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Job Outcomes in the Towns of South Sudan: Jobs, Recovery, and Peacebuilding in Urban South Sudan – Technical Report I

Arden Finn et al.

WORLD BANK GROUP
Jobs

JOB OUTCOMES IN THE TOWNS OF SOUTH SUDAN

JOBS, RECOVERY, AND PEACEBUILDING IN URBAN SOUTH SUDAN – TECHNICAL REPORT I

Arden Finn et al.

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JOBS OUTCOMES IN THE TOWNS OF SOUTH SUDAN

KEY MESSAGES

Summary

This report is one of a set of studies on urban jobs outcomes. This study is one of a set of four reports covering different aspects of jobs in urban South Sudan. Readers may refer to the respective companion reports on the macroeconomic environment for jobs (World Bank, 2020b), markets and market-linked agriculture (World Bank, 2020c), and jobs in businesses and NGOs (World Bank, 2020d). A synthesis report summarizes and contrasts findings from all four studies (World Bank, 2020e).

After years of conflict, the realities of the job outcomes in the towns of South Sudan are stark: poverty is very high, there are few productive jobs, and conflict has touched nearly all livelihoods

Few job activities in the towns of South Sudan are productive enough to provide a livelihood above the poverty level. In urban South Sudan, more than 70 percent of non-displaced residents, and 90 percent of IDPs in Protection of Civilians (PoCs) sites live in poverty. In none of the towns included in our analysis is the poverty rate below 60 percent. High poverty goes hand in hand with the low productivity of the job activities available to most South Sudanese: median income for young workers in household activities in 2019 was equivalent to about SSP 600-1,000 or US$2-3 per day, and businesses report a median income of roughly US$2 per worker and day. Low productivity is also reflected in the inability of households to diversify activities and the difficulties youth face in finding work beyond being household helpers.

Half of all urban households have lost a job activity through conflict, and the majority of the displaced are no longer active in the labor market. Even among households that have not been displaced, nearly half have lost an important job activity since 2013, often the household's primary activity. Wages have fallen for half of all urban workers, as has time at work, and more workers now report that they would like to work longer hours than before the conflict. The displaced have suffered much, and lost funds, land, and tools. Fewer than half of the internally displaced and fewer than one in five refugees are employed, and even those who are work less and report lower wages than urban residents.

Reintegrating South Sudan's 1.7m internally displaced and 2.2m refugees into the labor market will pose a major challenge. While most refugees hope for a return to South Sudan, two in three of the internally displaced hope to remain in their current host communities. At the same time, four in five of the displaced would like to resume the activities they led in their home communities. Absorbing these workers into the labor force may pose obstacles to home communities. For instance, a plurality of residents of the Juba PoC site used to originally do waged work; despite the fact that waged jobs are a relatively large source of employment in Juba, it is doubtful whether there is the potential to absorb a large number of additional workers.

Most urban households diversify their job activities little, and rely on household work in agriculture and commerce or services, or they depend on a household member's work for NGOs or as a public servant

For most urban workers, a job is own-account or household work in services or agriculture. Most workers are self-employed (46%) or support household-run business activities (27%). Paid labor (whether salaried work or daily labor) accounts for one in four jobs, with fewer youth and women in paid employment. Agriculture is a major source of employment in towns (37% of all jobs), second only to services, which employ about every other worker, mostly in commerce and personal services. While

comparisons over time are difficult, it is evident that the role of agriculture as an employer has increased during the conflict for urban residents – but not for IDPs, few of whom have access to land.

In a deeply disrupted economic environment, households make do by pooling family labor in subsistence activities or depend on a single wage earner. In an environment where few workers have savings, and where insecurity and depressed demand makes even small investments risky, households diversify their job activities little. Households – four adults and four children at the median – tend to work together on a sole job activity (often subsistence agriculture) or a set of activities (usually in agriculture and commerce). Others rely on a single household member (commonly in wage work), and share the income generated to support inactive household members. Among the displaced, far fewer work, and the many inactive adults rely on humanitarian aid rather than family for support.

Half of all urban households rely on agriculture for most of their income, and more base their livelihood on work for NGOs and the public sector than are employed in businesses. While about one in three workers are active in agriculture, half of all urban households rely on agriculture as their primary source of income. Work for NGOs and on the public payroll taken together are the primary source of income for about one in six households (16%), followed by commerce (13%) and personal services (10%). Far more households rely on the public sector and NGOs than count on waged work for for-profit companies, which is the primary activity of 5% of households).

Towns differ in which activities matter for jobs, in particular in their reliance on agriculture as opposed to commerce and services. Differences in job activities between towns speak to local constraints, but also to comparative advantage and the potential – if stability increases – for trade between towns. Waged employment contributes roughly equally across towns. However, reliance on agriculture varies strongly. Many workers and households are active in agriculture in towns including Yambio and Rumbek, while far fewer are in Aweil, Juba, or Wau. In towns where agriculture plays a lesser role, casual business activities and services provide more jobs.

Many young workers say they are ready to build from the less than attractive job activities available, and point to lack of funding, insecurity, and low demand as the main obstacles to doing better

Young workers show a realistic and reasonably open-minded attitude toward the modest job activities available to them. In the short term, most jobs will be in activities that are do not generate much income, and that may not be satisfying. Whether young South Sudanese in particular are willing to build from such limited opportunities will be important for economic recovery as well as for political stability. In survey answers, young workers in South Sudan have a realistic sense of the low incomes (around US$2-3 per day) that can be had from common job activities. Most view casual activities such as work in agriculture, in the market, in construction, or in casual services at least mildly favorably. While many young workers still hope to someday work for the government, fewer than one in ten expect such a job within a year, a more modest expectation than when youth were surveyed in 2014.

About half of all young urban workers view agriculture as a good job, and a majority of those currently in agriculture would rather do better in their activity than shift to another job. Among young urban workers, about half see agriculture as at least as good a job as others. Three in five who are currently active in agriculture would like to improve their activity, rather than switching to a new one or resume education – a higher share than among those in any other type of activity. While this is far from universal interest in agriculture, it gives some reason to hope that even in towns, a significant number of young urban South Sudanese will be interested in working in the sector, and may benefit from its potential for recovery.

Workers stress that lack of funds poses a crucial obstacle to improving their job activities, along with insecurity and weak demand. Young workers most often point to lack of funds as an obstacle to

improving their activities (61%), followed by weak demand (20%). Youth also feel that their work in agriculture would benefit most from access to tools and funding, perhaps through cooperatives. Similarly, traders in the markets report that lack of funding is the biggest problem in making their business work (26%), followed by insecurity (25%) and a lack of customers (17%).

Skills are unlikely to be a major constraint on jobs outcomes in early recovery, but conflict has taken a heavy toll on access to education, and these losses must be reversed as stability increases. In the towns of South Sudan, seven in ten workers have at least some formal schooling, and three in ten have more than primary education. Young workers today are much more likely to have some education than their older peers, with only about one in twelve 15-19 year-olds having had no education. However, conflict is eroding these gains, and as of 2015, about one in three primary school age children in towns were out of school. Young women are much less likely than young men to be enrolled.

Policy implications

Once security improves, trade between towns can yield significant benefits – but in the short term, it is realistic to focus on ways to promote job recovery within towns, based on local demand. Activity patterns differ across the towns of South Sudan in line with local comparative advantage, in particular in terms of how much activity there is in agriculture. Once greater security makes it possible again for producers and traders to travel from town to town with less fear, there is a significant potential for trade. However, in the short term, danger and poor road quality limit what can be done. Until security improves, it makes sense to think about the potential for job recovery within towns, based on local demand.

Jobs support must start from the reality that even in the towns of South Sudan, most jobs are low-productivity own-account activities in agriculture and services accounts. Most jobs outside of the public and NGO sector are self-employed activities in agriculture, commerce, and basic services. Few of them provide more than poverty-level income. The future of jobs in South Sudan need not reflect this present state. However, the first steps toward recovery need to take account of what the situation is today: broad progress toward better jobs is most likely to come from a recovery of productivity in these activities, and a resumption of the many market-linked activities lost to conflict.

Support to agriculture can build on a broad base even in the towns of South Sudan, and leverage the fact that many youth are open to the idea of working in the sector. Agriculture today is the main source of livelihoods to half of all urban households, and has the potential to become more productive as stability returns. While not all are interested in working in the sector, half of all young workers view jobs in agriculture favorably, youth currently active in the sector are more likely to want to continue their activities than those in other sectors, and many express interest in support to do better. There is therefore a broad base for better jobs linked to agriculture, and support programs are likely to encounter some interest.

Capital grants stand a chance of helping a recovery of productivity in self-employed activities. Many households report on the activities lost to conflict, households show little diversification of activities, and most respondents say that lack of funds is the greatest obstacle in their job activities. In the immediate term, the prescription for helping households recover some lost activities and raise productivity may be as straightforward as responding to this need for modest access to funds.

Programs to support small business activities can look to engage women and young workers. Women and young workers are likely to be limited to roles as helpers in household income-generating activities. Support to them can build on their prior experience in household activities, and seize opportunities to help households diversify their jobs portfolios. At the same time, data suggests that reservation wages

and overly optimistic expectations of government employment are unlikely to still pose the obstacle they once posed to engaging youth in small job activities.

With much concern over weak demand in the markets, purchase programs to stimulate local demand may be a sensible short-term measure until trade can resume with greater stability. Next to access to funding and insecurity, workers are most likely to complain that poor market demand is limiting their activities. Once some exchange between towns recovers, demand may rise. In the meantime, support that boosts demand is likely to have a role to play: injections of purchasing power through public works programs or cash transfers, humanitarian purchases (perhaps not only for grains but also for some processed agriculture products such as peanut paste or dried fish), and perhaps innovative instruments such as market guarantees for aggregators.

