IMPROVING CASH-BASED INTERVENTIONS
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Cash Transfer Programming for Syrian Refugees

Lessons Learned on Vulnerability, Targeting, and Protection from the Danish Refugee Council's E-Voucher Intervention in Southern Turkey



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Cash Transfer Programming for Syrian Refugees:

Lessons learned on vulnerability, targeting and protection from the Danish Refugee Council's e-voucher intervention in Southern Turkey

January 2016

This report was written by Karen Jacobsen and Paula Armstrong.

Cover Photo: A DRC beneficiary makes a purchase using an e-voucher at a supermarket in southern Turkey (DRC Turkey).

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Research Locations in Southern Turkey



Map source: Nations Online Project

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Executive Summary

Introduction

DRC Turkey is currently implementing a two-year, DFID-funded project that aims to provide immediate support to and strengthen the coping mechanisms of vulnerable non-camp Syrian refugees in southern Turkey. The first phase of the project focused on identifying and providing monthly cash transfers (in the form of supermarket e-vouchers) to vulnerable households. DRC assessed over 9,100 households in Sanliurfa and Hatay provinces and used a scoring index to target the most vulnerable 45% for assistance. While the project as a whole aims to have both a protection- and food security-related impact (i.e. through a reduction in households' use of negative coping mechanisms such as child labor and limited food consumption to meet needs), the e-voucher intervention itself aimed only to improve households' ability to meet their basic needs. It did not have any associated protection outputs beyond a target of 500 protection cases identified through household assessments being referred to other services.

This report provides a comprehensive "lessons learned" analysis of DRC's e-voucher intervention. It first outlines the strengths and weaknesses of the profiling questionnaire, survey methods, and scoring index that were used to assess and target households for assistance, and provides recommendations for improving these aspects of future cash transfer programming (CTP). Next, it examines the protection implications of the e-voucher intervention, again providing recommendations for future programs. The report ends with an illustration of how its recommendations will be applied in a forthcoming DRC e-voucher intervention. Findings are based on analysis of program tools and assessment data, key informant interviews with over 30 DRC staff and volunteers, and focus group discussions with 85 e-voucher beneficiaries.

The lessons learned and recommendations are as follows.

Vulnerability Assessment Methodology and Questionnaire

DRC did a commendable job assessing over 9,000 households across two provinces with limited time and resources, but its approach also had several shortcomings. These centered on a lack of enumerator training, difficulty identifying enumerators, inappropriate question formats, questions that should have been cut or addressed qualitatively, inadequately calibrated questions, and a problematic token of appreciation. To address these limitations in future programs, DRC and other humanitarian organizations should:

1 Provide enumerators with adequate training, at minimum covering the purpose of the assessment, a question-by-question run through of the survey tool to ensure a common understanding of all terminology and mechanics, guidance on how to ask sensitive questions, standard operating procedures for making referrals, GBV-sensitivity, and personal security. If, as in Turkey, enumerator turnover is high, a "buddy system" in which newly hired enumerators are paired with experienced team members can help mitigate gaps in knowledge.

2 Ensure that all staff whose programs utilize assessment data have access to a codebook that matches enumerators' codes to their names, thereby making it easier to follow up on enumerators' comments, identify patterns of inaccurate data entry, and test data for reliability.

3 Be careful to avoid problematic question formats and phrasing (i.e. ensuring that response categories are collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive, using drop-down menus where appropriate to minimize blank responses, narrowing overly-broad questions by specifying the time period, household members affected, etc., and treating income-related question with particular caution).

4 Consider using qualitative rather than quantitative methods to collect data on complex, sensitive issues such as negative coping strategies, post-traumatic stress, and protection-related risks. Survey enumerators who are not specially trained to collect data on sensitive issues can cause psychological harm to beneficiaries (as well as experience secondary trauma themselves), and are prone to collecting unreliable data. However, both qualitative and quantitative methods have limitations in contexts such as Turkey, where due to a severe lack of psychosocial support services, NGO assessments are frequently the primary outlet refugees have to talk about their experiences and express their emotions to an outside party.

5 Hold regular meetings between program staff, enumerators, and protection teams to discuss and troubleshoot concerns arising in the field, identify key protection realities and challenges faced by target populations, and adjust the questionnaire if necessary.

6 Use a context-appropriate modality that will mitigate expectations of continued assistance as a token of appreciation for a households' participation in an assessment.

Vulnerability Scoring Index

The primary strengths of DRC's vulnerability scoring index lay in its participatory design, simple weighting system, and capacity to adjust inclusion/exclusion of households based on verification assessment scores. However, its effectiveness was hampered by problematic variables, failure to distinguish between child and adult labor in the quantitative scoring system, inadequate communication between expat and local staff regarding index design, and lack of transparency vis-a-vis refugee households.

Based on this analysis, humanitarian organizations seeking to optimize CTP targeting systems should:

1 Follow DRC's example of using a participatory approach to develop targeting tools and criteria by collecting qualitative data through discussions with refugees, host community members, and internal and external humanitarian staff, resulting in a more locally-grounded targeting system.

2 Continue this participatory approach throughout the project by regularly consulting with field staff and target populations on which indicators are accurate and which are problematic, and making adjustments accordingly.

3 Ensure that scoring sufficiently differentiates between child and adult labor on criteria related to households' income-generating capacity, and that the overall system includes a "red flag" protection referral trigger for child labor.

4 Explain the rationale and methodology behind the targeting system to staff and enumerators. Doing so will increase their understanding (and buy-in) and will help them explain the system clearly and convincingly to refugee households, who have the right to know program eligibility criteria (unless there are serious and unique extenuating circumstances, i.e. sharing the eligibility criteria could put people at further risk). To mitigate the resulting potential for fraud or manipulation of eligibility, organizations can segregate staff duties, conduct spot checks in addition to post-distribution monitoring, and place more emphasis on objectively verifiable indicators (e.g. type of shelter) rather than subjective ones (e.g. income). If appropriate, they can also use mixed targeting methods including community-based targeting and community committees to decide referral cases or appeals.

5 Base targeting for cash and e-voucher assistance on socioeconomic criteria. Focus group discussions showed that DRC Turkey's notion of "vulnerability" – as reflected its 90+ variable vulnerability scoring index – was far more expansive and protection-focused than that of beneficiaries themselves, who

overwhelmingly defined vulnerability in socioeconomic or dependency ratio terms (i.e. a vulnerable household is one in which many people, especially young children and the sick or disabled, depend on few or no income earners). This finding, coupled with 1) the fact that a number of the protection-related variables included in the index could not be addressed by either the e-vouchers or other sectoral responses, and 2) the problematic nature (both in terms of data quality and "do no harm") of asking refugee households about negative coping strategies, post-traumatic stress, and protection risks through a quantitative household assessment, lead us to recommend that targeting for cash assistance be based on socioeconomic criteria, with protection concerns identified during the assessment and targeting phase flagged qualitatively and followed up with other sectoral responses where possible.

Protection Implications

- Focus group discussions did not provide evidence that receiving supermarket e-vouchers improved specific protection outcomes among beneficiaries (indeed, this was not a stated goal of the intervention). However, nearly all focus group participants stated that the e-cards provided valuable material support to their households, allowing them to cover their food needs and direct money toward other priorities, particularly rent. Several participants in both Sanliurfa and Antakya also highlighted the psychological effect of receiving e-card assistance, saying that it reduced their worries and even "conferred dignity and respect." As may be expected, participants in all groups expressed a preference for unrestricted cash over restricted e-vouchers, as cash would provide more choice and would allow them to avoid unpleasant and sometimes undignified conditions at partner supermarkets.

- Negative externalities associated with e-voucher assistance included unpleasant or hostile shopping experiences at partner supermarkets, as well as feelings of pressure from or guilt toward households who did not receive assistance. Notably, focus group participants reported a nearly universal lack of privacy among extended family and neighbors regarding which households were receiving DRC e-voucher assistance. This is likely because the restricted e-voucher modality made it easy to identify which households were shopping at the small number of supermarkets DRC partnered with.

- Focus group discussions revealed minimal gender differences in beneficiaries' experiences of the intervention. Both men and women were reported to be responsible for making e-voucher purchases and gender roles within households were not reported to have shifted as a result of the e-voucher assistance.

- Verification provides staff with an in-depth opportunity to understand and address household protection needs, even if a cash assistance program has little or no direct links with protection programming and services. A verification exercise carried out six months after the initial assessment allowed DRC staff to provide qualitative protection follow-up (i.e. through referrals to DRC's protection/psychosocial team or Special Needs Fund) overlooked due to the large volume of households originally assessed.

- Overall, the key for enhancing positive protection implications in CTP is ensuring that complementary protection programming/services are an integral part of cash interventions. It is not sufficient for enumerators simply to make protection referrals if they observe problems. Because protection programming is difficult to scale to meet the cash assistance caseload volume, enumerators may be the only point of contact for refugees who seek to voice protection concerns. One possible solution is to use target groups' feedback on vulnerability and protection issues as a way to prioritize protection concerns within the program. The agency can then "triage" these concerns, by dividing issues into those that can be addressed through cash assistance and those that require immediate protection follow up ("red flags" such as gender-based violence, child labor, etc.).

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Introduction

Cash transfer programming (CTP) – a term which refers to all interventions where cash or vouchers for goods or services are directly provided to beneficiaries – is a rapidly expanding component of emergency relief efforts. It has been lauded for ensuring better "value for money" through lower transaction costs, providing beneficiaries greater choice and dignity, and supporting local markets.[1] Yet gaps remain in the evidence base on CTP, both in terms of issues that block the effective use of CTP in emergency contexts and CTP's contribution to protection- and gender-related outcomes.[2]

This report provides a comprehensive "lessons learned" analysis of a Danish Refugee Council (DRC) e-voucher intervention that aimed to improve the ability of vulnerable non-camp Syrian refugee households to meet their basic needs. The objective of this report is two-fold: first, to provide concrete, operational recommendations for improving vulnerability assessment and targeting practices in future CTP, and second, to answer the following research questions around the protection implications of this specific e-voucher intervention, thereby addressing the above-mentioned gaps in the evidence base on CTP:

- What are the main indicators of protection-socioeconomic vulnerability for Syrian refugees in southern Turkey?
- Does household vulnerability change over time? If yes, based on which factors and why? Which vulnerabilities actually changed and how much?
- Did DRC's vulnerability scoring index capture the intended protection-socioeconomic vulnerability for the DFID project?
- Did the e-voucher intervention result in any negative externalities for either the refugee households or host community members? How can these be minimized in future cash programs?
- Were neighbors, friends, or extended family members aware of who received e-voucher assistance? If so, how did they find out? Did this awareness result in pressure or expectations for recipients to share assistance?
- Did the e-voucher intervention affect gender roles and identities within the household or the community? If so, how?
- Did individual e-voucher recipients feel more or less empowered? Did feelings and experiences of power (or lack thereof) differ on the basis of age, gender, etc.?

