UNHCR
The UN Refugee Agency

Protection Monitoring

Situation of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon

2nd Quarter 2025

Methodology

Since 2019, UNHCR - in partnership with multiple organizations - has conducted monthly Protection Monitoring (PM) surveys with Syrian refugees across Lebanon. As of January 2024, this activity was centralized and implemented by INTERSOS, with a representative sampling methodology based on the presence of the Syrian refugee population at both national and regional levels. PM surveys aim to gather information on refugees' situation, analyze protection trends, assess gaps, and inform responses. This supports evidence-based advocacy and programming under the Lebanon Response Plan and incorporates UNHCR's Age, Gender, and Diversity (AGD) approach to identify vulnerabilities. Referrals for specialized services are made as needs arise.

Between October 2024 and March 2025, coinciding with the escalation of conflict between Israel and armed groups in Lebanon and the resulting large-scale influx of internally displaced persons in Lebanon, regular surveys with Syrian refugees were paused due to security concerns, limited accessibility, and the need to prioritize rapid needs assessments to inform the emergency response. UNHCR resumed regular PM surveys with Syrian refugees in April 2025, following a comprehensive review of methodology and tools.

This report presents a protection analysis of trends affecting Syrian refugees in Lebanon during the second quarter of 2025 (April–June). Data was gathered through two primary methodologies:

- **Household Surveys (HHS): 4,629 HHS** were conducted across all governorates in Lebanon, covering **23,543** household members including youth, women-headed households, and households with older persons or persons with disabilities. Of these, 24% were in person and 76% remote via phone.
- **Key Informant Interviews (KII): 100 KIIs** were conducted to verify findings, complement quantitative data, and provide deeper qualitative insights.

Additionally, protection monitoring outcomes are validated by triangulation with community sources, field expert insight, protection observations, UNHCR monitoring of displacement and cross-border movements, and a range of secondary data published by other UN or INGO partners during the reporting period

Cover Photo: Syrian refugee Shadia Mohammad Jesm, 50, stands at the door of her tent in the Jasmine refugee camp in Saadnayel, Lebanon, where she has lived for the past five years, just a few kilometres from Masnaa, which borders Syria.
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Key Highlights

Nearly half of Syrian refugee children were out of school in Q2

43% of households reported their children were out of school, citing high education fees, lack of documentation, and an inability to pay transport. Tens of thousands of refugee children have been impacted by the Council of Minister's 17 September 2024 decision requiring Syrian children to hold a valid residency or UNHCR certificate to enroll in school, as well as a delayed start to the PM shift until January 2025 due to hostilities with Israel.

Access to shelter (and risk of eviction) is a priority issue for one-third of households

Amid rising inflation and limited livelihood prospects - with fewer than 1% of respondents in Q2 reporting being able to meet all basic needs - the inability to pay rent is widespread, placing thousands at risk of eviction, homelessness, and further debt. 64% of respondents were unable to pay their most recent rental installment, either partially or in full (average monthly rent reported as USD $171). In parallel, 15% of households report residing in tents or Informal Tented Settlements (ITS), often lacking proper infrastructure, insulation, or privacy and accompanied by protection risks and service barriers. In this context, raids of Syrian residences by Lebanese security forces and other administrative measures increased by 102% compared to Q1.

Humanitarian assistance is progressively less accessible to refugees

Of 77% of households reporting receiving some form of humanitarian assistance over the past year, 50% of those reported discontinued service in the last 3 months, aligned to corresponding global funding shortages.

Regional dynamics continue to influence population movements

Returns to Syria: Since the fall of the Assad regime, an estimated 191,956 Syrians have crossed from or via Lebanon - half of whom transited Lebanon or engage in temporary or pendular movements. At the end of Q2, 120,606 Syrians had been inactivated from UNHCR's registration records in Lebanon due to verified or presumed return, including 70,445 people who crossed during the escalation of hostilities in Lebanon in 2024. Yet, refugees continue to raise concerns, including lack of shelter, insecurity, and limited livelihood options in Syria, as well as family member reluctance to return, financial constraints, and unpaid debts in Lebanon.