Labor markets are characterized by local trends, and it is crucial to customize support. Tailoring to local job market challenges and opportunities will be a crucial component of livelihoods and jobs programming in South Sudan. While stark differences exist across different groups such as IDPs and urban residents, similarly large discrepancies exist among different towns – for instance, agriculture employs 70 percent of urban workers in Yambio, but only 20 percent in Aweil and Wau. Thus, while challenges of poverty, conflict, insecurity and resilience may be common across the landscape of South Sudan, a one-size-fits-all solution may not succeed.

Regular salary payments to those on the public payroll will contribute significantly to livelihoods and help sustain local market demand. Along with jobs in NGOs, public employment contributes to the livelihoods of a significant share of households. Paying salaries regularly will help these households improve their wellbeing, and may allow them to make the small investments needed to diversify their job activities. Public servants are also important clients for market traders, and resuming salary payments can directly help address depressed demand.

While skills are unlikely to be a binding constraint in the immediate term, the erosion of education due to conflict is taking a toll on the skills base of the future workforce. Because conflict has so profoundly disrupted economic activities, it is likely that jobs outcomes can significantly improve in the short term without remedial investments in skills. However, conflict is taking a major toll on access to education, with one in three primary-age children estimated to be out of school even in towns. As recovery proceeds, better access to schooling is needed to avoid damage to the skill base.

Better analysis is urgently needed to understand the looming challenge of re-integrating the displaced and demobilized fighters into the work force. Many South Sudanese workers have been internally displaced or have fled the country. Re-integrating them into the labor force will pose specific challenges, given that many of the displaced have experienced trauma, lost assets, land, and networks, and many have been inactive for some time. In addition, because of the sheer scale of displacement, return could represent a sizeable shock to local labor markets. Better analysis is urgently needed to better understand what form the challenges are likely to take.

I. Introduction

1. This report is one of a set of studies on urban jobs outcomes. This study is one of a set of four reports covering different aspects of jobs in urban South Sudan. Readers may refer to the respective companion reports on the macroeconomic environment for jobs (World Bank, 2020b), markets and market-linked agriculture (World Bank, 2020c), and jobs in businesses and NGOs (World Bank, 2020d). A synthesis report summarizes and contrasts findings from all four studies (World Bank, 2020e).

2. Following the signing of the 2018 peace agreement, good-enough jobs will be crucial for recovery and resilience in South Sudan. The upholding of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) signed in September 2018 will be strengthened by a labor market that is able to absorb the many South Sudanese youth who are currently unable to work in jobs that are productive and satisfying. While both the initial date of May 2019 and the extended date of November 2019 for the formation of a unity government have passed, there is potential that moves towards greater stability can be consolidated.

3. Armed conflict has had a long-standing and disruptive effect on jobs and economic opportunities in South Sudan, and most jobs have very low productivity. Widespread conflict, disruption of agriculture, looting of land and livestock, and near-universal insecurity have had serious effects on jobs. Very few jobs have high productivity, and even households with many job activities live in poverty. Millions of people – up to one third of the population – have been displaced, both internally and to other countries as refugees. Since the R-ARCSS was signed, there have been increasing numbers of returnees, both within and across borders.[1] Additional returns could have a large impact on the labor market.

4. Self-employment in agriculture and basic services is the norm in towns. Wage jobs – mostly with NGOs and the armed forces – contribute to urban livelihoods. However, as is the norm in low-income countries, the large majority of workers are self-employed. While the largest share of these jobs is in commerce and personal services, agriculture plays an important role as the second-largest employer even in towns. In order to operate at scale, jobs support must start from this reality.

5. An understanding of skill levels, aspirations and work profiles must inform jobs support programs. As is common, assessments of Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) indicate a need to review current vocational trainings so that they train workers to seize real rather than perceived labor market opportunities. This may mean orienting training away from its current focus on skills such as carpentry, plumbing, and tailoring, and toward self-sustaining livelihoods in agriculture and linked services.[2] More importantly, the kinds of job activities that are realistically available may require other support modalities than training – for instance, grants or in-kind support, or initiatives to revive market demand.

6. This chapter characterizes the labor-force and the jobs they work in, with a focus on the urban Partnership for Resilience and Recovery (PfRR)[3] locations and currently displaced populations. This chapter focuses on jobs in the towns of South Sudan, because it seeks to give an assessment of where and how a job recovery could begin in relatively secure and stable areas of the country. Because no recent survey covers all the towns of South Sudan (let alone rural areas), this analysis draws upon several survey sets with different coverage. While therefore, sample locations differ across various parts of the analysis, the focus is on Juba as well as the urban PfRR locations of Aweil Centre, Bor, Malakal, Rumbek Centre, Torit, Wau, Yambio and Yei.[4] Together, these towns are estimated to be home to about 3.1m South Sudanese. Jobs outcomes among IDPs across four PoC sites in Bentiu, Bor, Juba and Wau are also analyzed, along with South Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia. It is important to emphasize that IDPs who live in PoC sites and similar settlements represent only about one in four of all IDPs (27% - IOM, 2020). Other IDPs who live within urban communities are captured in our data on the overall urban population, but cannot

[1] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), "South Sudan Humanitarian Snapshot."
[2] United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Office (UNESCO), "Rapid Assessment: Technical and Vocational Education and Training."
[3] The PfRR is an inclusive group of donors, UN Agencies and NGOs who are committed to promoting local ownership and working together to reduce vulnerability and increase the resilience of people, communities and institutions in South Sudan. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/Annex_1_Partnership_for_Recovery_and_Resilience_Framework_PfRR.pdf
[4] Where this chapter reports aggregates for 'non-PfRR' urban locations, the reporting localities include Juba, Kapoeta East, Kapoeta South, Magwi, Maridi, Nzara and Terekeka.

be distinguished from longer-term residents. The chapter details poverty trends, educational attainment, current sectoral profiles of the employed workforce, challenges in resuming work post-conflict, reservation wages among refugees, and consumption and agricultural patterns around the PfRR centers.

7. Although the focus of this chapter is on the major towns, it is worth highlighting some important differences between jobs in these towns and rural areas. Urban livelihoods and employment are far more diversified than rural livelihoods are. Rural households rely almost exclusively on agricultural production to support their livelihoods (88%). Even for those in the top rural quintile, employment is overwhelmingly dominated by own-account agriculture. This contrasts with the upper urban quintiles, among whom the main activities are salaried labor and non-farm business. Those in the urban labor force are also much better educated than rural workers. Around one quarter of the urban labor force reports not having any education. By comparison, even among the richest rural quintile half of the working age population has no education. Access to basic amenities differs far more between urban and rural households than it varies by poverty status or any money-metric measure of welfare. Even the poorest fifth of urban households have better access to amenities than the richest fifth of rural households.

II. Features of Urban Livelihoods

A. Poverty and Education in Urban Areas

8. In urban South Sudan, more than 7 in 10 residents and 9 in 10 IDPs are poor. While earlier estimates of urban poverty were close to 25 percent (2008), estimates from recent data reflect a drastic increase in poverty after conflict. More than 70 percent of urban non-displaced populations, and 90 percent of IDPs in PoCs, live below the poverty line of US $1.90 (2011 PPP) per capita per day (Figure 1).[5],[6] South Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia face a similar prevalence of poverty as the urban South Sudanese residents, significantly above poverty rates among other major refugee groups (Eritrean, Somali and Sudanese).[7],[8] With respect to poverty rates among IDPs (as well as with respect to other jobs outcomes reported below), one must recall that they relate to those living in PoC sites and similar settlements, not the overall IDP population.

9. Poverty rates are high in all towns, but there are important differences, with one in three residents above the poverty level in some towns, compared to only one in ten in others. In Aweil, Rumbek and Torit, poverty is nearly universal, with poverty rates of close to 90 percent. By way of contrast, poverty rates in Wau, Yambio and Yei – while high –are substantially lower, and around two thirds of the population live in poverty. Among the IDP PoCs, Bentiu in Unity State, has the highest poverty rate while Bor PoC in Jonglei State has the lowest. However, poverty is higher than 60 percent in all locations. Urban poverty rates rose particularly sharply from 2015 onwards because of the devastating impact that extremely high inflation rates had on real purchasing power for the wage-dependent urban population.[9] These strikingly high urban poverty levels indicate the potential for livelihoods programs to be closely linked to poverty reduction programming.

[5] World Bank, "South Sudan: Jobs and Livelihoods."
[6] The US $ 1.90 (2011 PPP) per capita per day international poverty line has also been adopted by the Government of South Sudan as the national poverty line.
[7] World Bank, "Using Micro-Data to Inform Durable Solutions for IDPs in Sub-Saharan Africa."
[8] Here and in following figures in this chapter, 'Refugee' refers to South Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia, as surveyed in the Skills Profile Survey (SPS) Ethiopia, 2017, unless specified otherwise.
[9] World Bank, "The Impact of Conflict and Shocks on Poverty: South Sudan Poverty Assessment."

Figure 1 Poverty headcount ratios in South Sudan



Source: Authors' calculations using HFSSS 2017, CRS 2017 and SPS 2017.

