporu 2021, S.34. (https://www.egitimreformugirisimi.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/E%C4%B0R2021_YonetisimVeFinansman.pdf)

SB-2020-TABLE 59: What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding education of Syrian children in public schools in Turkey?

		2017		2019		2020	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
1	They should be able to freely enjoy education opportunities at all levels including university education	198	9,5	136	6,0	675	29,9
2	They should be able to freely enjoy the 12-year mandatory education	491	23,5	608	26,8	521	23,0
3	They shouldn't be able to receive any education	537	25,7	380	16,7	381	16,9
4	They should only be taught Turkish language	680	32,6	326	14,4	275	12,2
5	Syrian children should be able to receive education in separate classes at public schools	-	-	355	15,6	155	6,9
6	They should receive education in Arabic at separate schools apart from Turkish children	-	-	218	9,6	138	6,1
7	They shouldn't be able to go to public schools but should be able to receive vocational training	103	4,9	30	1,3	46	2,0
8	Other	-	-	-	-	11	0,5
	No idea/ No response	80	3,8	218	9,6	57	2,5
Total		**2089**	**100,0**	**2271**	**100,0**	**2259**	**100,0**

Education needs to be considered as one of the public service domains which are most vulnerable to be negatively affected by mass migration. Even though education of Syrian children is essential for social cohesion, various disruptions in the educational services run the risk of exacerbating the negative reactions among the Turkish society towards Syrians. The intense complaints and criticisms of Turkish respondents captured by SB-2020 particularly in the cities with larger Syrian communities contain hints that this is already happening. In these cities, the average support to education of Syrian children is below average while there are serious criticisms targeting Turkey's education policies. While the national share of those respondents who suggested that Syrians "should be able to freely enjoy education opportunities at all levels including university education" is 29,9%, the same share is 23,1% in the border cities. In the same way, while the response "They shouldn't be able to receive any education" received support from 16,9% in the overall survey, in border cities 21,3% of the respondents endorsed it.

SB-2020-TABLE 60: What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding education of Syrian children in public schools in Turkey? (%)

	They should be able to freely enjoy education opportunities at all levels including university education	They should be able to freely enjoy the 12-year mandatory education	They shouldn't be able to receive any education	They should only be taught Turkish language	Syrian children should be able to receive education in separate classes at public schools	They should receive education in Arabic at separate schools apart from Turkish children	They shouldn't be able to go to public schools but should be able to receive vocational training	Other	No idea/ No response
Sex									
Female	30,8	24,1	14,8	10,9	8,4	5,8	2,1	0,3	2,8
Male	29,0	22,0	18,9	13,4	5,3	6,4	2,0	0,7	2,3
Age Groups									
18-24	29,7	27,5	13,2	14,1	4,7	4,6	2,6	0,3	3,3
25-34	31,6	21,9	13,1	14,3	7,2	6,1	2,0	0,5	3,3
35-44	28,1	20,9	18,2	10,1	10,3	7,9	1,8	0,7	2,0
45-54	27,9	23,0	23,6	10,3	6,7	6,4	1,5	0,6	-
55-64	30,9	17,3	23,5	10,5	4,9	8,0	1,9	0,6	2,4
65+	39,1	15,6	25,0	4,7	6,3	3,1	1,6	-	4,6
Educational Attainment									
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	34,0	11,3	32,1	13,2	3,8	3,8	-	-	1,8
Primary school	25,2	20,2	22,5	10,8	7,6	9,2	1,6	0,5	2,4
Middle-school	28,3	23,4	17,3	10,4	8,1	7,2	3,2	0,6	1,5
High-school or equivalent	30,8	23,6	15,6	12,7	6,4	5,5	2,2	0,4	2,8
University/ Graduate degree	32,9	25,7	12,3	13,6	6,6	3,9	1,4	0,6	3,0
Region									
Border cities	23,1	7,7	21,3	10,6	11,8	22,2	0,5	0,2	2,6
Other cities	31,5	26,8	15,8	12,5	5,7	2,2	2,4	0,6	2,5
Metropolitan cities	33,7	27,7	15,2	7,2	7,2	1,7	2,8	0,6	3,9
Non-metropolitan cities	30,5	26,4	16,1	15,2	4,9	2,5	2,2	0,5	1,7
Occupation									
Private sector employee	26,4	22,8	17,5	10,4	9,6	7,2	2,1	0,9	3,1
Artisan/Tradesman	34,1	16,3	22,7	14,6	4,2	5,7	1,4	0,5	0,5
Housewife/ girl	28,7	21,6	17,8	10,4	10,1	7,7	1,4	0,2	2,1
Student	30,4	29,5	11,2	14,9	2,9	5,2	2,3	-	3,6
Unemployed	32,3	25,9	13,8	12,7	7,4	2,1	2,6	-	3,2
Retired	25,6	26,5	22,2	6,0	5,1	8,5	1,7	0,9	3,5
Public sector employee	35,4	17,7	13,3	13,3	7,1	7,1	2,6	0,9	2,6
Self-employed	25,5	31,8	13,6	12,7	6,4	5,5	2,7	-	1,8
Businessperson	36,8	21,1	12,3	12,3	7,0	5,3	3,4	1,8	-
General	**29,9**	**23,0**	**16,9**	**12,2**	**6,9**	**6,1**	**2,0**	**0,5**	**2,5**

SYRIANS BAROMETER
2020

SYRIANS
(UNDER
TEMPORARY
PROTECTION)

RESEARCH
FINDINGS

5

IV- SB-2020: SYRIANS RESEARCH PROFILE AND FINDINGS

IV- A. SB-2o20: SYRIANS RESEARCH PROFILE

1. Research Background, Profile, and Confidence

In the framework of Syrians Barometer-2020, research on Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey included a "household-based surveys" conducted on a sample of 1.414 households outside of camps in 15 cities. 873 of these households were in border cities, 352 were in metropolitan cities (i.e. Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir), and 189 were in non-metropolitan cities. These surveys were conducted using CAPI (computer-assisted personal interviewing). In addition to the region quota (i.e. "border cities", "metropolitan cities", and "non-metropolitan cities"), the sample included quotas on socio-economic status, sex, and age groups of the respondents in order to include sufficient diversity. The research was conducted on a representative sample, for which city-based representation was taken into consideration. Like it was the case in SB-2019, around 60 thousand Syrians were left outside of the research scope in SB-2020. Since the essence of SB research is to offer a vision for social cohesion, the selection of Syrians almost all of whom live in urban centers alongside with the Turkish society as the research subject reflects this mentality. In presenting comparisons between SB-2017, SB-2019, and SB-2020 only the data from Syrians living outside of camps were used for SB-2017.

SB-2020-TABLOE 61: **SB-2020 Syrians, City-based Sample**

	Cities	#	%		Cities	#	%
1	İstanbul	245	17,3	9	Konya	47	3,3
2	Hatay	191	13,5	10	Kilis	46	3,3
3	Gaziantep	190	13,4	11	Ankara	41	2,9
4	Şanlıurfa	184	13,0	12	Mardin	41	2,9
5	Adana	93	6,6	13	Kayseri	37	2,6
6	Mersin	93	6,6	14	Kahramanmaraş	35	2,5
7	Bursa	75	5,3	15	Kocaeli	30	2,1
8	İzmir	66	4,7		Total	1.418	100,0

To be able to make comparisons regarding social cohesion between regions where Syrians densely populate and those where relatively fewer Syrians live, three regional categories (border cities, metropolitan cities, and non-metropolitan cities) within two main regional categories (border region and other cities).

SB-2020-TABLE 62: SB-2020 SB-2020 Survey Regional Categories

	Region	Cities	#	%	#	%
Border Region	Border cities	Adana, Gaziantep, Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, Kilis, Mardin, Mersin, Şanlıurfa	873	61,7	873	61,7
Other Cities	Metropolitan cities	Ankara, İstanbul, İzmir	352	24,9	541	38,3
	Non-metropolitan cities	Bursa, Kayseri, Kocaeli, Konya	189	13,4		
Total			1414	100,0		

The household-based surveys with Syrians were conducted using CAPI method.[154] The surveys were conducted with an individual authorized to give information on behalf of the household. When determining the universe of the research, the average size of a household was determined to be 6. Total number of households, in turn, was calculated by dividing the total number of Syrians in Turkey by this average household size- 3.475.327 / 6 = 579.221. The sample size was determined, according to these figures on a 95% confidence level and ±2,6 confidence interval, to be 1.414. The surveys with Syrians were conducted between 10 December 2020 and 12 January 2021.

Since SB-2020 was conducted on a representative sample selected on a ±2,6 confidence interval, it is believed that, with certain reservations, it provides the most reliable and accurate information concerning the profile of all Syrians under temporary protection living outside of camps in Turkey. However, it shouldn't be forgotten that the study bears no claim of presenting "the truths" or "absolute perceptions" or "the reality". Instead, being aware of its limitations, it attempts at approaching to the social reality the best way it can in such a dynamic and complex process.

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154. CAPI: Computer Assisted Personel Interview

2. Profile and Demographic Characteristics of Syrian Participants

SB-2020-TABLE 63: Profile and Demographic Characteristics of Syrian Participants (15 cities - 1414 households - 6953 individuals)

	#	%		#	%
Sex (Household Distribution)			**Educational Attainment of Individuals in Households ****		
Female	3457	49,7	Illiterate	513	9,0
Male	3496	50,3	Literate but not graduate of any school	995	17,5
Total	**6953**	**100,0**	Primary school	2167	38,1
Age Groups in Households			Middle school	1082	19,0
0-5	1269	18,2	High-school or equivalent	532	9,4
6-11	1110	16,0	2-year associate degree / Vocational school of higher education	110	2,0
12-17	983	14,1	University	279	4,9
18-24	915	13,2	Graduate degree / PhD	6	0,1
25-34	1064	15,3	**Total**	**5684**	**100,0**
35-44	806	11,6	**Occupational Status of Individuals in Households***		
45-54	466	6,7	Housewife	1488	32,5
55-64	231	3,3	Working	1343	29,4
65+	109	1,6	Student	900	19,7
Total	**6953**	**100,0**	Unemployed	697	15,2
Status in Turkey of Individuals in Households			Unable to work or old	136	3,0
Temporary protection identification document	6874	98,9	Retired	10	0,2
No documents / Undocumented	29	0,4	**Total**	**4574**	**100,0**
Temporary protection registration document	25	0,4	**Type of Jobs of Individuals in Households*****		
Republic of Turkey citizenship identification	14	0,2	Casual (daily) worker	593	44,2
Residence permit	11	0,2	Regularly working employee	481	35,8
Total	**6953**	**100,0**	Seasonal worker	178	13,2
Marital Status of Individuals in Households *			Self-employed / Artisan	66	4,9
Married	2763	60,4	Employer (Employing at least 1 individual)	20	1,5
Single / Never married	1583	34,6	Unpaid family employee	5	0,4
Widowed	174	3,8	**Total**	**1343**	**100,0**
Divorced	46	1,0			
Separated	8	0,2			
Total	**4574**	**100,0**			

* Results from individuals of at least 12 years of age.
** Results from individuals of at least 6 years of age.
*** Results from individuals of at least 12 years of age who is reported to work at an income-generating work.

SB study covers Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey. In this context, 98,9% (6.874) of the 6.953 individuals in the sample of 1.414 households are holders of "Temporary Protection Identification Document". In addition, 25 individuals in these households have a "Temporary protection registration document. The total number of individuals in these households with other statuses in Turkey (no documents/undocumented, Turkish citizens, and residence permit holders) is 54. Since the survey was conducted on a household basis with one individual giving the information of individuals living in the household, demographic characteristics of the individuals living in the household could be different from those of the individual with whom the actual survey was conducted. 41,9% of the individuals with whom the surveys were conducted were female while the remaining 58,1% were male. However, 49,7% of the people in all households were female and 50,3% were male.

SB-2020-TABLE 64: **Distribution based on Sex**

Sex of Interviewed Individuals			Sex of Individuals in the Households		
	#	%		#	%
Female	592	41,9	Female	3457	49,7
Male	822	58,1	Male	3496	50,3
Total	**1414**	**100,0**	**Total**	**6953**	**100,0**

It is possible to divide Syrians in Turkey into 4 different categories regarding their legal status. The largest group is composed of more than 3.6 million individuals under temporary protection. In addition, there is a group of approximately 100 thousand Syrians with "residence permits". The last category is that of naturalized Turkish citizens of Syrian origin, who are technically not Syrian anymore but who continue to be perceived as Syrian in the social context. There are around 150 thousand Syrians who obtained Turkish citizenship through "exceptional naturalization", almost all of whom used to be under temporary protection before obtaining citizenship.[155]

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155. Turkish Daily Milliyet (09.05.2021) "150,000 Syrians were given citizenship" ("150 bin Suriyeliye vatandaşlık verildi") ('https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/150-bin-suriyeliye-vatandaslik-verildi-6501330) (Access: 04.06.2021)

SB-2020-TABLE 65: Distribution based on Marital Status

Marital Status of Interviewed Individuals (18 + year-olds)			Marital Status of Individuals in the Households (12 + year-olds)		
	#	%		#	%
Single / Never married	1229	86,9	Single / Never married	2763	60,4
Married	104	7,4	Married	1583	34,6
Separated	49	3,5	Separated	174	3,8
Widowed	26	1,8	Widowed	46	1,0
Divorced	6	0,4	Divorced	8	0,2
Total	**1414**	**100,0**	**Total**	**4574**	**100,0**

SB-2020-TABLE 66: Distribution based on Legal Status

Legal Status of Interviewed Individuals			Legal Status of Individuals in the Household		
	#	%		#	%
Temporary protection identification document	1412	99,9	Temporary protection identification document	6874	98,9
Temporary protection registration document	2	0,1	No documents / Undocumented	29	0,4
			Temporary protection registration document	25	0,4
			Republic of Turkey citizenship identification	14	0,2
			Residence permit	11	0,2
Total	**1414**	**100,0**	**Total**	**6953**	**100,0**

There isn't sufficient information regarding the educational attainment levels of Syrians in Turkey. A publication by the Ministry of Development in 2015 suggested that 33,3% of Syrians were illiterate and 13% knew how to read and write but were not a graduate of any school. After this, there was no other data on education was shared. SB research, in this context, contains significant information regarding educational attainment of Syrian community in Turkey. All three SB fieldworks conducted in 2017, 2019, and 2020 reveal that the average educational attainment among Syrians is significantly lower than the Turkish average. Even though there has been an important improvement in the educational averages with the incorporation of Syrian children to Turkish public schools after 2016, the number of Syrians with little or no education still appears to be very high. The total share of "illiterate" and "literate but not graduate of any school" was 30,3% in SB-2017, 24,9% in SB-2019, and 26,5% in SB-2020.

SB-2020-TABLE 67: Distribution based on Educational Attainment

(Individuals in the Households)

* Results from individuals of at least 6 years of age.

	SB-2017		SB-2019		SB-2020	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Illiterate	1200	**18,5**	436	**8,2**	513	**9,0**
Literate but not graduate of any school	768	**11,8**	891	**16,7**	995	**17,5**
Primary school	1817	28,0	1690	31,7	2167	38,1
Middle school	1278	19,7	1170	22,0	1082	19,0
High-school or equivalent	709	10,9	608	11,4	532	9,4
2-year associate degree / Vocational school of higher education	213	3,3	141	2,7	110	2,0
University	463	7,1	373	7,0	279	4,9
Graduate degree / PhD	37	0,6	15	0,3	6	0,1
Total	**6485**	**100,0**	**5324**	**100,0**	**5684**	**100,0**

Education and Knowledge of Language

SB-2020 tried to learn about Syrians' level of fluency in Turkish language based upon their subjective evaluations and statements. The respondents were asked "at what level do the individuals know Turkish?" Of all the individuals on whom data was collected, 24% were reported to be at an "advanced" level, while 36,6% were "intermediate". It needs to be remembered that the data comes from an individual at each household who gave information regarding other individuals living with them. They are presented here to give an impression and should be treated as such. Moreover, what is meant by "advanced level Turkish" is very difficult to know. It may refer to having the ability to "understand / be understood" in Turkish in the daily life. In fact, the finding that 10,7% of the illiterate individuals were reported to be at an advanced level in Turkish.

SB-2020-TABLE 68: At what level do the individuals know Turkish? (At least 6 years of age)

	#	%
Mother Tongue	115	2,0
Advanced	1365	24,0
Intermediate	1740	30,6
Beginner	1427	25,1
Don't know at all	1037	18,3
Total	**5684**	**100,0**

SB-2020-TABLE 69: At what level do the individuals know Turkish? (%)

	Mother Tongue	Advanced	Intermediate	Beginner	Don't know at all
Sex					
Female	2,4	20,9	26,2	26,6	23,9
Male	1,7	27,1	35,1	23,6	12,5
Age Groups					
6-11	1,9	22,1	34,2	26,7	15,1
12-17	2,0	41,2	38,6	12,3	5,9
18-24	2,3	37,4	29,0	16,4	14,9
25-34	2,0	19,7	33,7	28,3	16,3
35-44	2,6	12,0	29,4	35,7	20,3
45-54	1,7	8,6	21,0	37,8	30,9
55-64	1,3	8,2	8,2	31,2	51,1
65+	-	6,4	2,8	21,1	69,7
Educational Attainment					
Illiterate	6,2	10,7	12,1	13,8	57,2
Literate but not graduate of any school	1,8	20,5	29,9	28,6	19,2
Primary school	1,5	26,7	32,3	23,8	15,7
Middle school	1,7	25,6	33,0	27,5	12,2
High-school or equivalent	1,1	32,0	29,7	27,1	10,1
2-year associate degree / Vocational school of higher education	1,8	12,7	42,7	34,5	8,3
University	2,1	23,2	41,8	26,3	6,6
General	**2,0**	**24,0**	**30,6**	**25,1**	**18,3**

Focus Group Discussions

FGDs are particularly instrumental in getting a deeper understanding of the experiences and opinions of Syrians. While representativeness was not aimed in the FGDs, a significant degree of diversity was intended so that different opinions and experiences of various groups of specific attention would be obtained. Therefore, instead of inviting random groups, each FGD aimed at bringing together individuals with specific profiles.

In this context, 10 FGDs were conducted with Syrian participants. The greatest number of FGDs were conducted with groups of women. The reason for this was the desire to be aware of gender-specific experiences as well as to include women's perspectives, expectations, and opinions. Besides women, FGDs were conducted with Syrians from different occupational groups. These included in SB-2020, "students", "artisans/workers", and "NGO workers". FGDs took place in 2 border cities where dense Syrian populations live (Gaziantep, and Şanlıurfa) in addition to 2 metropolitan cities (İstanbul and Ankara) in December 2020. These FGDs were moderated by SB research team's Syrian senior expert in Arabic. In addition, at least one other member of the research team participated in each FGD with the help of a translator. Each FGD hosted 5 to 7 participants, reaching in total the views of 61 individuals through 10 FGDs.

SB-2020-TABLE 70: SB-2020 FGDs with Syrians

	Cities	FGD Group	Total
Metropolitan Cities	İstanbul	Artisans/ Workers (5)	3
		Students (6)	
		NGO Worker (6)	
	Ankara	Students (7)	2
		Women (6)	
Border Cities	Gaziantep	Women (6)	3
		Artisans/ Workers (6)	
		NGO Worker (5)	
	Şanlıurfa	Women (7)	2
		NGO Worker (7)	
Total number of participants: 61 (10 FGDs, average number of participants: 6.1)			

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IV- B. SB-2020: SYRIANS RESEARCH FINDINGS

1. How do Syrians Make Their Living in Turkey?

How the Syrians in Turkey make their living is a controversial topic and has a significant influence on social cohesion. Even though Syrians were legally provided with the right to work since 15 January 2016, conditional upon the invitation of an employer who is willing to pay them at least the minimum wage, it is known that a very large part of Syrians in Turkey work informally. According to the latest figures released by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security[156], the number of Syrians with a work permit in Turkey was 63.789 as of 2019. There is, however, no additional information concerning a breakdown of this number based on legal status of Syrians.

The most important financial support program for Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey is the Social Cohesion Assistance (SUY / Kızılay Card). Provided through EU funds, this financial support of 120 TL per person per month[157] benefits 1.8 million individuals under international protection in Turkey, 1.6 million of whom being Syrians.

When asked the question "Have you received assistance from any institution or individual in the last 12 months to make your family's living?", those who said yes were 22% in SB-2017, 36,3% in SB-2019, and 46,2% in SB-2020. The latter increase can probably be attributed to the increase in financial assistance in various forms due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

SB-2020-TABLE 71: Have you received assistance from any institution or individual in the last 12 months to make your family's living?

	2017		2019		2020	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Yes	195	22,0	515	36,3	653	46,2
No	684	77,1	896	63,2	759	53,7
No idea / No response	8	0,9	7	0,5	2	0,1
Total	**887**	**100,0**	**1418**	**100,0**	**1414**	**100,0**

When those who said "yes" were further asked where this assistance is coming from, more than 90% reported that they received support from SUY/Kızılay Card. This figure largely corresponds to SUY program data. An interesting observation is that the share of international organizations in the received support appears to be growing. While it constituted only 1,9% of the all reported sources of support in SB-2019, it climbed as high as to 9,5% in SB-2020. There is a reverse movement in the share of support provided by municipalities, which decreased from 7% in SB-2019 to 2,1% in SB-2020.

156. Labor and Social Security Ministry (2020) Yabancıların Çalışma İzinleri-2019 / Work Permits of Foreigners-2019, https://www.csgb.gov.tr/istatistikler/calisma-hayati-istatistikleri/resmi-istatistik-programi/yabancilarin-calisma-izinleri/ (Access: 22.05.2021)

157. ESNN payment in 2021 rose to 155 TL from 120 TL. However, in 2020, payments were made as 120 TL. SUY payments when calculated in euros, payment of 120 TL was equal to €32 at the beginning of the program in December 2016 (1€= 3.66 TL), while in December 2020, it dropped to €12.61 (€1= 9.51 TL).

SB-2020-TABLE 72: Where have you received the assistance from? (Multiple response)

		2019		2020	
		#	%	#	%
1	Kızılay Card / SUY	481	93,4	592	90,7
2	International Organizations	10	1,9	60	9,2
3	Civil Society Organizations	20	3,9	32	4,9
4	Municipalities	36	7,0	14	2,1
5	Other	12	2,3	32	4,9
6	Family/relatives in Syria	11	2,1	-	-
	No idea / No response	-	-	3	0,5
* Results from 653 respondents who stated that they have received assistance in the last 12 months to make their family's living.					

As presented earlier, Turkish society has a significantly different perception on this matter. More than 80% of the Turkish society in all three SB studies (86,2% in SB-2017; 84,5% in SB-2019; and 80,6% in SB-2020) believe. That Syrians make their living through "the support of Turkish state". Additionally, 54,2% of the Turkish respondents in SB-2017, 65,1% in SB-2019, and 53,1% in SB-2020 reported believing that Syrians make their living through "begging". The share of those Turkish respondents who suggested that Syrians work to make their living in Turkey was 49,8% in SB-2017, 50,9% in SB-2019, and 49,7% in SB-2020. Naturally, such a perception amongst Turkish society leads to Syrians being seen as a burden on the Turkish state and society.

2.   Working Status of Syrians and Sources of Livelihood

Rules and guidelines regarding the working of Syrians in Turkey are regulated by the 29th Article of the Temporary Protection Regulation which was adopted on 22 October 2014 in the framework of the LFIP[158] . Based on this regulation, the "Directive on Working Permits for Foreigners Under Temporary Protection" was adopted on 15 January 2016.[159] In a context where more than 98% of Syrians live outside of camps, there isn't any source of readily available regular income for Syrians, apart from some exceptional programs such as the ESSN program which is funded by the EU and from which around 1.6 million Syrians benefit by receiving a monthly payment of 120 TL. Moreover, it is obvious that not only those Syrians who don't benefit from the ESSN program, but also those who do benefit from it need to work as 120 TL per person is not sufficient for people living in urban contexts. It is a known fact that Syrians in Turkey have opened a space for themselves in the infor-

158. Regulation on Temporary Protection, https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/10/20141022-15-1.pdf (Access: 10.05.2019)

159. Regulation on the Working Permits of Foreigners under Temporary Protection, Official Gazette (15.01.2016) (http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/3.5.20168375.pdf) (Access: 20.10.2019).

mal economy to work. However, exactly figuring out how many of them are working is impossible because of the very nature of the informal economy, while it could be possible to make certain estimations based on projections.

SB-2020 tried to shed some light, albeit limited, on this issue, like SB-2017 and SB-2019 did, by including two important questions regarding the working status of Syrians. Among those aged 12 or above in households, 37,9% in SB-2019 and 29,4% in SB-2020 responded positively to the question *"are you currently working in an income-generating job?"* As of December 2020, the number of Syrians above the age of 12 was around 2.3 million. When the percentage detected by this research is taken into consideration, the number of Syrians above the age of 12 who are actively working can be estimated to be between 700 thousand and 1 million.[160] The interesting point to observe is the significant decrease from 2019 to 2020. When this decrease both in actual numbers and the percentage is considered together with the increases in the shares of those who identify as "unemployed" (SB-2019: 10,4%; SB-2020: 15,2%) and of those working in casual and irregular works; it appears safe to argue that the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Syrians has been significant.

SB-2020-TABLE 73: Profile of working status among Syrians in the Households

		SB-2019		SB-2020	
		#	%	#	%
1	Housewife	1.420	32,7	1488	32,5
2	Working	1.648	37,9	1343	29,4
5	Student	635	14,6	900	19,7
6	Unemployed	451	10,4	697	15,2
3	Unable to work / disabled or old	182	4,2	136	3,0
4	Retired	7	0,2	10	0,2
Total					
* Results from individuals who are 12 years old or older.					

160. ILO in this study makes this statement within the framework of the age group of 15 and over. See ILO Syrians in The Turkish Labour Market, Data from TURKSTAT Household Labour Force Survey (HHLFS) 2017, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/---ilo-ankara/documents/genericdocument/wcms_738618.pdf (Access: 18.03.2020)

SB-2020-TABLE 74: Profile of working status among Syrians in the Households

	#	%
Working	**1343**	**29,4**
Female	*105*	**7,8**
Male	*1238*	**92,2**

SB-2020-TABLE 75: Profile of working status among Syrians in the Households

	#	%
Female (aged 12 +)	**2306**	66,7*
Working	*105*	**4,6**
Male (aged 12 +)	**2268**	64,9**
Working	*1238*	**54,6**
* Percentage among women		
** Percentage among men		

There appears to be a significant imbalance when the sexes of those working Syrians are concerned. While the share of women among Syrians who are working is 7,8%, it is 4,6% of all Syrian women in Turkey.

When the demographic characteristics of Syrians in Turkey are concerned, the active working age population, i.e. those between the ages of 15 and 65, is around 2.1 million as of 31 December 2020. According to TUIK data, as of January 2021, the labor participation rate of Turkish population is 50,3%. While the labor participation rate is 69,4% among Turkish men, it is 31,5% among women.[161] Therefore, SB research data shows that labor participation rate among Syrian women is way below the Turkish average. A significant portion of Syrian women in Turkey, 32,7% in SB-2019 and 32,5% in SB-2020, identify themselves as "housewives".

The share of Syrians who are aged between 12 and 18 among the working population appears to remain stable with a slight decrease from 7,7% in SB-2019 to 6,9% in SB-2020.

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161. TUIK (TURKSTAT): Workforce Statistics (TÜİK: İşgücü İstatistikleri), January 2021, https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Isgucu-Is-tatistikleri-I.-Ceyrek:-Ocak---Mart,-2021-37545 (Access: 29.05.2021)

SB-2020-TABLO 76: Age Distribution of Those Who are Working in the Households

	SB-2019		SB-2020	
	#	%	#	%
12 years old	5	3,9	1	1.1
13 years old	7	5,5	6	6,4
14 years old	12	9,4	9	9,7
15 years old	29	22,7	13	14,0
16 years old	32	25,0	30	32,2
17 years old	43	33,5	34	36,6
Total	**128**	**100,0**	**93**	**100,0**

The findings related to the types of work Syrians are involved with are noteworthy. It is observed that while 50,2% of Syrian respondents reported being "regularly working employees" in SB-2019, it was 35,8% in SB-2020. This shows a significant decrease. This has reflected to the number of those working as "casual (daily) workers". In SB-2019, those who were involved in such "casual (daily)" work constituted 33,6% of working Syrians. Their share has increased to 44,2% in SB-2020. In other words, it appears that more Syrians are involved in insecure and precarious works.

SB-2020-TABLE 77: Type of Employment of Individuals in Households (12 + year-olds)

		SB-2019		SB-2020	
		#	%	#	%
1	Casual (daily) worker	553	**33,6**	593	**44,2**
2	Regularly working employee	828	**50,2**	481	**35,8**
3	Seasonal worker	32	**1,9**	178	**13,2**
4	Self-employed / Artisan	184	**11,2**	66	**4,9**
5	Employer (employing 1 or more individuals)	41	**2,5**	20	**1,5**
6	Unpaid family employee	10	**0,6**	5	**0,4**
Total		1648	**100,0**	1343	**100,0**
* Results from individuals that work who are at least 12 years old.					

As mentioned above, according to the most recent data released by Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the number of Syrians issued a work permit was 34.573 in 2018 and 63.789 in 2019.[162] Data from 2020 has yet to be released. In addition, it is not possible to know how many Syrians within these figures are under temporary protection. Two UNHCR documents published in 2019 and 2020 reported the number of work-permits issued to Syrians as 80 thousand[163] and 132.497.[164] The latter number is a cumulative figure representing all work-permits issued to Syrians since 2016. It can be safely suggested that these figures represent a small minority of Syrians who are actively working.

As it is known, informality is one of the most serious structural problems of the Turkish economy. According to TUIK data of January 2021 the rate of informality amongst Turkish citizens was 28,1%.[165] Since Syrians are generally not highly-skilled people and they have numerous disadvantages in the labor market including the language barrier and a "different working culture", they tend to be employed by small and medium-sized Turkish enterprises at menial jobs that require unskilled labor. In this context, our prediction based on the SB-2020 research data is that there are around 1 million Syrians that are actively working in Turkey as of December 2020.

Any possible link between Syrians' working status and their knowledge of Turkish language is investigated through cross-tables. Accordingly; 31,5% of those who reported that Turkish was their mother tongue or that they know Turkish on an advanced level are actively working. On the other end of the spectrum, 34,9% of those Syrian respondents who know Turkish on a beginner level or not at all are actively working. In these same groups, 39,2 of those native/advanced level Turkish and 28,5% of those with little/no Turkish knowledge are employed at a regular job. These findings indicate hints regarding the skill-levels required by the works taken by Syrians. It appears that those with more fluent Turkish have higher expectations regarding their work, however with less chance of finding such work.

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162. Labor and Social Security Ministry (2020) Yabancıların Çalışma İzinleri-2019 / Work Permits of Foreigners-2019, https://www.csgb.gov.tr/istatistikler/calisma-hayati-istatistikleri/resmi-istatistik-programi/yabancilarin-calisma-izinleri/ (Access: 22.05.2021)

163. Update: Durable Solutions for Syrian Refugees (July-August 2019) https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/70892

164. UNHCR- 3RP Regional Strategic Overview (2020) https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/73116 (Access: 02.05.2020)

165. The rate of those working in the informal economy which shows the share of those working without registered in the social security institution to the total number of those who are working has dropped 2.0 points to 28.1% during the first quarter of 2021 compared to the same quarter of the previous year. The rate of those working in the agriculture sector in the informal economy dropped 3.3 points to 17.1% compared to the same quarter of the previous year." See TUIK: Workforce Statistics (TÜİK: İşgücü İstatistikleri), January 2021, https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Isgucu-Istatistikleri-I.-Ceyrek:-Ocak---Mart,-2021-37545 (Access: 29.05.2021).

SB-2020-TABLE 78: Level of Turkish knowledge (%) X Type of Employment of individuals in the households

	Native Language	Advanced	Intermediate	Beginner	Don't know at all
Casual (daily) worker	2,9	26,1	36,9	24,0	10,1
Regularly working employee	3,1	27,2	45,6	19,3	4,8
Seasonal worker	0,6	24,7	38,2	26,4	10,1
Self-employed / Artisan	7,6	21,2	40,9	24,2	6,1
Employer (employing 1 or more individuals)*	-	15,0	60,0	20,0	5,0
Unpaid family employee**	-	-	20,0	40,0	40,0
General	**2,8**	**25,8**	**40,7**	**22,6**	**8,1**

* Results from 20 individuals who are "Employers (employing 1 or more individuals)

** Results from 5 individuals who are "Unpaid family employees".

Not: Results from 1343 individuals that work who are at least 12 years old.

3.   Accommodation

More than 90% of Syrians in Turkey live in urban spaces. This has been causing some serious problems and tensions. Both the quality of material and the size of accommodation have serious impacts on the quality of life. It is a fact that majority of Syrians are living in impoverished neighborhoods in their cities of residents in poor- quality houses. Syrians usually have the additional issues such as having large households, further financial limitations, and extra low quality of houses in some parts of Turkey. According to SB research findings it appears that Syrians usually reside in apartment flats. The share of those Syrians living in "apartment flats" was 64,4% in SB-2017, 80,3% in SB-2019, and 74,8% in SB-2020. It is followed by those who live in "self-contained houses" with 23,7% in SB-2017, 16,8% in SB-2019, and 18,5% in SB-2020. Obviously, the type of accommodation has very little explanatory power by itself. What matters more are the quality, size, location, rent/price of these accommodations. Even though these are outside of the scope of this research, the below presented findings do offer some valuable information.

<p align="center">SB-2020-TABLE 79: Type of Accommodation</p>

	SB-2017		SB-2019		SB-2020	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Apartment flat	571	64,4	1.139	80,3	1057	74,8
Self-contained house	210	23,7	238	16,8	262	18,5
Slum	95	10,7	23	1,6	57	4,0
Depot	7	0,8	11	0,8		
Store	3	0,3	7	0,5		
Tent	1	0,1	-	-	23	1,6
Other					15	1,1
Total	**887**	**100,0**	**1.418**	**100,0**		

4.   Problem Areas of Syrians

It is of utmost importance to listen to Syrians themselves about the problems they experience in Turkey for the prospects of a peaceful future together. In this context, the respondents were asked to reflect their experiences on 8 potential issue areas. It is illuminating to see the results in different years in terms of process-tracking. It appears that the responses given to the question "Please state to what extent do you experience problems regarding the following areas" over the years remain quite consistent in terms of the ranking of problem areas. For instance, at the top of the list has been "working conditions" across all SB surveys. However, when the percentages of the responses are scrutinized, it appears that while there was a slight decrease in the intensity of problems from SB-2017 to SB-2019, there is an increase again in SB-2020. It seems safe to think that the pandemic process has a significant role in this change.

SB-2020-TABLE 80: **Please state to what extent do you experience problems as a family regarding the following areas (Scored)**

		2017	2019	2020
1	Working conditions	3,2	2,9	3,4
2	Food	2,7	2,7	3,2
3	Accommodation	2,7	2,7	3,0
4	Health	2,5	2,5	3,0
Average Score		Average Score	2,6	2,8
5	Communication (language)	3,1	2,9	2,7
6	Education	2,1	1,9	2,4
7	Discrimination	2,6	2,6	2,3
8	Protection / Legal support*	-	-	2,1
	0-2,99		3,0-5,0	
* "Protection / Legal support " question was added in SB-2020.				

The most significant problem area for Syrians out of the 8 topics appears to be working conditions, which was followed by access to food and accommodation. The fact that Syrians ranked "discrimination" at the bottom of the list of problem areas in all three SB surveys is a very significant finding.

SB-2020-TABLO 81: Please state to what extent do you experience problems as a family regarding the following areas. (%)

		Experiencing a lot of problems	Experiencing problems	COMBINED PROBLEMS	Sometimes experiencing, sometimes not experiencing problems	Not experiencing problems	Not experiencing problems at all	COMBINED NO PROBLEMS	No idea / No response
	SB-2017								
1	Health	5,0	15,9	**20,9**	15,0	55,8	7,8	**63,6**	0,5
2	Accommodation	10,4	15,6	**26,0**	16,5	49,7	7,0	**56,7**	0,8
3	Discrimination	8,5	16,6	**25,1**	18,5	45,0	7,7	**52,7**	3,7
4	Education	6,9	11,4	**18,3**	13,4	40,5	10,1	**50,6**	17,7
5	Food	5,7	15,3	**21,0**	28,2	44,2	5,9	**50,1**	0,7
6	Communication (language)	16,7	23,7	**40,4**	23,8	26,9	7,0	**33,9**	1,9
7	Working conditions	17,8	32,5	**50,3**	17,6	25,0	2,4	**27,4**	4,7
	SB-2019								
1	Health	5,3	11,7	**17,0**	14,6	65,4	2,3	**67,7**	0,7
2	Education	3,0	4,4	**7,4**	10,1	61,9	3,5	**65,4**	17,1
3	Discrimination	9,0	12,1	**21,1**	14,4	59,8	2,0	**61,8**	2,7
4	Accommodation	8,7	17,6	**26,3**	15,5	55,0	2,8	**57,8**	0,4
5	Food	5,6	21,1	**26,7**	19,0	49,7	1,0	**50,7**	3,6
6	Communication (language)	11,3	21,9	**33,2**	17,7	44,3	4,1	**48,4**	0,7
7	Working conditions	9,6	26,6	**36,2**	18,4	43,1	0,9	**44,0**	1,4
	SB-2020								
1	Discrimination	5,0	7,8	**12,8**	10,5	67,3	7,9	**75,2**	1,5
2	Protection / Legal support	5,3	5,0	**10,3**	8,6	63,7	10,7	**74,4**	6,7
3	Education	5,5	16,3	**21,8**	14,4	48,5	7,1	**55,6**	8,2
4	Communication (language)	7,5	14,4	**21,9**	26,9	43,6	4,7	**48,3**	2,9
5	Health	12,7	26,4	**39,1**	12,9	42,4	5,0	**47,4**	0,6
6	Accommodation	9,3	31,2	**40,5**	15,2	37,4	6,1	**43,5**	0,8
7	Food	10,3	38,2	**48,5**	16,8	29,2	4,9	**34,1**	0,6
8	Working conditions	15,5	41,6	**57,1**	16,1	22,6	3,5	**26,1**	0,7

* "Protection / Legal support " question was added in SB-2020.

The ranking of problem areas of Syrians displays consistency to a large extent in SB-2017, SB-2019, and SB-2020. However, SB-2020 findings appear to diverge from those of SB-2019 and rather converge with those of SB-2017. For example, the percentage of those who mentioned having experienced problems regarding "working conditions" reduced from 57,1% in SB-2017 to 36,2% in SB-2019. However, it surged again to 50,3% in SB-2020, most likely due to the impact of pandemic. A similar trend is observed in the responses given on health and education, which can be similarly attributed to the influence of the pandemic. Across the three SB surveys, it appears that experiencing problems regarding access to "food" and "accommodation" are both regularly increasing. In contrast, problems experienced in relation to "communication / language" and "discrimination" appear to be regularly decreasing.

SB-2020-TABLE 82: Please state to what extent do you experience problems as a family regarding the following areas. (%)

(Since the question on "protection / legal support" was added in SB-2020 for the first time, it was excluded from this comparative table)

Problem Areas		Experiencing a lot of problems	Experiencing problems	COMBINED PROBLEMS	Sometimes experiencing, sometimes not experiencing problems	Not experiencing problems	Not experiencing problems at all	COMBINED NO PROBLEMS	No idea / No response
Working conditions	**2020**	15,5	41,6	**57,1**	16,1	22,6	3,5	**26,1**	0,7
	2019	9,6	26,6	**36,2**	18,4	43,1	0,9	**44,0**	1,4
	2017	17,8	32,5	**50,3**	17,6	25,0	2,4	**27,4**	4,7
Food	**2020**	10,3	38,2	**48,5**	16,8	29,2	4,9	**34,1**	0,6
	2019	5,6	21,1	**26,7**	19,0	49,7	1,0	**50,7**	3,6
	2017	5,7	15,3	**21,0**	28,2	44,2	5,9	**50,1**	0,7
Accommodation	**2020**	9,3	31,2	**40,5**	15,2	37,4	6,1	**43,5**	0,8
	2019	8,7	17,6	**26,3**	15,5	55,0	2,8	**57,8**	0,4
	2017	10,4	15,6	**26,0**	16,5	49,7	7,0	**56,7**	0,8
Health	**2020**	12,7	26,4	**39,1**	12,9	42,4	5,0	**47,4**	0,6
	2019	5,3	11,7	**17,0**	14,6	65,4	2,3	**67,7**	0,7
	2017	5,0	15,9	**20,9**	15,0	55,8	7,8	**63,6**	0,5
Communication (Language)	**2020**	7,5	14,4	**21,9**	26,9	43,6	4,7	**48,3**	2,9
	2019	11,3	21,9	**33,2**	17,7	44,3	4,1	**48,4**	0,7
	2017	16,7	23,7	**40,4**	23,8	26,9	7,0	**33,9**	1,9
Education	**2020**	5,5	16,3	**21,8**	14,4	48,5	7,1	**55,6**	8,2
	2019	3,0	4,4	**7,4**	10,1	61,9	3,5	**65,4**	17,1
	2017	6,9	11,4	**18,3**	13,4	40,5	10,1	**50,6**	17,7
Discrimination	**2020**	5,0	7,8	**12,8**	10,5	67,3	7,9	**75,2**	1,5
	2019	9,0	12,1	**21,1**	14,4	59,8	2,0	**61,8**	2,7
		8,5	16,6	**25,1**	18,5	45,0	7,7	**52,7**	3,7

Cross-tabulation of problem areas with sex of the respondents reveal important insights. It appears that not only men and women identify problem areas differently from one another, but also women report having experienced more problems than men in every proposed problem area.

SB-2020-TABLE 83: **Please state to what extent do you experience problems as a family regarding the following areas. (%) X Sex**

(For other versions of cross-tabulations with this question, see Additional Tables)

		Experiencing a lot of problems	Experiencing problems	COMBINED PROBLEMS	Sometimes experiencing, sometimes not experiencing problems	Not experiencing problems	Not experiencing problems at all	COMBINED NO PROBLEMS	No idea / No response
Working conditions	Female	16,6	**45,8**	**62,4**	15,9	16,2	4,4	**20,6**	1,1
	Male	14,7	**38,6**	**53,3**	16,2	27,1	2,9	**30,0**	0,5
Food	Female	12,8	**42,6**	**55,4**	17,7	20,3	5,9	**26,2**	0,7
	Male	8,4	**35,0**	**43,4**	16,1	35,6	4,1	**39,7**	0,8
Accommodation	Female	11,8	**34,6**	**46,4**	15,0	29,7	7,8	**37,5**	1,1
	Male	7,5	**28,7**	**36,2**	15,3	42,9	4,9	**47,8**	0,7
Health	Female	17,1	**32,1**	**49,2**	12,8	30,7	6,6	**37,3**	0,7
	Male	9,6	**22,4**	**32,0**	13,0	50,7	3,8	**54,5**	0,5
Education	Female	6,9	**20,6**	**27,5**	16,7	37,2	9,1	**46,3**	9,5
	Male	4,5	**13,1**	**17,6**	12,8	56,7	5,7	**62,4**	7,2
Communication (Language)	Female	10,5	**19,6**	**30,1**	29,9	31,1	5,9	**37,0**	3,0
	Male	5,4	**10,6**	**16,0**	24,7	52,6	3,8	**56,4**	2,9
Discrimination	Female	6,6	**9,5**	**16,1**	11,0	60,1	10,1	**70,2**	2,7
	Male	3,8	**6,6**	**10,4**	10,1	72,5	6,3	**78,8**	0,7
Protection / Legal support	Female	5,2	**6,1**	**11,3**	9,8	54,1	16,9	**71,0**	7,9
	Male	5,4	**4,1**	**9,5**	7,7	70,7	6,2	**76,9**	5,9

When the regions of the respondents are considered, it is observed that the Syrian respondents from border cities report a higher level of problems than the Turkey average in most areas except for "communication". In addition, less problems were reported by the respondents in border cities regarding "health" and "education" compared to respondents from other cities.

Perhaps the most important potential problem area in terms of establishing a peaceful common life is "discrimination". The fact that Syrians, almost all of whom have been living in urban spaces together with the Turkish society, rank "discrimination" at the bottom is certainly promising in terms of social cohesion. This finding can be seen as a strong indication of the still remarkably high level of "social acceptance" towards Syrians in Turkey. It also shows that social reactions towards Syrians remained quite limited despite the existing anxieties and complaints among the Turkish society.

FGD Findings: Problem Areas of Syrians

OSyrian FGD participants were also asked what the problem areas are for Syrians in Turkey. In this context, they were asked to reflect upon not only their personal problems but what problems are experienced by the Syrian community in Turkey based on their observations. The problems listed here included some general ones believed to affect all Syrians in Turkey as well as some more specific ones affecting smaller groups. The one significant difference regarding the findings in this question was on "discrimination". This issue was particularly mentioned in two contexts: (i) the discriminatory attitudes and acts towards Syrians in various public institutions, and (ii) the acts and attitudes from Turkish society towards them in various fields of the daily life that they perceive as discriminatory and, at times, "racist" and "hostile".

"What disturbs us the most after the language barrier is discrimination. They understand that we are Syrians from the way we speak. At university, for example, they understand that I am not Turkish from my name. I've had many problems with my professors and I still have two courses I need to pass from my first year. Professors did not give me the grades that I deserved because I am Syrian." (G.Antep-Women)

"Our biggest problem is discrimination. We experience that every day. We didn't come here out of our own wish. We pray every day to be able to return to our country. I wish that there were some awareness-raising campaigns about this. We were already broken apart when we arrived here. (G.Antep-NGO Workers)

"We still don't know whether we are here temporarily or for good. The people working at public institutions must be thinking that we are here temporarily because they treat us very badly. I think, the general attitude towards us prevents our social cohesion with Turks. They humiliate us a lot and they discriminate against us." (G.Antep-Workers)

"There is still too much discrimination at schools. Not only our children… we also experience discrimination at public institutions." (Istanbul-NGO Workers)

As the above-cited testimonies show, Syrian participants believe that the state should take action against the discrimination experienced by Syrians. There is an obvious expectation from the state to intervene to prevent the discriminatory and negative attitudes Syrians are facing at public institutions. Regarding what they perceive as discrimination from the society, there is a feeling that awareness-raising actions need to be taken. In this context, more specifically, Syrians voiced their expectations that misinformation regarding Syrians to be corrected and the Turkish society be reminded that Syrians did not come to Turkey willingly but were forced to leave their country because of a brutal civil war.

Another most frequently mentioned problem are for Syrians, after the language barrier and discrimination, concerns their legal status. One of the main issues discussed in this regard was the travel restrictions placed upon Syrians. Currently, Syrians are required to ask for permission before they can travel to any place outside of their city of registration. Many participants suggested that

these restrictions do not only make them feel psychologically cornered, but also reduce their ability to find employment, which was limited in the first place. Following travel restrictions, another frequently mentioned problem concerns the difficulties Syrians experience when registering and obtaining IDs. The last significant problem area regarding Syrians' legal status of persons under temporary protection is their lack of knowledge regarding their rights. They report that this issue creates complications in many different areas from economy to accommodation.

> *"We feel trapped because we are under temporary protection. We cannot go anywhere because of the travel restrictions." (Ankara-Women)*
>
> *"We don't know what our rights are. I think many of Syrians' problems derive from lack of information" (Ankara-Women)*
>
> *"There are restrictions on the mobility of Syrians under temporary protection within Turkey. When we look from the perspective of the state, I think they are justified because they need to know what everyone is doing. But from Syrians' perspective this is a problem. There is a lack of communication within institutions." (Ankara-Students)*
>
> *"There aren't many job opportunities in Turkey for Syrians. Therefore, Syrians are having a really hard time finding work and the travel restrictions prevent them from looking for work in other cities. These restrictions are constituting a huge impediment for Syrians to find work in Turkey." (Ş.Urfa-Women)*
>
> *"When we look at the legal matters, the decisions are not communicated to us clearly. The travel restrictions give way to smugglers and opportunists. There are inter-city smugglers now. When people's applications for permission are denied, they have no other chance but to go to these smugglers." (G.Antep-NGO Workers)*
>
> *"Now, because of the pandemic, things got a little bit easier. Before the pandemic, we used to wait for 7 hours at the DGMM office to get travel permission." (İstanbul-Students)*

When the bureaucratic difficulties entailed in such processes as getting travel permits or obtaining IDs are combined with the lack of information on Syrians' part regarding their rights, according to many participants, Syrians are not only forced to act outside of the laws, but also became vulnerable to the exploitation of people who promise them to solve their problems in exchange of money. "Being exploited" and experiencing injustice in other fields of life were also mentioned as significant problems for Syrians. In this respect, two issues can be underlined. Firstly, participants report that Syrians are being exploited in the economic realm as they are forced to work with insufficient payment and without any social security. Accordingly, due partly to several restrictions on their right to work in Turkey and partly to their low socio-economic status, Syrians are effectively forced to accept works that are not preferred by Turkish workers and they get paid much less than their Turkish counterparts. Moreover, since they can mostly find employment in the informal economy, they also lack any social security or insurance that would protect them.

The second issue discussed under the topic of exploitation concerns various people who take advantage of Syrians' insecure legal status when, for example, they try to rent a house or apply to university, by demanding extra money from them. Some participants suggested that this has become a known sector in particular regarding university education, where even some university officials are involved.

"Our workers work here uninsured and without any rights whatsoever. If anything happens to them no one would help. And no one is helping because they work informally and without social security. As if these are not enough, they are given extremely low wages." (G.Antep-Workers)

It has also been suggested as a major problem that since a majority of Syrians don't speak Turkish, they are unable to effectively communicate with Turkish society. In this regard, it was mentioned that it is difficult to learn Turkish, particularly for Syrians above a certain age, and that this pushes them to further close down within themselves.

