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DAVID JOHNSON – HEAD OF MISSION, NIGERIA

IDRIS CAMAPO – ASSESSMENT OFFICER, NIGERIA

ELSA SOFTIC – EMERGENCY OFFICER – EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT HQ



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## SUMMARY

Nigeria is currently facing one of the most critical humanitarian crises on the African continent, even if the international community has been relatively silent about it. The conflict between the insurgents of Boko Haram and the Government of Nigeria (GoN) and its allies have forced millions of people to flee their homes inside the country and outside Nigerian borders in neighboring countries such as Chad, Cameroon or Niger.

Maiduguri is the most important city in the northeastern part of the country, being strategically located on the commercial road connecting Dakar to Ndjamena. The city has seen its population almost doubled in the past 3 years, recording the arrival of about 1.8 million displaced persons.

In an area already weakened by underdevelopment and climatic pressure (Lake Chad and Sahel climate), the resilience capacity of the host population has reached its limits.

This document, the evaluation report resulting from the exploratory mission led by Première Urgence Internationale between December 2015 and January 2016, presents the main – but not exhaustive – findings of the multi sectorial needs assessment, as well as the corresponding strategy that PUI intends to implement in Nigeria.

Whereas the report details PUI's intended overall strategy, the most urgent components of the strategy are structured around the two following objectives:

- ✓ Providing life-saving assistance (food aid and NFI mainly) to the IDP and local populations affected (those hosting IDPs, and those not) by on-going armed conflict in Maiduguri
- ✓ Improving accessibility to, as well as functioning of, community-based protection mechanisms and psychosocial support for the most vulnerable HH of the IDP and local populations (both those hosting, and those not) affected by the crisis

*Première Urgence Internationale wishes to express its profound thanks to all the partners on the field, and particularly Action Against Hunger USA teams in Abuja, and in Maiduguri, who grandly facilitated the carrying forth of this assessment.*

## **INTRODUCTION**

### **A. PRESENTATION OF PUI**

Première Urgence Internationale is a non-governmental, non-profit, non-political and non-religious international aid organization. Our teams are committed to supporting civilian victims of marginalization and exclusion, those hit by natural disasters, wars, and economic collapses, by responding to their fundamental needs. Our aim is to provide emergency relief to uprooted people in order to help them recover their dignity and regain self-sufficiency.

Première Urgence Internationale leads on average 140 projects per year in the following sectors of intervention: food security, health, nutrition, construction and rehabilitation of infrastructures, water, sanitation, hygiene and economic recovery. Première Urgence Internationale provides assistance to around 4 million people in 20 countries – in Africa, Asia, Middle East, South Caucasus, and France. The mission in France includes support to refugees, asylum seekers and migrants.

### **B. BACKGROUND OF PUI IN THE REGION**

Neither Première Urgence, nor Aide Médicale Internationale, nor PU-AMI has implemented any humanitarian projects in Nigeria. That being said, PUI has been present in Chad since 2004 and in Cameroun since 2008. Since the rise of the insurgency in northeastern Nigeria in 2009, PUI has paid particular attention to the evolution of the security and humanitarian context in the region. In Cameroon, PUI is implementing a project in response to Boko Haram–related displacement in the North, on the Garoua - Maroua axis in Adamaoua.

### **C. ASSESSMENT JUSTIFICATION**

Major displacements have taken place (and continue to take place) in the northeastern States of Nigeria, with the most recent figure being placed at more than 2.150.000 internally displaced persons (IDPs)<sup>1</sup>. These displacements, in addition to creating massive humanitarian needs within the displaced population, have placed economic pressure on the host communities, in which approximately 92% of the displaced population is located. These dynamics are exacerbated given the protracted nature of the crisis, with 61.5% of the IDP population having been displaced since 2014.

Given that the majority of humanitarian effort has focused thus far on IDPs in camps, setting in which only 8% of the displaced population and 0% of the host community population affected by the crisis find themselves, a major humanitarian crisis is currently taking place with significant needs still to be covered.

In this context, and considering as well PUI's intervention in response to the insurgency-related displacement in northern Cameroon, PUI decided to fund a two-phase assessment in Nigeria:


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<sup>1</sup> IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) – Round VII, December 2015

- The first phase in December 2015 with the objective of meeting key partners, networking with INGOS, donors and authorities, as well as preparing the second phase;
- The second phase in January/February 2016 with the objective of performing a multi-sector needs and vulnerability assessment targeting IDP and local populations (those hosting IDPs and those not) outside of official camp settings in Borno State's capital, Maiduguri.



## D. AREA OF ASSESSMENT



In Maiduguri, nine different locations (indicated on the map above) were evaluated during the second phase of the assessment. Four of them were official camps (NYSC Camp, Bakasi Camp, Teacher's Village Camp & ATC Camp), and the remaining five were either informal settlements or host community areas (Galadima, Salamanti informal settlement, Mairi Kuwait, Jajeri and Flour Mills).

It is important to highlight that three of the communities targeted in the assessment had never before been assessed by any NGO, UN agency or state body (Flour Mills, Galadima and Jajeri). Additionally, not all three of the assessment tools utilized during the evaluation (site survey tool, HH survey, and focus group discussion – details follow) were used in all nine locations targeted.

## 1. CONTEXT

### A. GENERAL OVERVIEW


Nigeria is the most populated country in Africa, counting between 178.000.000 and 200.000.000 habitants, and is currently ranked as the first economy in Africa due, in large part, to oil and petroleum products, but



also to mineral resources (gold, iron, diamonds, copper etc...). Despite a strong economy, Nigeria suffers from a significant disparity between rich and poor, and also from a high rate of corruption, at every level.

In 2015, presidential elections were held, and Muhammad Buhari (retired Nigerian Army major general who successfully led a coup d'état in 1985 and who unsuccessfully sought election as president in 2003, 2007, and 2011) was elected to replace Goodluck Jonathan in May 2015. During the first months of his election, he has shown sustained efforts to progressively rid the country of corruption and officially announced that he would put an end to the Boko Haram insurgency before the end of 2015. This declaration has, evidently, not been upheld, as Boko Haram continues to devastate communities in many local government areas (LGAs) in NE Nigeria, not to mention the insurgents' continued attacks in neighboring countries in the Lake Chad basin.

That being the case, the northeastern part of Nigeria is not the only portion of the country suffering from instability and/or insecurity, as illustrated by the map below.



The geopolitical context of Nigeria is far more complex and multi-faceted than a straightforward armed conflict between Nigerian Armed Forces (with its ally, the Multi-Nation Joint Task Force – MNJTF) and the Boko Haram insurgency. The various, impacted areas, as shown on the above map, are henceforth explained.

## 1. Pro-Biafra Movement in South East Nigeria

Nigeria's history has been significantly marked by the civil war, also called the Biafra war, which took place from 1967 to 1970. The beginning of the war was caused by the secession of the Republic of Biafra from the central Government of Nigeria and led to the famine and death of 1 to 2 million people.

Whereas Biafra was eventually reintegrated into Nigeria in 1970, some secessionist groups remain active, and have even gained power over the past ten years.

One of the most important is the Movement for Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). MASSOB was created in 1999 by Ralph Uwazuruike, who presents himself and his group as non-violent. He has been arrested several times and spent two years in jail between 2005 and 2007 under the charge of treason.

The other major separatist organization is the movement of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) led by Nnamdi Kanu (who is also the Director of the London-based Radio Biafra). IPOB has spread in many countries such as France, the United States and even Russia and is lobbying for support from those nations in the quest for the independence of Biafra. Kanu, the leader of the group, was arrested in October 2015 by the Nigerian secret services (DSS) and has been held in jail ever since, despite the fact he was granted bail by the court. Following Nnamdi Kanu's arrest and detention, many pro-Biafra organizations came together and organized demonstrations that were violently repressed by the police in December 2015.

Nevertheless, the rivalries between these movements remain flagrant. In December 2015, Ralph Uwazuruike, then MASSOB leader, decided to rename the movement the Biafra Independent Movement (BIM) "because of the sad introduction of violence by the disgruntled dissidents, and this is at variance with the non-violence stance of MASSOB over the years." During the same announcement, and while calling for his release, he accused N. Kanu and its movement (IPOB) to advocate for violence and to preach hatred. The remaining members of MASSOB subsequently expelled R. Uwazuruike from the movement.

The events tied to the arrest and detention of N. Kanu show that tensions are currently on the rise, as concerns the Biafra situation, both amongst actors themselves and between the actors and the state.

## 2. Shia Group Insurrection in Kaduna & Kano States (North, Central Nigeria)

These two states in central, northern Nigeria have seen a recent spike in instability, following a violent clash between the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), a Shi'a<sup>2</sup> group, and the Nigerian army in December 2015. On 12 December, the Director of Army Public Relations (DAPR), Colonel Sani Usman claimed that members of the sect had attempted to assassinate the Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Tukur Buratai, when his convoy ran into the group in Zaria (Kaduna State), its spiritual headquarters.