10. About 70 percent of urban South Sudanese of working age have at least some primary education. Jobs and livelihoods programs should account for the skill level of the urban workforce. While education levels in the towns of South Sudan are low, most individuals of working age do have some formal education at either the primary level (39 percent) or secondary level (26 percent) education (Figure 2). About 5 percent have qualifications beyond secondary school. Similarly, about two thirds of young urban South Sudanese aged 15-24 are literate.[10]

11. The greatest variation in educational attainment is between whether people have no education or primary education. As with poverty rates, educational attainment varies by location. While such differences exist at all levels, arguably the starkest difference between localities lies in whether a plurality of workers has some primary education, or no formal education at all. In Aweil and Rumbek, more than 40 percent of the working-age population has no formal education, compared to 18 percent in Wau. Conversely, less than 30 percent have primary education in Aweil and Rumbek, compared to 42 percent in Wau.

Figure 2 Educational attainment among the working-age population, by town



Source: Authors' calculations using HFSSS 2017, CRS 2017 and SPS 2017.

[10] UNESCO and South Sudan's Ministry of General Education and Instruction, "Global Initiative on Out of School Children: South Sudan Country Study." (2018)

12. Younger urban South Sudanese are far more likely to have some formal education than their older peers. About 8 percent of the 15-19 year cohort has no formal education, compared to 40 percent of the 35-39 year cohort, and nearly 60 percent in the 60-64 year age group (Figure 3). As schooling increases for the younger workforce cohorts, an increased demand for further training opportunities beyond basic schooling, such as TVET, is likely.[11] Such an appetite for education can be a real asset for economic development, and could in principle be met by an expansion of initiatives on skills and vocational training. However, evidence shows that training programs are costly, and that they often have little impact on jobs outcomes of trainees due to a lack of demand for skilled labor and difficult barriers for graduates to establish themselves in self-employment. Policy in recovery must weigh and balance these factors.

13. Conflict is putting the education prospects of young South Sudanese at risk, with potentially dire consequences for skill levels in the long term. While access to education has increased for recent generations of young South Sudanese, there is a risk that conflict will erode such gains. Thus, as of 2015, more than 2.2 million children of school-age were out of school, including nearly one in three children of primary age in urban areas (30% among boys and 33% among girls) and many more at the risk of dropping out, including among groups of children who are not usually thought of as 'hard to reach'.[12] Thus, educating the young and boosting school-enrolment among the primary-school aged will be crucial for the future workforce and livelihoods programing.

Figure 3 Educational attainment among the urban working-age population, by age group



Source: Authors' calculations using HFSSS 2017, CRS 2017 and SPS 2017.

14. Young men are substantially more likely to be studying than young women. Among urban youth (15-24 years) about half are employed, and a third are enrolled in education. While it may be an encouraging sign that a significant share of working-age urban youth pursue education, young women's education (27 percent enrolled) seems to be prioritized less than young men's (38 percent enrolled). In a study of six (pre-war) South Sudanese states, four states saw a substantial decrease in the proportion of out-of-school boys aged 14-17 years, while only two states saw a substantial decrease in the proportion of out-of-school girls of the same age. Divergent trends among the states underscores the need to guide programs on gender according to local context.[13]

[11] United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Office (UNESCO), "Rapid Assessment: Technical and Vocational Education and Training."
[12] UNESCO and South Sudan's Ministry of General Education and Instruction (2018)
[13] UNESCO and South Sudan's Ministry of General Education and Instruction, "Global Initiative on Out of School Children: South Sudan Country Study."

B. Labor force participation, types of jobs, and Sectoral Employment Profile

Labor force participation is in line with neighboring countries, and there is little unemployment – but the displaced are far less likely to be working

15. As is common in low-income countries, there is very little unemployment in urban South Sudan, and about three quarters of the urban working-age population is active and employed. In low-income countries, outright unemployment is rare, given the imperative of contributing to the household's livelihood.[14] Urban South Sudan is no exception: only 2.1 percent of the labor force are unemployed (1.6% of the working age population). Nearly 75 percent are active and employed (Figure 4) – similar to labor force participation rates in urban Kenya (75%) or Uganda (70%).[15] Among the inactive, 12% either say they are discouraged or that conflict is the reason for their inactivity (and hence, may also be best considered discouraged). They account for 3% of the working-age population. Broad unemployment (unemployment plus discouragement) is thus about 6% - somewhat more elevated than narrow unemployment, but still a small minority.

16. Most job activities have very low productivity. The exceptionally high poverty rates are direct evidence of the low productivity of most jobs that are available to South Sudanese workers. Income data collected from young workers in 2019 illustrates the point (Table 1). Median income over the week preceding the survey was reported as SSP 3,000 for those with a full-time job activity, and SSP 1,500 for those with part-time work. This is equivalent to about SSP 600 or US$2 per day. Among those working a full-time activity, only one in four earn more than SSP 1,000 per day (a little more than USD 3), and one in four earn less than SSP 200 per day (less than one USD). Similarly, businesses in South Sudan report that they earn a median annual income of SSP 100,000 per worker – about USD 300-350 (World Bank, forthcoming). Low productivity is a common thread to many of the findings in this report, from an inability of households to diversify their activities, to common loss of secondary activities, a drop in wages and time worked per year, and to the difficulties youth face in starting activities beyond lending an extra hand to their household.

Table 1 Weekly income among young workers (SSP)

Weekly income among young workers (SSP)

	Median	25th percentile	75th percentile	*Sample size*
Full-time	3,000	1,000	5,000	*176*
Part-time	1,500	500	4,500	*52*
Casual	500	150	1,000	*66*

Source: Youth jobs survey 2019

17. Fewer than half of all working-age internally displaced living in PoC sites are employed, and fewer than one in five refugees. By stark contrast with urban residents, only about half of the working-age IDP population in PoC sites is economically active. Close to half of the inactive workers are enrolled in education, while most of the others are 'idle'. Refugees have even lower levels of employment and nearly 70 percent are inactive. (Figure 4) In addition, even among those who do have a job, 34% of IDPs and 39%

[14] Employment is defined as being of working-age (15-64 years), and having worked for at least 1 hour in the last 7 days, in either one or more of the following: paid labor, own-account non-farm work (business), helping in a family non-farm business, own-account work on a farm (including raising livestock, hunting, fishing, and herding cattle), or an unpaid apprenticeship or training. Not having worked even 1 hour in these activities in the last 7 days, but having a job that one will definitely return to, is also considered as being employed.

[15] ILOSTAT, based on 2016 (Kenya) and 2012 (Uganda) data.

of refugees would like to work longer hours (11% and 25% would like to work shorter hours, respectively). Loss of skills is a real danger for the many displaced South Sudanese who have been out of the labor force for a protracted period. There is hope that barriers to work may be less steep among IDPs living in communities, and that their jobs outcomes may be more similar to those among longer-term residents. However, the available data cannot shed light on this question.

18. Urban labor force participation varies between PfRR locations, and is lowest in Rumbek and Torit. Rumbek and Torit have lower employment rates (56 percent and 64 percent respectively) than other PfRR locations (Figure 4). Wau, Yambio and Yei have higher employment rates than the urban average (79 percent, 80 percent and 77 percent respectively). Close to 18 percent are inactive and enrolled in Torit and Rumbek, where employment rates are relatively low. In Rumbek, almost 19 percent of working-age individuals are inactive and 'idle', while in Torit 10 percent are 'idle'. [16] Across the locations, a relatively small proportion of the working-age population is unemployed or inactive due to household work.

Figure 4 Labor force participation status among working-age population



Figure 5 Reasons for not participating in the workforce, for working-age population



[16] In towns, such inactivity without an immediate reason may speak to discouragement from looking for a job. Conversely, as is common, 'idleness' may also reflect a failure of the survey to fully elicit respondents' engagement in unpaid work; the fact that far more young women than young men register as 'idle' is consistent with the latter interpretation.

Figure 6 Labor force participation, by education



Source: Authors' calculations using HFSSS 2017, CRS 2017 and SPS 2017.

19. Most of the inactive are enrolled in education. The most common reason for not participating in the workforce is being enrolled in education. More than half of the inactive population in PfRR locations and one third among IDPs is currently enrolled (Figure 4). The displaced are twice as likely (20%) than others (11%) to say they are inactive due to household care duties, perhaps due to the time it takes to queue for services such as water distribution points. Among towns, working-age individuals are inactive for different reasons depending on their location. In Aweil, 16 percent of the inactive population say they are discouraged from the job search. In Yei, being considered too old or young to work is the primary reason for being outside the labor-force, followed by disability. In Yambio, three quarters of the inactive population is enrolled in education.

20. The poor and less-educated are more likely than others to be out of employment without immediate reason. In towns in low-income countries, it is common to find unemployment chiefly among well-educated and better-off youth who are queueing for good jobs. This is not the case in South Sudan. Unemployment varies little by education and wealth status. However, the best-educated workers are most likely to be employed, with 9 in 10 active and working. Further, while roughly 25-30 percent of individuals in each of the other education groups are inactive, their reasons differ (Figure 5). Workers with some primary and secondary education are primarily inactive when they are enrolled in education. Individuals with no education are much more likely to be 'idle' (inactive, but neither enrolled in education nor in household care work). It is possible that these patterns speak to discouragement from the labor market being better masked among the better-educated. But they are also consistent with a labor market in which public employment and the rare wage employment opportunities open to the better-educated help sustain large households.

Self-employment in services and agriculture are the dominant job activities

21. The large majority of workers are self-employed or support household-run business activities. Self-employment and work in family business activities are the norm in the towns of South Sudan (Figure 7). Among the 95 percent of workers who have no more than secondary schooling, work in family-run business activities (either as owners or helpers) accounts for a bit less than half of all activities. It is followed by own-account agriculture, which provides roughly one-quarter of jobs for those with some primary or secondary schooling, and 37 percent of jobs for those with no formal education. Wage work (whether salaried or daily labor) accounts for 26-28 percent of jobs among those with some schooling, and 15 percent among those with no schooling. The exception are the few workers with tertiary education, more among whom about two in three (65 percent) are in salaried labor.