"I think our biggest problem is about the language… Most problems get resolved after learning the language. I have found that 90% of my problems got away after I've learned Turkish." (G.Antep-Women)

"I think our biggest problem is not knowing the language. It would have been much better if there was a compulsory language education. Refugees in Europe learn languages in this way and this facilitates their integration." (G.Antep-Workers)

"Our children used to have problems with Turkish children when they first started school because they didn't know the language. After they learned Turkish problems got reduced to a large extent. We need to learn the language and solve our problems in the same way." (İstanbul-NGO Worker)

"I think currently our biggest problem is that we are closed down within ourselves. In our dormitory, Syrian students only eat with one another and I think this is a major problem." (İstanbul-Students)

5. Cultural Closeness between Syrians and Turks

There are significant debates regarding the influence of cultural similarity or closeness between communities on their relations following mass human mobilities. Many experiences in the world show that initially, cultural closeness and senses of "brotherhood", "consanguinity", and "religious affinity" help support solidarity. However, through time, the role of these moral and emotional factors appears to fade away and those more objective, material, and practical matters become increasingly more important. In this context, the perception that the movement is turning into permanent settlement and the increasing number of the refugees appear particularly to be important. It should be underlined that the issue of similarity between communities is ultimately a matter of perception. Therefore, the respective perceptions of different communities regarding cultural similarity could diverge from one another, sometimes at extreme degrees.

The relationship between cultural closeness and social cohesion processes in the context of Syrian refugees in Turkey offers a significant testing case for the general discussions over social cohesion.

The responses provided for the question "To what extent do you think Syrians are culturally similar to Turks?" reveal that Syrians feel themselves culturally quite similar to the Turkish society. The combined share of those replied with "similar" and "very similar" was 56,8% in SB-2017, 57,1% in SB-2019, and 41,4% in SB-2020. There has been a remarkable decrease of 15,7% from SB-2019 to SB-2020. Interestingly, while there was no significant increase in the percentage of those who suggested that Syrians were not culturally similar to Turks, the share of those who said Syrians were culturally "neither similar, nor not similar" grew a substantial 12,2%. These changes show that once cohabitation started, perceptions over cultural similarity or closeness could quickly change.

SB-2020-TABLE 84: **To what extent do you think Syrians are culturally similar to Turks?**

	2017			2019			2020		
	#	%		#	%		#	%	
Not similar at all	71	8,0	23,9	51	3,6	21,9	91	6,4	24,3
Not similar	141	15,9		259	18,3		253	17,9	
Neither similar, nor not similar	140	15,8	**15,8**	281	19,8	**19,8**	452	32,0	**32,0**
Similar	417	47,0	56,8	669	47,2	57,1	527	37,3	41,4
Very similar	87	9,8		141	9,9		58	4,1	
No idea / No response	31	3,5	**3,5**	17	1,2	**1,2**	33	2,3	**2,3**
Total	**887**	**100,0**		**1418**	**100,0**		**1414**	**100,0**	

As discussed earlier, however, Turkish society never felt that they were culturally similar with Syrians since the beginning. The combined share of those Turkish survey respondents who said "not similar" and "not similar at all" was (70.6% in 2014), 80,2% in SB-2017, 81,9% in SB-2019, and 77,6% in SB-2020. The same views were repeated in the responses given to social distance questions. Even though in a decreasing trend, Syrians overall believe that they are culturally similar to Turkish society.

SB-2020-TABLE 85: To what extent do you think Syrians are culturally similar to Turks? (%)

	Not similar at all	Not similar	COMBINED NOT SIMILAR	Neither similar, nor not similar	Similar	Very similar	COMBINED SIMILAR	No idea / No response
Sex								
Female	8,8	20,1	**28,9**	27,2	35,8	3,5	**39,3**	4,6
Male	4,7	16,3	**21,0**	35,4	38,3	4,5	**42,8**	0,8
Age Groups								
18-24	11,2	20,0	**31,2**	36,8	24,8	3,2	**28,0**	4,0
25-34	5,6	23,6	**29,2**	33,3	33,7	2,1	**35,8**	1,7
35-44	6,0	17,0	**23,0**	32,0	36,1	6,7	**42,8**	2,2
45-54	6,6	9,9	**16,5**	30,6	46,3	3,7	**50,0**	2,9
55-64	4,1	12,4	**16,5**	23,7	50,5	6,2	**56,7**	3,1
65 +	10,8	13,5	**24,3**	29,8	45,9	-	**45,9**	-
Educational Attainment								
Illiterate	11,2	22,4	**33,6**	37,1	24,1	-	**24,1**	5,2
Literate but not graduate of any school	-	19,6	**19,6**	31,4	43,1	2,0	**45,1**	3,9
Primary school	7,5	22,9	**30,4**	29,2	33,6	3,4	**37,0**	3,4
Middle school	8,1	15,4	**23,5**	34,1	36,0	4,7	**40,7**	1,7
High-school or equivalent	3,7	13,8	**17,5**	32,8	43,4	5,8	**49,2**	0,5
2-year associate degree / Vocational school of higher education	1,6	10,9	**12,5**	28,1	54,7	4,7	**59,4**	-
University / Graduate Degree / PhD	2,3	10,0	**12,3**	33,1	46,9	6,9	**53,8**	0,8
Region								
Border cities	6,1	12,4	**18,5**	32,8	41,2	4,1	**45,3**	3,4
Other cities	7,0	26,8	**33,8**	30,7	30,8	4,1	**34,9**	0,6
Metropolitan cities	7,4	25,0	**32,4**	26,4	36,1	5,1	**41,2**	-
Non-metropolitan cities	6,3	30,2	**36,5**	38,6	21,2	2,1	**23,3**	1,6
General	**6,4**	**17,9**	**24,3**	**32,0**	**37,3**	**4,1**	**41,4**	**2,3**

Among Syrians, those respondents who are male, over 35 years old, with a higher educational attainment, and from border cities more strongly believe that Syrians are culturally similar with Turks.

The cultural, historical, and geographical closeness between the Turkish and Syrian societies cannot be denied. However, when extraordinary and unexpected conditions forced a cohabitation, there could be significant problems even despite this cultural closeness. The emotional background of the relations between Syrians and the Turkish society is particularly important in terms of social

perceptions. This is also an important starting point regarding future social cohesion policies. "Cultural closeness" is an important issue in social cohesion policies. There appears to be an assumed relationship between cultural closeness and social cohesion in many discussions, which seem to suggest that cultural closeness would facilitate social cohesion. As expected, cultural closeness between Syrians and Turkish society appears to have positively influenced the process in the initial years. However, as time passed and prospects of Syrians' permanent stay in the country became more pronounced, it seems that the positive influence of this cultural affinity have waned. In other words, a society may assign much importance to cultural closeness in the short run when certain communities arrive at its doors, escaping war and persecution; but when what is at stake is establishing a future together in the long run, the links of ethnicity, religion, and culture lose their significance. This is especially the case if it experiences loss of jobs, deterioration of public services, growing criminality, and an anxiety of losing its identity. What become more important than cultural closeness in such a context are the perception of permanence and the numerical size of the immigrant community. The striking difference regarding cultural closeness between Syrians and Turkish society shows a difference in perceptions more than it shows a fact. Still, however, this significant difference in perceptions need to be in mind for future social cohesion policies.

FGD Findings: Perception of Syrians Regarding Cultural Closeness with Turkish Society

As discussed above, while Turkish survey respondents strongly argue that Syrians are not culturally similar to them, Syrians appear to believe that they are culturally similar and close to Turkish society. To better understand this significant finding, which was confirmed by all SB studies including the SB-2020, the same question was posed to FGD participants. Moreover, they were encouraged to explain and justify their opinions at length. In line with the existing findings, a large majority of the participants reported believing that Syrians and Turks are culturally similar. According to these individuals, in addition to a common religion, Syrians and Turks share many customs and traditions as well as commonalities in the language. These commonalities, they further argue, stem from shared historical experiences and geographical proximity.

> *"I think we are very similar. For example, we also believe in the evil eye but we don't display our beads everywhere." (G.Antep-Women)*

> *"There are many similarities between these two societies that we inherit from the history. We share many words and our dishes are very similar, even the same. There are many similarities in religious belief and practice. I think we are the most similar with Turks and Kurds." (Ş.Urfa-Women)*

> *"Turks are both Muslim and Sunni. Our similarities are much more then our differences. We are more similar with Turks than we are with Gulf country Arabs." (G.Antep-Workers)*

According to a significant number of participants, while there are many similarities between two societies, there are also major differences. Therefore, these participants provided plenty of examples regarding these differences and similarities rather than an ultimate conclusion.

> *"We are very similar in being emotional people. However, we don't have a culture of getting organized through establishing political parties or associations. In contrast, Turks so eas-*

ily get organized through various parties, associations, and even religious communities."
(G.Antep-NGO Worker)

"Our customs and histories are the same. Some of our religious practices are somewhat different, for instance the way we pray at mosque and some of our beliefs... But I think as social cohesion increases, these would change." (G.Antep-Workers)

6. Social Distance of Syrians from Turkish Society

Identifying the mutual social distance between the Turkish society and Syrians in Turkey would provide a significant contribution in reducing or eliminating social problems that may arise in a potential common future. The findings from SB-2017, SB-2019, and SB-2020 all suggest that Turkish society is inclined to reject any argument for cultural closeness between themselves and Syrians. Turkish society appears to perceive a very large "social distance" between themselves and Syrians, although it was slightly reduced in SB-2020. Measured between +1 (closest) and -1 (furthest), the social distance between the two communities as perceived by Turkish survey respondents was scored at "-0,36" in SB-2017, "-0,51" in SB-2019, and "-0,42" in SB-2020.

In contrast to the attitude of Turkish society, Syrians in Turkey display a very different attitude in terms of their social distance. While in SB-2017, the combined share of "very close" and "close" was 73,5% with an overall social distance score of +0,51; the same figures were 85,7% and +0,74 in SB-2019, and lastly, 85,6% and +0,71 in SB-2020, respectively. All three scores fall into the category of "very close". These findings also suggest that Syrians do not yet intensively feel the negative opinions and perceptions of Turkish society against them. This, in turn, can be seen partly as a result of the closedness of Syrians as a community and partly as the still high level of social acceptance in Turkish society, which does not display an active hostility despite voicing its growing anxieties.

SB-2020-TABLE 86: Distance Groups among Syrians[166]

	2017			2019			2020		
	#	%	Social Distance Score	#	%	Social Distance Score	#	%	Social Distance Score
Very distant	13	1,5	-0,87	13	0,9	-0,85	50	3,6	-0,99
Distant	35	4,0	-0,21	32	2,3	-0,29	26	1,9	-0,22
Neither close, nor distant	186	21,0	0,16	156	11,1	0,18	125	8,9	0,17
Close	359	40,6	0,53	328	23,2	0,53	309	22,0	0,54
Very close	291	32,9	0,91	882	62,5	0,97	893	63,6	0,97
General	**884**	**100,0**	**0,53**	**1411**	**100,0**	**0,74**	**1403**	**100,0**	**0,71**

-1,00 ; -0,80 Puan: Very Distant	-0,79 ; -0,10 Puan: Distant	-0,09 ; 0,39 Puan: Neither close, nor distant	0,40 ; 0,79 Puan: Close	0,80 ; 1,0 Puan: Very close

166. 3 participants in SB-2017, 7 participants in SB-2019, 11 participants in SB-2020 were not included within the groups as they did not respond to social distance questions.

As described earlier, social distance score is a composite one calculated from the responses given to 10 related questions. When these questions are investigated individually, a quite positive picture emerges in all of them except for the one that asks whether the respondents would consider marrying a Turk. Syrians, in other words, seem to have a very positive attitude towards living, working, socializing, and partnering with Turks.

SB-2020-TABLE 87: **To what extent would you agree with the following statements concerning your feelings about Turkish people? (%)**

		Diasgree	Partially Agree	Agree	No idea / No response
1	It wouldn't disturb me if Turkish children go to the same school as my children	3,9	2,3	**89,7**	4,0
2	It wouldn't disturb me to live in the same building as a Turk	4,0	2,8	**89,2**	4,0
3	It wouldn't disturb me if some Turkish families were to move in my neighborhood	4,1	2,8	**89,0**	4,2
4	It wouldn't disturb me to move to a neighborhood where predominantly Turks live	3,9	3,0	**88,8**	4,2
5	It wouldn't disturb me to work in the same workplace as a Turk	4,2	2,5	**88,6**	4,6
6	I can be friends with a Turk	6,7	4,7	**85,5**	3,0
7	I can be business partners with a Turk	8,8	3,5	**80,5**	7,3
8	I would allow my child to marry a Turk	19,0	5,8	**69,1**	6,1
9	It wouldn't disturb me if my sibling were to marry a Turk	18,7	6,4	**69,0**	5,9
10	I can get married with a Turk	29,0	5,3	**59,9**	5,8

Although there doesn't seem to be a significant divergence regarding the social distance groups across different demographic groups, there are some interesting findings in some groups. It appears that men, those in the 55-64 years old age group, those with no formal education, and those from border cities perceive an even smaller social distance between Syrians and Turkish society. As presented earlier (see Table 27), Turkish society displays a much larger social distance against Syrians. What is even more striking is that while the social distance among Turkish society is high (35,2%), it is significantly higher in border cities (50,1%) where large Syrian populations exist. This finding shows that the effects of "cultural similarity/closeness" on social cohesion might not be as positive as apparently assumed by many. It can be argued here that what matters more in this regard is not "cultural similarities" but "numerical sizes". It is also interesting that "business people" and "university graduates" are the groups displaying the least social distance towards Syrians among Turkish society.

	Very distant	Distant	Neither close, nor distant	Close	Very close
Sex					
Female	2,7	1,5	11,2	24,7	59,9
Male	4,2	2,1	7,2	20,1	66,4
Age Groups					
18-24	4,1	2,4	12,2	25,2	56,1
25-34	4,5	2,5	9,9	20,9	62,2
35-44	2,1	1,1	7,2	24,4	65,2
45-54	5,8	2,1	8,3	19,5	64,3
55-64	-	1,0	8,3	23,7	67,0
65+	2,7	-	10,8	10,8	75,7
Educational Attainment					
Illiterate	4,3	3,5	20,7	26,7	44,8
Literate but not graduate of any school	-	2,0	3,9	17,6	76,5
Primary school	2,2	3,0	10,0	20,9	63,9
Middle school	4,8	1,1	7,3	22,9	63,9
High-school or equivalent	5,9	0,5	5,9	22,3	65,4
2-year associate degree / Vocational school of higher education	4,8	1,6	9,5	23,8	60,3
University / Graduate degree / PhD	2,3	-	4,7	20,1	72,9
Region					
Border cities	5,0	0,9	4,0	20,2	69,9
Other cities	1,3	3,4	16,8	25,0	53,5
Metropolitan cities	0,9	2,0	18,5	23,9	54,7
Non-metropolitan cities	2,2	5,9	13,5	27,0	51,4
General	**3,6**	**1,9**	**8,9**	**22,0**	**63,6**

The cross-analysis of social distance and Turkish language knowledge reveals a very interesting finding, albeit on a minimal level. In this context, those whose mother tongue was Turkish produced a social distance score of 0,71, which is below the general average of 0,79. Those who reported "advanced" or "intermediate" levels of knowledge in Turkish language, however, appeared to have social distance scores of 0,78 and 0,79, which are right on the average. This finding shows that having Turkish as one's mother tongue, or even obtaining citizenship, doesn't automatically mean it will be easy to establish a close relationship with the society.[167]

167. In a study conducted by M.M.Erdoğan et al. on Syrian university students in Turkey, the social distance of those students who

SB-2020-TABLE 89: Social Distance Groups (X Turkish speakers*) (%)

	Very distant	Distant	Neither close, nor distant	Close	Very close
Sex					
Female	3,2	0,9	10,5	32,0	53,4
Male	6,3	2,6	7,4	22,2	61,5
Age Groups					
18-24	5,1	2,6	12,8	30,8	48,7
25-34	5,2	2,8	9,1	21,7	61,2
35-44	2,4	1,0	8,2	30,6	57,8
45-54	14,1	2,4	2,4	17,6	63,5
55+ **	-	-	8,7	34,8	56,5
Educational Attainment					
Illiterate	4,4	-	23,9	41,3	30,4
Literate but not graduate of any school**	-	-	-	33,3	66,7
Primary school	3,5	5,2	10,1	27,9	53,3
Middle school	7,4	0,6	6,8	24,4	60,8
High-school or equivalent	8,3	-	5,2	20,9	65,6
2-year associate degree / Vocational school of higher education	7,9	2,6	7,9	15,8	65,8
University / Graduate degree / PhD	2,5	-	3,7	19,7	74,1
Region					
Border cities	8,6	0,8	4,0	22,5	64,1
Other cities	1,3	3,6	13,8	28,9	52,4
Metropolitan	-	1,5	15,0	28,9	54,6
Non-metropolitan	3,6	7,2	11,7	28,8	48,7
General	**5,3**	**2,1**	**8,4**	**25,4**	**58,8**

* "Turkish speakers" include those 678 individuals who reported to know Turkish at a "native", "advanced" or "intermediate" level.

** Age group "55+" presents results from 23 individuals and "Literate but not graduate of any school" presents results from 12 individuals .

The research clearly demonstrates that the perceived social distance between Turkish society and Syrians are very different in each's perspective. This is easily observable when the findings from two SB-2020 surveys, i.e. the one conducted with Syrians and the one conducted with Turkish respondents, are brought together for comparison. The share of positive responses was 80,93% among Syrians, while it was 20,69% among Turks.

SB-2020-TABLE 90: Comparison of Social Distance Turkish Society / Syrians:

To what extent would you agree with the following statements concerning your feelings about Syrians/Turkish people? (%)

		Disagree	Partially Agree	Agree	No idea / No response
1	It wouldn't disturb me to live in the same building as a Turk	4,0	2,8	**89,2**	4,0
	It wouldn't disturb me to live in the same building as a Syrian	**53,4**	**17,9**	**26,5**	**2,2**
2	It wouldn't disturb me if Turkish children go to the same school as my children	3,9	2,3	**89,7**	4,0
	wouldn't disturb me if Syrian children go to the same school as my children	**43,7**	**16,3**	**37,0**	**3,0**
3	It wouldn't disturb me to work in the same workplace as a Turk	4,2	2,5	**88,6**	4,6
	t wouldn't disturb me to work in the same workplace as a Syrian	**48,1**	**17,1**	**32,4**	**2,4**
4	It wouldn't disturb me to move to a neighborhood where predominantly Turks live	3,9	3,0	**88,8**	4,2
	It wouldn't disturb me to move to a neighborhood where predominantly Syrians live	**62,3**	**14,5**	**20,9**	**2,3**
5	It wouldn't disturb me if some Turkish families were to move in my neighborhood	4,1	2,8	**89,0**	4,2
	It wouldn't disturb me if some Syrian families were to move in my neighborhood	**53,0**	**18,2**	**26,3**	**2,5**
6	I can be friends with a Turk	6,7	4,7	**85,5**	3,0
	I can be friends with a Syrian	**54,7**	**17,8**	**25,6**	**1,9**
7	I can be business partners with a Turk	8,8	3,5	**80,5**	7,3
	I can be business partners with a Syrian	**72,7**	**12,1**	**11,9**	**3,3**
8	I can be business partners with a Turk	19,0	5,8	**69,1**	6,1
	I can be business partners with a Syrian	**78,7**	**9,4**	**9,3**	**2,6**
9	It wouldn't disturb me if my sibling were to marry a Turk	18,7	6,4	**69,0**	5,9
	It wouldn't disturb me if my sibling were to marry a Syrian	**77,4**	**9,5**	**10,4**	**2,7**
10	I can get married with a Turk	29,0	5,3	**59,9**	5,8
	I can get married with a Syrian	**84,7**	**6,1**	**6,6**	**2,6**

The statements that involved the type of relationship with the highest degree of intimacy are the ones with marriage. To the statement "I can get married with a Turk" received agreement from 24% of the participants in SB-2017, while this figure became 55,5% in SB-2019 and 59,9% in SB-2020. Those who suggested they could "be business partners with a Turk" were 70,7% in SB-2017, 83,8% in SB-2019, and 80,5% in SB-2020. These findings show that the demand or tendency among Syrians for a common life is increasing in every realm.

FGD Findings: Social Distance and Types of Relations

The types of relations involved in the 10 statements posed to survey respondents were also asked to FGD participants. It was intended to obtain a deeper understanding regarding the reasoning behind the positive and negative responses given to specific questions. In line with the survey findings, the most controversial type of relationship for Syrians to establish with Turks appears to be marriage. The other types of relationships such as being friends, business partners, or neighbors didn't appear to divide the FGD participants in that almost all gave positive responses. In fact, most participants suggested that they would be happy to establish these types of relationship with Turkish society, if the latter would be willing.

"We would very much love to become neighbors, friends, and business partners with them. I would establish all these types of relations with them, except for marriage." (Ankara-Women)

"I would like to do business with Turks more than I would with Syrians. I don't think that they would hurt us." (G.Antep-Women)

"Why wouldn't we want these as long as they accepted us... But Turkish society stays away from us." (Ş.Urfa-NGO Workers)

"Of course, I think these would be very beneficial for the economy. After all, we live in the same country and it would be best for all of us we lived and worked together in harmony." (Ş.Urfa-NGO Workers)

The tone changes when the discussion comes to marriage. In fact, this question seems to divide the Syrian FGD participants into two groups of roughly the same size, with half suggesting that they would consider getting married with a Turk and the other saying they wouldn't want that. To further encourage the hesitant participants to produce a respond, participants were also asked whether they would be disturbed if their siblings and children would want to marry a Turk. Those who responded positively to the marriage questions usually emphasized the argument that marriage is ultimately a personal relationship and that when two people love one another things like nationality or ethnic identity wouldn't matter.

"I don't think [marriage] has anything to do with the nationality of a person. Marriage is about many other things than nationality." (Ankara-Students)

"I would accept [getting married with a Turk]. I wouldn't care about a man's citizenship when I think about marrying him. What matters is whether get along." – "It's the same with me. I would accept it for the same reasons." (Ş.Urfa-Women)

"I would accept because we have the same religion. Also, I wouldn't mind if my children wanted it. I am open to having all types of relationships." (İstanbul-Workers)

Many other participants, in contrast, suggested either that they wouldn't prefer such a mixed-marriage or, in more harsh terms, they would strictly object to it. Most of these participants justified their response based on two reasons. Firstly, they suggested that the cultural differences between Syrians and Turks would constitute many problems for the marriage. In other words, two individuals with so different customs and traditions wouldn't likely get along well in a marriage. Secondly, the language barrier was mentioned as an important reason why such marriages wouldn't be successful, according to these participants.

"I wouldn't want it. My family would love for me to get married with a Turk but I wouldn't want it. I would want to argue in my own language when we fight." (Ankara-Women)

"Very difficult. Arabs are very different in this regard than Turks. We may have many similarities but our opinions and attitudes are very different. Love cannot be lived through translation." (Ankara-Women)

"For 2020, no, I wouldn't accept it. But perhaps in 20 or 30 years things may change, our lives may change, I may accept it, and we may be Turks. I wouldn't accept it at the moment because we don't know what will happen with our country and we don't know whether we will stay in Turkey or not. Also, we still don't know Turks very well." (Ş.Urfa-Women)

"I would, of course, respect my son's decision but I would prefer for him to marry a Syrian. If he marries a Turk, I would worry about my future grandchildren. If he is to return to Syria, the children would be torn between two countries." (G.Antep-NGO Workers)

7. Levels of Social Relations of Syrians

Syrians have lived in Turkey on average 5,5-6 years. To better evaluate their level of social interaction and social distance with the Turkish society, the question *"Have you ever engaged in any of the following social relations (e.g., having a conversation/shopping/fighting/...) with a Turkish citizen?"* was asked to survey respondents. The list included a number of social relations from low-intensity ones like "having a conversation" to very intimate ones like "getting married". As might be expected, the most frequently engaged one was "having a conversation" which was reported by 75,5%, 81,7%, and 78,7% of the respondents in SB-2017, SB-2019, and SB-2020, respectively. It was followed by "shopping" (72,9% in SB-2017; 74,8% in SB-2019; 75,4% in SB-2020) and "business relations", the latter of which is in a consistent trend of increase, (SB-2017: 62,5%; SB-2019: 68,1%; SB-2020: 70,9%). It is observed that there is an increase in "marriage" and decrease in "fighting" / "having a problem". Therefore, these findings confirm that, despite the hesitant stance of Turkish society, Syrians are getting increasingly closer to Turkish society.

SB-2020-TABLE 91: **Have you ever engaged in any of the following social relations with a Turkish citizen? (%)**

(For other versions of cross-tabulations with this question, see Additional Tables)

		2017			2019			2020		
		Yes	No	Don't remember / No response	Yes	No	Don't remember / No response	Yes	No	Don't remember / No response
1	Having a conversation	**75,5**	24,1	0,4	**81,7**	18,1	0,2	**78,7**	20,7	0,6
2	Shopping	**72,9**	26,6	0,5	**74,8**	24,6	0,6	**75,3**	23,7	1,0
3	Forming a business relationship	**65,6**	33,9	0,5	**68,1**	31,2	0,7	**70,9**	27,6	1,5
4	Being friends	**56,9**	41,7	1,4	**73,8**	25,4	0,8	**70,7**	27,9	1,4
5	Support / Solidarity*	**-**	-	-	**-**	-	-	**13,2**	76,5	10,3
6	Marriage	**3,4**	94,3	2,3	**2,8**	96,3	0,9	**5,7**	85,6	8,7
7	Fighting	**6,5**	92,4	1,1	**6,8**	91,0	2,2	**4,1**	87,4	8,5
8	Having a problem	**10,6**	87,7	1,7	**6,7**	91,0	2,3	**4,0**	87,6	8,4
9	Flirting	**5,2**	93,2	1,6	**3,1**	95,7	1,2	**1,7**	89,6	8,7

*"Support / Solidarity" was added for the first time in SB-2020.

8. Syrians' Perceptions Regarding Life in Turkey, Turkish Society, and Syrian Community in Turkey

It is seen that Syrians' social distance to Turkish society is quite "close" and that there is a positive trend in almost all types of their social relations with Turkish individuals. In this context, a set of questions were included to learn about how Syrians see Turkish society and the Syrian community in Turkey.

According to Syrian respondents, the Syrian community in Turkey is making a significant effort to integrate into Turkish society. 47,6% of the respondents agreed with this statement. In addition, 41,8% of Syrian respondents suggested that *"Syrians are grateful to the Turkish society"* while significant groups believed that they *"love Turkish society"* (41,6%) and *"are treating Turkish society respectfully"* (35,9%). In contrast, only tiny minorities agreed with the negative two statements, which are *"Syrians don't like the Turkish society at all"* (1,1%) and *"Syrians are exploiting the Turkish society"* (0,8%). The findings from this question and these statements include information regarding the future expectations, attitudes towards Turkish society, and positive/negative experiences of Syrians.

There are important trends of change regarding these issues. The trend of "positive" change from SB-2017 to SB-2019 does not appear to have continued in SB-2020. In contrast, there is a change

for the more negative in some fields. It is important to note that in all 10 statements posed in this question, the combined shares of "neither agree, nor disagree" and "no opinion / no response" are between 43% and 58%. These large percentages of undecided and/or indifferent individuals played a significant role in the above-mentioned trends of change. In other words, SB-2020 findings are largely in line with those of SB-2017 and SB-2019, with the sizable share of individuals who are either undecided or unwilling to respond changing percentages. This is because the large share of undecided or indifferent respondents decreases the shares of those reporting more decisive opinions. In other words, if those two groups were to be excluded and the evaluation was restricted to the combined shares of those who agree and those who disagree, a similar picture with that of SB-2019 would emerge. Thanks to FGDs, more and deeper information on these matters could be collected.

SB-2020-TABLE 92: **To what extent would you agree with the following statements regarding the situation of Syrians in Turkey? (Scored)**

		2017	2019	2020
1	Syrians want to obtain Turkish citizenship	3,5	3,4	3,1
2	Syrians are grateful to Turkish society	3,0	3,2	3,0
3	Syrians want to stay in Turkey	2,7	3,1	2,8
4	Syrians are happy in Turkey	2,7	3,0	2,7
5	Syrians want to go to another country	2,6	2,8	2,7
6	Syrians are excluded in Turkey	2,5	2,3	2,3
7	Turks are exploiting Syrians	2,8	2,3	2,2
8	Syrians can get work easily	2,2	2,6	2,2
9	Syrians are getting what their labor deserves	2,2	2,6	2,1
10	Syrians don't like Turks	2,3	2,0	1,9
	0-2,99 3,0-5,0			

In the context of SB-2020 research, one of the most interesting findings concerns the statement that "Syrians want to obtain Turkish citizenship", as it was the case in earlier SB studies. Following this statement that received the highest rate of agreement come the two statements *"Syrians are grateful to Turkish society"* and "Syrians want to stay in Turkey". The most extensively disagreed statements by Syrian respondents include "Syrians don't like Turks", *"Syrians can get work easily"*, *"Syrians are getting what their labor deserves", "Syrians are excluded in Turkey"*, and *"Turks are exploiting Syrians".*

The future expectations of Syrians, their feelings towards Turkish society, and their positive/negative experiences were investigated with these statements posed to Syrian respondents. These statements are grouped under these themes below in a table.

SB-2020-TABLE 93: To what extent would you agree with the following statements regarding the situation of Syrians in Turkey? (Scored)

	Syrians want to obtain Turkish citizenship	Syrians are grateful to Turkish society	Syrians want to stay in Turkey	Syrians are happy in Turkey	Syrians want to go to another country	Syrians are excluded in Turkey	Turks are exploiting Syrians	Syrians can get work easily	Syrians are getting what their labor deserves	Syrians don't like Turks	Average Score
Sex											
Female	3,1	2,9	2,9	2,7	2,9	2,4	2,3	2,0	2,0	2,0	2,5
Male	3,1	3,0	2,8	2,8	2,6	2,2	2,1	2,3	2,2	1,9	2,5
Age Groups											
18-24	2,8	2,8	2,8	2,6	2,7	2,3	2,3	2,1	2,1	1,9	2,4
25-34	2,9	2,8	2,7	2,6	2,6	2,3	2,0	2,1	2,1	1,8	2,4
35-44	3,2	3,1	2,9	2,8	2,9	2,4	2,3	2,2	2,2	2,0	2,6
45-54	3,2	3,0	2,9	2,8	2,7	2,3	2,2	2,2	2,1	1,9	2,5
55-64	3,2	3,1	3,0	3,0	2,6	2,1	2,2	2,3	2,3	2,2	2,6
65 +	3,0	3,1	2,5	2,6	2,0	2,0	2,0	2,3	1,7	1,9	2,3
Educational Attainment											
Illiterate	2,9	2,9	2,7	2,7	2,8	2,4	2,3	2,1	2,1	2,1	2,5
Literate but not graduate of any school	3,4	3,0	3,1	3,3	2,1	2,4	1,8	2,5	2,3	2,1	2,6
Primary school	3,0	3,0	2,8	2,7	2,7	2,3	2,2	2,2	2,1	1,9	2,5
Middle school	3,0	2,8	2,7	2,6	2,7	2,2	2,1	2,1	2,1	1,8	2,4
High-school or equivalent	3,3	3,0	3,0	2,9	2,8	2,3	2,1	2,3	2,1	1,9	2,6
2-year associate degree / Vocational school of higher education	3,1	3,0	3,0	2,8	2,8	2,4	2,6	2,0	2,1	2,2	2,6
University / Graduate degree / PhD	3,4	3,2	3,1	3,0	2,7	2,4	2,2	2,3	2,3	1,9	2,7
Regions											
Border cities	2,9	2,7	2,6	2,6	2,4	2,0	1,8	2,0	2,0	1,7	2,3
Other cities	3,4	3,4	3,1	3,0	3,3	2,8	2,8	2,5	2,3	2,2	2,9
Metropolitan cities	3,4	3,4	3,1	3,0	3,6	2,8	2,9	2,5	2,2	2,2	2,9
Non-metropolitan cities	3,4	3,4	3,2	3,1	2,7	2,6	2,5	2,5	2,5	2,2	2,8
General	3,1	3,0	2,8	2,7	2,7	2,3	2,2	2,2	2,1	1,9	2,5

SB-2020-TABLOE 94: **To what extent would you agree with the following statements regarding the situation of Syrians in Turkey? (%)**

		Completely disagree	Disagree	COMBINED DISAGREE	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	COMBINED AGREE	No idea / No response
FUTURE PERSPECTIVE / TENDENCY FOR PERMANENCE	Syrians want to obtain Turkish citizenship	2,7	1,1	**3,8**	31,8	38,0	11,0	**49,0**	15,4
	Syrians want to stay in Turkey	4,4	3,8	**8,2**	35,4	31,8	7,5	**39,3**	17,1
	Syrians want to go to another country	4,2	4,9	**9,1**	36,8	21,3	12,3	**33,6**	20,5
RELATIONS WITH / FEELINGS TOWARD TURKISH SOCEITY	Syrians are grateful to Turkish society	1,8	3,0	**4,8**	33,2	38,6	6,7	**45,3**	16,7
	Turks are exploiting Syrians	10,1	12,6	**22,7**	33,2	15,0	4,6	**19,6**	24,5
	Syrians don't like Turks	17,8	31,4	**49,2**	26,4	7,6	0,4	**8,0**	16,4
WORKING LIFE / CONDITIONS	Syrians are getting what their labor deserves	14,8	23,3	**38,1**	26,7	14,8	2,5	**17,3**	17,9
	Syrians can get work easily	14,9	26,8	**41,7**	25,4	14,4	2,8	**17,2**	15,7
	Syrians are excluded in Turkey	8,8	14,6	**23,4**	38,0	15,1	3,3	**18,4**	20,2
HAPPINESS	Syrians are happy in Turkey	4,4	8,2	**12,6**	39,9	26,1	5,7	**31,8**	15,7

An additional table with the responses given on these 10 statements is produced below to compare the findings of SB-2019 and SB-2020. It excludes the responses "neither agree, nor disagree" and "no idea / no response" and only presents the combined shares of "completely agree + agree" and "completely disagree + disagree". What this table clearly shows is the increasing uneasiness and hesitations of Syrians in SB-2020 compared to SB-2019.

SB-2020-TABLE 95: To what extent would you agree with the following statements regarding the situation of Syrians in Turkey? (%)

		Completely Agree + Agree	Completely Disagree + Disagree
Syrians want to obtain Turkish citizenship	SB-2020	49,0	3,8
	SB-2019	63,4	5,7
Syrians are grateful to Turkish society	SB-2020	45,3	4,8
	SB-2019	54,9	8,4
Syrians want to stay in Turkey	SB-2020	39,3	8,2
	SB-2019	54,0	8,0
Syrians are happy in Turkey	SB-2020	31,8	12,6
	SB-2019	48,1	16,4
Syrians want to go to another country	SB-2020	33,6	9,1
	SB-2019	40,4	24,1
Syrians are getting what their labor deserves	SB-2020	17,3	38,1
	SB-2019	29,1	43,4
Syrians can get work easily	SB-2020	17,2	41,7
	SB-2019	26,3	46,3
Turks are exploiting Syrians	SB-2020	19,6	22,7
	SB-2019	20,0	43,0
Syrians are excluded in Turkey	SB-2020	18,4	23,4
		19,2	44,5
Syrians don't like Turks	SB-2020	8,0	49,2
		11,2	57,4

8.a- The Future Perspective of Syrians

In order to have a better understanding concerning the future perspectives of Syrians, the three relevant statements; i.e. "Syrians want to obtain Turkish citizenship", *"Syrians want to stay in Turkey"*, and *"Syrians want to go to another country"* are analyzed together. As discussed above, the statement about citizenship received the highest rate of agreement of all 10 statements. Moreover, the statement *"Syrians want to stay in Turkey"* is ranked the third among the most agreed with statements. Together, responses to these two statements are already showing the strength of Syrians' future vision in Turkey. While 49% of respondents agreed with the first statement, only 5,7% of them disagreed with the statement that Syrians want to obtain Turkish citizenship. Also revealing a tendency to become permanent in the country, 39,3% of respondents suggested that Syrians want to stay in Turkey, while only 8,2% disagreed with this statement. Lastly, while 33,6% of the respondents agreed with the statement *"Syrians want to go to another country"*, 9,1% disagreed with it.

8.b- Relations with and Feelings about the Turkish Society

The responses to the statements related to Syrians' relations with and feeling about the Turkish society reflect very clearly a positive perception. These statements include *"Syrians are grateful to Turkish society"*, *"Syrians don't like Turkish society at all"*, and *"Syrians are excluded in Turkey"*. While the first statement involving "gratefulness" receives a strong level of agreement with 45,3%, the statement *"Syrians don't like Turks"* received an even stronger level of disagreement with 49,2%. Only 8% of the respondents agreeing with this statement. Another important finding concerning the level of social acceptance comes from the responses given to the statement involving perception of "exclusion" in Turkey. While 23,4% of the respondents agreed with the statement *"Syrians are excluded in Turkey"*, a sizable 18,4% disagreed with this statement. Somewhat in contrast to the findings above, it is noteworthy that those who agreed with this negative statement outnumber those who disagreed with it. This also indicates an increase in the agreement to the statement compared to the findings of the earlier SB studies. This perception of rising exclusion and discrimination is discussed more thoroughly in FGDs.

8.c- Working Life

It is clear that the most problematic area for Syrians is perceived to be the working life. This finding is clearly confirmed repeatedly by the answers given to many questions and statements. Among the 10 statements, the three relevant ones for this were *"Syrians are getting what their labor deserves", "Syrians can get work easily",* and *"Turks are exploiting Syrians"*. It was the first of these statements that received the strongest rejection with 38,1% of the respondents disagreeing with it. The share of respondents who agreed with this statement was 17,3%.

The findings regarding the provocative statement *"Turks are exploiting Syrians"* are interesting. While the share of Syrian respondents who agreed with this statement remained almost the same (20% in SB-2019 and 19,6% in SB-2020), there was a significant decrease in the percentage of those of disagreed with it from 43% in SB-2019 to 22,7% in SB-2020. This can be interpreted to show that the experiences in the past year, most likely related to the context of pandemic, led to growing hesitations among Syrians.

8.d- Perception of Happiness

The question regarding how happy Syrians are in Turkey, while being necessarily subjective and completely based on perceptions, has been important for the SB research. The combined share of respondents who either "completely agreed" or "agreed" with the statement "*Syrians are happy in Turkey*" was 33,7% in SB-2017. While it significantly increased to 48,1% in SB-2019, the SB-2020 findings record an equally significant decrease in this combined percentage to 31,8%. Conversely, the combined share of those who "completely disagreed" or "disagreed" with this statement was 21,9% in SB-2017, 16,4% in SB-2019, and 12,6% in SB-2020. A more detailed discussion concerning the level of perceived happiness of Syrians is presented below in the FGD findings section.

FGD Findings: Perception of Happiness of Syrians in Turkey

The FGD discussions on the question "are Syrians happy in Turkey?" mostly reveal, in line with the SB-2019 FGDs, that Syrians are happy to be living in Turkey. A majority of participants suggested that, while still carrying the sorrow of having to leave their country, they are happy with the rights and opportunities that Turkey provided for them. Particularly the services and opportunities provided in the health and education sectors were emphasized by many participants. Also, particularly the younger participants emphasized their happiness about the chance of obtaining Turkish citizenship which, accordingly, gives them the chance to become a full member of this society instead of being a foreigner. In addition to these services and opportunities mostly coming from the state, a significant number of participants suggested that Syrians are also happy because of the positive attitudes and actions of Turkish society towards them. The familiar cultural context in Turkey was also listed as one of the significant factors that help Syrians to lead a happy and comfortable life in this country. Some participants argued that Turkey was the best country for Syrians to live in based on either their own experiences or what they have heard from other individuals regarding the life of Syrians in other countries such as Jordan and Lebanon.

"I think Syrians are happy because Turks treat them nicely" (Ankara-Women)

"Generally speaking, I think Syrians are happy because there are more educational and economic opportunities here. Even if they work for the minimum wage here, the educational and working opportunities are much better compared to Syria. Those with higher incomes are happier. The ones that have an active social life tend to be even happier. Syrians become happy when they feel themselves safe." (Ankara-Students)

"I think Syrians are happy in Turkey. We left everything behind in Syria and formed a new life here in Turkey. Turkey both gave me an education and allowed me to work here. I can continue my life in a much better way here after becoming a citizen." (Ankara-Students)

"Of course, they are happy. Some Syrians learned Turkish in a short time and started their education here. It was like a dream for us to be able to continue our education. There are many potential opportunities especially for our youngsters who received education in Turkish schools." (Ş.Urfa-Women)

"I think Syrians are happy because they are living in a safe and stable country. Still, however, we can't feel as good as we would have done in our own country." (Ş.Urfa-Women)

"Generally speaking, we are leading good lives here. The same services provided for Turks are also being provided for us, even though we are foreigners. However, there are also those who live under bad conditions. Those who don't have a work-permit, for example, wouldn't be happy." (G.Antep-NGO Workers)

"My friends who went to Europe are telling me that they want to come back to Turkey because they felt themselves happier here." (İstanbul-NGO Workers)

A significant number of participants, in turn, reported believing that a majority of Syrians in Turkey are unhappy. According to these participants, there are two main reasons for this. First and most importantly, they mention the socio-economic difficulties experienced by most Syrians. These include having to work for very long hours at difficult jobs in Turkey with grossly insufficient pay. According to these participants, while a small minority of Syrians are happy in Turkey because they work at good jobs or have sufficient capital, a large majority are unhappy because they are suffering from serious economic difficulties and precarious working conditions.

The second reason mentioned by these participants to explain why a majority of Syrians are unhappy in Turkey is the negative social attitudes and discrimination. Accordingly, negative attitudes and actions towards Syrians from Turkish society have been growing. It was suggested that while a minority of Syrians, particularly those who learned to speak Turkish, may largely be immune to such discrimination, a large majority of Syrians are increasingly experiencing various forms of discrimination every day.

"Very few Syrians are happy. Only those who do business here and who have capital are happy. Generally, they are not happy. In fact, many university graduates have lost everything here. Most of them work as waiters or workers." (Ankara-Women)

"I think they are not happy because Turks see us as traitors." (Ankara-Women)

"I think the majority, particularly those who don't speak Turkish, are unhappy. Young Syrians that work at factories are also unhappy. Those people who know the language are happy because they work at good jobs. They are happy because Turks respect them and treat them well." (G.Antep-Women)

"They are not happy; they are just safe. The financial conditions are terrible here for Syrians but it is still better than constantly living in fear of death." (Ş.Urfa-NGO Workers)

"I think the only place Syrians could be happy is their own country." (G.Antep-Workers)

9. Anxieties of Turkish Society According to Syrians

Several factors that cause the host society to worry in the aftermath of mass movements of people are almost universal. Some major ones of these include the fear of losing one's job as well as the anxieties regarding a potential increase in the crime rates or deterioration of public services or even the loss of national identity. Similarly, a fear that the newcomers might someday possess decisive power in the political arena (e.g. participation in the elections, obtaining citizenship in large numbers, and so on) is very common. SB research has asked the Syrian respondents to what extent they think Turkish society is worried regarding such factors.

Syrian respondents were asked the question *"to what extent does Turkish society have the follow-ing concerns because of Syrians?"* They are provided with a list of 6 major anxieties. The responses indicate that Syrian respondents do not think that Turkish society is significantly worried about any of these issues. In general, the combined share of "they are not worried at all" and "they are not worried" was 45,3% while the combined share of "they are worried" and "they are very worried" was only 23,9%. Even so, however, the perceived ranking provided by Syrian respondents is largely in line with the ranking of concerns provided by Turkish respondents. On the top of the list, Syrians suggested that the Turkish society is worried the most about "losing their jobs because of Syrians" with 38,1% of the respondents reporting thinking that Turks are worried about this. Then, 26% of Syrian respondents appear to believe that Turkish society is concerned about *"reduction or dete-rioration of public services because of Syrians".* These were followed by *"security problems Syrians would cause"* (24,5%), "concerns on Syrians' political participation (elections)" (20,8%), "concerns that Syrians will obtain Turkish citizenship and have a say in Turkey's future/fate" (19,4%), and at the bottom, "concerns that Syrians would damage the identity Turkish society" (14,9%).

SB-2020-TABLE 96: To what extent does Turkish society have the following concerns because of Syrians? (%)

		Not worried at all	Not worried	COMBINED NOT WORRIED	Neither worried, nor not worried	Worried	Very worried	COMBINED WORRIED	No idea / No response
1	Losing their jobs because of Syrians	17,0	17,0	**34,0**	15,8	31,0	7,1	**38,1**	12,1
2	Reduction or deterioration in public servic-es because of Syrians	21,5	24,8	**46,3**	13,4	21,6	4,4	**26,0**	14,3
3	Security problems the Syrians would cause	22,0	26,4	**48,4**	12,4	19,9	4,6	**24,5**	14,7
4	Concerns on Syrians' political participation (elections)	20,7	24,0	**44,7**	9,4	17,0	3,8	**20,8**	25,1
5	Concerns that Syrians will obtain Turkish citizenship and have a say in Turkey's fu-ture/fate	20,2	23,6	**43,8**	9,6	15,6	3,8	**19,4**	27,2
6	Concerns that Syrians would damage the identity of Turkish society	27,1	27,7	**54,8**	8,0	12,3	2,6	**14,9**	22,3

When the findings of SB-2019 and SB-2020 are compared, it appears that Turkish society is now seen by Syrians to be even less worried. The overall level of concern of Turkish society in the eyes of Syrians was translated into a score of 2,1 out of 5 in SB-2019. This score decreased to 2,0 in SB-2020

SB-2020-TABLE 97: **To what extent does Turkish society have the following concerns because of Syrians? (Scored)**

		2019	2020
1	Losing their jobs because of Syrians	2,6	2,6
2	Reduction or deterioration in public services because of Syrians	2,3	2,2
3	Security problems the Syrians would cause	2,4	2,1
Average Score		2,1	2,0
4	Concerns on Syrians' political participation (elections)	2,0	1,8
5	Concerns that Syrians will obtain Turkish citizenship and have a say in Turkey's future/fate	1,8	1,8
6	Concerns that Syrians would damage the identity of Turkish society	1,8	1,7

FGD Findings: Anxieties of Turkish Society According to Syrians

As mentioned in various parts of the report above, one consistent finding of SB research has been that significant and growing concerns exist within Turkish society regarding Syrians. If these economic, political, cultural, and security-related concerns and anxieties are not effectively managed, they may contribute in the creation of major problems regarding living together in the future. Therefore, Syrian FGD participants were also asked about their perceptions regarding the concerns of Turkish society.

In this context, participants were, first, asked what concerns they thought the Turkish society had about Syrians. According to many participants, Turkish society considers Syrians as a rival to its members and feels like Syrians are already causing harm to it. Economy is perceived by Syrian participants to be the epicenter of the fears and worries of Turkish society, where Turks are thought to believe that Syrians have stolen their jobs leading to growing unemployment. Apart from the economy, Syrians believe that Turks are also concerned about a potential deterioration of education because of Syrians. In addition, there is a widespread view, particularly among female participants, that Turkish women are concerned about Syrian women to steal their husbands.

> *"They are worried that we will obtain citizenship and the state will treat us as equal members of the society." (Ş.Urfa-Women)*

> *"Employers prefer Syrian workers over Turks because they work for cheaper. This makes Turks concerned because unemployment has increased. But a lot of Syrians also lost their jobs because of this." (Ş.Urfa-Women)*

> *"Because there are so many of us, they are having difficulties in finding homes for themselves and the rents have significantly gone up." (Ş.Urfa-Women)*

> *"Especially Turkish women and mothers, whenever they a Syrian, they tell us that 'you take*

my son's job away". The reality is that their children don't want to work, but we came from another country and we want to work. They are unemployed because they don't want to work." (G.Antep-NGO Workers)

"They say that we steal their education opportunities and that our young people have stolen away their jobs. I think their anxieties are justified." (Ş.Urfa-NGO Workers)

"Especially the women in Şanlurfa are afraid that Syrian women will take away their husbands from them. They are right but it is not our fault." (Ş.Urfa-NGO Workers)

Following this, FGD participants were asked whether they thought Turkish society was justified in holding these concerns. The discussions reveal that, even though there are some that find these concerns as justified, a majority of participants suggested that those concerns were mostly unwarranted. Those who believe that Turkish society is right to be worried argued that when they look at the situation from the perspective of Turks, they could easily understand them. Accordingly, it is normal for the host society to feel this way when a large number of refugees arrived in the country in a very short time.

"Since I am from Damascus, I used to look at the migrants or refugees in the same way. I used to question why they received so many services from our state. I was even thinking that they were receiving better service than us citizens. I think that this is normal. To get rid of these concerns of Turks, us Syrians need to express ourselves to them." (G.Antep-NGO Workers)

Lastly, the participants were asked how they thought these worries and concerns could be alleviated. It can be suggested that a majority of participants were quite optimistic. Accordingly, since most of these worries were based on unjustified and irrational fears, they could easily be destroyed. According to some participants, the bigger responsibility falls on the shoulders of Syrians, who need to pay more effort to express themselves to Turkish society. The first required step in this framework was suggested as 'learning the language'. According to some other participants, in contrast, the responsibility falls primarily on the shoulders of Turkish state, media, and society.