The field research on which this report is based employed an "action research" approach, where an academic research team works closely with humanitarian practitioners to assess or develop methods and analysis. From June to August 2015, a Tufts University team (three graduate student researchers from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, supported by a research director at the Feinstein International Center [FIC]) worked with DRC in southern Turkey. Prior to arriving in Turkey, the researchers were trained in field methods at Tufts and reviewed assessment data gathered by DRC. The field team was based with DRC Turkey in Sanliurfa and Antakya for 11 weeks, backstopped by FIC. During this time, they conducted qualitative research to complement quantitative data already collected by DRC, and observed and participated in DRC activities such as staff meetings, field distributions, and market monitoring sessions.

[1] ECHO, "10 Common Principles for Multi-Purpose Cash-Based Assistance to Respond to Humanitarian Needs," 29 June 2015, available from: www.gsdrc.org/document-library/10-common-principles-for-multi-purpose-cash-based-assistance-to-respond-to-humanitarian-needs/. See also: DFID, "Value for Money of Cash Transfers in Emergencies," February 2015, available from: www.cashlearning.org/downloads/summary-vfm-cash-in-emergencies-report-final.pdf, ODI/DFID, "Doing Cash Differently," September 2015, available from: www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9828.pdf.

[2] Michelle Berg and Louisa Seferis, "Protection Outcomes in Cash-Based Intervention: A Literature Review," 8 April 2015, available from: www.cashlearning.org/resources/library/590-protection-outcomes-in-cash-based-interventions-a-literature-review.

It is important to note upfront that the Tufts team faced significant challenges in conducting qualitative field research and had to adjust their approach accordingly. Shortly before their arrival in Turkey, the Turkish government restricted large-scale assessments by NGOs, resulting in the temporary detention of a DRC consultant for failing to adhere to the new policy. This restriction reduced the scope of qualitative data collection that could be carried out, which in turn had two main implications:

1 The conclusions that can be drawn from the beneficiary focus group discussions are limited because researchers could only speak to 85 adult Syrian e-card beneficiaries (approximately 30% female and 70% male) out of over 30,000 who received monthly assistance. Moreover, due to widespread, strong negative reaction among households who were assessed by DRC but not selected for monthly assistance – culminating in protests outside DRC offices and harassment of staff – it was not possible to speak to any members of these households to gather control data. Findings therefore reflect broad protection trends but cannot be considered representative in any way.

2 There was a reorientation toward using existing or more easily accessible data sources, including the dataset of 9,166 households assessed as part of CTP targeting, as well as key informant interviews with about 30 DRC staff and volunteers.

In total, ten focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted to explore beneficiaries' experiences of the e-voucher intervention. In order to capture a diversity of opinions and experiences, researchers sought out heads of households with varying characteristics. These included: male-headed households (two all-male groups), female-headed households (two all-female groups), new arrivals who had been in Turkey less than eight months (two all-male groups), established residents who had been in Turkey for more than 18 months (one all-male group), households reporting no income in the initial assessment (one all-male group and one mixed group), and households with a member suffering from chronic illness or disability (one all-male group).

The team conducted six FGDs in Sanliurfa and four in Antakya with a total of 85 individuals. Each FGD had between six and fifteen participants and lasted from forty minutes to one hour. Two Syrian DRC staff members facilitated the discussions in Arabic and took notes, and two researchers took notes and answered questions about the research if needed. DRC provided refreshments to participants, who were otherwise uncompensated. After the discussion, information on DRC's hotline was distributed to participants. Although every effort was made to create an open, welcoming environment, FGD participants may not have felt comfortable sharing experiences or opinions with the larger group, particularly if these diverged from those expressed by others.

Key informant interviews with DRC staff were conducted individually or in groups, depending on the preferences and time availability of staff. The length of these interviews varied from 15 to 45 minutes. A key limitation of these interviews is the high turnover among Syrian DRC staff, which meant that researchers could not speak to all individuals involved in the pre-CTP assessment.

Syrian Refugees in Turkey and DRC's E-Voucher Intervention

As of December 2015, Turkey hosted approximately 2.29 million Syrian refugees, more than any other country in the world. Of these, about 260,000 reside in 25 camps, while the rest – nearly 90 percent – live outside camps, most in urban or peri-urban areas in Turkey's southern border provinces of Hatay, Kilis, Gaziantep, Sanliurfa, and Mardin.[3] All Syrians in Turkey are granted "temporary protection" status

[3] UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response: Turkey, accessed 21 December 2015, available from: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management, "The Numbers of Syrians Were Announced to the Public," 20 August 2015, available from: www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/the-numbers-of-syrians-were-announced-to-the-public_914_1015_8849_icerik. Turkey also hosts more than 100,000 Afghans, Iraqis and Iranian; see UNHCR's figures, available from: www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48e0fa7f.html.

under the 2014 Law on Foreigners and International Protection, which guarantees non-refoulement and, on paper, provides access to schooling and free health care. In reality, out-of-camp Syrians' access to these services is hampered by inconsistent implementation and insufficient resources at the local level.[4] Moreover, Syrians with temporary protection status are not fully recognized refugees, meaning they do not enjoy rights guaranteed under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol (e.g. the right to work) and that UNHCR does not have a full mandate from the Turkish government to register and assist them.

DRC – which has been registered in Turkey since 2013 and has offices in Antakya, Sanliurfa, and Kilis – is currently implementing a two-year, GBP 5 million DFID-funded project that aims to provide immediate support to and strengthen the coping mechanisms of vulnerable non-camp Syrian refugees in southern Turkey. The first phase of the project, carried out in 2014 and 2015, focused on cash-based assistance (using a supermarket e-voucher modality) to refugee households in Sanliurfa and Hatay provinces. The project began with an assessment to see which households should qualify for e-voucher assistance. The assessment took the form of a profiling survey of 9,166 households (48,942 individuals). For each household that completed the questionnaire, a supermarket e-card loaded with 120 Turkish Lira (TL), approximately 45 USD, was given as a token of appreciation. The e-cards could only be used at specific partner supermarkets in Sanliurfa and Antakya (capital of Hatay Province). Based on the assessment data and using a vulnerability index, DRC then selected households to receive monthly cash assistance. The amount received varied based on household size, with a base amount of 40 TL plus 40 TL per household member.

While the DFID project as a whole aimed to have both a protection- and food security-related impact (i.e. through a reduction in households' use of negative coping mechanisms such as child labor and reduced food consumption to meet needs), the e-voucher intervention itself aimed only to improve households' ability to meet their basic needs. It did not have any associated protection outputs beyond a target of 500 protection cases identified through household assessments being referred to other services.

The CTP portion of the project was initially designed to provide unconditional, unrestricted cash via the Turkish post office (PTT). However, the proposed unconditional cash assistance was the first program of its kind in Turkey, and administrative and contractual issues prevented the possibility of partnering with PTT until 2016. Instead, DRC continued to utilize an e-voucher modality. Beginning in February 2015, 4,674 households (32,030 individuals) received monthly e-voucher assistance for sixth months.[5] The CTP portion of the project was run by 15 national staff and two internationals (direct project staff).

Defining and Operationalizing Vulnerability

Determining what constitutes "vulnerability" and what criteria an individual or household must meet in order to be considered "vulnerable" is an ongoing discussion among international humanitarian actors.[6] While different agencies have different definitions, most center on 1) risk of exposure to a natural or manmade harm, and 2) ability to cope with the impact of this harm once exposed.[7] Vulnerability can be analyzed at the individual, household, community, or national level and is both a relative and dynamic concept. It can be defined as status-based (i.e. based on displacement status or protection-related characteristics), socioeconomic (i.e. based on livelihood-related factors), or a combination of the two.

[4] Amnesty International, "Struggling to Survive: Refugees from Syria in Turkey," November 2014, available from: www.amnesty.org/en/documents/EUR44/017/2014/en/.

[5] The exact number of households assisted each month varied according to exchange rates and changes in households' vulnerability scores based on verification data.

[6] For more on definitions of vulnerability in the Syrian refugee context, see pp. 9–18 in Sarah Bailey and Veronique Barbalet, "Towards a Resilience-Based Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Critical Review of Vulnerability Criteria and Frameworks," ODI and UNDP, May 2014, available from: www.refworld.org/pdfid/53d0b8634.pdf.

[7] "What is vulnerability?" International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, available from: www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/about-disasters/what-is-a-disaster/what-is-vulnerability.

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In the Syrian refugee context in Turkey, humanitarian agencies often use a "category" approach both to identify vulnerability (as defined by that organization) and to target assistance. Certain groups (e.g. female-headed households, unaccompanied children, persons with disabilities) are assumed to be "more vulnerable" and are therefore targeted to receive assistance. Although such category-based targeting is pragmatic from an operational perspective, the most commonly used categories often miss households that are highly vulnerable to food insecurity or lack access to health resources.

For the DFID project, DRC Turkey conceptualized household vulnerability as a continuous rather than discrete variable (i.e. there is no absolute distinction between "vulnerable" and "not vulnerable" households) and as encompassing both socioeconomic and protection-related concerns. Although no precise definition of vulnerability was developed, the January 2014 project proposal states that:

> Priority for assistance will go to households which are characterized by a one (if extremely vulnerable) or combination of the following criteria: single-headed households, women and female youth at risk (domestic violence/SGBV/female-headed HH); large families (over six persons) or those with several young children (five years and under); separated children or unaccompanied minors; elderly (60+) with limited family support; families with children/adolescents out of school and in the workforce due to economic difficulties; families with persons with disabilities, chronic illnesses or with medical condition; families with legal issues – at risk of eviction, no legal documents, etc., and families with members unemployed or engaged in limited employment (ad hoc, daily labor).[8]

These original standards eventually evolved into the vulnerability scoring index, the development of which is detailed in Part I of this report.