New arrivals: Separately, new arrivals to Lebanon in late 2024/early 2025, March, and May continue to face mounting social tensions with long-staying refugees and host communities over scarce resources, alongside protection risks associated with inadequate shelter and WASH, lack of legal status and consequent barriers to basic services, scarce livelihood opportunities, and elevated gender-based violence (GBV) concerns.

Internal displacement: Despite the declared ceasefire in November 2024, of roughly 1 million internally displaced people at the height of hostilities with Israel (including 100,000 refugees), 82,632 remain displaced, citing destroyed homes, limited funds, safety concerns, and developments in Syria as barriers to return.

Only one-fifth of refugees report legal status in Lebanon

The prevalence of refugee households with at least one member above age 15 lacking legal residency remains very high, standing at 80% in Q2 (down from 89% in Q2 2024). Additionally, of households reporting at least one child born in Lebanon, nearly 30% note these children lack a birth certificate issued in Lebanon. Despite the criticality of documentation for movement and access to services, refugees cite financial barriers, an inability to find a sponsor, and irregular entry as primary barriers.

Exposure to risks impacts children's physical, emotional, developmental well-being

The complex socioeconomic and protection environment continues to impact refugee families and children, with roughly one-third (29%) of respondents reporting mental health symptoms and worsening psychological distress, particularly among children. Additionally, 21% of households report child labor as a primary child protection concern, including worst forms of child labor, while child marriage for girls remains an issue.

Support remains inaccessible for one-third of refugees with disabilities

Of households reporting a family member with a disability, 30% reported being unable to access required care and support mechanisms. Among these, nearly all (90%) cited financial barriers as the primary cause.

Operational Context: Regional Developments and Population Movements

Regional developments

In Q2, Lebanon was impacted by an intersection of escalating regional developments:

Continued hostilities with Israel. Despite a ceasefire declaration in November 2024, hostilities continued in 2025, with Israeli airstrikes and military incursions targeting border areas in southern and eastern Lebanon exacerbating protection risks for vulnerable Syrian refugees and negatively impacting a sustainable return to pre-conflict places of residence.[1] In South and Nabatiyeh, UNHCR has recorded four refugee casualties from Israeli strikes since the ceasefire.

Large-scale cross-border movement after the fall of the Assad regime. Since 8 December 2024, Lebanon has experienced a surge of new arrivals from Syria from diverse religious and political backgrounds. In parallel, tens of thousands of Syrians have returned to Syria from or via Lebanon.[2]

Destabilizing regional hostilities. Violence in the Damascus suburbs and Sweida in Syria (May) and exchange of fire between Iran and Israel (June) elevated regional tension.

Funding cuts in humanitarian aid. As organizations were compelled to downscale operations, the Lebanon humanitarian response was significantly impacted, with growing hardships and a rise of negative coping mechanisms among refugees.

Lebanon's prolonged economic crisis. Rising inflation, stagnant incomes, and reduced purchasing power continue to negatively affect all populations. Syrian refugees are particularly vulnerable, with 87% living below the poverty line as of 2024.[3] These hardships intensify social pressures and competition over limited resources including jobs, housing, and public services.

New arrivals from Syria

Following the collapse of the Assad regime, Lebanon witnessed a complex wave of displacement to and from Syria. At the end of Q2, over 108,000 Syrians, driven by violence, had newly arrived in Lebanon,[4] marked by dynamic and pendular cross-border movement or relocation in Lebanon.