"They have a lot of concerns but I think they don't have very big concerns. I think it is Syrians who need to work to remedy these concerns, not the Turkish state or society." (Ankara-Women)

"It becomes easier when we learn the language because we can tell other people who we are. We need to emphasize those who do good things. We shouldn't blame or judge a whole nation for a mistake committed by a single person." (Ankara-Students)

"To reduce these concerns, I think, Turks and Syrians need to work at the same workplaces together side by side. To have only Syrians work at a workplace is wrong. If we integrate, these concerns would be mostly diminished." (G.Antep-Women)

"I think the Turkish state needs to implement certain policies to reduce these anxieties. In

the absence of clear and concise explanations to people, society becomes riddled with gossips." (Ş.Urfa-Women)

"We need to make the point that we are active individuals who would be beneficial for this country. They don't appreciate our efforts even though we work very hard for less money than Turks." (G.Antep-NGO Workers)

10. Turkish Society's Behavior towards Syrians

Perhaps as important for social cohesion as the legal and physical infrastructure is the existence of a ground enabling intimate social relations. Having finished their 10th year of residence in Turkey, Syrians were welcomed with extraordinary support and solidarity. Although the number of Syrians has exceeded 3.6 million, the Turkish society -- despite their concerns -- still provides this solidarity and "social acceptance". This is extremely important. However, how Syrians assess the way Turkish society treats them is also a significant issue. This issue without any doubt an area of perception. So, the assessments would remain speculative.

The Syrians were asked the question "in your opinion, how does the Turkish society treat Syrians" with a "multiple answer" system and a mix of 2 "positive" and 3 "negative" statements as responses. In SB-2019, the two positive statements were ranked at the top two, while the negative ones received much less agreement from respondents. This has changed in SB-2020. According to a large majority of respondents, 63,3% in SB-2019 and 62,3% in SB-2020, "Turkish society embraced Syrians". The statement "Turkish society exploits Syrians as cheap labor" received an almost identical rate of support in SB-2019 and SB-2020. A significant change is observed regarding the statement "Turkish society does everything it can for Syrians", which received support from 42,7% of the respondents in SB-2019, retreated to third rank in SB-2020 with 32,7% of the respondents giving this response. The other two negative statements received much more limited support from respondents. Moreover, there is a trend of decrease in the percentages of both responses.

SB-2020-TABLE 98: **How do you think the Turkish society treats Syrians? (%) (Multiple Responses)**

(For other versions of cross-tabulations with this question, see Additional Tables)

	2019		2020	
	#	%	#	%
Turkish society embraced Syrians	898	63,3	881	62,3
Turkish society exploits Syrians as cheap labor	500	35,3	491	34,7
Turkish society does everything it can for Syrians	605	42,7	463	32,7
Turkish society treats Syrians badly	117	8,3	46	3,3
Turkish society looks down on Syrians	54	3,8	28	2,0
No idea / No response	110	7,8	83	5,9

FGD Findings: Turkish Society's Behavior towards Syrians

The same question was posed to Syrian FGD participants. The responses fall broadly in three categories: (i) Turkish society treats Syrians badly, (ii) it treats Syrians well, and (iii) the way the society treats Syrians depends on the person/the context/the place.

(i) As it became obvious in different parts of the research, the perception that Turkish society is treating Syrians badly and in a discriminatory way is becoming increasingly widespread among Syrians. According to participants in this camp, there are strong prejudices against Syrians within Turkish society. As examples of these prejudices, participants suggested that Syrians are perceived as "traitors", as cowards who escaped from their motherland instead of fighting to protect it, and as lazy people who live on the support provided to them by the state and other organizations. Moreover, it was suggested that the views on Syrians within Turkish society is getting worse through time.

> *"We feel very bad when they say to us 'you are Syrians'. It is as if they are up there and we are down here. When they ask 'are you foreigners' instead, we become happier." (G.Antep-Women)*

> *"They are intimidated and disturbed by us. Some of them are disturbed by our clothes, our food, the way we speak... I think this is a normal reaction. It is not right to make generalizations but some people, especially the ignorant ones, treat us very badly. There are good and bad people in every community." (Ş.Urfa-NGO Workers)*

> *"They treat us very badly because misleading information is circulating. Even the taxi drivers keep asking us whether we will return all the time. And they become so happy when we say 'we will return'. I think that Turkish society doesn't empathize with us anymore." (İstanbul-NGO Workers).*

> *"When we first arrive here, they used to say to us 'we are Ensar and you are Muhajeer'. Now, they don't say it anymore. The way they treat us has changed for the worse." (İstanbul-Workers)*

> *"Not everyone treats us badly and not all Syrians are good people. But I think that Syrians are treated badly in the cities where the Syrian population is large." (Ankara-Women)*

(ii) Despite the common view that negative attitudes and behaviors are on the rise, a significant number of participants suggested that Turkish society treats Syrians well. According to these participants, while those individuals who treat Syrians badly are a small minority within Turkish society, a large majority of the society treats Syrians well and with respect. They go on to argue that this small minority is affected by the disinformative and provocative information common particularly in social media. According to these participants, the fact that no major social conflict was experienced in such a long time and that Syrians feel safe in Turkey proves that the society treats Syrians well.

> *"Turkish society generally treats foreigners and Syrians well. There is not much discrimination. 80% of those who discriminate against Syrians are people who had never met Syrians. Prejudices are formed stemming from the news at TVs and the internet. That is why discrim-*

ination and hostility are increasing. I think they may change their opinion if they met and got to know a Syrian. I have lived this so I know it is to be true." (Ankara-Students)

"There may be problems but, I think, Syrians feel safe here and many people treat us very well. I see that problems and conflicts are decreasing through time." (İstanbul-NGO Workers)

(iii) According to another common view, it is not possible to come up with a general conclusion regarding how Turkish society treats Syrians. Neither concept, i.e. 'Turkish society' or 'Syrians', refers to a homogenous community. Therefore, there are so many factors that largely determine how Syrians are treated including the educational attainment levels, socio-economic statuses, occupations, and whether or not a lot of Syrians live in a given context. According to the participants defending this view, one of the most important factors shaping how people treat Syrians is their level of fluency in Turkish language. They argue that those Syrians who speak Turkish well are perceived to be better integrated into Turkish society and they are treated in a much better way. Another very significant factor was suggested to be the number of Syrians living in a region.

"It depends on the region. I think, for example, Syrians living in Gaziantep or Fatih [İstanbul] feel much more confident because of their large numbers and they are able to protect themselves. When you travel with the subway, you see that Syrians' voices are very loud around the Fatih stop. But their voices get down when they come to Bahçelievler stop because it is not their region." (Ankara-Women)

11. "Social Cohesion" / "Local Integration"

The concepts of "integration" and "social cohesion" were discussed above under the heading "social acceptance and social cohesion". SB-2019 and SB-2020 studies approached these issues based on the "durable solutions" approach of the UNHCR. UNHCR focuses on three "durable solutions" for refugees.[168] These are "voluntary return", "resettlement to a third country", and, if the first two solutions are inaccessible or ineffective, "local integration". UNHCR's definition of "local integration" is a comprehensive one referring to social, economic, and particularly legal integration processes. This concept oversees a process towards permanent settlement through which refugees first obtain legal rights similar to those of citizens and clear prospects for naturalization in time. Naturalization, it needs to be noted, is not suggested as a necessary target of this process. "Local integration", in this context, differs as a concept from "social cohesion".

In Turkey, the concept of "local integration" is also being used to refer to the processes at the local level towards social cohesion, mostly coordinated by local governments. With all these conceptual differences, specific facts and foresights regarding the future of Syrians in Turkey are decisive. Using clear statements regarding the future of Syrians in Turkey, such as "they will leave" or "they will stay", doesn't seem to be right. However, it appears safe to suggest that Syrians' motivation for and interest in voluntary return has significantly diminished over the years in the face of an environment of chronic war and a devastated country. In such a context, prospects for the first two

168. UNHCR (2021) Durable Solutions: https://www.unhcr.org/tr/kalici-cozumler (Access: 03.02.2021)

"durable solutions" discussed by UNHCR don't seem to be promising. Therefore, the significance of local integration and social cohesion becomes further accentuated. In this context, SB research aims to understand the views and experiences of Syrians regarding social cohesion.

Out of the six statements posed to Syrian survey respondents regarding the views and behavior of Syrians toward Turkish society, Syrians seem to place the most significance on the one involving integration. In fact, the statement *"Syrians are making an effort to integrate into the Turkish society"* received agreement from the largest number of respondents in both SB-2019 (47,6%) and SB-2020 (43,1%). It was followed by the statements *"Syrians love Turkish society"* (39,9% in SB-2020; 41,6% in SB-2019) and *"Syrians are grateful to the Turkish society"* (39,6% in SB-2020; 41,8% in SB-2019). Respondents also seem to believe that "*Syrians are treating Turkish society very respectfully"* with 34,8% of the respondents agreeing with this statement. In addition to high levels of agreement to positive statements, it is interesting to note the very low levels of agreement with the two negative statements. While those who agreed with the statement *"Syrians don't like the Turkish society at all"* were only the 0,7% of the respondents (down from 1,1% in SB-2019), those who agreed with the statement *"Syrians are exploiting the Turkish society"* were only 0,4% (also down from 0,8% in SB-2019).

SB-2020-TABLE 99: What do Syrians feel about the Turkish society? (Multiple responses)

(For other versions of cross-tabulations with this question, see Additional Tables)

	2019		2020	
	#	%	#	%
Syrians are making an effort to integrate into the Turkish society	675	47,6	609	43,1
Syrians love Turkish society	590	41,6	564	39,9
Syrians are grateful to the Turkish society	593	41,8	560	39,6
Syrians are treating Turkish society very respectfully	509	35,9	492	34,8
Syrians don't like the Turkish society at all	16	1,1	10	0,7
Syrians are exploiting the Turkish society	11	0,8	6	0,4
No idea / No response	79	5,6	71	5,0

The issue of "social cohesion" is very complicated, starting from the fact that there is no agreed-upon meaning of the concept. It can be suggested that the decisive determinant of social cohesion is the "level of social acceptance"[169] in the host society, which can be discerned in its attitudes and approach towards the newcomers. The other main factors in the process include the capacity of

169. See. M.M.Erdoğan (2018) (Expanded 2nd Edition) Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration, Bilgi University Press, İstanbul.

the host society, existing vulnerabilities, the issues concerning public services caused by the new-comers as well as their number. How Syrians perceive their level of integration is also an important issue. The question "Have Syrians integrated into Turkey / will they integrate?" concerns the 3,6 million Syrians accounting for around 5% of Turkey's population as much as it does Turkish society. Therefore, the respondents were asked the question *"To what extent have the Syrians integrated into Turkish society?"* In stark contrast with the dominant opinion among Turkish society, Syrians appear to believe that they have integrated into Turkey. In fact, the combined share of those who stated that Syrians have "completely" or "to a great extent" integrated was 46,3% (down from 51,6% in SB-2020). Another 44,8% (up from 36,9% in SB-2019) suggested that they have "partially" integrated. Total rate of those who believed that Syrians have integrated "to a very little extent" or "have not integrated at all" was only 5,6%, further down from 8,5% in SB-2019. In other words, despite the common negative view within Turkish society, about half of Syrians believe that they have integrated into Turkish society. The two dominant discourses on the Turkish side that "Syrians haven't integrated/will not integrate" and on the Syrian side that "Syrians have already largely integrated" reflect two conflicting "beliefs". This significant difference might cause to problems in the future.

SB-2020-TABLE 100: **To what extent have the Syrians integrated into Turkish society?***

	2019*		2020	
	#	%	#	%
Completely	119	8,4	88	6,3
To a large extent	613	43,2	566	40,0
Partially	523	36,9	634	44,8
To a very little extent	95	6,7	62	4,4
Not at all	25	1,8	17	1,2
No idea / No response	43	3,0	47	3,3
Total	1418	100,0	1414	100,0

*This question was worded as "To what extent have the Syrians integrated into Turkey/Turkish society?" in SB-2019

Respondents from certain demographic groups appear to more strongly believe that Syrians have integrated into Turkish society. These include men, the youth and those over 65 years of age, graduates of middle school, and those who live in non-metropolitan cities. In contrast, those in the metropolitan cities, those who are illiterate, and women appear to believe that social cohesion hasn't taken place yet.

SB-2020-TABLE 101: **To what extent have the Syrians integrated into Turkish society?* (%)**

	Completely	To a great extent	Partially	To a very little extent	Not at all	No idea / No response
Sex						
Female	3,0	34,3	50,7	4,4	1,3	6,3
Male	8,5	44,2	40,6	4,4	1,1	1,2
Age Groups						
18-24	10,4	29,6	51,2	3,2	1,6	4,0
25-34	7,3	33,3	49,4	4,8	1,0	4,2
35-44	4,8	45,1	42,7	3,7	0,7	3,0
45-54	5,0	46,7	38,0	5,4	2,9	2,0
55-64	3,1	45,4	41,2	6,2	-	4,1
65 +	10,8	46,0	43,2	-	-	-
Educational Attainment						
Illiterate	5,2	34,5	45,7	5,2	2,6	6,8
Literate but not graduate of any school	3,9	39,2	51,0	3,9	-	2,0
Primary school	5,7	36,6	47,2	5,1	1,2	4,2
Middle school	8,4	41,9	41,1	3,4	1,7	3,5
High-school or equivalent	7,4	39,2	46,6	4,8	0,5	1,5
2-year associate degree / Vocational school of higher education	1,6	45,3	50,0	1,6	-	1,5
University / Graduate de-gree / PhD	4,6	52,3	37,7	4,6	0,8	-
Region						
Border cities	2,3	45,8	43,9	3,1	0,1	4,8
Other cities	12,6	30,7	46,4	6,5	2,9	0,9
Metropolitan cities	8,8	33,5	47,4	7,7	2,6	-
Non-metropolitan cities	19,6	25,4	44,4	4,2	3,7	2,7
General	**6,3**	**40,0**	**44,8**	**4,4**	**1,2**	**3,3**

As it was the case in SB-2017 and SB-2019, the findings of the present study reveal that Syrians strongly believe that they have integrated. Even though social cohesion inevitably involves mutual processes and social acceptance by the host society is of crucial importance, this strong belief into their own integration is remarkable. It could be possible to describe this with the term of "spontaneous social cohesion", which refers to a spontaneous social cohesion process regardless of the host society's reactions and anxieties.

FGD Findings: Concept of Social cohesion and Perception of Syrians Regarding Their Integration

Syrian FGD participants were firstly asked what they understood from the concept of social cohesion. Then, the discussion turned towards participants' assessment of the extent to which Syrians have integrated into Turkish society. The last part of the discussions in this part included the views on the future of social cohesion in Turkey.

What is 'Social cohesion' according to Syrians in Turkey?

Three different understanding of social cohesion can be distinguished from among the discussions. The first appears to place the main responsibility for social cohesion on the shoulders of Syrians themselves. In other words, social cohesion is defined as the outcome of a transformation that Syrians would and should undertake. According to these participants, social cohesion is the process through which the newcomers learn about and absorb the language, culture, and norms of the host society.

> *"It means the process for new individuals to learn the language and culture of the native society. It also means to empathize and show solidarity when necessary. It means for both sides to learn about the rules and customs." (Ankara-Women)*

> *"It means not to feel foreign. It also means to understand the culture and way of thinking." G.Antep-Women)*

> *"I think social cohesion is something that starts with knowing the laws. It means to understand and get along with the existing habits and traditions." (İstanbul-Workers)*

> *"Social cohesion in Turkey means learning the language." (İstanbul-Workers)*

The second main understanding of social cohesion in these discussions puts more emphasis on the transformation that the native society needs to undertake. According to this, social cohesion ultimately is the 'acceptance' of the newcomers by the host society. In other words, social cohesion can be said to have been achieved once the Turkish society stopped seeing Syrians as foreigners and started seeing them as natural members of the society.*"Bence uyum öncelikle Türkler bana baktığında ve beni Suriyeli olduğumu bildiklerinde bir tepki vermemeliler." (Suriyeli-Ankara-Öğrenci)*

> *"I think social cohesion means that when Turks look at me and realize that I was Syrian for them to not give a reaction." (Ankara-Students)*

> *"It means for both sides to accept one another with their respective differences." – "I think it means Turkish society to accept us." (Ş.Urfa-Women)*

> *"Social cohesion means for Turks to not see Syrians as foreigners. Of course, for this, we need to learn the language and understand the customs of the society. It required both sides to work for it. It means coming together and it can only happen if both sides accept each other." (G.Antep-NGO Workers)*

> *"Social cohesion means for us to be able to live with our own customs and for the other side to accept these customs." – "When we are able to live our lives normally like we did back in Syria and when Turkish society accepts this, social cohesion has been achieved." (G.Antep-NGO Workers)*

The third understanding of social cohesion, in turn, sees it as a mutual process of getting used to the new social context and the ability to create peaceful relations between communities. Accordingly, social cohesion should not require one or the other group to change itself while the other makes no effort. Instead, social cohesion is achieved when all groups have learned to live together with all their differences.

"I don't think social cohesion means altogether acting like them. It means getting used to them. (G.Antep-Workers)

"It means establishing good relations with people, whether they are Syrian or Turkish. I think social cohesion means equality." (İstanbul-Students)

"I think social cohesion means not being afraid of different opinions and thoughts. Social cohesion is living together through understanding and accepting differences." (Ankara-Students)

The evaluation of Syrians' integration process by themselves

One consistent finding of SB research is that there is a significant disparity between the perceptions of Turkish society and Syrians regarding the extent to which the latter has integrated. To obtain a deeper understanding of the reasons, this issue was discussed at length at the FGDs. Confirming the survey findings of previous years as well as SB-2020, majority of the participants argued that Syrians have largely integrated into Turkish society. Accordingly, despite the lack of an social cohesion policy, Syrians have integrated by themselves. Participants mentioned as proof that Syrians are Turks were increasingly working together, the growing relations and communications between two communities, and the increasing number of Syrian students at Turkish schools at different levels of education.

"Perhaps we cannot move beyond certain barriers (such as the language and the feeling of foreignness) but I think we have integrated without any plan and without noticing." (G.Antep-NGO Workers)

"We wouldn't be working with them if we hadn't integrated. I think most of us have integrated." (İstanbul-Workers)

There is a broad consensus among Syrians FGD participants that some Syrian groups have integrated much more easily and to a much greater extent, compared to the rest of the Syrian community. Accordingly, particularly the children and young people have integrated much more easily because they arrived in Turkey at an earlier age, went to school here, and learned Turkish. Some participants even suggested that it is becoming impossible to distinguish Syrian children from Turkish children.

"Our children have completely integrated. They want to dress and be like Turks now." (Ankara-Women)

"Some Syrians have not integrated. I think Syrian students have completely integrated but the families and the adults have not." (Ş.Urfa-Women)

There were also those participants who depicted a more pessimistic picture regarding integration of Syrians. According to these participants, the main reason for little or no social cohesion is the language barrier, which prevented communication and dialogue between Turks and Syrians and which led Syrians to turn inwards. According to some other participants, however, the actual reason for lack of social cohesion is the fierce economic rivalry forced on Turks and Syrians. In other words, they argue that large segments of Turkish society would not accept Syrians because they compete for the same type of jobs with them in the economy. Some other participants, in turn, emphasized the importance of lack of acceptance, without necessarily citing a deeper explanation for it.

"I think integration hasn't happened because they haven't learnt Turkish and don't know the laws. But children go to Turkish schools and therefore they have completely integrated, I think." (İstanbul-Workers)

"I don't think we have integrated. We didn't accept them and they didn't accept us. No one is taking a step towards the other." (İstanbul-Students)

Prospects of Social Cohesion: Will it get better or worse?

The participants were asked about their expectations regarding Syrians' integration. Do they expect the situation to get better or worse? In other words, will we see an increasing integration of Syrians into Turkish society through time or will the future bring a failure of social cohesion and emergence of social conflict?

A significant number of participants portrayed a quite pessimistic future. Accordingly, there is a growing wave of discriminatory and racist attitudes within Turkish society towards Syrians in the country. These participants expect the situation to only got worse through time. As reasons, they cite the increasing number of Syrians and their prolonged stay in the country as well as the growing volume of misleading and provocative news in the media.

"I think problems and conflicts are increasing. They used to like us much more when we first arrived. But as the numbers increased, they grew intolerant of us. They are much more focusing on our negative aspects. (Ş.Urfa-Women)

"I thing social cohesion is getting worse. This is because media is focusing on Syrians and it is making provocative news about us saying things like Syrians are doing this and doing that and smoking shisha. Syrians are human beings, too, and they can mistakes. But when everyone focuses solely on the mistakes, it makes social cohesion very difficult." (G.Antep-NGO Workers)

"It is getting worse because both sides are having a difficult time in economic hardships and they compete with each other." (İstanbul-Workers)

In contrast, a significant number of other participants had much more optimistic expectations. According to these, Syrians and Turks have been getting used to one another and the passing time should be expected to make it only better. In this context, the rising number of Syrian students at

Turkish schools was particularly emphasized as a major reason to be optimistic about the future. Moreover, it was suggested that intensifying interactions and relations would further lead to an improvement of the situation regarding social cohesion. Lastly, these participants argued that the number of Syrians who speak Turkish has been and will continue to be increasing, which will be an effective facilitator for social cohesion.

"I think it is getting better. Our children are studying at the same schools and same class-rooms. This is paving a way for social cohesion. Both communities need to work for more improvement." (İstanbul-NGO Workers)

"I believe that it will get better. Turks are not bad people. We just need to communicate. We cannot solve our problems unless we learn the language. I think that it is us who need to take a step towards them." (Ankara-Women)

"I don't think there is much that the state can do for social cohesion. Social cohesion cannot happen unless and until society accepts it. I think we will integrate slowly through time and they will accept us." (Ş.Urfa-NGO Worker)

There is a large number participants who suggested that it is possible for social cohesion to progress if certain conditions are met. According to these individuals, responsibility falls on the shoulders of Syrians and Turks as well as the state. They argue that for social cohesion to take place, Syrians need to make an effort, the Turkish state needs to remove various obstacles before social cohesion, and the Turkish society needs remove the negative prejudices and discriminatory attitudes.

"Firstly, we need to respect the laws and customs of this country. We need to adapt to them. Turkish state and society, in turn, need to help us. Society needs to give us a chance and understand that we have a life and emotions, too. They should not shut the doors to our face. Even if there was no other commonality or link between the two sides, our humanity should be as strong a link as necessary to bind us." (G.Antep-NGO Worker)

"Everybody needs to work towards social cohesion. This includes the state, Syrians, and Turks. But, I think, the newcomers should be the ones who should make the biggest effort for social cohesion." (İstanbul-Students)

12. The Support Provided by the Turkish State to Syrians

The survey aimed to gather information on the perceptions and experiences of Syrians regarding the various public services they receive, which would be important in terms of process management. In this context, respondents were asked the question of *"To what extent do you find the support and aids the state provides for the Syrians in Turkey in the following areas sufficient?"* referring to the six main areas (health, protection/legal support, education, housing, food, and Money/financial aid) for which the Turkish state provides support. While in SB-2017, the total rate of those who responded "sufficient" and "very sufficient" to this question on average (outside the camps) was 28.62%, this rate has risen to 34.96% in SB-2019. In SB-2020, the same rate was found to be 31,5%. In all three SB studies, the highest level of satisfaction was found in the field

of "health" (72% in SB-2017; 71,8% in SB-2019; 61,9% in SB-2020). The question "protection/legal support" was included for the first time in SB-2020. 47,8% of the respondents replied with either "sufficient" or "very sufficient" to this new question. "Education", the percentage of which declined significantly, came in the third rank. While a combined 58% and 64,6% of the respondents found services sufficient in SB-2017 and SB-2019, respectively; this figure retreated to 47% in SB-2020. It seems safe to believe that implementation of the pandemic-induced restrictions on education and the experience of online education had a significant role in this fall.

SB-2020-TABLE 102: **To what extent do you find it sufficient the support and aids the state provides for the Syrians in Turkey in the following areas? (%)**

		Very insuffi-cient	Insuffi-cient	COM-BINED INSUFFI-CIENT	Neither suffi-cient, nor insufficient	Suffi-cient	Very suffi-cient	COM-BINED SUFFI-CIENT	No idea / No response
1	Health support	4,1	15,3	**19,4**	17,1	49,4	12,5	**61,9**	1,6
2	Protection / Legal support	8,9	18,7	**27,6**	16,5	37,0	10,8	**47,8**	8,1
3	Education support	5,7	20,2	**25,9**	16,1	37,5	9,5	**47,0**	11,0
4	Food aid	28,7	43,7	**72,4**	12,1	9,7	1,8	**11,5**	4,0
5	Housing support	30,6	43,0	**73,6**	11,2	9,0	1,6	**10,6**	4,6
6	Financial support	29,9	45,2	**75,1**	11,4	9,1	1,3	**10,4**	3,1

The most significant dividing line in the context of this question was the region in which the respondents lived. For instance, the satisfaction level of Syrians from public services in the fields of health, education, food, housing, and financial support in the border cities is below the Turkey average. Only in the field of "protection/legal support" was the satisfaction level in border cities above that of Turkey average, most probably because these cities usually host a high number of national and international NGOs and humanitarian organizations to cater for the needs of large Syrian populations.

SB-2020-TABLE 103: To what extent do you find it sufficient the support and aids the state provides for the Syrians in Turkey in the following areas? (%)

	Very insufficient	Insufficient	COMBINED INSUFFICIENT	Neither sufficient, nor insufficient	Sufficient	Very sufficient	COMBINED SUFFICIENT	No idea / No response
Border Cities								
Health support	3,5	16,7	**20,2**	16,8	49,0	12,2	**61,2**	1,8
Protection / Legal support	5,2	18,3	**23,5**	16,7	40,5	9,7	**50,2**	9,6
Education support	4,2	24,2	**28,4**	15,8	34,3	8,9	**43,2**	12,6
Food aid	27,8	51,1	**78,9**	8,8	6,5	1,3	**7,8**	4,5
Housing support	28,9	49,8	**78,7**	8,7	6,3	1,1	**7,4**	5,2
Financial support	30,0	52,0	**82,0**	7,1	6,6	0,8	**7,4**	3,5
Other Cities (Metropolitan + non-metropolitan cities)								
Health support	5,2	12,9	**18,1**	17,6	49,9	13,1	**63,0**	1,3
Protection / Legal support	7,9	13,9	**21,8**	16,6	42,7	10,5	**53,2**	8,4
Education support	15,0	19,2	**34,2**	16,1	31,4	12,6	**44,0**	5,7
Food aid	30,1	31,8	**61,9**	17,4	14,8	2,8	**17,6**	3,1
Housing support	33,5	32,0	**65,5**	15,3	13,3	2,4	**15,7**	3,5
Financial support	29,8	34,2	**64,0**	18,3	12,9	2,2	**15,1**	2,6
Metropolitan Cities								
Health support	5,7	17,3	**23,0**	14,8	49,4	11,6	**61,0**	1,2
Protection / Legal support	8,2	17,6	**25,8**	13,9	44,3	9,7	**54,0**	6,3
Education support	17,0	24,7	**41,7**	13,9	33,8	4,8	**38,6**	5,8
Food aid	31,3	33,8	**65,1**	12,2	16,2	3,1	**19,3**	3,4
Housing support	30,1	36,1	**66,2**	13,6	14,8	2,8	**17,6**	2,6
Financial support	34,7	33,5	**68,2**	11,1	14,2	2,6	**16,8**	3,9
Non-metropolitan Cities								
Health support	4,2	4,8	**9,0**	22,8	50,8	15,9	**66,7**	1,5
Protection / Legal support	11,1	9,0	**20,1**	20,1	27,0	27,0	**54,0**	5,8
Education support	7,4	6,9	**14,3**	21,7	39,7	12,2	**51,9**	12,1
Food aid	28,0	28,0	**56,0**	27,1	12,2	2,1	**14,3**	2,6
Housing support	31,2	29,1	**60,3**	23,3	11,7	2,1	**13,8**	2,6
Financial support	29,1	30,7	**59,8**	27,0	9,5	1,1	**10,6**	2,6

When average scores are calculated for each of the areas for SB-2017, Sb-2019, and SB-2020; it appears that the average scores tend to increase. The two significant exceptions are health and education, where satisfaction levels of Syrians with public services seem to be decreasing.

SB-2020-TABLE 104: **To what extent do you find it sufficient the support and aids the state provides for the Syrians in Turkey in the following areas? (Scored)**

(For other versions of cross-tabulations with this question, see Additional Tables)

		2017	2019	2020
1	Health support	3,6	3,6	3,5
2	Protection / Legal support	-	-	3,0
3	Education support	2,9	3,3	2,9
Average Score		2,2	2,5	2,6
4	Food aid	1,6	1,8	2,0
5	Financial support	1,4	1,8	2,0
6	Housing support	1,5	1,8	1,9
	0-2,99		3,0-5,0	

FGD Findings: Views on Policies and Programs Targeting Syrians

To expand the scope of discussion in this part, instead of asking them to merely evaluate public services and support by the state, FGD participants were asked to reflect on all the policies and programs targeting Syrians in Turkey. The field of health appears to be where Syrians are the happiest and most satisfied regarding the policies and services. In fact, not a single participant mentioned any criticism or demand for improvement in this field. Overall, many participants mentioned their appreciation and happiness with the various policies, programs, and actions targeting Syrians.

Participants also discussed their problematic experiences, criticisms, and demands. Four issues can be distinguished in this context. These are the following: (i) restrictions on travel and settlement, (ii) regulations on Syrians' employment/working, (iii) issues related to the uncertainty of the status of "temporary protection", and (iv) problems in education of Syrians, particularly including the fact that Syrian children's inability of learning Arabic at schools.

(i) There appears to be a strong and widespread demand among Syrians in Turkey for the revision of existing restrictions on their travel and settlement practices. The discussions in this part are presented in detail below under the title 'Travel Restrictions'.

(ii) At least as important in the eyes of the FGD participants as the restrictions on travel were the policies and actions regarding working of Syrians. Participants complained from the fact that most Syrians are forced to work informally, for very low wages, and without social security due to the current policies and regulations. They suggested that the state needed to protect Syrians from be-

ing exploited, ensure that they earned equal wages for equal work, and make necessary legislative regulations so that Syrians would have social security that would protect them against possible work accidents.

In addition to these, it was mentioned that those Syrians who would like to work formally had to go through long and difficult bureaucratic procedures. There appears to be an expectation from the state to simplify the processes of obtaining work-permits and help highly-qualified Syrians to find work that is suitable to their qualifications.

> *"People with higher levels of educational attainment need to be able to obtain work-permits more easily. We really want to be useful individuals for this country and for that reason we want to be able to work through regular channels." (G.Antep-NGO Workers)*

> *"They ask us for knowledge of language to work. When we learn the language, they ask for a diploma. When we provide the diploma, they ask for Turkish citizenship. When we obtain the citizenship, they ask that we obtain insurance... It is as if they created all these so that they could prevent us from working." (Ş.Urfa-NGO Workers)*

> *"I think that serious and concrete steps need to be taken to improve the economic conditions of Syrians.* **At first, we used to have psychological problems because we had escaped a war. Now, we started to experience economic problems instead.** *Those who work or those who are engaged in trade should be exempt from travel restrictions and requirements to obtain a travel permit so that they can go to other cities for economic purposes." (İstanbul-Workers)*

(iii) Another frequently discussed policy domain in this context was education. While it could be expected that Syrian students who are actively involved in the education system in Turkey would be most vocal about this area, it was the Syrian women who most frequently mentioned their views on education. Some of these views and criticisms concerned the perceived difficulty of obtaining a place in Turkish education institutions, particularly at higher education level. Apart from that, there were many positive comments and compliments regarding Turkey's education policies towards Syrians, particularly including the policy of integrating all Syrian children into the national education system. According to most participants, Syrians assign a huge importance to education both for social cohesion and for being able to find better employment opportunities in the economy.

> *"We are experiencing a lot of problems not only at YÖS [Foreign Student Examination] but also at admission processes. Although we take many official exams of Turkey, universities still don't admit us. That is why students are increasingly getting away from education." (G.Antep-Women)*

> *"We don't want to receive any aid or support. We want to be able to work and receive education here. I think there is a need for producing more training and education opportunities, particularly for women." (İstanbul-NGO Workers)*

> *"Syrian children who go to Turkish schools have integrated very well. It was very good for them to go to the same schools as Turkish children. Since they receive education in Turkish, they are now teaching it to their parents." (İstanbul-Workers)*

(iv) While most participants spoke positively about the integration of Syrian children into Turkish education in terms of its benefits regarding social cohesion and socio-economic mobility; some participants emphasized what they perceive to be a negative side effect. Accordingly, as a result of this policy, new generations of Syrians are forgetting their native language of Arabic. Some participants argued that this represents an early stage of assimilation. In this regard, they requested the state to continue to provide educational opportunities to Syrian children while incorporating certain support mechanisms that could help them learn Arabic, as well. Some other participants, in turn, suggested that it was the families' responsibility, not the state's, to make sure that their children don't forget their native language.

"We are having big problems with the issue of Arabic language. Our children are learning Turkish and forgetting Arabic. However, there is a perception that refugees will eventually return to Syria. What will these children do in Syria when they return, then? They will have only known Turkish. I don't believe that the education they got in Turkey would of much use in Syria. The efforts for social cohesion have a side effect of corrupting the identities of Syrian children. This may have come into being out of good intentions, I am sure, but this will harm Syrian children and a solution needs to be found." (G.Antep-NGO Workers)

"Our children are speaking Turkish now. I think it is great that Syrian and Turkish children are going to school together. But I wish there were some courses in Arabic offered at Turkish schools." (İstanbul-NGO Workers)

"I think they want our children, not us, in this country. The policies are developed to this effect. Because 10 years later our children will be contributing in this country much more than we could. We lost our children and they won them." (İstanbul-Workers)

13. Status Syrians would prefer in Turkey

Syrians' status of "temporary protection" is one of the most frequently discussed topics. Therefore, it is important to learn about how Syrians evaluate their own status and the legal prospects that wait for them in Turkey. Among the responses to the question of what status Syrians want to have, "citizenship" strikingly takes the lead. The combined share of those who replied with either "dual citizenship- both Syrian and Turkish" or "only Turkish citizenship" was 70,2% in SB-2017; 80,3% in SB-2019; and 72,3% in SB-2020. The option of "refugee status / under temporary protection status" was divided into two separate options in SB-2020. An interesting finding was the significant increase in the share of the option "continue with under temporary protection status" to 17,2%. In SB-2019, the option "refugee status / under temporary protection status" was preferred only by 9,9% of the respondents. This increase may be related to the perception that those Syrians who obtain citizenship, and thus lose their "under temporary protection status", are forfeiting some of their privileges associated with this status. Other options than the above mentioned three received almost no interest.

SB-2020-TABLE 105: Which status would you want to have in Turkey?

		2017		2019		2020	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
1	Dual citizenship- both Syrian and Turkish	376	61,8	818	57,7	911	64,4
2	Refugee status / under temporary protection status	95	15,6	140	9,9	-	-
	Continue with under temporary protection status	-	-	-	-	253	17,9
	Refugee status	-	-	-	-	19	1,3
3	Only Turkish citizenship	51	8,4	320	22,6	111	7,9
4	Long term /unlimited residence permit	21	3,5	9	0,6	8	0,6
5	Same as my current status	35	5,8	45	3,2	-	-
6	Work permit	13	2,1	-	-	-	-
	No idea / No response	17	2,8	86	6,0	112	7,9
Total		608	100,0	1418	100,0	1414	100,0

It appears that men, those with educational attainment levels above high-school, and those who live in metropolitan cities show a higher level of interest for dual citizenship. For the response "only Turkish citizenship", in turn, the more willing respondents include men, those over the age of 65, those who are literate but with no diploma, and those who live in the border cities. Lastly, the response "continue with under temporary protection status" received the most interest from women, those in the 25-34 age group, those who are illiterate, and those who live in the metropolitan cities.

SB-2020-TABLE 106: Which status would you want to have in Turkey? (%)

	Dual citi-zenship – both Syrian and Turk-ish	Continue with under temporary protection status	Only Turk-ish citi-zenship	Refu-gee status	Long term / unlimited residence permit	No idea / No re-sponse
Sex						
Female	60,8	19,6	6,4	1,4	0,3	11,5
Male	67,0	16,7	8,9	1,3	0,7	5,4
Age Groups						
18-24	64,8	17,6	7,2	2,4	-	8,0
25-34	64,6	21,8	5,4	1,3	0,2	6,7
35-44	63,9	16,8	8,7	0,9	0,9	8,8
45-54	64,5	13,6	9,5	1,2	1,2	10,0
55-64	64,9	16,5	10,3	3,1	-	5,2
65+	64,9	13,5	13,5	-	-	8,1
Educational Attainment						
Illiterate	39,7	24,1	12,1	4,3	-	19,8
Literate but not graduate of any school	54,9	15,7	25,5	2,0	-	1,9
Primary school	61,9	20,8	6,5	1,4	0,8	8,6
Middle school	62,8	19,3	8,1	0,8	-	9,0
High-school or equivalent	75,7	11,6	5,8	-	0,5	6,4
2-year associate degree / Vo-cational school of higher educa-tion	68,7	17,2	7,8	4,7	1,6	-
University/Graduate de-gree/ PhD	86,2	7,7	4,6	-	1,5	-
Region						
Border cities	64,0	17,3	9,0	1,3	0,5	7,9
Other cities	65,1	18,9	5,9	1,5	0,7	7,9
Metropolitan cities	61,6	20,7	6,8	0,9	1,1	8,9
Non-metropolitan cities	71,4	15,4	4,2	2,7	-	6,3
General	**64,4**	**17,9**	**7,9**	**1,3**	**0,6**	**7,9**

These findings clearly show the strong demand among Syrians for citizenship. Obviously, the demand for citizenship doesn't necessarily show by itself intention to stay permanently. In fact, it is known from the FGDs that for some people obtaining citizenship might mean feeling more secure and becoming more likely to return.

FGD Findings: Syrians' Views on the Issue of Legal Status

According to a majority of the FGD participants, the current status of "under temporary protection" brings a lot of uncertainties for Syrians both regarding today and future.

> *"We have a lot of questions and problems regarding our future. Will we stay here or will they send us back? We will relax when we get the answer to this question." (G.Antep-Workers)*

> *"There is something wrong with temporary protection. I feel scared when I say 'temporary protection'. We feel like one day we will all be told to go away. I wish this was changed, I wish they call this 'permanent protection'." (İstanbul-Students)*

> *"I think they could give us residence permits now instead of temporary protection. Temporary protection makes sense when there is something from which you protect the people. But what are they protecting us from now? I think this status is very political." (İstanbul-Students)*

Another issue related to these discussions concerned Syrians rights and responsibilities that come with their status. According to many participants, a large majority of Syrians in Turkey don't know about their rights. Neither do they know about the laws and their duties before these laws. This, on the one hand, makes them vulnerable to exploitation, and, on the other, causes even the most well-intentioned Syrians to appear like law-breakers at times. In this context, Syrians need to be educated both regarding the legal system and laws in Turkey and regarding their rights and responsibilities.

14. Returning to Syria?[170]

One of the most sensitive topics of research for SB studies has concerned the views and tendencies of Syrians about voluntary return. The issue of permanency of Syrians in Turkey should be considered in two dimensions. The first is the desire or condition of staying in Turkey without any reason, while the second is the desire or condition of not returning to Syria. For this reason, the SB study, specifically conducted on social cohesion, considers Syrians' opinions on return as one of the most significant areas.

In a process of extraordinary uncertainties, it is obvious that the Syrians' views on return would be very relative. Because the developments in Syria, and the host country Turkey's attitude would also play significant roles as much as the desire of Syrians. For this reason, besides asking direct questions to Syrians, such as "are you planning to return?", other indirect findings also need to be considered. For this sensitive issue, it is helpful to restate an important issue to remember: As frequently mentioned in the study, although it is a study with a high confidence level, the findings of the SB reflect the views of those who participated in this study rather than all Syrians in Turkey.

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170. The question "Please specify under which conditions you would like to return", which was asked in SB-2019 but could not get enough meaningful results, was not asked in SB-2020. This issue was mostly tried to be clarified in the interviews in the focus groups.

14-a. Opinions of Syrians in Turkey about returning to Syria

In the SB study, the basic question of "In general, which of the following statements better explains your attitude in returning to Syria?" was asked to get some clues on return tendencies. The most striking finding here is that the rate of those who responded to this question by saying "I don't plan to return to Syria under any circumstances" was 16,7% in SB-2017, which dramatically increased to 51,8% in SB-2019 and further increased once again to 77,8% in SB-2020. This incredible rise in the rate of those who said they would not return no matter what the conditions were, needs to be seriously considered with regard to the future of Syrians in Turkey and the social cohesion processes. This finding shows that the future conditions in Syria have radically lost their attraction and influencing power on decisions. In other words, the change in these two years, when considered along with the other findings, can be seen as the most significant indicator that the permanency tendency of Syrians has become stronger.

SB-2020-TABLE 107: In general, which one of the following statements better explains your attitude on returning to Syria?

	2017		2019		2020	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
I do not plan to return to Syria under any circumstances	**148**	**16,7**	**735**	**51,8**	**1059**	**77,8**
I would return if the war in Syria ends and if an administration we want is formed	529	59,6	429	30,3	218	16,0
I would return if a safe zone is created in Syria	-	-	83	5,9	32	2,3
I would return if the war ends in Syria, even if an administration we want is not formed	114	12,9	78	5,5	9	0,7
I would return even if the war continues in Syria	19	2,1	3	0,2	-	-
No idea / Don't know	46	5,2	64	4,5	38	2,7
No response	31	3,5	26	1,8	6	0,5
Total	887	100,0	1418	100,0	1362	100,0

* The present statement "I would return if the war in Syria ends and if an administration we want is formed" was "I would return if the war ends and if a good administration is formed" in SB-2017. Similarly, the statement "I would return if the war ends in Syria, even if an administration we want is not formed" was "I would return if the war ends, even if a good administration was not formed" in SB-2017.

In SB-2019, the rate of those who said "I would return if the war in Syria ends and if an administration we want is formed" has dropped to 30.3% from 59.6% in SB-2017. The trend of decrease has continued regarding this, as the share of respondents who gave this answer has further dropped to 16% in SB-2020. Therefore, these top two responses show that Syrians appear to have taken voluntary return out of their agenda. Similar findings were also obtained from many other questions including, for instance, the question on preferred legal status.

The rate of those who said "I would return if the war ends in Syria, even if an administration we want is not formed" was 12,9% in SB-2017. Similar to the case above, it dropped to 5,5% in SB-2019, and to 0,7% in SB-2020. The rate of another response that is added in SB-2019, "I would return if a safe zone is created in Syria", also recorded a drop from 5,9% in SB-2019 to 2,3% in SB-2020. All these data, actually show that the will/tendency of Syrians to return has dramatically dropped in the last four years.

SB-2020-TABLE 108: In general, which one of the following statements better explains your attitude on returning to Syria? (%)

	I do not plan to return to Syria under any circumstances	I would return if the war in Syria ends and if an administration we want is formed	I would return if a safe zone is created in Syria	I would return if the war ends in Syria, even if an administration we want is not formed	No idea / No response
Sex					
Female	78,7	14,0	3,0	0,5	3,8
Male	77,1	17,5	1,9	0,8	2,7
Age Groups					
18-24	86,6	8,4	0,8	-	4,2
25-34	72,3	20,5	3,1	0,9	3,2
35-44	78,2	15,3	2,6	0,2	3,7
45-54	82,5	14,0	1,7	0,4	1,4
55-64	78,5	14,0	1,1	2,2	4,2
65 +	81,1	10,8	2,7	2,7	2,7
Educational Attainment					
Illiterate	84,4	11,0	1,8	-	2,8
Literate but not graduate of any school	89,8	6,1	-	-	4,1
Primary school	78,9	15,2	1,0	0,6	4,3
Middle school	79,0	15,2	2,6	0,6	2,6
High-school or equivalent	73,6	20,9	3,8	-	1,7
2-year associate degree / Vocational school of higher education	61,9	28,6	4,8	3,2	1,5
University	73,2	16,3	4,9	1,6	4,0
Region					
Border cities	79,3	15,1	1,7	0,7	3,2
Other cities	75,0	17,6	3,4	0,6	3,4
Metropolitan cities	77,5	16,0	2,8	0,9	2,8
Non-metropolitan cities	70,5	20,5	4,5	-	4,5
General	77,8	16,0	2,3	0,7	3,2

14-b. Is there a return plan within the next 12 months?

To get some clues on return tendencies, the Syrians in Turkey were asked the question of "What are your plans for return within the next 12 months?". The share of those respondents who replied with "I do not plan to return" has significantly increased from 56,1% in SB-2019 to 89% in SB-2020. This rate is significantly higher than the rate of "I don't plan to return under any circumstances" (77,8%) in the question in the previous section. Also, the share of those who replied with "I plan to return in the next 12 months" has reduced from 6,8% in SB-2019 to 3,7% in SB-2020. In other words, the resistance of Syrians to the issue of returning in the short term is much higher. It could be predicted that COVID-19 pandemic also contributed in this trend.

SB-2020-TABLE 109: What are your plans for return within the next 12 months?

	2019		2020	
	#	%	#	%
I do not plan to return	795	56,1	1259	89,0
I am undecided	266	18,8	75	5,3
I plan to return	96	6,8	52	3,7
No idea / No response	261	18,3	28	2,0
Total	**1418**	**100,0**	**1414**	**100,0**

14-c. Reasons for Not Returning[171]

It is illuminating to look at the reasons why the Syrians in Turkey **do not plan** to return. When participants were asked the question of "Provide the most important 3 reasons why you are not planning to return to Syria", through a multiple response system, the first response with the highest rate is *"because it's not a safe place"* (69,9%). The option *"because I want to obtain citizenship in Turkey"*, which was added in SB-2020 for the first time, came in second (30,4%). This finding is particularly important in terms of future prospects. In the third place is the option *"because the war still continues"* (25,3%). These were followed by, in descending order, *"because of the bad economic situation in Syria"* (19,5%), "there is nothing left in Syria for us" (18%), *"to go to another country"* (16,1%), *"to provide a better future for my children"* (11,8%), *"because we established a new life in Turkey"* (10,5%). The rest of the options each received less than 5% support. Overall, while concerns over security in Syria are the most dominant, it appears that the lives established in Turkey increasingly becoming more important reasons of not wanting to return.

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171. SB çalışmasında geri dönme-dönmeme eğilimleri için katılımcılara mümkün olduğunca çok sayıda seçenek verilmesine çalışılmıştır. Toplam seçenek sayısı 17 *("Güvenli bir yer olmadığı için", "Savaş devam ettiği için", "Türkiye'de çalıştığım için", "Suriye'de bize ait olan bir şey kalmadı", "Burada mutlu olduğum için", "Türkiye'deki eğitim daha iyi olduğu için", "Dönmek istemiyorum", "Çocuklarıma daha iyi bir gelecek temin etmek için", "Rejim tarafından arandığım için", "Türkiye'de kalmak istediğim için", "Suriye'de hayat koşulları çok zor", "Mevcut Yönetim/rejim olduğu sürece gitmem", "Türkiye'yi sevdiğim için", "Ailem Türkiye'de yaşadığı için", "Suriye'de kimsem kalmadı", "İslam ülkesi olduğu için", "Askere gitmemek için")*, "Diğer" ve "Fikrim yok/cevap yok" ile toplamda 19'dur. Bu çalışmada ilk 10 sırada olanlar değerlendirmeye tabi tutuluştur. Ayrıca 10. Sıranın altında yer alan hiçbir seçenek %3'den daha güçlü değildir.

SB-2020-TABLE 110: Provide the most important 3 reasons why you are not planning (don't want) to return to Syria (Multiple responses) (%)

(Results from 1259 participants who do not plan to return to Syria in the next 12 months.)

For other versions of cross-tabulations with this question, see Additional Tables)

		2019		2020	
		#	%	#	%
1	Because it is not a safe place	341	42,9	880	**69,9**
2	Because I want to obtain citizenship in Turkey	-	-	383	**30,4**
3	Because the war still continues	248	31,2	318	**25,3**
4	Because of the bad economic situation in Syria	-	-	245	**19,5**
5	There's nothing left in Syria for us	116	14,6	226	**18,0**
6	To go to another country	-	-	203	**16,1**
7	To provide a better future for my children	33	4,2	149	**11,8**
8	Because we established a new life in Turkey	-	-	132	**10,5**
9	Because education in Turkey is better	67	8,4	61	**4,8**
10	Because I am working	164	20,6	53	**4,2**
11	Other	280		166	
	No idea / No response	31	3,9	3	**0,2**

FGD Findings: Return

The FGD participants were asked to reflect on the future prospects particularly regarding the issue of return, both for themselves personally and for Syrians in Turkey more generally. A large number of participants reported that they expect (i) the majority or (ii) at least a large part of Syrians would return. According to these participants, the two main conditions for return of Syrians are for the war to come to an end and for the existing regime to change. Some other participants claimed that many Syrians would return if their safety were to be ensured. Some individuals went so far as to suggest that if the political problems are resolved and stability is ensured in Syria, they would return even if they might have obtained Turkish citizenship at that point. According to participants who expect only a limited number of Syrians to ever return to Syria, young Syrians and particularly those who were born and/or raised in Turkey would not consider returning, even if stability is secured there. Accordingly, only those Syrians over a certain age, who still have relatives back in Syria as well as those who own land or property in their home country would return, if and when the war comes to an end.