[8] "Provision of Immediate Support and Strengthening Coping Mechanisms for Vulnerable, Non-Camp Syrian Refugees in Turkey," DRC Turkey Proposal, January 2014.

CONTENTS

PART 1:

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT AND TARGETING

Analysis of Assessment Methodology and Questionnaire

This section examines the findings of DRC's vulnerability assessment as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the assessment methodology and questionnaire, and makes recommendations for improvement. In doing so, it highlights common problems facing household surveys in humanitarian settings.

Assessment Methodology, Questionnaire, and Findings

Between 18 May 2014 and 31 January 2015, DRC field teams conducted an assessment of 9,166 Syrian households: 4,810 across 38 neighborhoods in Antakya and 4,356 across 44 neighborhoods in Sanliurfa. The purpose of the assessment, as stated in the January 2014 project proposal, was threefold:

1 To identify 3,150 [this number was later adjusted] of the most vulnerable non-camp refugee families for regular, monthly conditional cash assistance through an e-card system;

2 To identify cases for referral so as to increase refugee access to services provided by DRC and other agencies including government entities; and

3 To identify and map out gaps and trends, particularly protection and livelihoods challenges faced by non-camp refugees, which could be advocated for with the authorities and other aid agencies.[9]

This objective was chosen based on the dearth of assistance available to non-camp refugees in southern Turkey and in light of the overall project impact aim of decreasing households' use of negative coping mechanisms to meet their needs (see Annex II for the complete project logframe).

The DRC questionnaire was based on other tools that had been used to assess refugees in Turkey, including a DRC Kilis assessment tool, a UNHCR profiling tool, the Turkish NGO Support to Life's data collection tools, and a Turkish government social assistance assessment tool. The questionnaire was reviewed by DRC staff in all three DRC Turkey offices and revised based on their feedback. It was translated by DRC Lebanon staff[10] and tested with beneficiaries in DRC's community center in Altinozu, Hatay. The profiling questionnaire consisted of 105 questions, grouped into a general information section followed by seven modules:

[9] Ibid.

[10] This is because DRC Lebanon had staff with Arabic translation experience more readily available.

A Biodata

B Shelter/housing information

C Livelihoods: income, assets, needs

D Assistance

E Health/psychosocial (PSS)

F Well-being

G Observations

According to Sanliurfa enumerators, it took about 30 to 40 minutes to complete the assessment in each household. Households were then given a supermarket e-card loaded with a one-time payment of 120 TL (approximately 45 USD) as a token of appreciation for their time.

It is important to note the DRC assessment required purposive (non-random) sampling in order to identify Syrian refugee households and their needs in areas where DRC was to provide assistance. That is, DRC only assessed neighborhoods not already being assisted by other humanitarian agencies. Among these neighborhoods, those to be assessed were chosen based on consultation with mukhtars (heads of local government), who identified areas with high concentrations of Syrian households. Next, pairs of male and female enumerators visited the selected neighborhoods, identified Syrian households and collected data using a tablet-embedded questionnaire. The enumerators attempted to locate and assess all the Syrian households in assessed neighborhoods by asking interviewees to identify additional Syrian households living nearby. Due to this non-random sampling approach, the data obtained is representative only of the population assessed and cannot be generalized to the wider Syrian refugee population in Turkey. Moreover, statistical testing cannot be applied to this data because the assumptions about probability that such testing is founded on are violated in the non-random sampling approach used to collect it.[11] Nevertheless, the data provides valuable descriptive insight into the protection and socioeconomic challenges faced by non-camp Syrian refugees in parts of Antakya and Sanliurfa.

The majority of households assessed were headed by males, with only 13% headed by females. Nearly all (98%) of male heads of households reported being married, compared to only 43% of female heads of households, who were instead more likely to be widowed (44%) or have a missing spouse (11%). Only 27 households out of 9,166 (0.3%) reported being headed by someone younger than 18. Furthermore, only 3% of households included unaccompanied children. Nearly half of all households (45%) shared their dwelling with at least one other household, often belonging to the same extended family.

In socioeconomic terms, assessed households in both Antakya and Sanliurfa can be considered extremely vulnerable. Mean reported monthly household income was 451 TL in Antakya and 534 TL in Sanliurfa. While, as will be discussed later, the reliability of these figures was strongly called into question by DRC staff and enumerators in both locations, they are nonetheless clearly below the Turkish Ministry of Development's 2014 poverty line of 4,515 TL per month for a family of four, as well as the Confederation of Turkish Labor Unions' "starvation threshold" of 1,158 TL per month.[12] Only 13% of household members assessed reported working in the past 30 days, and of those individuals nearly all (95%) reported having "temporary" (i.e. informal) employment. Despite such a low rate of employment, 62% of households ranked "income from labor" as their top source of income. DRC staff noted that many households were being supported by the income of someone outside the household (usually an extended family member) working elsewhere in Turkey, in Syria, or further abroad.

[11] Dalson Britto Figueiredo Filho et al., "When is statistical significance not significant?" Brazilian Political Science Review, Vol. 7 No. 1 (2013), available from: www.scielo.br/pdf/bpsr/v7n1/02.pdf.

[12] "16 percent of Turkey's population under poverty line," Today's Zaman, 8 July 2014, accessed 24 November 2015, available from: www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_16-percent-of-turkeys-population-under-poverty-line_352414.html.

Nearly all households (95%) reported using one or more of the following coping strategies in the past week due to a lack of food: relying on less preferred and less expensive food (89% of households), reducing the number of meals eaten in a day (73%), limiting portion sizes at meals (60%), borrowing food or relying on help from relatives or friends (15%), restricting consumption by adults so children can eat (10%), and skipping entire days without eating (7%). Female headed households (FHH) reported a lower mean monthly income (372 TL) than male headed households (MHH, 508 TL), and FHH were more than twice as likely as MHH to list assistance or gifts as their main source of income in the last 30 days (25% vs. to 11%). Unmet needs were similar in Antakya and Sanliurfa, as well as between MHH and FHH: 62% reported the payment of rent, 58% utilities, 52% clothing, and 43% food. Only 18% reported receiving humanitarian assistance in the past six months. Despite these economic challenges, the vast majority of households in both Antakya and Sanliurfa reported living in a flat (95% and 91%, respectively) and having access to tap water inside the home (97% and 95%, respectively), with minimal variation between MHH and FHH.

In terms of indicators of health and protection vulnerability, 40% of households reported problems accessing health services, 21% reported at least one adult with symptoms of post-traumatic stress, and 17% reported at least one child with such symptoms. At the same time, only 14 of the 9,166 households surveyed (0.16%) reported receiving psychosocial assistance in the last six months, indicating a massive gap in humanitarian support for the assessed population. 13% of households reported a member with chronic illness or disability, and another 13% reported a member who has been injured. Households with one of more chronically ill or disabled members reported greater difficulty meeting food needs, but neither they nor households with one or more injured members had shelter outcomes that varied from the general assessed population. Moreover, 9% of households in both locations reported having school aged children working in the past 30 days due to an inability to meet basic needs, with DRC staff and enumerators emphasizing that this figure is almost certainly an underestimate.

Questions about legal concerns, safety, and discrimination had to be modified or cut entirely from the assessment due to authorities' restrictions. Still, some notable data demonstrating significant regional variation was gathered: 64% of households in Antakya and 30% in Sanliurfa reported facing discrimination by the host community, while 24% in Antakya and 5% in Sanliurfa reported conflict or tension with the host community. This discrepancy could be due to closer ethnic and familial affinities between Turks and Syrians in Sanliurfa (many of whom share Kurdish or Arabic roots), as well as the fact that households in Sanliurfa had generally arrived in Turkey more recently. Other key protection concerns include inadequate or overcrowded housing (reported by 35% of households in Antakya and 16% in Sanliurfa), and lack of information on legal status (reported by 33% of households in Antakya and 1% in Sanliurfa).

Overall, however, households' self-reported protection concerns were trumped by socioeconomic concerns, above all lack of job/self-employment opportunities (reported by 89% of households in Antakya and 62% in Sanliurfa), insufficient food supply (reported by 67% of households in Antakya and 59% in Sanliurfa), and lack of access to humanitarian assistance (reported by 88% of households in Antakya and 92% in Sanliurfa).

Although a report on assessment findings was shared internally among DRC Turkey staff in February 2015, it is unclear to what extent the data collected informed DRC programming or was shared with other humanitarian actors in Turkey (the aim had been for both to occur).

Assessment Strengths and Weaknesses

Given limited time and resources, DRC Turkey staff did a commendable job conducting such a large-scale, comprehensive assessment of a mobile refugee population. At the time of its collection, the assessment dataset was the largest of its kind with regard to non-camp Syrian refugees in Turkey and the goal was to use the data collective to inform a range of DRC programming, including protection, winterization, etc. Moreover, DRC's use of pre-existing questionnaires and question formats reflects good practice because it theoretically allows staff to cross-check and compare collected data with pre-existing data.

The weaknesses of the profiling questionnaire and assessment methodology can be grouped into six major categories:

1 Lack of enumerator training

2 Difficulty identifying enumerators

3 Questions that should be reconsidered

4 Poorly designed questions

5 Inadequately calibrated questions

6 Problematic token of appreciation

Lack of enumerator training

The primary shortcoming of the assessment methodology was the lack of training provided to enumerators. Key informant interviews revealed that enumerators in Sanliurfa received just 30 minutes to one hour of training on how to use the tablet devices, while enumerators in Antakya received two half-hour trainings on general protection issues and participated in the questionnaire pilot in Altinozu community center. There was little or no discussion of the purpose of the assessment, personal security, how to ask respondents about sensitive issues, how not to ask leading questions, or how to define and explain key concepts like "average monthly income," "temporary work," or the symptoms of post-traumatic stress (and what to do if enumerators encountered this). Enumerators stated that they "learned from experience" and gradually adjusted their interviewing methods over the course of the assessment. In Antakya, enumerators said that although they received some protection training, they would have liked to additional guidance on what to do when they encountered gender-based violence (GBV), as several said they saw evidence of it but did not know how to respond.