22. Even in the towns, agriculture is a major source of employment, second only to services. About half of all urban workers (49%) are active in services, chiefly in commerce and personal services.[17] At the same time, it remains common for urban workers to practice agriculture, and one in three (37%) primarily work in related activities. In particular, nearly half of urban residents with no education are engaged in agriculture (47%). Even among those with some tertiary education, 22 percent work primarily in the sector (Figure 8). The large role of agriculture in urban employment may appear surprising, but is explained by context. Thus, many of the towns of South Sudan are small, with significant farming activity on their outskirts (World Bank, 2020e). Secondly, with internal displacement, farmers from rural areas have temporarily settled in towns and some continue to rely on agriculture (World Bank, 2020c). Finally, as discussed below, the role of agriculture has increased during conflict, in part due to the decline of other opportunities.

Figure 7 Type of primary job activity, by education



Figure 8 Employment sector by education



Source: Authors' calculations using HFSSS 2017, CRS 2017 and SPS 2017.

23. With little access to land, few IDPs and refugees work in agriculture. Against 37 percent of the urban population, only 4 percent IDPs and 3 percent of refugees are engaged in agriculture. As land and livestock losses have accompanied displacement, most IDPs have shifted into household-run business

[17] Table A.1 shows that the 2017 survey data records a very small share of workers (8%) being active in services, likely due to miscoding between commerce and other services.

activities.18 This is true across the four PoC sites in our sample, although IDPs otherwise have a varied mix of work activities (Figure 9).

Figure 9 Primary employment activity among working-age population



Source: Authors' calculations using HFSSS 2017, CRS 2017 and SPS 2017.

24. Among youth, most of those who are employed are helping other family members run business activities. More than 60 percent of employed youth are engaged in business, with 44 percent helping with business activities owned by other family members (Figure 9). (Most such activities are in commerce, personal services, or hospitality.) Youth are much less likely than older adults to have a job providing paid labor (10 and 32 percent, respectively). While we do not have data on obstacles youth face in establishing themselves in business, analysis in Sahelian countries has shown that in the absence of credit and productive paid employment, youth face a particularly long and difficult road toward saving up enough funds to start their own casual business activities. At the same time, the engagement of youth, both women and men, in running household businesses could help provide them with some know-how to be able to run their own activities, given the right support.

25. Women tend to work less in wage jobs and more in helping family businesses. Among adults, women are much less likely to work in paid jobs (whether daily labor or salaried jobs). About 42 percent of adult men, but only 23 percent adult women, are in salaried jobs (Figure 9). Conversely, women are more likely to be helping in family business activities.

26. The public sector accounts for about ten percent of jobs in towns; an important contribution but below what workers expect. Survey data from 2017 and 2019 suggests that about one in ten urban jobs are in the public sector (Table 2). This is an important source of salaried employment; public sector jobs both play a role in sustaining families and in creating market demand for goods and services. At the same time, as we discuss below, three in five young workers say they hope someday to work for the government. Greater dissemination of information about the limited prospect for government jobs may help to manage expectations.

[18] World Bank, "Using Micro-Data to Inform Durable Solutions for IDPs in Sub-Saharan Africa." See South Sudan case study.

27. It is hard to analyze changes in employment since before the conflict, but there is an impression that agriculture has increased in importance and public sector jobs have decreased. In today's labor market, services including commerce are the primary sector for urban employment, followed by agriculture. Comparison of sector employment shares over time are very difficult, because surveys conducted at different times had to work in a changing security environment and could not maintain a consistent methodology. However, the available data suggest that after years of conflict, public employment has deceased in importance, and more workers are active in agriculture. Thus, in 2010 household data, next to commerce and services, public administration, defense, education, and health were the more prevalent sectors for urban employment, and estimated to account for nearly one in five jobs (19 percent), with a far more limited contribution from agriculture.[19] Today, agriculture is not far behind services and commerce as a source of jobs, and the public sector accounts for about one in ten jobs – a significant but less dominant share.

28. Differences in employment patterns across the PfRR locations indicate local comparative advantage and speak to the need to customize jobs support. The sources of jobs vary significantly between towns For instance, Yambio relies particularly strongly on agriculture (71 percent), with fertile land in close proximity. In contrast, in Aweil and Wau about 20 percent are employed in agriculture (Table 2). While the public administration and defense sector is more prevalent in Torit (19 percent) and Rumbek (14 percent), it accounts for less than 5 percent of the other PfRR countries. Aweil and Yei have the largest prevalence of trade (wholesale, retail and repair of vehicles), at 16 percent and 12 percent respectively.

29. Even beyond agriculture, many activities are seasonal, while one in six young workers report that they have temporarily migrated for work at some point. As is to be expected, three in four households active in subsistence agriculture say that their activities are seasonal (73%), as do half of all households in market-linked agriculture (53%). For any type of job activity, at least one in five households say they do not carry it out year-round. Wage work for NGOs or the UN is most likely to be year-round (82%), but about one in three other wage jobs are seasonal, whether in the public or private sector. Among different types of self-employed activities between one and four and one in two are seasonal. The high prevalence of activities that are not year-round speaks to the importance of agriculture – which is often complemented with an additional activity during the off-season, but also to the casual nature of many jobs. In consequence, households employ different strategies to combine activities to make a livelihood – further explored in the next section. Among young workers, temporary migration plays a significant if not overwhelming role: one in six (17%) report that they have at some point migrated for work (with a broad mix of destinations within the country, including both towns and villages). This includes one in four young men (23%), and one in eleven young women (9%).

[19] Activities coded as agriculture make up 11%, compared to 37% in 2017. There is, however, significant uncertainty over whether some agriculture activities may have been miscoded as 'household work'. The aggregate of activities coded as agriculture or household work accounted for 25% and 41% of job activities in 2010 and 2017, respectively.

Figure 10 Prevalence of seasonal work by type of activity



Source: Authors' calculations using Youth jobs survey 2019.

Table 2 Sector of employment, for employed population

	Urban										IDP Sites (PoCs)				Overall	
Sector	**Aweil**	**Rumbek**	**Torit**	**Wau**	**Yambio**	**Yei**	**PfRR Average**	**Non-PfRR**	**Poor**	**Non-Poor**	**Bentiu**	**Bor**	**Juba**	**Wau**	**Urban**	**IDP**
Agriculture, forestry, fishing	19.8	39.9	29.1	19.8	70.6	41.2	34.2	46.7	37.0	36.6	10.3	14.8	2.4	8.7	36.8	8.0
Construction	4.7	0.3	0.2	4.3	1.4	1.1	2.7	2.2	2.8	2.3	12.1	1.4	2.0	6.0	2.6	7.5
Wholesale, retail trade, repairs	16.2	3.7	3.3	7.7	3.8	12.0	8.3	4.7	7.6	7.6	12.5	1.8	4.6	11.8	7.6	10.3
Accommodation, food service	1.0	0.9	3.5	5.4	1.0	14.5	5.0	4.0	4.9	4.7	4.3	7.0	2.8	9.1	4.8	5.7
Admin & support services	3.5	3.7	2.0	5.9	0.4	4.9	4.1	0.6	2.3	5.1	1.7	4.3	5.1	1.6	3.4	2.5
Public admin & defense	2.2	14.3	19.2	4.0	1.9	4.5	5.2	6.1	6.7	3.4	1.6	2.9	0.7	1.9	5.4	1.5
Education	2.8	14.7	0.4	3.3	7.8	0.8	4.6	2.6	4.5	3.8	6.0	5.4	17.9	6.0	4.2	8.7
Human health and social work	0.6	3.6	1.4	0.6	0.1	3.8	1.4	1.5	1.1	1.9	6.6	3.3	7.2	3.7	1.4	5.7
Other service activities	34.6	9.2	32.9	38.4	9.7	4.4	24.1	17.6	21.7	24.5	10.2	33.3	16.6	19.5	22.8	15.2
Household work	9.6	4.4	2.4	1.1	0.2	7.5	3.6	4.0	5.3	1.1	16.9	17.0	29.9	21.7	3.7	21.5
Transportation and storage	1.3	0.1	1.9	2.4	0.7	2.5	1.7	5.5	1.8	3.6	1.2	0.2	1.1	2.2	2.5	1.5
Professional, scientific, technical	0.7	0.5	0.0	3.5	0.0	0.8	1.6	1.3	1.1	2.4	1.2	1.1	0.3	1.0	1.6	0.9
Extraterritorial organizations	0.1	0.6	0.0	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.2	3.8	3.0	3.3	2.0	0.3	3.0
Manufacturing	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.8	1.1	0.6	0.7	0.3	1.2	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.9	0.7	0.5
Water supply and waste	1.4	0.4	0.0	0.6	0.7	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.5	0.4	9.7	2.9	2.1	1.2	0.4	4.9
Others	1.1	3.9	3.7	1.8	0.9	0.8	1.7	2.0	2.1	1.3	1.7	1.6	3.5	2.8	1.8	2.5
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**

Source: Authors' calculations using HFSSS 2017 and CRS 2017.