(i)

"Nobody would return unless the regime changes. Even if the regime changes, as long as the living conditions remain bleak, I don't think anyone will want to return. Our children certainly don't want to return. But if things are resolved and the situation improves, many people would return." (Ankara-Women)

"Our problem is a political problem. Therefore, when the regime changes we would return to Syria. But, I think, the political stability could only be ensured in 20 years or so." (Ankara-Women)

"I would want to return even if I become a citizen here. Because even when that happens, I will live here as a foreigner. This is why, I think, most Syrians would return." (İstanbul-Students)

(ii)

"If the war ends, and I think that it will end after many years, some Syrians would return. They would return because it is their country." (G.Antep-Women)

"At the moment, nobody wants to or even thinks about the prospects of return. Many Syrians say that they would continue to live in Turkey for a while longer even if the regime changes. The education, health, infrastructure are all in terrible shape in Syria, so nobody would return." (Ş.Urfa-NGO Workers)

"I think those Syrians who live near the [Syrian] border or who used to live near the Turkish border would return." (G.Antep-NGO Workers)

"Those who are studying here wouldn't return. Those people who couldn't adapt to life and who couldn't get a job here would return. But Syrians who have been living here for at least 6-7 years would not return." (Ş.Urfa-NGO Workers)

"Our children went to school here and they want to live here. But Syrians our age would want to get old and die in Syria. Because we were raised there. But we don't know when our motherland would become a safe place and we are tired of thinking about this." (İstanbul-NGO Workers)

A majority of Syrian FGD participants argued, in a more decisive tone, that most Syrians would not return. These participants emphasized three main arguments:

(i) Firstly, it was suggested that security still couldn't be ensured and that it was very unlikely to be ensured anytime soon. In other words, many participants reported that Syrians are still rightfully afraid of being punished or finding themselves again in a violent context if they return to Syria. According to some participants, Syrians are not merely scared of the state but also the Syrian society and its potential reactions to their return.

(ii) Secondly, some participants suggested that most Syrians don't have anything left back in Syria. Accordingly, they either lost their belongings during the war or sold them when they were escap-

ing to Turkey. Therefore, they don't have any wealth, property or belonging to return to.

(iii) Third and lastly, participants reported that Syrians have established new lives in Turkey now. Accordingly, they have diplomas that would only be valid here, bought properties with all their savings here, and opened workplaces here. Therefore, it appears very unlikely to these participants that Syrians would be willing to leave behind these lives that they formed from scratch.

"Everybody says they would return if the regime is replaced but I don't think they will return. When we watch the news, we see that a solution is still very far away. Even if the regime is gone, there will be a population of 18 million people who would have lived with Asad for many years. I am sure that, even if the regime is gone, there will be many more 'Bessar Asad's in Syria." (Ankara-Women)

"Return is very difficult because there is nothing left in Syria. Our trouble is not only with the regime anymore. We don't know who is fighting us there. Syria is not a safe place anymore. We established new lives here, it would be terribly difficult to start again from zero there." (G.Antep-Women)

"The whole country of Turkey keeps asking us this question all the time. I don't think they would return. Our homes were destroyed. We, as students, don't know if Syria will accept our diplomas after we graduate. The situation in Syria keeps getting worse." (G.Antep-Women)

"I don't think they will return. Most Syrians started selling their houses in Syria to buy houses here. Even if a safe zone is established, I don't think most Syrians would go there. Syrians are afraid of Syria now." (Ş.Urfa-Women)

"I don't think they are planning to or would ever return. There is nothing left in Syria anymore. The war destroyed everything. There is no work, no electricity, no schools… where are they going to return to? Syria is still not a safe place." Ş.Urfa-NGO Workers)

14-d. Moving to a Third Country (Other Than Turkey and Syria)

Tendency of Syrians living in Turkey to go to a third country was tried to be understood with the question of *"Would you want to move to a country other than Turkey and Syria?"* Significantly differently from the findings of SB-2017 and SB-2019, the findings of SB-2020 on this question show that the intentions of Syrians to move to a third country has been strengthened. In fact, the response *"I would go if I had the opportunity"* has emerged as the top answer for the first time in SB-2020 with a rate of 49,1%. The same response ranked second in both of the previous SB studies, receiving the support of 23% and 34,1% in 2017 and 2019, respectively. Among the replies to this question, having the opportunity of multiple responses, 42,7% of the respondents suggested that they *"would never consider going under any circumstances"*, placing this response to the second rank. This response used to be the top one in both SB-2017 and SB-2019 with the endorsement of, respectively, 65,8% and 58,6% of the respondents. It also appears that the idea of moving to a third country if certain "conditions" are met is also becoming more popular.

SB-2020-TABLE 111: **Would you want to move to a country other than Turkey and Syria?**
(Multiple responses)

		2017*		2019*		2020	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
1	I would go if I had the opportunity	204	23,0	483	34,1	694	49,1
2	I would never consider going	584	65,8	831	58,6	604	42,7
3	I would go if I cannot become a Turkish citizen	-	-	71	5,0	123	8,7
4	I would go if I have a relative/acquaintance to help me there	3	0,3	196	13,8	99	7,0
5	I would go if I am provided a job opportunity	36	4,1	202	14,2	72	5,1
6	I would go if I cannot find a job in Turkey	24	2,7	64	4,5	27	1,9
7	I would move abroad after I become a Turkish citizen	-	-	43	3,0	14	1,0
8	I would go if I cannot get education in Turkey	4	0,5	23	1,6	8	0,5
9	I would go if I cannot earn the money worth my ef-forts in Turkey	8	0,9	19	1,3	3	0,2
10	I would go if my child is provided health support	-	-	-	-	1	0,1
	No idea / No response	24	2,7	23	1,6	18	1,3
	* In SB-2017 and SB-2019, this question was worded as "Would you want to go to and live in a country other than Turkey and Syria?"						

"Women, relatively young people between the ages of 18 and 44, and graduates of primary and elementary schools more than averagely supported the option "I would go if I had the opportunity". Those over the age of 45, those who are illiterate and primary school graduates, in contrast, chose the option "I would never consider going" more strongly.

SB-2020-TABLE 112: Would you want to move to a country other than Turkey and Syria? (Multiple responses) (%)

	I would go if I had the opportunity	I would never consider going	I would go if I cannot become a Turkish citizen	I would go if I have a rela-tive/acquaintance to help me there	I would go if I am provided a job oppor-tunity	I would go if I cannot find a job in Turkey	I would move abroad after I become a Turkish citizen	Other	No idea / No response
Sex									
Female	49,5	43,2	8,8	7,1	3,2	0,8	0,7	0,8	1,5
Male	48,8	42,3	8,6	6,9	6,4	2,7	1,2	0,9	1,1
Age Groups									
18-24	51,2	43,2	2,4	1,6	0,8	1,6	0,8	-	2,4
25-34	53,6	38,7	8,6	6,7	6,3	1,5	0,8	0,8	0,8
35-44	48,7	42,3	10,1	8,5	5,7	1,8	0,9	1,1	0,7
45-54	44,2	49,2	9,1	8,7	5,0	2,9	1,2	0,4	0,8
55-64	43,3	44,3	9,3	7,2	3,1	3,1	1,0	2,1	4,1
65 +	35,1	51,4	10,8	-	2,7	-	2,7	-	5,4
Educational Attainment									
Illiterate	45,7	49,1	3,4	4,3	1,7	1,7	-	0,9	-
Literate but not grad-uate of any school	23,5	66,7	9,8	5,9	5,9	-	-	-	2,0
Primary school	54,7	39,7	6,1	7,1	5,3	1,8	0,6	0,8	1,0
Middle school	52,8	41,1	7,3	7,3	5,9	2,0	0,6	0,6	0,8
High-school or equiv-alent	47,6	41,8	10,6	9,0	5,8	0,5	2,1	0,5	3,2
2-year associate degree / Vocational school of higher education	45,3	39,1	15,6	6,3	1,6	1,6	6,3	3,1	1,6
University / Graduate degree / PhD	33,8	46,9	20,8	6,2	5,4	5,4	0,8	1,5	1,5
Region									
Border cities	44,0	45,5	10,9	6,4	4,0	2,4	1,4	0,8	1,5
Other cities	57,3	38,3	5,2	7,9	6,8	1,1	0,4	0,9	0,9
Metropolitan cities	61,4	33,5	6,5	11,9	8,0	1,4	0,6	1,4	0,6
Non-metropolitan cities	49,7	47,1	2,6	0,5	4,8	0,5	-	-	1,6
General	**49,1**	**42,7**	**8,7**	**7,0**	**5,1**	**1,9**	**1,0**	**0,8**	**1,3**

15. Future Expectations of Syrians in Turkey

Whether Syrians see a future for themselves in Turkey gives important clues both on their permanency trends and social cohesion processes. Within this framework, the Syrians were asked the following question based on three actors: "Do you believe that there is a future for yourself, for your family, and for other Syrians?". The findings suggest that Syrians do strongly believe that there is a future for "themselves" and "their families" in Turkey. Both in SB-2019 and SB-2020, a large majority of respondents, more than 62%, gave this response. The belief in the future of "Syrians" in Turkey is significantly weaker. However, it also appears to be growing as the rate of this answer increased from 47,2% in SB-2019 to 52,1% in SB-2020. [172]

Among those who believe that there is a future for themselves and their families in Turkey, those with the strongest belief were the individuals who lived in border cities. This response was least popular among the respondents from metropolitan cities.

SB-2020-TABLE 113: Do you believe that there is a future in Turkey for yourself, your family, and other Syrians? (%)

(For other versions of cross-tabulations with this question, see Additional Tables)

		Yes	No	No idea/ No answer
For yourself	2019	62,5	30,1	7,4
	2020	62,2	30,8	7,0
For your family	2019	63,7	28,9	7,4
	2020	63,4	29,7	6,9
For other Syrians in Turkey	2019*	47,2	21,7	31,1
		52,1	24,4	23,5
*In 2019, this question was worded as "Syrians".				

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172. This question was asked differently in SB-2017. It was posed as "Do you believe that there is a future for you and your family in Turkey?" with the possible responses of "Yes", "No", and "I don't want a future in Turkey". The rate of those who said "yes" to this question was 49,7% among Syrians living outside of the camps.

FGD Findings: Future Expectations of Syrians in Turkey

Do Syrians Believe that They have a Future in Turkey?

FGD participants were firstly asked whether Syrians believed that they have a future in Turkey. The responses can be grouped under three headings: (i) "yes, Syrians believe that they have a future in Turkey", (ii) "no, they don't believe that", and (iii) "whether or not they believe this depends on some factors".

(i) Those who think that Syrians do believe that they have a future in Turkey suggest that Syrians have built lives in Turkey and now they don't think about life in any other country. Accordingly, there are many Syrians who studied, worked, obtained citizenship in Turkey and they naturally see their future in Turkey. In addition, these participants argued that inter-marriages between Turks and Syrians were increasing in number, which also shows that Syrians do expect a future in Turkey.

(ii) The participants who responded negatively to this question think that most Syrians do not believe that they have a future in Turkey as they are not citizens and they still are under temporary protection. These participants also emphasized the economic difficulties that Syrians in Turkey have been going through. Therefore, accordingly, unless significant changes happen in these regards, Syrians would not be able to see their future in Turkey.

(iii) Lastly, there are some participants who refrained from making generalizations regarding this question. According to these, whether Syrians will be able to imagine a future in Turkey depends on two factors. The first concerns the profile, economic standing, and legal status of Syrians. In this context, it was argued that those more highly educated and qualified Syrians who are wealthier and who were able to obtain Turkish citizenship are expecting a future in Turkey. Others with the opposite attributes, in turn, cannot imagine such a future here. The second factor concerns the future of Turkish government. According to some participants, a change in government would jeopardize the future of Syrians' in Turkey.

16. Would you move to another city in Turkey, if you had the chance?

In the early years of their arrival, and particularly between 2013 and 2018, Syrians were able to move to and settle in any Turkish city they preferred. However, since 2018, the Temporary Protection Regulation was revised and certain restrictions were imposed on Syrians' ability to travel, thereby regulating their movement between cities. Syrians prefer their places of settlement by considering the whereabouts of their relatives, employment opportunities, and their access to public services and support. It is observed that some Syrians who settle down in border regions are waiting for an opportunity to move to a third country. Ultimately, Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey can leave their cities of registration, whether for travel or settling in another city, only with a permission and on a temporary basis. SB-2020 included the question "If you had the chance/permission, would you want to move to and live in another city in Turkey?". The responses reflect that Syrians are generally content with the cities in which they live. Only 11,5% of the respondents suggested that they would consider moving to another city in Turkey.

SB-2020-TABLE 114: : If you had the chance/permission, would you want to move to and live in another city in Turkey?

	#	%
I definitely would not	877	62,0
I would not	307	21,7
I am undecided	35	2,5
I would	138	9,8
I definitely would	38	2,7
No idea / No response	19	1,3
Total	**1414**	**100,0**

Among the respondents who reported their willingness to move to another city, women, those in the 35-44 age group, those with at least a high-school education, and the ones living in the border cities are more prominently represented.

SB-2020-TABLE 115: If you had the chance/permission, would you want to move to and live in another city in Turkey? (%)

	Definitely would not	Would not	Undecided	Would	Definitely would	No idea / No response
Sex						
Female	57,1	25,3	2,7	9,1	4,1	1,7
Male	65,6	19,1	2,3	10,2	1,7	1,1
Age Groups						
18-24	68,0	20,0	1,6	5,6	4,0	0,8
25-34	68,2	15,9	2,7	9,8	2,5	0,9
35-44	57,2	24,6	2,8	9,7	3,7	2,0
45-54	56,6	27,7	2,1	11,2	1,7	0,7
55-64	57,7	25,8	3,1	12,4	-	1,0
65 +	64,9	18,9	-	8,1	2,7	5,4
Educational Attainment						
Illiterate	63,8	29,3	0,9	2,6	1,7	1,7
Literate but not graduate of any school	31,4	56,9	5,8	3,9	2,0	-
Primary school	67,2	19,6	1,9	7,5	2,4	1,4
Middle school	65,4	19,8	1,3	8,7	3,4	1,4
High-school or equivalent	61,4	19,6	4,2	10,1	2,6	2,1
2-year associate degree / Vocational school of higher education	42,2	25,0	3,1	26,6	3,1	-
University / Graduate degree / PhD	53,8	16,2	4,6	21,5	3,1	0,8
Region						
Border cities	47,3	30,6	3,3	13,2	3,7	1,9
Other cities	85,8	7,4	1,1	4,3	1,1	0,3
Metropolitan cities	89,8	6,3	0,5	2,0	1,1	0,3
Non-metropolitan cities	78,3	9,5	2,1	8,5	1,1	0,5
General	**62,0**	**21,7**	**2,5**	**9,8**	**2,7**	**1,3**

Of those respondents who suggested that they would be willing to move to another city, 46% said that they would want to move to İstanbul

SB-2020-TABLE 116: **Which city would you want to go? (Multiple responses)**

		#	%
1	İstanbul	81	46,0
2	Gaziantep	12	6,8
3	Mersin	10	5,7
4	Bursa	10	5,7
5	Ankara	10	5,7
6	İzmir	9	5,1
7	Antalya	5	2,8
8	Konya	3	1,7
9	Adana	3	1,7
10	Kilis	2	1,1
11	Trabzon	2	1,1
12	Malatya	2	1,1
13	Other	6	3,4
	No idea / Don't know	32	18,2
	No response	7	4,0
* Results from 176 individuals who responded with "I definitely would" or "I would" to the question "If you had the chance/permission, would you want to move to and live in another city in Turkey?"			

17. Travel Permit / Road Permit

Syrians under Temporary Protection in Turkey are required to apply for a travel permit document when they need to or want to travel to cities other than the one in which they are registered. This applies not only to Syrians but to all international protection applicants in Turkey. Called by the respondents "travel restrictions" in short, this issue has been frequently brought up my Syrian FGD participants. Therefore, SB-2020 survey incorporated a question on it.

The respondents were asked the question "how does the obligation to obtain a travel permit affect your life?" and given the chance to provide multiple responses. Interestingly, the two most popular responses with almost identical rates are quite contradictory to one another. While 45,3% of the respondents suggested that they *"feel like their freedom is restricted"*, another 44,3% reported that it *"does not affect"* their lives. These were followed by *"it reduces our chances of finding jobs"* (30,1%), *"it harms family/relative relations"* (17%), *"I want to be free of problems we face in the process of obtaining a travel permit"* (12,4%), and *"it adversely affects my psychology"* (9,7%)

SB-2020-TABLE 117: **How does the obligation to obtain a travel permit affect your life? (Multiple responses)**

		#	%
1	I feel like my freedom is restricted	641	45,3
2	It does not affect my life	627	44,3
3	It reduces our chances of finding jobs	426	30,1
4	It harms family/relative relations	240	17,0
5	I want to be free of problems we face in the process of obtaining a travel permit	175	12,4
6	It adversely affects my psychology	137	9,7
7	It reduces my chance to better access public services	15	1,1
8	Other	18	1,3
	No idea / No response	49	3,5

Those who complained the most from travel restrictions include men, those between the ages 45 and 65, those with higher educational attainment levels, and those who live in the border cities. Particularly, respondents from border cities are the most prominently represented in the group that responded with "it reduces our chances of finding jobs".

SB-2020-TABLE 118: How does the obligation to obtain a travel permit affect your life? (Multiple responses) (%)

	I feel like my freedom is restricted	It does not affect my life	It reduces our chances of finding jobs	It harms family/ relative relations	I want to be free of problems we face in the process of obtaining a travel permit	It adversely affects my psychology	It reduces my chance to better access public services	Other	No idea / No response
Sex									
Female	37,3	51,5	21,3	13,3	10,5	8,4	0,7	1,0	5,2
Male	51,1	39,2	36,5	19,6	13,7	10,6	1,3	1,5	2,2
Age Groups									
18-24	37,6	52,0	27,2	11,2	9,6	4,0	-	0,8	1,6
25-34	40,0	49,6	25,3	13,8	8,8	7,5	0,6	0,8	4,0
35-44	49,2	41,8	33,6	18,6	13,3	11,0	1,4	1,4	2,8
45-54	51,2	38,4	35,5	23,1	18,6	12,0	1,7	1,7	3,3
55-64	53,6	35,1	34,0	19,6	11,3	16,5	-	1,0	5,2
65 +	35,1	43,2	16,2	10,8	18,9	8,1	5,4	5,4	8,1
Educational Attainment									
Illiterate	44,8	43,1	22,4	8,6	14,7	6,0	0,9	-	7,8
Literate but not graduate of any school	31,4	49,0	27,5	13,7	17,6	5,9	-	-	9,8
Primary school	38,1	52,6	25,5	17,8	13,0	7,3	0,4	0,4	3,0
Middle school	50,0	40,5	28,2	18,7	13,7	10,3	1,1	1,7	3,4
High-school or equivalent	46,6	41,3	32,3	16,4	8,5	11,6	2,1	3,2	3,2
2-year associate degree / Vocational school of higher education	56,3	34,4	50,0	17,2	14,1	14,1	-	1,6	-
University / Graduate degree / PhD	59,2	31,5	48,5	18,5	6,9	16,9	3,1	2,3	1,5
Region									
Border cities	49,1	39,2	41,7	21,1	18,7	12,6	1,4	1,7	4,5
Other cities	39,2	52,7	11,5	10,4	2,2	5,0	0,6	0,6	1,8
Metropolitan cities	43,8	48,3	12,5	12,2	2,8	6,8	0,9	0,6	2,3
Non-metropolitan cities	30,7	60,8	9,5	6,9	1,1	1,6	-	0,5	1,1
General	**45,3**	**44,3**	**30,1**	**17,0**	**12,4**	**9,7**	**1,1**	**1,3**	**3,5**

FGD Findings: Travel Permit

As it was mentioned in several places above, there is a widespread demand among Syrians under temporary protection for the revision of travel restrictions placed upon them. On a related point, some participants mentioned the recent announcements in certain cities where new registrations were stopped, practically banning any new Syrians, with certain exceptions, to move to these cities/districts. Accordingly, this is not a good policy. In this context, participants suggested that these restrictions prevent Syrians from seeing their family members who live in other cities or even helping them when they are sick. Moreover, participants argued that because of these restrictions, Syrians are having many difficulties in accessing public services in cities where they are not registered. For example, they cannot go to a hospital or enroll their children to a public school in such cities. Lastly, these travel restrictions are harshly criticized for preventing Syrians from finding employment or performing well in their existing jobs. According to some Syrian FGD participants, these wrong policies and applications increase the number of Syrians who resort to illegal practices and pave the way for the emergence of "inter-cities migrant smuggling".

"I think there are many policies that need to change. First of all of them is the travel permits. It should be revised or removed altogether. When our children or relatives get sick and they need to go to another city, we cannot get travel permits. Perhaps we don't feel this problem as much now because of the pandemic, but it harms us a lot. It makes us feel under pressure." Ş.Urfa-NGO Workers)

"Nowadays there are new decisions taken regarding our travel arrangements and where we can live. But, why didn't they do this when we first arrived? At first they gave us the right to choose where we want to settle down and now they are removing these rights." (G.Antep-Women)

18. The Decision to Not Prevent Passage of Refugees at the Pazarkule Border Gate[173]

After the developments following the loss of life of 33 Turkish soldiers as a result of an attack on Turkish Army in Idlib on February 27th, 2020, Turkey announced that it would not prevent the passage of Syrian and other refugees to Europe.[174] Since the developments between February 27th and March 27th, 2020, had Syrians at their center, some additional questions regarding these events were posed to SB respondents.

The first of these questions was "Did you plan to go when Turkey in February decided not to control crossings at Pazarkule/Greece border (to allow transit of refugees to Europe)?" A vast majority of Syrian respondents, i.e. 83%, suggested that they didn't plan to go and they didn't go. Only 2,5%

173. For developments on this topic, see Migration Research Association -GAR (2020) "What Happened on Turkey-Syria Border? "Türkiye-Yunanistan Sınırında Neler Oldu?" (https://gocarastirmalaridernegi.org/attachments/article/160/turkiye-yunanistan-sinirinda-neler-oldu..pdf) (Access: 12.04.2021)

174. Turkish daily Hurriyet (29.02.2020) President R.T.Erdogan: "We opened the borders, the number (of refugees passing to Europe through the borders) has reached 18,000 by this morning. It may hit 25,000-30,000 today. We will not close these borders after this process. We are not supposed to have these many refugees."
(https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-kapilari-actik-bundan-sonraki-surecte-de-kapatmayacagiz-41458102) (Access: 12.04.2021)

said that they went to the border but couldn't cross it, while 13,9% suggested that they planned to go but ended up not going.

Did you plan to go when Turkey in February decided not to control crossings (open the border) at Pazarkule/Greece border?

	#	%
Yes, I went but I couldn't cross	36	2,5
Yes, I planned to go but I didn't go	196	13,9
No, I didn't plan to go	1174	83,0
No idea / No response	8	0,6
Total	**1414**	**100,0**

It is observed that among the 36 respondents who said "Yes, I went (to the border) but I couldn't cross", men, those in the 18-24 age group, primary school graduates, and those who lived in non-metropolitan cities were more numerous. However, the 18-24 age group also showed a strong preference for the response "No, I didn't plan to go".

Did you plan to go when Turkey in February decided not to control crossings (open the border) at Pazarkule/Greece border?

	Yes, I went but couldn't cross	Yes, I planned to go but I didn't go	No, I didn't plan to go	No idea / No response
Sex				
Female	2,2	14,5	82,4	0,9
Male	2,8	13,4	83,5	0,3
Age Groups				
18-24	3,2	5,6	89,6	1,6
25-34	3,1	13,8	82,8	0,3
35-44	2,3	16,8	80,5	0,4
45-54	2,1	14,5	82,2	1,2
55-64	2,1	12,4	85,5	-
65 +	-	8,1	91,9	-
Educational Attainment				
Illiterate	2,6	15,5	80,2	1,7
Literate but not graduate of any school	2,0	9,8	88,2	-
Primary school	2,0	12,8	84,4	0,8
Middle school	3,9	13,1	82,7	0,3
High-school or equivalent	1,0	17,5	81,5	-
2-year associate degree / Vocational school of higher education	3,1	18,8	78,1	-
University / Graduate degree / PhD	3,1	12,3	83,8	0,8
Region				
Border cities	1,9	10,4	86,9	0,8
Other cities	3,5	19,4	76,7	0,4
Metropolitan cities	3,4	23,6	72,4	0,6
Non-metropolitan cities	3,7	11,6	84,7	-
General	**2,5**	**13,9**	**83,0**	**0,6**

When those Syrians who suggested that they didn't plan to go to the border were asked why and given the chance to produce multiple answers, 52,6% of them said that they *"didn't prefer to go without invitation or through illegal ways"*. This was followed by the response *"because I am happy with my life in Turkey"* (36,6%) and "Because I want to obtain Turkish citizenship" (31,8%). The other responses are ranked in the following way: "Because I was concerned about getting hurt in the process of crossing the border" (13,4%), "Because I established a new life in Turkey" (13,1%), "Because I knew that I wouldn't cross/ we saw/heard of those who couldn't cross" (8,2%), "Because my children are going to school here" (8,2%), and "Because I am working in Turkey" (4,8%).

SB-2020-TABLE 121: **Why didn't you plan to go/why didn't you go? (Multiple responses) (%)**

(For other versions of cross-tabulations with this question, see Additional Tables)

		#	%
1	I didn't prefer to go without invitation or through illegal ways	720	**52,6**
2	Because I am happy with my life in Turkey	502	**36,6**
3	Because I want to obtain Turkish citizenship	435	**31,8**
4	Because I was concerned about getting hurt in the process of crossing the border	183	**13,4**
5	Because I established a new life in Turkey	179	**13,1**
6	Because I knew that I wouldn't cross/ we saw/heard of those who couldn't cross	113	**8,2**
7	Because my children are going to school here	102	**7,4**
8	Because I am working in Turkey	66	**4,8**
9	Because I am happy about the education in Turkey	43	**3,1**
10	I was planning to go but Turkey sent back those at the border	18	**1,3**
11	Because I don't have the financial means for it	15	**1,1**
12	Because I'm concerned about losing my legal status in Turkey	14	**1,0**
13	Other	11	**0,8**
	No idea / No response	21	**1,5**
* Results from 1,370 people who responded to the question of "Did you plan to go when Turkey in February decided to open crossings at Pazarkule/Greece border (to allow transit of refugees to Europe)?" as "Yes, I planned to but did not go" and "No, I did not plan to go"			

SB-2020 asked the Syrians Under Temporary Protection in Turkey whether they would "go if Turkey decides again not to control (i.e. open) the borders". While only slightly more than 10% of the respondents suggested that they would either "definitely would go" or "would go" if this happens, a combined 80,1% said they either "wouldn't go" or "definitely wouldn't go".

Would you go if Turkey decides again not to control (open) the borders?

(For other versions of cross-tabulations with this question, see Additional Tables)

	#	%
Definitely wouldn't go	402	28,4
Wouldn't go	731	51,7
Undecided	118	8,3
Would go	113	8,0
Definitely would go	35	2,5
No idea / No response	15	1,1
Total	**1414**	**100,0**

FGD Findings: The Decision to Not Prevent Passage of Refugees at the Pazarkule Border Gate

SThe FGDs also discussed how Syrian participants evaluate this decision and action. A large majority of the participants suggested that they found it wrong and that they were disappointed because of it. In justifying their argument, these participants said that the decision was completely political. They went on to suggest that they felt like Turkey had used them as political leverage. In addition, it was suggested that the practice was not humane and many migrants suffered because of it.

Some other participants, in contrast, claimed that the practice gave hope for a better life in Europe to those Syrians who couldn't find work and sustain their lives in Turkey. Accordingly, Turkey did not force these people to go to the border but merely announced that it will not stop those who wishes to cross the border. In fact, these participants go on to argue, most Syrians who are content with their lives in Turkey didn't go to the border. Accordingly, only those young Syrians who couldn't set their lives in Turkey straight moved towards the border. In addition, some participants suggested that, even though they were not happy with the outcome of this decision, they could understand why Turkey made it. Accordingly, Turkey's step was dramatic but justified because it needed to make Europe feel the extraordinary burden that is on its shoulders.

> *"The people who went there were the Syrians who didn't have anything to lose in Turkey. Some Syrians saw that decision as a ray of hope. The majority, however, were suspicious of it and so they didn't go." (Ankara-Women)*

> *"I didn't see any Syrian family who went to Edirne. Almost all of the people who went there were young people." (Ankara-Women)*

19. Pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic, which was declared as such on 11 March 2020 by WHO, has led to major health, social, and economic problems throughout the world. As it might be expected, this process has created an even more dramatic impact on poor people everywhere, who felt the economic

impact most severely. There is also a well-known risk that these economic problems and growing poverty could cause a significant deterioration of the already negative attitudes among societies towards foreigners, immigrants, and refugees. In this context, it is observed that Syrians in Turkey have been severely affected by this pandemic through job losses and impoverishment in addition to health problems. In fact, the finding that the ratio of Syrians who are actively working has significantly decreased, from 37,9% in SB-2019 to 29,4 in SB-2020, needs to be attributed to the effects of this pandemic. Another finding that supports this concerns the changing figures related to the types of work that Syrians are involved in. For instance, while the share of those who were employed in regular jobs in SB-2019 was 50,2%, it has dropped to 35,8% in SB-2020. Conversely, the share of those Syrians who work at more insecure jobs such as daily, casual work has grown significantly from 33,6% in SB-2017 to 44,2% in SB-2020. Lastly, SB-2020 found that the number of Syrian respondents who received support/aid in the last 12 months has grown significantly as well.

To understand the social impact of the pandemic on Syrians in Turkey, the respondents firstly asked the question *"Do you think that there has been a change in the general perceptions of Turkish society towards Syrians after the COVID-19 pandemic?"* While 13,7% of the respondents said "yes" and another 13,8% said "partially", a large majority of 67,5% said "no".

SB-2020-TABLE 123: Do you think that there has been a change in the general perceptions of Turkish society towards Syrians after the COVID-19 pandemic

	#	%
Yes	194	13,7
Partially	195	13,8
No	954	67,5
No idea / No response	71	5,0
Total	**1414**	**100,0**

The 194 respondents who suggested that the perceptions have changed after the pandemic were further probed with the question "in what direction do you think the perceptions have changed?" The responses show that the pandemic is felt to have affected the perceptions in both directions, although the negative change appears to be felt in a stronger way.

SB-2020-TABLE 124: In what direction do you think the perceptions have changed?

	#	%
From positive to negative	86	44,3
From negative to positive	60	30,9
Both positive and negative	47	24,2
No idea / No response	1	0,5
Total	**194**	**100,0**
* Results from the respondents who suggested that there was a change of perceptions among Turkish society towards Syrians after the pandemic.		

The most interesting finding regarding the demographic analysis concerns the respondents from the border cities. Accordingly, a majority of the respondents from the border cities reported that the perceptions have changed for the positive.

When those respondents who suggested that the perceptions have changed for the negative after the pandemic were further probed with the question "what are the reasons for this negative change?", three major responses emerge. According to these participants, perceptions among the Turkish society towards Syrians have gone more negative because "discourses have emerged saying that Syrians have exacerbated the pandemic" (31,4%), "Syrians couldn't have much communication/interaction with Turkish society during the pandemic" (30,2%), and "Syrians were seen to be responsible for the growing unemployment and competition in the labor market caused by the pandemic" (26,7%).

SB-2020-TABLE 125: What are the reasons for this negative change? (Multiple responses)

		#	%
1	Discourses have emerged saying that Syrians have exacerbated the pandemic	27	31,4
2	Syrians couldn't have much communication/interaction with Turkish society during the pandemic	26	30,2
3	Syrians were seen to be responsible for the growing unemployment and competition in the labor market caused by the pandemic	23	26,7
4	The provocative publications about Syrians were effective	14	16,3
5	The worsening media language about Syrians was effective	9	10,5
6	The competition that emerged between the two communities for the pandemic supports was effective	7	8,1
7	Opening of the border with Greece in February-March and what happened there were effective	3	3,5
8	The competition that emerged between the two communities for the access to health and other public services was effective	2	2,3
	No idea / Don't know	7	8,1
	No response	5	5,8
*Results from the 86 respondents who suggested that there was a negative change of perceptions among Turkish society towards Syrians after the pandemic			

SB-2020 focuses on the developments that took place in the year 2020. Clearly, COVID-19 pandemic, which was declared so on 11 March 2020, created a special period in many ways both for Syrians and Turkish society. It appears that this special period has seriously affected the relations between Syrians and Turkish society. It appears to have changed many priorities for both communities. Syrian respondents were asked the question "In the last 12 months, how often have you / your family / other Syrians in Turkey experienced tensions with Turkish society?" It appears from the responses that the level of tensions with Turkish society that Syrians felt/experienced was limited. In fact, only 10 to 13% of respondents mentioned having experienced some tension with Turkish society over the last 12 months. Based on this finding, it can be suggested that the negative impact imposed by the pandemic on the social relations between Turks and Syrians remained at reasonably low levels.

SB-2020-TABLE 126: : In the last 12 months, how often have you / your family / other Syrians in Turkey experienced tensions with Turkish society? (%)

(For other versions of cross-tabulations with this question, see Additional Tables)

	Not experienced at all	Not experienced much	COMBINED NOT EXPERIENCED	Partially experienced	Experienced	Experienced a lot	COMBINED EXPERIENCED	No idea / No response
You	49,4	29,8	**79,2**	9,5	8,1	2,6	**10,7**	0,6
Your family	49,5	30,0	**79,5**	9,3	7,9	2,5	**10,4**	0,8
Syrians in Turkey	32,5	27,1	**59,6**	13,7	9,6	3,8	**13,4**	13,3

The demographic analysis reveals that the Syrian respondents that experience the most tensions live in the metropolitan cities.

Whether Syrians experienced any problems in the health sector during this process was asked in SB-2020 with the question "Have you experienced problems regarding hospital visits/access to health services during the pandemic?" The responses produce a very positive image where Syrians report almost no problems. In fact, 88,3% of the respondents replied saying they didn't experience any problem. A combined share of 10% of the respondents reported some problems. However, these figures point at a very positive picture regarding the satisfaction of refugees at a time when national health systems were paralyzed across the world by a deadly pandemic.

SB-2020-TABLE 127: Have you experienced problems regarding hospital visits/access to health services during the pandemic?"
(For other versions of cross-tabulations with this question, see Additional Tables)

	#	%
No, didn't experience any problem	1248	88,3
Yes, I got sick but I couldn't go to hospital	30	2,1
Yes, I got sick but the hospital didn't accept me	50	3,5
Yes, I got sick but the hospital was full	25	1,8
Yes, I got sick but there was no translator	31	2,2
Other	10	0,7
No idea / No response	20	1,4
Total	**1414**	**100,0**

Another question posed to Syrian respondents regarding the pandemic was "How has the pandemic period affected your life in Turkey?" Being able to provide multiple responses, the respondents seem to emphasize three factors. The first one is the issue of financial effects of the pandemic, where 64,2% of the respondents reported being adversely affected. This response was closely followed by the more general response that "it adversely affected my emotional/psychological state" (63,8%). In the third place was the response "I lost my job" (47,9%), which could be considered to be closely related to the first response.

SB-2020-TABLE 128: How has the pandemic period affected your life in Turkey? (Multiple responses)

	#	%
It adversely affected my financial situation	908	64,2
It adversely affected my emotional/psychological state	902	63,8
I lost my job	678	47,9
Our dialogue with our Turkish neighbors/friends/co-workers got reduced/disturbed	223	15,8
It hasn't affected my life at all	160	11,3
My health got deteriorated	156	11,0
I/someone from my family couldn't access education	85	6,0
I couldn't implement my plans (travel to a third country / return to Syria / open a workplace / education, etc.)	30	2,1
No idea / No response	13	0,9

SB-2020-TABLE 129: How has the pandemic period affected your life in Turkey? (Multiple responses) (%)

	It adversely affected my financial situation	It adversely affected my emotional/psychological state	I lost my job	Our dialogue with our Turkish neighbors/friends/co-workers got reduced/disturbed	It hasn't affected my life at all	My health got deteriorated	I/someone from my family couldn't access education	I couldn't implement my plans (travel to a third country / return to Syria / open a workplace / education, etc.)	No idea / No response
Sex									
Female	64,0	69,4	37,3	18,1	9,1	14,0	7,6	2,5	1,4
Male	64,4	59,7	55,6	14,1	12,9	8,9	4,9	1,8	0,6
Age Groups									
18-24	48,0	50,4	44,8	9,6	22,4	1,6	3,2	0,8	1,6
25-34	62,6	62,1	50,6	13,8	10,9	7,5	6,7	2,1	1,0
35-44	70,6	69,4	50,8	17,0	6,7	12,4	8,0	2,1	0,5
45-54	63,2	63,6	47,1	19,0	14,9	16,5	4,1	2,5	1,2
55-64	67,0	68,0	36,1	20,6	7,2	16,5	4,1	3,1	1,0
65 +	64,9	54,1	27,0	13,5	21,6	21,6	-	2,7	-
Educational Attainment									
Illiterate	60,3	53,4	34,5	8,6	19,8	12,1	0,9	1,7	-
Literate but not graduate of any school	70,6	64,7	37,3	15,7	15,7	21,6	-	2,0	-
Primary school	65,2	65,4	54,3	13,0	11,9	7,9	4,3	1,0	0,6
Middle school	61,7	60,9	49,7	13,7	9,8	10,6	6,1	2,2	2,2
High-school or equivalent	64,0	64,0	44,4	21,2	9,0	15,3	5,8	3,7	0,5
2-year associate degree / Vocational school of higher education	64,1	65,6	43,8	25,0	12,5	14,1	17,2	7,8	-
University / Graduate degree / PhD	68,5	73,1	41,5	26,2	6,9	11,5	13,8	1,5	0,8
Region									
Border cities	68,7	74,2	52,9	22,8	9,6	14,9	7,3	1,5	0,8
Other cities	56,9	47,0	39,9	4,4	14,0	4,8	3,9	3,1	1,1
Metropolitan cities	61,1	59,1	42,3	5,4	6,0	7,4	4,5	3,4	0,6
Non-metropolitan cities	49,2	24,3	35,4	2,6	29,1	0,0	2,6	2,6	2,1
General	**64,2**	**63,8**	**47,9**	**15,8**	**11,3**	**11,0**	**6,0**	**2,1**	**0,9**

"Another pandemic-related question that was posed to Syrian respondents concerned channels/ instruments of information. When asked the question "Where did you get information regarding the pandemic in this process?", 85,8% of the respondents mentioned "TV/social media/internet". It was followed by "Syrian neighbors/friends/relatives" (4,5%) and "Turkish state institutions" (4,4%). Even though the option of "TV/social media/internet" was not clearly defined, finding reveals the impact of social media usage among Syrians. "

SB-2020-TABLE 130: **Where did you get information regarding the pandemic in this process?**

	#	%
TV/sosyal medya/internet	1213	85,8
Suriyeli komşular/arkadaşlar/akrabalar	64	4,5
Türk devlet kurumları	62	4,4
STK'lar	35	2,5
Türk komşu/arkadaşlar	21	1,5
Diğer	17	1,2
Fikrim yok/cevap yok	2	0,1
Toplam	**1414**	**100,0**

FGD Findings: Pandemic

OThe FGD participants were asked about their experiences in a period of pandemic in the past year as well as their evaluation of the policies and services of the state. A large number of participants suggested that most Syrians were adversely affected by the pandemic. However, they argued, this was not related to the state's policies since the Turkish society was also equally adversely affected. The most frequently mentioned effects included the economic losses. In addition, the fact that Syrians who got sick received the same treatment in the same hospitals as Turks was much appreciated by many participants.

> *"As far as I know, the refugees could receive treatment at the public hospitals when they get the COVID. I don't think there are any problems related to health services. Only the sources of income got affected but this is true for both sides." (Ankara-Students)*

> *"Pandemic affected everyone. It affected the Syrians in the same way it did the Turks. We didn't experience anything peculiar to ourselves." (G.Antep-NGO Workers)*

> *"Both Turks and Syrians got affected in the same way. Policies are very good. We were treated equally during the pandemic process." (Ş.Urfa-NGO Workers)*

Some other participants, however, argued that Syrians were affected more severely by the pandemic than Turks were. Accordingly, this was because Syrians were mostly working informally and without social security, they were unable to receive the pandemic support that the state provided

for citizens, and they didn't have as wide social support groups as Turks did. The issue of education during the pandemic and the associated problems were particularly emphasized.

"Syrians experience more problems with distant education. We don't understand many things. Other than that we were as affected as everyone else around the world." (Ş.Urfa-Women)

"Syrians were affected more negatively than the Turks. Because Turks have many relatives and friends here that they could ask to borrow money. But Syrians have no source of income when their wages are cut down." (Ankara-Students)

"Case numbers were much smaller among Syrians. However, they were more seriously affected by the pandemic than Turks because they didn't receive any financial support. (G.Antep-NGO Workers)

20. General FGD Findings: Experiences of Syrians in Turkey

SB research, as described in various sections on its methodology, include comprehensive and representative surveys as well as Focus Group Discussions, all conducted with both Syrians and Turks. The findings of the FGDs conducted with Turkish participants mostly confirm the findings of the survey. However, there appears to be significant differences between the findings of the survey and FGDs conducted with Syrians in Turkey. A detailed discussion in a sincere and trust-based context brings out many important details. One general observation from the FGDs in SB-2020 is that they involved much more criticisms and reactions compared to the FGDs conducted earlier. While in the beginning of their responses at SB-2017 and SB-2019 FGDs the Syrian participants would customarily begin by expressing their gratitude to the Turkish society and state, this time around they directed more severe and precise criticisms against the both.

Most findings of the FGDs were presented throughout the report under relevant sections. This section, in turn, includes some selected parts of the discussions that didn't fit into other sections.

Conflicts, Tensions, and Problems with Turkish Society

When asked whether they experience any conflicts, tensions, and/or problems with Turkish society. 5 issues can be distinguished among the answers: (i) discrimination, racist attitudes, and negative behavior from various segments of the society towards Syrians; (ii) various problems and ill-treatment experienced at state institutions; (iii) being reported to police and unfairly being seen as guilty; (iv) being attacked at a collective scale; and (v) problems related to education.

Experiences of Syrian Women in Turkey

The female participants were asked what specific experiences they have had as Syrian women in Turkey. Some participants suggested that the life in Turkey brings many positives for Syrian women including, for example, the opportunity to work. They also said that they received more support from the state and they feel less harassed within the society. Overall, however, they mentioned feeling

that their experiences were similar to those of Syrian men. In other words, they argued that their experiences were more affected by their Syrian and refugee identities, than they were by their gender.

> *"I think that Turkey provides more support to women compared to other countries. All women did was getting married back in Syria. Things have changed here. I didn't feel like women were respected and valued in Syria. There, their job was to cook and take care of their family. But here, we can do anything." (G.Antep-Women)*

> *"Our women get to work in many different sectors and jobs. Back in Syria, women could work only as hairdressers, teachers or tailors. Here, we can work anywhere from the real estate sector to shopping malls. When I came Turkey alone for my education, people back in Syria gave my family a hard time asking them why they sent me here all alone. But here, when I tell this to Turks, they support me a lot and they become happy for me." (G.Antep-Women)*

> *"Whether they wear a headscarf or not, women are not disturbed here. In Syria, even when we would be walking together with our brothers, people would disturb us with their actions and words. Here, women are much more respected. And women don't want to return to Syria because they live much more comfortably here." (G.Antep-Women)*

Working Experiences and Views of Syrian Workers/Artisans in Turkey

The main issues mentioned here were the same as those discussed under many different headings. To reiterate here, Syrian workers/artisans mostly complain about having to work informally, uninsured and with no social security; very low wages; the economic problems caused by travel restrictions; and the problems caused by Syrians' lack of information regarding the legal system and rules in Turkey.

> *"Our biggest problem is the low wages. I think the state needs to make a law to prevent this." (İstanbul-Workers)*

> *"Because we cannot travel freely, we cannot do our work well or find more work." (G.Antep-Workers)*

> *"Syrian employers, artisans, and workers still don't know the laws here. We only learn about the laws after we've had a problem. Then, we learn about the law and we solve the problem." (İstanbul-Workers)*

> *"We haven't experienced major problems in establishing our businesses. We had some problems in the beginning because we didn't use to know the laws but now that we learned about them, we don't repeat our mistakes." (G.Antep-Workers)*

> *"I think the decisions and the policies need to be better. Then, Syrians could work instead of receiving financial aid." (İstanbul-Workers)*

Experiences and Views of Students in Turkey

The issue of education was one of the most frequently discussed topics in all Syrian FGDs. The Syrian university students studying at Turkish universities were asked to evaluate their experiences. Even though the general tone was positive, there were some participants who reported having experienced discrimination. Also, the uncertainties in the education system were criticized.

> *"There are many positive aspects of being a Syrian student. We don't pay any money for our education, for example, but the other foreigners do." (Ankara-Students)*

> *"The only negative thing is that those Syrian students who want to stay in Turkey cannot do that if they don't become a Turkish citizen." (Ankara-Students)*

Syrian students were also asked about their expectations from the future. It appears that Syrian students are not so clear about what to expect from the future at the moment. Many participants suggested that they would want to go back to Syria and contribute in the reconstruction of their country once the war is over. Some other participants said that they would consider moving to third countries, particularly the ones in Europe, if they couldn't find satisfactory employment opportunities in Turkey.

> *"I don't know what I will do after graduation. I am not a citizen. So I cannot be a civil servant or a bureaucrat for the Turkish state. Finding a job is very difficult for us. I want to do a masters program but my friends told me that I would need personal connections to get that." Ankara-Students)*

> *"I want to go abroad to work because I am studying computer engineering. But I would also want to come back to Turkey to work and live here." (İstanbul-Students)*

> *"I will live in Turkey if I find a good working opportunity. But if I find a good opportunity abroad I may go." (İstanbul-Students)*

"I want to continue my studies with a masters and a PhD in Turkey. If things get better in Syria, I would want to return there and help reconstruct the country. If they don't, I would want go to another country that gives more value to health personnel." (İstanbul-Students)

"I would want to go back to Syria, of course. After I complete my education and if stability is ensured, I would definitely go back." (İstanbul-Students)

"I would definitely not return to Syria. I am emotionally too attached to İstanbul. I want to have my doctorate and work and live here. If I become a Turkish citizen I would definitely stay but if I cannot, then I may go abroad." (İstanbul-Students)

MAIN FINDINGS

7

SYRIAN BAROMETER (SB) 2020

MAIN FINDINGS

By 31.12.2020, the number of Syrians who have fled the crisis, chaos, and war in their country since 29 April 2011 and sought refuge in Turkey, where they were given Temporary Protection status, exceeded 3,641,000. This number corresponds to the 4.38% of Turkey's 83.1 million population at the same date. In Turkey, 90,000 Syrians are living with residence permit, along with those under Temporary Protection status. Some among those under Temporary Protection status or living with residence permits are also given Turkish citizenship. According to a statement made by the Ministry of Interior in October 2021 with the title of "last status report", a total of 174,726 Syrians were granted Turkish citizenship between 2011 and 2021. The same report further states that in total 38,855 Syrians, 33.045 women and 5.810 men, got married with Turkish citizens.[175] Syrians in Turkey who are given Turkish citizenship also keep their Syrian Arab Republic citizenship, and so can hold double citizenship. In this regard, the total number of Syrians living in Turkey in different types of status is estimated to be around 4 million. A significant characteristic of Syrians in Turkey is that over 98% of them are living outside refugee camps and mostly in urban areas together with the Turkish society.

The presence of Syrians in Turkey for over a decade has led to the emergence of a new sociological structure. The figures showing this sociological transition are remarkable. Since 2011, over 650,000 Syrian babies have been born. More than 770,000 Syrian children aged 5-17 have enrolled in primary and secondary education institutions, and are taking their education in Turkish, while over 35,000 Syrians have been taking education in Turkish universities. According to data SB studies have compiled, more than 1 million Syrians in Turkey are actively in the work force. The most significant sociological situation is probably that over 3.6 million Syrians across Turkey are living together with the Turkish society within urban areas. Meanwhile, there have been many incidents making it harder for Syrians to voluntarily return to Syria. Among these are the deteriorating war conditions, conflicts and chaos environment threatening people's lives in Syria. Also, the collapsed infrastructure in the country, overtaking of properties of those who flee Syria through legal and de facto means are among factors that deter Syrians living in Turkey from returning to their country. The SB studies have clearly put forward that despite high anxiety and social distancing towards Syrians in the Turkish society for the last decade, the tendency of Syrians in returning has been weakening each day and their efforts to establish new lives are at the forefront.

A period of over a 10-year "compulsory co-existence" has mainly passed without conflicts and in solidarity despite disadvantages arising from an unpredictable process and a high number of Syrians nearing 5% of Turkey's population. Although the Turkish society has a large share in this situation, the Turkish society's high social acceptance rate has gradually and significantly declined along with anxiety becoming prevalent, which also appeared in findings of SB studies.

The Syrians' lives in Turkey have been normalizing each day and an unnamed "spontaneous social

175. CNN-Turk (12.10.2021) "174 thousand Syrians became Turkish citizens" (https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/174-bin-suriyeli-turk-vatandasi-oldu) (Access: 02.11.2021)

cohesion process" mentioned in SB-2019 has been continuing in many aspects. There have been many data showing that lives of Syrians, with an average of 5.5 years of stay in Turkey, have evolved into being permanent during these long years of Turkey's "attraction" along with the "deterring" conditions in Syria. Since 2017, one of the most prominent findings of SB studies is the common prediction of both societies that Syrians' stay in Turkey is permanent, while this doesn't necessarily mean that this common "prediction" is in line with the expectations and desires.

The Syrian Barometer is an academic study that intends to define the relation between Syrians in Turkey and the Turkish society and to make policy recommendations through comprehensive public opinion research and focus group discussions (FGDs) with both communities. The main purpose of this study is to highlight the experience in social areas and to describe the "framework of living together in solidarity" in a defined period or a continuous common life.

This study makes an effort to reach a clear picture and interpret it with an academic outlook and method through comprehensive field research. The focus of the research is the perceptions of both communities, so it may present some perceptions from the statements of both communities different from what is happening in reality. It is still valuable to put forth the societal perceptions. The study tries to present the existing situation with interpretations and analyses close to the reality "as much as possible," using mixed methods of research.