The lack of training raises concerns about the accuracy of data collected. Because enumerators did not have a common understanding of terminology and concepts, they are likely to have calculated income and expenditures differently or taken different approaches to asking questions (e.g. providing/not providing all response options to respondents after they answered affirmatively to one). Interviews with enumerators revealed several examples of such discrepancies in data collection.

Difficulty identifying enumerators

Although the questionnaire called for each enumerator's unique code to be recorded, in practice DRC staff had difficulty identifying which enumerators assessed which households because they did not have ready access to a list matching codes to names. This led to problems following up on enumerators' comments, as well as identifying enumerators who entered data inconsistently or inaccurately (e.g. entering interview dates instead of birth dates, leaving certain questions blank). This lack of follow-up on enumerators' codes was likely compounded by staff and enumerator turnover.

Questions that should be reconsidered

Some assessment questions need to be reconsidered for survey purposes. First, asking households about their average monthly income was highly problematic. Most people (anywhere) cannot calculate this figure, and because different enumerators handled this question differently (i.e. some asked respondents directly, while other calculated it themselves based on monthly expenditures) responses were even less reliable. Consequently, according to Sanliurfa staff, the income data collected "could not be taken seriously."

Second, questions on households' inability to meet needs and coping mechanisms were found to be sensitive and required careful training of enumerators. Depending on the context, such questions may be more suited to a focus group discussion format, where participants can speak more generally about such issues in their communities rather than answering specific questions about themselves.[13] Enumerators in both Sanliurfa and Antakya reported that survey respondents often became emotional when asked about not having enough to eat, particularly when mislabeled instructions led to enumerators prompt respondents about specific coping mechanisms (e.g. borrowing food, restricting adult consumption, skipping meals). Questions related to post-traumatic stress would likewise have been better addressed using a different approach. Some questions – such as "Who would you turn to if you had a problem?" and "What other difficulties do you face?" – were simply too broad (as protection was considered too sensitive an issue for authorities and the DRC protection team consequently made certain question very vague), and need to either be narrowed (e.g. by specifying the time period, household members affected, and/or type of difficulty or problem) or asked in different ways, such as in focus group discussions or counseling sessions. If, as in Turkey, authorities restrict the ability to ask specific details on protection issues, humanitarian organizations should consider removing these questions from their household surveys altogether.

Poorly designed questions

First, some questions were missing response categories or included categories that were not mutually exclusive (although only one could be selected). For example, "divorced/separated" was not a response option for marital status, causing some divorced individuals to be incorrectly identified as widowed. Moreover, the response categories for classifying injured household members had potential for overlap, as someone could, for instance, be both "injured and unable to work" and "missing a limb (arm)." This made it more difficult for DRC staff to compare and refer cases without reading enumerators' notes (which were only available in Arabic).

Second, certain questions – such as those on how many times households had moved within and between cities since arriving in Turkey – received hundreds of blank responses because enumerators had to enter numbers (and therefore had the option of entering nothing), rather than selecting them from a drop-down menu.

Third, households were asked to select a single answer for complex questions such as "Why did you come to live in your current house/location?" and "If you are not able to go back to Syria, why?" The questionnaire was consequently unable to capture the experiences of households whose decisions were based on more than one reason.

Inadequately calibrated questions

Some questions received a large number of "other" responses – up to 64 and even 80%. For these questions, not having an open-ended write-in option for respondents who answered "other" significantly hampered the usefulness of the data collected. A more thorough pilot of the questionnaire or mandatory review of comments in a short time period (e.g. over one to two weeks) would have caught this problem, and allowed the most commonly cited "other" responses to be added as categories.[14]

[13] If, as in Turkey, there is an overall lack of services and support to refugees on psychosocial and protection concerns, asking sensitive questions in focus group discussions rather than surveys may not reduce participants' strong emotional response.

[14] For questions related to legal concerns, the high proportion of "other" responses was due to DRC's self-censorship in anticipation of Turkish authorities.

In addition, enumerators were asked to observe the presence of household assets (kitchen appliances, washing machine, dish washer, vehicle/car, and motorcycle), but these were not equivalent indicators of wealth, despite being interpreted as such. While 71% of households were observed to have a TV, 54% kitchen appliances, and 32% a washing machine, only 1% had a car, and less than 0.5% each a motorcycle or dishwasher. Moreover, there was no way of distinguishing between the quality of assets or whether they were bought second hand or received as gifts. Finally, according to Sanliurfa enumerators, the way that "kitchen appliances" was translated into Arabic implied plates and cutlery, rather than more expensive assets. While household assets are potentially a good indicator of socioeconomic status, questions on assets need to be carefully calibrated, translated, and interpreted in order to provide valid insights.

Problematic token of appreciation

Finally, giving e-cards to all households who completed the questionnaire led to problems for DRC because it created expectations of continued assistance. Households who were not selected for monthly assistance were angry and confused about why their cards were not reloaded while some of their neighbors' cards were. Enumerators who conducted verification assessments reported being threatened by frustrated one-off beneficiaries.

Recommendations for Improvement

These problems prompt the following recommendations for DRC and other organizations conducting household assessments.

First, it is critical to provide enumerators with adequate training, ideally spread over two to four days, followed by a field pilot.[15] The training should cover:

- The purpose of the assessment
- A question-by-question run through of the questionnaire, in both the original and translated language, to ensure that enumerators have a common understanding of all terminology and mechanics (i.e. when to prompt responses and when not to)
- How to ask sensitive questions and how to react if a respondent becomes upset during the assessment
- Standard operating procedures for making referrals
- How to be sensitive to gender-related concerns, including evidence of GBV in households
- How to maintain personal security
- Who to contact in case of difficulties and how to voice concerns

This training should be designed to be as lively and participatory as possible, and include frequent "refresh" sessions to sustain trainees' and trainers' attention spans. As part of the training, enumerators should be encouraged to practice the interview repeatedly, role play, and discuss ways to address problems including translation of terms and questions. This is also an opportunity to calibrate questions, for example by identifying a short list of household assets that reflect socioeconomic status. The questionnaire should be revised before a full field test (pilot) of the methodology is conducted.

At the end of the training, ideally at least one full day should be allocated to field testing the survey questionnaire, and additional time reserved for corrections and final revisions of the questionnaire after this field test. If it is not feasible to include the suggested week of training and piloting before data

[15] One problem faced by DRC was staff and volunteer (enumerator) turnover and attrition. In some cases, enumerators who received training left, leaving gaps in the team (and wasted DRC time and resources). One way of dealing with this problem suggested by DRC was a "buddy system" in which newly hired enumerators are paired with experienced team members.

collection begins, the first one to two weeks of data collection should include daily structured debriefs with field teams, and the questionnaire should be revised at the end of this review period.

Second, organizations should ensure that all staff whose programs utilize assessment data have access to a codebook or other document that matches enumerators' codes to their names. This makes it easier to follow up on enumerators' comments, identify patterns of inaccurate data entry, and test data for reliability.

Third, organizations should be careful to avoid problematic or poorly translated question formats and phrasing. This can be caught during training and initial data collection (field testing). Based on DRC's experience, this includes:

- Ensuring that response categories are collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive.
- Using drop-down menus where appropriate to minimize blank responses.
- For complex questions on motivations, following UNHCR's example and asking first about the most important reason, and in the next question giving respondents the option of providing a second reason.
- For overly broad questions, either narrowing them (by specifying the time period, household members affected, etc.) or asking them in a focus group context.

Income-related questions are a particular concern. Although consumption is generally viewed as a more accurate indicator of socioeconomic vulnerability, organizations may still want to assess households' income.16 In this case, it is preferable to ask for average daily or weekly household income, rather than average monthly household income, because it is simply too difficult for most people to accurately calculate the latter.

Fourth, organizations should recognize that collecting data on complex, sensitive issues such as negative coping strategies, post-traumatic stress, and protection-related risks is a difficult and ethically challenging exercise. Survey enumerators who are not specially trained to collect data on sensitive issues can cause psychological harm to beneficiaries (as well as experience secondary trauma themselves), and are prone to collecting unreliable data. However, both qualitative and quantitative methods have shortcomings in contexts such as Turkey, where due to a severe lack of psychosocial support services, NGO assessments are frequently the primary outlet refugees have to talk about their experiences and express their emotions to an outside party.

Fifth, during the assessment, it is helpful to hold regular meetings between program staff, enumerators, and protection teams to discuss and troubleshoot concerns arising in the field, identify key protection realities and challenges faced by target populations, and adjust the questionnaire if necessary. Many of the problem areas outlined above were identified by DRC staff during the assessment, but were not addressed because there was no structured way of gathering and acting on feedback from the field.

Finally, organizations should be careful about how surveys and ensuing tokens of appreciation exacerbate expectations of continued assistance.

By learning from DRC's experience and following these recommendations, humanitarian organizations can augment the validity and reliability – and thus the usefulness – of the data they collect through household assessments.

[16] The World Bank, for example, argues that "Consumption is conventionally viewed as the preferred welfare indicator, for practical reasons of reliability and because consumption is thought to better capture long-run welfare levels than current income." World Bank, "World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty," 2001, available from: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/11856.

CONTENTS

Analysis of Vulnerability Scoring Index

In order to determine which assessed households would receive monthly assistance, DRC ranked the vulnerability of households based on scores from their responses and enumerators' observations. A weighted scoring index added and subtracted points using a base score of 0. Households' scores ranged from -5 (least vulnerable) to 80 points (most vulnerable), with a mean score of 34.7 in Antakya and 25.6 in Sanliurfa. Budget availability and targets reported to the donor meant that DRC could provide follow-up assistance to 45% of households, resulting in an initial cut-off score of 29.

In developing the index, DRC used a participatory approach and sought to avoid becoming overly technical. In designing the index and scoring questions, DRC staff collected qualitative data on protection and socioeconomic/livelihood vulnerability from different sources including refugees, the host community, local authorities, DRC staff, other NGOs, and UNHCR. Questions focused on refugees' needs and coping strategies (including how these change over time), shelter conditions (e.g. what is considered an "unacceptable" number of people per dwelling), who is considered the most vulnerable and why, and widespread vs. acute protection concerns.