Box 1: The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on livelihoods

The Covid-19 pandemic has had an impact on livelihoods through the increased burden of disease, lockdown measures and trade disruptions, as well as macro-fiscal challenges. As of June 28, 2020, the WHO reported nearly 2,000 confirmed cases of Covid-19 in South Sudan; with very low testing capacity, however, the actual burden of disease is almost certainly higher. Between late March and early May 2020, South Sudan imposed lock-down policies similar to those used in many countries to control the spread of Covid-19. Juba was under curfew, and non-essential businesses were closed (while these measures were intended to be nation-wide, anecdotally, other towns experienced less change). Borders have remained open for goods; however, rules on quarantine and turnaround times have slowed imports and raised prices. The prices of staple grains rose precipitously during the early pandemic response, between 20 percent and 40 percent, though inflation may have slowed recently.[20]

The fall in oil prices has put severe pressure on the government's budget. The fall in global oil prices from nearly USD70 a barrel in early January 2020 to about USD40 at time of writing is putting pressure on the Government's budget, with worrisome implications for market demand for goods and services. The fiscal deficit is projected to more than triple, to USD510m, complicating an already difficult budget execution. There is a risk that deficits may be monetized, reigniting inflation. Unrealized spending on capital investment, further arrears in paying civil servants, and slower service delivery are constraining demand, growth, and jobs. Before the crisis, development assistance and remittances were the first and second-largest foreign currency flows, both exceeding oil revenue. Remittances are likely to have fallen, and it is not known whether NGOs and intergovernmental agencies have fully maintained their activities.

Job activities have been lost due to Covid, especially in non-farm self-employed activities, but as of June 2020, the scale was limited. The World Bank conducted phone surveys in June 2020 to monitor the impact on livelihoods of Covid-19 and measures to contain the pandemic (World Bank 2020f and 2020g).[21] Unless indicated, results in this text box reflect findings from these surveys. One in eight households (13%) reported having lost all income from their main job activity at some point since the onset of the pandemic in early April. Losses were largest among the households that depend primarily on non-farm self-employed business activities. Among these households, one in five have lost all income from their primary activity (20%). Household businesses mostly attributed their losses to a lack of demand (52%) and to usual places of business being closed (49%). Among market traders, one in seven (15%) reported having lost their business, due to travel restrictions due to Covid (33% of those no longer active), but also a broad range of other issues both related and unrelated to the pandemic. Hardly any businesses reported having closed permanently (0.3%), and very few remained temporarily closed as of end-June (5%). However, measuring permanent business closure is difficult, and businesses do report that they know a direct

[20] For instance, Mayai et al. (2020) report that the price of wheat flour rose by 27 percent and the price of rice by 25 percent over the month of March, while the University of Juba measured increases in the price of rice, sorghum, and wheat flour by 40 percent, 27 percent, and 19 percent between February and March.

[21] Surveys were implemented between June 9 and July 3, 2020. Respondents included 1,213 mostly urban households, 118 market traders, and 612 businesses. Of the respondent households, 75% live in urban areas. Inherently, the phone survey reflects only households that own a cellphone and live where there is coverage. In the 2019 Youth Jobs Survey, 83 percent of urban households owned a cellphone. Of those that did, 12 percent were in the lowest asset wealth quintile, compared to 45 percent of those that did not. Demographics and labor market outcomes in the tracking survey are similar to those observed in earlier in-person surveys. Thus, household-level results are best interpreted as reflecting outcomes for a large stratum of urban households, with some under-representation of the most marginal.

competitor who has gone out of business (47%), and that they considered closing at some point (35%). Activities in Juba seem to have been particularly affected, with higher loss of activity among market traders (31%), and more businesses considering closing (52%) and having competitors who closed (58%).

With widespread poverty and a history of shocks, households are looking to replace lost income opportunities. The real but limited extent to which activities have been lost may be expected, given that households and businesses have lived through many shocks, and that generating income is an immediate question of survival for many households. It is worth recalling that, since 2013, conflict led to the loss of primary activities for 47% of households, that 50% of businesses lost assets and 43% had to temporarily close (World Bank 2020e). While the disruption due to Covid-19 is harmful, it is thus not unheard of. By June 2020, respondents also reported some potential signs of recovery. About one in five households that lost their main activity (22%) reported that they had started a new activity by the time they were surveyed. Similarly, while some traders had stopped their activities, respondents were about twice as likely to say that on balance, the number of traders in the market had increased since April than to say that it had decreased. Both market traders and businesses also reported a modest increase in the number of workers they employed since April, although the rate of hiring has slowed substantially among businesses.

Market activity has reduced, and loss of revenue and income is pervasive. While few job activities have stopped outright, many respondents report losing income from their main activities. This is true of every other main household activity (52%), and of three in five market traders (59%). Traders who offer consumer commodities reported larger declines in revenue (a 35% drop at the median) than food traders (a 25% drop), consistent with temporary closures of non-food markets and a loss of consumer disposable income. Among businesses, four in five (81%) reported a decrease, including 59% who say income has declined by half or more.

The main obstacles to business activities reported today remain the same as reported in 2019, but they have tightened. When surveyed in mid-2019, households, market traders, and businesses consistently identified insecurity, bad roads, access to funding, and low demand as their main obstacles. They flagged the same constraints when re-surveyed now, but were likely to say that the constraints had become more difficult to navigate – perhaps with the exception of insecurity, where businesses were more likely to report an improvement (44%) than a deterioration (28%). Surveys in 2019 did not directly ask about inflation as an obstacle, while in 2020, inflation was the third-most frequently cited obstacle among market traders, and the second-most frequently cited among businesses.

Sourcing goods has become more difficult, but is rarely considered a key business obstacle. Border closures and movement restrictions have raised transport cost and slowed down sourcing. Among market traders who source agricultural products from Juba or abroad, 85% say buying supplies has become more difficult since the onset of the pandemic. At the same time, while traders mention poor availability of inputs (8%) and transport cost (13%) as obstacles, they give less prominence to them than to other constraints. Similarly, nearly four in five businesses (79%) say that since April, it has become more difficult to buy goods to re-sell or use as inputs. Yet, transport cost is mentioned less frequently as an obstacle than a lack of funds, high inflation, and low demand, and very few point to poor availability of inputs.

Low market demand already posed an important obstacle before the pandemic, and it has further declined due to the crisis. Even before the pandemic, businesses of all sizes viewed constrained demand for goods and services as a key obstacle. Respondents across all three surveys agree that demand has further tightened. Among the households who were unable at some point during the pandemic to buy staple cereals (46% of all households), most say that this was due to a lack of funds (44%), rather than to traders being out of stock (7%) or price changes (11%). Majorities of market traders explain that they have fewer customers on a typical market day (63%), and that customers buy less (60%). Businesses agree:

most (73%) say that demand for their products has declined, and half (52%) say that it has dropped by half or more.

C. A HOUSEHOLD PERSPECTIVE ON JOBS AND LIVELIHOODS

To understand jobs in urban South Sudan, a household perspective is useful

30. For a realistic picture of jobs in South Sudan, it is worth looking at how households combine activities to make a living. In low-income settings, households pool resources and allocate labor across the basket of activities that combines to provide their livelihood (Blattman and Ralston, 2016). For a clear sense of which job activities matter to the well-being of many households, it is useful to consider households directly as a unit of analysis, in addition to the analysis of individual jobs outcomes shown above. We conduct such an analysis using data from a small-sample youth survey designed to provide a well-rounded picture of household job activities. It was collected in May and June 2019 from 540 households in five towns of South Sudan (Bor, Juba, Malakal, Rumbek, and Wau). Because the youth survey was collected at a different time, in different localities, and with a different survey instrument, results cannot be expected to exactly match those shown elsewhere in this chapter. However, larger lessons are consistent across the two surveys.

31. Households are large, with four adults and four children at the median; households in Juba have much higher dependency ratios, possibly due to displacement. Households in towns are large, though not unusually large by the standards of low-income countries. The median household has eight members, including four adults of 15 years and older, and four children. Median household size varies somewhat between towns, with larger households in Rumbek, and smaller ones in Bor and Malakal – the two towns in the sample that have been particularly affected by displacement. More importantly for the jobs discussion, while in most towns, the typical household has about one child for every working-age household member, households in Juba have closer to two children per adult, and those in Malakal, two adults for every child. These patterns are consistent with displacement of dependents from Malakal and into Juba. For further analysis, we distinguish between small households of one or two adult members (a bit less than one in every five households), medium-size households of three to five adults that make up most of the distribution (about three out of five), and large households of more than five adults (about one in five households).

32. The urban inactive population tends to be supported through family networks. Working-age individuals who are inactive in the labor force primarily subsidize their needs through support from the family. More than 70 percent of the urban inactive population, including 67 percent in PfRR locations and 82 percent in non-PfRR locations, depend on such support (Figure 11). As is intuitive, youth rely more on such support than adults (80 percent and 55 percent respectively). Family networks thus remain a strong channel of social protection, despite years of conflict.[22] While family support is always most important, secondary channels vary between towns and population groups. Norms and opportunities appear to guide subsidiary means through which inactive individuals support themselves. In Wau, four in ten inactive individuals say they rely on cash savings, while in Rumbek and Yei, many depend on savings in the form of produce from the previous harvest. Remittances play a far more important role for adult women (11%) than adult men (3%) and youth of either gender (1%).

[22] Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility (CRSF), "Caught Between Two Cultures."

Figure 11: Means through which the inactive working-age population supports itself.



Source: Authors' calculations using HFSSS 2017, CRS 2017 and SPS 2017.

33. With low employment rates among the displaced, IDPs and refugees rely overwhelmingly on aid in place of family networks. Over 70 percent of inactive IDPs and 75 percent of inactive South Sudanese refugees depend on aid to support themselves (Figure 11). Only 25 percent of IDPs and 13 percent refugees rely on family support, in line with much lower labor force participation among the displaced, and the loss of family networks through displacement. Within IDP sites, support mechanisms vary largely with location. The exception is Wau PoC, where 64 percent of inactive IDPs rely on family networks, and where the employment rate is much higher than in other PoC sites.