As a result, on 13 December 2015, an all-night siege and violent exchange of gunfire left an unknown number of IMN sect members dead, as well as the group leader's wife and son. Human rights activists claim that hundreds, and perhaps as many as 1,000 were killed<sup>3</sup>. Additionally, MK Ibrahim, Director of Amnesty

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<sup>2</sup> "The Shi'a sect is a minority Muslim group in northern Nigeria, and there is known to be enmity between them and the majority of Nigeria's Muslims, who are Sunni. But they are acknowledged as more educated and more influential, with many Shi'a said to hold significant positions in government. The exact numbers are not clear but could run in to the millions and are mainly in Kano, Sokoto and Kaduna." (Menas Associates, *Nigeria Politics and Security*. 14 December 2015).

<sup>3</sup> Al Jazeera, *Nigeria Accused of Killing Hundreds of Shia Muslims*, 16 December 2015.

International, Nigeria, said, “While the final death toll is unclear, there is no doubt of that there has been a substantial loss of life at the hands of the military”. Lastly, subsequent to the attacks, Ibrahim El Zakzaky, the leader of the IMN, was arrested.

It remains unclear, at this point in time, whether the government will prosecute El Zakzaky over the attempted murder of the Chief of Army staff, Buratai. That being said, if the government does attempt to suppress the sect, there is fear that this act may drive the group underground and turn them violent, as happened with Boko Haram several years prior. It is important to remember that the (extrajudicial) killing of Boko Haram’s leader was one of the principle factors that contributed to the extreme radicalization of the group and that subsequently ignited the Boko Haram crisis.

In the aftermath of the clash opposing the Nigeria Army and IMN, certain governmental leaders, like Alhaji Muhammad Sa’ad Abubakar, the Sultan of Sokoto and president of the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, warned the Federal Government about the risk of creating another group like Boko Haram.

## **B. BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY**

### **1. Birth of Boko Haram and Primary actions (2002-2009)**

Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) is an Islamist group commonly known as Boko Haram, which in the local language of Hausa literally means, “Western” or “deceptive” education is “forbidden/a sin”. The group pledged allegiance in april 2015 to the Islamic State (Daech/ISIS/ISIL) and thus renamed itself the Islamic State in Western Africa. For the purposes of this report, the group will simply be called Boko Haram.

Boko Haram is a Sunni jihadist group seeking to create a caliphate in western Africa ruled by sharia law and founded upon its strict interpretation of the Koran. Created in 2002 by Mohamed Yusuf in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria, the sect established a religious school where poor Muslim families from across Nigeria, as well as from neighboring countries, could send their children. By denouncing political and police corruption, as well as the tyranny of the elite (notably, those Nigerians educated in British universities but that had come back to Nigeria to unjustly reign over the impoverished and underdeveloped North), Mohamed Yusuf attracted followers amongst the unemployed youth and drew on growing anger and dissatisfaction amongst Nigerians from the North.

From 2002 to 2009, Boko Haram conducted its operations more or less peacefully. Despite evidence suggesting the increasingly militant character of Boko Haram, as well as advice from community leaders not to broadcast Yusuf’s preaching on national television, the GoN repeatedly ignored their warnings. Additionally, even as the group became increasingly violent in its reactions against the GoN towards 2009, the group had a reputation amongst the population “as not killing innocent civilians”; Boko Haram even benefited from considerable support from the population at that time.

However, in 2009, everything changed. Police finally began an investigation into the group and arrested members of the sect and confiscated weapons and bomb-making equipment. Boko Haram fighters lead an attack on a mosque and a police station in the village of Bauchi, which resulted in the death of 55 people. The GoN responded forcefully and put in place a joint task force (JTF – comprised of police, military and intelligence personnel) and concomitantly launched a brutal retaliation against the group that resulted in

the death of more than 700 people (mainly members of Boko Haram, but also many innocent civilians). Police stations, prisons, governmental offices, schools and churches were also destroyed during the attacks.

Mohamed Yusuf was arrested and suffered an extrajudicial execution by the police, which gave him the status of a regional hero. Initial police reports attest that he died in custody as he was trying to escape. Additionally, local religious and political leaders supported his death and did not, as a consequence, talk about his extrajudicial killing. Their silence on the matter, though, did not successfully quell ambiguity amongst the population.

In 2012, Human Rights Watch wrote, “Civil society activists in Nigeria say that ordinary citizens fear both Boko Haram and the JTF, whose abusive tactics at times strengthen the Islamist group’s narrative that it is battling government brutality. Indeed, the police’s extrajudicial execution of Boko Haram’s leader, Mohammed Yusuf, and dozens of other suspected members in July 2009 became a rallying cry for the group’s subsequent violent campaign. In addition, civil society activists said that because community members themselves are subjected to JTF abuses they are often unwilling to cooperate with security personnel and provide information about Boko Haram, which impedes effective responses to the group’s attacks.”<sup>4</sup>

Unfortunately, the death of Mohamed Yusuf in 2009 did not mark the end to the Boko Haram-related suffering of innocent civilians (irrespective of those responsible for that suffering) but rather only opened up a new chapter in the groups movement towards extreme radicalization.

## 2. Radicalization and Civilian Targets (2009 – today)

After the original leader died, Abubakar Shekau, former number 2 of the group, took over as leader and increased its operational capacities and carried out its first attacks on Western interests by bombing UN Headquarters in Abuja, FCT. Using suicide attacks, bombs and IEDs, the group conducted around 115 attacks during 2011 and was suspected of having infiltrated both police and army in Borno as well as different posts in the government. A state of emergency was then declared in Borno state beginning of 2012 and would usher in an intensification of violence.

From 2013, Boko Haram exported its action abroad, in Cameroon, Chad and Niger and was linked to a number of kidnappings, particularly in Northern Cameroon. The state of emergency was extended in May 2013 to cover the whole of the three northeastern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, raising tensions in the region. The intensification of conflict in northeastern states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe has inevitably resulted in the displacement of people across the troubled states.

Over 2014, Boko Haram seized large swathes of territory in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa and the number and scale of attacks on villages, cities, schools and military bases increased. By targeting public places such as markets, churches, mosques, hospitals, schools etc..., the number of civilian victims grew, and the social and economic infrastructure was heavily damaged in the North East region of Nigeria (with a few exceptions, like Maiduguri, which has demonstrated social and economic resilience to the crisis). Even though attacks are mainly conducted in this region, some have been reported in other parts of the country, including the capital Abuja and the industrial capital of Nigeria, Lagos.

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<sup>4</sup> *Spiraling Violence*. Human Right’s Watch. October 11, 2012.

7,711 deaths due to Boko Haram-related violence were reported by media sources in 2014, which represents, in that year alone, over half of Boko Haram-related deaths in the country since May 2011. The group became sadly infamous for kidnapping 276 schoolgirls in the city of Chibok in April 2014 and received global media attention, especially after United States First Lady Michelle Obama gave several speeches to raise awareness on this issue. As of today, the Chibok girls are still missing, which is a fact that is less internationally broadcast than the kidnappings themselves.

Over 2014, the conflict's spread to neighboring countries intensified and isolated incidents were recorded in Niger and Chad. In December 2014, Boko Haram launched several large-scale attacks in the far north region of Cameroon, including one in late December involving up to 1,000 fighters.

The Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF, a regional force made up of troops from Benin, Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon) launched a military offensive against Boko Haram in early 2015, which resulted in significant territorial losses for the insurgent group. By April 2015, Boko Haram had lost all its held territories except its stronghold in the Sambisa forest in Borno state (Reuters, 05/05/2015). The territorial gains by MNJTF have prompted Boko Haram to revert to guerrilla tactics including village raids, abductions, bombings, and suicide attacks, increasingly targeting civilians – also in areas not previously targeted. In March 2015, Boko Haram declared allegiance to Islamic State, and soon after began referring to themselves as Islamic State's West Africa Province.

A report from Amnesty International, published 1 October 2015, reported 3 500 civilian deaths in 2015, and attacks were still ongoing at the time the report was published. At the end of the year 2015, Boko Haram has been responsible for the deaths of 11,000 people, becoming the world's deadliest terrorist group, even before the Islamic State.

Since the election of President Muhammad Buhari, the Nigerian Army has intensified its operations in the North to "clear" positions. Maiduguri city, capital of Borno State is no longer under Boko Haram's control. In September 2015, the director of Information of the Ministry of Defense declared that Boko Haram had been defeated, that all known Boko Haram camps and cells had been destroyed, and that the group was so weakened that they could no longer hold any territory. In December 2015, President Buhari claimed that Boko Haram was "technically defeated", fulfilling thus his electoral campaign promise.

Nevertheless, even if the insurgent group has been defeated in and cleared from several towns of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States, it has maintained a significant striking force, notably with the utilization of suicide attacks, IEDs, and rocket-propelled grenades.

