Inter-Agency Meeting

14 October 2022
Agenda

10.00am-10.30am - Cholera prevention, preparedness and response planning: Updates on the response led by the joint Health, Water/WASH sectors and Risk Communication & Community Engagement

10.30am-1.10pm – Feedback and consultation following regional IA Situation Analysis Workshops:

- **10.30am-11.10am: Economic Vulnerability** (Poverty: S/MEB, income, debt and expenditure; Food security, consumption, coping strategies; Livelihoods and employment)
- **11.10am-11.50am: Protection** (Legal residency & civil registration; Child protection; PWSN; SGBV)
- **11.50am-12.30pm: Access to Services** (Health; Education; Shelter, including evictions; Water, sanitation and energy; Municipal services - covering solid waste, conflict resolution, community police, community-based projects)
- **12.30pm-1.10pm: Tensions, Communal Relations and Insecurity** (Quality of relations, drivers of tensions, aid perception bias; Restrictive measures, mobility, safety & security, communal insecurity & propensity to violence)
Initial Cholera Preparedness and Response Planning in Lebanon

October 2022
1. Cholera: Definition, Prevention & Treatment

What is it?
Bacterial disease that causes diarrhea and is caused by the bacteria Vibrio cholerae.

How is it spread?
WATER & FOOD BORNE. By drinking water or eating contaminated food.
It can spread rapidly in areas with inadequate treatment of sewage and drinking water.

Symptoms?
Mild to severe watery diarrhea, vomiting, & dehydration.
The symptoms may appear from a few hours to 5 days after eating or drinking contaminated food or water. Most people infected with V. cholerae do not develop any symptoms, although the bacteria are present in their faeces for 1-10 days after infection and are shed.
It is anticipated that 80% of cases would be asymptomatic or have mild symptoms only.
1. **Cholera**: Definition, Prevention & Treatment

**Diagnosis?**
Detection: Rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs). Confirmation: laboratory culture or PCR.

**Treatment?**
*With prompt rehydration, <1% of cholera patients die.* Early care-seeking is key!
Immediate replacement of the fluid and salts lost through diarrhea.

- Oral Rehydration Solution (ORS);
- Intravenous fluid replacement;

⚠ Antibiotics shorten the course and diminish the severity of the illness, but they are not as important as receiving rehydration.

**Vaccine?**
Yes, but not currently available in Lebanon. Used only in outbreaks. Global scarcity at present.
1. **Cholera**: Definition, Prevention & Treatment

- Avoid eating raw, uncooked food.
- ONLY use *water that has been boiled, chemically disinfected, or bottled* for the following purposes:
  - Drinking;
  - Making ice;
  - Preparing food or drinks;
  - Brushing your **teeth**;
  - Washing your face and hands;
  - Washing dishes and utensils that you use to eat or prepare food;
  - Washing **fruits and vegetables**.
- **Wash your hands** often with soap and clean water or an alcohol-based hand cleanser, particularly before you eat or prepare foods and after using the bathroom.
2. Cholera Situation in Lebanon

- On **06 OCT 2022**, a Cholera case was confirmed in Akkar, North Lebanon (MoPH)
- Outbreak declared by MoPH (One case $\rightarrow$ Outbreak)
- The last cholera case from local/regional origin was seen in Lebanon in **1993**.

- Lebanon is at **high risk** for outbreaks of Cholera / Acute Watery Diarrhoea (AWD):
  - The proximity of the ongoing outbreak in Syria.
  - The current compounded crises in Lebanon affecting the living conditions of all populations.
  - Disrupted health, water and sanitation services and systems.
  - Scarcity and unaffordability of water, triggering reliance on water sources of unknown safety
  - Funding shortfalls to provide needed humanitarian assistance, particularly in vulnerable settings.
  - Last JMP (2016) study indicates that 51% of households in the country are using contaminated water
Situation in Lebanon

Cholera Surveillance Update
12 Oct 2022

- 83% are Syrian refugees;
- 72% are females
- 5 cases severe reached hospital
- 2 suspected deaths

Confirmed Cases past 24 hours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Deaths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By day

By locality

By age group

By Presence of Illness

By Hospital Admission

By Outcome

Call Center 1787
Key risk factors used to estimate the risk:

- Cadasters **bordering Syria** (potential to replace with areas with high levels of movement between Syria and Lebanon?)
- Cadasters with **rivers passing through**
- Cadasters with **ISs with previous flooding history**
- Cadasters with **ISs with self-reported diarrhoea symptoms and vomiting**
- Cadasters with **ISs with the main water source faecal coliform contaminated**
- Initially: Cadasters with **ISs with 7.5 Litres per capita per day** (no longer the case)
- Cadasters with **highly critical water supply gaps**, cadasters **without water networks**, cadasters **without WE-managed or municipal water stations**
- Cadasters **without wastewater networks** and cadasters **without wastewater treatment plants** and cadasters with **wastewater not functioning**
- Areas of **high population density**
- Areas with a **high proportion of displaced Syrians within the population**
3. Cholera / Acute Watery Diarrhea Preparedness & Planning

- **Cholera Prevention, Preparedness and Response**: Government led, with partners working across response frameworks (LCRP & ERP) to contribute at national and local levels.

- Ministry of Public Health has initiated a **national taskforce** including key ministries (MoEW, MoE, MoA, MoIM), lead agencies, Red Cross, Disaster Risk Management (meetings chaired by Minister); launching missions to affected areas.

- **Lead sectors** (Health, WASH, RCCE) led on the development of a **draft** Cholera Prevention, Preparedness & Response Plan based on global guidance. Updated strategic plan will be released in next few days following inputs from **Protection, Social Stability** and **Education** sectors and wide array of partners.

- **Health/WASH/RCCE ‘operational plan’** has been shared with the IA: priority activities for six months

- **Dynamic situation**: both the ‘strategic’ and ‘operational’ plans will necessarily be living documents that evolves with the situation and context.
Multi-sectoral response considerations

- Social Stability
- Protection
- Health
- Basic Needs (food, shelter etc)
- Education
- WASH
- Gender
- RCCE
Pillar 2: Surveillance

- **Medical Surveillance:**
  - ToT on surveillance and reporting for peripheral ESU staff was conducted
  - Case identification
  - Referral
  - Reporting
  - Analysis

- **Environmental Surveillance:**
  - Weekly monitoring of 9 sewage water treatment plants: samples to be taken and sent to water establishments for further monitoring of pumped water

- **Priorities:** accelerated and decentralization of surveillance

Cross-sectoral *Cholera Rapid Response Teams (RRTs)* to be launched at field level: *learning lessons from COVID response*
Pillar 3: Laboratory Diagnostics

- Two referral laboratories are already operational (AUB WHO collaborating centre and LAU microbiology laboratory)
  - Over 50 samples sent so far for confirmatory culture
- In the process of upgrading RHUH Laboratory
- 100 RDTs procured and distributed
- Additional 4000 RDTs in the pipeline

Priorities: rapid capacity building and procurement of diagnostics
Pillar 4: Case Management

• 9 public hospitals designated as Diarrhea Treatment Centers (DTCs). Currently in the process of assessing needs, supporting with Cholera kits and assessing IPC and Lab capacity

• Clinical care guidelines and SOPs updated and disseminated

• Currently considering utilizing selected PHCCs to be used as Oral Treatment Centers