- ***Late 2024/early 2025:*** *Syrians from diverse religious and political backgrounds, including Alawite, Shia, and Christian minorities, arrive in Lebanon, with many settling in Bekaa and Baalbek-El Hermel.*
- ***March****: A second wave, driven by violence in Tartous, Lattakia, Homs, and Hama, settle in Akkar and North Lebanon, adding pressure to strained local resources.*
- ***May****: Violence in Sweida and the Damascus suburbs triggers a smaller wave of arrivals from the Druze community.*

New arrivals per governorate



New arrivals—often entering without documents, shelter, or networks—navigate a landscape of instability, scarcity, and uncertainty, facing:

1. Poor shelter and WASH
2. Lack of legal status
3. High health costs
4. Scarce livelihoods
5. Gender-based violence
6. Social tension

Shelter continues to be an urgent concern, with many living in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions in informal settlements, unfinished buildings, or hosted arrangements with a constant threat of eviction. In parallel, lack of legal status remains a paramount challenge, rendering new arrivals vulnerable to exploitation, arbitrary detention, and abuse. Absent documentation, new arrivals report self-restricting movements, fearing arrest and

consequent deportation.[5] Additionally, new arrivals raise concerns about the high cost of healthcare, as well as scarcity of livelihood opportunities. Many resort to informal and high-risk labor, including child labor, to meet basic needs. In this context, women and children face heightened risks of gender-based violence, as safe spaces are few and protection mechanisms limited.[6]

Critically, social cohesion between newly arrivals, long-staying refugees, and the host community is also under strain, with community support varying by area. In many areas, sectarian divides undermine efforts to build solidarity, while tensions over aid distribution and shared facilities affect dynamics.[7]

Despite these challenges, most new arrivals intend to stay in their current area but are open to relocating within Lebanon for work. While many remain fearful of return to Syria, others have attempted short-term or exploratory pendular movement to assess conditions or have returned given an inability to sustain their lives in Lebanon.[8]

Returns and intentions to return to Syria

*Since the fall of the Assad regime, an estimated **191,956** Syrians have crossed from or via Lebanon – half of whom transited through Lebanon or engage in temporary or pendular movements.[9] At the end of Q2, 120,606 Syrians had been inactivated from UNHCR's registration records in Lebanon due to verified or presumed return, including 70,445 people who crossed during the escalation of hostilities in Lebanon in 2024.*

*On 16 June, the Lebanese Council of Ministers approved the **Lebanese Government Return Position**, with intention to sign an Exchange of Letters between the Inter-Ministerial Committee and UNHCR on 1 July outlining roles and responsibilities of the Ministry of Social Affairs, the General Security Directorate (GSO) and UNHCR on implementation of the Return Programme.[10]*

Despite these dynamics, refugees cite primary barriers to return:

1. Lack of shelter
2. Security Concerns
3. Limited livelihood

Among respondents, many raised concerns about return, citing lack of shelter, insecurity, and limited livelihood options in Syria, as well as family member reluctance to return, financial constraints, and unpaid debts in Lebanon. Men showed greater intention to return than women, who hesitated to respond and deferred to a head of household.

Refugees consistently express a need for information on housing, employment, access to services, and the security situation in Syria to make informed decisions.

Barriers to return to Syria - % reporting



Displacement within Lebanon

*In Q2, Lebanon continued to struggle with lasting impacts of the conflict with Israel and associated internal displacement. Of 1 million people internally displaced within Lebanon at the height of hostilities (including an estimated 100,000 Syrian refugees[11]), at least **82,632** IDPs[12] remained as of May, while Israeli military maintained a presence in five border points in south Lebanon.[13] Those who remain displaced cite:*

Internal Displacement / Returns



1. Destroyed homes
2. No financial means
3. Safety concerns
4. Situation in Syria
5. Housing/services in current area
6. Restrictions

Refugees cite destroyed housing, lack of financial means, and safety concerns as barriers to return to pre-conflict places of residence.[14] In Baalbek-El Hermel, KIIs indicated internally displaced Syrian refugees continue to face limited job opportunities and increased housing pressure, exacerbated by new arrivals, compelling them to seek accommodation in expensive neighborhoods. In Beirut and Mount Lebanon, KIIs noted displaced Syrian refugees continue to be deprioritized for rental space compared to Lebanese, resulting in overcrowding.