A closer look at activity types

34. Most households, small and large alike, do not diversify their activities much, consistent with a lack of working capital. Households are not very diversified in terms of the types of activities they pursue to make a living. Slightly more than half of all households (53%) have a single type of income generating activity (Table 3). About a quarter have two, and a quarter have more than two. Larger households are a little more diversified, but household size makes less of a difference than one might expect. For instance, about two thirds of small households of one or two adults have only a single income-generating activity, while about half of larger households do. By implication, larger households have pronouncedly fewer activities per adult household member. The low level of diversification is consistent with a lack of working capital (though there are other explanations). Rather than diversifying, larger households allocate more workers to each of the household's activities. For instance, at the median, one worker is involved in the household's main activity in small households, two workers in medium-size households, and three workers in large households.

Table 3 Number of job activities per household

		One activity	Two activities	Three and more activities	Mean number of activities	Activities per adult	Median workers in main activity
HH size	Small	65%	19%	15%	1.5	0.9	1
	Medium	51%	24%	26%	1.8	0.5	2
	Large	47%	28%	25%	1.9	0.3	4
	All	53%	24%	24%	1.8	0.5	

Source: Youth jobs survey 2019

35. Even in towns, agriculture is a primary part for the livelihood strategy of about half of all households. Agriculture is the most common type of activity for households (54% of all households are involved in it), followed by small business activities (42%), a significant share of households engaging in wage work (34%), and a small share of households active in casual labor (13%). (Figure 12) What truly stands out is that agriculture is nearly always a very important activity for those households that engage in it. Thus, 49% of households say that agriculture is their primary job activity (91% of those who engage in agriculture at all).[23] (Note that this household-level pattern obtains although the share of individual workers employed in agriculture reported in the youth survey is 37%, the same value observed in the 2017 HFS, and shown in Table 2. Rather, the difference is due to the fact that agriculture is more likely than other important activity groups to be the primary income source for households that have several sources of income.)

Figure 12 Household job activities by sector



Source: Youth jobs survey 2019

[23] We cannot always reliably distinguish between primary and secondary activities. However, it is reassuring that the same patterns persist when we consider whether households say in response to another survey question that they derive most of their income from activities in agriculture.

36. **The ways households make a living differs very significantly across the five towns in which the survey was conducted.** Across towns, wage work makes a relatively stable contribution to household livelihoods Figure 13. About one in three households rely on some wage work, including work as soldiers, civil servants, and for NGOs and the UN. (This is a common finding in LICs, but perhaps surprising in the context, given that businesses are quite concentrated in Juba). Agriculture is important to half of all households or more in all towns, with the exception of Juba, where far fewer households practice agriculture (17%). Juba and Wau stand out in the high share of households engaging in business activities (42% and 85%), and casual jobs (22% and 20%). These patterns are consistent with higher business activity in Juba and the traditional trading center of Wau.

Figure 13 Household job activities by sector and town



Source: Youth jobs survey 2019

37. **Subsistence agriculture is most common among all activities, and it is often the primary source of income for households that practice it.** Agriculture for own consumption is by far the most common activity in terms of the share of households that engage in it (46%; Figure 14). For the largest share of households that practice agriculture for their own consumption, this is also their primary job activity (90% - primary activities are computed across categories excluding training and those 'other' activities that cannot be parsed). It less common for households to practice agriculture for sales in the market (17%), or to engage in processing (11%). Both of these activities are also rarer than wage work or commerce, and about as common as work in casual services. They are rarely a primary activity (27%), and typically best thought of as activities to generate some cash income.

38. **Commerce and casual services are significant sources of livelihoods.** Subsistence agriculture is followed in importance by work in commerce (27%) and casual services (17%). By way of contrast to market-linked activities in agriculture, they are a primary activity for about half of the households that

engage in them (48% and 57%, respectively). Very few households are engaged in artisanal production, but those that are, are more likely than not to rely heavily on the activity (60%).

Figure 14 Household job activities by detailed sectoral breakdown



Source: Youth jobs survey 2019

39. Taken together, work on the public payroll and for NGOs is the second-most common part of livelihood strategies, and far more households rely on it than wage income from private companies. Among different types of waged work, service in the armed forces is most common (14% of households rely on it in part), and waged work in public service (9%) and for the UN and NGOs (8%) are important. (Figure 15) Far fewer households draw upon waged work for local (7%) and foreign companies (3%). Combined, nearly one in three households (29%) receive part of their income from work on the public payroll of for the UN and NGOs, compared to one in ten (10%) active in waged work for private firms. It is striking that wage work is overwhelmingly a primary activity for those who are employed with foreign-owned businesses (60%) or especially, NGOs (70%), but not for those with local businesses (41%), civil servants (50%), or soldiers (43%). For soldiers and civil servants, it is likely that inflation has contributed to eroding the role of their wage earners. Taken together, waged work outside of for-profit firms is the primary activity for 16% of households (compared to 5% in firms). Thus, work on the government payroll and for the UN and NGOs is about as important as work in commerce, both as a partial and primary source of income. It is eclipsed in importance only by agriculture.

Figure 15 Types of wage work



Source: Youth jobs survey 2019

40. Artisanal production, processing, and daily labor are the activities most likely to be casual in nature. Activities tend to be year-round, with the obvious exception of those in agriculture, which are more often seasonal. Again unsurprisingly, seasonal activities are most commonly in the growing season. Artisanal production stands out as an activity dedicated to the off-season in about one in four households that carry out this type of work (25%). All activities are more likely to be full-time while they are in season, rather than part-time or casual. Of course, this is particularly true of wage work. Activities that are most likely to be casual are casual daily labor (22%), artisanal work (21% of all artisanal activities), as well as perhaps more unusually, wage work with local employers (12%) and in the armed forces (11%).

Household livelihood strategies

41. For a more intuitive overview, we divide households into five roughly equally common jobs strategies, based on whether job activities are diversified, and on their reliance on agriculture and wage work. We try to synthesize the information on different types of activities in order to present a more intuitive picture of what are the different strategies households use to piece together a living. We distinguish [24] between five stylized strategies that each roughly account for one-fifth of households in the five towns surveyed. They also do not vary much in household size, so that roughly

[24] Assisted by the analysis of activity types above as well as a model search algorithm (random forests) to explain wealth index values, we arrive at the following way of grouping together different strategies: (1) we distinguish between households that have any wage earner and those that do not; (2) among the households with wage earners, we distinguish between those that rely only on wage work and those that have other types of activities as well; (3) among the households without wage earners, we disaggregate between those active in agriculture and those who are not (i.e., households that exclusively work in business activities and casual services); (4) finally, among those active in agriculture, we distinguish between those that have only a single activity, and those with diversified activities within agriculture or mixing agriculture with other activities. (This is nearly synonymous with basing the distinction on whether a household relies on subsistence agriculture, but not fully: about 15% of the households in the 'one activity only' category are active only in market-linked agriculture or processing. Empirically, however, these households are similar in their welfare outcomes to those who practice subsistence agriculture.)

similar numbers of South Sudanese depend on each strategy. Table 4 provides an overview, and *Figure 16* shows how many households rely on the different strategies in each town.

Figure 16 Household livelihood strategies by town



Source: Youth jobs survery 2019

42. ***Households specialized in agriculture:*** **many workers in a single activity with poor welfare outcomes.** Households specialized in a single agriculture activity at the median have four workers in a single primary activity. In most cases, this is subsistence agriculture (83%); much more rarely it is market-oriented agriculture (8%) or processing (9%). These households have the poorest wealth outcomes of all groups (Table 4). Specialized agriculture is the dominant livelihood strategy in Rumbek (56%) and Malakal (37%; Figure 16). Work is most likely (49%) to be full-time and seasonal.

43. ***Households that diversify their labor between agriculture and other non-wage jobs:*** **highly fungible labor use with poor but somewhat better welfare outcomes.** Households that are active in several activities including agriculture use labor highly fungibly. These households have three activities at the median, with a roughly equal mix of year-round full-time, seasonal or part-time, and casual activities. Three family members work on each activity at the median. Subsistence agriculture is the most common primary activity (62%), and the most common combination of activities is of subsistence agriculture and commerce (53%). This approach to livelihoods is dominant in Wau (46%) and common in Bor (27%). While wealth index levels are higher than among households specialized in agriculture, these households have the second-lowest wealth of all groups.

44. ***Households that rely on business activities and casual labor:*** **few workers in few activities, with intermediate welfare outcomes.** Households that base their livelihood in business activities and casual labor are most likely to be found in Juba (49% of households in Juba). They tend to rely on a single activity (79%), carried out by few workers (one at the median). Primary activities tend to be in services (39%) and trading (32%), less frequently in casual labor (19%) and artisanship (10%). Activities are most commonly year-round and full-time (52% of households). About one in four households primarily active in services and trading have other activities. More do among artisans (66%), and many fewer in casual labor (14%) Those in services are most likely to work also in trading, and those primarily in trading, in casual labor. They achieve intermediate wealth levels.

45. ***Households that combine wage work with other activities:*** **work fungibly across a number of activities with comparatively good welfare outcomes.** Households have three activities at the median, mostly full-time (41%) or casual (31%). They use labor fungibly, with two household members active in each activity at the median. Their primary activities are most commonly in subsistence agriculture (37%), different kinds of wage work (22%), and trading (15%). They enjoy the second-best welfare outcomes among different livelihood strategy types.

46. ***Households that rely only on wage labor:*** **single earners provide the highest wealth levels.** About four in five of these households have only a single activity (78%) in which a single worker is active. These workers sustain households that at the median count seven members Primary activities are most commonly in the armed forces or with the UN and NGOs (24% each), followed by civil servants (18%). One in five households (22%) has more than one wage activity, with no combination clearly more prevalent. This strategy is dominant in Malakal (35%), and common in Juba (26%).