• Current stocks:
  • Ongoing ORS distribution to health facilities and partners
  • Medication stock available for treatment of 500 cases

Priorities: capacity building for case management
Pillar 5: Vaccination

- Oral cholera vaccine has been mentioned by MoPH for possible LIMITED use among very high risk populations.
- Availability uncertain with global supply shortages.
- Request initiated at global level
- Costs of this intervention are NOT included here.
- **Priorities:** secure doses for high risk populations (Prisoners, refugees in ITS)
Pillar 6: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

• Partners of WASH Sector: 25 partners (15 INGOs, 6 NNGOs, 4 UN Agencies, Ministry of Water and Energy)

• Ongoing cleaning and disinfecting water tanks, with replacement of WASH hardware where needed

• Emergency fuel support dispatched for the main water stations and three lifting stations draining the Wastewater from Nahr el Bared, Minie and Beddawi catchment area to Tripoli wastewater treatment

• **Priorities:**
  • Update chlorination standards and disseminate them
  • Ensuring uninterrupted water supply at household level to minimize water trucking and improve access to safe (high advocacy and fuel support needed)
  • Preposition WASH stock: chlorine for disinfection, disinfection kits and hygiene kits
  • Provision of reliable and continuous water quality monitoring – including sampling, testing and analysis.
  • Capacity mapping of water quality laboratories and reactivation of the 8 water labs in located in public hospitals jointly with health sector as listed above.
  • Secure Fuel for water and waste water stations
Pillar 7: RCCE

- Awareness sessions ongoing for field coordinators, health care workers and partners. Also provided online by academic partners (Balamand).
- Awareness material developed and disseminated to partners
- Media/ TV awareness sessions initiated with most local TVs
- **Priorities:** Accelerated awareness and community engagement
Feedback and consultation following regional IA Situation Analysis Workshops
Theme 1: ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY
Since 2019, Lebanon is facing unprecedented economic and financial crisis, ranking among the top 10 most severe crises worldwide, affecting all residents. In July 2022, the World bank downgraded Lebanon to a lower middle-income country with a decrease of GDP to 20.5 billion USD for the first time in 27 years. While depreciation of the local currency against USD continues reaching 38,000 LBP/USD in September 2022. Lebanon relies on imports for most of its food and non-food items. The prices of these items are increasing due to currency depreciation, inflation and Ukraine crisis. The government has adjusted some subsidies and is only subsidizing wheat for local bread production and some medications. All these have led to an increase in SMEB and cost of living and a decrease in purchasing power.
Sub-Theme: POVERTY - S/MEB, INCOME, DEBT AND EXPENDITURE
POVERTY: SMEB, INCOME, DEBT AND EXPENDITURE - POVERTY

**KEY FINDINGS**

- 67% of Syrian refugee households are below SMEB \(^a\)
- If assistance is excluded, 89.9% of Syrian refugee households will be below SMEB \(^a\)
- The poorest were most affected with the inflation. Food expenditure shares have increased by 7% since 2021 with HH shifting their expenses to cover food cost \(^a\)
- According to the Household Deprivation Scores, 53% of Lebanese households need assistance to meet their basic needs \(^b\)

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\(^a\) VaSyR 2022 data  
\(^b\) WFP Lebanon - Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis of Lebanese Residents (July 2022)
**KEY FINDINGS**

- 94% of SyR households have debt averaging 499USD\(^a\)
- The average income was 60USD and male-headed households had 57% higher income than female-headed households \(^a\)
- 23% of Lebanese employees are earning <1million LBP per month, with an even higher % for females \(^b\)
- 17% of the Lebanese population receive remittances with 32% reporting inability to cover their expenses without one \(^b\)

\(^a\) VaSyR 2022 data
\(^b\) WFP Lebanon – Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis of Lebanese Residents (July 2022)
WORKSHOP: FIELD ANALYSIS

- Reasons for expenditure increase and regional differences: inflation, subsidy adjustment, service expenses, and rent
- Profile of poor:
  - Lebanese and Syrian vulnerable communities live together
  - Some regional differences (pockets versus clusters; natural resources, access to services, development)
  - Urban moving to rural area (cheaper rent/electricity) and Rural moving to urban (service accessibility and transportation cost but ending up in slumps)
  - Elderly
  - Governmental sector workers
  - Palestinian camp residents
- Causes of debt for SyR were rent where majority are only paying half of the required amount.
- Income increase in South is due to limited access of refugees and shortage of certain workers
- Inability to cover the minimum needs without 4 working members in Lebanese households.
- Besides remittances, Lebanese are relying on borrowing money to cover expenses
- Lebanese are borrowing money from relatives, sharing transportation means/costs, and borrowing money from suppliers which can affect their livelihood
Sub-Theme: FOOD SECURITY, CONSUMPTION, COPING STRATEGIES
FOOD SECURITY, CONSUMPTION, COPING STRATEGIES - FOOD SECURITY

KEY FINDINGS

• 67% of SyR households are moderately or severely food insecure\ a
  • substantive increase from last year and across all districts.
    • 96% in Beirut followed by Akkar and Baalbek-El Hermel
    • 12% more in female headed households (5% difference in 2021)
• 57% of SyR households had poor or borderline food consumption scores \ a

• Both reflect inability to meet basic needs despite increase in income because of higher increase in expense cost

% Syrian refugee households that are food insecure (moderate or severe) by governorate

\ a VaSyR 2022 data
FOOD SECURITY, CONSUMPTION, COPING STRATEGIES - FOOD SECURITY

KEY FINDINGS

- 44% of Lebanese households are moderately or severely food insecure during Jul-Dec 2021.
  - Duplication of severely insecure households between first and second half of 2021.
  - Highest percentage noted in Akkar and Baalbek-Hermel (61%).
- Households with borderline and poor food consumption also increased.
- UNDP/ARK Jul 2022 survey indicated widespread concerns about the price and access to fuel, food, water, medicine and healthcare.
  - 178% increase in proportion of Lebanese concerned about access to food as compared to 2018.
  - 176% increase in proportion of Lebanese concerned about access to safe drinking water as compared to 2018.

*WFP Lebanon - Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis of Lebanese Residents (July 2022)*
*UNDP/ARK Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon (2022)*
Almost all SyR HH have adopted at least one food-based coping strategy:
- Reduced portion size of the meal reflects the increase in severity and might be indicative of large food gaps.

Over 80% of SyR HH resorted to one or more livelihood coping strategies with the most common being:
- buying food on credit
- reducing health expenditure

*KEY FINDINGS*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food based coping strategies (% of Syrian refugee households)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Relied on less preferred, less expensive food</td>
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<tr>
<td>96%</td>
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<tr>
<td>93%</td>
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<tr>
<td>88%</td>
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<td>88%</td>
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*Source: VASyR 2022*
FOOD SECURITY, CONSUMPTION, COPING STRATEGIES – COPING STRATEGIES

KEY FINDINGS

Over 90% of Lebanese households adopted at least one food-based coping strategy.\(^b\)
- Highest % in Akkar and Baalbek
- 60% restricted consumption of adults or reduced portion size

The most adopted Livelihood coping strategies were:
- reducing health and education expenditure which is consistent with increase in healthcare cost, removal of subsidy on certain medications and shortages in the market and the dollarization for a portion of tuition.
- 5% of Lebanese adopted at least one of the emergency strategies with increase in withdrawing children from school.