Barriers to return for IDPs - % reporting



Administrative Measures

*Throughout Q2, refugees continued to be impacted by **96** reported administrative restrictions by authorities, mainly targeting Syrians, related to movement restrictions, checkpoint arrests, data collection, imposition of taxes and fees, restrictions on livelihood and rental of accommodations, and tent demolitions. Punishments for violation include verbal notice, confiscation of vehicles, physical punishment, arrest, and deportation.*

Of note, raids of Syrian residences by Lebanese security forces, accompanying by checks at official checkpoints, increased by 102% compared to Q1- with a sharp increase in June - resulting in the arrest and consequent deportation of over 500 Syrians. On social media, national security and preemptive counter-terrorism efforts were frequently cited as possible reasons.

Protection Trends

Social tensions and community support

Evolving patterns of displacement in Lebanon in 2025 have intensified sectarian tensions and added complexity to an already fragile relationship between host and refugee communities. A quarter of respondents cited political, cultural, and/or religious differences and/or regional political dynamics as drivers of tension between Lebanese and Syrian communities.[15] Further, reductions in humanitarian aid and challenges with legal residency have intensified competition for resources and employment, fueling tensions. In Beirut, key informants cited instances of conflict, harassment, and social exclusion, with top sources of tension:

1. Social differences
2. Regional political situation
3. Competition – jobs
4. Competition – services/utilities
5. Socioeconomic scapegoating

> *We constantly hear negative things being said to us on the street because we are Syrians, so we are not going out, except for work.*
> - Syrian refugee, Bourj Hammoud

Since December, there is growing public pressure on Syrians to return to Syria, with eviction threats in Bekaa, as Lebanese key informants note some Lebanese perceive improved conditions in Syria.

In parallel, tensions have arisen between long-staying refugees and new arrivals, with some areas in Lebanon, notably BML, facing resurgent sectarian tension where demographic shifts or political affiliations intersect with historical grievance. Some new arrivals are perceived as affiliated with the former Syrian government, fueling mistrust.

Sources of inter-communal tension - % reporting



In this context, perceived inequality in provision of humanitarian aid and resources also contributed to tensions. Long-staying refugees in South and North expressed frustration over aid distribution—perceived to favor new arrivals—alongside disputes over shared ITS facilities/shelters.

Yet, dynamics with host communities are not uniform, varying by region and community composition. Refugees in North reported more host community support compared to other regions, and new arrivals from the Druze community to Mount Lebanon in May reported host community empathy and solidarity, though overall perceptions of support remain low.

Perceived host community support - % reporting



Legal residency

Absent documentation, refugees face elevated risk of arrest, detention, and deportation; barriers to access basic rights and essential services including healthcare and education; exploitation and unsafe working conditions; increased isolation; and fewer opportunities for work and housing. Barriers to legal status include:

1. Lack of funds
2. Cannot find sponsor
3. Irregular entry
4. No sponsor - ineligible for waiver
5. Missing documents

For years, lack of documentation has remained a significant challenge for Syrian refugees, with 80% aged 15+ reporting a lack of legal residency in Q2. Additionally, of households reporting at least one child born in Lebanon, nearly 30% report these children lack a birth certificate issued in Lebanon, with further barriers to residency.

Despite these barriers, respondents cited financial and administrative constraints as the primary hurdle to obtain or renew residency, as many lack funds to pay renewal fees or transport costs. Others report challenges finding sponsors to extend residency.

Reasons for lack of legal status - % respondents without residency



> *"As daily workers, we earn $10 per day, instead of the fair wage of $25 per day – Syrian refugee, Ketermaya, Chouf district*

Community sources report that those without legal residency are often denied access to full wages by employers, face mistreatment at work, and are frequently subjected to verbal abuse, bullying, and unequal treatment on the job site. In addition, as a protective strategy, refugees without status self-restrict movement to avoid interaction with law enforcement or authorities.