Given the above reasons, the Syrian Barometer does not claim to define the findings of the study as "the absolute reality", although it is the most comprehensive and continuous study among others conducted in Turkey on the issue and intends to mirror a very dynamic process. Also, the study does not intend to play a role in encouraging or rejecting Syrians' permanent stay in Turkey.

The Syrian Barometer-2020 is based on a comprehensive public opinion research and FGDs with Syrians who are under temporary protection and turned into urban refugees in Turkey which hosts the most refugees since 2014 globally. The field study of SB research was conducted through surveys and FGDs.

Face-to-face surveys were conducted with Turkish citizens in 2,259 households across 26 cities selected by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK) and with 6,953 Syrians under temporary protection in 1,414 households across 15 cities. The confidence level of the survey research is 95%, while the confidence interval stands at ±2.06 for Turkish people and ±2.6 for the Syrians. The FGDs of the research were conducted in 5 cities (i.e. Ankara, Istanbul, Gaziantep, Hatay, and Sanliurfa) -- 10 of them with Turkish citizens and 10 with Syrians.

In total, 80 Turkish citizens and 61 Syrians participated in FGDs. The part of the study that covers Syrians was conducted only with Syrians living outside of camps and under temporary protection. The survey was done on Dec. 15, 2020-Jan. 12, 2021, while FGDs were held in December 2020.

For the findings to be more meaningful, the survey sample was selected in consideration of the diversity stemming from sex, age, border cities/metropolitan cities/others, educational attainment, occupation, ethnic background, and political orientation of the respondents. The findings were evaluated accordingly, and responses from different groups were separately analyzed through cross-tabulations where relevant.

The SB-2020 final report was then submitted to the attention and evaluations of the members of the Academic Advisory Board, comprising academic experts with valuable studies on various subjects in social sciences and public opinion research, and the report was then finalized taking their comments and recommendations into consideration.

SB-2020 MAIN FINDINGS

The main findings of SB-2020, also evaluated in comparison to the findings of SB-2017 and SB-2019, can be summarized as follows:

➢ The research covers the year 2020, and the field study was conducted on Dec. 10, 2020-Jan. 12, 2021 during a period when the COVID-19 pandemic, announced in March 11, 2020 in Turkey, was at a peak. It is clear that the pandemic has affected the poor, particularly those that have to work every day with no social security. This requires considering the link between the findings of SB-2020 and the pandemic. One of the most obvious findings of the research is probably that the pandemic has seriously affected the Syrians living in Turkey, especially in the areas of work conditions, education, and health. During the same period, it is observed that the Turkish society has somewhat pushed the Syrian issue to the background among other issues.

➢ In SB-2020, the **level of social acceptance** is still high despite Turkish society's concerns and discomfort regarding the presence of Syrians. This does not necessarily mean that its concerns and criticisms have disappeared. But the Turkish society's acceptance of Syrians has largely been transformed into "**toleration**" rather than an understanding of establishing a practice of living together.

➢ The claim that the level of social acceptance is high is supported by both the research findings of meetings with Syrians and two other significant factors: 1. Particularly after 2014, the practice of living together in urban areas have mostly continued without conflicts and problems. So, the practice of living together has been successful despite all concerns, anxiety, and poverty. 2. The issue of Syrians over the last decade has not yet become a significant "instrument" of politics. So, the society's attitude regarding the issue has mostly been "ignoring". In sum, the Turkish society, although concerned and uncomfortable, has not turned the issue into physical attacks or a political punishment..

➢ As in SB-2017 and SB-2019, in SB-2020, a high level of anxiety is observed within the Turkish society. But in SB-2020, albeit limited, a "decrease" / "relaxation" is found in Turkish society's high level of "negative" attitudes, social distancing, and the tendency of avoiding relations with regard to Syrians. Although this decrease is not significant in proportion, it is noteworthy in terms of indicating a trend. It is observed that Syrians, compared to previous research findings, have become more pessimistic and critical in their outlook to the Turkish society and to their own living conditions. It is noteworthy that they are less "content" about Turkey's public services and in their relations with the society, with a rise in their "complaints". A more criticizing discourse that Syrians have used in referring to the Turkish state and society in SB-2020 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) indicates a noteworthy change.

➢ This study, conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic, has found some evidence on the soli-

darity between the Turkish society and the Syrians. It has been observed that the solidarity, particularly the neighborly ties, has increased. During this process, the Turkish society has not associated the existing problems with the Syrians, on the contrary, the Turkish people tried to support them with the belief that the Syrians are also adversely affected by the pandemic.

➢ Loss of jobs due to cheap labor and rising crime rates are the two major concerns that emerge after mass human flows. Although the Turkish society's concerns and negative perceptions about Syrians are at a high level, SB-2020 found that these concerns have to some extent decreased. This is probably because these concerns of job loss or crime-related issues do not correspond to what they experience in reality. Moreover, these concerns are even lagging behind other concerns such as "Syrians will harm the national economy" or "Syrians will harm the socio-cultural fabric of the society".

➢ The issue of Syrians staying in Turkey or returning to their country depends on many factors. Despite all the risks, voluntary return depends ultimately on individuals' initiative and it can happen. On the other hand, it is in Turkish state's initiative to preserve or remove the temporary protection status given to Syrians. The removal of the temporary protection status by the Turkish state can be expected either if another status is to be given to Syrians or if their voluntary return is expected. Both Turkey's commitments under international law and its own national legislation firmly endorse the "non-refoulement" principle. In other words, whatever their legal status is in Turkey, Syrians cannot be forced to return. In addition to all legal barriers, practicality of such a decision is highly debatable. The study of SB aims to analyze the issue of return through social perceptions and tendencies rather than the state's or the international community's political/legal decisions on the issue. Given this, it is seen that the "voluntary return" tendency of Syrians is sociologically declining each day.

➢ Through the question of "In general, which of the following statements better explain your attitude on **returning to Syria?**" the SB studies have tried to find out evidence on "**return tendency**" of Syrians. Among the responses to this question, **the rate of Syrians saying "I do not plan to return to Syria" was 16.7% in SB-2017, 51.8% in SB-2019, while it climbed to 77.8% in SB-2020.** This striking transformation in the return tendency can also be observed in the radical drop of the rate of those saying "I would return if the war in Syria ends and if an administration we want is formed".

➢ The rate of this response was 59.6% in SB-2017, 30.3% in SB-2019, while dropped to 16% in SB-2020. Among the responses to the question of "What are your plans **for returning to Syria** in the next 12 months?" the rate of Syrians saying "I don't plan to return" rose to 89% in SB-2020 from 56.1% in SB-2019. All this data collected in the field to find out the return tendencies indicate that the willingness/tendency of Syrians to voluntary return has remarkably declined.

➢ Some factors affecting return decisions and tendencies are related with Syria's situation and others with the life Syrians has established in Turkey. Assessing the issue through "push" and "pull" factors as part of a mainstream approach in migration analysis, it is possible to see that Syria has played a "push" role in the current and near-middle term, while Turkey has played a "pull" role for Syrians in multiple ways. The radical drop in the return opportunity and tendency of Syrians seems to have become independent of Turkish society's concerns and complaints as

MAIN OPINIONS AND THOUGHTS OF TURKISH SOCIETY IN SB-2020

➢ CHANGE TENDENCY: According to SB studies, the concerns and complaints of the Turkish society are continuing, while the negative descriptions are decreasing and positive descriptions are increasing to some extent when SB-2019 and SB-2020 are compared. This can be explained with normalization, and even creating a "habit", of the practice of living together as well as the change in priorities during the pandemic.

➢ THE DIFFERENCE OF THE BORDER REGION: One of the issues that SB-2020 draws attention is the analysis on the Turkish society's attitude towards Syrians regarding different demographic characteristics. It finds that opinions about Syrians do not differ with regard to the demographic factors of gender, age, occupation, and education. **According to the demographic analysis, the main difference is observed in the group of Turkish people "living in cities at the border region" which has a dense Syrian population in terms of number and ratio. The attitudes of Turkish people living in cities at the border region where Syrians live in greater numbers and more geographical concentration are more tense, negative and pessimistic.** This group requires particular attention within the framework of general analysis and region-specific policies.

➢ DESCRIBING SYRIANS: SB-2020 also reflects the Turkish society's preferences in describing Syrians on a scale ranging from "being a victim/oppressed" to "posing a problem". Responses to this multiple answer question suggest that the weight of clustering drops and that there are Turkish people who consider Syrians both "oppressed" and "problem/threat". But those who describe Syrians more as a "problem/threat" are living in neighborhoods with more Syrian residents, while those who describe Syrians more as victims are living in neighborhoods with no Syrians. A serious distance and prejudice in describing Syrians is found, although to a less extent, in SB-2020 as in SB-2017 and SB-2019.

➢ CULTURAL SIMILARITY: The SB studies show that the Turkish society keeps a cultural distance from Syrians, despite the common history between Turkey and Syria, 911 km long shared border, and religious and sectarian similarities. The number of those who responded to the question of "To what extent do you think the Syrians have cultural similarities with Turkish people" as "they have no similarities" "they do not have similarities" are at a high rate of 77.6% in total, while those who responded "they have similarities" and "they have many similarities" are only at 8.8%. Although the trend of cultural othering change over the years, there is a considerable attitude of rejecting the cultural similarities, with at least standing at 70%. The most surprising result in the "cultural similarities" question is observed among Turkish citizens living in "border cities". In SB-2020, the number of those who said "we do not have similarities with Syrians" is 77.6% on average in Turkey, while it rises to 83.4% in border cities. In that region, the rate of those who said "we have similarities-we have many similarities" is also below Turkey's average.

➢ INTENSITY OF SOCIAL RELATIONS: Responses of Turkish society on the intensity and type of relations they establish with Syrians provide significant evidence within the framework of SB-2017, SB-2019, and SB-2020. The study finds a slight rise in Turkish society's social relations with Syrians in almost all areas in comparison to findings of SB-2019. It can be argued that

Syrians' acquiring the skill of speaking Turkish and joining the workforce as employers or employees has an effect in this rise. What is interesting is that the tendency of having problems or fights has also increased, which is actually a part of the complex social life.

➢ *SOLIDARITY/SUPPORT: While the rate of respondents among the Turkish society in SB-2019 who answered "yes" to the question of* "Have you ever provided in cash or in-kind assistance to Syrians (except for giving money to beggars)?" was 34.1%, this rate has increased to 40.5% in SB-2020. Meanwhile, the rate of respondents in Turkish society who answered "yes" to the question of "Have you provided in cash or in-kind assistance to Syrians over the past 1 year?" is at a considerably high rate of 79.7%. This shows that **solidarity with Syrians on humanitarian grounds has increased during the pandemic** and that Turkish society has provided support to Syrians.

➢ SOCIAL DISTANCE: SB studies, focusing on social cohesion, intend to determine the social distance between Turkish society and Syrians by using Bogardus' social distance scale. The Turkish society keeps itself "distant" from Syrians, although the social distance narrowed from -0.51 in SB-2019 to -0.42. This situation is reflected completely different among Syrians who keep themselves "very close" to Turkish society. However, the change over the years shows that the distance of Turkish society, compared to SB-2019, has slightly decreased, while there is a pause in Syrians' tendency to get closer to Turkish society. In SB-2020, a striking social distance is observed in border cities. The scales of "very distant" and "distant" in total correspond to 61.4% on average in Turkey, while it rises to 71.2% in border cities. **It is noteworthy that the relative cultural closeness between population living in border cities and Syrians has not decreased the social distance but rather increased it. These findings indicate that in cities with high numbers of Syrians and density of Syrian population, the social distance gets higher, regardless of the cultural closeness.**

➢ INCOME SOURCES OF SYRIANS: SB studies show that Turkish society's perceptions about "how Syrians make their living" are insufficient despite living together, while **biases and misunderstanding are the main determinants.** One of the most striking ones, which does not reflect reality, is related with the belief of "the state's financial support" to the Syrians. The answers to the question of "How are the Syrians in Turkey making their living?", reached through the multiple-responses method, indicate that over 80% of the society believe that the Syrians live "through assistance from the Turkish state". It is noteworthy that the perception that Syrians make their living "by working" is at around 50% in all three studies. As SB studies and other field studies also show, it is known that they do make their living "by working". The number of Syrians receiving financial support through the Social Cohesion Assistance Program (ESSN) is 1.6 million, with a rate of around 44%. Despite all speculations, the Turkish state does not have any other regular and continuous financial support program for Syrians. That dominant perception does not reflect the reality that Syrians are making their living by working.

➢ CONCERNS: SECURITY-PEACE AND SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE: SB studies that mainly intend to explain the situation of social cohesion also ask some specific questions to find out Turkish society's support and concerns. This aims at revealing the reasons, types, and dimensions of concerns about Syrians. In SB-2017 and SB-2019 studies, it had been observed that concerns at

all fields were on a rising tendency. But according to findings of SB-2020, these concerns have, albeit at a micro level, decreased, and the biggest concern/anxiety was "Giving Syrians Turkish citizenship" with a rate of 74.2%. Although the strongest concern that Syrians would "harm the economy" in SB-2017 and SB-2019 studies has been observed once again at a high rate (72.3%), the concern about Syrians' becoming Turkish citizens has become a more significant concern.

➢ GENERAL CONCERNS: As part of concern/anxiety-related questions, the Turkish society was asked about four basic anxieties that emerge in mass human movements, including "deterioration in the public services", "loss of jobs", "rise in crime rates", and "corruption of identity". Interestingly, in Turkish society's prioritization of concerns/anxieties, loss of job and rise of crime rates remain relatively behind. Among 9 categories, the rise of crime rates ranks 6th (63.6%), while the concern of "loss of jobs" ranks 7th (62.6%). These rates surely indicate high concerns but what is interesting is that concerns such as "harm on our country's economy", "harm on socio-cultural structure", "deterioration in the public services", "corruption of Turkish society's identity" "rise in crime rates" are further considered compared to the concern of "loss of jobs".

➢ DIFFERENT CONCERNS IN BORDER CITIES: A demographic analysis of concerns about Syrians indicate that those living in border regions have very high levels of anxieties in all areas compared to the average in Turkey. While the average anxiety score is 3.5, in border regions it is 3.9. This shows that concern of those living in border cities with high number Syrians along with a high rate compared to the population and the tension brought by this are at very high levels. However, the finding that emerges within the context of the general assumption that the "cultural closeness" of Turkish citizens living and Syrians in border cities is higher compared to the average level is important. The average in Turkey supports the statements of "Syrians will harm the socio-cultural fabric of the society" and "Syrians will corrupt the Turkish society's identity" even more than the concern that "the Syrians will strip us of our jobs." This shows us that there is not that much of a linear relation between the assumed "cultural closeness" and the social cohesion process.

➢ "PERSONAL HARM" FROM SYRIANS AND "THINGS THAT ARE HEARD": It is important to analyze the relation between the anxieties about Syrians and experiences confirming these anxieties. The question of "Have you experienced any harm from a Syrian in the last 5 years?" was asked, specifying timing and activity, which helps explain whether the participants, their families, or their personal environment experienced any harm from Syrians. According to the SB-2020 study, the rate of those who said that they experienced personal harm from Syrians in the last 5 years stands at 11.4%.

➢ EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND CONCERNS ABOUT JOB LOSS: In all mass flows, one of the most concerning issues for the host societies is the loss of jobs especially due to cheap labor. This prevalent concern of the Turkish society particularly in the first period seems to have lost its priority over time. Although the Syrians have lived in urban areas and made their living by working, the thought that the loss of jobs were because of Syrians did not find a place among the perceptions. Without doubt, particularly in border cities with a high density of Syrian population, there are more losses of jobs compared to the Turkey's average. SB studies find that at least 1 million Syrians are in the active work force in Turkey, while the Turkish society does not make a link between this situation and the rise in unemployment in Turkey. It can be argued that the in-

formal economy as one of the structural problems of Turkey's economy has played a significant role here. Almost all Syrians have opened new areas for themselves in the informal economy, which leads to a limited impact on the problems that the local work force experiences. For this reason, the anxiety of loss of jobs is placed in the lower rankings among other anxieties about Syrians. The anxiety that "The Syrians will stripe us of our jobs" ranks 8th among the 9 anxiety statements of SB-2020.

➢ WORK PERMITS: The rate of those who said "Under no circumstances should they be allowed to work/given work permits" about Syrians' employment in Turkey is 54.6% in SB-2017, 56.8% in 2019, and 49% in SB-2020. It is noteworthy that the resistance slightly drops in the issue of work permits. This situation also seems to be related to the fact that the anxieties that there will be loss of jobs due to the Syrians did not turn into reality.

➢ ESTABLISHING BUSINESS/ENTREPRENEURSHIP: It is understood that the Turkish society opposes Syrians' opening businesses/workplaces/companies even more than their employment. While the rate of those who oppose Syrians' employment was 54.6% in SB-2017, 56.8% in 2019, and 49% SB-2020, the rate of those who responded to the question of "Under which conditions should Syrians be able to open workplaces?" as "They definitely shouldn't" was 67.2% in SB-2019, and 55% in SB-2020. It can be said that the perception of "unfair competition" and "rejecting permanency" might be at the background of the situation here.

➢ "WILL SYRIANS RETURN TO THEIR COUNTRY?": The rate of those in the Turkish society who thought that all Syrians or a significant part of them will stay in Turkey was 70% in SB-2017 among the Turkish society, while this rate exceeded 90% in SB-2019 and SB-2020. This situation shows that although the Turkish society's opposition to Syrians' permanency increases, the hope and belief about their return drop.

➢ IS THE TURKISH SOCIETY READY FOR COMMON LIFE? 90% of Turkish society thinks that at least half of Syrians will stay in Turkey. However, although the statement that "They will be permanent here" is mentioned, it is understood that the will of a common life remains very weak. In other words, in the Turkish society the issue of Syrians is an issue of "involuntary acceptance". Responses to the question of "Where should Syrians live?" are quite noteworthy in this context. 85% of the Turkish society suggest Syrians' return or their isolation in camps, secure regions, or designated cities, instead of living together. The rate of Turkish society's support to the statement of "We can live together with Syrians in serenity" indicates the prevalence of anxieties and the "involuntary acceptance" about the idea of a common future. The rate of "combined disagree" in response to this statement stood at 75% in SB-2017, 82.6% in SB-2019, and 77.9% in SB-2020.

➢ SYRIANS AND SOCIAL COHESION: The issue of social cohesion has been considered very differently among the host community and "the newcomers". For this reason, although the evaluation of the obtained data gives us some idea, they are not sufficient to measure the quality and level of social cohesion. Responses to the question of *"To what extent have Syrians integrated into Turkish society/Turkey?"* show how pessimistic the Turkish society is about Syrians' integration. In other words, although the period of common life extends, the perception of the

Turkish society that Syrians have not integrated has been strengthened. However, when Syrians were asked "if they think that they have integrated", the results show the opposite as they think that they have well integrated into Turkish society.

➤ HOW SIGNIFICANT A PROBLEM ARE SYRIANS? The response to the question of "Among the top 10 problems of Turkey, how would you rank the priority of the issue of Syrians?" in SB-2019 was 3.3, while it was 3.8 in SB-2020. So, the Turkish society states that they see the issue of Syrians among the top four problems of Turkey.

➤ POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CITIZENSHIP: In SB studies, although nearly 90% of Turkish society say at least half of Syrians will stay in Turkey, there is considerable opposition about granting Syrians political rights and citizenship. As the research finds, one of the most important concerns mentioned by Turkish society about Syrians is the issue of citizenship. SB studies ask specific questions about "giving political rights" and "citizenship" to find out the thoughts and perceptions of Turkish society on the issue. Turkish society's answer of "They should not be given any political rights" to the question of "What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding Syrians and political rights?" stood at 85.6% in SB-2017, 87.1% in SB-2019, and 83.8% in SB-2020. The answer of "None of them should be given citizenship" to the question of "What kind of an arrangement should be made regarding giving Syrians Turkish citizenship?" was at 75.8% in SB-2017, 76.5% in SB-2019, and 71.8% in SB-2020.

➤ EDUCATION OF SYRIAN CHILDREN: Findings of SB-2017, SB-2019, and SB-2020 indicate that Turkish society is "sensitive" about education of Syrian children. Around 16-17% of the society regularly support the statement that "They shouldn't be able to receive any education". Higher opposition to this issue in border cities with high Syrian population can be assessed as the capacity problem and a critique to the deterioration of education quality.

➤ IMPACT ON POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR: Although the issue of Syrians in Turkey has not been "politicized" so far and has not been an influential matter in the elections, it is unthinkable that a topic that is popularly seen as one of the top 4 problems of Turkey to remain outside of politics. For this reason, in SB studies, the question of "Would the policies or discourses of political parties or leaders on Syrians influence your decision in the elections?" was asked to find out the political value of the Syrians issue for Turkish society. While, those who responded to this question as "combined wouldn't influence" was 40.4%, those who answered as "combined influence" was 47%. This rate is obviously a very high one that would make an impact on politicians in the next elections.

MAIN OPINIONS AND THOUGHTS OF SYRIANS IN SB-2020

➢ STRENGTHENING OF PERMANENCY TENDENCY AND THE PANDEMIC: In SB-2020, it can be said that there are two main factors determining Syrians' general opinion and thoughts. The first of these is that they have almost no hope or willingness about their return to Syria as they have a 10-year past and a life built in Turkey. The second is the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic during the fieldwork period of SB-2020.

➢ DIFFERENT RESULTS BETWEEN FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS AND SURVEY STUDY: The field study of the SB study is conducted through comprehensive survey study and FGDs. While there is a very consistent data sharing between surveys and FGDs with the Turkish society, the findings obtained in FGDs with Syrians differ from the findings obtained in surveys. This might probably be related to the situation that Syrians do not feel safe enough while responding to the survey questions. Within this context, in SB-2020 research it is very important to simultaneously evaluate the survey data and FGD findings about Syrians to better detect the situation.

➢ LEVEL OF TURKISH LANGUAGE KNOWLEDGE: In SB-2020, the level of Turkish language knowledge of Syrians living in Turkey for more than 5 years on average and mostly in big cities has increased considerably – according to their own statement – compared to the previous study. It can be estimated that there is at least one person who knows Turkish in each Syrian family, thanks to the rising ability to speak the language as well as children who learn Turkish by attending public schools.

➢ EFFECT OF THE PANDEMIC: It was observed in the SB-2020 research that the process after COVID-19 was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) on March 11, 2020 has very much affected the Syrians living in Turkey in terms of working conditions and opportunities as well as procurement of needs and education. This situation has reflected on relations with Turkish society both positively and negatively.

➢ FINANCIAL SUPPORT RECEIVED BY SYRIANS: The rate of Syrians in Turkey who said "yes" in response to the question of "Have you received assistance from any institution or individual in the last 12 months?" was 22% in SB-2017, 36.3% in SB-2019, while it increased to 46.2% in SB-2020. Probably, the increased support due to the COVID-19 pandemic has been effective in this rise. When Syrians were asked about the institution that they received the support from, the response of the KIZILAYKART/SUY/ESSN program stood at a rate of 90%.

➢ EMPLOYMENT OF SYRIANS: SB-2019 finds that among 37.9% of 2.5 million Syrians aged over 12 are in the active workforce, while this rate stands at 29.4% in SB-2020. It is noteworthy that compared to the previous year there is a considerable drop in the rate of those who are working. This drop, nearly one-third, can be explained by the general rise in unemployment in Turkey, but mostly by the impact of the pandemic. However, it is understood that by all means, among around 650,000 Syrian households in Turkey, the number of those who are working ranges between 1 million and 1.5 million. The number of those who are employed with work permits is around 60,000 by 2019. It is known that the remaining Syrians are within the informal economy. Syrians are in general make their living through their own efforts and works. The data showing the type of jobs of Syrians who are actively working and their status

of employment is similarly noteworthy. According to this data, 50.2% of Syrians that are in the active workforce are working at jobs that provide regular income while this rate is 35.8% in SB-2020. There is also a considerable drop in this rate over the past 1 year. So, it is understood that Syrians who have already been facing problems in working with social security have both lost their jobs and become more insecure due to the effect of the pandemic. While the total rate of those Syrians that are self-employed, artisan/tradesman, or businessperson is 13.7% in SB-2019, this rate has dropped to 6.4% in SB-2020.

➢ WOMEN WORKING OUTSIDE HOMES: The share of women among Syrians who are actively working is 7.8%. However, if we consider those Syrians that are above the minimum age of employment, this share drops to 4.6%. This situation indicates that family structures with multiple children, conservative/traditional lifestyles, and concerns about possible threats on women outside homes would pose serious obstacles for women who work outside their homes. The Syrian women's working situation outside their homes does not differ from their lives in Syria.

➢ PROBLEM AREAS FOR SYRIANS: In terms of the basis of a peaceful common life, it is very important to ask for the opinions of Syrians about the type of problems they experience in Turkey. Within this framework, the Syrians' responses to the question about the "problem areas" in 7 categories provides findings on the follow-up of the process. The responses to the question of "To what extent in the following areas have you, as a family, experienced problems?" in general are consistent in SB-2017, SB-2019, and SB-2020. So, it is observed that there is a similarity in the ranking of problems, and the topic that Syrians complain the most is "the working conditions". However, if observed in terms of ratio, there are limited drops in the problems experienced in 2019 compared to 2017. In other words, an optimism prevails, while in SB-2020, it is observed that the problems increase again. One of the causes of this situation might be the pandemic process.

➢ WORKING CONDITIONS AND DISCRIMINATION: SB-2020 findings show that Syrians in Turkey are mostly disturbed by the working conditions among eight topics, followed by problems in accessing food and accommodation. A noteworthy and important finding of SB-2017 and SB-2019 particularly in terms of social cohesion is that the Syrians consider "discrimination" at the lower ranks among the problem areas. It is predicted that problems in health and education are closely related to the pandemic conditions. In areas of "communication/language" and "discrimination", gradually fewer problems are experienced.

➢ SOCIAL DISTANCE OF SYRIANS TO TURKISH PEOPLE: The social distance of Syrians in Turkey to Turkish society is much less than the social distance of Turkish society to the Syrians. In SB-2017, rate of close and very close categories of the scale in total reaches 73.5%, while in SB-2019 it rises to 85.7%, and stands at 85.6% in SB-2020. These rates in all these 3 studies fall into the "very close" category.

➢ LEVEL OF SOCIAL RELATIONS OF SYRIANS: To better analyze the "social closeness" or "the social distance" of Syrians living in Turkey to Turkish society and to point to the type and density of social relations, the SB-studies ask the question of "Have you ever established social relations such as talking/shopping/fighting with Syrians?" Despite the distant stance of Turkish society, Syrians are considerably getting closer in all areas to Turkish society by making efforts.

- ➤ SOCIAL COHESION EFFORTS: According to Syrian participants of the study, the Syrians in Turkey are spending great effort in integrating into Turkish society. Among other statements, the rate of those that support this statement stands at 47.6%. 41.8% of Syrian participants said they are "grateful", 41.6% said they "love Turkish society very much", 35.9% said they are "treating Turkish society with respect". Meanwhile, support to the statements of "Syrians do not like Turkish society at all" (1.1.%) and Syrians are exploiting Turkish society" (0.8%) are very limited.

- ➤ FUTURE PERPECTIVE OF SYRIANS AND CITIZENSHIP: For the topic of Syrians' future/permanency perspectives, it is meaningful to analyze the statements that "Syrians want to obtain Turkish citizenship", "Syrians want to stay in Turkey", and "Syrians want to move to another country" together. Among 10 statements, the most supported one is about "obtaining citizenship", while the statement of "Syrians want to stay in Turkey" ranks 3rd, which confirm the vision of permanency.

- ➤ RELATIONS WITH/FEELINGS TOWARDS TURKISH SOCIETY: Syrians' feelings, opinions, and perceptions about Turkish society significantly differ in survey results and FGDs. Survey results show that Syrians are very happy content about the Turkish society, while FGDs indicate their criticisms are more dominant. For example, Syrians mention many experiences of exclusion. 23.4% of Syrians do not support the statement that "Syrians are excluded in Turkey" that ranks 7th among the 10 statements, while 18.4% support this statement.

- ➤ PERCEPTION OF HAPPINESS: SB studies are particularly interested in "to what extent Syrians in Turkey are happy" about living in the country, which this stands as a question of perception. Rate of Syrians who said they are happy in Turkey is much higher than those who said they are not happy. However, SB-2020 observes a decrease in the perception of happiness. As much as the pandemic conditions, Turkish society's attitude could also be playing a role in this tendency.

- ➤ SOCIAL COHESION: It may not be right to suggest a clear-cut statement regarding the future of Syrians. There is, however, a general acknowledgement that prospects of their permanent stay in Turkey are getting strengthened. Pointing to the Syrians' opinions and efforts about social cohesion is an important area of SB studies. Among 6 statements that describe Syrians' feelings and behaviors with regard to Turkish society, social cohesion issue is the most supported one. 47.6% of participants in SB-2019 supported the statement of "Syrians are spending efforts to integrate into Turkish society", while this rate stands at 43.1% in SB-2020.

- ➤ "WE'VE INTEGRATED!": How Syrians consider themselves in terms of social cohesion is another significant point. The question of "Have Syrians integrated into Turkey?"/"Will Syrians integrate into Turkey" is not only significant for Turkish society but also for over 3.6 million Syrians that nearly make up 5% of Turkey's population. For this reason, Syrian participants asked the question of "To what extent have Syrians integrated into Turkish society/Turkey?" Contrary to the general approach of Turkish society, 51.6% of Syrians in 2019 and 46.3% of them in SB-2020 believe that they have "completely" and "to a large extent" integrated into Turkish society. 36.9% in SB-2019 and 44.8% in SB-2020 believe that they have integrated "to a little extent". So, although Turkish society is not convinced, Syrians themselves believe that they have integrated into Turkish society and Turkey. The general belief in Turkish society that Syrians have not been able to integrate into Turkey may lead to "othering" and "ghettoization".

➤ TURKISH STATE'S SUPPORT TO SYRIANS: The rate of Syrian participants who responded to the question of "To what extent do you find state's help and support to Syrians sufficient?" in 6 main areas (health, protection/legal support, education, housing, food, and financial/cash support) as "combined sufficient" in SB-2017 is 28.62%, while this rate rose to 34.96%, and stands at 31.5% in SB-2020. The highest satisfaction was seen in health support with 72% in SB-2017, 71.8% in SB-2019, and 61.9% in SB-2020. Another public service area that is considered positive in terms of support is education. FGD findings confirm that Syrian participants mention satisfaction with health services, yet they voiced their concern regarding several problems they experience regarding education/distant education/EBA system. The pandemic may have had an impact in the decreasing rate of satisfaction in health and education areas.

➤ STATUS SYRIANS WOULD PREFER IN TURKEY: The "temporary protection" status is among issues frequently discussed as much as the future of Syrians. The question asked to find out what Syrians would prefer as their status in Turkey has shown that "citizenship" is at the forefront among the answers. 70.2% of Syrians in Turkey prefer to become double citizen and Turkish citizen, while this rate is 80.3% in SB-2019 and 72.3% in SB-2020. Another noteworthy point in SB-2020 is the rise in the option of "to continue with the temporary protection status" from 9.9% in SB-2019 to 17.9% in SB-2020. Together with the option of "being in the refugee status", the total rate rises to 19.2%. Particularly the rise from 9.9% in SB-2019 to 19.2% could be related to Syrians' perceived loss of certain support programs such as ESSN supports when they acquire the citizenship. There has been almost no interest in options other than double or Turkish citizenship and refugee/temporary protection status.

➤ RETURN TO SYRIA: In SB research, the responses of Syrian participants to the question of "In general, which one of the following statements better explains your attitude on returning to Syria?" are noteworthy. The rate of those who said "I do not plan to return to Syria under any circumstances" was 16.7%, while it rose to 51.8% in SB-2019 and to 77.8% in SB-2020. It is observed that the rate of those who said "I would return if the war in Syria ends and if an administration we want is formed" ranked second and considerably decreased in popularity. This rate was 59.9% in SB-2017, dropping to 30.3% in SB-2019, and to 16% in SB-2020. So, given these two preferences, it can be argued that Syrians have either removed the option of return from their agenda or see it as impossible. This approach of Syrians is tested through many other questions about status and citizenship and similar results were reached. The rate of those who said "I would return if the war ends in Syria, even if an administration we want is not formed" was 12.9% in SB-2017 and falling to 5.5% in SB-2019, and to 0.7% in SB-2020.

➤ ANY PLANS TO RETURN BACK IN 12 MONTHS? The rate of those who said I do not plan to return to the question of "What are your plans for return within the next 12 months?" was 56.1%in SB-2019 and rose to 89% in SB-2020.

➤ REASONS OF NOT RETURNING: When Syrian participants, through a multiple-responses method, were asked to "Provide the most important 3 reasons why they are not planning to return to Syria", the top response was "because it is not a safe place" (SB-2020: 69.9%). The answer of "because I want to acquire Turkish citizenship" ranks the second among the responses, which provides important findings about the future perspective and tendency to return to Syria. "Because the war still continues" response ranks third (SB-2020: 25.3%), followed by

"the bad economic conditions in Syria" (19.5%), "there is nothing left in Syria for us" (SB-2019: 14.6%, SB-2020: 18%), "because I want to go to another country" (16.1%), "To provide a better future for my children" (11.8%), "because we've established a new life in Turkey" (10.5%). It can be argued that among the reasons of "not returning" to Syria, the safety concern is at the forefront, while each day the effort of holding on to the new life in Turkey increases.

- MOVING TO A COUNTRY OTHER THAN TURKEY AND SYRIA: The findings of SB-2020 for understanding the tendency of Syrians in Turkey to go to a third country in response to the question of "Would you want to go to a country other than Turkey and Syria?" are very different than that of SB-2017 and SB-2019. The findings show that this tendency has increased. The response of "I would go if I had the opportunity" ranks first in SB-2020 with a rate of 49.1%, which was at 23% in SB-2017 and 34.1% in SB-2019. This shows that the rate of those who said "I would go if I am provided an opportunity" has increased. FGDs have also indicated that moving to a third country is favored if made possible on legal grounds such as invitation and/or permission.

- FUTURE EXPECTATIONS OF SYRIANS IN TURKEY: Whether Syrians see a future for themselves in Turkey gives important clues both on their permanency trends and social cohesion processes. Within this framework, the Syrians were asked the question of "Do you believe that there is a future for yourself, for your family, and for other Syrians?" Both SB-2020 and SB-2019 results show that Syrians very strongly, at a rate of over 62%, believe that they believe in a future for "themselves" and for "their families". This rate was 47.2% in SB-2019 "for Syrians", it rose to 52.1% in SB-2020.

- RIGHT TO UNRESTRICTED RESIDENCY: In SB-2020, the responses to the question of "If you had the opportunity/permission now, would you want to move to and live in another city of Turkey?" show that Syrians are in general happy about the place they live and the rate of those who are favoring changing cities is at 11.5%.

- PERMISSION TO FREE MOVEMENT/TRAVEL: When Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey need to go to cities other than they are registered in they must get travel permits. Also, when they want to reside in another city, they need to apply for permission showing valid reasons for their intended move. This situation is being criticized by Syrians. As it is known, there was no central planning regarding the settlement of Syrians. Particularly between 2013-2017, Syrians were allowed to settle and reside in cities of their own choosing. This freedom gave Syrians the chance to choose cities based on employment opportunities, the chance to live with their relatives and personal networks, and their sense of security. Syrians can still move to and settle in any city of their choosing, provided that they have valid reasons. There has been, however, an exception since July 2019 when a decision was made to close 15 cities for any new registration. New registrations can still be made in the other 66 cities, under certain circumstances. Because of all these reasons, how meaningful the current system of permits for travel and settlement is debatable. As this issue is one of the most discussed topics by Syrians in FGDs, this question is also included in survey study of SB-2020. The question of "How does the obligation to obtain a travel permit affect your life?" was asked in the form of multiple responses and the most given answer was "I feel like my freedom is restricted" with 45.3%. The second most given answer was "It does not affect" with 44.3%, which might be related

to the existence of a stable life, the lack of need or because of the belief that "there is no monitoring". These two options are followed by "it reduces our chances of finding jobs" with 30.1%, "it harms family/relative relations" with 17%, "I want to be free of problems we face in the process of obtaining travel permits" with 12.4%, and "it adversely affects my psychology" with 9.7%.

➢ DECISION TO NOT PREVENT PASSAGE OF REFUGEES AT THE PAZARKULE BORDER GATE: After the developments that started on Feb. 27, 2020 following an attack on Turkish Armed Forces staff in Idlib, it was announced that "Turkey has made a decision to allow refugees to transit to Europe".[176] Developments on Feb. 27-March 27, 2020 that mainly involved Syrians were discussed by SB research and SB-2020 developed some additional questions. The first question in this issue is "Have you planned to go when Turkey in February decided to open crossings at Pazarkule/Greece borders (to allow transit of refugees to Europe)?" 83% of Syrian participants in SB-2020 said they did not plan and did not go to the border, 2.5% said they went to the border but could not pass, while 13.9% said they planned to but did not go.

➢ REASON FOR NOT GOING TO THE BORDER: Syrians who said "We did not plan to go to the Greek border" were asked through a multiple responses method why they did not plan or go. The first most given response with 52.6% was "I did not prefer to go without invitation or through illegal ways". It was followed by "Because I am happy with my life in Turkey" (36.6%) and "Because I want to obtain Turkish citizenship" (31.8%). Other responses include "Because I am concerned about getting hurt at the transit process", "Because I established a new life in Turkey", "I did not go because I knew that I wouldn't cross, as we saw/heard that those who went couldn't cross", "Because my children are going to school here", and "Because I'm working in Turkey".

➢ EFFECT OF THE PANDEMIC: The COVID-19 pandemic has created important health-related social and economic problems across the world. This process has more adversely affected those poor populations and refugees that are obliged to make their living through casual jobs. The economic challenges and impoverishment that are created by the process have also been negatively affecting the attitudes towards foreigners, migrants and refugees. So the job losses and impoverishment, much more than the health problems, have been the most important negative effects of the pandemic for Syrians in Turkey. While in SB-2019, the rate of those who are in the active work force is 37.9%, in SB-2020 this rate has dropped to 29.4% mostly due to the pandemic process. The rate of those who were in the active workforce on "regular jobs" (50.2%) in SB-2019 fell to 35.8% in SB-2020, while the rate of those on "casual work" increased from 33.6% in SB-2019 to 44.2% in SB-2020, which both support the same trend in the pandemic process.

➢ THE PANDEMIC AND RELATIONS WITH TURKISH SOCIETY: The question of *"Do you think the perceptions of the Turkish society about Syrians have changed in general after the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic?"* was asked to find out the social impact of the pandemic. The rate

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176. Turkish daily Hurriyet (February 29, 2020), President R.T.Erdogan: "We opened the borders, the number (of refugees passing to Europe through the borders) has reached 18,000 by this morning. It may hit 25,000-30,000 today. We will not close these borders after this process. We are not supposed to have this many refugees." (https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-kapila-ri-actik-bundan-sonraki-surecte-de-kapatmayacagiz-41458102) (Accessed on April 12, 2021)

of those who responded to this question as "there has been no change" was 67.5%. 194 of the respondents who said the perceptions have changed were also asked a follow up question of "In which direction do you think the perceptions have changed?" Answers to this question show that the effect has worked in both directions, while the change in the "negative" direction is stronger than the change in the "positive" direction.

➢ SYRIANS DURING THE PANDEMIC AND HEALTH SERVICES: The question of "Have you experienced problems in reaching hospitals/accessing health services during the pandemic?" was asked to find out whether Syrians in Turkey have had problems in health services during the pandemic. The responses show that 88.3% of Syrians in Turkey, nearly all of them, have not had any problems in the health services area, which is a significant point.

➢ IMPACT OF THE PANDEMIC ON DAILY LIFE: "How has the pandemic process affect your life in Turkey?" was another question the Syrians were asked. Three answers that are given through multiple responses come to the forefront. The first one is the response of "It has adversely affected my financial situation" with 64.2%. The second is "It has adversely affected my emotional/psychological situation" (63.8%), and the third is "I lost my job" with a rate of 47.9%.

SYRIANS BAROMETER
2020

POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS

8

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The Syrian Barometer study aims to take a scientific snapshot on Syrian refugees, who caused what can be termed "a social shock" for Turkey due to its development, volume and duration. Depending on this snapshot, it has provided some policy recommendations. Its main objective in this sense is to prevent this "social shock" from turning into a trauma and chronic problem which would lead to social segregation and conflict, and to contribute into drawing a framework for a peaceful and honorable cohabitation. What is recommended here as "social cohesion" is used not in a hierarchical and ideologically-biased way, but is meant to refer to "an honorable life together in peace and serenity" that would be established by a rights- and individual-oriented approach. This study defines social cohesion as "the way of life in which different communities, whether came together voluntarily or involuntarily, could live in peace and harmony on a common ground of belonging where pluralism is embraced in a framework of mutual acceptance and respect."

In this context, supporting the findings of SB-2017 and SB-2019 research, policy recommendations of SB-2020 for various policy fields are provided. While most policy recommendations of SB-2017 and SB-2019 are also provided in this study, different recommendations based on new developments are also presented as follows:

➢ **IT IS NECESSARY TO MOVE BEYOND THE "TEMPORARINESS-PERMANENCE" DUALITY AND TO MAKE POLICIES FOCUSED ON THE SOCIAL REALITY**

What has started in April 2011 with the arrival of first Syrian groups to Turkey, and was seen to be "temporary" by all parties, has undergone a tremendous transformation through time, although this emphasis on temporariness still exists in political discourse and in terms of the status of Syrians. More than 3,6 million Syrians are now living all across the country, in mostly urban places, and their presence is felt in every facet of life in Turkey. **Turkey's policy on Syrians,** which has been built since the beginning on the expected transformations within Syria, **has to be revisited considering the sociological realities of the past nearly 10 years and the fact that establishing a peaceful and stable environment within Syria appears to be a remote prospect for the short and medium terms.** When these years are taken into consideration, it can be speculated that any prospective political changes in Syria will have a much more diminished influence on the Syrians in Turkey. If policies are built on **"temporariness"** and with a short-term **"problem-solving"** mentality, there is a very real risk that these may lead to serious social costs in the future, both for the Syrians and the Turkish society.

➢ **CONCERNS OF THE SOCIETY SHOULD BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED WITHOUT DISREGARDING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BEING A MIGRANT AND A REFUGEE**

Over 270 million international migrants across the world mostly go to economically strong countries through invitation and permission processes. However, all advanced countries see it necessary to take all measures to prevent uncontrolled human mobility in order to maintain their peace and cohesion. Despite the fact that the EU received more than 2.7 million immigrants from non-EU countries in 2019 and 1.9 million in 2020, 21,750 refugee resettlement in 2019 and 8,700 in 2020 is one of the most striking examples of this.[177] The issue of migration

177. EU Commission Overall figures of immigrants in European society (2021) https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_en (Access: 23.09.2021)

management is expressed as one of the most important problems of Western Europe today. These countries, which have to accept immigrants due to aging population and decreasing births, limit their quotas to as few people as possible when it comes to refugees. It cannot be expected that the irregular and mixed human mobility would be free of problems as even the advanced countries are having difficulties in regular migration management and the far right and racist parties are dominating the systems. Even though right to asylum is a fundamental human right and states are bound by their commitments under international law, process management appears to be more difficult in the issue of refugees and that it creates anxiety in the society, while responsibility and burden sharing do not go beyond being symbolic. In any case, the field of asylum and international protection needs to be seen in relation to the concepts of "obligations" and "regulation" framed by international law, instead of in relation to the concept of "management". Migration, on the other hand, is defined as a field of management. Flows of irregular migrants and asylum-seekers on a mass scale, similar to the one Turkey has experienced after 2011, create an understandable degree of concern and anxiety among states and societies. In this context, Turkish society's anxieties and concerns should be taken seriously for social cohesion. If the security concerns of the society are not taken seriously and policies and explanations convincing the public are not realized, the issue can be politicized and the conflict potential may rise. For all these reasons, the extent of the problem faced by the Turkish state and society should be recognized, while realistic and transparent policies that would strengthen the Turkish society's resistance are needed.[178]

➢ **IN ADDITION TO "TEMPORARY PROTECTION" STATUS, OTHER ALTERNATIVE STATUSES SHOULD BE DISCUSSED FOR SYRIANS THAT HAVE A 10-YEAR PAST:**

The **"Temporary Protection Status"** of Syrians needs to be re-evaluated as their average duration of stay in Turkey has exceeded 5.5-6 years and their tendencies to return are decreasing continually. Even though the Temporary Protection Regulation mentions the possibilities of other legal statuses (e.g. residence permit, citizenship or international protection) for Syrians if and when this status is terminated, an evaluation of the prospects of alternative statuses could contribute in the process particularly in terms of basic rights and social cohesion processes.

➢ **CHANNELS TO CITIZENSHIP, WITH SPECIFIED PROCESSES, SHOULD BE CONSIDERED INSTEAD OF "EXCEPTIONAL CITIZENSHIP":** It is significant for the "exceptional citizenship" to actually turn into an "exceptional" implementation in terms of those who will be given citizenship and the sensitivities of Turkish society. A significant deficiency of the exceptional citizenship process is its lack of transparency. In this context, if citizenship prospects will be made available to Syrians, alternative channels other than exceptional citizenship should be discussed. Those who live in Turkey with a residence permit for 5 years acquire the right to apply for citizenship. However, as the Temporary Protection Regulation does not specify Syrians' existence in Turkey from the residence perspective, it is not possible for Syrians to acquire this right. Considering the new situation, enabling Syrians who have been living in Turkey under temporary protection for 5 years to acquire this right after living with residence permit for another 5 years might be

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178. See M.M.Erdoğan [2021] "Securitization from Society" and "Social Acceptance": Political Party-Based Approaches in Turkey to Syrian Refugees", Uluslararası İlişkiler, Vol. 17, No. 68, 2020, pp. 73-92, DOI: 10.33458/uidergisi.883022.

evaluated, which may open the way apply for citizenship in 10 years. So, the last decision can be given by Turkish authorities given specific criteria and needs through special legal regulations. As is known, Article 34 of the Geneva Convention also encourages citizenship processes for refugees.

➢ **A "DEVELOPMENTAL AND SUSTAINABLE PROCESS MANAGEMENT" SHOULD LEAD THE WAY:** Whether it is desired or not, the very likely prospects of cohabitation should be built upon a developmental approach that structures this cohabitation in a way that would contribute to every segment in society. A development-based migration-asylum policy could potentially open up a significant new space for the peaceful cohabitation. As it has been emphasized in the 11th Development Plan of the Turkish Republic, a very important starting point for such a policy would be the social cohesion policies. Here it should be noted that there is an important difference between migrants and refugees, so in implementing development-based migration policies, the differences this makes among refugees and the host communities should be considered.

➢ **ESSN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM NEEDS TO BE RESTRUCTURED WITH "DEVELOPMENT" SET AS A PRIORITY OBJECTIVE:** Funded by the EU, the SUY/ESSN program has costed approximately €1.2 billion in the last two years and was benefitted by 1.8 million asylum-seekers in Turkey, 1.6 million of whom being Syrians. Even though this assistance involves a monthly payment of only 120 TL per person, it is still very significant for its beneficiaries. These funds should also be used as sources for the local economy. It is necessary for the funds that are used for the ESSN program to be redirected to development investments through medium and long-term policies.

➢ **THE POLICY OF TRAVEL PERMITS FOR SYRIANS SHOULD BE REFORMED:** After 10 years of living in Turkey, the two most frequently voiced complaint of Syrians concerning their lives in the country are working conditions and travel restrictions. In line with the general practice worldwide, the place of residence of those who applied to or who are already under international protection is determined by the state and they are only allowed to travel outside of this place with a proper reason. However, the case of Syrians needs to be considered as a special case. As mentioned above, there was no advance planning in the beginning of the process concerning Syrians and they were told to remain in their cities of registration after the registrations were completed. This has created significant differences in terms of number of Syrian residents among cities, districts, and even neighborhoods. Moreover, due to the largeness of the number, mobility could not be prevented. 3.6 million Syrians have complex networks of relationships which may facilitate mobility, for instance, one can move to another city for work or for university education that may divide families. The existing experience has shown both that applying such travel permit requirements are difficult to implement and it is not clear why they are necessary. It is very clear that there is a need to reform travel restrictions of Syrians.

➢ **"INFORMAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES" SHOULD NOT ONLY BE SEEN AS A PROBLEM OF SYRIANS:**

While informal economic activities are neither sustainable nor ethically defensible, the prospects of developing a sufficient employment capacity for the Syrians in the short and medium term in Turkey do not seem realistic. Even though employment in the informal market seems to provide an opportunity for the Syrians to support themselves economically in the short term,

this practice is also known to create risks and losses as well as leading to serious exploitation. New arrangements need to be made in this field considering the economic capacity and the needs of Turkey. However, it should not be forgotten that the informal economy constitutes more than 32% of the Turkish economy and, therefore, informal economic activities should not only be seen as a problem of Syrians. Although informal economy cannot be accepted and sustained, it does not seem realistic that this issue would be resolved in the medium- or even in the long-term period. It is still valuable to have some temporary regulations and support relevant for the current situation, particularly for the individual security and safety of those in the workforce. The state should make some regulations and spend efforts to meet the financial needs through external funding, particularly through the EU.

➢ **THE ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD BE ENHANCED:**

The issue of Syrians in Turkey has created an important opportunity to experience how important a role the civil society can play. While the civil society organizations had to rely on their cooperation with international organizations and the international NGOs in the beginning, the development of a serious capacity has been possible through the passing time. This development of capacity has also led to a development in terms of international cooperation. The cooperation between the public institutions and the NGOs has also developed into an impressive level. New NGO formations of Turks and Syrians should be supported in the process. However, it is also necessary to establish mechanisms that would allow conducting impact analysis studies on activities as well as openly displaying cooperation opportunities and possible support resources through a transparent NGO mapping.