\(^b\) WFP Lebanon - Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis of Lebanese Residents (July 2022)
WORKSHOP: FIELD ANALYSIS

• Regional differences: Beirut is more expensive in terms of rent and utilities causing spikes in expenditure costs despite higher incomes. While in the South and Nabatieh employment rates and incomes are high thus helping sustain the refugees more. Akkar, Baalbek and Bekaa host the most vulnerable populations and some living in ITSs.

• For Lebanese population, food quantity and quality deteriorated and this could be due to a decrease in their purchasing power and the inflation rates. Their food security is expected to keep on worsening.

• Why have coping strategies not increased as much considering the food insecurity jumps?
  • Overall worsening and across majority of the population.
  • Some have exhausted their coping strategies like relying on less expensive /preferred food
  • Some coping strategies are not an option anymore like borrowing.
What type of support is recommended?

School snack program has become a vital element for food security and school attendance for Lebanese children in Baalbek El Hermel region and elsewhere. It was recommended to increase this program and to include more beneficiaries from similarly vulnerable regions.

Livelihood projects: an increase in assistance to farmers both direct and through capacity building, reclaiming unused lands and encouraging agricultural land use as a source of income, foreign currency through exports and increasing food availability in local markets.

Cash assistance to meet the food preferences and access to food considering that Lebanese mainly rely on food from the market. Assistance is also needed to cover gas and electricity for cooking and refrigeration.
Sub-Theme: LIVELIHOODS & EMPLOYMENT
Socio-economic vulnerabilities can be exacerbated or reduced by the economic activity of the individuals (i.e. employment status).

In 2022, more changes were observed in the Lebanese labor force that recorded an increase in the unemployment rate vs. a decrease in the labor force participation and employment rates.

For displaced Syrians, though little has changed in the composition, it was worth noting the increase in women labor force participation.
KEY FINDINGS

Lebanese
- Almost one-third of the labor force was unemployed in January 2022.
- Female unemployment rate higher than that of male (32.7% vs. 28.4%).
- Youth unemployment rate almost twice as that of adults (47.8% vs. 25.6%).

Displaced Syrians
- No significant change.
- Lower unemployment rate among women (8.3% vs. 17%).
- High outside labor force rates standing at 82% for women.

source: VASYR 2022
Higher unemployment rate among women:

• Disparities between wages offered to females from different nationalities (Syrian are getting half of what Lebanese are getting)

• Gender roles: Some families still have a very conservative concept of the family, and the mother should stay home and take care of her children;

• For families with children as many are not going to school someone needs to stay home to look after them

• This low unemployment rate of Syrian women is not an indication that women have a higher rate of employment but rather a result of the high outside labor force rates standing at 82% for women compared to only 27% for men. In other words, women are not actively being part of the labor force, neither as employed nor as currently and actively looking for a job
**KEY FINDINGS**

**Lebanese**
- The LFPR was 43.4% nationally: less than half of the working-age population were either working or seeking employment.
- The male labor force participation rate was 66.2%, significantly higher than the female rate of 22.2%.

**Syrian Refugees**
- Nationally, the LFPR for men reached 75% compared to only 19% for women.
- The lowest rate for women was recorded in Beirut (11%) and the highest recorded in Baalbek Hermel (27%).

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**LFPR & EMPLOYMENT - LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>LFPR (%)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Source: VASYR 2022
• LFP for Syrian women has slowly increased over time while it appears Lebanese women have left the labor force during the economic crisis. For Syrian women LFP was 16% in 2021, and now it is 19%. On the other hand, according to the ILO LFHLCS, the LFP of Lebanese women decreased from 30% in 2019 to 23% in 2022.

• Several factors are contributing to changing the composition of the labor market in Lebanon such as:

  • Migration (brain drain) where many Lebanese are leaving Lebanon which is leading to gaps in labor hand supply (especially in sectors that cannot utilize foreign labor hand)

  • Import substitution: where local production became a necessity to respond to the consumer demand

• Markets with growth potential

  • Agro-food
  • Forestation,
  • Composting
  • Solar systems
Theme 2: PROTECTION
Sub-Theme – LEGAL RESIDENCY AND CIVIL REGISTRATION
LEGAL RESIDENCY - CONTEXT

Legal residency is critical for securing one’s access to justice, access to basic services incl. work opportunities, free movement and access to other forms of civil documentation.

Lack of legal residency decreases feelings of safety, limits social networks and heightens risk of eviction, arbitrary arrest and detention and risk of deportation.

Legal residency rates for Syrians remained stable at 17% (16% in 2021). Over half of allPRS are thought to be without legal residency [UNRWA June 2022] Growing unemployment and inability of Lebanese families to afford sponsoring full time domestic migrant workers may leave more migrant individuals without legal residency (2% without employment 2019, 20% in 2020) (IOM Reports, 2020/2021).
KEY FINDINGS

- There is a notable sharp decline in South Lebanon (29.3% to 22.26%) and El Nabatieh (39.3% to 26.9%) from 2019-2020.
- Trends by gender and age remain similar to previous years, however the gender gap grew for 20–34-year olds and narrowed for 55-59 year olds.
- 3 common barriers; rejection by GSO including inconsistent practices (37%), limitation of existing regulations (23.4%) and inability to obtain a sponsor or pay residency fees (13.9%).
- Legal residency for Syrian individuals above 15 y/o increases in number according to shelter type; residential (19%), non-residential (15%) and non-permanent (14%).
- In 2022 at national level, legal residency categories obtained through UNHCR certificate was the highest category (53.1%) followed by; 30.7% sponsorship, 14% courtesy and 1.4% rent/property ownership.
WORKSHOP: FIELD ANALYSIS

• Two additional impacts of lack of legal residency: At times during collective evictions refugees who have legal residency based on a sponsor from the village are more likely to be able to remain than those without legal residency or residency based on UNHCR certificate. In the South, some reports are that municipalities are asking landlords to only hire refugees for seasonal work who have legal residency.

• Most notable is the sharp decline in legal residency in South Lebanon and El Nabatiyeh. Since 2019 both governorates had the highest legal residency rates. In past years, El Nabatieh had equal legal residency rates between men and women (28%) in 2022 this significantly changes with a gender gap of 10%. It also had the highest reports of ‘inability to access due to transportation costs’ which was verified by workshop participants as a key challenge as well as financial cost of renewal, growing unemployment rates, inability to find a sponsor.

• Mt. Lebanon governorate which had declined from 2019 to 2020 has experienced an increase from 2020-2022 by 7.8%. This was explained because legal residency is mostly renewed based on UNHCR certificate compared to urban areas and there is less scrutiny from GSO.

• Rates of legal residency in Akkar (9.3%) and Baalbek Hermel (11.9%) continue to have the lowest rates of legal residency, accompanied now by North Lebanon (11.9%) and Beqaa (13.3%). Rates in Akkar remain low due to inability to find sponsorship, fear approaching GSO for the residency waiver and lower impact for those working close to their homes.
Birth registration is essential to ensuring a child’s legal identify, preventing risk of statelessness and ensuring access to basic services and needs as well as to durable solutions. Marriage registration has implications on legal protection including guardianship and inheritance rights as well as on obtaining other civil documentation.