Table 4 Characteristics of household livelihood strategies

Household livelihood strategy	Share of households	Wealth index rank (median value)	Labor use	Median number of activities	Median workers in primary activity	Typical primary activities	Seasonality	% women in primary activity	Towns - most common strategy (or *close second / unusually common*)
Undiversified agriculture	22%	Lowest (-0.33)	Many household members working in a single activity.	1	4	Most commonly subsistence agriculture (83%).	Most commonly seasonal full-time, or year-round part-time.	54%	Rumbek (56%) Malakal (37%) Bor (28%)
Diversified agriculture or agriculture plus non-wage work	21%	Second-lowest (-0.13)	Highly fungible labor use, with many workers active in many activities.	3	3	Mostly subsistence agriculture as primary activity (62%), most commonly combined with commerce (53%).	A mix of full-time, part-time, and casual.	51%	Wau (46%) *Bor (27%)*
Business activities and casual labor	23%	Intermediate (-0.00)	Few people working on few activities.	1	1	Most commonly a single activity in services (39%) and trading (32%). Those who provide services are most likely to also do some trading. Traders are most likely to also offer casual labor.	Most commonly a single full-time, year-round activity, sometimes combined with a casual secondary pursuit.	48%	Juba (49%)
Wage plus other activities	18%	Second-highest (0.18)	Several workers active across a number of activities.	3	2	Subsistence agriculture is more likely to be the primary activity (37%) than wage work (22%).	Mostly either full-time or casual.	39%	*Wau (32%)*
Wage only	16%	Highest (0.38)	Typically a single activity, carried out by a single worker.	1	1	Most commonly in the armed forces or with the UN and NGOs (24% each), followed by civil servants (18%).	Typically full-time year-round. One in five households has a secondary activity.	23%	Malakal (35%) *Juba (26%)*

Source: Youth jobs survey 2019. The wealth index is computed as a standard factor index based on housing characteristics and asset ownership.

D. Resuming Work after Conflict and Displacement

Conflict has taken a toll on most livelihoods in towns

47. **Conflict has changed the world of work in towns and led to loss of activities, a drop in wages, reduction in time worked, and among the displaced, to inactivity.** Even among households that have not been displaced, nearly half have lost an important job activity since 2013, often the household's primary activity. Wages have fallen for half of all urban workers, as has time at work, and more workers now report that they would like to work longer hours than before the conflict. Inactivity among the displaced is very high, with fewer than half of the internally displaced in PoC sites and fewer than one in five refugees of working age active and employed.

48. **Even among those who do not live in PoC sites, nearly half of urban households have had to abandon an important economic activity since conflict began.** Even among urban residents who have not had to flee, conflict has led to tremendous disruption in their working lives. Nearly half (47%) of households say they have lost a job activity that was important to the household's income (Figure 17). Some towns have been much more heavily affected than others, with large majorities of households in Wau and Malakal affected, compared to about one in three households in Bor and Juba. About one in every three households have lost a principal activity that used to account for all or nearly all of the household's income. About three out of five households that have lost an activity explain that they had to abandon it due to the direct impact of conflict, such as violence or looting. Most other households point to reasons such as inflation, lack of funds, or loss of customers that are related to conflict.

Figure 17 Loss of household job activities due to conflict



Source: Youth jobs survey 2019

49. **More than half of urban wage workers report that their incomes have fallen since the December 2013 conflict.** About 52 percent of the urban population, 44 percent of refugees, and nearly 70 percent IDPs, report that their wages are lower at the time of surveying than they were before December 2013 (Figure 18). The lower wages reflect the disruptive effect of conflict on labor activity. IDPs are most severely affected, as displacement into a new location further limits their livelihood opportunities in addition to the effects of conflict.

50. **Shifts in wages vary by location with the biggest drop in Aweil and the smallest in Torit, and wage workers may have been less affected than the self-employed.** There are notable differences in wage changes across towns (Figure 18). In Aweil, an overwhelming majority report that wages have fallen (86 percent), while in Torit, only 20 percent report lower wages. In Yei, while half the employed population report lower wages, about 40 percent said they enjoyed higher wages than before December 2013. Wage workers are more likely to say that their wages have remained the same than those who work on their own or their household's account. This may speak to the relative stability of salaried jobs and the public sector, which adds to the desirability of those jobs in a conflict environment. However, it is also possible that salaried workers in particular may have based their responses on stable *nominal* wages, which have, however, lost much purchasing power due to inflation (the fact that far fewer report an increase in wages than among own-account workers is consistent with this explanation).

Figure 18: Current wages in comparison to pre-Dec.2013 wages, for urban, IDPs and refugees.[25]

Source: Authors' calculations using HFSSS 2017, CRS 2017 and SPS 2017.

51. **South Sudanese worked more months per year before conflict than they do now**. Before conflict broke out in December 2013, people in PfRR towns worked for 10.5 months a year on average, and 85% worked for at least nine months per year. (Figure 19; Figure 20) At the time of surveying, in 2017, they were working 9.5 months a year on average, and only 70% worked nine month per year or more. In Torit, Aweil and Yei, the fall in months worked is especially drastic. In Torit, individuals report having worked almost 12 months a year pre-conflict, compared to 9 months a year currently. In Aweil, and

[25] For refugees, 'before' refers to 'before displacement'. For IDPs and urban, 'before' refers to 'before December 2013'.

Yei, the number of months worked has dropped by two on average. Refugees, facing further challenges around working in a foreign country, work 7.5 months a year.

Figure 19: Months worked per year, now and before Dec. 2013, by the employed population.



Figure 20 Share of employed workers working at least nine months per year, before the conflict and in 2017



Source: Authors' calculations using HFSSS 2017, CRS 2017 and SPS 2017.

The displaced face many obstacles, and only a minority of them work

52. **Many of the 3.7 million displaced long to return home, and their re-entry into the labor market will pose a considerable challenge.** Many of the displaced hope to return to their home country and communities. Their re-integration into the labor force will pose very important challenges. As we show elsewhere, in the current context demand for goods and services is depressed, and so are job opportunities. In addition, many of the displaced have lost family and trusted networks, and have abandoned land and assets. Many have been inactive for prolonged periods. In this section, we discuss the profiles of the displaced as workers, and point to some implications for their possible return.

53. **The displaced are far less likely to be employed, work shorter hours and report lower wages than urban residents, and they experience more poverty.** South Sudanese who have been displaced from their homes and live either in PoC sites or as refugees abroad experience a worse job situation than urban residents in many respects (Table 5). IDPs are much more likely to live in poverty, much less likely to be employed, work fewer hours and more seasonally even if employed, are more likely to want to work longer hours, and are more likely to have experienced a decrease in wages. Lower employment rates are at least in part due to the fact that agriculture – an important source of livelihood for urban workers – is largely inaccessible to the displaced. Among refugees, the situation is somewhat more subtle: fewer than one in five are employed, but among those who are employed, wages are less likely to have fallen, and with external support, poverty levels are not as high as among IDPs.

Table 5 Key jobs outcomes among urban residents, IDPs, and refugees

	Poverty headcount rate	Active and employed	Agriculture (% of all jobs)	Decrease in wages	Months per year worked	Want to work more hours
Urban	72%	74%	37%	52%	9.3	18%
IDP	91%	42%	8%	68%	8.8	34%
Refugee	71%	19%	*3% **	44%	7.5	39%

Source: Authors' calculations using HFSSS 2017, CRS 2017 and SPS 2017.

** For refugees, only the share of workers who are self-employed in agriculture is available, and shown here.*

54. **When last surveyed in 2017, many refugees but only a minority of IDPs were hoping for a return home – but few refugees envisaged being able to go home soon.** While one in every six refugees (16%) wished to return to South Sudan at the time of surveying, fewer than 5% were certain of being able to return within the next year. Conversely, one in three IDPs were hoping for a return to their home communities, and about half of them were hoping for a move within a year. Since the signing of the September 2018 peace deal, the displaced have been returning in greater numbers, but the patterns reflect the greater hesitancy among refugees to return. In October 2019, the IOM reported that since 2016, 1.3m returnees had come back, including 0.9m IDPs and 0.4m refugees. Challenges and opportunities in integrating these large displaced groups into local labor markets will be a key focus in moving towards sustainable livelihoods for the country.

55. **Most IDPs and refugees would like to resume their pre-displacement employment and believe they can do so when displacement ends – but a loss of contracts, assets, and land pose challenges.** Almost 8 in 10 IDPs and 9 in 10 refugees would like to resume their pre-displacement employment (Figure 21). More than 7 in 10 IDPs and 8 in 10 refugees believe that they will be able to do so once displacement ends. The reasons given by those who believe they will not be able to pick up where they left reveal additional challenges returnees will face. More than one in three IDPs in this group cannot resume work as they have lost their contracts (Figure 22). Another one in three cite lack of funds as a key challenge. Restoring land, tools and productive assets for returnees will be crucial to remove basic hurdles from resuming employment.

Figure 21: Intent to resume pre-displacement employment.



Figure 22: Reasons for not being able to resume pre-displacement jobs, for IDPs and refugees.



Source: Authors' calculations using HFSSS 2017, CRS 2017 and SPS 2017.

56. **The majority of internally displaced people would prefer to remain in their current location, with potentially significant impacts on local labor markets.** Of all the IDPs surveyed in the four main PoC sites, 56 percent report that they would like to remain in their current location. Just over one third want to return to where they lived before being displaced, while eight percent would prefer to move to a new location entirely. These ratios are consistent across the PoC sites in Juba, Wau and Bentiu. The exception is the Bor PoC camp in which almost three quarters of IDPs express a desire to return to their pre-displacement location.