Access to shelter, basic services, and livelihood

*Lebanon's socioeconomic situation remains fragile, compounded by ongoing instability. In this context, **87%** of Syrian refugees were living below the poverty line as of 2024, elevating vulnerability.[16] In this reality, fewer than 1% of respondents in Q2 reported being able to meet basic needs, while 44% could meet less than half of needs, and 42% reported meeting only half. As a result, 92% of respondents reported having household debt, 45% reported taking on (additional) debt in the last 30 days, 42% reduced food expenses, and 11% reduced needed healthcare/medicine. Priority needs include:*

Ability to meet basic needs



1. Food
2. Shelter
3. Healthcare

Throughout Q2, refugees consistently identified food, shelter, and healthcare as top needs, with the demand for shelter increasing toward the end of Q2 while the need for healthcare declined. Focus on primary needs came at the expense of critical but under-prioritized services — only 3% of respondents cited education as a top need, and only 1% cited protection and mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS), respectively.



> *Everyone is focused on putting food on the table. The economic crisis in Lebanon has hit us all hard and people are overwhelmed just trying to cover their daily needs* - Syrian refugee, Saida

Despite these needs, humanitarian assistance for Syrian refugees has been significantly impacted by heavy funding cuts in Q1, with serious implications for household stability and protection. While 77% of households reported receiving some form of assistance over the past year, only 34% of those indicated that support is ongoing while 50% noted assistance ceased within the last three months[17]. Such unpredictable cuts to assistance elevates protection risks and risks of negative coping mechanisms.

Access to Shelter

In Q2, shelter was reported as the second most pressing need after food. UNHCR recorded 44 collective eviction notices in Bekaa, South, and North (330% increase from Q1) affecting thousands of households, with a sharp increase in June when the Litani River Authority issued an eviction notice for 38 ITS in Bekaa due to proximity to the river and alleged pollution, sewage and wastewater issues. Additionally, UNHCR documented seven effectuated evictions (33% increase from Q1) impacting 75 households, of which five received a notice.

Roughly 15% of respondents report residing in tents or ITS, with exposure to harsh living conditions and protection risks such as lack of privacy, inadequate facilities, and risk of eviction. Eviction arises as a predominant concern, correlated with an inability to pay rent as well as pressure from landlords seeking to push refugees to return to Syria and/or to make rental space available for Lebanese, or for reasons outside refugees' control such as landlord disputes and informal agreements.[18]

In parallel, refugees secondarily displaced by the recent hostilities with Israel continued to be subjected to unfair practices by some landlords who prefer to rent to Lebanese at higher prices

> *Our camp is under constant threat of eviction. We live in fear of waking up with nowhere to go* – Syrian refugee, Sammouniyeh

Access to Healthcare

Access to healthcare also arises are a primary concern, with refugees facing multiple barriers, including high costs, distance to providers, lack of legal status, and limited specialized services.[19] Those lacking legal status are particularly impacted by self-restricted movements and barriers to access healthcare absent documents. In parallel, access to services for older people and people with disabilities remained limited, with 30% of relevant families reporting an inability to obtain needed care for a family member, with greatest prevalence in Akkar (77%) and North (54%) where high costs were identified as the primary barrier. Finally, for those in areas affected by Israeli airstrikes, access to health services was disrupted by instability, with an airstrike in south Lebanon on 3 April destroying a new medical center and damaging two ambulances.[20]

Livelihoods

Livelihood opportunities for Syrians remained limited and poorly paid. Countrywide, 20% of households reported no source of income, with variations by region (i.e. 38% in Bekaa compared to 12% in North and Mount Lebanon, respectively). Of those engaged in income-generating activity, only 38% are employed full-time. Those without legal status face compounded barriers, as reported by 10% of respondents, with those commuting to work (particularly men) subjected to strict control at checkpoints. In parallel, in Q2, respondents in North noted a drop in wages due to competition from newly arrived Syrians.[21]

Child Protection

Child labor emerged as the primary child protection concern for families, reported by 21% of respondents. While only 3% of households with children acknowledged having at least one working child, the perceived risk is considerably higher. Of children reportedly working, boys are disproportionately affected (79%), often working in street vending, while girls (21%) were likely to engage in agriculture. Primary reasons for child labor include:

1. Insufficient caregiver income
2. Child cannot attend school
3. Caregiver physically cannot work

Among families reporting child labor, insufficient caregiver income is predominant (72%), reflecting limited livelihood options, alongside barriers to education due to overcrowding and residency issues.