Birth registration rates for Syrian refugees at the foreigner’s registry have risen to 36% in 2022 (31% in 2021) 2% have no documentation. From 2019 to 2021 the proportion of refugees of other nationalities having completed birth registration in Lebanon with an embassy stamp increased 21% (17% in 2019 to 38% in 2021) [Varon 2021].

Marriage registration for Syrian refugees with the foreigner’s registry increased slightly to 33% in 2022 (30% in 2021).
**KEY FINDINGS**

- Male and female babies are equally registered, but female-headed households have ~14% higher rates of no documentation for their children (F HoH: 16.5%, M HoH: 2%) [VASyR 2022]

- There is a strong correlation between shelter type and birth registration – 13.4% in non-permanent shelter completed birth registration, 33.9% in non-residential and 45.5% in residential [VASyR 2022]

- **Persons with disabilities** have higher birth (~6%) and marriage registration rates (6.8%) at the foreign registry than those without disability

- Respondents from female headed households have higher rates of marriage certificate with an uncertified Sheikh and higher rates of no marriage documentation.

### With birth certificate registered with the Foreigners Registry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Lebanon</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Lebanon</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>46.9%</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Nabatieh</td>
<td>40.6%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
<td>55.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beqaa</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>65.2%</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
<td>56.4%</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baalbek-Hermel</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akkar</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: VASYR 2022
Workshop: Field Analysis

- Increases in birth registration rates may be due to increases in marriages taking place in Lebanon making it easier to register marriages and consequently births.

- Syrian refugees with disabilities living in Lebanon have higher rates of birth registration across all levels of the process. This may be due to their need to access health services at an early age. It would be useful to look at additional analysis by shelter type and expenditure and disability type.

- Top barriers to birth registration were cost of fees and associated costs and lack of awareness of procedures. Women are less aware of birth registration procedures compared to men possibly because of traditional gender roles related to civil documentation which is usually given to the man.

- Positively since 2021, Akkar, Beqaa, El Nabatieh, and South Lebanon all experienced a decrease greater than or equal to 10% in the % of marriage contracts with uncertified sheikh.
Sub-Theme: Child Protection
CHILD PROTECTION – CHILD MARRIAGE

KEY FINDINGS

• Overall increase in percentage of Child Marriage among Syrian refugee girls and young women with 21.9% compared to 20.4% in 2021
• Early marriage of Syrian refugee girls is considered as a coping strategy for their families due to displacement, poverty, and patriarchal social norms.
• The increased rates of Child Marriage could be interpreted due to the lift of COVID19 restrictions.

Source: VASYR 2022
WORKSHOP: FIELD ANALYSIS

• Child Marriage has more than doubled in Baalbek-Hermel going from 11% in 2021 to 22% in 2022, followed by Beirut with 35% in 2022 compared to 27% in 2021.

• South Lebanon and Akkar witnessed a decrease in Child Marriage with 21% and 16% respectively compared to 2021 34% and 24%.

• Married children have moved from rural areas to urban settlements, where more job opportunities are present for their spouses; this may also explain the low % recorded for the South area as well as Akkar.

• Increased rates of Child Marriage among Syrian refugee girls led to increased rates of school drop-out (3%), particularly for girls.
At the national level, Child Labor has decreased in 2022 among Syrian refugee children with 4.3% compared to 5% in 2021.

This translates into 24,140 Syrian refugee children are engaged in child labor, compared to 27,825 in 2021.

Child Labor rates increase as the child’s age increases, reaching 9.8% for children 17 years old.

In terms of gender disaggregation, more boys (6.8%) are involved in child labor compared to girls (1.9%).
In 2022, Child Labor among Syrian refugee children increased only in North and Akkar with 6.1% and 6% respectively compared to 4% and 5% in 2021.

El Nabatieh governorate which had the highest rates of child labor among Syrian refugee children in 2021 with 9%, witnessed more than 37% decrease with 5.7% in 2022.

Child Labor was reported to be the third reason for children not regularly attending school with an increase from 11% in 2021 to 19% in 2022.

The decreased rates of Child Labor were contested by field partners as it could be under-reported due to the VaSYR methodology and fear of families to lose assistance if they report Child Labor.

It could also be interpreted by the close of businesses/work opportunities in the country due to economic hardship. And as more Lebanese children are involved in Child Labor, as reported by field partners.

The decrease in Child Labor could be also interpreted as a result of the Child Protection sector interventions directly targeting children engaged in child labor, their caregivers and their communities.
CHILD PROTECTION – CHILD DISCIPLINE

KEY FINDINGS

• More than half of the Syrian refugee children (57.8%) between the ages of 1 and 14 years of age have experienced at least one form of violent discipline, a slight increase compared to 2021 (56%).

• Almost half of the parents (47%) reported resorting to either physical aggression or to psychological aggression (46.8%), while severe violence was reported at (6.7%), an increase compared to 2021 (4%).

Source: VASYR 2022
WORKSHOP: FIELD ANALYSIS

• The prevalence of children experiencing violent disciplinary methods varied between regions. The highest was reported in El Nabatieh governorate (77%) and the lowest in Mount Lebanon (46.7%). There were no big differences between girls (56.7%) and boys (58.9%).

• Boys are more prone to physical aggression (48.5%) as a method of violent discipline compared to girls (46%), including severe aggression (7.4%) of the boys, compared to (6%) of the girls.

• According to field consultations, stress level of caregivers is leading to higher risks of violent discipline;

• (47%) of the girls reported experiencing psychological aggression as a form of Child Discipline, compared to (46.5%) of the boys.
Sub-Theme: SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE
GBV - Context

- Main GBV incident: physical assault (36%) and psychological and emotional abuse (34%). Linked to intimate partner violence and domestic violence.
- Sexual assault are 17% of all reported cases – underreporting.
- 56% of incidents took place in the client’s home.
- 1% of survivors receiving services are persons with disability.
- Syrian refugees continue to be most of the population seeking GBV services, accounting for 75% of all the individuals.
- 94% of survivors seeking services are females – male survivors increasing (+3%).
- 10% of assessed PRL HHS, 7% of migrant HHs and 5% of Lebanese HHs reported fear of sexual harassment or violence for boys, in the 2022 MSNA.

SGBV Incident Location

- Other: 2%
- Work Place: 5%
- WASH Facilities: 0%
- Transportation: 0%
- Street: 6%
- Shelter/Safe House: 1%
- Security Institution: 0%
- School/Education: 0%
- Religious Center (Mosque, Church): 0%
- Registration/Distribution Setting: 0%
- Police/Prison: 0%
- Market/Shopping Center: 0%
- Health Center/Hospital: 0%
- Garden/Open Field: 1%
- Check Point: 0%
- Border: 0%
- Perpetrator’s Home: 27%
- Client’s Home: 56%
KEY FINDINGS

• Reported more cases of sexual exploitation, prostitution and trafficking. (South)
• Incidents of sexual violence perpetrated at the workplace.
• Reported close relation between child labour and sexual abuse/child prostitution. Working children are more likely to be subjected to sexual violence or harassment. Girls are more affected than boys. (North and South)
• General increase in child marriage (Akkar)
• Increase in psychological abuse and denial of resources. Possibly related to shifting gender roles. Because of the economic crisis, women are taking the role of the head of household, ‘single mothers’ seeking shelter. (South and BML)
• 16% (32% in Bekaa) of children at schools reported that they are unsafe. There is a need to increase GBV risk mitigation in/to school in coordination with the Education sector.
• Women and girls safety concerns (North and Bekaa)
• Access to justice and legal assistance status/ gaps: Courts encouraging extra-judiciary solutions in the cases of family conflicts. In the South for example, the religious judge is assigning a private psychologist as a mechanism to follow up with families and resolve any conflicts.