## **C. SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN CONTEXT - ANALYSIS**

### **1. Humanitarian Situation and Accessibility Constraints**

As mentioned, host communities (i.e areas where IDPs settled outside official camps) in Maiduguri, Borno State, constituted the principal target group of PUI's multi-sector needs and vulnerability assessment in NE Nigeria. The target group can be disaggregated as follows: **IDPs in host communities and local populations, both those hosting IDPs and those not.**

Before delving into an in-depth analysis of the humanitarian consequences for the affected (and assessed) populations, it is necessary first and foremost to mention that despite all the efforts provided by the humanitarian actors, and the progressive arrival of more actors over the course of 2015, **the massive needs of the IDP population and the size of Maiduguri have limited the global understanding of the humanitarian situation both within** – most notably for the communities targeted by PUI in the assessment – and without Maiduguri.

PUI, in order to be complementary to humanitarian assessment and action that has previously been carried forth, made use to the extent possible of available secondary data during its assessment. However, as was attested by several actors during the assessment and subsequently confirmed by PUI in its literature review, there **exists a limited amount of information concerning the global humanitarian situation affecting host communities in Maiduguri.** This conclusion is supported, for example, by the lack of an existing stakeholder analysis (5W) in host communities in the city at the time of the assessment.

Regarding the humanitarian situation outside of Maiduguri, even less is known. Approximately 3M people in need are located in inaccessible LGAs in NE Nigeria, of which 2.5M are located in Borno State alone. As noted in Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) 2016<sup>5</sup>, understanding of the needs of the 3M people in need and that are currently inaccessible is based on anecdotal information coming from recently displaced IDPs. Moreover, as indicated in the *Cadre Harmonisé*<sup>6</sup> for Nigeria, produced on 5 November 2015, 54 242 individuals currently suffer from IPC level 5 food insecurity in Borno State. In spite of this, there is currently no way of identifying and locating the concerned population, much less providing them life-saving assistance.

## 2. Security situation in Borno state and in the region

As mentioned above, it is undoubted that Boko Haram was significantly weakened and lost considerable territorial control in NE Nigeria over the course of 2015, following President Buhari's commitment to defeating the insurgency as well as the establishment of and subsequent military advances made by the MNJTF. However, determining to what extent they currently constitute a threat to civilians' safety and security in NE Nigeria and having a finer understanding of when, where and how that threat may concretize in the act of an attack are both difficult tasks, especially given that the security information divulged to this effect bears a heavy political bias. This political bias has a tendency to reduce and simplify analysis of the current situation, which is, in contrast, multi-dimensional, complex and dynamic.

This bias can, in part, be understood from a political standpoint: local governments desire to politically align themselves with the federal government's objective of ridding the region of Boko Haram and the various governmental declarations indicating that they have been significantly weakened. That notwithstanding, security information circulated in humanitarian spheres must take into consideration this – and other – existing biases.

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<sup>5</sup> See Annex

<sup>6</sup> See Annex



### 3. Potential return of IDPs to LGAs of origin

In spite of continued insecurity in the region, the GoN has initiated IDP returns both to LGAs of origin and to Maiduguri, the latter taking place when a return from a neighboring state to an LGA in Borno is not possible. According to IOM, IDPs from Gubio, Kaga and Konduga LGAs were enabled to return home in late 2015 after these LGAs were rendered accessible (partially or fully) by the GoN. This movement of return has been preliminarily confirmed by the significant reduction of the IDP population in the IOM-operated Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) between the months of October and December 2015 for the same region (Borno State): from 1.606M to 1.434M IDPs. As concerns IDP intentions of return, IOM DTM Round VII report also demonstrates that 94% of the IDP population in Nigeria is in favor of returning, once the (security and other) situation allows the concretization of these intentions to return.

In light of these elements, PUI's initial analysis of the security and humanitarian situation in NE Nigeria is as follows:

*NE Nigeria is an ongoing level 3 crisis and will be treated as such by the organization. That notwithstanding, PUI recognizes the need for nuancing its analysis of the security situation in different parts of Borno State, in light of military advances against the insurgents and the fact that certain LGAs have been rendered (at least partially) accessible by GoN.*

Additionally, and more importantly, it is essential that PUI take into account the following concern when performing an operational analysis to determine whether or not the organization will assure a humanitarian presence in targeted IDP return areas: not to create a pull factor that could be utilized to encourage people to return whereas they would perhaps not otherwise desire to do so.

Consequently, at this point in time, PUI, having just arrived in country, is not well positioned to determine whether or not a return to any specific LGA is in line with humanitarian principles (see Annex OCHA – Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, notably Principles 27-30). As it stands, **on top of the fact that there are numerous uncovered needs currently in Maiduguri city**, initial analysis indicates that it is judicious to wait and see: to establish itself on ground, to watch the development and unfolding of the government's 3R plan (reconstruction, rehabilitation, resettlement), as well as future military evolutions on the ground. Additionally, **it is strongly recommended that PUI contribute actively to security and humanitarian (as well as feasibility) assessments** in Borno State outside of Maiduguri **before deciding to provide humanitarian assistance in LGAs of origin.**

For more information on the recommended assessments, see 5. Recommendations, B. Humanitarian Feasibility Assessment – Return to LGAs of Origin.

## D. HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIOS - 2016

The following graphic presents the three most likely geo-political scenarios for 2016, as well as the correlating descriptions of hypothesized humanitarian impact on IDP and local populations for each of those scenarios. Before delving into this analysis, a few introductory remarks are of order:



Recent displacement trends have shown that military advances by GoN in LGAs in Borno State create a liberating effect for those communities theretofore trapped by the insurgents, at which point in time, they **flood to urban centers**. Considering that further military advances are possible, if not likely, this year, it can be expected that **2016 will see continued displacement**, with a **potential increase of IDP population** in Borno State's capital city, Maiduguri.

That notwithstanding, if military advances there are in 2016, the possibility of GoN implementing its 3R (reconstruction, rehabilitation, resettlement) plan **could result in an increase in the IDP population's voluntary intention of returning to certain LGAs of origin**. Operational forecasts for 2016 must, therefore, take into account the **existence of multiple and simultaneous displacement dynamics during the year**.

The three most likely hypothetical scenarios, as determined by PUI, are as follows<sup>7</sup>:

Probability	Scenario
LOW	<b>Boko Haram insurgency group is defeated by the GoN and MNJTF in 2016</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Security is restored in the 3 North Eastern states of Yobe, Adamawa and Borno</li> <li>➤ <b>Humanitarian needs shift, in large part, to the monitoring of a large scale return of most of the IDPs</b> (within and outside Maiduguri) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Arrival of some new IDPs in Maiduguri after their LGA is liberated by GoN and before the conflict is over</li> <li>○ <b>Full-scale humanitarian response to the 3M persons in need previously inaccessible</b></li> </ul> </li> </ul>
AVERAGE	<b>Fighting continues between Boko Haram and the GoN; the latter gains significant ground and the security situation improves</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ <b>Increased IDPs returns while a large number are still unwilling to leave due to insecurity</b></li> <li>➤ Humanitarian needs are dual: <b>monitoring the return of those who came back home and support the worsening situation of those who stayed, as well as those who come from recently liberated LGAs</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ 3M persons in need remain largely inaccessible</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
HIGH	<b>Fighting continues between Boko Haram and the GoN: the security situation remains relatively similar to the current one while the humanitarian needs deepen.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ <u>Situation:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Heavy deployment of GoN military forces in the area, regular fights and Boko Haram terror attacks leading to a continuation of the present security situation</li> <li>○ The GoN increases communication about its successes against the insurgency and pursues its policy of IDPs relocation from inside Maiduguri to the outskirts of the city and to IDP areas of origin, along with the roll-out of the 3R plan.</li> <li>○ Further displacement from rural areas liberated by the Nigerian Army takes place replicating current displacement trends.</li> <li>○ <b>The overall number of IDPs in Maiduguri remains relatively stable</b></li> </ul> </li> <li>➤ <u>Humanitarian needs:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ IDP situation in Maiduguri: increase in vulnerability for the large majority who stay due to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Exacerbated pressure on public services and on host communities</b></li> <li>▪ <b>Likelihood of intercommunity tensions</b></li> <li>▪ <b>Greater utilization of negative coping strategies</b></li> <li>▪ <b>Impact of the new displacement to the outskirts of the city: marginalization and difficulty of access</b></li> </ul> </li> <li>○ <b>Strong need of humanitarian monitoring of the process of return to LGAs of origin.</b></li> <li>○ The situation of the 3M IDPs <b>located in rural areas remains unaddressed if the humanitarian community doesn't improve its response mechanism.</b></li> <li>○ Increased needs in advocacy in order to <b>raise national and international awareness of the situation to get the necessary funding to meet the assessed and identified needs.</b></li> <li>○ <b>Principal needs of the affected populations:</b></li> </ul> </li> </ul>

<sup>7</sup> For an in-depth scenario analysis see annex

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Food Security and Livelihood</li> <li>- NFI</li> <li>- Shelter</li> <li>- Health &amp; Nutrition</li> <li>- WASH</li> <li>- Protection</li> <li>- Psychosocial</li> </ul>
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In six month's time, and barring any majorly impacting incident taking place before then, it will be necessary to **update the hypothetical scenarios table** for the 2nd semester of 2016 / 1st semester of 2017 in light of geo-political, security and humanitarian developments taking place in 1st semester 2016.