In developing the questionnaire, DRC staff identified questions that, based on the qualitative data collected, best captured vulnerability as understood by the abovementioned stakeholders in the southern Turkey context. In total, 91 variables were scored and grouped into the following descriptive categories (see Annex I for the complete scoring index):

1 Indicators that offset/mitigate vulnerability (lower vulnerability score)

2 Indicators of higher protection risk

3 Indicators of precarious/vulnerable living conditions

4 Indicators of inability to generate sufficient income

5 Negative coping strategies

6 Indicators of "well-being"

7 Most urgent problem faced

Variables were weighted from -10 to +6, depending on the type of variable. For example, possessing two household assets (such as a dishwasher and a car) reduced the vulnerability score by 10, while living in a garage, shop, unfinished building, or public place increased the score by 4. DRC Turkey did not have the capacity to devise a vulnerability formula or apply statistical analysis, and the goal was to have scores that could be easily adjusted with input from non-technical staff. The scoring system was reviewed three times: by the DRC Turkey protection team in May 2014, by DRC's Global Technical Advisor on Cash-Based Programming in July 2014, and finally by DRC Turkey's Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, who ran a statistical analysis that found scoring to be "statistically representative across the entire dataset."

Although they had the option to do so, DRC staff did not adjust the scoring system over the course of the project, and it was again used to rank households in the verification exercise conducted from January to April 2015. This was due to both a lack of time and ability to sit with teams to come up with a more accurate revised scoring system, and a widespread – but mistaken – perception among staff that the system was "set in stone."

The following sections evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the vulnerability scoring index and offer general recommendations for improvement.

Index Strengths and Weaknesses

The primary strengths of the index lay in its participatory design, simple weighting system, nuanced conception of vulnerability, and capacity to adjust the inclusion/exclusion of households based on verification assessment scores. Rather than being "copy and pasted" from another program, the variables and their weights were based on discussions with refugees, the host community, local authorities, DRC staff, other NGOs' staff, and UNHCR. The resulting index was thus well grounded in the local context.

The integer-based scoring system was also easy for non-technical staff to understand and – in theory – adjust. This is important because vulnerability and targeting are subjective and contextual, and adjusting or fine-tuning an index is the sign of a good system. Adjustments do not mean that an index was "wrong" – simply that the index is sensitive to agreed-upon proxy indicators of vulnerability.

The index's nuanced conception of vulnerability meant that it captured both socioeconomic and protection-related factors reflecting a households' risk of exposure to and ability to cope with harm. The ranked scoring system captured households' relative vulnerability (versus simply including or excluding on the basis of certain criteria), which facilitated adjustments to the inclusion and exclusion of households based on follow-up assessments.

The weaknesses of the index and its implementation fall under the following categories:

1 Problematic variables that were not adjusted

2 No quantitative distinction between child and adult labor

3 Mismatch between targeting and assistance modality

4 Inadequate communication of methodology and rationale behind index design to DRC staff and enumerators

5 Lack of transparency vis-a-vis refugee households

Problematic variables that were not adjusted

A number of variables included in the index simply did not reflect increased or decreased household vulnerability. For example, households with at least one Syrian passport holder lost five points based on the justification that "passport holders have greater access to services and rights within Turkey."[17] However, DRC staff stated that, in reality there are few practical benefits to having a passport, as all Syrians are (on paper) guaranteed equal access to education and public health care under the temporary protection regime, and virtually no Syrians are able to acquire work permits, regardless of whether they have a passport or not. Indeed, analysis of the assessment data showed that having or not having a passport did not affect a household's quality of housing, likelihood of having income from labor, or likelihood of reporting insufficient food. While there may still be protection concerns resulting from the type of labor passport vs. non-passport holders engage in, DRC enumerators and staff strongly argued that vulnerability did not differ between the group groups. This suggests that even common category-based indicators of protection vulnerability are context-specific and depend on local cultural norms and practices, as well as the local regulatory framework (both de jure and de facto), all of which must be taken into account when constructing an index.

Moreover, the variable on observed assets (-5 points for one asset and -10 for two or more assets) was repeatedly flagged by enumerators and staff as the most problematic of the entire scoring index since, for example, a very poor household could lose 10 points merely for having an old television and some kitchenware.

[17] See complete vulnerability index, Annex I.

The existence of inaccurate variables such as these is not a problem in and of itself; rather, the problem lies in their not being adjusted after being recognized by program staff. Despite the fact that the DRC scoring system was intentionally kept simple (i.e. based on integers rather than a formula or regression results) so that variables and their weights could be adjusted, no such adjustments were ever made, in large part because staff did not feel that they were able to change them. Consequently, problematic variables continued to distort households' scores throughout the entire project.

No distinction between child and adult labor

Variables related to households' income-generating capacity did not take into account whether "household members working" were children or adults. This lowered the vulnerability scores of households with children working, despite the fact that, from a child protection standpoint, these households should be seen as more vulnerable than those with no household members working.

Mismatch between targeting and assistance modality

Some protection-related variables – for example, +4 points for facing "risk of forced recruitment" or "lack of freedom of movement in area," and +2 points for being unable to move back to Syria – targeted risks that could not be addressed through supermarket e-voucher (or even cash) assistance. It does not make sense to include these variables in the index. Nor can the risk of forced recruitment be adequately captured in a survey such as this assessment.

Inadequate communication of index design

Although the index was developed in a thoughtful, participatory way, this process and the rationale behind it were not explained to many of the DRC staff and enumerators who implemented the e-voucher intervention. This lack of communication led to the widespread impression that the scoring system was "arbitrary" and simply "copy-pasted" from another context.

In general, Turkish and Syrian staff did not feel that they were adequately consulted on the index. In practice, this was difficult as some were hired after the system had been decided upon; however, it would have still been possible – and indeed advisable – to hold intermittent "check-in" meetings with enumerators and staff to assess the accuracy of the index based on their experiences in the field, as well consultations with target populations to assess their satisfaction with the targeting system.

Lack of transparency vis-a-vis refugee households

Because staff and enumerators were not aware of how the scoring index had been developed, they were not able to explain it to beneficiaries (beyond stating that scores were computer-generated) and beneficiaries may have picked up on enumerators' skepticism. As a result, many beneficiaries perceived DRC's household selection method for monthly e-voucher assistance as unfair and non-transparent. Beneficiaries visited DRC offices in Sanliurfa and Antakya, called a DFID project hotline to complain, and started a protest on a Facebook page for Syrian refugees in Sanliurfa. In some cases, dissatisfaction escalated into threats against DRC staff on the street and protests outside DRC offices.[18]

In Sanliurfa, DRC staff observed that after the verification assessment, households that were excluded based on decreases in their vulnerability scores were called individually and had the reasons for their exclusion explained to them. They overwhelmingly reacted in an understanding way. This strongly suggests that the fairness of the scoring system is perceived very differently depending on how much effort is made by program staff to explain the system to beneficiaries.

[18] The frustration toward enumerators was compounded by the fact that refugees' first point of contact with DRC (and with most humanitarian agencies) was through DRC enumerators, who then bore the brunt of the aggression. Limited to no humanitarian assistance to refugees outside of camps in Turkey further exacerbated refugees' frustration.

Recommendations for Improvement

The following recommendations outline ways in which DRC and other humanitarian organizations can improve future beneficiary targeting.

First, organizations should follow DRC's example of using a participatory approach to develop targeting tools and criteria. This can be done by collecting qualitative data through discussions with refugees, host community members, and internal and external humanitarian staff and results in a more locally-grounded, relevant targeting system.

Second, it is crucial to continue this participatory approach throughout the project. Specifically, organizations should regularly consult with staff and volunteers in the field, as well as with target populations, about which indicators are accurate and which are problematic, and make adjustments accordingly. Adjustments, so long as they are justified and validated, are not a sign of failure but rather of a strong, flexible targeting approach. Agencies should ensure that indicator adjustment and review are a distinct activity done at regular intervals and built into the project work plan.

Third, criteria related to households' income-generating capacity must differentiate between child and adult labor, or risk perpetuating harm to working children if their households are excluded from assistance on this basis. Child labor should be a "red flag" triggering immediate protection referral.

Fourth, organizations must explain the rationale and methodology behind the targeting system used to staff and enumerators. The inadequate explanation of the index coupled with the measurement error that arose from insufficient enumerator training, resulted in a widespread perception among staff and assessed households that the index did not accurately assess vulnerability. Better intra-office communication, training and beneficiary outreach could have significantly reduced this perception. Maximizing the enumerators' buy-in to the system helps ensure that they are able to explain it clearly and convincingly to refugee households. To mitigate the resulting potential for fraud or manipulation of eligibility, organizations can segregate staff duties, conduct spot checks in addition to post-distribution monitoring, and place more emphasis on objectively verifiable indicators rather than subjective ones (e.g. income).

Related to this, it is important to ensure that enumerators and staff explain the inclusion and exclusion rationale to refugee households. Refugee households have a right to know program eligibility criteria (unless there are serious and unique extenuating circumstances, i.e. sharing the eligibility criteria could put people at further risk). As the verification exercise demonstrated, excluded households were far more understanding of their exclusion when DRC staff took the time to explain the reasons behind it to them. Even if calling each excluded household is not feasible in a large-scale CTP, enumerators and hotline volunteers should be trained in how to explain the scoring system and the rationale behind it to refugee households 1) during the profiling assessment itself, and 2) once more if households call or visit to ask more information about the reasons for their exclusion. In addition, mass information dissemination tools – such as SMS (text messages), fliers, etc. – can be utilized depending on the level of information the implementing agency wants to provide in open forums. More generally, organizations can also consider using mixed targeting methods including community-based targeting and community committees to decide referral cases or appeals.

Last, organizations should base targeting for cash and e-voucher assistance on socioeconomic criteria. Focus group discussions showed that DRC Turkey's notion of "vulnerability" – as reflected the 90+ variable vulnerability scoring index – was far more expansive and protection-focused than that of beneficiaries themselves, who overwhelmingly defined vulnerability in socioeconomic or dependency ratio terms. That is, they characterized vulnerable households (defined by FGD moderators as households that should be prioritized for humanitarian assistance) as those in which many people, especially young

children and the sick or disabled, depend on few or no income earners. Several local DRC staff members advocated for a similar definition of vulnerability. Although a number of participants stated that female-headed households were particularly vulnerable, their reasoning was still income-driven: they noted that women are less able to work outside the home, both for "practical" reasons (e.g. they have to watch children; they cannot do the informal manual work most readily available to Syrians in Turkey) and cultural reasons (e.g. it is less acceptable for women, particularly older women, to work).