• There is a gap and an increasing percentage of unavailable services in safe house shelter, safety and security and livelihood.

• In Bekaa and Baalbeck, a hesitancy in institutions willing to provide safe shelters for different survivors

• In the North, there are gaps reported by communities in access to some specialized services ranging from mental health, family planning, legal assistance and the safety and protection.

• In Bekaa and Baalbek areas, transportation issues and internet shortages impacted the survivors' access to services and their ability to report the incident. Trying to reach out remotely to survivors is hard and affects the case management service (perpetrators often at home)
Theme 3: Access to Services
Sub-Theme: HEALTH
HEALTH - CONTEXT

CONTEXT

• Accessibility barriers:
  • Financial, geographical, availability, acceptability.
  • Supply & Demand sides.
  • Individuals & Institutions.

• Multifaceted crises.

• PwD, older persons, adolescents, SGBV, female-head. HHs.

• Middle-income Leb HHs were affected as well.

• An increasing number of people have been driven to seek services from the public sector.

• Increased demand

• Added additional strain to the public health system, while resources remained the same or even decreased.

Source: VASYR 2022
**KEY FINDINGS**

- 48% of HHS have at least one member with a health issue
- 79% received the required care
- 18% of individuals had health problems that required PHC in the last 3 months
- 73% received the required PHC
- 38% of the services were received in governmental PHCs
In all Governorates:
- Increased demand (LEB).
- Disrupted WASH services.
- Negative coping mechanisms. (Meds rationing)
- Transportation.

Field Specific:
- Bekaa and Baalbek El-Hermel: higher % of individuals with health problems (large refugee population, competition on resources (LEB), outbreaks, living conditions, higher birth rates)
- North: Lebanese are accessing more PHCs and Governmental hospitals. In the previous years (unlike other years). Hospitalization is a major challenge for Lebanese. Increased fraud (Lebanese using Syrian IDs) to access supported services (mainly hospitalization).
- BML: Increased number of consultations for LEB. Increased tension. In participatory assessment, refugees reported discrimination at the PHC level because they have access to subsidized services.
Even though, the data is not comparable with previous years, the following challenges were noted for hospital care in Lebanon for 2022:

- Fuel crisis
- 50% bed capacity.
- LBP devaluation
- Higher hospital bills
- Situation for medical supplies is critical.
- Brain drain
- Critical items with stock ruptures
- Jeopardized access to hospital and advanced hospital care.
- Economic situation & inability of MoPH to cover for hospital care.
WORKSHOP: FIELD ANALYSIS

- Lebanese are facing more and more challenges accessing hospitals (hospitals don't prefer to admit a patient under MoPH coverage and a lot are not insured)
- Violent incidents happening in hospitals where they varied between demonstrations, display of arms, armed clashes, and road blockages due to high health costs, access/admittance to hospitals, and lack of power in hospitals.
- Lebanese are accessing more PHCs and Governmental hospitals.
- Increased fraud (Lebanese using Syrian IDs) to access supported services (mainly hospitalization).
- Increase hospitalization due to decompensation of chronic diseases.
- For refugees, UNHCR referral care programme does not cover all conditions.
- Unregistered Syrian pregnant women are not covered by UNHCR and therefore not supported for delivery.
- Increased referral to psychiatric hospitalization.
- Brain drain is a major challenge especially with the specialized doctors.
- Hospital image is being affected. Accepting specific conditions imposed by the doctors to retain them.
- Prisoners access to SHC, reduced access, lack of coverage, lack of access care.
- Some specialties are not available in Bekaa hospitals (pediatric cardiology for example)
**Key Findings**

Increased mental health needs.

For the Number of Specialized Mental Health Consultations:

- 27% Increase from May to Jun 2022
- 41% Increase comparing Jun 2021 with Jun 2022
- H1 2021 v/s H1 2022: 24% Increase
- ↑ Availability (Package)
- ↑ Needs à ↑ Demands

*Source: VASYR 2022*
Overlapping crises have also affected the mental health of people, increasing levels of tensions in areas.

Poor nutrition is a risk factor for mental disorders.

Increased reporting on substance use among the youth.

Psychiatric nurses are leaving their jobs in light of the very low pay ($50) for working 12 hours shifts with agitated psychiatric patients. This has been hindering admissions of psychiatric emergencies.

South: increased capacity to meet current needs is being planned.

North: MHPSS services are so high in Akkar:
  - Stigma on MH decreased over the years. More than 50% cases are self referrals.
  - A long and extended waiting list is due to the increase in demand and lack of medications.
Sub-Theme: EDUCATION
The overstretching of the public education system caused by the protracted nature of the Syria crisis, the deteriorating economic situation, COVID-19 pandemic, and the high fuel costs have largely contributed to the disruption of learning for the most vulnerable children at the start of the 2021/22 school year.

These factors continue to result in growing learning gaps, leading to the rise in negative coping mechanisms such as child labour (affecting mainly boys) and child marriage (mainly affecting adolescent girls), depriving many of their rights to education.
**Key Findings**

- **Decrease of attendance** of children between 3-5 across Lebanon
- **Overall increase** in attendance for primary education except for Bekaa.
- **Overall increased readiness to enroll** for the upcoming year for boys (71%) and girls (69%)
- At country level, **drop out rate** for girls is higher (3.2%) than for boys (2.6%) for the age group 6 to 17.

*Source: VASYR 2022*
WORKSHOP: FIELD ANALYSIS

• Increase in attendance across most governorates at primary and secondary can be attributed to the shift from hybrid/remote implementation to in-person presence in school. Decrease in preprimary enrolment is due to structural requirements for enrolment in schools and deprioritization of early childhood education by families, affordability, awareness about importance of education for younger children.

• Financial situation resulting in decrease in attendance and higher drop-outs especially in most vulnerable areas (North Akkar and Bekaa), as well as South and Nabatie, in particular the high cost of transportation due to increasing cost of fuel is reported by families as one of the main reasons for drop out.

• Low attendance in Bekaa can be attributed to the cost of transportation, closure or delay in opening public schools and limited awareness and access to information by families about the school opening.

• The need for solid understanding of sociology children and families are facing and better matching between supply and demand. The need for programming such as cash for education, school feeding and addressing issues around the denial for admissions.
KEY FINDINGS

Reasons for not attending school:
- cost of transportation
- cost of education
- child having to WORK (19 % compared to 11 % in 2020)
- Not allowing to register
- difficulties with curriculum (7.3 %)
- Child marriage (3.4 %)

Source: VASYR 2022
The main barriers to education for Syrians are cost of transportation 35%, the cost of education materials 29%, having to work 19.5%, school did not allow registration 8.1%, and difficulties of understanding curriculum and/or language as a barrier 7.3%.

The deterioration of the economic situation (increased poverty) compared to previous years explain the higher percentage reported for child labor.

In Tripoli, 50% of children surveyed in Tripoli cited working as main reason for drop out. Partners confirm that child labor is becoming one of the most widely applied coping mechanisms adopted by households and has direct negative impact on education of children.