## 2. METHODOLOGY

### A. MISSION OBJECTIVES

The overall objective of the first phase of assessment was to provide a general overview of the humanitarian situation of internal displaced persons and affected host communities in Nigeria, to network with actors involved in the response, as well as to understand the constraints of implementation in the country (in terms of security and other technical and operational matters). Moreover, this first phase aimed at clearing the standard operating procedures (SOPs) of intervention and providing recommendations for a second phase, intended to target specific areas and/or sectors.

The overall objective of the second phase was to perform a comparative needs and vulnerability study of affected communities (regardless of status) in Maiduguri<sup>8</sup>.

### B. MISSION METHODOLOGY & ORGANIZATION OF THE TEAM

Phase 1 took place from the 1<sup>st</sup> to the 15<sup>th</sup> of December 2015, in Abuja and was led by the Emergency Officer from HQ Emergency team who met with most of the actors present and involved in the humanitarian response to gather information, perspective and advice from partners. Presence in the country was definitely useful in gaining a better understanding of the political context and in order to access information.

The information collected during the first phase of the assessment was based on the following:

- Consultation with governmental authorities;
- Consultation with UN agencies, international and local NGOs;
- Review of secondary data recently produced by relevant stakeholders.

Phase 2 was conducted from the 15<sup>th</sup> of January to the 5<sup>th</sup> of February 2016, in Abuja and in Maiduguri by a Country Representative and an Assessment Officer, with additional support from HQ Emergency Officer.

In order to achieve the objective set forth for the second phase, PUI made the decision to deploy teams across the city to perform: 1) a limited number of assessments in a wide range of communities (in camps, in informal settlements, and in host communities), as well as, 2) a significant number of assessments in targeted, host community areas. As a result of this (albeit limited) understanding of the global situation facing affected populations in Maiduguri, PUI was enabled to target certain host communities based on overall tendencies of vulnerability and need in those communities, as compared to others.

The team carried out the multi sectorial needs assessment in nine different areas of Maiduguri, met with INGO partners, UN agencies, institutional donors, OCHA and authorities (including NEMA).

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<sup>8</sup> Maiduguri city was selected as the preferred area for the multi sectorial needs assessment, even though certain needs are still to be covered in Yobe State, for instance.

The information gathered during the MSNA was based on:

- Site surveys (9 Sites surveys were performed);
- Household surveys (more than 700 HH surveys performed);
- Focus Group Discussions (8 FGD conducted);
- Consultation with key actors in Maiduguri and Abuja;
- Review of Secondary Data recently produced by relevant stakeholders.

Specific assessment tools were created and/or adapted for the Nigerian context. For more details on the assessment tools, please refer to Annex. – PUI Assessment Tools

## **G. SECONDARY DATA SOURCES**

The following is a non-exhaustive list of secondary data used by the team. Some are available in annex.

- ACAPS – Briefing Notes
- Secondary data review – ACAPS
- DISPLACEMENT TRACKING MATRIX (DTM) Round VI Report - October 2015
- DISPLACEMENT TRACKING MATRIX (DTM) Round VII Report - December 2015
- Humanitarian Needs Overview – November 2015
- Humanitarian Response Plan – December 2015
- Nigeria Humanitarian Bulletin OCHA – October 2015
- Amnesty International report « NOTRE MÉTIER EST D'ABATTRE, DE MASSACRER ET DE TUER » - April 2015
- Cadre Harmonisé for Identifying Risk Areas and Vulnerable Populations in The Sahel and West Africa – Government of Nigeria, FAO and CILSS

## **D. ASSESSMENT LIMITATIONS**

Considering the size of Maiduguri and the absence of a finalized 5W at the time of the assessment, it was difficult to select the communities to assess, and nearly impossible to do so based on a coherent and global targeting of needs and vulnerability.

No particular limitations due to security were noted during the mission.

# **3. ASSESSMENT RESULTS**

## **A. POPULATION PROFILE**

### **1. Affected populations**

Before going any further, it is important to call attention to the fact that breakdown of affected population into traditional categories (i.e. IDPs in official camps, IDPs in informal settlements, and IDPs in host families) does not render justice to the complex reality of the situation in Maiduguri, NE Nigeria.

Disaggregation of affected populations is, in reality, not as clear-cut, specifically as concerns host and IDP populations. **Of those IDPs assessed in Maiduguri by PUI, 72.9% pay rent for their lodging.** In some cases, IDPs pay rent to the landowner that continues living in one building or one room of a building in the compound and who remains, thus, in close physical proximity to the IDPs. In other cases, however, **IDPs rent from a landlord that is absent and that rents the totality of his/her lodging to IDPs.** In some parts of the city, there are whole IDP settlements where little to no locals remain and where IDPs rent from absent landlords. Flour Mills is such an area. Concomitantly, and which is also showing the complexity of the situation, **16.9% of the IDP population assessed by PUI and paying rent attested itself to hosting additional IDPs in their domicile (IDPs hosting IDPs).**

The above cases blur traditional lines that exist between IDP and host communities and render humanitarian analysis of dynamics between affected populations more complex. As such, **it is strongly recommended that PUI study, on a case-by-case basis, the existing dynamics between (and within) local and IDP communities to determine the level of resource sharing.** Additionally, furthering its cultural understanding of the different communities in NE Nigeria, which boasts, for example, **a strong sense of commerce**, will also prove fruitful.

Consideration of these, and other, elements of analysis will forcibly contribute to gain a clearer understanding of the impact of IDP presence on other, affected communities.

#### Status of the Households<sup>9</sup> assessed:

Household Status	Proportion
Displaced Households	69,67%
HH Not hosting IDPs	13,25%
Host Community	17,08%
<b>Total Population Assessed</b>	<b>100,00%</b>

According to PUI's database, the table below shows the repartition of Households depending on the status of the householder:

Status of the Householder	Proportion
Women Headed Households	12%
Man (no women) Headed Household	20%
Elderly Headed Household	1%
Normal Composition of Household (Man + at least One Woman)	67%
Total	100%

#### Access to Assistance of the Targeted Population:

**Of those assessed, 87% have never received any assistance. Within the host community, 95 % have never received any assistance.**

<sup>9</sup> Household – defined as a group of persons living of the same room and usually sharing the same food. In Maiduguri, HH are generally composed of **7 to 16 persons.**

Of those who have received assistance, most of them received support from their extended relatives (family, friends, children etc...) while only 2% received support from NEMA, and 3% from NGOs. Main support attested was food (38%), financial support (17%), and NFI (14%). Among those who have received assistance, less than 6% have received support over the last three months.

## 2. Targeted Geographical Areas In Maiduguri City

As in many other humanitarian/development contexts, there exist simultaneously a centralized, governmental system and a traditional authority system in Nigeria. The centralized governmental system has contributed to the geographical and administrative (amongst other things) creation of Local Government Areas (LGAs), subdivided into Wards, subdivided again, etc.

In Maiduguri city, and specifically in host communities, **superimposed on that governmental, geographical mapping is a distinct and separate mapping of geographical areas, according to traditional authority figures (i.e. lawans, bulamas)**. During the assessment, PUI observed a confusing alternation between the two systems of geographic distinction. It is thus recommended that PUI pay close attention to exact geographical locations in future assessments and project implementation and contribute, as well, to the clarification on a larger humanitarian level of the system of community appellation. The below table explicates and clarifies some of these potentially blurring roles and responsibilities:

Title	Roles in Community	Communication with Community	Frequency
Emir	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•State and LGA advisors on matters relating to the promotion and preservation of culture and tradition and to peace and security.</li> <li>•Are used by the government as the forefront mobilization team for the people to embrace government policies and programs</li> </ul>	Rarely. Their main communication channel is through the Hakim	Meets with hakim twice a month or when there is need
Hakim	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Same responsibilities as above.</li> <li>•The Emir's advisors</li> </ul>	Meets with the Lawan regularly, can be formal or informal meetings	Meets with different Lawans on a weekly basis
Lawan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Settle disputes among community members within the village.</li> <li>•Shares farmland to village members.</li> </ul>	Everyday interaction with the community members and	Formal meeting with Bulamas once a week, after Friday prayer.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Communication channel between the community and the Hakim (Represents village to the Hakim)</li> <li>•Advises the village on issues relating to peace and preservation of the culture</li> </ul>	regular meeting with the Bulama.	
Bulama	Same as the Lawan but at settlement level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Day to day interaction with men in the settlement.</li> <li>•Send women leader with information to the women</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Daily</li> <li>•When there is need</li> </ul>
LGA Chairman	Over see the LGA and is the administrative decision maker of the LGA	Campaign	During election time
Councillor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Oversee the political wards.</li> <li>•Enable communities to help themselves and provide a vital link between the local authority and the communities which they serve</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Monthly meetings with Lawan and Bulamas</li> <li>•Communicate through their respective ward committee.</li> <li>•Campaigns</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Once/twice a month</li> <li>•Weekly basis.</li> <li>•During elections</li> </ul>
Imam	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Prayer leader</li> <li>•Adviser on issuing relating to everyday life, the Koran and disputes.</li> </ul>	Prayer time	Daily