Despite an overall low reporting rate, key informants and UNHCR community sources reported child labor as a widespread issue countrywide, with many children working in the streets selling tissues and small items, employed in supermarkets, bakeries, auto repair, restaurants, or alongside adult beggars.

Primary reason for child labor - % respondents with a working child



Other key informants highlight that children are engaged in the worst forms of child labor, with boys and girls as young as seven working in agriculture, construction, or waste collection under harsh physical and psychological conditions, long hours, and exposure to hazards.

> *The children are working more than the adults now. In Batroun, you see them on the streets begging or selling tissues till midnight.*
> – Syrian Refugee, Anfe

Child protection response monitoring by the Child Protection Working Group consistently shows child labor (37%) is the most prevalent risk addressed through case management, followed by emotional abuse (35%), neglect (19%) and physical abuse at home (17%).[22]

Education

Challenges accessing education were reported by 17% of families, while 43% indicated their children were out of learning. Critically, a Council of Minister's decision from 17 September 2024 requiring Syrian children to hold a ***valid residency or UNHCR certificate to newly enroll in school*** *has barred thousands of children from formal education. In parallel, due to escalating hostilities and registration challenges, the start of the second shift school year — primarily attended by Syrians — was dramatically delayed until January 2025 (rather than its scheduled start of September 2024) and concluding in June 2025. For those enrolled, the Council of Ministers in May granted access to official exams for non-Lebanese children in Grade 12 with three or more years of certified learning, reversing an earlier decision restricting certification to those with legal residency or UNHCR certificate. In this context, primary barriers to learning include:*

1. Cost of enrolment/ material
2. No documentation
3. Distance/ transport cost

Overall, legal obstacles (32%) and financial challenges continue to exclude many refugee children from education, escalating both their immediate protection risks and limiting their future opportunities. In addition, UNHCR community sources confirmed the risk of school dropout in 2025 was linked to the inability to afford transport costs, removal from UN assistance, and children needing to work to support family.

Barriers to regular school attendence



> *We don't want them to drop out from school like we did. We want them to have a better life* –Syrian refugee, Arkay

Gender-based violence

Recognizing that stigma, fear of reprisal, and normalization of certain forms of violence can lead to significant underreporting of GBV, 21% of households reported some type of GBV risk for them and/or their families.

VASYR 2024 preliminary results show marriage of Syrian adolescent girls (aged 15 - 19 years) remains a concern, with 17% married (down from 27% in 2023).[23] Rates were particularly high in Akkar (15%) and North (13%) predominantly from male-headed households. Field observations in May flagged that some religious courts in Bekaa refused to register marriages of female children to reduce this risk.[24]



For new arrivals, the GBV Safety Audit[25] across six high-density collective shelters in Akkar found GBV risks were exacerbated in remote or poorly lit areas, including WASH facilities or paths to Primary Health Centers. Women highlighted that the absence of privacy and gender-sensitive space in collective shelters contributed to distress and heightened GBV risks. Overall, women and girls commonly reported needing to be accompanied by male relatives when leaving shelters to feel safe, restricting their access to services. Increased cyber-violence and abuse towards adolescent girls due to lack of alternative activities have also been reported.

In parallel, respondents cite several risk factors that elevate GBV concerns, including psychological distress and economic vulnerabilities. Among new arrivals, women described conflicting challenges: a lack of income increasing their dependency and exploitation at home, and exposure to safety risks when attempting to earn a living outside, including harassment at checkpoints while commuting to work. As a result, some avoid jobs outside their immediate area. Several women also shared experiences of economic violence at home, including male partners controlling their income or restricting their ability to make financial decisions.[26]

Mental health and psychosocial support

In Q2, roughly one-third (29%) of respondents reported mental health symptoms, with highest rates in South, Nabatiyeh, and North. Of these, 17% reported mild or isolated symptoms, 8% persistent depressed moods, 2% worsening pre-existing mental health conditions, and 1% concerning behavioral changes such as anger and aggression. Additionally, respondents report worsening mental health, particularly among children, linked to complex and overlapping socio-economic and protection challenges[27].