This finding, coupled with 1) the fact that a number of the protection-related variables included in the index could not be addressed by either the e-vouchers or other sectoral responses, and 2) the problematic nature (both in terms of data quality and "do no harm") of asking refugee households about negative coping strategies, post-traumatic stress, and protection risks through a quantitative household assessment, lead us to recommend that targeting for cash assistance be based on socioeconomic criteria, with protection concerns identified during the assessment and targeting phase flagged qualitatively and followed up with other sectoral responses where possible.

Changes in Household Vulnerability over Time

A verification assessment of 1,500 households carried out in Sanliurfa from January to March 2015 showed that the primary reasons for a change in a household's overall vulnerability (as captured by their household vulnerability score) were changes in household size, level of household income, number of assets in the home, and number of coping strategies used in the past week due to a lack of food. Mean reported monthly household income increased from 534 to 858 TL overall, while the percentage of households observed to have kitchen appliances increased from 54 to 81% and those observed to have a TV increased from 71 to 92%. While there were increases in the percentage of households that reported borrowing food or relying on help from relatives or friends (15 to 20%) and restricting consumption by adults so children can eat (6 to 9%) and the share relying on less preferred or less expensive food remained steady (93%), there were sharp falls in the proportions of households limiting portion sizes at meals (61 to 48%) and skipping entire days without eating (10 to 3%) as well as a small drop in those reducing the number of meals eaten in a day (73 to 70%).

These changes are difficult to interpret because they may be partially attributable to households receiving monthly e-voucher assistance. For example, although the mean reported monthly income among households receiving assistance increased from 534 to 817 TL, these households may have been including e-voucher assistance in the total income they reported. The same is true for changes in food security-related coping strategies: the sharp drops in the percentage of households limiting portion sizes at meals and skipping entire days without eating are likely due to the e-voucher assistance itself. The remarkable increase among e-voucher assisted households in the share observed to have kitchen appliances (54 to 81%) and televisions (71 to 91%) may indicate that households purchased these assets once they were better able to meet their basic needs.

Apart from the above findings, analysis of DRC's verification assessment also highlighted the fact that verification provides staff with an in-depth opportunity to understand and address household protection needs, even if a cash assistance program has little or no direct links with protection programming and services. A verification exercise carried out six months after the initial assessment allowed DRC staff to provide qualitative protection follow-up (i.e. through referrals to DRC's protection/psychosocial team or Special Needs Fund) overlooked due to the large volume of households originally assessed.

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PART 2:

PROTECTION IMPLICATIONS

Negative Externalities of E-Voucher Intervention

Unpleasant or Hostile Shopping Experiences

Participants in all focus groups referenced unpleasant or hostile shopping experiences, including crowding in supermarkets on loading days (with lines up to two hours long),[19] price manipulation directed against Syrians (particularly in Sanliurfa), and supermarket staff who forced Syrians to spend their e-voucher value in certain ways, for example by insisting they had to spend it all at once or preventing beneficiaries from buying large quantities of certain items. In addition to exploiting beneficiaries' dependence on e-vouchers, such incidents can stoke inter-community misunderstanding and resentment, with potentially harmful protection outcomes for both refugees and host community members. No reports of physical violence or aggression were reported by beneficiaries.

DRC staff conducted market monitoring activities – secret shopping, visible monitoring activities, and review of receipts for goods – in all partner supermarkets (approximately three in Sanliurfa and five in Antakya); however, no pricing irregularities and only minimal evidence of spending coercion were found. One DRC staff member observed that the belief that Syrians pay different prices could be due to the fact that the supermarkets DRC partnered with in Sanliurfa have two prices next to all of their items: one for regular shoppers and one for people who are enrolled as members of the supermarket's loyalty program. Syrians were less likely to be aware of this program due to the Turkish-Arabic language barrier. This example underscores the importance of strong two-way communication mechanisms with CTP beneficiaries as crucial protection tools to help dispel potentially harmful misunderstandings and provide channels for beneficiaries to report protection and other concerns back to the organization providing assistance. DRC did not have a clear channel for beneficiaries to communicate reports of unpleasant or hostile shopping experiences beyond the general DFID program hotline, which was often tied up by assessed households who were not selected for monthly assistance calling to ask why they were not selected. Consequently, these reports were not widely known to program staff and were therefore not addressed.

Lack of Privacy

With regard to privacy-related protection concerns, all focus group participants stated that their neighbors (both Syrian and Turkish) and extended family members were aware of who was and was not receiving DRC e-voucher assistance. In Sanliurfa, this was not seen as a problem, perhaps due in part to the better inter-communal relations reflected in the assessment data. However, participants in Antakya mentioned several concerns arising out of the community-wide knowledge of who was receiving assistance. First, some individuals felt guilt over their monthly assistance, while their neighbors had been cut off from support or never received an e-card to begin with. The reverse was also true, with

[19] Although DRC attempted to space e-card loading to prevent such crowding, this was not always possible due to the small number of supermarkets it was contracted with.

some participants reporting jealousy when their assistance ended (i.e. due to changes in their household vulnerability score as calculated using verification data) while others continued to receive monthly top-ups. Furthermore, some participants stated that their Turkish neighbors did not understand the nature of the program, believing it to be assistance from the Turkish government. Some individuals sought to minimize their guilt, as well as mitigate possible community tension, by sharing their purchases with neighbors and extended family members. Again, there were no reports of physical violence or aggression related to the e-voucher program.

These findings raise two key questions: what are the reasons for this lack of privacy, and is it specific to the modality of assistance provided (e-vouchers as opposed to in-kind assistance or unrestricted cash)? Focus group participants stated a main reason neighbors and extended family members knew they received DRC e-voucher assistance was that they were seen to be carrying full shopping bags from partner supermarkets on e-voucher loading days. This suggests that while restricted e-vouchers may be more discreet than in-kind assistance, which are often distributed in highly-visible ways, they are still considerably more visible than unrestricted cash. To decrease this visibility, humanitarian agencies that cannot provide unrestricted cash should strive to partner with multiple retailers in a range of locations and space e-voucher loading over a broad time period. DRC has since changed to a new e-card service provider with the capacity to engage as many retailers in a geographic area as are willing and able to participate in the program.

E-Vouchers, Gender, and Protection

Gender Differences in CTP Experience

The data gathered through focus group discussions shows surprisingly few differences in women's and men's experiences of the e-voucher intervention. A small number of women reported or were reported by their husbands as having stopped work after receiving e-voucher assistance, while no men reported doing so, likely reflecting the greater acceptance of male than female out-of-household labor among beneficiaries. Notably, one DRC staff member in Antakya stated that he knew of women who were being sexually harassed or assaulted at their jobs who were able to stop working thanks to e-voucher assistance. Both men and women reported being responsible for making e-voucher purchases, although one male participant in Antakya noted that he did not like sending his wife to the overcrowded supermarket on loading days. Several female FGD participants in Antakya requested additional psychosocial support, with one suggesting that having opportunities for Syrians to share their experiences with Turkish host community members could diminish discrimination.

Neither men nor women reported feeling either more or less empowered after receiving e-voucher assistance; indeed, this was not a stated goal of the intervention. However, "empowerment" is a notoriously difficult word to define, and although e-vouchers did not enhance beneficiaries' feelings of autonomy per se, they did provide other important benefits.[20] Nearly all focus group participants, both men and women, stated that the e-vouchers provided valuable material support to their households, allowing them to cover their food needs and direct money toward other priorities, particularly rent. Several participants in both Sanliurfa and Antakya also highlighted the psychological effect of receiving e-voucher assistance, saying that it reduced their worries and even "conferred dignity and respect." As may be expected, participants in all groups expressed a preference for unrestricted cash over restricted e-vouchers, as cash would provide more choice and would allow them to avoid unpleasant and sometimes undignified conditions at partner supermarkets.

[20] Monique Hennink et al., "Defining Empowerment: Perspectives from International Development Organizations," Development in Practice, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2012), available from: www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09614524.2012.640987.

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Women Perceived as More Deserving of Assistance

As previously mentioned, female-headed households were perceived by a number of male and female focus group participants as "more vulnerable" in the sense that they should be prioritized for humanitarian assistance, due to their limited access to the Turkish labor market. This suggests that community acceptance of women's inclusion in the e-voucher intervention was greater than that of men, with the implication that men may face greater community resentment due to their inclusion in, or more pressure to share their assistance received through, CTP.

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CONCLUSION

The findings of this lessons learned analysis support five main takeaways around vulnerability assessment, targeting, and protection implications in CBP.

First, they underscore the importance of strong communication with and training of local staff, as well as communication with beneficiaries. Gaps in enumerator training, which were compounded by high staff turnover, led to inconsistencies in data collection and possible missed opportunities to address GBV. Moreover, because DRC staff and enumerators lacked a thorough understanding of the vulnerability scoring index's mechanics, they were unable to explain the index to refugee households, leading to frustration among households who were badly off but did not qualify for e-voucher assistance. While increasing transparency of targeting systems raises the problem of potential fraud or manipulation by beneficiaries seeking to meet the targeting criteria, there are ways to mitigate these concerns (outlined above) while respecting beneficiaries' right to receive an explanation for why they were selected or not selected for assistance.

Second, the analysis shows that a CTP vulnerability targeting index must be flexible and adjustable based on feedback from enumerators or suggestions from local staff. While the initial design of DRC's index was laudably consultative, the consultation process stopped after the design phase and consequently a number of problematic variables skewed household scores for too long. Vulnerability and targeting are subjective and contextual, and adjusting or fine-tuning an index is not a sign of failure, but rather of a strong, flexible system.