Source: Context Analysis and Risk Assessment – Other Solution Consulting November 2015

## B. FOOD SECURITY / LIVELIHOOD ANALYSIS

In terms of the humanitarian situation as assessed by PUI, the affected IDP and local populations suffered from a widespread need of basic services and life-saving assistance. That being said, **across the board**, be it in discussion with traditional community leaders (Bulamas), in focus groups with selected, target audiences, or in general household surveys<sup>10</sup> performed on a large scale in Maiduguri, **PUI teams observed that the principal and most urgent need was for improved food security.**

Given diminishing resources and the IDP population's lack of access to non-compromising livelihood, the situation is not expected to be significantly better in the near future. This corroborates food security forecasts presented in the *Cadre Harmonisé* of November 2015, which anticipates 834 000 people suffering from IPC 4 or 5 food insecurity until at least August 2016.

### 1. Food Consumption Score in Households & Coping Strategies

Concerning the food security data analysis, PUI utilized the classification of food consumption scores into three categories (following WFP Regional Bureau for West Africa, *Food Security Indicators*), represented in the table below:

Food Consumption Score Categories / Level		
Category 1	Acceptable Score	SCA > 35
Category 2	Limit Score	SCA between 21.5 and 34.5
Category 3	Poor Score	SCA < 21.5


<sup>10</sup> Cf. Household Survey Template in Annex



Additionally, PUI, to facilitate analysis, grouped the scoring of Universal Coping Strategy Index into three categories, split as follows:

Coping Strategy Index Categories		
Category 1	Viable Strategies	CSI < 22
Category 2	Endangering Strategies	CSI between 22 and 43
Category 3	Negative Strategies	CSI > 43

The following graphic shows the food consumption level for the total population assessed (without consideration of status), with the exception of households assessed in the official camps.




Graphic 01 – Food Consumption Level – Population outside the camps

Of the households assessed outside the official camps, 69% have a food consumption level considered as limit (44%) or poor (25%).


### IDPs and Food Insecurity

It is, however, interesting to correlate Graphic 01 to Graphic 02 below, for the latter focuses on the level of food consumption within the IDP population, among whom distribution is quite even between the 3 levels.

In order to have a more complete understanding of the food security situation of assessed populations, Graphic 03 presents the Coping Strategy Index scores of the IDP population in the sites assessed. **74% of the IDPs are employing endangering and negative coping mechanisms to address food insecurity.**




Graphic 02: Level of FCS – IDPs




Graphic 03: Coping Strategy Index - IDPs

## Host Community and Food Insecurity

As demonstrated below (Graphic 04), 56% of the host community has a food consumption level considered as limit (37%) or poor (19%). Overall, food consumption is noticeably better than in the IDP population; however, as demonstrated by Graphic 05 below, 82% of the host community is resorting to hazardous coping strategies, with endangering (I2) and negative (I3) levels both being higher in the host community than in the IDP population. These coping mechanisms could explain, at least in part, why the host community households scored better on food consumption.



Graphic 04: Level of FCS in Host Community




Graphic 05: Coping Strategies In Host Communities


## Households Not Hosting IDPs and Food Insecurity

The graphics below illustrate data regarding the local population, those not hosting IDPs but living in close proximity to areas where IDPs are settled. 20% of them are suffering from (I3) food insecurity, with food consumption scores below 21.5. Additionally, 64% of them use endangering (I2) and negative (I3) coping mechanisms to address food insecurity.

Preliminary Conclusion: Before disaggregating the data further and performing a geographical food security analysis in Maiduguri, it can already be concluded that, **based on the data shown above, the food security situation is critical, regardless of status**. Host communities, as well as local households not hosting IDPs, face food insecurity, and can be particularly vulnerable (even more so than IDP households assessed in certain neighborhoods).



Graphic 06: Level of FCS in HH not hosting IDPs



Graphic 07: Coping Strategies In HH not hosting IDPs

## 2. Focus on the three sites never before assessed:


### Galidima Area:

Located in the city center along Kashim Ibrahim Road, Galadima has been highly impacted by Boko Haram, especially given that the group was created close by. Despite the presence of young followers in the neighborhood who joined the ranks of the insurgents, attacks were conducted by Boko Haram against the population in Galidima forcing some to leave to other wards, and for the wealthiest, those who were able to flee the country, to Cameroon. Currently, the security situation is relatively stable in the area, as security is provided by the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). Though, their presence represents, at the same time, a potential protection threat<sup>11</sup>.


As of today, IDPs from numerous LGAs (principally from Bama, Kaga and Konduga) are hosted in the community and live in coexistence with the local population. The area is multiethnic (Hausa, Kanuri, Gwónza...) and multi religious (Muslims and Christians are both represented). Some of the IDPs are hosted in local households, and about 35% are renting rooms belonging to natives from the area who fled and have not yet returned. Inter religion and inter ethnic relations are relatively good, and household surveys revealed that no major tensions were registered between host community and the IDPs.

Focus Group (FG) discussions carried out with host communities and IDPs, both with men and women (separately), expressed as their priority and principal need: **food and (secondly) access to income**. In Galidima, as shown by the graphic below, the level of food consumption is quite equivalent in the host community and in the IDP population in terms of the percentage of acceptable households. That being said, the percentage of households with a level 3, poor score, is greater in the host community than in the IDP population.

<sup>11</sup> The CJTF is also accused of committing atrocities against the population. This is further discussed in *Section F. Protection Analysis*.



Graphic 08: Galadima IDPs FCS



Graphic 09: Galadima Host Community FCS

Lastly, the coping mechanisms put in place by the host community, as demonstrated below, are more dangerous and potentially pernicious than those put in place by the IDP population.

LEVEL – CSI	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	TOTALS
<b>Galidima TOTAL</b>	29.58%	30.99%	39.44%	100.00%
Displaced	33.33%	30.56%	36.11%	100.00%
Host Community	25.71%	31.43%	42.86%	100.00%


It can thus be initially concluded that the food security situation is worse for the host community in Galidima than IDP population. This phenomenon, however, was not systematically observed in other areas assessed, which provides initial justification for an adapted intervention based on vulnerability in each area targeted.

### Jajeri:

Jajeri/Zajiri area is located within Bolori II Ward, in the far north of Maiduguri. At the time of the assessment, security was good and it was possible to move freely inside the area. However, it was reported that the neighborhood was previously one of Boko Haram's bastions and was accessed with difficulty for a certain time after 2009. Additionally, it was difficult to find reliable information on the number of persons living in this area of Bolori II (whose estimated total population is 97 719 individuals)<sup>12</sup>.

Nevertheless, PUI conducted 144 household surveys and 2 focus group discussions, all of which showed that level of food insecurity is worrying. Indeed, the graphic below shows that 76% of those assessed have a food consumption score considered as limit or poor.

<sup>12</sup> IOM DTM Round VII.




Graphic 10: Jajeri Global FCS

### Flour Mills Area:

Flour Mills is an informal settlement in northern Maiduguri where IDPs settled in left behind (but not abandoned) compounds belonging to absent landlords, and where they pay rent (about 2850 NGN<sup>13</sup> per month). According to the IDP population living there, many of the dwellings are in bad shape and unsanitary. Flour Mills counts 369 displaced households (1941 Individuals), according to the Bulama, and about 650 local households in close proximity.

Focus Groups separately conducted with men and women revealed in both cases that food security is the priority need, along with access to income.



Graphic 11: Flour Mills FCS

The main source of income of the IDP population before the crisis was farming or trading; however, as can be expected, their lifestyle radically changed when they were forced to flee, and they lost access to their livelihood. In Flour Mills, IDPs arrived around September 2014 and **have never received any assistance either from local authorities or from humanitarian organizations (local or international).**

Some of the IDPs assessed access food thanks to their relatives or neighbors, who share. Some of the IDP men have access to small labor like non-agricultural daily work, petty trading, plumbing, or tailoring. Nevertheless, the household surveys carried forth in this community show the alarming figures in the table

<sup>13</sup> About 12 euros

below as concerns the coping strategies put in place:


Flour Mills - Coping Strategies		
Coping Strategy Used by the HH	At least 1 day in the Past 7 days	More than 5 days in the past 7 days
Begging	66%	23%
Send 1 or more family members to eat elsewhere	46%	19%
Went at least 1 day without eating	69%	20%
Bought food on credit	82%	23%
Fed active members of the family at the expense of the dependants	32%	38%

Source: PUI, February 2016.