➢ **SOCIAL COHESION POLICIES ARE RISKY, THEY ENCOURAGE PERMANENCY; BUT IF PROSPECTS OF PERMANENCY ARE ALREADY STRONG, POSTPONING SOCIAL COHESION POLICIES ARE RISKY. THESE TWO RISKS SHOULD BE SIMULTANEOUSLY CONSIDERED**

Adopting social cohesion policies for temporary immigrants and especially refugees is not a popular choice for many countries because of the uncertainties surrounding the process and because it is believed that social cohesion policies "encourage permanency". However, the future projections in the minds of governments may not turn out to be accurate. The long-term stay of Syrians in Turkey, in the same way, has developed outside of the political expectations. There are currently more than 1.7 million Syrian children under the age of 18. More than border regions, Syrians are living in more developed parts of Turkey. Their likelihood of return is decreasing both because of the conditions in Syria and because of the lives that they have established in Turkey over the years. Thus, a common life and future, even though not preferred, appears to be increasingly inevitable. Therefore, social cohesion policies are an essential requirement, not a preference, for the creation of an honorable and peaceful common life and for preventing many potential problems in social and political realms, as analyses and developments such as SB studies also present strong evidence on the tendency that Syrians will stay in Turkey.

➢ **WHICH MODEL OF SOCIAL COHESION, WHICH ACTORS?**

The issue of social cohesion is extremely complicated. Even though it may be possible to iden-

tify certain principles, it is impossible to talk about a model that would effectively work everywhere. In the absence of a common definition, what is essentially meant by social cohesion policies is taking the necessary steps so that the "newcomers", no matter what their status might be, can live a decent life in the duration that they will stay in the country, in cooperation with all stakeholders. Therefore, the need for social cohesion exists not only regarding immigrants but also all foreigners living in a country. There are many actors that are relevant in this regard. However, the three main actors can be identified as the "state", as the maker and implementor of decisions, the "local society" as the ones that need to display social acceptance, and the "newcomers". One of the biggest handicaps before social cohesion policies is the perception of temporariness particularly regarding those who are under temporary protection and irregular migrants. The role of the state in this process includes providing protection to everyone based on basic rights, status determination, making strategic decisions, and process management in the public realm. However, states' policies cannot be expected to be effective and successful by themselves in the absence of social acceptance and support. The attitude of the native society towards the newcomers is one of the most important factors for a peaceful and honorable life together. In other words, it should not be forgotten that the real process will take place among the society and at the local level. Actions in line with universal legal principles are necessary for social cohesion but they might not be sufficient. What is required is constructive cooperation among all stakeholders.

➢ **LOCAL PROCESSES FOR SOCIAL COHESION NEED TO BE STRENGTHENED:**

Social cohesion policies operate through local and community-based approaches. This is even more important in the case of Syrians in Turkey because a **placement policy** regarding where the Syrians will live in Turkey has not been implemented. This situation has led to an unbalanced distribution amongst various cities, districts, and even neighborhoods. While there is a placement system in place for applicants and beneficiaries of international protection regarding the how many need to settle in which cities, this system couldn't be/wasn't used for Syrians. Both positive and negative implications of this could be underlined. It has become almost impossible today to adopt a new placement/settlement policy concerning Syrians. Therefore, particularly the **local processes for social cohesion need to be encouraged through municipalities and civil society organizations.** This requires not only opening a legal space for local governments, but also transferring financial and other resources to them depending on the foreigners that live within their boundaries.

➢ **A FINANCIAL SUPPORT PROGRAM ("BEL-SUY" /MUN-ESSN) NEEDS TO BE DEVELOPED FOR MUNICIPALITIES (LOCAL AUTHORITIES):**

It is known that the local authorities, particularly the municipalities, do not have the resources to be used in their activities towards people under international protection in Turkey. In order to facilitate the local processes social cohesion and to protect social peace, it is necessary to provide funding through municipalities/local authorities to be benefitted not only by Syrians, but also others under international protection. There are significant numbers people under temporary protection in many cities and districts. In this context, the Municipal Law needs to be revisited whereby municipalities start to receive central funding not depending on how

many Turkish citizens live within their borders, but on how many individuals live there. In the short run, some funds provided by the EU can be used in this regard. The ESSN model can be applied for this new program which could be named Municipality Social Cohesion Assistance (Belediye Sosyal Uyum Yardımı- BEL-SUY / MUN-ESSN). Through such a program, municipalities could be provided with a monthly funding of €10 per refugee, the municipalities could be supported to design and implement projects dedicated to refugees. Such a program would monthly cost €37 million, annually around €450 million if it only targets Syrians, and if it covers other asylum-seekers in Turkey (4 million), then it would monthly cost €40 million and around €480 million annually. This kind of a program would be essential to eliminate the complaints from the local people who are aggrieved by the perceived use of all funds for the Syrians and to ease the pressure on the politicians because of this. It needs to be remembered, however, that such a solution would necessarily be a short-term one.

> **ARE DURABLE SOLUTIONS REALISTIC?**

The UNHCR offers 3 "durable solutions" regarding refugee cases. These include "working for voluntary repatriation", "attempting to resettle in a third country", and "implementing local integration policies". These durable solutions should be implemented simultaneously at different weights. However, the general tendencies across the world show that the voluntary return of refugees and their resettlement remain limited. 10-year war in Syria and uncertainties about the future remove the opportunities of voluntary return to Syria in the short- and medium-term. Resettlement in a third country is at around 0.3% globally, while the refugee quotas decrease each day. Since 2011, 29,000 Syrians were resettled from Turkey in EU countries with a "1 to 1" rule, while 17,000 Syrians were resettled by the UNHCR, raising the total to 46,000, which make around 1% of Syrians under protection in Turkey. This situation reveals that the alternative of resettlement to a third country will contribute partially, and that it is not realistic for millions of refugees. The remaining alternative, as defined by the UNHCR, is local integration. In local integration processes, different obligations and efforts of the state, society, and newcomers are influential. However, the most significant one is the "acceptance" level of a society and newcomers' avoiding of behaviors that would confirm the existing concerns of the host community. So, everyone has a role within this framework.

> **SPECIAL EFFORTS SHOULD BE SPENT FOR MORE BURDEN AND RESPONSIBILITY SHARING BY INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY:**

The attitude of international society unfortunately creates a big disappointment. Advanced countries, within the reach of only 15% of current migrants, are to a less extent meeting their moral obligations about financial support and settling refugees. They are openly following externalization policies. Countries making refugee policies are often acting with a concern of self-protection. When resettlement and financial aid support that need to be given to countries hosting high number of refugees such as Turkey are not provided, it means that countries applying open door policy and the refugees are punished, while authoritarian regimes causing the refugee problems are also encouraged. Turkey hosting the most refugees in the world can take a more active role in these issues and produce concrete projects to raise awareness among the international community.

➢ **SHARING EXTERNAL FUNDING INFORMATION COMING FROM EU AND OTHER SOURCES WITH THE SOCIETY WOULD HELP REDUCE THE PRESSURE OF SOCIAL REACTIONS:**

The external funds received by Turkey are far from meeting the needs. The lack of solidarity in the international community is once again observed despite the Global Compact and discourses of responsibility/burden sharing. After 2011, the largest financial support arriving in Turkey for Syrians is EU-origin. With the March 2016 deal, a 3+3 billion euros of support was agreed on and around €4 billion of this source has been transferred to projects in Turkey. The remaining €2 billion of the funds will be transferred to Turkey in line with the development of projects. After 2021, it is stated that the EU will transfer an additional fund of €3 billion to be used in projects for refugees in Turkey. Without a doubt, this source is much below the actual need. The EU and other donors should provide more support in increasing these sources. Although the known and unknown burdens are on the Turkish taxpayers, the sharing of these incoming external financial sources is significant both in terms of transparency and social cohesion processes. Various claims and statements suggesting that no external resources are being received and that huge amounts of public funds are being spent on Syrians create social reactions among both the Turkish society and the asylum-seekers themselves. Explaining to the Turkish society the fact that this funding, albeit insufficient, is provided by external resources would help reduce social reactions in many fields.

➢ **AGRICULTURE, ANIMAL HUSBANDRY AND INDUSTRY SECTORS CAN OFFER OPPORTUNITIES TO CREATE EMPLOYMENT FOR SYRIANS:**

A very large part of the Syrians in Turkey work in the service industry. However, the very large industries of agriculture, animal husbandry and in some regions such as Istanbul, Kayseri, Bursa, Izmir, Gaziantep, Mersin, the industrial sector in Turkey, which are open to investment, can provide very good opportunities for the employment of the newcomers. The experience so far has shown that agriculture could be a particularly convenient industry for Syrians as it is one of the economic spaces where anxieties concerning Syrians remain relatively low. Developing projects in this area in close cooperation with the EU, including tax reductions and incentive policies can bring along a policy the outcomes of which can be reached in a short while.

➢ **SYRIANS CAN BE TRAINED AND EMPLOYED IN A WAY TO RESPOND TO THE LABOR NEEDS OF THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR:** It has also been observed in various conversations with industrialists that Syrians could constitute a significant source of labor in the industrial sector in some regions. In this context, further work could be carried out in line with the expectations and suggestions of Chambers of Industry regarding employment of Syrians in this sector.

➢ **TURKEY SHOULD DEVELOP ITS OWN SHORT, MEDIUM, AND LONG-TERM SOCIAL COHESION STRATEGIES**

After 2011, the support of international organizations and institutions in providing protection, capacity, and financial resources and cooperation in Turkey cannot be underestimated. One of the most significant problems concerning the Syrians in Turkey is that various projects, particularly those developed by international agencies and NGOs, are implemented in the field in an incoherent manner.

More efficient implementation of these projects is only possible through a comprehensive planning or making them parts of a general strategy. Therefore, "project dominated era of short-term solutions" should be replaced by "the era of projects framed by Turkey on a needs-based approach". For this reason, Turkey within the framework of its own priorities and capacity should develop its own strategy and use external sources under this strategy. S**o, moving away from the chaos of unconnected "projects" towards relevant projects framed by a general strategy would help attract more resources and their efficient use.**

➢ **INSTITUTIONS AND CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN TURKEY SHOULD UNDERTAKE MORE INITIATIVES IN THE EFFICIENT USE OF EU AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL FUNDS:**

Turkey requires a new structuring where public institutions, local administrations and NGOs would play more roles. That would help plan the transferred international resources, mainly the EU resources, and their efficient use for refugees. Although the project-based use of resources and their controlled distribution is understandable, it would also a risk of waste of resources when local initiatives are disregarded along and when there is a lack of effective needs and impact analyses. In this context, Turkey's institutions should have a more say in financial cooperation agreements with the EU as well as in the planning and implementation processes of all external resources. Over the past decade, Turkey's public institutions, local administrations, and NGOs have improved their capacity and increased their experience. It is a must for Turkey's institutions to have a more say in order to maintain the efficient and relevant use of resources.

➢ **THOSE WORKING IN NGOS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING IN THE AREA OF HUMANITARIAN AID SHOULD PARTIPATE IN THE PROCESS MANAGEMENT:**

After 2011, many NGOs operating in the humanitarian field in Turkey have become stronger, grown or newly established. Similarly, UN agencies, international organizations, foreign missions have increased their staff numbers and activities. This enabled emergence of a new sector in fields of humanitarian aid, protection, process management, etc. There are still around 50,000 Turkish staff, and thousands of foreign experts are working in this sector. The said group has well acknowledged the problems faced during the process as well as what needs to be done. This led to an expansion of the capacity through international cooperation. Their impact in the process management should be further strengthened. Also, opportunities of Turkey's public institutions to work with such NGOs and international organizations should be expanded.

➢ **BOTH PROCESS MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL COHESION POLICIES SHOULD BE MADE CONSIDERING NUMERICAL SIZES RATHER THAN "CULTURAL CLOSENESS"**

"Cultural closeness" may play a role for solidarity in mass human mobilities in the beginning but as time passes, numerical size becomes the determinant. Although it is a fact that religious and cultural affinity exists between the Turkish society and Syrians, society's perception on this can change with increasing numbers or negative experiences. Therefore, Turkish society's characterization of Syrians, particularly those living in border cities, as "a group that is very culturally different from us" can be considered a deliberate reaction. The perception of "cultural foreignness" is observed more among those who are living in border regions and have closeness with Syrians in terms of language, customs, kinship, etc. This provides important evi-

dence for producing realistic policies instead of policies based on emotions. What becomes the determinant factor here is the numerical size, which is seen to have exceeded the manageable levels. While bringing uneasiness among the host society in multiple ways, growing numbers usually increase the self-confidence of the newcomers in the meantime making it possible for them to live within their social networks without needing the host society. This, in turn, could further increase the distance and contribute in the emergence of "parallel societies". For these reasons, building social cohesion on cultural closeness may be unrealistic and such emotional statements may not be found to be satisfying for either of them.

➢ **THE HEALTH AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF THE PANDEMIC SHOULD BE MONITORED CAREFULLY AND ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS SHOULD BE PREVENTED:**

General impoverishment in the society during the pandemic has been raising the tension in the society, causing the refugees to further become targets. The pandemic has also been causing Syrians to lose their jobs and work at places without social security and with less payments. The health damage that Syrians face due to the pandemic seems to be around the average in Turkey, while the impoverishment has become clearer. It will not be surprising to see its multi-faceted negative effects in the future. For this reason, preventing anti-migrant and anti-refugee discourses that increase during health and economic crises as well as implementing policies that would minimize the negative experiences which affect refugees during this difficult process are very significant.

➢ **A COMMUNICATION STRATEGY BASED ON COMPREHENSIVE AND ACCURATE INFORMATION SHOULD BE DEVELOPED:**

SB studies have shown that a large part of the negative opinions and attitudes concerning Syrians among the Turkish society are based on misleading or incomplete information. It is essential for the Turkish society and Syrians to be regularly informed about the process using accurate and reliable information. Preparation of an urgent and **comprehensive communication strategy** could ease the anxieties that exist in the Turkish society as well as encouraging Syrians' efforts to become a part of the society. **An effective communication strategy based on accurate data** would fight against misinformation and gossiping, which spread very quickly and often through the social media. Such a communication strategy would also be important in terms of bringing transparency to the subject. In a similar way, informing the public regarding the legislation and legal processes in a transparent way would significantly contribute in social cohesion.

➢ **PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS SHOULD COLLECT HEALTHY DATA AND PROVIDE THIS DATA TO THE USE OF ACADEMICS AND RESEARCHERS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE:**

The biggest problem facing the experts on the subject is the difficulty of accessing healthy official data. However, the first step of healthy migration management is reliable data. The second important part involves sharing this official data with academics and researchers. Without sharing this data, it would not be possible for the academics and researchers to carry out sound

analysis and provide useful policy recommendations. Preparing plans and projections concerning millions of immigrants and asylum-seekers requires the contribution of the experts on this subject in addition to the efforts of bureaucrats and politicians.

> **SYRIANS SHOULD BE PROVIDED WITH SUPPORT SO THAT THEY MAKE THEIR LIVING THROUGH THEIR OWN EFFORTS INSTEAD OF EXTERNAL SOURCES AND AIDS:**

In Turkey, Syrians, with almost all living together with Turkish society in urban areas, make their living through their own efforts. It is known that in Turkey there are still over 1 million Syrians in the workforce and active as entrepreneurs. Supporting these efforts, known as "self-reliance" in the literature, is very significant for both contributing to the country's economy and for social cohesion and an honorable life.

> **THE QUALITY OF THE SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS SHOULD BE PREVENTED FROM DETERIORATION; PHYSICAL AND HUMAN CAPACITY SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED:**

Disruptions arising from newcomers is playing a significant role in the politicization of average complaints and disturbances towards the "newcomers" and their turning into hate speech. Therefore, the state needs to consider the necessary steps in ensuring a speedy increase in the capacity of such public services, especially including health, education, and municipal services, to contribute to the management of the process and social cohesion. Otherwise, the society will suffer and social acceptance will be negatively affected. Voicing objections and reactions to deteriorating public services is a natural situation that should be expected. Therefore, labeling the voiced concerns or reactions simply as "anti-Syrian discourse", "racism", or "hate speech" might make the social cohesion process more complicated.

> **SYRIANS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE POLICY-MAKING AND SOCIAL COHESION PROCESSES**

More effective involvement of Syrians in the policy-making processes should be ensured. Syrian academics, university students, NGO representatives that are living in Turkey can potentially play a very significant role in this regard. There should be also more efforts to make City Councils to join this process in a more effective way.

> **SYRIAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS SHOULD BE UTILIZED AS STRATEGIC ACTORS IN THE SOCIAL COHESION PROCESSES:**

The special social group of over **37,000 university students and alumni of Turkish universities need to be identified as strategic solution partners.** They should be enabled to facilitate the communication and interactions between the Turkish society and Syrians. It should be ensured for the university students and alumni to **assume an active role in social cohesion processes as social bridges and role models.** The opportunities for Syrian university students in Turkey to find jobs after their graduation and their individual choices should be monitored carefully and there should be a special effort to prevent them from leaving Turkey.

> **THE MULTI-PURPOSE COMMUNITY CENTERS SHOULD BE IMPROVED:**

The number of the multi-purpose community centers should be increased and their qualities

should be improved. These centers should be used both to inform and direct individuals concerning activities in education and employment; and to provide support regarding legal rights and social cohesion. These centers would also be important in creating opportunities for the local people and Syrians to come together and interact with one another for social cohesion.

➤ **IT SHOULD BE ENSURED THAT SYRIAN WOMEN ARE EMPOWERED AND THAT THEY PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE PROCESSES:**

45% of the Syrian population in Turkey are women. Syrian women are the main actors not merely at an individual level, but also at the family level. Syrian women, however, appear to have a quite low level of educational attainment in comparison to Syrian men, who already have much lower levels of educational attainment compared to the Turkish averages. Therefore, empowerment of Syrian adult women through literacy, language, vocational, and entrepreneurial courses, among others, would not only lead to their self-improvement but also create a much wider influence in their respective communities.

➤ **MORE EFFORT IS REQUIRED IN THE FIELD OF MANDATORY EDUCATION TO PREVENT SYRIAN CHILDREN FROM TURNING INTO "LOST GENERATIONS":**

Despite Turkey's extraordinary efforts and success and schooling of over 770,000 Syrian children, more than 35% of school-aged Syrians do not have access to formal education. Some of the main reasons for this are the differences in the formal education systems in Syria and Turkey (such as the duration of formal education – 8 years in Syria and 12 years in Turkey), language barrier, the families' perception/expectation of temporariness, the fact that boys over a certain age are working, some families' preference of not sending girls to school, and capacity issues at schools. There is obviously a **need for a new initiative and a leap concerning the schooling of Syrian school-aged children.** However, to prevent this from aggrieving the native people, there is an urgent need to strengthen the capacity including the number of schools, classrooms, teachers, and other educational equipment. In addition, further precautions need to be taken to tackle peer bullying, prevent drop-outs, and take the necessary steps to recover from the serious negative impact of the Pandemic on education.

➤ **IT IS NECESSARY TO EMPOWER TEACHERS AND INCREASE THEIR NUMBERS:**

It is plainly obvious that education of Syrians is crucial both for preventing Syrian children from turning into lost generations and for the serenity of the Turkish society and a harmonious cohabitation. It is also known that there is a serious capacity problem in this field. Over 770,000 Syrian children have been placed into Turkish public schools over the past few years. The teachers, who are the bearers of the heaviest burden stemming from this policy of placement of Syrians, need to be supported and strengthened as they work extremely hard in firstly teaching a new language and its alphabet to foreign students, and then trying to give them education.

➤ **VOCATIONAL TRAINING: It is very valuable and necessary for the young and adult Syrians to be directed towards vocational training.** However, a reduction of interest in vocational training in Turkey creates a handicap, while the vocational schools are still attractive alternatives for Syrian youth and their families, which might even be effective in encouraging Turkish youth and their families.

➢ **COURSES TO HELP SYRIANS ACQUIRE OCCUPATIONS:**

Turkish Ministry of National Education's Directorate of Life Long Learning, international organizations and NGOs organize courses to help Syrians in Turkey acquire occupations. However, the efficiency and necessity of these courses should be questioned as they are mostly funded by international organizations and managed by NGOs. They devalue the studies in this field as they are unrelated to the actual economic needs and far from helping with employment. Some vocational courses are carried out merely for meeting the demands of participants to receive financial support, even limited, demand of in the short term. These courses which do not have cooperation with industry, trade, and commerce chambers merely create an overabundance of certificates. Even at the planning stage, there should be a central structure led by chambers of commerce, MoNE, Labor and Social Security Ministry, and ISKUR. This is very significant in terms of certification and employment processes.

➢ **ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH THE "GLOBAL COMPACT ON REFUGEES" AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS CONCEPTS WOULD BRING IMPORTANT BENEFITS:**

It would be very important for Turkey to re-evaluate its asylum policy on the basis of the 2018 Global Convention on Refugees of the UN, bringing its solidarity elements into action. The world needs to be aware of the immense support that Turkey has been providing to over 4 million asylum- seekers using its limited resources and the risks that it has been taking. It may be possible for Turkey to assume a leadership role in this regard. This way, Turkey can become an example to other countries as well as utilizing the international capacity that had been accumulated within itself to improve its policies.

➢ **THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL VULNERABILITY AND CONFLICT AREAS WITHIN TURKISH SOCIETY ARE THE BIGGEST OBSTACLES BEFORE THE "NEWCOMERS":**

The biggest obstacle before a society in its struggle with the social problems is its inner social vulnerabilities and conflicts. If a society has inner tensions and vulnerability, together with a harshness leading to hate speech, the attitude towards newcomers becomes even more problematic. In other words, for a society composed of individuals that don't like one another, the hate speech - in an even stronger way - will be extended against others. For this reason, it is important to spend efforts to remove areas of social tension and conflict in general.

➢ **THE ANXITIES OF THE TURKISH SOCIETY THAT HAVE GROWN AS A RESULT OF HIGH TRAFFIC OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION OVER THE LAST YEARS SHOULD BE REMOVED THROUGH RELIABLE COMMUNICATION:**

One of the most important sources of anxiety in the society has been the perception that the state doesn't have sufficient control on the process. This perception, in turn, exacerbates the anxieties among society regarding Syrians. This would be prevented by keeping sound communication channels open. The intensive irregular migration flow into Turkey since 2015 has been adversely affecting the policies about Syrians as well as Syrians' lives in Turkey. The desperation and anxiety in the society would make implementation of all sorts of social cohesion policies even more difficult.

➢ **TURKISH SOCIETY SHOULD ALSO BE A TARGET GROUP OF SOCIAL COHESION POLICIES:**

Social cohesion policies and programs usually target the newcomers. In Turkey, similarly, social cohesion efforts have generally targeted Syrians and other foreign groups. However, since social cohesion is not a uni-directional process, Turkish society should also be targeted in social cohesion policies and programs to strengthen social acceptance and to foster the support of local communities for social cohesion.

➢ **EFFORTS SHOULD BE SPENT TO SOLVE GENERAL AND LOCAL COORDINATION PROBLEMS AND TO STRENGTHEN COOPOERATION:**

Coordination problems among and within the institutions should be taken seriously and policies solving these problems should be developed. Otherwise, the services are delayed, their efficiency is decreased, and the social anxieties would further be fueled.

The purpose of this study is to draw a picture that is as realistic as possible using the views of both the Turkish society and Syrians. This picture makes it possible to analyze social cohesion and the social "acceptance" among the most critical actor in the process, the host society. Even though the purpose of this study is not to develop a conceptualization of social cohesion, it is generally defined here as **"a way of life and emotion enabling peaceful cohabitation in the framework of mutual acceptance and respect, on the basis of a common belonging where plurality is accepted, for communities that come together either spontaneously, voluntarily, or forcibly".** In the framework of this definition, it is obvious that a lot of different actors, the political and social structure, various priorities, the capacity, and most importantly, social acceptance can/will play a role in the process of social cohesion. It is also obvious that in the case of refugees, there are many additional complexities concerning the social cohesion policies. Moreover, there are difficulties stemming from the dynamism, volatility, and uncertainty of the process.

What started in 2011 in Turkey appears to be a very important process that moves towards permanent stay of refugees. The large number of Syrians in Turkey is both causing anxieties among the Turkish society and enhancing the risk for Syrians to form inward-looking communities. In other words, there is a risk of ghettoization where Syrians could produce the social spaces that they need by themselves. While taking these risks in serious consideration, policies need to be developed that would aim for Syrians to live together with the Turkish society as an honorable part of it. The structure of the social cohesion policies should be **dynamic, modular and prioritizing local actors and processes** and they should be based on rights and centered around individuals so that they can contribute in minimizing current and future problems.

Making social cohesion policies that consider new sociological realties and Syria's situation- which is not expected to improve in the short- and medium-term – is not a preference but a must for maintaining peace in the society that should be shared with the society itself.

SYRIANS BAROMETER
2020

ADDITIONAL TABLES

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ADDITIONAL TABLES

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 14- a: What percentage of Syrians in Turkey fit the following characteristics? (%) Most appropriate expressions to describe Syrians

	None of them	Minority of them	None	Half of them	Majority of them	All of them	Majority	No idea/No response
Woman								
Hardworking	43,5	17,7	**61,2**	17,6	12,5	4,9	**17,4**	3,8
Kind	49,8	20,8	**70,6**	17,6	5,8	1,4	**7,2**	4,6
Trustworthy	51,6	20,1	**71,7**	15,7	4,6	0,8	**5,4**	7,2
Nice	40,8	19,8	**60,6**	24,3	7,9	1,4	**9,3**	5,8
Friendly	43,5	20,3	**63,8**	19,7	7,4	2,2	**9,6**	6,9
Lazy	18,8	12,3	**31,1**	19,9	25,7	17,6	**43,3**	5,7
Rude	14,8	11,2	**26,0**	18,6	28,8	20,4	**49,2**	6,2
Unreliable/dangerous	13,3	9,3	**22,6**	20,3	27,7	22,5	**50,2**	6,9
Bad	14,4	12,3	**26,7**	23,7	24,8	17,0	**41,8**	7,8
Distant	15,1	9,5	**24,6**	20,9	27,6	19,5	**47,1**	7,4
Man								
Hardworking	41,4	15,8	**57,2**	19,1	12,7	7,0	**19,7**	4,0
Kind	54,0	17,1	**71,1**	16,2	6,2	1,7	**7,9**	4,8
Trustworthy	55,3	15,0	**70,3**	15,5	5,8	1,5	**7,3**	6,9
Nice	43,7	17,0	**60,7**	23,3	8,7	1,9	**10,6**	5,4
Friendly	45,5	18,0	**63,5**	19,2	8,8	2,5	**11,3**	6,0
Lazy	20,6	10,6	**31,2**	18,6	23,1	22,1	**45,2**	5,0
Rude	14,9	10,6	**25,5**	17,9	27,0	23,6	**50,6**	6,0
Unreliable/dangerous	14,5	10,5	**25,0**	18,6	25,6	24,7	**50,3**	6,1
Bad	16,8	10,2	**27,0**	22,0	22,7	21,5	**44,2**	6,8
Distant	16,1	8,7	**24,8**	22,1	24,6	22,7	**47,3**	5,8

SB-2020- ADDITIONAL TABLE 14- b: What percentage of Syrians in Turkey fit the following charac-teristics? (%)

Based on age groups:	None of them	Minority of them	None	Half of them	Majority of them	All of them	Majority	No idea/no response
18-24								
Hardworking	40,7	17,4	**58,1**	22,5	11,2	5,3	**16,5**	2,9
Kind	50,2	21,4	**71,6**	18,9	4,6	1,7	**6,3**	3,2
Trustworthy	51,8	20,8	**72,6**	17,4	4,2	0,7	**4,9**	5,1
Nice	39,7	19,9	**59,6**	28,1	7,5	0,7	**8,2**	4,1
Friendly	43,8	21,8	**65,6**	22,7	5,3	1,7	**7,0**	4,7
Lazy	18,9	12,3	**31,2**	24,0	23,7	16,8	**40,5**	4,3
Rude	14,9	11,6	**26,5**	22,1	29,6	19,1	**48,7**	2,7
Unreliable/dangerous	12,9	10,3	**23,2**	24,8	28,1	20,2	**48,3**	3,7
Bad	15,1	11,5	**26,6**	26,7	24,1	17,6	**41,7**	5,0
Distant	16,9	8,9	**25,8**	24,0	27,3	18,5	**45,8**	4,4
25-34								
Hardworking	40,6	18,6	**59,2**	17,8	13,7	6,3	**20,0**	3,0
Kind	51,0	18,9	**69,9**	19,9	3,9	1,0	**4,9**	5,3
Trustworthy	53,3	18,0	**71,3**	16,4	4,5	1,0	**5,5**	6,8
Nice	38,7	21,1	**59,8**	22,9	7,8	2,3	**10,1**	7,2
Friendly	41,6	19,7	**61,3**	20,3	7,8	2,1	**9,9**	8,5
Lazy	21,5	12,7	**34,2**	17,8	23,2	18,4	**41,6**	6,4
Rude	15,8	10,5	**26,3**	17,2	27,0	20,9	**47,9**	8,6
Unreliable/dangerous	16,0	9,4	**25,4**	17,6	25,4	23,2	**48,6**	8,4
Bad	17,6	10,9	**28,5**	23,6	21,7	17,2	**38,9**	9,0
Distant	16,2	8,4	**24,6**	23,2	25,0	20,1	**45,1**	7,1
35-44								
Hardworking	47,0	15,4	**62,4**	14,8	11,9	6,3	**18,2**	4,6
Kind	55,9	17,0	**72,9**	14,2	6,9	1,4	**8,3**	4,6
Trustworthy	56,5	14,4	**70,9**	14,4	6,1	1,2	**7,3**	7,4
Nice	47,0	16,0	**63,0**	21,1	9,3	1,6	**10,9**	5,0
Friendly	50,6	18,2	**68,8**	15,0	9,5	1,6	**11,1**	5,1
Lazy	20,9	8,9	**29,8**	16,2	26,7	22,3	**49,0**	5,0
Rude	15,4	9,5	**24,9**	17,0	27,3	24,1	**51,4**	6,7
Unreliable/dangerous	13,4	10,3	**23,7**	16,2	27,1	25,9	**53,0**	7,1
Bad	16,0	10,9	**26,9**	18,8	25,9	20,9	**46,8**	7,5
Distant	15,8	10,3	**26,1**	18,8	25,9	22,9	**48,8**	6,3

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 14- c: What percentage of Syrians in Turkey fit the following characteristics? (%)

	None of them	Minority of them	None	Half of them	Majority of them	All of them	Majority	No idea/no response
45-54								
Hardworking	42,1	17,3	**59,4**	16,1	12,1	7,0	**19,1**	5,4
Kind	53,3	15,5	**68,8**	14,2	8,2	2,1	**10,3**	6,7
Trustworthy	53,0	15,8	**68,8**	14,8	5,5	1,2	**6,7**	9,7
Nice	43,0	17,0	**60,0**	24,5	7,3	1,8	**9,1**	6,4
Friendly	41,5	16,1	**57,6**	20,9	10,0	3,6	**13,6**	7,9
Lazy	17,3	10,6	**27,9**	17,6	27,6	20,9	**48,5**	6,0
Rude	13,3	13,0	**26,3**	16,4	26,4	23,0	**49,4**	7,9
Unreliable/dangerous	13,0	10,6	**23,6**	17,6	27,0	23,3	**50,3**	8,5
Bad	15,5	11,5	**27,0**	21,5	24,2	19,1	**43,3**	8,2
Distant	14,2	9,1	**23,3**	20,0	25,8	21,8	**47,6**	9,1
55-64								
Hardworking	42,6	14,2	**56,8**	17,9	16,0	6,2	**22,2**	3,1
Kind	51,2	20,4	**71,6**	14,8	9,9	1,9	**11,8**	1,8
Trustworthy	56,2	14,8	**71,0**	11,7	8,6	2,5	**11,1**	6,2
Nice	49,4	13,0	**62,4**	19,8	11,1	3,1	**14,2**	3,6
Friendly	46,3	14,2	**60,5**	19,1	11,7	3,7	**15,4**	5,0
Lazy	19,1	11,1	**30,2**	17,3	21,0	27,2	**48,2**	4,3
Rude	14,2	9,3	**23,5**	14,2	28,4	29,6	**58,0**	4,3
Unreliable/dangerous	15,4	9,9	**25,3**	17,9	21,6	30,9	**52,5**	4,3
Bad	13,6	11,7	**25,3**	21,0	21,6	26,5	**48,1**	5,6
Distant	13,0	9,9	**22,9**	19,8	26,5	26,5	**53,0**	4,3
65 and over								
Hardworking	40,6	10,9	**51,5**	17,2	18,8	3,1	**21,9**	9,4
Kind	42,2	20,3	**62,5**	9,4	10,9	3,1	**14,0**	14,1
Trustworthy	45,3	17,2	**62,5**	12,5	4,7	3,1	**7,8**	17,2
Nice	40,6	18,8	**59,4**	10,9	10,9	3,1	**14,0**	15,7
Friendly	40,6	20,3	**60,9**	6,3	12,5	4,7	**17,2**	15,6
Lazy	18,8	15,6	**34,4**	17,2	15,6	23,4	**39,0**	9,4
Rude	10,9	9,4	**20,3**	15,6	28,1	23,4	**51,5**	12,6
Unreliable/dangerous	12,5	3,1	**15,6**	14,1	28,1	28,1	**56,2**	14,1
Bad	9,4	10,9	**20,3**	17,2	21,9	25,0	**46,9**	15,6
Distant	9,4	4,7	**14,1**	14,1	23,4	26,6	**50,0**	21,8

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 14- d: What percentage of Syrians in Turkey fit the following characteristics? (%)

Based on Educational Attainment:	None of them	Minority of them	None	Half of them	Majority of them	All of them	Majority	No idea/no response
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school								
Hardworking	39,6	18,9	**58,5**	17,0	18,9	1,9	**20,8**	3,7
Kind	49,1	18,9	**68,0**	13,2	15,1	1,9	**17,0**	1,8
Trustworthy	56,6	22,6	**79,2**	9,4	7,5	1,9	**9,4**	2,0
Nice	47,2	18,9	**66,1**	18,9	9,4	1,9	**11,3**	3,7
Friendly	45,3	15,1	**60,4**	22,6	5,7	3,8	**9,5**	7,5
Lazy	30,2	15,1	**45,3**	13,2	18,9	17,0	**35,9**	5,6
Rude	22,6	18,9	**41,5**	13,2	18,9	20,8	**39,7**	5,6
Unreliable/dangerous	28,3	11,3	**39,6**	11,3	24,5	20,8	**45,3**	3,8
Bad	22,6	18,9	**41,5**	15,1	17,0	18,9	**35,9**	7,5
Distant	24,5	7,5	**32,0**	17,0	15,1	22,6	**37,7**	13,3
Primary school								
Hardworking	39,7	14,0	**53,7**	15,8	14,9	9,6	**24,5**	6,0
Kind	50,9	19,0	**69,9**	14,2	7,3	2,3	**9,6**	6,3
Trustworthy	52,5	17,2	**69,7**	13,8	5,5	2,1	**7,6**	8,9
Nice	46,8	16,3	**63,1**	20,9	8,3	1,8	**10,1**	5,9
Friendly	45,6	18,1	**63,7**	17,4	8,7	3,2	**11,9**	7,0
Lazy	20,9	11,7	**32,6**	18,1	21,3	21,1	**42,4**	6,9
Rude	16,3	8,9	**25,2**	16,1	26,6	23,6	**50,2**	8,5
Unreliable/dangerous	14,9	10,6	**25,5**	17,0	25,5	25,7	**51,2**	6,3
Bad	15,8	11,5	**27,3**	20,0	23,6	22,5	**46,1**	6,6
Distant	16,3	8,9	**25,2**	20,6	23,4	24,1	**47,5**	6,7
Middle-school								
Hardworking	46,5	13,9	**60,4**	18,2	12,7	5,5	**18,2**	3,2
Kind	52,0	20,8	**72,8**	15,6	4,6	2,3	**6,9**	4,7
Trustworthy	53,5	18,5	**72,0**	16,2	4,0	1,2	**5,2**	6,6
Nice	45,4	16,5	**61,9**	26,0	6,1	1,4	**7,5**	4,6
Friendly	43,6	19,9	**63,5**	19,7	8,1	3,5	**11,6**	5,2
Lazy	19,7	13,9	**33,6**	15,0	26,6	21,7	**48,3**	3,1
Rude	13,3	11,3	**24,6**	18,8	28,9	23,1	**52,0**	4,6
Unreliable/dangerous	12,1	11,0	**23,1**	19,9	27,7	24,6	**52,3**	4,7
Bad	14,5	9,5	**24,0**	23,1	22,5	23,7	**46,2**	6,7
Distant	13,0	11,0	**24,0**	19,9	28,6	22,0	**50,6**	5,5

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABEL 14- e: What percentage of Syrians in Turkey fit the following characteristics? (%)

	None of them	Minority of them	None	Half of them	Majority of them	All of them	Majority	No idea/no response
High-school or equivalent								
Hardworking	42,1	18,4	**60,5**	19,8	11,6	5,1	**16,7**	3,0
Kind	53,0	19,1	**72,1**	16,8	5,9	1,3	**7,2**	3,9
Trustworthy	55,0	17,7	**72,7**	14,8	5,7	0,7	**6,4**	6,1
Nice	40,1	20,4	**60,5**	23,3	8,6	1,6	**10,2**	6,0
Friendly	45,4	20,3	**65,7**	18,8	8,1	1,8	**9,9**	5,6
Lazy	17,5	10,1	**27,6**	20,9	26,9	20,0	**46,9**	4,6
Rude	13,6	11,8	**25,4**	17,5	30,9	21,4	**52,3**	4,8
Unreliable/dangerous	12,7	9,5	**22,2**	19,5	28,5	23,9	**52,4**	5,9
Bad	14,8	11,1	**25,9**	23,3	26,2	17,7	**43,9**	6,9
Distant	15,6	8,2	**23,8**	20,5	29,0	20,5	**49,5**	6,2
University/Graduate degree								
Hardworking	42,8	17,9	**60,7**	17,9	11,7	5,1	**16,8**	4,6
Kind	51,0	17,1	**68,1**	20,6	5,1	1,0	**6,1**	5,2
Trustworthy	51,0	16,0	**67,0**	18,9	4,6	1,0	**5,6**	8,5
Nice	39,7	17,7	**57,4**	26,1	9,1	1,9	**11,0**	5,5
Friendly	42,4	17,7	**60,1**	22,2	8,0	1,4	**9,4**	8,3
Lazy	21,8	11,5	**33,3**	20,8	21,4	17,5	**38,9**	7,0
Rude	16,0	9,7	**25,7**	22,0	23,5	21,2	**44,7**	7,6
Unreliable/dangerous	15,0	9,3	**24,3**	22,0	23,7	20,8	**44,5**	9,2
Bad	17,1	11,7	**28,8**	25,1	20,6	16,5	**37,1**	9,0
Distant	16,0	9,7	**25,7**	25,9	22,2	18,9	**41,1**	7,3

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 14- f: What percentage of Syrians in Turkey fit the following characteristics? (%)

Based on regions:	None of them	Minority of them	None	Half of them	Majority of them	All of them	Majority	No idea/no response
Border cities								
Hardworking	47,5	15,6	**63,1**	12,0	11,5	10,4	**21,9**	3,0
Kind	64,0	19,0	**83,0**	9,3	4,3	1,1	**5,4**	2,3
Trustworthy	63,6	18,3	**81,9**	10,2	2,5	1,1	**3,6**	4,3
Nice	60,4	19,7	**80,1**	11,8	4,3	1,1	**5,4**	2,7
Friendly	60,0	20,1	**80,1**	11,1	4,1	1,6	**5,7**	3,1
Lazy	24,2	13,6	**37,8**	15,2	18,3	25,6	**43,9**	3,1
Rude	16,5	10,0	**26,5**	13,6	21,7	34,8	**56,5**	3,4
Unreliable/dangerous	14,9	11,1	**26,0**	12,2	21,5	36,0	**57,5**	4,3
Bad	16,3	9,3	**25,6**	13,3	17,9	38,0	**55,9**	5,2
Distant	17,9	9,3	**27,2**	12,7	18,8	36,9	**55,7**	4,4
Other cities*								
Hardworking	41,2	17,1	**58,3**	19,9	12,9	4,9	**17,8**	4,0
Kind	49,0	18,9	**67,9**	18,7	6,4	1,7	**8,1**	5,3
Trustworthy	51,0	17,3	**68,3**	16,9	5,8	1,2	**7,0**	7,8
Nice	37,9	18,1	**56,0**	26,7	9,2	1,8	**11,0**	6,3
Friendly	40,8	18,9	**59,7**	21,5	9,1	2,5	**11,6**	7,2
Lazy	18,6	10,9	**29,5**	20,3	25,9	18,5	**44,4**	5,8
Rude	14,4	11,1	**25,5**	19,4	29,4	18,9	**48,3**	6,8
Unreliable/dangerous	13,6	9,6	**23,2**	21,2	27,9	20,6	**48,5**	7,1
Bad	15,5	11,7	**27,2**	25,2	25,2	14,7	**39,9**	7,7
Distant	15,1	9,0	**24,1**	23,7	27,8	17,3	**45,1**	7,1

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 14- g: What percentage of Syrians in Turkey fit the following characteristics? (%)

	None of them	Minority of them	None	Half of them	Majority of them	All of them	Majority	No idea/no response
Metropolitan cities								
Hardworking	40,3	23,2	**63,5**	18,8	11,5	2,2	**13,7**	4,0
Kind	44,8	22,2	**67,0**	20,7	5,8	1,2	**7,0**	5,3
Trustworthy	48,0	20,8	**68,8**	17,8	6,3	0,8	**7,1**	6,3
Nice	38,5	21,5	**60,0**	23,8	9,7	0,8	**10,5**	5,7
Friendly	37,3	22,5	**59,8**	22,3	10,5	1,7	**12,2**	5,7
Lazy	6,3	13,3	**19,6**	21,3	36,0	17,3	**53,3**	5,8
Rude	4,0	12,8	**16,8**	20,8	40,0	16,5	**56,5**	5,9
Unreliable/dangerous	4,0	10,8	**14,8**	23,7	36,8	18,2	**55,0**	6,5
Bad	5,0	12,8	**17,8**	24,0	35,8	14,3	**50,1**	8,1
Distant	6,7	9,6	**16,3**	23,7	37,1	15,2	**52,3**	7,7
Non-metropolitan cities								
Hardworking	41,6	14,0	**55,6**	20,4	13,6	6,2	**19,8**	4,2
Kind	51,0	17,3	**68,3**	17,7	6,7	2,0	**8,7**	5,3
Trustworthy	52,5	15,5	**68,0**	16,4	5,6	1,3	**6,9**	8,7
Nice	37,6	16,4	**54,0**	28,1	9,0	2,3	**11,3**	6,6
Friendly	42,5	17,1	**59,6**	21,1	8,5	2,9	**11,4**	7,9
Lazy	24,7	9,7	**34,4**	19,7	20,9	19,1	**40,0**	5,9
Rude	19,6	10,3	**29,9**	18,7	24,2	20,1	**44,3**	7,1
Unreliable/dangerous	18,4	9,0	**27,4**	20,0	23,5	21,8	**45,3**	7,3
Bad	20,6	11,2	**31,8**	25,7	19,9	15,0	**34,9**	7,6
Distant	19,2	8,7	**27,9**	23,7	23,3	18,3	**41,6**	6,8

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 14- h: What percentage of Syrians in Turkey fit the following characteristics? (%)

Based on occupation:	None of them	Minority of them	None	Half of them	Majority of them	All of them	Majority	No idea/ No response
Private sector employee								
Hardworking	47,6	15,8	**63,4**	16,0	12,4	5,3	**17,7**	2,9
Kind	57,8	17,1	**74,9**	15,3	4,3	1,5	**5,8**	4,0
Trustworthy	58,2	14,7	**72,9**	14,5	4,5	1,1	**5,6**	7,0
Nice	48,0	15,3	**63,3**	23,9	7,0	0,9	**7,9**	4,9
Friendly	49,0	18,6	**67,6**	19,2	6,8	1,5	**8,3**	4,9
Lazy	17,1	10,9	**28,0**	18,1	25,6	23,7	**49,3**	4,6
Rude	11,7	8,3	**20,0**	17,9	30,9	25,4	**56,3**	5,8
Unreliable/dangerous	10,9	8,5	**19,4**	18,1	27,9	28,4	**56,3**	6,2
Bad	12,6	8,7	**21,3**	23,5	24,5	24,3	**48,8**	6,4
Distant	13,7	6,3	**20,0**	18,6	30,5	25,2	**55,7**	5,7
Artisan/Tradesman								
Hardworking	40,7	10,9	**51,6**	20,5	13,8	9,6	**23,4**	4,5
Kind	51,1	13,8	**64,9**	20,7	6,4	2,7	**9,1**	5,3
Trustworthy	52,3	13,3	**65,6**	19,0	5,2	2,2	**7,4**	8,0
Nice	40,0	14,1	**54,1**	26,9	8,6	4,2	**12,8**	6,2
Friendly	39,8	14,3	**54,1**	24,0	10,1	4,7	**14,8**	7,1
Lazy	20,7	9,4	**30,1**	21,7	25,4	17,3	**42,7**	5,5
Rude	16,3	8,4	**24,7**	21,2	28,1	20,0	**48,1**	6,0
Unreliable/dangerous	14,3	7,9	**22,2**	21,7	26,7	21,7	**48,4**	7,7
Bad	17,0	7,7	**24,7**	26,2	24,0	17,0	**41,0**	8,1
Distant	14,1	7,9	**22,0**	26,9	25,2	20,0	**45,2**	5,9
Housewife/girl								
Hardworking	40,2	20,2	**60,4**	16,4	13,9	5,5	**19,4**	3,8
Kind	46,2	23,8	**70,0**	15,3	9,6	1,4	**11,0**	3,7
Trustworthy	48,6	24,0	**72,6**	13,1	6,3	0,8	**7,1**	7,2
Nice	40,2	23,5	**63,7**	21,3	9,0	1,6	**10,6**	4,4
Friendly	42,9	23,0	**65,9**	17,2	7,7	2,7	**10,4**	6,5
Lazy	21,0	14,8	**35,8**	16,4	25,1	17,2	**42,3**	5,5
Rude	18,6	14,2	**32,8**	15,3	25,1	20,8	**45,9**	6,0
Unreliable/dangerous	18,3	11,7	**30,0**	16,1	24,9	23,2	**48,1**	5,8
Bad	17,5	16,1	**33,6**	18,0	24,0	17,8	**41,8**	6,6
Distant	17,5	12,3	**29,8**	18,6	24,9	18,9	**43,8**	7,8

Note: Occupation: "Other and "no response" categories are not shown on the table as they were at low numbers.

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 14- i: What percentage of Syrians in Turkey fit the following characteristics? (%)

	None of them	Minority of them	None	Half of them	Majority of them	All of them	Majority	No idea/ No response
Public Sector Employee								
Hardworking	38,7	19,8	**58,5**	21,5	11,2	4,3	**15,5**	4,5
Kind	47,9	22,6	**70,5**	17,5	6,9	2,0	**8,9**	3,1
Trustworthy	51,9	21,5	**73,4**	15,5	5,7	0,9	**6,6**	4,5
Nice	37,8	23,2	**61,0**	25,8	9,2	0,9	**10,1**	3,1
Friendly	44,7	24,1	**68,8**	20,6	4,9	1,7	**6,6**	4,0
Lazy	18,9	13,5	**32,4**	22,3	22,6	17,5	**40,1**	5,2
Rude	16,6	14,0	**30,6**	19,8	28,1	18,1	**46,2**	3,4
Unreliable/dangerous	15,2	12,9	**28,1**	21,5	27,8	18,1	**45,9**	4,5
Bad	17,5	14,3	**31,8**	24,6	23,5	15,2	**38,7**	4,9
Distant	19,5	10,9	**30,4**	22,1	26,9	15,8	**42,7**	4,8
Self-employed								
Hardworking	42,9	17,5	**60,4**	21,2	8,5	7,4	**15,9**	2,5
Kind	50,8	21,2	**72,0**	22,8	0,5	-	**0,5**	4,7
Trustworthy	57,1	17,5	**74,6**	15,9	2,6	0,5	**3,1**	6,4
Nice	40,7	21,2	**61,9**	20,1	9,5	-	**9,5**	8,5
Friendly	43,4	17,5	**60,9**	19,6	8,5	1,6	**10,1**	9,4
Lazy	19,6	10,6	**30,2**	18,0	31,7	14,3	**46,0**	5,8
Rude	12,2	12,2	**24,4**	19,0	32,8	17,5	**50,3**	6,3
Unreliable/dangerous	13,2	11,1	**24,3**	21,2	31,7	17,5	**49,2**	5,3
Bad	16,9	11,1	**28,0**	21,2	28,0	14,8	**42,8**	8,0
Distant	16,9	8,5	**25,4**	22,8	28,0	17,5	**45,5**	6,3
Businessperson								
Hardworking	42,7	15,4	**58,1**	19,7	13,7	4,3	**18,0**	4,2
Kind	54,7	16,2	**70,9**	12,0	6,8	1,7	**8,5**	8,6
Trustworthy	54,7	15,4	**70,1**	12,8	4,3	1,7	**6,0**	11,1
Nice	45,3	15,4	**60,7**	18,8	8,5	2,6	**11,1**	9,4
Friendly	45,3	17,9	**63,2**	13,7	11,1	3,4	**14,5**	8,6
Lazy	15,4	9,4	**24,8**	15,4	21,4	33,3	**54,7**	5,1
Rude	6,8	7,7	**14,5**	12,8	29,9	33,3	**63,2**	9,5
Unreliable/dangerous	8,5	7,7	**16,2**	12,8	23,9	35,9	**59,8**	11,2
Bad	7,7	7,7	**15,4**	15,4	23,1	31,6	**54,7**	14,5
Distant	8,5	6,8	**15,3**	14,5	24,8	34,2	**59,0**	11,2

Note: Occupation: "Other and "no response" categories are not shown on the table as they were at low numbers.