In Beqaa the main reason for not attending was that the school did no allow enrollment or registration. Improved awareness raising is needed through sector partners.
**EDUCATION – PROTECTION CONCERNS**

**KEY FINDINGS**

- Increasing tensions within the refugee community of which, 7% of services related incidents are linked to schools).
- Schools are increasingly considered unsafe.
- Child labour in North and Beirut is significantly increasing, 5.3% of girls are not attending school due to work, while for the boys this number is 31%.

**School safety: Do you consider the school or center your child/children is/are attending as safe space from him/her/them?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Safe (%)</th>
<th>Unsafe (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akkar</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBH</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakaa</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabatieh</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mleeta</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentages calculated out of the total number of HHs that have at least one child attending school. Source: VASYR 2022.*
WORKSHOP: FIELD ANALYSIS

• On child safety, when households asked “do you consider the school or center your child /children is/are attending as safe space for him/her/them? In Akkar, 30% of parents said that the school attended by their children is unsafe. It is also high in Beirut 22.6% and North Lebanon (20.3%). These percentages are from households who have children attending school.

• Child labor in North and Beirut is significantly increasing due to inflation and cited as reason for drop out. Child labor highest in North and Beirut.
Sub-Theme: SHELTER
In Lebanon, **70%** Syrian refugee population live in residential units and **10% non** residential units in cities and villages while the remaining **21%** live in spontaneously set-up tented settlements throughout the country due to the GoL's policy against formal refugee camps. Refugees face harsh winters with sub-zero temperatures and flooding that affect mainly those living in non-permanent and non-residential shelters.

- FHH are particularly vulnerable and are more likely that MHH to reside in Informal Settlements **28%** of HH vs **19%**.
- **58%** of Syrian refugee households are living in shelter conditions that were either overcrowded, below standards or in dangerous condition.
KEY FINDINGS

- Increase of **176%** in rent since 2021
- **Half** of HH are late on rental payments and **30%** are late by **three months** or more.
- Dollarized rents rose from almost 0% in 2021 to **4%**, reaching **8%** in some districts.
- MHH were able to pay higher percentage of their rent value in the last 30 days (55%) when compared to FHH (43%).
• Affordability of shelters is not just related to the average rent but also to the regional disparity between average income, employment opportunities, and cost of utilities.

• Lebanese landlords are becoming more vulnerable and relying on the rent as a key source of income leading to “Actual rents” being lower than the agreed rental value, especially when looking at the trend where the percentage of HH evicted due to inability to pay rent is declining.

• Vulnerable Lebanese looking for cheaper accommodation in some regions competing for the limited number of shelters with Syrians at the lower end of the rental market and consequently potentially increasing prices.

• Some refugee HH are choosing to share shelters to save on rental costs. This is leading to tensions in some areas where municipalities are refusing to allow this practice, while some landlords are increasing rents when shelters are shared.

• The threat of eviction has increased and going to increase due to economic crisis however as we have seen the actual eviction has lowered due to also vulnerability of landlord which make a good entry point for negotiations by partners for CfR and other interventions.
**SHELTER – EVICTIONS AND MOBILITY**

**KEY FINDINGS**

- Of those who moved in the last 12 months, **18%** were evicted and **41%** moved because the rent was too expensive.
- In 2022, **68%** of households that were evicted indicated the inability to pay rent as the reason for being evicted (**72%** in 2021; **86%** in 2020).
- **66%** HHs under an eviction notice were expected to leave within a month. Of them, **14%** were expected to leave in a week.
Factors that led to a decrease in evictions while the threat to evictions increased.

In ISs, families living in communities, working with the landlord, can allow the landlord to wait for the rent, due to mutual economic interests and increased vulnerability of the homeowner.

MoIM and MoSA contributed to support in stopping the evictions in Informal settlements by mediating with municipalities and landlords to limit evictions, especially as certain areas municipalities are not allowing HH to move in.

However, flexibility on the part of landlords may be approaching its limits. Early indications from the field that landlords are becoming less likely to accept reduced or deferred payment, with more observations of dollarization of rent.

Factors that led to a decrease of mobility in 2022.

While rent has increased HH are not choosing to relocate to cheaper and more distant shelters, as the increased transportation are incentivizing HH to stay closer to livelihood opportunities.

Cost of moving could be proving prohibitive, leaving HH to live in substandard conditions.
Sub-Theme: WATER
All population groups residing in Lebanon are increasingly facing dramatic challenges with accessing safe and sufficient quantities of water for drinking and domestic hygiene, and accessing safe sanitation.

The crisis is affected by both institutional capacity to supply services as well as household purchasing power, driving poverty, deprivation and inhibiting access to services.

The majority of wastewater treatment plants are no longer functioning due to electricity cuts and unaffordability of fuel to run the back-up power generators.

The cholera outbreak in Lebanon, in the current situation presents an additional and urgent risk.
**KEY FINDINGS**

- **28% Syrian HHs** - drinking water source NOT available when needed (BML 40%, North 32%).
- **Worse out of ITSs 32%** vis-a-vis 16% in ITSs.
- 22% HHs use water network as the main drinking water source, but half had access for < 2 h/d.
- There is a 25% difference in access to basic sanitation services between residential (67%) and non-permanent (41%) locations.
- **23% of HHs with babies** reported not having enough baby care items (diapers etc). Highest also in Nabatiyeh – 47% and North 34%.

**Increasing Cost of Water**

- **VaSyR**: On average 367,000 LBP per month in cash (70,500 LBP in 2021), and 60,500 LBP on credit.

Changes in the cost of water trucking (domestic) and bottled water over the last year. Data from the Water Market Monitoring from the WaSH Sector.
Overarching risk: Highlighting the cholera as a risk to be tackled in 2023 onwards.

Tension: Support from diaspora, private parties affiliated to communities and religions is creating intra-Lebanese tensions.

Decrease in services in ITSs will lead to more informal actions and thus intercommunal tension.

Women and girls might be more affected by lack of water, including by being more exposed to diseases (when water is contaminated) and by gynecological problems.

Schools WaSH situation is critical (limited financial resources to supply water, non-operational filter systems). However, the last WinS was done in 2018.

Recommendation for WASH in school programming to engage with Local Authorities and include O&M on the filtering system.
Sub-Theme: ENERGY
Lebanon’s electricity sector has suffered chronic power supply shortage for decades, which has been partially met by private diesel generators.

While the national utility network covers most of Lebanon, the electricity sector faced numerous challenges prior to the current crisis, including high technical and non-technical network losses, inadequate tariffs, and insufficient generating capacity (due to under investment in supply).

Between 40-45% of Lebanon’s national debt is due to subsidies that the Government of Lebanon has transferred to Electricité du Liban (EDL) to cover the cost of fuel since the 1990s. (equal to $1-US$2.3 billion in transfers per year).

High inflation and the rising fuel prices have severely impacted the electricity supply in the country. The EDL prices per KW remained the same (in LBP) leading to more losses when supplying electricity and therefore unable to secure cash to purchase fuel.

Private generators became the main suppliers of electricity in the country and the increasing global fuel prices led to a sharp increase in the generator bill making them unaffordable for most residents of Lebanon.
ENERGY – ACCESS

KEY FINDINGS

• 88% of households had a connection to a source of electricity. For the first time, there is a significant drop of 10% in access to electricity. 12% of households now live in the dark.