### 3. Commercial activity in North East Nigeria:

Despite the ongoing conflict in Borno State and the neighboring States of Yobe and Adamawa, Maiduguri has illustrated commercial resilience and constitutes the only place in Borno and Yobe States where markets are fully functioning (see map below). All nine of the major markets in Maiduguri were functioning at the time of the assessment.

The market analysis was not pushed further by PUI teams, for WFP, AAH, and NRC were in the process of performing (during the assessment) a joint market assessment in Maiduguri. PUI will thus rely on the results of this study as the basis for its preliminary and global analysis of commercial feasibility of future interventions in food security/livelihood in Maiduguri, Borno State.



Source : Functioning Markets in Norht East Nigeria States affected by the conflict – Few's Net

## C. WASH ANALYSIS


### 1. Drinking Water:

As concerns the principal sources of drinking water for the assessed populations, Graphic 12 below demonstrates that, in all three sites, the most represented sources are water vendors and unprotected sources (which includes: unprotected wells, rivers, dam water...).

In Flour Mills, for example, access to water depends highly on the water vendors, with nearly 16% of the population accessing water through that means. Not being able to pay, and as reported in Focus Group discussions conducted with women, they beg the host community to let them access wells and boreholes. Most of the time, adult women are in charge of collecting the water, for when children try to collect water, they are shooed away by the host community.

Additionally, another serious problem faced by the households interrogated during the assessment, besides the quality of water to which they have access, is the lack of sizeable and hygienic water containers, especially among the IDP population.





Graphic 12: Main Sources of Drinking Water of Population in Galidima, Jajeri and Flour Mills

## 2. Sanitation:

According to PUI database of the household surveys, only 24% of the population has access to hygienic latrines. As expected, the situation is worse in the IDPs settlements inside the host communities, where 75% of the IDPs attest to utilizing a non hygienic latrine. In some areas, such as Flour Mills, the women reported during FG discussions that access to latrines is connected to the payment of rent to the landlord. As a result, women reported going often “to the bush”.

Moreover the teams observed a limited number of latrines in the assessed areas, and corroborated the information shared by the women in most of the FG discussions of there being no gender separate latrines and no latrines accessible to persons with disabilities.

Regarding waste management, most of the households surveyed reported burning waste when possible; otherwise, they send their children to dispose of the waste in an open field.

## 3. Hygiene:

As concerns hygiene, only 21% of those assessed reported having access to soap and/or ashes for hand washing. However:

- 86% of the respondents are aware that it is important to wash hands after going to the latrine
- 52 % of the respondents are aware that it is important to wash hands before preparing food
- 92% of the respondents are aware that it is important to wash hands before eating.

Only 2% of the households assessed have access to a shower device.

## D. HEALTH ANALYSIS

Even though the assessment did not particularly focus on health, key health actors were met (MSF, UNICEF) in order to get an in-depth understanding of the humanitarian situation in Maiduguri. Whereas the health

system in Nigeria is carried by what seems to be a relatively strong and functional Ministry of Health, it is fair to assume that in such a context in Maiduguri city, access to healthcare has been severely impacted. Beyond access to services, health conditions and status have most certainly worsened over the course of the crisis. Massive displacement, leading to poor shelter conditions (promiscuity, insalubrity etc...), limited access to potable water, poor hygiene and sanitary conditions, severe food insecurity and a low access to income, especially for IDPs, have all contributed to increasing the vulnerability of the affected population.

Though the assessment was not principally focused on health, some interesting data were nonetheless collected. 34 % of the households assessed revealed not going to a health facility, with the main reason impeding them from going being a lack of sufficient funds (in 48% of the cases). FG discussions brought out the fact that pregnant women do not have access to antenatal care, for instance, or that some of them even gave birth on the run (literally while fleeing), and had no access to healthcare afterwards. From what PUI teams observed in the field, which has been confirmed by data shared by other actors, malnutrition rates are quite high. During the survey, 8% of the children under five years old were reported by their parents as being followed for malnutrition.

Malaria happens to be the most common disease reported by those assessed, followed by diarrhea and respiratory infection.

## **E. PSYCHOSOCIAL / MENTAL HEALTH ANALYSIS**

Given the severe psychological suffering already inflicted upon the affected populations by the harrowing events at the origin of their displacement, psychosocial needs preliminarily appear to be tremendous, both in breadth and in complexity. Several factors constitutive of the complex nature of the psychosocial situation facing affected populations need to be studied with care, and appropriate, well analyzed, and expertise-based responses put in place. To name a few of those factors:

- The psychological impact that discussion for a return to LGAs of origin may have on affected populations, if they are not yet emotionally (or other) prepared for that prospect;
- IDP relocations that will imminently take place within Maiduguri and without, and thus the psychological impact a secondary (or tertiary) displacement may have on the population;
- The binary nature of discourse about the ongoing conflict in NE Nigeria – i.e. Boko Haram is bad, the Nigerian Army (or the MNJTF) is good – which potentially worsens the psychological state of those people that may have been the victim of aggression (sexual, or other) on behalf of the Nigerian Army or troops of the MNJTF, or even on behalf of the CJTF (see below, *Protection Analysis*, for more information).


It is for this reason and others that PUI has made the decision to perform an in-depth health and psychosocial analysis in Maiduguri in February 2016. This analysis will help nourish PUI's development of contextually adapted psychosocial programming for affected populations.

## **F. PROTECTION ANALYSIS**

As indicated in the Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) 2016, 5.5M people in Nigeria are in need of protection services. Consequently, the HRP 2016 makes an appeal for the humanitarian community to “focus on better understanding the protection concerns, implementing mitigation and intervention strategies and reinforcing advocacy...Without scaled-up protection interventions, ongoing insecurity and grave violations against civilians will severely affect at risk groups including women, children and elderly.” During the assessment, several key protection informants in Maiduguri judged the current protection response in NE Nigeria as insufficient; this observation was, at least partially, confirmed by UN Special Reporters during their visit in late January 2016<sup>14</sup>.

Concurrently, and perhaps even *due* to this, clear and apparent violations of humanitarian principles, like the **restriction of movement in/out of official IDP camps in Maiduguri** (see Principle 14, Clause 2 – *OCHA Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement*)<sup>15</sup>, are taking place in Maiduguri. In stark juxtaposition with the prevalence of the binary and simplistic nature of discourse mentioned above, “Nigerian Armed Forces and the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) have been accused of atrocities such as killing people on suspicion of being Boko Haram sympathizers or operatives. There is a deep concern in civil society that the state-sponsored CJTF, which encourages the youth to take up arms against Boko Haram, is promoting a dangerous form of vigilantism that is already leading to violent criminality. (*HCT Communications and Advocacy Strategy*, Humanitarian Communications Working Group.)

**In addition to these elements, PUI observed a considerable need for additional protection actors in order to increase protection understanding and response capacity in the assessed locations.** Graphic 13 below, extracted from the household survey database, shows that, when faced with the protection problem of losing contact with a family member, households have nobody to not refer to in the vast majority of cases. This exemplifies a correlated lack of access to information and lack of resources made available to vulnerable populations in the assessed locations.



Graphic 13: Person/Group Contacted in Case of Lost Family Member in Galidima, Jajeri and Flour Mills

## G. NFI ANALYSIS

<sup>14</sup> UN Special Rapporteurs on sale of children, child pornography and child prostitution; contemporary forms of slavery; and the right to the highest attainable standard of health, Abuja, Nigeria, 22 January 2016.

<sup>15</sup> See Annex

As was anticipated before visiting the field, IDPs are the most vulnerable group regarding NFIs. Having fled from their homes rapidly, many of them arrived with nothing in Maiduguri. FG discussions revealed that cooking items and hygienic items (including items for water storage and water collection) constitute the most critical need for the households assessed. When commenting their situation in terms of food insecurity, many households mentioned that even were they to receive a distribution of food items, they would not be able to prepare meals for lack of kitchen utensils.

Data consolidation and analysis of household surveys are still ongoing, which will contribute to a proper NFI scoring (to be shared imminently).

## H. SHELTER ANALYSIS

As explained, the areas assessed during the exploratory mission are mainly neighborhoods in which host communities and IDP populations coexist.

In terms of shelter, one of the principal tendencies revealed in the household surveys is that 72 % of the IDPs in the communities assessed pay rent to a landlord. That being said, it is important to underline that paying rent is not necessarily a guarantee for good conditions of living, as most of the dwellings were reported by the IDP population as being in poor condition.