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 14- j: What percentage of Syrians in Turkey fit the following characteristics? (%)

	None of them	Minority of them	None	Half of them	Majority of them	All of them	Majority	No idea/No response
Public Sector Employee								
Hardworking	39,8	27,4	**67,2**	13,3	10,6	4,4	**15,0**	4,5
Kind	54,9	23,0	**77,9**	8,8	5,3	-	**5,3**	8,0
Trustworthy	50,4	20,4	**70,8**	13,3	3,5	-	**3,5**	12,4
Nice	45,1	21,2	**66,3**	19,5	6,2	-	**6,2**	8,0
Friendly	47,8	18,6	**66,4**	14,2	8,0	-	**8,0**	11,4
Lazy	24,8	8,8	**33,6**	18,6	22,1	18,6	**40,7**	7,1
Rude	16,8	11,5	**28,3**	14,2	25,7	20,4	**46,1**	11,4
Unreliable/dangerous	15,0	8,0	**23,0**	18,6	28,3	20,4	**48,7**	9,7
Bad	15,9	15,0	**30,9**	20,4	23,9	15,0	**38,9**	9,8
Distant	16,8	10,6	**27,4**	19,5	21,2	22,1	**43,3**	9,8
Self-employed								
Hardworking	38,2	15,4	**53,6**	17,3	16,4	5,4	**21,8**	7,3
Kind	50,9	16,4	**67,3**	15,5	9,1	-	**9,1**	8,1
Trustworthy	50,0	17,3	**67,3**	15,5	9,1	-	**9,1**	8,1
Nice	39,1	16,4	**55,5**	25,5	10,9	0,9	**11,8**	7,2
Friendly	38,2	17,3	**55,5**	19,1	17,3	-	**17,3**	8,1
Lazy	25,5	12,7	**38,2**	18,2	14,5	21,8	**36,3**	7,3
Rude	15,5	12,7	**28,2**	18,2	20,0	27,3	**47,3**	6,3
Unreliable/dangerous	11,8	11,8	**23,6**	21,8	20,9	26,4	**47,3**	7,3
Bad	16,4	12,7	**29,1**	23,6	18,2	20,9	**39,1**	8,2
Distant	14,5	14,5	**29,0**	22,7	21,8	20,0	**41,8**	6,5
Businessperson								
Hardworking	57,9	5,3	**63,2**	19,3	12,3	5,2	**17,5**	-
Kind	63,1	8,8	**71,9**	21,1	3,5	3,5	**7,0**	-
Trustworthy	59,6	5,3	**64,9**	24,6	7,0	3,5	**10,5**	-
Nice	49,1	8,8	**57,9**	29,8	3,5	3,5	**7,0**	5,3
Friendly	54,4	14,0	**68,4**	21,1	7,0	3,5	**10,5**	-
Lazy	17,5	7,0	**24,5**	26,3	17,5	28,1	**45,6**	3,6
Rude	12,3	7,0	**19,3**	24,6	22,8	28,1	**50,9**	5,2
Unreliable/dangerous	12,3	7,0	**19,3**	26,3	22,8	28,1	**50,9**	3,5
Bad	12,3	8,8	**21,1**	31,6	21,1	22,8	**43,9**	3,4
Distant	15,8	5,3	**21,1**	31,6	15,8	24,6	**40,4**	6,9

Note: Occupation: "Other and "no response" categories are not shown on the table as they were at low numbers.

SB-2020- ADDITIONAL TABLES 18- a: Please state whether or not you have ever established the following types of social relationship with Syrians until 2020? (%)

		To have a conversation	Support/ solidarity	To shop (from a Syrian)	To be friends	To have a problem	To establish a business relationship	To fight	To Flirt	To get married
					Sex					
Female	Yes	42,3	30,0	23,2	18,4	16,6	16,4	10,5	3,9	3,9
	No	56,5	68,5	75,4	80,3	81,9	82,3	88,4	94,6	94,6
	No idea/No response	1,2	1,5	1,4	1,3	1,5	1,3	1,1	1,5	1,5
Male	Yes	54,4	30,9	31,4	24,1	22,7	22,7	15,8	5,9	5,9
	No	44,8	67,4	67,2	74,8	76,1	75,9	83,1	93,0	93,2
	No idea/No response	0,8	1,7	1,4	1,1	1,2	1,4	1,1	1,1	0,9
					Age Groups					
18-24	Yes	49,1	29,7	23,5	21,4	25,5	18,5	18,5	5,0	3,9
	No	50,2	68,6	74,9	77,9	73,6	80,6	80,6	94,1	95,4
	No idea/No response	0,7	1,7	1,6	0,7	0,9	0,9	0,9	0,9	0,7
25-34	Yes	51,6	31,4	30,7	19,1	19,5	20,1	11,3	3,9	4,7
	No	47,1	67,0	68,0	79,5	78,7	77,7	87,5	94,7	94,1
	No idea/No response	1,4	1,6	1,3	1,4	1,8	2,2	1,2	1,4	1,2
35-44	Yes	46,8	30,2	29,1	23,1	17,2	21,1	13,0	5,7	6,5
	No	52,8	69,0	69,8	75,7	82,2	78,1	86,4	93,5	92,9
	No idea/No response	0,4	0,8	1,1	1,2	0,6	0,8	0,6	0,8	0,6
45-54	Yes	48,8	30,9	28,2	21,5	16,4	22,1	8,8	5,2	5,5
	No	49,7	67,0	70,6	77,0	81,2	76,1	89,4	92,4	91,8
	No idea/No response	1,5	2,1	1,2	1,5	2,4	1,8	1,8	2,4	2,7
55-64	Yes	45,7	29,0	28,4	22,2	13,6	17,3	9,3	5,6	4,9
	No	52,5	68,5	69,8	75,9	84,6	80,9	88,9	92,6	93,2
	No idea/No response	1,8	2,5	1,8	1,9	1,8	1,8	1,8	1,8	1,9
65 and over	Yes	34,4	34,4	21,9	20,3	7,8	9,4	4,7	3,1	3,1
	No	64,1	62,5	76,6	78,1	89,1	89,1	93,8	95,3	95,3
	No idea/No response	1,5	3,1	1,5	1,6	3,1	1,5	1,5	1,6	1,6
General	**Yes**	**48,4**	**30,5**	**27,4**	**21,3**	**19,7**	**19,6**	**13,2**	**4,9**	**4,9**
	No	**50,6**	**67,9**	**71,3**	**77,5**	**79,0**	**79,0**	**85,7**	**93,8**	**93,9**
	No idea/No response	**1,0**	**1,6**	**1,3**	**1,2**	**1,3**	**1,4**	**1,1**	**1,3**	**1,2**

SB-2020- ADDITIONAL TABLE 18- b: Please state whether or not you have ever established the following types of social relationship with Syrians until 2020? (%)

		To have a conversation	Support/ solidarity	To shop (from a Syrian)	To be friends	To have a problem	To establish a business relationship	To fight	To Flirt	To get married
Educational Attainment										
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	Yes	43,4	22,6	17,0	17,0	3,8	5,7	1,9	3,8	1,9
	No	52,8	71,7	75,5	77,4	90,6	86,8	94,3	92,5	94,3
	No idea/No response	3,8	5,7	7,5	5,6	5,6	7,5	3,8	3,7	3,8
Primary School	Yes	39,9	28,0	25,9	20,0	17,7	17,4	12,4	5,7	6,4
	No	58,7	70,2	72,9	78,9	80,5	81,2	86,2	92,2	91,5
	No idea/No response	1,4	1,8	1,2	1,1	1,8	1,4	1,4	2,1	2,1
Middle-School	Yes	50,3	31,2	29,5	24,3	21,1	21,4	16,2	6,6	5,8
	No	48,8	67,3	69,7	74,6	78,0	77,7	82,9	91,9	92,8
	No idea/No response	0,9	1,5	0,8	1,1	0,9	0,9	0,9	1,5	1,4
High School or equivalent	Yes	51,2	33,0	27,2	21,5	22,1	20,5	15,7	4,5	4,6
	No	48,1	65,1	71,6	77,5	76,7	78,4	83,2	94,5	94,6
	No idea/No response	0,7	1,9	1,2	1,0	1,2	1,1	1,1	1,0	0,8
University/ Graduate degree	Yes	50,0	28,0	28,6	20,4	17,5	20,2	8,2	3,9	3,9
	No	49,0	71,2	69,8	78,4	81,5	78,4	91,2	95,5	95,5
	No idea/No response	1,0	0,8	1,6	1,2	1,0	1,4	0,6	0,6	0,6
Region										
Border cities	Yes	50,9	36,2	33,5	28,5	20,6	24,7	13,8	12,7	12,4
	No	48,9	62,9	65,8	70,8	79,0	75,1	85,7	86,4	86,7
	No idea/No response	0,2	0,9	0,7	0,7	0,4	0,2	0,5	0,9	0,9
Other cities*	Yes	47,8	29,1	25,9	19,5	19,4	18,4	13,0	3,0	3,1
	No	51,0	69,1	72,6	79,1	79,0	80,0	85,7	95,6	95,7
	No idea/No response	1,2	1,8	1,5	1,4	1,6	1,6	1,3	1,4	1,2
Metropolitan cities	Yes	47,0	30,0	31,0	23,7	18,5	24,3	14,0	5,2	4,5
	No	52,7	68,5	68,5	76,0	80,5	74,5	85,7	93,8	94,5
	No idea/No response	0,3	1,5	0,5	0,3	1,0	1,2	0,3	1,0	1,0
Non-metropolitan cities	Yes	48,2	28,6	23,3	17,5	19,9	15,4	12,6	2,0	2,4
	No	50,1	69,4	74,6	80,7	78,2	82,7	85,7	96,5	96,2
	No idea/No response	1,7	2,0	2,1	1,8	1,9	1,9	1,7	1,5	1,4
General	**Yes**	**48,4**	**30,5**	**27,4**	**21,3**	**19,7**	**19,6**	**13,2**	**4,9**	**4,9**
	No	**50,6**	**67,9**	**71,3**	**77,5**	**79,0**	**79,0**	**85,7**	**93,8**	**93,9**
	No idea/No response	**1,0**	**1,6**	**1,3**	**1,2**	**1,3**	**1,4**	**1,1**	**1,3**	**1,2**

SB-2020- ADDITIONAL TABLE 18- c: Please state whether or not you have ever established the following types of social relationship with Syrians until 2020? (%)

		To have a conversation	Support/ solidarity	To shop (from a Syrian)	To be friends	To have a problem	To establish a business relationship	To fight	To Flirt	To get married
Occupation										
Private sector employee	Yes	47,5	29,6	25,4	18,5	22,6	20,7	15,1	4,9	5,3
	No	52,2	69,9	74,4	81,5	77,0	78,7	84,9	94,7	94,2
	No idea/No response	0,3	0,5	0,2	-	0,4	0,6	-	0,4	0,5
Artisan/Trades-man	Yes	55,6	34,1	44,7	22,0	16,5	27,9	11,1	4,2	4,7
	No	43,0	64,0	53,8	76,0	81,2	70,1	86,9	94,1	93,8
	No idea/No response	1,4	1,9	1,5	2,0	2,3	2,0	2,0	1,7	1,5
Housewife/girl	Yes	35,8	26,0	18,6	19,7	11,2	10,7	9,6	4,6	4,9
	No	62,0	71,6	79,0	78,1	86,1	86,9	88,3	92,6	92,6
	No idea/No response	2,2	2,4	2,4	2,2	2,7	2,4	2,1	2,8	2,5
Student	Yes	53,6	32,7	20,9	22,9	26,4	15,2	16,9	3,7	3,2
	No	45,8	65,0	77,1	76,2	73,1	83,7	81,9	94,8	95,7
	No idea/No response	0,6	2,3	2,0	0,9	0,5	1,1	1,2	1,5	1,1
Unemployed	Yes	49,2	28,6	24,9	23,8	24,3	16,9	14,8	6,9	4,8
	No	50,8	70,9	75,1	76,2	75,1	83,1	85,2	93,1	95,2
	No idea/No response	-	0,5	-	-	0,6	-	-	-	-
Retired	Yes	48,7	34,2	23,9	23,1	16,2	18,8	8,5	7,7	8,5
	No	51,3	64,1	76,1	76,9	82,9	81,2	91,5	92,3	91,5
	No idea/No response	-	1,7	-	-	0,9	-	-	-	-
Public sector employee	Yes	45,1	29,2	23,0	20,4	16,8	16,8	10,6	6,2	5,3
	No	54,9	70,8	75,2	78,8	82,3	82,3	89,4	93,8	94,7
	No idea/No response	-	-	1,8	0,8	0,9	0,9	-	-	-
Self-employed	Yes	45,5	25,5	25,5	22,7	24,5	29,1	18,2	5,5	5,5
	No	51,8	71,8	70,9	72,7	72,7	67,3	79,1	90,9	90,9
	No idea/No response	2,7	2,7	3,6	4,6	2,8	3,6	2,7	3,6	3,6
Businessperson	Yes	66,7	43,9	52,6	35,1	17,5	36,8	12,3	5,3	7,0
	No	33,3	54,4	47,4	64,9	82,5	63,2	87,7	94,7	93,0
	No idea/No response	-	1,7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
General	**Yes**	**48,4**	**30,5**	**27,4**	**21,3**	**19,7**	**19,6**	**13,2**	**4,9**	**4,9**
	No	**50,6**	**67,9**	**71,3**	**77,5**	**79,0**	**79,0**	**85,7**	**93,8**	**93,9**
		1,0	**1,6**	**1,3**	**1,2**	**1,3**	**1,4**	**1,1**	**1,3**	**1,2**

SB-2020- ADDITIONAL TABLE 30- a: Which one of the following statements best reflects how our society treats Syrians? (%)

	Our society has embraced Syrians	Our society is exploiting Syrians as cheap labor	Our society is doing everything it can	Our society looks down on Syrians	Our society treats Syrians badly	Other	No idea/no response
Sex							
Female	35,3	24,2	17,8	10,4	8,3	0,9	3,1
Male	36,3	26,1	20,0	7,3	6,5	1,1	2,7
Age Groups							
18-24	31,3	29,4	11,9	11,8	9,5	1,1	5,0
25-34	33,2	26,8	21,5	8,6	7,2	1,2	1,5
35-44	39,1	22,9	22,3	6,7	6,3	1,0	1,7
45-54	40,9	22,4	21,2	7,0	6,1	0,6	1,8
55-64	40,7	18,5	24,7	6,8	6,2	0,6	2,5
65 and over	42,2	14,1	23,4	10,9	4,7	1,6	3,1
Educational Attainment							
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	45,3	13,2	24,5	9,4	7,6	-	-
Primary school	42,7	22,2	21,3	5,3	5,7	0,5	2,3
Middle-school	36,1	21,7	23,1	7,2	6,6	1,7	3,6
High-school or equivalent	33,2	27,4	17,3	11,2	7,6	0,6	2,7
University/ Graduate degree	33,5	27,2	16,5	8,6	9,1	1,9	3,2
Region							
Border cities	37,8	39,4	12,2	3,2	5,9	-	1,5
Other cities*	35,3	21,7	20,6	10,2	7,8	1,3	3,1
Metropolitan cities	46,0	12,8	18,3	11,8	7,8	1,0	2,3
Non-metropolitan cities	30,1	26,0	21,7	9,4	7,7	1,4	3,7
Occupation							
Private sector employee	35,0	26,4	20,0	6,8	7,3	1,3	3,2
Artisan/Tradesman	35,6	22,2	20,5	12,1	7,2	1,0	1,4
Housewife/girl	41,0	21,0	21,0	7,9	7,1	0,5	1,5
Student	25,8	34,4	14,0	10,9	9,5	0,9	4,5
Unemployed	43,4	24,3	13,8	9,5	6,9	0,5	1,6
Retired	37,6	17,1	27,4	7,7	6,0	-	4,2
Public sector employee	37,2	23,9	19,5	6,2	6,2	3,5	3,5
Self-employed	39,1	20,9	20,0	6,4	10,0	0,9	2,7
Businessperson	36,8	31,6	15,8	10,5	3,5	-	1,8
General	**35,8**	**25,1**	**18,9**	**8,9**	**7,4**	**1,1**	**2,8**

*Other cities include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.
Note: Occupation: "Other and "no response" categories are not shown on the table as they were at low numbers.

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 33- a: To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding Syrians in Turkey? (%)

Based on Sex:	Completely disagree	Disagree	Combined Disagree	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	Combined Agree	No idea/ No response
Female								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	19,7	17,6	**37,3**	15,8	31,9	13,0	**44,9**	2,0
I think that Syrians will harm our society	11,0	11,3	**22,3**	14,0	40,8	20,8	**61,6**	2,1
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	7,2	8,2	**15,4**	9,5	45,9	27,1	**73,0**	2,1
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	11,3	12,3	**23,6**	12,1	40,1	22,3	**62,4**	1,9
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	9,7	9,3	**19,0**	10,6	43,9	22,8	**66,7**	3,7
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	9,4	9,8	**19,2**	16,1	38,5	22,5	**61,0**	3,7
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	8,2	8,7	**16,9**	11,2	44,7	24,0	**68,7**	3,2
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	10,3	11,4	**21,7**	10,6	41,5	23,7	**65,2**	2,5
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	7,7	6,5	**14,2**	8,7	38,5	36,4	**74,9**	2,2
Male								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	23,3	15,8	**39,1**	12,2	29,7	17,1	**46,8**	1,9
I think that Syrians will harm our society	11,8	12,0	**23,8**	11,9	39,5	23,7	**63,2**	1,1
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	8,7	9,4	**18,1**	8,7	41,8	29,8	**71,6**	1,6
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	13,9	11,8	**25,7**	9,9	38,3	24,4	**62,7**	1,7
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	9,3	9,8	**19,1**	9,3	42,2	27,3	**69,5**	2,1
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	8,5	10,5	**19,0**	12,4	38,4	27,7	**66,1**	2,5
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	8,0	11,3	**19,3**	10,6	40,2	26,9	**67,1**	3,0
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	10,4	11,9	**22,3**	9,8	39,0	26,9	**65,9**	2,0
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	8,7	8,5	**17,2**	7,9	35,6	38,0	**73,6**	1,3

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 33- b: To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding Syrians in Turkey? (%)

Based on age groups:	Completely disagree	Disagree	Combined Disagree	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	Combined Agree	No idea/ No response
18-24								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	23,8	18,5	**42,3**	16,6	27,7	12,1	**39,8**	1,3
I think that Syrians will harm our society	12,5	11,0	**23,5**	16,1	39,5	19,8	**59,3**	1,1
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	8,0	8,8	**16,8**	10,2	44,6	26,0	**70,6**	2,4
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	12,3	12,3	**24,6**	12,3	38,3	23,2	**61,5**	1,6
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	9,9	8,9	**18,8**	12,1	42,8	23,1	**65,9**	3,2
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	8,6	10,3	**18,9**	18,4	38,6	21,5	**60,1**	2,6
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	7,3	8,9	**16,2**	14,3	42,9	23,5	**66,4**	3,1
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	10,9	10,2	**21,1**	12,2	42,2	22,0	**64,2**	2,5
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	9,2	7,2	**16,4**	11,2	37,9	33,0	**70,9**	1,5
25-34								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	22,9	17,2	**40,1**	13,3	28,1	16,2	**44,3**	2,3
I think that Syrians will harm our society	10,5	11,1	**21,6**	13,3	39,3	24,4	**63,7**	1,4
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	7,4	8,8	**16,2**	8,2	43,8	30,5	**74,3**	1,3
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	13,1	12,5	**25,6**	9,4	41,6	21,9	**63,5**	1,5
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	8,8	8,6	**17,4**	11,5	42,8	25,8	**68,6**	2,5
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	10,4	8,4	**18,8**	15,4	38,7	24,0	**62,7**	3,1
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	8,6	10,7	**19,3**	10,0	41,0	27,5	**68,5**	2,2
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	9,6	11,3	**20,9**	12,1	37,5	27,3	**64,8**	2,2
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	7,6	7,4	**15,0**	7,2	40,2	35,9	**76,1**	1,7

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 33- c: To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding Syrians in Turkey? (%)

	I completely disagree	I disagree	Combined disagree	Neither agree, nor disagree	I agree	I completely agree	Combined agree	No idea/No response
35-44								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	18,0	16,8	**34,8**	13,4	34,2	16,0	**50,2**	1,6
I think that Syrians will harm our society	10,1	12,6	**22,7**	11,1	42,5	22,5	**65,0**	1,2
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	7,3	9,1	**16,4**	8,9	43,7	29,6	**73,3**	1,4
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	12,1	12,8	**24,9**	10,5	38,5	24,5	**63,0**	1,6
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	9,3	11,1	**20,4**	7,5	44,5	25,9	**70,4**	1,7
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	6,9	12,1	**19,0**	10,1	40,1	27,5	**67,6**	3,3
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	7,5	10,3	**17,8**	8,3	47,0	24,7	**71,7**	2,2
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	10,1	11,5	**21,6**	7,3	43,7	26,1	**69,8**	1,3
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	7,7	7,7	**15,4**	5,3	38,7	39,1	**77,8**	1,5
45-54								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	22,4	13,3	**35,7**	12,4	33,3	17,0	**50,3**	1,6
I think that Syrians will harm our society	13,9	12,7	**26,6**	9,7	39,7	21,8	**61,5**	2,2
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	10,0	8,2	**18,2**	9,4	44,2	27,0	**71,2**	1,2
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	14,8	12,1	**26,9**	10,3	36,7	24,8	**61,5**	1,3
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	10,9	10,9	**21,8**	7,9	43,0	24,8	**67,8**	2,5
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	11,5	9,7	**21,2**	12,7	37,0	27,6	**64,6**	1,5
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	10,6	9,4	**20,0**	11,5	39,7	26,1	**65,8**	2,7
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	12,1	13,9	**26,0**	10,0	35,5	27,3	**62,8**	1,2
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	8,5	8,5	**17,0**	9,1	31,8	41,2	**73,0**	0,9

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 33- d: To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding Syrians in Turkey? (%)

	Completely disagree	Disagree	Combined Disagree	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	Combined Agree	No idea/ No response
55-64								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	19,8	13,6	**33,4**	10,5	35,8	16,7	**52,5**	3,6
I think that Syrians will harm our society	10,5	13,6	**24,1**	8,6	39,5	25,9	**65,4**	1,9
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	8,0	9,3	**17,3**	6,2	44,4	29,6	**74,0**	2,5
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	11,7	10,5	**22,2**	11,7	38,3	25,3	**63,6**	2,5
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	8,0	10,5	**18,5**	9,3	40,7	28,4	**69,1**	3,1
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	8,6	11,1	**19,7**	13,0	32,1	31,5	**63,6**	3,7
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	8,6	13,6	**22,2**	7,4	38,9	27,8	**66,7**	3,7
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	8,6	14,2	**22,8**	5,6	39,5	29,0	**68,5**	3,1
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	6,8	7,4	**14,2**	8,6	29,6	43,8	**73,4**	3,8
65 and over								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	12,5	17,2	**29,7**	12,5	32,8	17,2	**50,0**	7,8
I think that Syrians will harm our society	6,3	4,7	**11,0**	17,2	39,1	23,4	**62,5**	9,3
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	4,7	7,8	**12,5**	12,5	32,8	35,9	**68,7**	6,3
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	6,3	3,1	**9,4**	14,1	51,6	15,6	**67,2**	9,3
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	7,8	3,1	**10,9**	4,7	42,2	26,6	**68,8**	15,6
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	4,7	6,3	**11,0**	3,1	46,9	26,6	**73,5**	12,4
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	4,7	7,8	**12,5**	6,3	37,5	26,6	**64,1**	17,1
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	7,8	12,5	**20,3**	7,8	40,6	21,9	**62,5**	9,4
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	9,4	6,3	**15,7**	3,1	35,9	40,6	**76,5**	4,7

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 33- e: To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding Syrians in Turkey? (%)

Based on educational attainment:	Completely disagree	Disagree	Combined Disagree	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	Combined Agree	No idea/ No response
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	11,3	18,9	**30,2**	11,3	41,5	17,0	**58,5**	-
I think that Syrians will harm our society	13,2	13,2	**26,4**	17,0	34,0	22,6	**56,6**	-
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	11,3	9,5	**20,8**	7,5	47,2	24,5	**71,7**	-
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	13,2	7,5	**20,7**	13,2	49,1	13,2	**62,3**	3,8
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	15,1	5,7	**20,8**	3,8	52,8	15,1	**67,9**	7,5
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	11,3	9,4	**20,7**	13,2	49,1	15,1	**64,2**	1,9
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	11,3	5,7	**17,0**	11,3	47,2	15,1	**62,3**	9,4
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	11,3	9,4	**20,7**	11,3	49,1	15,1	**64,2**	3,8
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	13,2	3,8	**17,0**	9,4	37,7	34,0	**71,7**	1,9
Primary School								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	18,1	13,3	**31,4**	12,6	36,0	17,4	**53,4**	2,6
I think that Syrians will harm our society	9,6	11,9	**21,5**	9,6	41,1	25,0	**66,1**	2,8
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	7,1	7,8	**14,9**	8,9	41,5	32,3	**73,8**	2,4
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	9,9	9,6	**19,5**	9,6	39,9	28,4	**68,3**	2,6
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	6,9	9,9	**16,8**	7,8	42,4	28,9	**71,3**	4,1
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	7,3	9,2	**16,5**	11,9	36,9	31,2	**68,1**	3,5
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	6,9	9,2	**16,1**	10,1	41,7	28,4	**70,1**	3,7
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	8,3	12,4	**20,7**	7,6	38,3	31,2	**69,5**	2,2
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	6,2	8,0	**14,2**	7,1	33,5	43,1	**76,6**	2,1

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 33- f: To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding Syrians in Turkey? (%)

	Completely disagree	Disagree	Combined Disagree	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	Combined Agree	No idea/ No response
Middle-school								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	23,4	17,6	**41,0**	12,1	30,3	15,3	**45,6**	1,3
I think that Syrians will harm our society	10,4	12,7	**23,1**	11,0	44,2	20,8	**65,0**	0,9
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	5,8	8,1	**13,9**	10,1	46,8	26,9	**73,7**	2,3
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	10,1	12,4	**22,5**	11,0	41,0	24,3	**65,3**	1,2
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	8,7	9,8	**18,5**	11,0	47,7	20,8	**68,5**	2,0
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	5,8	12,1	**17,9**	12,4	41,9	25,1	**67,0**	2,7
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	6,6	10,7	**17,3**	9,5	46,6	25,1	**71,7**	1,5
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	9,2	10,4	**19,6**	11,3	44,8	22,5	**67,3**	1,8
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	8,4	7,8	**16,2**	8,4	38,7	35,3	**74,0**	1,4
High school or equivalent								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	21,3	16,7	**38,0**	15,0	30,5	14,7	**45,2**	1,8
I think that Syrians will harm our society	12,3	11,1	**23,4**	13,6	40,6	21,1	**61,7**	1,3
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	8,5	9,6	**18,1**	8,6	44,6	27,1	**71,7**	1,6
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	13,8	13,1	**26,9**	10,0	39,3	22,2	**61,5**	1,6
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	10,4	9,7	**20,1**	10,2	42,5	24,4	**66,9**	2,8
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	9,8	9,6	**19,4**	14,9	39,4	23,2	**62,6**	3,1
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	8,2	10,0	**18,2**	10,3	43,5	24,8	**68,3**	3,2
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	11,6	11,7	**23,3**	9,2	41,6	23,8	**65,4**	2,1
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	8,8	7,0	**15,8**	8,4	38,8	35,1	**73,9**	1,9

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 33- g: To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding Syrians? (%)

	Completely disagree	Disagree	Combined Disagree	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	Combined Agree	No idea/ No response
University/Graduate degree								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	24,7	18,7	**43,4**	14,8	25,7	13,2	**38,9**	2,9
I think that Syrians will harm our society	11,9	11,5	**23,4**	15,4	36,0	23,0	**59,0**	2,2
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	8,6	8,4	**17,0**	9,7	42,0	29,2	**71,2**	2,1
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	14,6	12,3	**26,9**	13,8	36,0	21,6	**57,6**	1,7
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	9,9	9,3	**19,2**	11,1	40,1	27,0	**67,1**	2,6
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	10,7	10,7	**21,4**	16,5	34,4	24,5	**58,9**	3,2
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	9,9	10,7	**20,6**	13,6	37,7	25,3	**63,0**	2,8
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	10,5	11,9	**22,4**	13,6	35,2	26,3	**61,5**	2,5
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	8,2	8,2	**16,4**	8,8	35,6	37,7	**73,3**	1,5

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 33- h: To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding Syrians in Turkey? (%)

Based on Regions:	Completely disagree	Disagree	Combined Disagree	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	Combined Agree	No idea/ No response
Border cities								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	18,6	10,0	**28,6**	10,9	26,9	32,6	**59,5**	1,0
I think that Syrians will harm our society	8,8	7,9	**16,7**	12,2	33,7	36,4	**70,1**	1,0
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	7,2	6,1	**13,3**	8,4	36,4	40,5	**76,9**	1,4
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	7,2	5,2	**12,4**	9,5	34,8	42,3	**77,1**	1,0
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	6,3	6,3	**12,6**	7,5	36,0	43,2	**79,2**	0,7
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	5,2	5,9	**11,1**	11,8	34,2	41,6	**75,8**	1,3
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	4,8	5,9	**10,7**	8,4	36,0	43,0	**79,0**	1,9
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	5,2	6,1	**11,3**	10,2	30,8	45,7	**76,5**	2,0
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	5,0	3,8	**8,8**	7,7	29,6	51,8	**81,4**	2,1
Other cities*								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	22,2	18,3	**40,5**	14,7	31,7	10,8	**42,5**	2,3
I think that Syrians will harm our society	12,1	12,5	**24,6**	13,1	41,7	18,8	**60,5**	1,8
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	8,1	9,4	**17,5**	9,3	45,6	25,5	**71,1**	2,1
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	13,9	13,7	**27,6**	11,3	40,3	18,8	**59,1**	2,0
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	10,2	10,4	**20,6**	10,5	44,8	20,6	**65,4**	3,5
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	9,8	11,2	**21,0**	14,9	39,5	21,1	**60,6**	3,5
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	9,0	11,0	**20,0**	11,5	44,0	21,2	**65,2**	3,3
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	11,6	13,0	**24,6**	10,2	42,5	20,4	**62,9**	2,3
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	9,0	8,4	**17,4**	8,4	38,9	33,6	**72,5**	1,7

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 33- i: To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding Syrians in Turkey? (%)

	Completely disagree	Disagree	Combined Disagree	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	Combined Agree	No idea/ No response
Metropolitan cities								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	22,5	19,0	**41,5**	10,3	40,8	6,2	**47,0**	1,2
I think that Syrians will harm our society	13,2	11,5	**24,7**	10,8	51,3	11,8	**63,1**	1,4
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	9,2	9,0	**18,2**	9,3	56,5	15,0	**71,5**	1,0
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	10,0	14,2	**24,2**	9,3	49,2	16,8	**66,0**	0,5
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	9,7	9,8	**19,5**	10,2	55,8	12,5	**68,3**	2,0
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	9,5	9,7	**19,2**	13,2	50,3	15,5	**65,8**	1,8
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	8,0	10,2	**18,2**	9,8	57,3	13,3	**70,6**	1,4
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	10,5	11,8	**22,3**	9,2	53,8	13,2	**67,0**	1,5
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	10,8	7,3	**18,1**	6,5	43,5	30,3	**73,8**	1,6
Non-metropolitan cities								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	22,1	18,0	**40,1**	16,9	27,2	13,1	**40,3**	2,7
I think that Syrians will harm our society	11,5	13,1	**24,6**	14,2	36,9	22,3	**59,2**	2,0
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	7,6	9,6	**17,2**	9,3	40,3	30,7	**71,0**	2,5
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	15,9	13,5	**29,4**	12,3	35,9	19,7	**55,6**	2,7
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	10,5	10,6	**21,1**	10,7	39,3	24,6	**63,9**	4,3
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	10,0	11,9	**21,9**	15,7	34,2	23,9	**58,1**	4,3
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	9,4	11,4	**20,8**	12,3	37,5	25,1	**62,6**	4,3
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	12,2	13,6	**25,8**	10,7	37,0	24,0	**61,0**	2,5
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	8,1	9,0	**17,1**	9,4	36,6	35,2	**71,8**	1,7

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 33- j: To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding Syrians in Turkey? (%)

Based on employment status:	Completely disagree	Disagree	Combined Disagree	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	Combined Agree	No idea/ No response
Private sector employee								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	20,7	16,9	**37,6**	13,2	29,0	17,9	**46,9**	2,3
I think that Syrians will harm our society	10,0	10,2	**20,2**	13,0	39,4	26,6	**66,0**	0,8
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	7,7	6,0	**13,7**	7,7	43,3	33,5	**76,8**	1,8
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	11,5	12,1	**23,6**	10,2	36,3	28,6	**64,9**	1,3
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	9,4	7,7	**17,1**	7,2	44,6	28,4	**73,0**	2,7
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	9,8	7,2	**17,0**	12,4	37,1	29,8	**66,9**	3,7
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	8,3	7,0	**15,3**	10,0	40,3	31,6	**71,9**	2,8
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	10,9	9,0	**19,9**	8,3	37,9	32,2	**70,1**	1,7
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	8,8	5,5	**14,3**	7,0	33,3	43,7	**77,0**	1,7
Artisan/Tradesman								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	31,9	12,3	**44,2**	12,3	29,6	13,1	**42,7**	0,8
I think that Syrians will harm our society	15,6	11,3	**26,9**	8,9	44,0	19,2	**63,2**	1,0
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	8,9	8,4	**17,3**	7,4	47,9	26,2	**74,1**	1,2
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	20,0	10,1	**30,1**	8,7	41,5	18,5	**60,0**	1,2
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	12,6	9,4	**22,0**	8,4	45,9	22,5	**68,4**	1,2
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	11,1	9,1	**20,2**	15,3	41,0	21,7	**62,7**	1,8
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	9,9	10,6	**20,5**	9,6	48,6	19,8	**68,4**	1,5
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	13,6	11,9	**25,5**	10,6	42,5	20,5	**63,0**	0,9
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	10,1	5,7	**15,8**	8,9	43,0	30,9	**73,9**	1,4

Note: Occupation: "Other" and "no response" categories are not shown on the table as they were at very low numbers.

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 33- k: To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding Syrians in Turkey? (%)

	Completely disagree	Disagree	Combined Disagree	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	Combined Agree	No idea/ No response
Housewife/girl								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	13,9	19,9	**33,8**	14,8	35,0	14,2	**49,2**	2,2
I think that Syrians will harm our society	8,7	16,9	**25,6**	10,1	40,2	21,6	**61,8**	2,5
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	7,9	10,9	**18,8**	9,6	43,7	25,1	**68,8**	2,8
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	9,6	11,7	**21,3**	10,7	45,6	19,9	**65,5**	2,5
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	9,0	11,2	**20,2**	9,0	44,5	21,6	**66,1**	4,7
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	8,7	12,6	**21,3**	12,0	38,3	25,1	**63,4**	3,3
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	7,4	12,0	**19,4**	9,0	41,8	24,9	**66,7**	4,9
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	8,5	13,7	**22,2**	7,9	42,1	24,6	**66,7**	3,2
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	7,4	9,0	**16,4**	7,7	39,9	33,6	**73,5**	2,4
Student								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	19,8	19,5	**39,3**	16,3	31,2	11,5	**42,7**	1,7
I think that Syrians will harm our society	10,9	11,2	**22,1**	15,7	40,7	19,8	**60,5**	1,7
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	7,7	10,0	**17,7**	10,9	44,7	24,6	**69,3**	2,1
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	10,6	14,9	**25,5**	11,5	37,5	23,8	**61,3**	1,7
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	7,4	10,9	**18,3**	13,8	39,8	24,9	**64,7**	3,2
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	7,4	11,2	**18,6**	17,8	40,7	20,3	**61,0**	2,6
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	6,0	11,2	**17,2**	14,9	45,0	21,5	**66,5**	1,4
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	8,9	11,2	**20,1**	13,8	42,7	21,2	**63,9**	2,2
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	6,9	8,0	**14,9**	9,5	37,8	36,1	**73,9**	1,7

Note: Occupation: "Other and "no response" categories are not shown on the table as they were at very low numbers.

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 33- l: **To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding Syrians in Turkey? (%)**

	Completely disagree	Disagree	Combined Disagree	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	Combined Agree	No idea/ No response
Unemployed								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	21,2	15,3	**36,5**	19,6	31,2	10,6	**41,8**	2,1
I think that Syrians will harm our society	13,2	7,9	**21,1**	21,2	39,2	17,5	**56,7**	1,0
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	9,0	6,9	**15,9**	13,2	46,0	24,9	**70,9**	-
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	9,5	10,1	**19,6**	12,7	44,4	22,8	**67,2**	0,5
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	10,1	6,3	**16,4**	12,7	45,5	22,8	**68,3**	2,6
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	10,1	9,5	**19,6**	16,4	39,7	22,8	**62,5**	1,5
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	7,9	11,6	**19,5**	13,2	40,2	24,9	**65,1**	2,2
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	9,0	12,2	**21,2**	11,6	43,4	21,2	**64,6**	2,6
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	8,5	8,5	**17,0**	11,1	38,6	33,3	**71,9**	-
Retired								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	15,4	11,1	**26,5**	12,0	35,0	22,2	**57,2**	4,3
I think that Syrians will harm our society	6,8	9,4	**16,2**	12,0	41,9	25,6	**67,5**	4,3
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	4,3	8,5	**12,8**	8,5	40,2	35,0	**75,2**	3,5
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	9,4	6,0	**15,4**	12,0	42,7	25,6	**68,3**	4,3
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	4,2	10,3	**14,5**	6,8	41,9	30,8	**72,7**	6,0
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	5,1	10,3	**15,4**	11,1	37,6	29,9	**67,5**	6,0
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	6,8	10,3	**17,1**	7,7	37,6	30,8	**68,4**	6,8
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	6,8	14,5	**21,3**	7,7	36,8	29,9	**66,7**	4,3
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	6,8	7,7	**14,5**	4,3	33,3	44,4	**77,7**	3,5

Note: Occupation: "Other and "no response" categories are not shown on the table as they were at very low numbers.

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 33- m: To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding Syrians in Turkey? (%)

	Completely disagree	Disagree	Combined Disagree	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	Combined Agree	No idea/ No response
Public sector employee								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	17,7	22,1	**39,8**	11,5	31,0	16,8	**47,8**	0,9
I think that Syrians will harm our society	7,1	15,0	**22,1**	16,8	38,1	22,1	**60,2**	0,9
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	4,4	11,5	**15,9**	9,7	39,8	32,8	**72,6**	1,8
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	7,1	18,6	**25,7**	19,4	29,2	24,8	**54,0**	0,9
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	4,4	13,3	**17,7**	17,7	33,6	28,3	**61,9**	2,7
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	3,5	10,6	**14,1**	18,6	34,5	29,2	**63,7**	3,6
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	5,3	9,7	**15,0**	11,5	36,3	31,0	**67,3**	6,2
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	8,8	11,5	**20,3**	13,3	35,4	28,3	**63,7**	2,7
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	4,4	9,7	**14,1**	12,4	36,3	36,3	**72,6**	0,9
Self-employed								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	19,1	18,2	**37,3**	10,9	28,2	20,9	**49,1**	2,7
I think that Syrians will harm our society	11,8	10,0	**21,8**	11,8	36,4	28,2	**64,6**	1,8
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	5,5	11,8	**17,3**	5,5	40,9	33,6	**74,5**	2,7
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	12,7	11,8	**24,5**	10,9	32,7	29,1	**61,8**	2,8
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	9,1	10,9	**20,0**	9,1	45,5	23,6	**69,1**	1,8
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	6,4	11,8	**18,2**	12,7	39,1	27,3	**66,4**	2,7
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	9,1	10,0	**19,1**	10,0	43,6	25,5	**69,1**	1,8
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	7,3	14,5	**21,8**	10,9	39,1	27,3	**66,4**	0,9
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	5,5	10,0	**15,5**	7,2	30,9	45,5	**76,4**	0,9

Note: Occupation: "Other and "no response" categories are not shown on the table as they were at very low numbers.

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 33- n: To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding Syrians in Turkey? (%)

	Completely disagree	Disagree	Combined Disagree	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	Combined Agree	No idea/ No response
Businessperson								
I think that Syrians will harm me, my family, my children	36,8	14,1	**50,9**	7,0	26,3	15,8	**42,1**	-
I think that Syrians will harm our society	21,1	10,5	**31,6**	10,5	33,3	24,6	**57,9**	-
I think that Syrians will harm our country's economy	17,5	8,8	**26,3**	8,8	36,8	28,1	**64,9**	-
I think that Syrians will strip us of our jobs	29,8	14,1	**43,9**	8,8	29,8	17,5	**47,3**	-
I think that Syrians will harm Turkey's socio-cultural structure	15,8	7,0	**22,8**	12,3	35,1	29,8	**64,9**	-
I think that Syrians disturb social peace and morality by engaging in violence, theft, smuggling, and prostitution	12,3	17,5	**29,8**	10,5	33,3	24,6	**57,9**	1,8
I think that there will be reduction or deterioration in the public services provided by the state because of Syrians	15,8	7,0	**22,8**	12,2	42,1	21,1	**63,2**	1,8
I think that Syrians will corrupt Turkish society's identity	21,1	10,5	**31,6**	8,8	33,3	26,3	**59,6**	-
I am worried that Syrians will become citizens	15,8	12,3	**28,1**	5,2	22,8	43,9	**66,7**	-

Note: Occupation: "Other and "no response" categories are not shown on the table as they were at very low numbers.

SB-2020- ADDITIONAL TABLE 34- a: Have you/your family/those in your personal environment experienced any harm from a Syrian in the last 5 years? (%)

		Have you experienced personal harm?	Has someone in your family experienced harm?	Has someone in your personal environment experienced harm?
Sex				
Female	Yes	7,9	6,2	25,6
	No	91,5	92,9	72,1
	Don't remember/No response	0,6	0,9	2,3
Male	Yes	14,9	7,4	35,8
	No	84,2	91,9	62,6
	Don't remember/No response	0,9	0,7	1,6
Age Groups				
18-24	Yes	14,9	8,3	31,3
	No	83,6	90,4	67,0
	Don't remember/No response	1,5	1,3	1,7
25-34	Yes	10,5	7,8	33,8
	No	88,9	91,0	64,1
	Don't remember/No response	0,6	1,2	2,1
35-44	Yes	9,5	5,5	26,5
	No	89,9	94,3	72,3
	Don't remember/No response	0,6	0,2	1,2
45-54	Yes	10,0	4,5	32,1
	No	89,7	95,2	65,2
	Don't remember/No response	0,3	0,3	2,7
55-64	Yes	9,3	8,0	35,8
	No	90,1	91,4	61,7
	Don't remember/No response	0,6	0,6	2,5
65 and over	Yes	7,8	1,6	14,1
	No	92,2	98,4	84,4
	Don't remember/No response	-	-	1,5
General	Yes	11,4	6,8	30,8
	No	87,8	92,4	67,3
	Don't remember/No response	0,8	0,8	1,9

SB-2020- ADDITIONAL TABLE 34- b: Have you/your family/those in your personal environment experienced any harm from a Syrian in the last 5 years? (%)

		Have you experienced personal harm?	Has someone in your family experienced harm?	Has someone in your personal environment experienced harm?
Educational Attainment				
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	Yes	5,7	5,7	22,6
	No	94,3	94,3	73,6
	Don't remember/ No response	-	-	3,8
Primary school	Yes	10,6	7,3	31,9
	No	88,8	91,7	65,6
	Don't remember/ No response	0,7	0,9	2,5
Middle-school	Yes	13,0	6,1	32,1
	No	87,0	93,9	66,5
	Don't remember/ No response	-	-	1,4
High school or equivalent	Yes	12,9	6,9	32,8
	No	86,0	92,2	65,7
	Don't remember/ No response	1,1	0,9	1,5
University/ Graduate degree	Yes	8,8	6,8	25,7
	No	90,1	92,0	72,0
	Don't remember/ No response	1,0	1,2	2,3
Region				
Border cities	Yes	12,0	5,9	36,7
	No	87,8	93,4	61,8
	Don't remember/ No response	0,2	0,7	1,6
Other cities*	Yes	11,3	7,0	29,3
	No	87,8	92,1	68,7
	Don't remember/ No response	0,9	0,8	2,0
Metropolitan cities	Yes	10,7	6,8	30,5
	No	88,8	92,3	68,3
	Don't remember/ No response	0,5	0,8	1,2
Non- Metropolitan cities	Yes	11,6	7,1	28,8
	No	87,3	92,0	68,9
	Don't remember/ No response	1,2	0,8	2,4
Generel	Yes	11,4	6,8	30,8
	No	87,8	92,4	67,3
	Don't remember/ No response	0,8	0,8	1,9

SB-2020- ADDITIONAL TABLE 34- c: Have you/your family/those in your personal environment experienced any harm from a Syrian in the last 5 years? (%)

		Have you experienced personal harm?	Has someone in your family experienced harm?	Has someone in your personal environment experienced harm?
Occupation				
Private sector employee	Yes	12,2	6,0	34,3
	No	87,0	93,2	64,0
	Don't remember/ No response	0,8	0,8	1,7
Artisan/ Tradesman	Yes	11,6	5,9	27,9
	No	87,7	93,8	70,9
	Don't remember/ No response	0,7	0,2	1,2
Housewife/girl	Yes	3,8	5,5	25,1
	No	95,6	94,0	72,4
	Don't remember/ No response	0,5	0,5	2,5
Student	Yes	16,6	9,7	35,5
	No	81,4	88,0	62,2
	Don't remember/ No response	2,0	2,3	2,3
Unemployed	Yes	12,7	10,1	31,7
	No	86,8	89,4	66,1
	Don't remember/ No response	0,5	0,5	2,1
Retired	Yes	12,0	6,0	32,5
	No	88,0	94,0	66,7
	Don't remember/ No response	-	-	0,9
Public sector employee	Yes	8,0	7,1	23,0
	No	92,0	92,9	74,3
	Don't remember/ No response	-	-	2,7
Self-employed	Yes	14,5	6,4	34,5
	No	85,5	93,6	64,5
	Don't remember/ No response	-	-	0,9
Businessperson	Yes	17,5	3,5	29,8
	No	82,5	96,5	68,4
	Don't remember/ No response	-	-	1,8
General	Yes	11,4	6,8	30,8
	No	87,8	92,4	67,3
	Don't remember/ No response	0,8	0,8	1,9
Note: Occupation: "Other and "no response" categories are not shown on the table as they were at low numbers				

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 35- a: What kind of harm have you experienced because of a Syrian? (Multiple Response %)

	Theft	Bullying/ Harassment	Violence	Unrest/Noise	Occupation of property	Loss of a job	Disruption of family order due to affair/ marriage	Financial/ economic damage	Other	No idea/No response
Sex										
Female	45,1	46,8	32,9	37,6	13,9	4,0	3,5	1,2	1,7	1,2
Male	50,0	44,3	46,5	36,0	15,5	6,8	2,2	1,1	1,3	0,9
Age Groups										
18-24	39,2	38,8	35,1	34,7	9,3	6,0	1,5	0,7	2,2	1,1
25-34	44,2	49,5	38,4	36,8	14,7	8,4	4,2	0,5	2,1	-
35-44	50,3	50,3	41,2	34,6	15,7	5,2	2,0	2,6	-	1,3
45-54	54,6	47,1	50,4	33,6	19,3	3,4	4,2	0,8	1,7	0,8
55-64	74,6	44,4	55,6	50,8	25,4	1,6	3,2	1,6	-	3,2
65 and over	63,6	54,5	18,2	63,6	27,3	-	-	-	-	-
Educational Attainment										
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	60,0	33,3	46,7	13,3	26,7	-	-	-	-	-
Primary school	61,4	48,4	50,3	40,5	20,9	1,3	2,6	0,7	0,7	2,0
Middle-school	60,9	48,4	38,3	35,9	21,1	7,8	1,6	1,6	-	-
High school or equivalent	40,4	41,5	39,8	35,7	10,4	6,0	3,3	0,8	2,5	1,1
University/Graduate degree	39,6	50,7	34,0	38,2	12,5	7,6	2,8	2,1	1,4	0,7
Region										
Border cities	56,2	29,7	42,2	17,3	4,3	3,2	4,3	0,5	3,8	1,1
Other cities*	45,4	50,1	40,2	42,5	17,9	6,3	2,3	1,3	0,8	1,0
Metropolitan cities	43,3	49,3	40,6	31,3	11,5	5,1	0,9	2,3	0,9	0,9
Non- metropolitan cities	46,5	50,5	40,0	48,5	21,4	7,0	3,0	0,7	0,7	1,0
Occupation										
Private sector employee	47,6	43,3	42,4	35,7	14,3	4,8	3,8	1,0	2,9	-
Artisan/Tradesman	51,9	42,9	39,8	35,3	15,8	3,8	1,5	2,3	1,5	1,5
Housewife/girl	53,5	52,5	39,6	43,6	23,8	5,0	4,0	1,0	-	2,0
Student	38,8	42,8	30,3	34,2	10,5	7,2	1,3	0,7	2,6	1,3
Unemployed	40,0	48,6	37,1	35,7	4,3	1,4	-	1,4	-	1,4
Retired	73,8	57,1	64,3	50,0	21,4	2,4	2,4	-	-	-
Public sector employee	44,8	48,3	58,6	34,5	13,8	3,4	6,9	-	-	-
Self-employed	53,7	39,0	46,3	26,8	26,8	14,6	4,9	2,4	-	2,4
Businessperson	33,3	38,1	42,9	33,3	4,8	19,0	4,8	-	-	-
General	47,9	45,4	40,7	36,7	14,8	5,6	2,7	1,1	1,5	1,0

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 48- a: To what extent would you agree with the following statements concerning the effects of Syrians living in our country? (Scored)

	We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	We can live together with Syrians in serenity	Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	Average Score
Sex					
Female	1,9	1,7	1,5	1,5	1,6
Male	1,9	1,7	1,5	1,4	1,7
Age Groups					
18-24	1,8	1,7	1,4	1,4	1,6
25-34	2,0	1,8	1,5	1,5	1,7
35-44	2,0	1,7	1,6	1,5	1,7
45-54	2,0	1,7	1,6	1,5	1,7
55-64	2,0	1,6	1,6	1,5	1,7
65 and over	2,1	1,8	1,6	1,4	1,7
Occupation					
Illiterate/ Literate but not graduate of any school	1,9	1,9	1,7	1,5	1,7
Primary school	2,1	1,7	1,6	1,5	1,7
Middle-school	2,0	1,7	1,5	1,4	1,6
High-school or equivalent	1,9	1,7	1,5	1,4	1,6
University/Graduate degree	1,8	1,8	1,5	1,5	1,6
Region					
Border cities	1,7	1,4	1,3	1,3	1,4
Other cities*	2,0	1,8	1,6	1,5	1,7
Metropolitan cities	1,8	1,7	1,6	1,5	1,7
Non-Metropolitan cities	2,0	1,8	1,5	1,5	1,7
Employment status					
Private sector employee	1,9	1,6	1,4	1,4	1,6
Artisan/Tradesman	2,0	1,7	1,5	1,4	1,7
Housewife/girl	2,0	1,8	1,6	1,6	1,8
Student	1,7	1,7	1,5	1,5	1,6
Unemployed	1,8	1,8	1,5	1,4	1,6
Retired	2,0	1,6	1,6	1,4	1,7
Public sector employee	2,0	1,7	1,4	1,5	1,7
Self-employed	1,9	1,5	1,5	1,4	1,6
Businessperson	1,9	1,8	1,6	1,5	1,7
General	1,9	1,7	1,5	1,5	1,6

0-2,99	3,0-5,0	

Note: Employment status: "Other and "no response" categories are not shown on the table as they were at low numbers.