Third, in contrast to the broad, protection-focused notion of "vulnerability" reflected in DRC's targeting index, both beneficiaries and local DRC staff overwhelmingly defined vulnerability in narrower socioeconomic or dependency ratio terms. This finding, coupled with 1) the fact that a number of the protection indicators included in the index – such as legal concerns (e.g. forced eviction, lack of documentation, etc.) and lack of freedom of movement – could not be addressed by either the e-cards or available complementary programming, and 2) the problematic nature (both in terms of data quality and "do no harm") of asking refugee households about negative coping strategies, post-traumatic stress, and protection risks through a quantitative household assessment, lead us to recommend that targeting for cash assistance be based on socioeconomic criteria, with protection concerns flagged qualitatively and followed up with other sectoral programming where possible.

Fourth, the evidence on the protection implications of CTP for this particular intervention is mixed. Qualitative data collected did not indicate that receiving supermarket e-cards increased empowerment or improved specific protection outcomes among beneficiaries (as noted, neither were stated goals of the intervention). However, nearly all participants noted that e-vouchers were an important source of psychological support, as they reduced their anxieties about meeting basic needs. Negative externalities associated with e-voucher assistance included unpleasant or hostile shopping experiences at partner supermarkets, as well as feelings of pressure from or guilt toward households who did not receive assistance due to a lack of privacy among neighbors and extended family members regarding which households were receiving DRC e-voucher assistance. Furthermore, focus group discussions revealed minimal gender differences in beneficiaries' experiences of the intervention, although key informant interviews found anecdotal evidence that women who worked but were sexually harassed or assaulted were able to stop working thanks to e-voucher assistance. Both men and women were reported to be responsible for making e-voucher purchases and gender roles within households were not reported to have shifted as a result of the intervention.

Fifth, the overall key for achieving positive protection outcomes in CTP is ensuring that complementary protection programming/services are an integral part of cash programs. It is not sufficient for enumerators simply to make protection referrals if they observe problems. Because protection programming is difficult to scale to meet the cash assistance caseload volume, enumerators may be the only point of contact for refugees who seek to voice protection concerns. One possible solution is to use target groups' feedback on vulnerability and protection issues as a way to prioritize protection concerns within the program. The agency can then "triage" these concerns, by dividing issues into those that can be addressed through cash assistance and those that require immediate protection follow up ("red flags" such as gender-based violence, child labor, etc.).

Based on these findings, DRC Turkey plans to make the following adjustments for the next round of cash programming beginning in January 2016 (again using restricted e-vouchers, but through a provider partnering with a wider range of retailers):

Revise the assessment to avoid the above identified problematic question formats and phrasing, and eliminate questions on post-traumatic stress, as well as questions that do not feed into the simplified vulnerability targeting index (see below).

- Include a red flag for child labor in the assessment that will trigger protection referral.
- Provide a full day of training for assessment enumerators, focusing on the points outlined in this report. DRC protection colleagues will provide guidance to enumerators on how to ask about negative coping mechanisms in a sensitive manner, as well as how to handle sensitive situations when refugees want to tell their stories.
- Hold regular feedback meetings with enumerators (daily during the first week of data collection, and as deemed appropriate thereafter) to troubleshoot concerns arising in the field. Involve protection colleagues in these meetings.
- Do not provide assessed households with a token of gratitude. To clarify, the assessment will only cover 300 households, all of which have already received DRC assistance. If the assessment were larger or covered more unassisted households, DRC Turkey would consider providing all assessed households with one-time assistance in a modality different from that of the planned repeated assistance.
- Simplify the vulnerability targeting index to focus on socioeconomic indicators (see Table 1 below).
- Consult with field staff and, where possible, target populations on which of these variables are accurate and which are problematic, and make adjustments accordingly.
- Review the assessment data collected on a daily basis to catch data entry problems and evaluate appropriateness of variables and their weights.
- Explain targeting rationale and methodology to staff and enumerators, who will then be able to explain it in general terms to beneficiaries.

Table 1, Socioeconomic indicators of vulnerability

Factor	Score	Question	Comments / Explanation
Greater socioeconomic burden/risk	2	A6	Female-headed household
	2	A10	7 or more people in HH
	4	A10	10 or more people in HH
	2	A10	Per child under 5 years old
	1	A12	Per unaccompanied child
	2	D1	Person with chronic illness in HH
	4	D1	2 or more people with chronic illness in HH
	2	D2	Person with disability in HH
	4	D2	2 or more people with disability in HH
	2	D3	Injured person in HH
	4	D3	2 or more injured people in HH
	1	D4	1 or more pregnant or lactating women in HH
	3	D5	Head of household with chronic ilness/disability/ injured/pregnant or lactating
Precarious/vulnerable living conditions	2	B1	Insalubrious flat/mud house
	4	B1	Tent OR garage, shop, unfinished building OR public place
	2	B3	# of HHs sharing a dwelling: 3 HHs
	3	B3	# of HHs sharing a dwelling: 4 HHs
	4	B3	# of HHs sharing a dwelling: 5 HHs
	5	B3	# of HHs sharing a dwelling: 6+ HHs

Factor	Score	Question	Comments / Explanation
Inability to generate sufficient income	5	A10f	0 (zero) household members can generate income
	1	A11a	< 10 days worked (maximum 4 points)
	1	A11c	< 10 TL/day (maximum 4 points)
	5	C1	Monthly income per HH member ([weekly income*4]/# of HH members): no income at all
	5	C1	Monthly income per HH member: below 10 TL
	4	C1	Monthly income per HH member: 10 to 20 TL
	3	C1	Monthly income per HH member: 21 to 40 TL
	2	C1	Monthy income per HH member: 41 to 60 TL
	1	C1	Monthly income per HH member: 61 to 80 TL
	1	C1	Monthly income per HH member: 81 to 100 TL
		C1	Monthly income per HH member: 101 to 120 TL
	-2	C1	Monthly income per HH member: 121 to 200 TL
	-5	C1	Monthy income per HH member: above 201 TL
	2	C2	Main income from assistance/gifts OR savings/ selling assets
	4	C2	Main income from debts/loans
Negative coping strategies	4	C4	Lack of food in the last 7 days: 2 or more negative coping strategies
	4	C5	Inability to meet needs in the last 30 days: 2 or more negative coping strategies

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Annex 1: DRC Vulnerability Scoring Index

Factor	Score	Question	Comments / Explanation
Offsets/mitigates vulnerability (LOWERS VULNERABILITY SCORE)	-5	A9	(Syrian) passport holders have greater access to services and rights within Turkey
	-5	A10f	More than 2 people working indicates at least minimum income generation capacity
	-5	A11b	Permanent employment = steady income
	-5	B3	Rental contract indicates shelter stability
	-5	G1	1 asset (through observation) indicate families are relatively better off than others
	-10	G1	2+ assets (through observation) indicate families are relatively better off than others
		C1	Income from labor (however temporary or permanent) or remittances
	-2	D2b	Receiving some type of monthly material assistance
Indicator of higher protection risk/ vulnerability	2	A6	Female headed household
	4	A7	Child-headed household
	2	A8	Widowed or spouse's whereabouts unknown
	2	A10	More than 7 people per HH
	4	A10	More than 10 people per HH
	2	A10	Per child under 5 years old
	2	A12a	Per each unaccompanied child under 12 years old
	2	A13	If unaccompanied children are NOT related to anyone in the household
	2	A17a	moving >5 times within the same city since first arriving in Turkey
	2	A17b	moving >5 times moved between cities since first arriving in Turkey
	2	A21	Unable to move back to Syria (indicator of protection concerns)
	1	E1	Facing problems accessing health services
	2	E3	Persons with chronic illnesses or disabilities
	4	E4	More than 2 people with chronic illnesses or disabilities
	2	E5	Injured persons
	4	E6	More than 2 injured people
	1	E7	1 or more pregnant or lactating women

Factor	Score	Question	Comments / Explanation
Precarious/ vulnerable living conditions	1	B1	Basement flat - contextual indicator of vulnerable/ inadequate housing (low vulnerability)
	2	B1	Tent - contextual indicator of vulnerable/inadequate housing (medium vulnerability)
	4	B1	Extremely vulnerable dwelling: Garage, shop, unfinished building (unhealthy conditions, inhabitable) or public place (mosque, church, etc.)
	0	B2	Rent per household: no rent paid, hosted
	1	B2	Rent per household: 75 to 150 TL per month
	1	B2	Rent per household: 151 to 300 TL per month
	2	B2	Rent per household: 301 to 450 TL per month
	3	B2	Rent per household: 451 to 600 TL per month
	2	B4a	# of HHs sharing a dwelling: 3 HHs
	3	B4a	# of HHs sharing a dwelling: 4 HHs
	4	B4a	# of HHs sharing a dwelling: 5 HHs
	5	B4a	# of HHs sharing a dwelling: 6+ HHs
	2	B4b	# of people per dwelling: 10 people
	3	B4b	# of people per dwelling: 11-12 ppl
	4	B4b	# of people per dwelling: 12-15 ppl
	5	B4b	# of people per dwelling: 16+ ppl
	1	B7	No bathtub/shower in the house (indicator of poor hygiene)
	2	B8	Using a public toilet or toilets outside the house (indicator of poor hygiene and potential protection concerns for women accessing toilets)
	1	B9	No heating source available
	1	B10	No heating within the dwelling
	1	B11	No fuel for cooking
	2 to 5	B12	Interdependence of HHs sharing a dwelling - to determine support system (positive) or sharing limited resources (negative)

Factor	Score	Question	Comments / Explanation
Unable to generate sufficient income	5	A10f	0 (zero) household members can generate income
	2	A11a	<10 days worked
	2	A11c	<10 TL/day
	2	A11d	>10 hours/day
	5	C1	Income per household: no income at all
	5	C1	Income per household: below 50 TL
	4	C1	Income per household: 50- 100 TL
	3	C1	Income per household: 101 -200 TL
	2	C1	Income per household: 201 to 300TL
	1	C1	Income per household: 301 to 400 TL
	1	C1	Income per houshold: 401 to 500 TL
		C1	Income per household: 501 to 600 TL
	-2	C1	Income per household: 600 to 1000 TL
	-5	C1	Income per household: above 1001 TL
	4	C2	Main income from assistance/gifts or savings/selling assets (medium vulnerability)
	6	C2	Main income from debts/loans (higher vulnerability) BUT MAY NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR CASH ASSISTANCE
Negative coping strategies	4	C8	Lack of food in the last 7 days: 2 or more negative coping strategies
	4	C9	Lack of food in the last 30 days: 2 or more negative coping strategies
	4	C10	Meeting needs in next 30 days: 2 or more negative coping strategies
	4	C11	Meeting needs in next 3 months: 2 or more negative coping strategies