Example of Dwelling in Flour Mills rented by IDPs



Example of Dwelling in Selementi rented by IDPs

## 4. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

### A. 3W

As mentioned, PUI focused its assessment on host communities in Maiduguri out of a desire to be complementary to assessment and action carried forth by actors already present on ground. As such, upon arrival in Maiduguri, PUI performed inquiries before organizing bodies (both on a global, sector-wide level and on a working-group level) to develop a clear stakeholder analysis in host communities in Maiduguri.

This information was not available at the time of the assessment, and it was therefore necessary for PUI to individually perform visits to the different NGO actors present and operational in host communities in order to gather and consolidate the information requested. The process was labor-intensive and penalized the development of a more in-depth analysis of the situation in the field.

At the time of the assessment, the following organizations operated in host communities in Maiduguri, all of whom were contacted by PUI:

- IRC, ICRC, NRC, Action Against Hunger, Oxfam, Save The Children, MSF-F.

Not all of the actors were available for the proposed encounter with PUI, and the stakeholder analysis that was therefore obtained from the exercise is unsatisfactory. That notwithstanding, the OCHA Sub-Office in Maiduguri is currently performing a stakeholder analysis in host communities in Maiduguri that will be published imminently.

Lastly, although PUI is not currently able to provide a thorough 3W for host communities in Maiduguri, **the affected populations of targeted host communities in which it focused its assessment were not beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance.** It can therefore be determined that PUI, given the particular lack of coordination in Maiduguri, **performed a negative stakeholder analysis** successfully determining where

humanitarian actors were **not** present at the time of the evaluation.

⇒ **Annex - PUI - 3W data base (for host communities ONLY, Maiduguri)**

⇒ **Annex - OCHA - 3W Map of Nigeria - 21 Oct 2015**

**It can be concluded that the humanitarian needs in IDP and host communities in Maiduguri surpass the existing response capacity of the humanitarian community and of the GoN.** Indeed, PUI understands arguments that purport that bringing in additional NGOs would only exacerbate and worsen pre-existing difficulties in delivering targeted, complementary and coordinated humanitarian assistance; however, our organization has concluded that the arrival of additional actors is necessary to contribute to attaining a critical mass in terms of the number and capacity of humanitarian organizations present in Nigeria, which would in turn contribute to resolving, not exacerbating, some of the aforementioned difficulties.

Additionally, with **more actors on ground in NE Nigeria**, the bolstered and reinforced humanitarian capacity would have a greater chance at coherently, and in a principal- and evidence-based manner, evaluating the feasibility of extending its coverage to the 2.5M persons in need currently located in inaccessible LGAs in Borno State.

## **B. LOCAL AUTHORITIES**

Whereas local authorities are not hostile to humanitarian intervention in Nigeria, they do not necessarily ease or facilitate the process. Nigeria has a strong government, ruling the first economy of Africa, and has historically been unwilling to draw attention to the insurgency in the North East, for fear that it might scare away economic partners and/or foreign investors. This political positioning contributed, in fact, to worsen the humanitarian situation of millions of IDPs and of corresponding affected host community populations.

The federal form of government that exists in Nigeria also plays a major role in the way in which the humanitarian crisis has been (and is) managed. The federal government is, in some senses, far from the reality of the individual states, which is a dynamic that is particularly applicable to the states in the Northeast.

Additionally, certain key informants reported the existence of an incompatibility between humanitarian and GoN federal/state modes of functionality. Humanitarian organizations operate in a heavily centralized manner in Nigeria, with operations in the North East that depend on validation, approval and/or decision-making from Abuja. This mode of centralized operation is contrasted with the federal government's modus operandi, which is rather decentralized (at least in theory) and accords a certain amount of autonomy to individual states. According to these key informants, this incompatibility contributes to delaying processes of decision-making and advancing on key issues.

The government also plays a significant role within the humanitarian mechanism in Nigeria. Governmental bodies fulfill the various roles of sector-based Working Group lead (at both federal and state levels), with UN agencies as co-lead, and certain NGOs as secretaries for certain Working Groups. This configuration places GoN as the central figure of humanitarian action in the country, with UN agencies, institutional funders, and NGOs (both international and local) as partners in operation.



On a national level, **NEMA** (National Emergency Management Agency) is in charge of coordinating the humanitarian crisis response. On a state level, the corresponding governmental body, **SEMA** (State Emergency Management Agency) is in charge of coordinating the humanitarian response in their respective states. Given the scale of the crisis in Borno State, NEMA and SEMA signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in May 2015, according to which NEMA deployed 40 members of its personnel to Borno in an effort to support SEMA in its efforts to coordinate and respond to the crisis.

PUI visited both NEMA and SEMA in Maiduguri and received governmental approval to perform the assessment in targeted areas (see Annex).

### **C. LOCAL CIVIL SOCIETY**

No representative of the local civil society was met during either phase of the exploratory mission. However, both local NGOs and local media are considerably developed in the country. Additionally, Nigerian Red Cross is quite active in the northeastern states and benefits from an overall good reputation.

### **D. COORDINATION MECHANISM**

This point will not be belabored here, for the difficulties in coordination, specifically in the NE, are widely acknowledged by actors already present on ground. PUI repeating this information does not bring any added value to the discussion that predates its presence in the country. That being said, some of the difficulties that were encountered during PUI's assessment in Maiduguri are intrinsically linked to the lack of coordination.

### **E. NIGERIAN SPECIFICITIES**

During the assessment, PUI encountered numerous actors, both in Abuja and Maiduguri, many of whom, if not the quasi-totality of them, responded to questions about the current state of humanitarian affairs by citing the elements enumerated below. These elements constitute what has come to be known as “the Nigeria narrative”.

#### **1. The strength of the State of Nigeria**

Unlike other countries, in central Africa for example, where humanitarian workers have a long history of operating, Nigeria boasts a powerful and capable government that is not only strong but that also has a plan in response to the humanitarian crisis wreaking havoc in the NE. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the GoN even has the financial means and organizational capacity to put that plan into action. As such, the role of humanitarian organizations in Nigeria is understood as being less of a substitute to the state, a role that has become familiar in other humanitarian contexts where the state is openly deficient in certain areas/domains. On the contrary, the humanitarian role in Nigeria consists of influencing, accompanying and completing the government as it creates, and subsequently carries forth, its own crisis response plan.

This task, however, as confirmed by many of the same informants, reveals itself as not being simple. As a result, the influence that the humanitarian community may have on GoN is mitigated.



## 2. Fear of negative repercussions on the humanitarian community

Additionally, and still according to the narrative, one of the principle risks associated with a humanitarian attempt to influence the government's plan and implementation of that plan is the potential expulsion of an organization. The GoN, being as strong as it is, could easily, if it decided to do so, expulse an organization openly critical of its practices or actions. This fear is rampant and widespread in the humanitarian community in Nigeria. To what extent, though, it is based on a legitimate risk analysis is harder to decipher.

First analysis, though, leads to the following pieces of information:

- The GoN has not expelled one single iNGO in recent history.
- The International Center for Not-For-Profit Law cited in its June 2011 Issue of *Global Trends in NGO Law* that: "Registration provisions in many countries include vague language and sweeping grants of power to agencies or ministries, allowing government employees broad discretion when evaluating registration applications from would-be NGOs... According to the Nigerian Criminal Code (Article 62), Societies are deemed unlawful if formed for the purpose of "interfering with, or resisting, or encouraging interference with or resistance to the administration of the law."

At first glance, the second component of this response does indeed constitute a potential risk to NGOs as they are in the process of being formed in country (i.e. registering with the government), it does not seem to apply to those organizations already registered, established and operational.

Regardless, PUI has already **involved legal counsel** in country.

This forms part and parcel of a broader risk analysis to be performed with other iNGOs already in place, notably the iNGO Forum.

## 3. The "Development vs. Humanitarian" effect

Lastly, the narrative nearly systematically makes mention of the fact that, in years prior, the community of aid workers in Nigeria was comprised principally of development workers, who boasted a development-oriented mentality and work rhythm. Accordingly, the development workers were more likely to have a consenting attitude to behavior that would be more difficult to accept for the humanitarian community.

This seems, though, to be an illusory and artificial explanation, given that development workers, just like humanitarian workers, labor for the respect of human rights, and that they are, in fact, considerably experienced and adept at dealing with functional governments.

## 5. RECOMMENDATIONS

### A. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

The Exploratory Mission confirmed that Nigeria is facing one of the most important Humanitarian crises of our time, and that critical humanitarian needs of the Nigerian population - with no consideration of status - are unmet.

The most urgent lifesaving assistance should be targeted at improving the food security situation for the most vulnerable population, as well as increasing their access to livelihood.