• Almost all people interviewed (Lebanese and Syrians) rated the quality of electricity as poor or very poor in 2022. (was 36% in 2017)

• Only 11% of Lebanese households and less than 1% of Syrian households in Wave XIV (July 2022) said they had access to supplemental electricity for all hours that the EDL power was cut, compared to 74% in Wave X (April 2021)

ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY*

Source: VASYR 2022
*Access is defined by having a connection to the grid, to a diesel generator, or to any renewable electricity source. Even if the access is limited (ex: 1 hour)

Rate the Quality of Electricity in your area – 2017 to 2022

Source: UNDP/ARK Perception survey
ENERGY – ACCESS AND EXPENDITURES

KEY FINDINGS

• Electricity outages on average were more than half of the day in all governorates. Akkar was the worst.
• Expenditure on electricity has increased significantly in 2022); exceeding payments on rent in some governorates.

Source: VASYR 2022
The ongoing electricity crisis has had a lasting impact on quality of life, as well as negative downstream effects in other sectors such as hospitals with electricity cuts; Water stations not functioning affecting access to water; wastewater / sanitation networks not working leading to environmental and health related issues; public institutions only functional for few hours.

Households' quality of life has been negatively affected by the lack of electricity. Aside from the impact on the economic situation, households are unable to keep food refrigerated and safe, cannot rely on electricity for heating in winter -> affects their health; Children unable to study after dark; safety concerns for women and girls at night; Livelihoods / jobs dependent on electricity are affected.

Tariffication to be revisited concurrently with increasing supply hours (early 2023). This will be implemented in parallel with the increase in wages (linked to cost of living). Tariffication for vulnerable groups will be lower.

Tensions at municipalities level related to energy supply, with direct insecurity, Solarization of water pumping requests.

Who should be supported with energy related projects? vulnerable groups or individuals ? business operations ? private vs public?

While scaling up alternative energy sources, partners to take into consideration environmental impacts of batteries and solar panel at end of life.
Sub-Theme: MUNICIPAL SERVICES
Many municipalities are now unable or hampered to deliver basic services under their mandates due to limited funds. Requests to LCRP partners for fuel and spare parts, maintenance of machinery, equipment and direct support have progressively increased. The extent of the needs and the requests is now impacting the operational environment for LCRP partners that are increasingly under pressure to support municipalities.

In July 2022, 45.8% of Lebanese disagreed with the statement, ‘The municipality is doing the best it can to respond to the needs of people in this community’. This, nevertheless, reflected a moderate improvement in public perceptions of the responsiveness of municipalities. This minor improvement in the national level estimate was driven largely by improved perceptions in the Beqaa, where 58.9% agreed with this statement in Wave XIV (July 2022), compared to just 38.4% in Wave XIII (April 2022).
KEY FINDINGS

- IMF Transfers: 1) Delays in Transferring (last trench received was of 2020 and received in 2022) 2) All Transfers are based on old exchange rates (not at all sufficient to perform activities as before) 3) Not updated (still based on registered voters in a Municipality/Village and not based on the real numbers of residents who use/need Municipal services)

- Reduced taxes collections from residents, also based on the old exchange rate - not compatible with current services costs and needs

- Lack of personnel and capacity - ranging from administration staff to municipal police. Several municipalities are unable to ensure the payroll of employees and pay newly added fees such as transportation. As a result, there is a lack of capacity to operate and technically maintain infrastructure and equipment

- Lack of necessary equipment, machinery and infrastructure which affects the ability to deliver services
• Gaps in solid waste management
• Gaps in water, wastewater including lack of maintenance

⇒ Increasing health and environment hazards for all populations
Spillover effects: contaminations resulting from sewers and waste pouring into the sea, rivers, water distribution networks and water canals - Disconnection of the water network due to poor electricity, or even unavailability of drinking water - Flooding and clogging of the water canals - Air pollution - Contamination of underground water and natural springs used by farmers, resulting in contaminated crops - Degradation of forests due to illegal sourcing of fuel wood - Spread of rodents – Diseases

• Gaps in electricity – increasing requests for support for solar for water pumping
• Gaps in municipal police - heightened insecurity with an increasing number of theft and crimes, leading to protection concerns, discriminatory measures towards Syrian refugees, and access issues
• Increasing tensions - between and within communities. Access to jobs, services and cash, mainly triggered by the perception of aid bias and misperceptions that aid is distributed in USD.
• Evictions - Solid waste management remains a key driver for eviction threats and actual collective evictions, in addition to the encroachments on electricity grids and water networks.
MUNICIPALITIES – REGIONAL DIFFERENCES

FIELD INSIGHTS

• **Akkar:** Municipal police applying to CfW activities, now considered to be a vulnerable group. Aid to municipalities was not always sustainable.

• **North:** Municipalities are becoming more dependent on organizations rather than working on internal planning and funding. Some decided to resign due to decision-making loss of power, lack of funding, and other political parties taking over the power dynamics.

• **Beirut:** Municipal police is a big challenge in Beirut and Southern Suburbs in particular. In SSOB, no access is given to some NGOs.

• **Mount Lebanon:** Large municipalities lack interest in working with NGOs especially if it is a small CfW project and if workers are not voters. Municipalities need operational support.

• **South:** Trust in municipal authorities is declining sharply with exception of Jezzine due to limited financial capacities. Municipalities are relying on remittances.

• **Nabatiyeh:** The challenge is access issues, and reach to basic services such as electricity, water, and medication. Quality of life has deteriorated.

• **Bekaa:** Access challenges are tight to support and services offered in the area by donors.

• **Baalbek el-Hermel:** SWM remains an issue while the area is suffering from marginalization in basic services.
Theme 4: SOCIAL TENSIONS
Sub-Theme: QUALITY OF RELATIONS, DRIVERS OF TENSIONS, AID PERCEPTION BIAS
Quality of Relations - Context

Context

Over the last four years, displaced Syrians-host community relations have been on a negative trajectory, however, over the last year, the quality of these relations has not changed greatly. In July 2022, 37% of respondents reported negative inter-communal relations, as compared to 21% in July 2018 and 36.1% in August 2021.

Main drivers of inter-communal tensions are mainly economic, including the most quoted tensions drivers being ‘competition for lower skilled jobs’ (50.3%), ‘competition for services and utilities’ (30.2%) and ‘unfair aid distribution’ (26.3%).

Relations are the most fragile in the Beqaa, Akkar and the South.

It is notable that both males and females have a similar reflection on the matter, nevertheless, females cite 3% lower in citing negative relations.
QUALITY OF RELATIONS

KEY FINDINGS

• 55% of Syrians and 44% of Lebanese believed that Syrians who lived in their area before the crisis in Syria have better relations with the host community.

• 91.5% believe that Lebanese have been good hosts.

• Most cited factor to facilitate good relations was the return of Syrian refugees to Syria, cited by 42%.

• Less than a third of displaced Syrian households reported daily or regular interactions between Syrians and Lebanese communities.