Factor	Score	Question	Comments / Explanation
"Well-being"	2	F5	Legal concerns: 1-2 concerns cited
	4	F5	Legal concerns: 3-4 concerns cited
	5	F5	Legal concerns: 5+ concerns cited
	2	F7	Problems faced: 1-2 concerns cited
	4	F7	Problems faced: 3-4 concerns cited
	5	F7	Problems faced: 5+ concerns cited
		F8	MOST URGENT PROBLEM
	2	F8	Conflict or tension with the host community
	2	F8	Discrimination by host community
	4	F8	Risk of forced recruitment
	2	F8	Immediate family members are missing
	2	F8	Women or girls are insecure in the area
	4	F8	Absence or loss of official documents
	4	F8	Inadequate /over crowded housing
	4	F8	Inadequate drinking water supply
	3	F8	Insufficient food supply
	1	F8	Language barriers
	1	F8	Lack of information on services
	1	F8	Lack of information on legal status
	1	F8	Insufficient privacy for family members
	3	F8	Lack of job/self-employment opportunities
	3	F8	Unsafe work environment (abuse, physical assault, sexual harassment, etc.)
	4	F8	Lack of freedom of movement in the area
	1	F8	Difficult access to education
	1	F8	Difficult access to humanitarian assistance
	3	F8	Issues with medical care: lack of, insufficient

Annex 2: DRC Project Logframe

PROJECT NAME Provision of immediate support and strengthening coping mechanisms for vulnerable, non-camp Syrian refugees in Turkey

IMPACT	Impact Indicator 1		Baseline 2015	Milestone 30/04/15	Milestone 31/07/2015	Milestone 31/10/15	Target 31/01/2016	Assumptions
Socio-economically vulnerable Syrian refugees and Turkish hosting communities in Hatay and Sanliurfa Provinces strengthen self-reliance mechanisms while displaced in Turkey.	% of HHs reporting a decrease in the use of negative coping mechanisms to meet needs by the end of the project.	Planned	0	0			75%	**Assumptions on impact:** **Negative coping mechanisms as listed by protection standards (UNHCR) and food security standards (WFP).** **Assumption 1:** Evidence indicates that Syrian families resort to negative coping mechanisms (reduced food consumption, child labour, exploitative labour, selling assets, etc.) to meet needs. With increased ability to meet needs, families will reduce the use of negative coping strategies. **Assumption 2:** The UN (UNHCR/WFP) concepts of negative coping align with refugees' perceptions of negative strategies.
		Achieved						
		Source	FGDs, internal monitoring reports, impact evaluation					
	Impact Indicator 2		**Baseline 2015**	**Milestone 30/04/15**	**Milestone 31/07/2015**	**Milestone 31/10/15**	**Target 31/01/2016**	
		Planned						
		Achieved						
		Source						

OUTCOME	Outcome Indicator 1		Baseline 2015	Milestone 30/04/15	Milestone 31/07/2015	Milestone 31/10/15	Target 31/01/2016	Assumptions
To meet basic NFI/food and protection needs of vulnerable non-camp Syrian refugees.	% reduction in income-expenditure gap for 1,800 extremely vulnerable HH.	Planned	0	0	10%	10%	10%	Security remains stable. Access to beneficiaries is granted. Cash assistance is sufficient to meet needs and therefore reduce gap. Courses provide skill levels required to competitively enter the market. Employment obtained will not be considered exploitative by ILO standards.
		Achieved						
		Source	FGDs, internal reports					
	Outcome Indicator 2		**Baseline 2015**	**Milestone 30/04/15**	**Milestone 31/07/2015**	**Milestone 31/10/15**	**Target 31/01/2016**	
	% of course participants demonstrate increase in skills acquired relevant to the course subject.	Planned	0	0	80%	80%	80%	
		Achieved						
		Source	Course attendance list, pre and post-tests					
	Outcome Indicator 3		**Baseline 2015**	**Milestone 30/04/15**	**Milestone 31/07/2015**	**Milestone 31/10/15**	**Target 31/01/2016**	
	% of beneficiaries who attended livelihood counselling, courses or have received a business grant can generate additional income by the end of the project.	Planned	0	0	50%	50%	50%	
		Achieved						
		Source	Beneficiary reports, internal reports					**RISK RATING** Medium
INPUTS (£)	DFID (£)		Govt (£)		Other (£)		Total (£)	
	2,500,000							
INPUTS (HR)	DFID (FTEs)							

OUTPUT 1	Output Indicator 1.1 TOTAL		Baseline 2014	Milestone 30/04/15	Milestone 31/07/2015	Milestone 31/10/15	Milestone 31/10/15	Assumptions
The most vulnerable Syrian refugee households in Hatay and Urfa have an improved ability to meet basic needs (food and non-food) from February until July 2015	Number of HH identified for the monthly cash assistance.	Planned	0	2,000	0	0	2,000	Security remains stable. Access to beneficiaries is granted. PTT provides cash to Syrians. Referral services required are available to refugees free of charge or at reasonable costs
		Achieved						
			Source					
			Household re-assessment, assessment report from Y1					
	Output Indicator 1.2		**Baseline 2014**	**Milestone 30/04/15**	**Milestone 31/07/2015**	**Milestone 31/10/15**	**Target 31/01/2016**	
	Number of individuals receiving up to 6 monthly cash payments.	Planned	0	0	14,000	0	14,000	
		Achieved						
			Source					
			Distribution report, and beneficiary post-delivery/assistance documents, and monitoring report					
	Output Indicator 1.3		**Baseline 2014**	**Milestone 30/04/15**	**Milestone 31/07/2015**	**Milestone 31/10/15**	**Target 31/01/2016**	
	Number of protection cases referred to other services	Planned	0	200	500	0	500	
		Achieved						
			Source					
			Procurement documents, finance payments, and bank transfer verification documents					
IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)	**Output Indicator 1.4**		**Baseline 2014**	**Milestone 30/04/15**	**Milestone 31/07/2015**	**Milestone 31/10/15**	**Target 31/01/2016**	
63%	No of monthly cash payments made	Planned	0	6,000	12,000	0	12,000	
		Achieved						
			Source					**RISK RATING**
								Low
INPUTS (£)	DFID (£)		Govt (£)		Other (£)		Total (£)	
	1,584,335							
INPUTS (HR)	DFID (FTEs)							

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OUTPUT 2	Output Indicator 2.1		Baseline 2014	Milestone 30/04/15	Milestone 31/07/2015	Milestone 31/10/15	Target 31/01/2016	Assumptions
Targeted individuals (Syrian and Turkish) from vulnerable households in Hatay and Urfa are better prepared for economic self-reliance by December 2016.	Number of beneficiaries accessing sector specific skills training.	Planned	0	0	1,000	1,000	2,000	Security remains stable. Access to beneficiaries is granted. External partner cooperation. Courses offered are based on both beneficiary interest and market demand. DRC can obtain relevant information on market dynamics. Turks and Syrians are willing and able to meet to discuss.
		Achieved						
			Source					
			Database					
	Output Indicator 2.2		**Baseline 2014**	**Milestone 30/04/15**	**Milestone 31/07/2015**	**Milestone 31/10/15**	**Target 31/01/2016**	
	Number of people who receive livelihood counselling	Planned	0	900	2,250	3,600	4,500	
		Achieved						
			Source					
			Course participation list, course curriculum, pre- and post-tests.					
	Output Indicator 2.3		**Baseline 2015**	**Milestone 30/04/15**	**Milestone 31/07/2015**	**Milestone 31/10/15**	**Target 31/01/2016**	
	Minimum numbers of beneficiaries participating in intercommunal dialogues (Syrians and Turks)	Planned	0	80	200	320	400	
		Achieved						
			Source					
			Attendance list, internal reports					
IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)	**Output Indicator 2.4**		**Baseline 2015**	**Milestone 30/04/15**	**Milestone 31/07/2015**	**Milestone 31/10/15**	**Target 31/01/2016**	
21%		Planned	0					
		Achieved						
			Source					**RISK RATING**
			Attendance list, internal reports					Medium
INPUTS (£)	DFID (£)		Govt (£)		Other (£)		Total (£)	
	527,757							
INPUTS (HR)	DFID (FTEs)							

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OUTPUT 3	Output Indicator 3.1		Baseline 2014	Milestone 30/04/15	Milestone 31/07/2015	Milestone 31/10/15	Target 31/01/2016	Assumptions
Targeted individuals (Syrian and Turkish) from vulnerable households in Hatay and Urfa can connect to the labour market by December 2016	1 labour market mapping document is developed	Planned	0	0	1	0	1	Security remains stable.
		Achieved						Access to beneficiaries is granted.
					Source			Turkish authorities allow DRC to carry out this exercise.
					Labour market mapping document.			Turkish authorities allow DRC to carry out this exercise.
	Output Indicator 3.2		**Baseline 2014**	**Milestone 30/04/15**	**Milestone 31/07/2015**	**Milestone 31/10/15**	**Target 31/01/2016**	The economic downturn will not overly influence beneficiaries' ability to open and sustain small businesses.
	8 workshops for small business grants are organized	Planned	0	4	0	8	8	
		Achieved						
					Source			
					Database			
	Output Indicator 3.3		**Baseline 2015**	**Milestone 30/04/15**	**Milestone 31/07/2015**	**Milestone 31/10/15**	**Target 31/01/2016**	
	Provision of 20 grants for small business opportunities	Planned	0	0	10	20	20	
		Achieved						
					Source			
					Business plans, selection report			
IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)	**Output Indicator 3.4**		**Baseline 2015**	**Milestone 30/04/15**	**Milestone 31/07/2015**	**Milestone 31/10/15**	**Target 31/01/2016**	**RISK RATING**
16%		Planned	0					Low
		Achieved						
					Source			
INPUTS (£)	DFID (£)			Govt (£)	Other (£)		Total (£)	
	387,908							
INPUTS (HR)	DFID (FTEs)							

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Humanitarian Aid
and Civil Protection