The **psychological aspect of this crisis** – of the initial violence-related incidents provoking the displacements as well as the way in which this crisis has been and is being managed (see *Section 3. Assessment Results. E. Psychosocial and Mental Health Analysis*) – has been preliminarily determined as being **extremely critical**. The need appears so great that PUI, out of a desire to put in place a tailor-fit, contextually and socio-culturally adapted response, has decided to bring in a Health & Psychosocial Expert to perform an in-depth analysis during first quarter 2016.

Moreover, according to the HRP 2016, the number of baseline advocacy initiatives undertaken and advocacy products developed to promote respect of protection standards prevent and mitigate protection risks and support development of legal frameworks for 2016 is “N/A”. Regardless of the myriad commentary littered throughout this report illustrating the need for improved advocacy capacity in Nigeria, this statement alone exemplifies the grave need for such capacity reinforcement and for additional actors to actively participate in advocacy initiatives and in the development of a communications and advocacy strategy in the country (see in Annex, *Nigeria HCT Communications & Advocacy Strategy*).

As a result, Première Urgence Internationale has made the decision to position itself as a multi-sector actor targeting affected IDP and host communities in Maiduguri and has concurrently begun discussion with institutional funders in an effort to garner financial support for the implementation of the following strategy.

### B. HUMANITARIAN FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENTS - IDP RETURN TO LGAS OF ORIGIN

As mentioned above, it is strongly recommended that PUI perform humanitarian feasibility assessments in order to collect evidence for PUI’s standpoint concerning potential operations in zones of return, as well as to bolster backing for potential advocacy before the Nigerian government concerning those returns. The assessments, include, but are not limited to, a study of the following factors:

- Presence of Nigerian Army both in LGA Headquarters and in LGA rural areas, especially given that the majority of the affected population depend on access to land for their livelihood;
- Presence of public structures and basic services;
- Presence of operational health facilities (with sufficient personnel);
- Presence of police;
- Presence of government officials;
- Commercial activity;

- Physical accessibility (routes, etc...) to and within the LGA,
  - o With expert validation that the area has been cleared of landmines, unexploded ordnances (UXOs) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs);
- Presence of shelter.

Let it be noted, these assessments are not independently sufficient and must continually be crosschecked with IDP intentions to return, on a region-by-region basis.

## 6. ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY

### A. THREE PILLARS INTEGRATED APPROACH

Resulting from the evaluations that took place in phases 1 & 2 of the PUI exploratory mission, the following three-pillared operational strategy is proposed for adoption by the PUI start-up mission team in Nigeria. The proposed strategy offers a community-based, integrated approach to the provision of life-saving humanitarian services in NE Nigeria, which targets the most vulnerable population based on vulnerability and not status.

It is recommended that the strategy be used as a **guiding tool for mission start-up**; however, **it is equally recommended that the country team performs, within 6 months, a collaborative, strategic development exercise** with input from regional PUI actors, as well as in-country personnel, as a means of appropriating and honing the initial strategy herein suggested.

It is not necessarily recommended that PUI put in place all three pillars of action simultaneously during mission start-up.

Additionally, coordination with actors already present and operational in the recommended target sectors is essential and constitutes thus a prerequisite to successful implementation on ground. As mentioned previously, it is recommended that PUI commence operations in Maiduguri, Borno State, and **evaluate the feasibility and coherence of eventually operating beyond the limits of the city**. As concerns Maiduguri, it is recommended that PUI focus activities on those areas that have not heretofore been targeted by the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Bearing these elements in mind, the following table presents PUI's recommended 3-pillar strategy for its mission in NE Nigeria:

	Intervention Logic	General Indicators (to be further defined and specified by the country mission)
General Objective	Improve the living conditions of populations affected by the Boko Haram crisis in NE Nigeria	

<b>Specific Objective 1</b>	<b>To provide life-saving assistance to the IDP and local populations affected (those hosting IDPs, and those not) by on-going armed conflict in Maiduguri</b>	
<b>Expected Results 1</b>	Improved Food security for the most vulnerable HH of Maiduguri	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of persons who received food assistance through in kind and/or C&amp;V interventions</li> <li>• Number of people reporting an improvement in dietary diversity scores and Household Hunger Scale (reduction in use of negative coping strategies)</li> </ul>
<b>Expected Results 2</b>	Improved livelihood protection for the most vulnerable food insecure HH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of people engaging in alternative livelihood strategies</li> <li>• Increase in the % of HH revenue of targeted HH</li> </ul>
<b>Expected Results 3</b>	improved accessibility to minimum standard, emergency shelter and NFI kits for Vulnerable HH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of e-shelter/ shelter repair kits delivered to households in need (including people in host communities)</li> <li>• Number of reinforced e-shelters constructed / shelters repaired in host communities</li> <li>• Number of NFI kits delivered to households in need</li> </ul>
<b>Expected Results 4</b>	improved accessibility to timely, life-saving water and sanitation assistance and hygiene awareness for Vulnerable HH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of people with access to safe water</li> <li>• Number of latrines constructed</li> <li>• Number of people aware of the dangers of open defecation</li> <li>• Number of people aware of proper hygiene practices</li> <li>• Number of people provided with basic WASH NFI</li> </ul>
<b>Specific Objective 2</b>	<b>Improve accessibility to, as well as functioning of, community-based protection mechanisms and psychosocial support for the most vulnerable HH of the IDP and local populations (both those hosting, and those not) affected by the crisis</b>	
<b>Expected Results 1</b>	An in-depth psychosocial analysis is performed by PUI expert to establish operational baseline for mission activities in psychosocial domain	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 evaluation report to be shared with humanitarian community in 1st quarter 2016</li> </ul>
<b>Expected Results 2</b>	PUI teams are trained on Psychological First Aid (PFA) and PFA is provided to the most vulnerable targeted beneficiary populations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of PUI staff trained on PFA principles</li> <li>• % of targeted beneficiaries receiving PFA</li> <li>• Number of HH and community leaders informed of existing services</li> </ul>

Expected Results 3	Protection risks are mitigated for vulnerable HH through a comprehensive protection response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of vulnerable persons profiled, screened or registered</li> <li>• Number of persons sensitized on protection issues (including community-based protection, peace-building activities and mine risk education)</li> <li>• Number of vulnerable persons who have received specific protection services</li> <li>• Number of vulnerable persons reached with material assistance</li> <li>• Number of individuals referred to specialized and targeted services where required</li> <li>• Number of vulnerable persons whose psychosocial well-being is supported through protection services</li> <li>• Number of vulnerable persons reached with psychosocial support</li> <li>• Number of individuals referred to specialized and targeted services where required</li> </ul>
Expected Results 4	Psychosocial and mental health services are provided to most vulnerable HH and referencing to appropriate actors in case of need is systematically performed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of vulnerable persons whose psychosocial well-being is supported through protection services</li> <li>• Number of vulnerable persons reached with psychosocial support</li> <li>• Number of individuals referred to specialized and targeted services where required</li> </ul>
Specific Objective 3	<b>Improve advocacy capacity of iNGO community and augment likelihood of favorable policy change through increased awareness, media coverage and diversified funding, as well as improved political will on particular issues</b>	
Expected Results 1	The capacity of advocacy-oriented coalition of organizations (of which PUI) that leads, adapts, manages and implements an advocacy strategy is improved	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased knowledge about advocacy, mobilizing or organizing tactics</li> <li>• Improved media skills and contacts</li> <li>• Increased ability to get and use data</li> </ul>
Expected Results 2	Mutually beneficial relationships within coalition are created and coalition recognized as a credible source on advocacy-related issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New or stronger organizational relationships developed</li> <li>• New organizations signing on as collaborators</li> <li>• Policy agenda alignment between collaborators</li> <li>• Collaborative actions taken between organizations</li> </ul>
Expected Results 3	Quantity and/or quality of coverage generated in print, broadcast or electronic media	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of media citations of advocate research or products</li> <li>• Number of stories successfully placed in the media</li> <li>• Number of advocate or trained spokesperson citations in the media</li> </ul>
Expected Results 4	Increase of audience recognition that a problem exists with a policy proposal or with implementation of a policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Percentage of audience members with knowledge of an issue</li> </ul>

## Expected Results 5

Increase in the willingness of policymakers to act in support of an issue or policy proposal

- Number of citations of advocate products or ideas in policy deliberations/policies
- Number of government officials who publicly support the advocacy effort
- Number of issue mentions in policymaker speeches
- Number and party representation of policy sponsors and co-sponsors
- Number of votes for or against specific policies

## ANNEXES

- *HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN – OCHA*
- *CADRE HARMONISE*
- *GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR “PEOPLE IN DISPLACEMENT – OCHA*
- *DTM MATRIX ROUND VII – OIM*
- *SCENARII ANALYSIS*
- *ASSESSMENT TOOLS*
- *PUI - 3 W DATA BASE – HOST COMMUNITIES MAIDUGURI*
- *MAPS*
- *ANNEX, NIGERIA HCT COMMUNICATIONS & ADVOCACY STRATEGY*