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 48- b: To what extent would you agree with the following statements concerning the effects of Syrians living in our country? (%)

	Completely disagree	Disagree	Combined Disagree	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	Combined Agree	No idea/ No response
Female								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	65,8	20,1	85,9	5,6	5,1	1,0	6,1	2,4
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	65,7	21,3	87,0	6,5	4,3	0,4	4,7	1,8
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	58,5	20,1	78,6	10,4	8,8	1,0	9,8	1,2
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	53,2	18,9	72,1	8,1	13,4	4,2	17,6	2,2
Male								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	69,0	15,1	84,1	5,9	8,3	0,6	8,9	1,1
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	70,5	17,5	88,0	5,0	5,3	0,5	5,8	1,2
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	62,9	14,4	77,3	10,3	9,8	1,3	11,1	1,3
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	54,2	15,9	70,1	8,9	12,2	6,5	18,7	2,3

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 48- c: To what extent would you agree with the following statements concerning the effects of Syrians living in our country? (%)

Based on age groups:	Completely disagree	Disagree	Combined Disagree	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	Combined Agree	No idea/ No response
18-24								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	71,7	15,8	87,5	5,7	4,7	0,6	5,3	1,5
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	70,2	18,8	89,0	6,5	3,2	0,1	3,3	1,2
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	62,1	17,2	79,3	11,0	8,2	0,6	8,8	0,9
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	57,7	18,1	75,8	8,5	9,5	3,6	13,1	2,6
25-34								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	67,2	18,7	85,9	5,9	5,8	1,0	6,8	1,4
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	67,0	20,1	87,1	6,6	5,3	0,2	5,5	0,8
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	57,8	16,8	74,6	12,5	10,5	1,2	11,7	1,2
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	51,6	17,4	69,0	9,0	12,7	6,8	19,5	2,5
35-44								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	66,2	18,0	84,2	5,9	7,9	0,8	8,7	1,2
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	68,2	19,8	88,0	5,5	5,3	0,6	5,9	0,6
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	61,3	17,8	79,1	9,3	9,7	1,0	10,7	0,9
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	53,6	18,0	71,6	7,5	14,4	5,5	19,9	1,0

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 48- d: To what extent would you agree with the following statements concerning the effects of Syrians living in our country? (%)

	Completely disagree	Disagree	Combined Disagree	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	Combined Agree	No idea/ No response
45-54								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	64,2	18,8	83,0	6,1	8,2	0,9	9,1	1,8
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	67,3	20,0	87,3	4,2	5,5	1,2	6,7	1,8
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	62,4	16,7	79,1	8,5	9,7	1,5	11,2	1,2
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	51,2	17,0	68,2	8,5	15,8	5,7	21,5	1,8
55-64								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	63,6	16,0	79,6	5,6	9,9	1,2	11,1	3,7
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	67,3	17,9	85,2	4,3	6,8	0,6	7,4	3,1
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	61,7	17,9	79,6	8,0	9,3	0,6	9,9	2,5
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	51,8	14,2	66,0	10,5	13,6	6,8	20,4	3,1
65 and over								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	57,8	20,3	78,1	4,7	10,9	-	10,9	6,3
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	60,9	17,2	78,1	4,7	6,2	1,6	7,8	9,4
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	53,1	17,2	70,3	9,4	6,2	7,8	14,0	6,3
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	45,3	15,6	60,9	7,8	20,3	6,3	26,6	4,7

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 48- e: To what extent would you agree with the following statements concerning the effects of Syrians living in our country? (%)

Based on educational attainment:	Kesinlikle katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum + Katılmıyorum	Ne katılıyor, ne katılmıyorum	Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle katılıyorum	Kesinlikle Katılıyorum + Katılıyorum	Fikrim yok/ cevap yok
Illiterate/Literate but not graduate of any school								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	49,0	34,0	83,0	5,7	5,7	1,8	7,5	3,8
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	58,5	26,4	84,9	3,7	5,7	-	5,7	5,7
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	51,0	26,4	77,4	9,4	11,3	1,9	13,2	-
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	51,0	24,5	75,5	7,5	11,3	3,8	15,1	1,9
Primary school								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	61,7	20,2	81,9	5,3	7,8	1,4	9,2	3,6
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	65,1	21,4	86,5	3,4	5,3	1,4	6,7	3,4
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	59,4	20,2	79,6	7,1	8,7	2,1	10,8	2,5
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	48,4	17,7	66,1	7,6	16,3	7,3	23,6	2,7
Middle-school								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	70,8	16,2	87,0	6,1	6,1	0,3	6,4	0,5
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	69,9	18,5	88,4	6,1	4,9	-	4,9	0,6
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	63,3	15,0	78,3	10,4	9,5	0,9	10,4	0,9
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	55,2	15,0	70,2	8,1	13,3	6,6	19,9	1,8
High-school or equivalent								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	69,0	16,5	85,5	5,7	6,4	0,9	7,3	1,5
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	69,4	19,0	88,4	5,4	4,8	0,3	5,1	1,1
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	61,6	17,4	79,0	10,2	8,7	0,9	9,6	1,2
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	54,2	17,0	71,2	8,2	12,9	5,2	18,1	2,5
University/Graduate degree								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	69,1	16,3	85,4	6,4	7,0	0,4	7,4	0,8
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	68,1	18,3	86,4	8,4	4,1	0,4	4,5	0,7
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	59,5	14,8	74,3	13,6	10,5	1,0	11,5	0,6
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	56,8	18,9	75,7	10,3	9,3	3,1	12,4	1,6

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 48- f: To what extent would you agree with the following statements concerning the effects of Syrians living in our country? (%)

Based on regions:	Completely disagree	Disagree	Combined Disagree	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	Combined Agree	No idea/ No response
Border cities								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	83,7	4,5	88,2	3,8	5,7	0,7	6,4	1,6
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	81,9	7,2	89,1	4,1	4,7	0,7	5,4	1,4
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	80,8	6,1	86,9	7,0	4,3	0,9	5,2	0,9
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	64,5	8,8	73,3	10,6	13,6	1,1	14,7	1,4
Other cities*								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	63,4	20,7	84,1	6,3	7,0	0,8	7,8	1,8
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	64,8	22,3	87,1	6,2	4,8	0,4	5,2	1,5
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	55,9	19,9	75,8	11,2	10,5	1,2	11,7	1,3
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	51,1	19,5	70,6	8,0	12,6	6,4	19,0	2,4
Metropolitan cities								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	63,7	22,2	85,9	5,3	7,3	0,8	8,1	0,7
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	65,7	21,5	87,2	6,5	5,3	0,3	5,6	0,7
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	57,5	20,5	78,0	9,3	11,2	0,7	11,9	0,8
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	56,6	21,2	77,8	6,2	10,1	4,7	14,8	1,2
Non-metropolitan cities								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	63,4	20,0	83,4	6,7	6,8	0,8	7,6	2,3
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	64,3	22,8	87,1	6,0	4,5	0,5	5,0	1,9
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	55,1	19,6	74,7	12,1	10,2	1,5	11,7	1,5
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	48,3	18,7	67,0	8,9	13,8	7,2	21,0	3,1

Based on occupation:

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 48- g: To what extent would you agree with the following statements concerning the effects of Syrians living in our country? (%)

	Completely disagree	Disagree	Combined Disagree	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	Combined Agree	No idea/ No response
Private sector employee								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	72,9	16,2	89,1	3,0	6,2	0,8	7,0	0,9
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	71,9	17,0	88,9	5,3	4,7	0,2	4,9	0,9
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	65,9	12,8	78,7	11,3	8,5	0,6	9,1	0,9
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	56,9	14,3	71,2	7,9	11,8	7,0	18,8	2,1
Artisan/Tradesman								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	71,4	13,8	85,2	5,9	7,7	0,7	8,4	0,5
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	76,0	13,6	89,6	4,4	4,9	0,8	5,7	0,3
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	64,7	12,6	77,3	9,1	10,9	2,0	12,9	0,7
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	57,0	12,9	69,9	7,2	14,1	8,1	22,2	0,7
Housewife/girl								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	54,1	27,3	81,4	6,6	6,8	1,4	8,2	3,8
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	56,0	27,0	83,0	7,1	5,5	1,1	6,6	3,3
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	50,5	27,0	77,5	8,2	10,9	1,4	12,3	2,0
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	44,3	23,2	67,5	9,6	16,7	3,3	20,0	2,9
Student								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	68,8	16,6	85,4	6,0	6,3	0,9	7,2	1,4
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	65,6	21,5	87,1	7,2	4,6	0,3	4,9	0,8
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	59,6	20,3	79,9	9,7	8,9	0,3	9,2	1,2
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	57,0	20,6	77,6	6,6	10,3	2,6	12,9	2,9
Unemployed								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	68,3	18,5	86,8	7,4	3,2	1,0	4,2	1,6
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	70,9	18,5	89,4	6,4	2,6	-	2,6	1,6
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	55,0	20,1	75,1	14,8	7,4	1,6	9,0	1,1
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	56,1	19,6	75,7	11,6	6,4	4,2	10,6	2,1

Note: Occupation: "Other and "no response" categories are not shown on the table as they were at low numbers.

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 48- h: To what extent would you agree with the following statements concerning the effects of Syrians living in our country? (%)

	Completely disagree	Disagree	Combined Disagree	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Completely agree	Combined Agree	No idea/ No response
Retired								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	66,7	12,0	78,7	8,5	9,4	0,9	10,3	2,5
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	69,2	15,4	84,6	4,3	6,0	0,9	6,9	4,2
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	65,0	12,8	77,8	9,4	7,7	2,6	10,3	2,5
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	53,0	13,7	66,7	10,3	14,5	6,0	20,5	2,5
Public sector employee								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	65,5	20,4	85,9	7,1	3,5	-	3,5	3,5
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	61,9	27,4	89,3	7,1	1,8	-	1,8	1,8
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	57,5	18,6	76,1	14,2	7,0	1,8	8,8	0,9
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	44,3	21,2	65,5	10,6	15,1	4,4	19,5	4,4
Self-employed								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	70,9	13,6	84,5	6,4	7,3	-	7,3	1,8
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	70,9	20,0	90,9	4,5	3,6	-	3,6	1,0
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	67,3	13,6	80,9	9,1	8,2	-	8,2	1,8
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	51,8	18,2	70,0	9,1	12,7	5,5	18,2	2,7
Businessperson								
Syrian refugees are good for our country's economy	68,4	12,3	80,7	7,0	12,3	-	12,3	-
Syrian refugees are culturally enriching us	71,9	15,8	87,7	1,8	10,5	-	10,5	-
We can live together with Syrians in serenity	64,9	10,5	75,4	8,8	15,8	-	15,8	-
We have shown the world that we are a strong state by accepting Syrian refugees	57,9	14,0	71,9	8,8	14,0	5,3	19,3	-

Note: Occupation: "Other and "no response" categories are not shown on the table as they were at low numbers.

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 86- a: To what extent have you experienced problems regarding the following areas as a family in Turkey? (%) Region

		Experiencing a lot of problems	Experiencing problems	COMBINED PROBLEMS	Sometimes experiencing sometimes not experiencing problems	Not experiencing problems	Not experiencing problems at all	COMBINED NO PROBLEMS	No idea/ No Response
Working conditions	Border cities	12,0	50,1	**62,1**	18,0	14,0	5,2	**19,2**	0,7
	Other cities*	21,1	27,9	**49,0**	12,9	36,4	0,9	**37,3**	0,8
	Metropolitan cities	22,7	30,4	**53,1**	13,9	32,1	0,6	**32,7**	0,3
	Non-Metropolitan cities	18,0	23,3	**41,3**	11,1	44,4	1,6	**46,0**	1,6
Food aid	Border cities	7,0	45,1	**52,1**	20,0	19,6	7,1	**26,7**	1,2
	Other cities*	15,5	27,0	**42,5**	11,5	44,7	1,3	**46,0**	-
	Metropolitan cities	16,8	31,5	**48,3**	10,0	40,3	1,4	**41,7**	-
	Non-Metropolitan cities	13,2	18,5	**31,7**	14,3	52,9	1,1	**54,0**	-
Accommodation	Border cities	6,6	34,2	**40,8**	19,6	29,7	8,7	**38,4**	1,2
	Other cities*	13,7	26,2	**39,9**	8,1	49,9	1,8	**51,7**	0,3
	Metropolitan cities	16,2	30,1	**46,3**	8,2	43,2	2,3	**45,5**	-
	Non-Metropolitan cities	9,0	19,0	**28,0**	7,9	62,4	1,1	**63,5**	0,6
Health	Border cities	10,5	27,5	**38,0**	16,3	37,7	7,2	**44,9**	0,8
	Other cities*	16,3	24,8	**41,1**	7,6	49,9	1,3	**51,2**	0,1
	Metropolitan cities	19,9	26,4	**46,3**	7,1	44,9	1,7	**46,6**	-
	Non-Metropolitan cities	9,5	21,7	**31,2**	8,5	59,3	0,5	**59,8**	0,5
Communication (Language)	Border cities	5,4	9,5	**14,9**	35,4	39,1	6,0	**45,1**	4,6
	Other cities*	10,9	22,2	**33,1**	13,1	50,8	2,6	**53,4**	0,4
	Metropolitan cities	13,4	21,6	**35,0**	13,6	48,6	2,6	**51,2**	0,2
	Non-Metropolitan cities	6,3	23,3	**29,6**	12,2	55,0	2,6	**57,6**	0,6
Education	Border cities	3,4	16,3	**19,7**	19,7	43,1	8,8	**51,9**	8,7
	Other cities*	8,9	16,3	**25,2**	5,9	57,3	4,4	**61,7**	7,2
	Metropolitan cities	9,7	18,8	**28,5**	6,3	55,7	2,8	**58,5**	6,7
	Non-Metropolitan cities	7,4	11,6	**19,0**	5,3	60,3	7,4	**67,7**	8,0
Protection support/ legal support	Border cities	2,1	1,6	**3,7**	8,9	69,5	10,8	**80,3**	7,1
	Other cities*	10,5	10,4	**20,9**	7,9	54,3	10,5	**64,8**	6,4
	Metropolitan cities	12,2	13,1	**25,3**	9,9	54,0	2,3	**56,3**	8,5
	Non-Metropolitan cities	7,4	5,3	**12,7**	4,2	55,0	25,9	**80,9**	2,2
Discrimination	Border cities	2,7	2,7	**5,4**	10,4	72,2	9,6	**81,8**	2,4
	Other cities*	8,5	15,9	**24,4**	10,5	59,5	5,2	**64,7**	0,4
	Metropolitan cities	11,6	19,3	**30,9**	10,5	55,4	2,6	**58,0**	0,6
	Non-Metropolitan cities	2,6	9,5	**12,1**	10,6	67,2	10,1	**77,3**	-

* Other cities include metropolitan cities and non-metropolitan cities

SB-2020- ADDITIONAL TABLE 94- a: Have you ever established the following types of social relationships with a Turkish citizen? (%)

		Yes	No	I don't remember/
To have a conver-sation	Kadın	no re-sponse	28,9	1,0
	Erkek	84,9	14,7	0,4
To shop (from a Turkish citizen)	Kadın	61,1	37,2	1,7
	Erkek	85,5	14,0	0,5
To establish a business relationship	Kadın	48,6	49,5	1,9
	Erkek	86,9	11,9	1,2
To be friends	Kadın	59,5	38,9	1,6
	Erkek	78,8	20,1	1,1
To fight	Kadın	3,4	88,7	7,9
	Erkek	4,6	86,5	8,9
To have a problem	Kadın	3,5	88,2	8,3
	Erkek	4,3	87,2	8,5
To flirt	Kadın	0,8	90,7	8,5
	Erkek	2,3	88,8	8,9
To get married	Kadın	4,4	88,0	7,6
	Erkek	6,6	83,9	9,5
Support/ solidarity	Kadın	9,8	79,9	10,3
	solidarity	15,7	74,1	10,2

SB-2020- ADDITIONAL TABLE 94- b: Have you ever established the following types of social relationships with a Turkish citizen? (%)

		Yes	No	I don't remember/ no response
To have a conversation	18-24	75,2	24,0	0,8
	25-34	75,1	24,5	0,4
	35-44	82,1	17,2	0,7
	45-54	82,2	16,9	0,9
	55-64	78,4	20,6	1,0
	65 and over	75,7	24,3	-
To shop (from a Turkish citizen)	18-24	70,4	28,8	0,8
	25-34	71,8	27,4	0,8
	35-44	79,8	19,3	0,9
	45-54	78,5	20,7	0,8
	55-64	73,2	25,8	1,0
	65 and over	70,3	24,3	5,4
To establish a business relationship	18-24	68,0	29,6	2,4
	25-34	72,6	26,8	0,6
	35-44	73,8	25,3	0,9
	45-54	70,2	26,9	2,9
	55-64	61,9	35,1	3,0
	65 and over	51,4	45,9	2,7
To be friends	18-24	57,6	40,8	1,6
	25-34	66,3	32,8	0,9
	35-44	75,6	23,0	1,4
	45-54	76,0	22,7	1,3
	55-64	72,2	24,7	3,1
	65 and over	75,7	21,6	2,7
To fight	18-24	7,2	88,8	4,0
	25-34	6,3	85,4	8,3
	35-44	2,3	88,0	9,7
	45-54	2,9	88,8	8,3
	55-64	-	89,7	10,3
	65 and over	5,4	86,5	8,1

SB-2020- ADDITIONAL TABLE 94- c: Have you ever established the following types of social relationships with a Turkish citizen? (%)

		Yes	No	I don't remember/ no response
To have a problem	18-24	6,4	91,2	2,4
	25-34	5,4	86,2	8,4
	35-44	2,8	87,4	9,8
	45-54	2,5	88,4	9,1
	55-64	2,1	89,7	8,2
	65 and over	5,4	86,5	8,1
To flirt	18-24	3,2	92,8	4,0
	25-34	2,5	88,9	8,6
	35-44	0,7	89,2	10,1
	45-54	1,7	89,7	8,6
	55-64	-	89,7	10,3
	65 and over	2,7	91,9	5,4
To get married	18-24	2,4	90,4	7,2
	25-34	3,6	87,7	8,7
	35-44	6,2	84,1	9,7
	45-54	9,1	84,3	6,6
	55-64	7,2	81,4	11,4
	65 and over	10,8	81,1	8,1
Support/	18-24	7,2	79,2	13,6
	25-34	13,2	78,0	8,8
	35-44	14,9	74,5	10,6
	45-54	13,6	76,9	9,5
	55-64	8,2	78,4	13,4
	65 and over	24,3	64,9	10,8

SB-2020- ADDITIONAL TABLE 94- d: Have you ever established the following types of social relationships with a Turkish citizen? (%)

Based on educational attainment:		Yes	No	Don't remember/ no response
To have a conver-sation	Illiterate	70,7	22,4	6,9
	Literate but not graduate of any school	90,2	9,8	-
	Primary School	73,1	26,7	0,2
	Middle-School	79,9	20,1	-
	High-school or equivalent	85,7	14,3	-
	2-year associate degree/Vocational school of higher education	84,4	15,6	-
	Undergraduate/Graduate/PhD degree	86,9	13,1	-
To shop (from a Syrian)	Illiterate	64,7	28,4	6,9
	Literate but not graduate of any school	66,7	33,3	-
	Primary School	73,9	26,1	-
	Middle-School	75,7	23,7	0,6
	High-school or equivalent	81,5	18,0	0,5
	2-year associate degree/Vocational school of higher education	81,2	17,2	1,6
	Undergraduate/Graduate/PhD degree	80,8	17,7	1,5
To establish a business relationship	Illiterate	54,3	38,8	6,9
	Literate but not graduate of any school	52,9	45,1	2,0
	Primary School	70,7	29,1	0,2
	Middle-School	73,7	25,7	0,6
	High-school or equivalent	75,6	23,3	1,1
	2-year associate degree/Vocational school of higher education	76,5	17,2	6,3
	Undergraduate/Graduate/PhD degree	75,4	22,3	2,3
To be friends	Illiterate	59,5	34,5	6,0
	Literate but not graduate of any school	62,7	35,3	2,0
	Primary School	66,0	33,2	0,8
	Middle-School	74,9	24,9	0,2
	High-school or equivalent	77,8	21,2	1,0
	2-year associate degree/Vocational school of higher education	76,6	23,4	-
	Undergraduate/Graduate/PhD degree	77,7	19,2	3,1
To fight	Illiterate	2,6	91,4	6,0
	Literate but not graduate of any school	-	98,0	2,0
	Primary School	4,2	91,5	4,3
	Middle-School	5,0	86,3	8,7
	High-school or equivalent	5,8	82,5	11,7
	2-year associate degree/Vocational school of higher education	1,6	76,6	21,8
	Undergraduate/Graduate/PhD degree	3,1	79,2	17,7

SB-2020- ADDITIONAL TABLE 94- e: Have you ever established the following types of social relationships with a Turkish citizen? (%)

		Evet	Hayır	Hatırlamıyorum/cevap yok
Problems	Illiterate	-	94,8	5,2
	Literate but not graduate of any school	2,0	98,0	-
	Primary School	3,8	91,7	4,5
	Middle-School	5,3	85,5	9,2
	High-school or equivalent	5,8	82,5	11,7
	22-year associate degree/Vocational school of higher education	1,6	79,7	18,7
	Undergraduate/Graduate/PhD degree	3,8	78,5	17,7
Flirting	Illiterate	0,9	94,8	4,3
	Literate but not graduate of any school	-	100,0	-
	Primary School	1,8	93,1	5,1
	Middle-School	1,1	89,4	9,5
	High-school or equivalent	4,2	84,7	11,1
	2-year associate degree/Vocational school of higher education	-	78,1	21,9
	Undergraduate/Graduate/PhD degree	1,5	80,8	17,7
Marriage	Illiterate	7,8	87,1	5,1
	Literate but not graduate of any school	9,8	90,2	-
	Primary School	5,9	88,5	5,6
	Middle-School	3,9	86,9	9,2
	High-school or equivalent	5,8	83,6	10,6
	2-year associate degree/Vocational school of higher education	6,3	73,4	20,3
	Undergraduate/Graduate/PhD degree	5,4	76,9	17,7
Support/	Illiterate	10,3	81,9	7,8
	Literate but not graduate of any school	19,6	78,4	2,0
	Primary School	13,2	79,6	7,2
	Middle-School	11,5	77,9	10,6
	High-school or equivalent	15,9	72,5	11,6
	2-year associate degree/Vocational school of higher education	7,8	70,3	21,9
	Undergraduate/Graduate/PhD degree	16,9	63,9	19,2

SB-2020- ADDITIONAL TABLE 94- f: Have you ever established the following types of social relationships with a Turkish citizen? (%)

Based on regions:		Yes	No	Don't remember/ No response
To have a conversation	Border cities	81,4	17,6	1,0
	Other cities*	74,3	25,5	0,2
	Metropolitan cities	69,0	31,0	-
	Non-Metropolitan cities	84,1	15,3	0,6
To shop (from a Turkish citizen)	Border cities	76,2	22,3	1,5
	Other cities*	73,9	25,9	0,2
	Metropolitan cities	70,7	29,3	-
	Non-Metropolitan cities	79,9	19,6	0,5
To establish a business relationship	Border cities	70,6	27,3	2,1
	Other cities*	71,3	28,3	0,4
	Metropolitan cities	66,8	33,2	-
	Non-Metropolitan cities	79,9	19,0	1,1
To be friends	Border cities	74,7	23,3	2,0
	Other cities*	64,3	35,5	0,2
	Metropolitan cities	63,4	36,6	-
	Non-Metropolitan cities	66,1	33,3	0,6
To fight	Border cities	2,2	84,9	12,9
	Other cities*	7,2	91,5	1,3
	Metropolitan cities	4,8	94,9	0,3
	Non-Metropolitan cities	11,6	85,2	3,2
To have a problem	Border cities	2,1	85,0	12,9
	Other cities*	7,0	91,9	1,1
	Metropolitan cities	5,7	94,3	-
	Non-Metropolitan cities	9,5	87,3	3,2
To flirt	Border cities	1,0	86,0	13,0
	Other cities*	2,8	95,4	1,8
	Metropolitan cities	2,3	97,7	-
	Non-Metropolitan cities	3,7	91,0	5,3
To get married	Border cities	7,6	80,2	12,2
	Other cities*	2,6	94,5	2,9
	Metropolitan cities	2,0	98,0	-
	Non-Metropolitan cities	3,7	87,8	8,5
Support/	Border cities	12,4	75,1	12,5
	Other cities*	14,6	78,7	6,7
	Metropolitan cities	13,1	85,8	1,1
	Non-Metropolitan cities	17,5	65,6	16,9

* Other cities include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 102- a: How does Turkish society treat Syrians? (Multiple responses %)

	Our society has embraced Syrians	Our society is exploiting Syrians as cheap labor	Our society is doing everything it can for Syrians	Our society treats Syrians badly	Türk toplumu Our society looks down on Syrians	No idea/No response
Sex						
Female	54,1	35,8	27,4	3,4	2,5	10,3
Male	68,2	33,9	36,6	3,2	1,6	2,7
Age Groups						
18-24	62,4	20,0	26,4	4,0	2,4	8,0
25-34	68,2	36,6	29,3	4,0	2,1	3,8
35-44	58,2	38,6	37,0	3,0	1,1	7,1
45-54	59,9	33,5	35,1	2,9	2,5	5,4
55-64	57,7	33,0	32,0	2,1	4,1	6,2
65 and over	62,2	27,0	35,1	-	-	13,5
Educational Attainment						
Illiterate	44,0	25,9	35,3	1,7	2,6	19,8
Literate but not graduate of any school	47,1	25,5	54,9	3,9	2,0	3,9
Primary School	65,8	33,8	31,4	3,6	1,6	5,5
Middle-School	65,6	35,5	26,5	3,6	2,5	4,5
High-school or equivalent	68,8	39,2	33,3	2,1	2,6	2,1
2-year associate degree/Vocational school of higher education	46,9	46,9	39,1	3,1	-	6,3
Undergraduate/Graduate/PhD degree	60,0	35,4	40,0	3,8	1,5	4,6
Region						
Border cities	58,9	25,9	38,9	1,6	1,4	8,0
Other cities*	67,8	49,0	22,7	5,9	3,0	2,4
Metropolitan cities	57,1	52,0	28,4	8,2	4,5	3,1
Non-Metropolitan cities	87,8	43,4	12,2	1,6	-	1,1
General	**62,3**	**34,7**	**32,7**	**3,3**	**2,0**	**5,9**

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 103- a: Which of the following statements best describe how Syrians treat Turkish society? (Multiple responses %)

	Syrians are making an effort to integrate into Turkish society	Syrians love Turkish society very much	Syrians are grateful to Turkish society	Syrians are treating Turkish society with respect	Syrians do not like Turkish society at all	Syrians are exploiting Turkish society	No idea/ No response
Sex							
Female	47,5	28,7	32,4	33,1	0,7	0,5	7,8
Male	39,9	47,9	44,8	36,0	0,7	0,4	3,0
Age Groups							
18-24	31,2	46,4	29,6	28,8	0,8	0,8	6,4
25-34	36,4	44,6	36,0	31,6	0,8	0,4	5,6
35-44	50,1	33,8	43,0	38,2	0,2	-	5,3
45-54	46,7	38,4	41,3	38,0	0,8	1,2	2,9
55-64	49,5	37,1	46,4	35,1	2,1	-	3,1
65 and over	45,9	45,9	51,4	35,1	-	-	8,1
Educational attainment							
Illiterate	44,8	25,9	30,2	25,0	1,7	0,9	12,1
Literate but not graduate of any school	62,7	27,5	45,1	43,1	-	-	3,9
Primary School	40,7	39,9	38,9	34,8	0,8	0,4	6,1
Middle-School	41,1	46,1	35,8	31,6	0,3	0,6	4,7
High-school or equivalent	41,3	42,9	42,9	39,2	1,1	0,5	2,6
2-year associate degree/ Vocational school of higher education	48,4	28,1	45,3	37,5	-	-	1,6
Undergraduate/ Graduate/PhD degree	48,5	41,5	51,5	41,5	0,8	-	0,8
Region							
Border cities	47,1	43,2	42,0	31,8	0,2	0,3	6,0
Other cities*	36,6	34,6	35,7	39,6	1,5	0,6	3,5
Metropolitan cities	39,2	26,4	42,9	41,2	1,4	0,3	2,0
Non-Metropolitan cities	31,7	49,7	22,2	36,5	1,6	1,1	6,3
General	**43,1**	**39,9**	**39,6**	**34,8**	**0,7**	**0,4**	**5,0**

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 108- a: To what extent do you find the Turkish state's following types of aid and support to Syrians sufficient? (Scored)

	Health support	Protection support/	Education support	Food aid	Cash aid	Housing support	Average Score
Sex							
Female	3,4	2,9	2,7	1,9	1,9	1,8	2,4
Male	3,5	3,1	3,1	2,1	2,0	2,0	2,6
Age Groups							
18-24	3,5	3,0	2,6	2,1	2,1	2,0	2,5
25-34	3,4	2,9	2,8	2,0	2,0	2,0	2,5
35-44	3,5	3,0	3,1	2,0	2,0	1,9	2,6
45-54	3,5	3,0	3,0	2,0	2,0	2,0	2,6
55-64	3,5	3,0	3,0	1,9	1,8	2,1	2,6
65 and over	3,6	3,5	2,8	1,9	1,7	1,8	2,5
Educational attainment							
Illiterate	3,3	3,0	2,6	2,0	2,0	2,0	2,5
Literate but not graduate of any school	3,8	3,5	2,6	2,0	2,0	2,0	2,6
Primary School	3,4	3,0	3,0	1,9	2,0	1,9	2,6
Middle-School	3,4	2,9	2,9	2,0	2,0	1,9	2,5
High-school or equivalent	3,5	2,8	3,1	2,1	2,0	1,9	2,6
2-year associate degree/Vocational school of higher education	3,4	2,8	2,7	1,9	1,8	2,0	2,4
Undergraduate/Graduate/PhD degree	3,7	3,1	3,0	2,2	2,0	2,1	2,7
Region							
Border cities	3,4	3,0	2,8	1,9	1,9	1,9	2,5
Other cities*	3,5	2,9	3,1	2,2	2,2	2,1	2,7
Metropolitan cities	3,4	2,7	3,1	2,2	2,2	2,0	2,6
Non-Metropolitan cities	3,6	3,3	3,1	2,2	2,1	2,2	2,8
General	3,5	3,0	2,9	2,0	2,0	1,9	2,6

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 114- a: Please provide reasons of why you are not planning (willing) to return to Syria. (Multiple responses %)

		18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 and over	General
1	Because it is not a safe place	76,6	65,7	69,1	75,0	66,7	85,3	69,9
2	Because I want to obtain Turkish citizenship	22,5	24,1	34,5	34,3	40,2	38,2	30,4
3	Because the war still continues	18,9	28,6	22,9	23,1	31,0	29,4	25,3
4	Because of the bad economic conditions in Syria	12,6	15,1	21,9	26,4	21,8	17,6	19,5
5	There is nothing left in Syria for us	14,4	18,4	17,0	19,0	17,2	29,4	18,0
6	To go to another country	10,8	15,4	18,0	17,6	13,8	17,6	16,1
7	To provide a better future for my children	5,4	11,8	17,5	7,4	8,0	5,9	11,8
8	Because we established a new life in Turkey	11,7	8,3	10,8	10,2	18,4	11,8	10,5
9	Because education in Turkey is better	0,9	3,8	7,0	6,0	4,6	-	4,8
10	Because I am working in Turkey	5,4	3,1	6,4	2,3	2,3	5,9	4,2
	Other	-	1,9	1,0	1,9	3,4	-	1,5
	No idea/no response	-	0,2	-	0,9	-	-	0,2

* Responses of 1,259 Syrians who are not planning to return to Syria in the next 12 months.

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 117- a: Do you believe that there will be a future in Turkey for you, your family, and other Syrians living in Turkey? (%)

		Yes	No	No idea/no response
Border cities	For yourself	**72,9**	18,7	8,4
	For your family	**73,1**	18,9	8,0
	For other Syrians in Turkey	61,6	14,7	23,7
Other cities*	For yourself	44,9	50,3	4,8
	For your family	47,7	47,1	5,2
	For other Syrians in Turkey	36,6	40,1	23,3
Metropolitan cities	For yourself	34,7	60,8	4,5
	For your family	37,8	57,4	4,8
	For other Syrians in Turkey	34,4	50,3	15,3
Non-Metropolitan cities	For yourself	64,0	30,7	5,3
	For your family	66,1	28,0	5,9
	For other Syrians in Turkey	40,7	21,2	38,1
General	**For yourself**	**62,2**	**30,8**	**7,0**
	For your family	**63,4**	**29,7**	**6,9**
	For other Syrians in Turkey	**52,1**	**24,4**	**23,5**

* The general category of other cities include metropolitan and non-metropolitan cities.

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 125- a: Why didn't you plan to go/why didn't you go? (Multiple responses %)

		18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 and over	General
1	I didn't prefer to go without invitation or through illegal ways	44,5	56,1	53,4	49,1	52,6	45,9	52,6
2	Because I am happy with my life in Turkey	42,9	35,9	33,8	41,9	29,5	43,2	36,6
3	Because I want to obtain Turkish citizenship	21,0	26,2	34,5	38,5	38,9	43,2	31,8
4	Because I was concerned about getting hurt in the process of crossing the border	3,4	14,7	15,1	14,5	10,5	8,1	13,4
5	Because I established a new life in Turkey	16,8	8,4	13,9	15,8	20,0	13,5	13,1
6	Because I knew that I wouldn't cross/ we saw/heard of those who couldn't cross	9,2	9,5	9,0	6,4	2,1	8,1	8,2
7	Because my children are going to school	2,5	4,1	13,2	8,1	4,2	2,7	7,4
8	Because I am working in Turkey	5,9	5,0	5,2	3,8	4,2	2,7	4,8
9	Because I am happy about the education in Turkey.	2,5	1,5	3,8	4,7	6,3	-	3,1
10	I was planning to go but Turkey sent back those at the border	0,8	1,5	1,7	1,3	-	-	1,3
11	Because I don't have the financial means for it	-	1,1	1,7	0,9	1,1	-	1,1
12	Because I'm concerned about losing my legal status in Turkey	1,7	1,5	0,7	0,4	1,1	-	1,0
13	Other	-	0,2	0,9	2,6	-	-	0,8
	No idea/no response	2,5	1,3	1,9	1,7	-	-	1,5

* These are results of 1,370 people who responded to the question of "Did you plan to go when Turkey in February decided to open crossings at Pazarkule/Greece border (to allow transit of refugees to Europe)?" as <Yes, I planned to but did not go>, <No, I did not plan to go>

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 125- b: Why didn't you plan to go or didn't you go? (Multiple responses %)

		Illiterate	Literate but not graduate of any school	Primary	Midde-school	High-School and equivalent	2-year associate degree/ Vocational school of higher education	Undergraduate/ Graduate/ Doctoral degree	General
1	Because I was concerned about getting hurt in the process of crossing the border	49,5	26,0	55,7	54,2	51,3	56,5	48,8	52,6
2	Because I established a new life in Turkey	36,9	50,0	36,0	35,0	38,5	24,2	41,6	36,6
3	Because I knew that I wouldn't cross/ we saw/heard of those who couldn't cross	25,2	46,0	26,0	32,9	32,6	40,3	45,6	31,8
4	Because my children are going to school	18,9	14,0	14,2	12,2	13,9	8,1	9,6	13,4
5	Because I am working in Turkey	13,5	26,0	11,8	13,7	12,3	8,1	14,4	13,1
6	Geçemeyeceğimi bildiğim için gitmedim/ gidenin geçemediğini gördük/ duyduk	17,1	6,0	9,8	6,7	7,0	4,8	3,2	8,2
7	Çocuklarım burada okudukları için.	5,4	4,0	7,3	7,3	5,3	11,3	12,8	7,4
8	Türkiye'de çalıştığım için	1,8	6,0	3,7	7,3	5,9	1,6	4,8	4,8
9	Because I am happy about the education in Turkey.	0,9	2,0	2,4	2,0	4,8	6,5	7,2	3,1
10	I was planning to go but Turkey sent back those at the border	-	-	2,0	1,5	0,5	-	1,6	1,3
11	Because I don't have the financial means for it	0,9	-	1,0	1,5	0,5	3,2	0,8	1,1
12	Because I'm concerned about losing my legal status in Turkey	-	-	1,0	0,9	1,6	-	2,4	1,0
13	Other	-	2,0	1,2	0,6	-	1,6	0,8	0,8
	No idea/no response	0,9	4,0	1,2	1,5	1,6	1,6	2,4	1,5

* These are results of 1,370 people who responded to the question of "Did you plan to go when Turkey in February decided to open crossings at Pazarkule/Greece border (to allow transit of refugees to Europe)?" as <Yes, I planned to but did not go>, <No, I did not plan to go>

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 126- a: **Would you go if Turkey decides again to loosen control on the borders (%)**

	Definitely wouldn't go	Wouldn't go	Undecided	Would go	Definitely would go	No idea/no response
Sex						
Female	26,2	53,0	7,8	8,6	3,0	1,4
Male	30,0	50,7	8,8	7,5	2,1	0,9
Age Groups						
18-24	33,6	48,8	5,6	6,4	4,0	1,6
25-34	25,3	53,6	8,6	8,6	2,9	1,0
35-44	30,6	49,2	8,3	8,3	2,8	0,8
45-54	24,0	57,4	7,9	8,3	1,7	0,7
55-64	29,9	47,4	12,4	8,2	-	2,1
65 and over	51,4	40,5	8,1	-	-	-
Educational attainment						
Illiterate	30,2	45,7	12,1	6,0	4,3	1,7
Literate but not graduate of any school	17,6	72,5	2,0	3,9	-	4,0
Primary school	32,6	50,6	7,1	6,3	2,4	1,0
Middle-School	27,4	52,8	6,4	9,5	2,8	1,1
High-school or equivalent	25,9	48,1	12,2	10,6	2,6	0,6
2-year associate degree/Vocational school of higher education	15,6	56,3	15,6	12,5	-	-
Undergraduate/ Graduate/ Doctoral degree	27,7	53,1	8,5	7,7	2,3	0,7
Region						
Border cities	25,5	53,6	10,1	9,4	0,2	1,2
Other cities*	33,1	48,6	5,5	5,7	6,1	1,0
Metropolitan cities	38,6	41,2	4,8	5,7	8,8	0,9
Non-metropolitan cities	22,8	62,4	6,9	5,8	1,1	1,0
General	**28,4**	**51,7**	**8,3**	**8,0**	**2,5**	**1,1**

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 128- a: In what direction do you think the perceptions have changed? (%)

	From positive to negative	From negative to positive	Both positive and negative	No idea/no response
Sex				
Kadın	40,0	31,1	28,9	-
Erkek	48,1	30,8	20,2	1,0
Age Groups				
18-24	44,4	33,3	22,2	-
25-34	44,0	30,7	25,3	-
35-44	45,5	29,1	25,5	-
45-54	50,0	28,1	18,8	3,1
55-64	33,3	44,4	22,2	-
65 and over	20,0	40,0	40,0	-
Educational attainment				
Illiterate	59,1	9,1	31,8	-
Literate but not graduate of any school	16,7	16,7	66,7	-
Primary school	47,1	33,8	19,1	-
Middle-School	40,4	38,3	21,3	-
High-school or equivalent	42,9	32,1	21,4	3,6
2-year associate degree/Vocational school of higher education	57,1	14,3	28,6	-
Undergraduate/ Graduate/ PhD degree	31,3	37,5	31,3	-
Region				
Border cities	26,2	32,3	40,0	1,5
Other cities*	53,5	30,2	16,3	-
Metropolitan cities	53,1	32,3	14,6	-
Non-metropolitan cities	54,5	24,2	21,2	-
General	**44,3**	**30,9**	**24,2**	**0,5**

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 130- a: "In the last 12 months, how often have you / your family / other Syrians in Turkey experienced tensions with Turkish society? (Scored)

	Syrians in Turkey	Yourself	Family
Sex			
Female	1,9	1,9	1,9
Male	1,8	1,8	1,8
Age Groups			
18-24	1,9	1,8	1,8
25-34	1,9	1,8	1,8
35-44	1,9	1,9	1,9
45-54	1,8	1,8	1,8
55-64	1,8	1,8	1,8
65 and over	1,2	1,4	1,2
Educational Attainment			
Illiterate	1,9	2,0	2,0
Literate but not graduate of any school	1,9	1,7	1,7
Primary school	1,9	1,9	1,8
Middle-School	1,8	1,8	1,8
High-school or equivalent	1,9	1,8	1,9
2-year associate degree/Vocational school of higher education	1,7	1,7	1,7
Undergraduate/ Graduate/ PhD degree	1,8	1,7	1,8
Region			
Border cities	1,6	1,6	1,6
Other cities*	2,3	2,2	2,2
Metropolitan cities	2,4	2,4	2,4
Non-metropolitan cities	2,1	1,8	1,7
General	1,9	1,8	1,8

SB-2020-ADDITIONAL TABLE 131- a: Have you experienced problems regarding hospital visits/ access to health services during the pandemic? (%)

	No, didn't experience any problem	Yes, I got sick but couldn't go to hospital	Yes, I got sick but the hospital didn't accept me	Yes, I got sick but the hospital was full	Yes, I got sick but there was no translator	Other	No idea/no response
Sex							
Female	85,8	2,7	3,7	2,0	2,9	0,8	2,1
Male	90,0	1,7	3,4	1,6	1,7	0,6	1,0
Age Groups							
18-24	84,8	1,6	6,4	1,6	3,2	0,8	1,6
25-34	86,4	2,7	3,8	2,1	2,3	1,0	1,7
35-44	89,9	1,8	2,8	2,1	1,8	0,2	1,4
45-54	91,7	1,7	3,3	0,8	1,2	0,8	0,5
55-64	87,6	2,1	2,1	-	4,1	1,0	3,1
65 and over	83,8	2,7	5,4	5,4	2,7	-	-
Educational Attainment							
Illiterate	85,3	1,7	6,0	3,4	2,6	-	1,0
Literate but not graduate of any school	94,1	-	2,0	-	2,0	-	1,9
Primary school	87,9	1,6	5,1	2,2	1,8	1,0	0,4
Middle-School	89,9	3,4	2,0	1,1	2,0	0,3	1,3
High-school or equivalent	83,1	2,6	3,2	2,1	4,2	1,6	3,2
2-year associate degree/ Vocational school of higher education	90,5	1,6	1,6	1,6	3,1	1,6	-
Undergraduate/ Graduate/PhD degree	91,5	1,5	1,5	0,8	0,8	-	3,9
Region							
Border cities	89,8	1,1	3,3	1,3	1,5	1,0	2,0
Other cities*	85,8	3,7	3,9	2,6	3,3	0,2	0,5
Metropolitan cities	87,5	3,1	4,5	2,0	2,6	-	0,3
Non-metropolitan cities	82,5	4,8	2,6	3,7	4,8	0,5	1,1
General	**88,3**	**2,1**	**3,5**	**1,8**	**2,2**	**0,7**	**1,4**

SYRIANS BAROMETER 2020

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SYRIANS BAROMETER - 2020

A FRAMEWORK FOR ACHIEVING SOCIAL COHESION WITH SYRIANS IN TURKEY

SB 2020

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
When the first group of 252 Syrians arrived in Turkey on 29 April 2011 through the Hatay border, nobody expected these movements either to reach such a scale or to last this long. However, just three years after, in 2014, Turkey has become the country hosting the largest number of refugees in the world. After a decade, the number of Syrians in Turkey has exceeded 3,6 million, accounting for 4,37% of the Turkey's population. More than 98% of Syrians in Turkey are living together with the Turkish society as "urban refugees"; between 2011 and 2019, 625 thousand Syrian babies have been born in Turkey; more than 750 thousand Syrian children have enrolled in Turkish public schools; more than 37 thousand young Syrians have been studying at Turkish universities; around 180 thousand Syrians have obtained Turkish citizenship. There is a significant decrease in the voluntary return trends among Syrians due to the war, which has turned into a chronic issue in Syria, and the efforts of Syrians to rebuild their lives in Turkey. Now, instead of emergency management, social cohesion programmes and practices are on the agenda, and both the Turkish society and Syrians have ten years of experience in cohabitation, in what could be considered a successful term characterized by lack of conflict to a large extent. However, despite this, serious concerns and complaints caused by large numbers and prolonged durations are coming to the fore in the social sphere each day and the issue is becoming a particular concern for daily politics.

"Syrians Barometer: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey", as an effort to understand the social aspects of social cohesion, instead of the institutional or formal aspects, has been designed and regularly conducted since 2014 by Prof. M. Murat Erdoğan the study. The study, which aims at understanding the developments related to the "common social life", social cohesion processes and tensions, from both the perspective of the Turkish society and Syrians, and developing related policy recommendations, is conducted through highly representative public opinions surveys and focus group discussions (FGD). The primary objective of the study is to take, in consideration of the academic limitations, the best possible realistic snapshot of this significant and highly dynamic process and build on this, to share with the public the assesments and recommendations focusing on social peace. SB-2020 field study was conducted in December 2020 in 26 cities according to NUTS 2 classification with 2,259 individuals on "individual basis" from among the citizens of the Republic of Turkey (confidence level: 95%, confidence interval: ±2.06), and with 1,414 Syrian households under temporary protection living outside of camps on "household basis" (confidence level: %95, confidence interval: ±2.6). Within the scope of SB-2020, 20 FGDs were held in 4 cities.

The SB-2020 study was chaired and drafted by Prof. M. Murat Erdoğan and commissioned by UNHCR Turkey. Dr. Onur Unutulmaz, Tülin Haji Mohamad, Dr. Nihal Eminoğlu and Deniz Aydınlı took part in the research team. In addition, comprising the most esteemed/distinguished academics in the field of migration, refugees, and social research both from Turkey and abroad, "Syrians Barometer Academic Advisory Board" including Prof. Dr. Nermin Abadan-Unat, Prof. Dr. Mustafa Aydın, Prof. Dr. Banu Ergöçmen, Prof. Dr. Elisabeth Ferris, Prof. Dr. Ahmet Kasım Han, Prof. Dr. Ahmet İçduygu, Omar Kadkoy, Prof. Dr. Neeraj Kaushal, Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya, Prof. Dr. Fuat Keyman, Ümit Kızıltan, Prof. Dr. Kemal Kirişçi, Prof. Dr. Nilüfer Narlı, Kathleen Newland, Prof. Dr. Barbara Oomen, Assoc. Prof. Saime Özçürümez, Prof. Dr. Nasser Yasin, Assoc. Prof. Ayselin Yıldız and UNHCR-Ankara Team provided invaluable support and contributions.

Syrian Refugees Under Temporary Protection in Turkey by Years

Year	Number
2011	14.237
2012	224.655
2013	1.519.286
2014	2.503.549
2015	2.834.441
2017	3.426.786
2018	3.623.192
2019	3.576.370
2020	3.641.370