UNHCR community sources similarly note refugees consistently report anxiety, stress, and helplessness due to deteriorating living conditions, insecurity, lack of stability, and the inability to meet basic needs. Many also expressed sadness and anger. In North, community sources reported an increase in domestic violence against spouses due to deteriorating economic situation.



At the close of Q2, nearly three-fourths of respondents (70%) with a mental health condition reported economic hardship as the lead cause of psychological distress (compared to 57% in April), with highest rates in Baalbek-El Hermel (90%) and Bekaa (82%). Other contributors to psychological distress included personal issues (divorce, child custody disputes, family conflict and forced marriage), the situation in Syria, eviction, and tensions with host communities. In the South and Nabatiyeh, 22% of respondents referenced personal issues. Additionally, several key informants reported fear of further conflict among those residing in border areas.

As reported by field observations in North and Bekaa, despite being identified as a critical need, MHPSS services remain unavailable due to funding constraints

> *Some families came from areas where there was heavy shelling, like Hermel. Even now, a loud noise or military vehicle can trigger panic, especially among the children."* –Syrian refugee, Qaa Baayoun

For more information, please contact ramosyan@unhcr.org

Endnotes

[1] OHCHR. *Israeli operations in Lebanon continue to kill civilians.* Press briefing note from 15 April 2025.
[2] UNHCR. *Lebanon – Syrian Returns & Movements Snapshot 30 June 2025*. 10 July 2025. Reflects returns prior to the official launch of the Government of Lebanon-UNHCR return programme on 1 July.
[3] UNHCR. *Annual Results Report 2024 Lebanon*. 29 May 2025.
[4] *See* Endnote 2.
[5] UNHCR PMTF Northern Lebanon. *Protection Needs Assessment of Syrian New Arrivals in Northern Lebanon*. April 2025.
[6] UNHCR. *New arrivals from Syria: Protection Overview.* August 2025.
[7] For more information on social tensions, please refer to the dedicated section.
[8] UNHCR. *New arrivals from Syria: Protection Overview.* August 2025.
[9] *See* Endnote 2.
[10] While this report only covers the period until 30 June, it should be noted that per the EOL signed on 1 July, GSO waived exit fees, overstay fines, and re-entry bans for Syrian and Palestinian refugees returning via land border between 1 July and 30 September 2025, facilitating safe, dignified, voluntarily return via official crossing points. UNHCR began implementing the UNHCR-supported Self-Organized Voluntary Return Programme on 3 July 2025.
[11] UNHCR. *Lebanon Emergency Flash Update #17*. 29 November 2024.
[12] IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix. *Mobility Snapshot – Round 87*.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Preliminary Findings - Protection Monitoring on IDPs, February-June 2025. Presented at the Protection Working Group, 13 August 2025.
[15] This may include any sociopolitical developments taking place in neighboring countries.
[16] UNHCR. *Annual Results Report 2024 Lebanon*. 29 May 2025.
[17] UNHCR. *On the Brink: The Devastating Toll of Aid Cuts on People Forced to Flee*. 18 July 2025.
[18] Key informant interviews, June 2025.
[19] Field Protection Observation (INTERSOS Protection Monitoring Report Q2 2025).
[20] *See* Endnote 1.
[21] UNHCR PMTF Northern Lebanon. *PMTF Monthly Situation Report.* June 2025.
[22] Child Protection Working Group Dashboard, Case Management Services, accessed on 3 September 2025; a case may be managed to address multiple risks simultaneously.
[23] UNHCR. *Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR) 2024*.
[24] Field Protection Observations (UNHCR Situational Reports, 2 May 2025)
[25] PMTF Northern Lebanon. *Gender-based Violence Safety Audit for New Arrivals in Northern Lebanon*. July 2025
[26] *Ibid.*
[27] *See* Endnote 14.