• Access to services is increasingly cited as a source of inter-communal tensions. As of July 2022, more than 30% of the population considers that competition for services and utilities is a key driver of tensions, compared to 23% in 2017.
• Misinformation and dissemination of rumors are a rising issue affecting inter-communal relations (i.e. displaced Syrians are getting assistance in USD, density and presence of displaced Syrians in specific areas)
• Media is playing an increasing role - on Facebook: 26.32% of posts regarding displaced Syrians are negative whereas on Twitter 9.54% are negative.
• Increased discourse on returns
• Aid perception bias with perception that aid is provided in USD for displaced Syrians while Lebanese are not getting assistance (including in Palestinian gatherings)
• Education-related incidents are on the rise tensions between students, child protections issues in schools, drop out of children from schools
• Perception among displaced Syrians that UN agencies are only helping displaced Syrians connected to someone well known)
• Most affected group: Displaced Syrians in ISs especially in areas that are anti-displaced Syrians (political)
TENSIONS – REGIONAL DIFFERENCES

REGIONAL INSIGHTS

• Level of tension: Zahle, Saida, Minieh-Dannieh and Bcharre showing most negative relations
• At governorate level, the most negative perceptions of the quality of relations were in the Beqaa, where 82.3% describe relations between both groups as ‘negative’ or ‘very negative’ in July 2022. The second most negative perceptions are in the South at 73%.
• The perception of the quality of inter-communal relations also continued to deteriorate in Akkar where the fraction in Akkar describing inter-communal relations as either ‘negative’ or ‘very negative’ increased from 50.8% in April 2022 to 61.7% in July 2022.
• In terms of perceptions around “international aid/assistance goes to the people who deserve it the most”, there are vast geographical differences. For example, in Beirut, 85.6% agreed with this statement while only 3.34% in Akkar and 18% in Bekaa agreed.
Intra-Lebanese relations

Key Findings

- Over the last three years, intra-Lebanese relations, which were previously very positive, have been deteriorating.
- In 2018, 4% of Lebanese cited negative relations between different communities. As of July 2022, 39% report negative relations.
- However, Lebanese describing relations as ‘negative’ or ‘very negative’ has declined slightly since 2021 with 12.0 percentage point decline. Despite this, tensions between Lebanese are now at similar level to Syrian-Lebanese relations and are increasingly resulting in various incidents.
- The most significant deterioration in the perception of the quality of intra-Lebanese relations over the wave was observed in the Beqaa, where 58.5% of Lebanese described relations as negative to any degree in Wave XIV (July 2022), compared to 42.0% in Wave XIII (April 2022).
• Aid provided is also creating tensions between Lebanese (this have affected some interventions), private investments from diaspora (choosing specific neighborhoods or groups to be supported with scholarships). This can be a negative peace factor and have different education levels between different communities.

• The political affiliation have affected the intra-Lebanese relations even within the same families, especially between the supporters of political parties and the ones who are against them.

• The combination of decreased capacity of state institutions, including security institutions and decrease in trust in the state create an environment in which local groups along existing division lines can take security and justice increasingly into their hands. This can affect both intra- and inter-community dynamic.
Sub-Theme: RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AND MOBILITY
• 2022 has witnessed a rise in restrictive measures: 429,490 refugees living in municipalities with curfews and other movement restrictions.

• As of July 2022, 67% of the population nationally agrees that when tensions are high, some restrictions on foreigners' movement or curfews can help keep this area safe.

• Despite the deteriorating security situation, these measures have not been coupled with an increased agreement that targeted restrictions on refugees are acceptable but rather the opposite.
RESTRICTIVE MEASURES & MOBILITY

KEY FINDINGS

- Different types of restrictive measures can affect the safety and security of people differently, a large increase in reported raids during the first half of this year corresponded with a period of anti-refugee rhetoric by high profile political and other host community leaders.

- Limited freedom is the most frequently reported impact of curfews as a restrictive measure (69.7%), second being loss of employment/livelihood (20.7%), and third being difficulty accessing grocery stores / supermarkets (14.7%).

- Refugees are responding to restrictions imposed by curfews by reducing or limiting movement to certain times of day (76.3%), and to certain areas (53.7%).
Workshop: Field Analysis

- Reporting of curfews is highest in Nabatieh, and has been this way since 2019, the highest year was 2020 when 67.7% of respondents reported having curfews imposed on them.

- Groups of married men in the North and Bekka, married women and male youth in Bekaa mentioned fear of detainment due to legal residency – increase in document checks at checkpoints.

- The percentage of the population nationally agrees that when tensions are high, some restrictions on foreigners' movement or curfews can help keep this area safe has dropped significantly across all governorates between 2017 and 2022, except for Mount Lebanon where it stayed at 87.3%.

- Self-imposed curfew is being set by both host community and displaced Syrians specially in the ISs to remain less visible especially in night hours and to avoid different potential risks leading to limited access to certain services specially in night hours as well as leading to questioning the perception of feeling insecure and limiting movements to different community groups.
Sub-Theme: SAFETY, COMMUNAL INSECURITY AND PROPENSITY TO VIOLENCE
SAFETY, COMMUNAL INSECURITY AND PROPENSITY TO VIOLENCE - CONTEXT

CONTEXT

The sustained deterioration in the economy, high levels of political instability, persistent concerns about access to food, clean water, electricity and medical care and increased crime rates, have also contributed to dramatically worsening perceptions of physical safety and security, nationwide.

Overall, 55% of the population reports feeling unsafe during the night; this is more than five times as many as those who said the same in 2018 (9.5%), prior to the current economic crisis.

Gaps in community security are leading to an increasingly insecure environment. In July 2022, 40% of the population believed that violence is sometimes necessary when interests are being threatened and 74.8% worried about the threat of crime.

As living conditions continue to deteriorate, this will almost certainly place additional pressure on already-strained relations between different Lebanese groups and between Lebanese host-communities and displaced Syrians, thus also increasing the potential of further violence.
SAFETY, COMMUNAL INSECURITY AND PROPENSITY TO VIOLENCE

KEY FINDINGS

• 53% Lebanese and 64% of Syrians still report feeling unsafe in their area or neighborhood at night.

• Markets (58.4%) and streets/neighborhoods (66.6%) are the places most avoided by Syrian women and girls due to lack of safety.

• Notable increase in crimes and strikes – as well as an overall increase in violence related to violent crime, at increased rates; election-related political violence; related to generator subscription disputes and economic including availability of and access to subsidized bread.

• There has been also an overall increase in a range of incidents including armed clashes, display of arms, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and drug-related crime.

• For intra-Lebanese tensions and incidents, the parliamentary elections were one of the primary drivers of social tensions, with incidents of violence.
WORKSHOP: FIELD ANALYSIS

• **Association of security incidents to displaced Syrians** – That are more visible in Bekaa specifically due to living in ITSs vs. urban areas. Noting the demographic and confessional differences in terms of connectors and dividers, increase of perception that incidents are driven by displaced Syrians.

• **Increase in violence cases with lack of reporting** - Less access in formal reporting channels and access to justice specifically for displaced Syrians mostly by fear of retaliation of host community, leading to oppression and tensions.

• **Decreased capacity of state institutions** - Specifically security institutions (with lack of resources including vehicles, fuel, etc.) and decrease in trust in the state create an environment in which local groups along existing division lines can take security and justice increasingly into their hands. this can affect both intra- and inter-community dynamics.

• **Increase of violence at formal and informal education** - including verbal and physical aggression specifically against displaced Syrian students, fueled by inter-communal tensions and competition on education resources, with Lebanese moving to public schools.

• **Nature of theft has have changed now (desperation crimes)** - to be also churches, mosques etc. and are being committed by all nationalities. High number of house locks have been bought this year indicating the rise in feeling insecure within households.