57. **Since most IDPs would like to remain where they have taken refuge and most hope to resume their pre-displacement jobs, it is worth asking whether local labor demand can provide enough opportunities.** We are able to compare the pre-displacement employment activities of IDPs in Juba and Wau PoC sites to the contemporaneous activity profiles of urban (host) residents (Figure 23). IDPs living in the Juba PoC camp[26] displayed a strong pre-displacement reliance on wage and salaried work (43 percent). This is a far higher proportion than the equivalent of the rest of the urban population in Central Equatoria (25 percent), meaning that it may be difficult to meet expectations, even in Juba where such employment is relatively common. There is a stark difference between the pre-displacement livelihood profiles of IDPs living in Wau and the urban communities of Western Bahr el Ghazal. In the Wau PoC camp[27] many workers have a background in agriculture (45 percent) while this is not a large source of employment in the rest of the former state of Bahr el Ghazal (11 percent). This raises the question whether the displaced, with their different work background will be able to compete.

[26] There were just over 32 000 IDPs living across Juba's PoC sites as of early 2019.
[27] There was a population of just under 25 000 in the PoC and collective centers as of December 2019.

Figure 23 Sector of activity among the displaced and their host communities



Source: Authors' calculations using HFSSS 2017, CRS 2017 and SPS 2017.

58. **If labor force participation recovered among the displaced upon their return, an additional 900,000 workers may be looking for job opportunities.** Among the displaced, far fewer work than among the urban population. For a rough assessment of the potential scale of the challenge of re-integration, we assume that labor force participation would recover upon return, and reach the same level as among the urban population. We account for the age profile of the displaced, and for the number of IDPs currently employed. With these assumptions, some 900,000 displaced – 627,000 refugees and 265,000 IDPs may eventually be looking for work in South Sudan – including in cities, but not necessarily only there.

59. **In addition to the displaced, a significant number of current members of the armed forces may eventually look for civilian employment.** While payrolls are not fully reliable, the federal government currently lists about 400,000 security forces in the army and police (World Bank 2020b). As we show in the next section, only about one in four young members of the armed forces hope for advancement within their current jobs; many more would prefer to begin other activities or pursue further education. As peace stabilizes, a significant number of security forces may look to to re-join the civilian workforce – as well as, in addition, some members of other armed groups.

E. Aspirations, Attitudes, and Reservation Wages

60. **After years of conflict, few good jobs are available to urban South Sudanese in the short-run; workers' attitudes toward these prospects matter for the future of jobs as well as stability.** Today's labor market in the towns of South Sudan reflects the disruption of many years of conflict. There are few good job opportunities, with the result that most households live in poverty. While recovery could change this bleak outlook, in the short term, most workers will need to rely on activities that are low in productivity, and that may not be satisfying. Whether South Sudanese – and in particular, young South Sudanese – are willing to build from such limited opportunities will be important for economic recovery as well as for political stability. It is therefore worth better understanding the attitudes and aspirations of young workers, the obstacles they face and support they might need, as well as their wage expectations.

Aspirations and attitudes of young workers

61. **Many worries have been expressed about whether young South Sudanese will be willing to work modest jobs, but a survey of attitudes reflects a reasonably realistic and open-minded outlook on jobs.** Young workers in South Sudan have a realistic sense of what incomes can be had from common job activities. They view most activities at least mildly favorably when they are experienced with them. In particular, about half of young urban workers feel that agriculture is at least as good a job as others, and three in five young workers currently active in agriculture would like to improve their current activity, rather than switch to a new one or resume education. This is of course far from universal interest in agriculture, but it gives reason to hope that a significant number of young urban South Sudanese will be interested in work in the sector, and may benefit from its potential for recovery. At the same time, it is true that a substantial minority of young workers express concern about the hardship, low pay, boredom, and danger of common activities, and it is also true that hopes of finding a government job – while less urgent than in the past – remain overly optimistic.

62. **Young urban workers expect to earn around SSP 500-1,000 ($2-3) per day from common daily job activities, thought NGOs are thought to pay much more.** Urban youth who are experienced workers at the median expect that they can earn about SSP 500-1,000 in common activities (Table 7). Work in agriculture and in the market is in the lower range of expected incomes (SSP500-1,000), and work in transport, construction, or skilled labor in the higher range (SSP 1,000-1,500). These wage expectations are quite well-aligned with what both businesses and market traders say they pay their employees and helpers. Experienced workers had median expectations that were lower – about half – of inexperienced workers. But even inexperienced workers show a general awareness of income levels in the jobs most plausibly available to them in the short run. Youth believe that NGOs pay considerably more for the same kinds of activities: SSP 3,000 per day (with a range between the 25th and 75th percentile of SSP 2,000-6,000).

63. **Young workers have at least a somewhat positive view of those daily job activities linked to agriculture that they are familiar with.** When asked to assess the desirability of a broad range of basic tasks linked to agriculture, youth tend to view most tasks mildly favorably when they are experienced in them (between 3 and 4 on a five-step scale from least to most desirable). (Figure 25) The exceptions are fishing, hunting, which they view mildly negatively. Youth who have not worked in an activity tend to see them as mildly undesirable, or very undesirably in the case of fishing, hunting, and herding.

64. **Half of young workers feel that agriculture is at least as good a job as others.** In line with their assessment of activities linked to agriculture, about half (51%) of young workers feel that agriculture is as good a job as others or a better job (Figure 26). Those who have previously worked in agriculture are more likely to agree (58%) than those who have no experience (43%), and those who have worked in agriculture using machinery or draught animals, yet more likely (64%). Men view agriculture somewhat more favorably than women, among those with experience in the sector (63 percent compared to 54 percent). There are similar differences when respondents are asked about specific tasks.

65. **Many more youth active in agriculture would like to improve their current job rather than switch to another activity.** We ask young workers whether, if given the chance to improve their jobs, they would rather begin a new activity, improve their current activity, or pursue more education (Figure 24). It is striking that three out of five youth (60%) in agriculture say they would most like to improve their current activity, a higher share than among workers engaged in any other type of activity. This is more than twice as many than would like to pursue further education (27%), and five times as many as would like to start another activity (12%). Given concern in many low-income countries about a lack of interest in agriculture, this is a remarkable finding among young urban workers.

66. **Young women and men from wealthier and poorer households are equally likely to hope to continue in agriculture, but those with more education look for other opportunities.** Among those currently in agriculture, respondents who say they would like to start a new activity are more likely to be men and better educated than those who would like to do better in agriculture. Those who would like further education are in turn more likely to be men and better educated than those who look for a new job. Interestingly, however, household wealth is higher among those who would like to continue in agriculture – that is, they are in the more successful households active in agriculture. When controlling for all three factors in a regression setting, the respondent's education level is the only characteristic that is significantly associated with whether respondents with to improve or change their job: those with at least complete primary education are eleven percentage points more likely to be looking for another activity, and 23 percentage points more likely to be interested in a new activity or more education. When we control additionally for which livelihood strategy the young respondent's household engages in (discussed above), respondents are more likely to hope to continue in agriculture if their household has diversified into several activities, rather than relying solely on subsistence agriculture (education remains a significant correlate). from households that have diversified These patterns suggest that a preference for work in agriculture is a choice related to low education, but not linked to gender roles, and potentially related to working in a household that is among the more successful ones active in agriculture.

Table 6 Correlates of a stated preferences for different to impove job outcomes

		Current activity	
		Outside agriculture	**Agriculture**
Prefer to start a new activity	% women	55%	55%
	% at least primary education	78%	65%
	Median household asset wealth	0.17	-0.47
	Number of observations	101	32
Prefer to improve current activity	% women	61%	61%
	% at least primary education	66%	47%
	Median household asset wealth	0.15	-0.14
	Number of observations	113	129
Prefer to pursue more education	% women	49%	45%
	% at least primary education	83%	84%
	Median household asset wealth	0.37	0.28
	Number of observations	102	52

Source: Youth jobs survey 2019

67. **Young wage workers overwhelmingly would like further education, those in the armed forces are looking for a change, and those in other activities have varying plans.** Three in five young wage workers (60%) would most like to pursue further education; more than twice as many as would like to switch to a better job (26%). This preference is perhaps not surprising, given that wage workers are already better-educated, and may compete on education for better jobs. Fewer than one third of those in the armed forces (24%) wish to improve their current job. Those active in other jobs have a

mix of ideas about what would be the best path, with a plurality interested in improving their current activity, but a substantially higher share than among farmers interested in making a change.

Figure 24 Youth preferences over how to improve their jobs



Source: Youth jobs survey 2019

Table 7 Youth perceptions of prevailing wage levels

Youth perceptions of daily wage rates (SSP)

	Median	25th percentile	75th percentile	*Sample size*
Hard work in agriculture (e.g. clearing land)				
Experienced in agriculture	1,000	400	2,000	*128*
No experience	1,000	500	1,000	*51*
Lighter work in agriculture (e.g. harvesting)				
Experienced in agriculture	508	300	2,000	*134*
No experience	1,000	500	1,500	*51*
Transport something (e.g. take fertilizer to a village)	1,000	300	2,000	*93*
Construction	1,500	700	2,500	*188*
Help out selling things in the market	600	400	1,000	*198*
Tasks that require some skill (e.g. fixing a bicycle or motorbike)	1,000	500	1,500	*141*
Work for NGO	3,000	2,000	6,000	*327*

Source: Youth jobs survey 2019

Figure 25 Youth attitudes toward work in food sector activities



Source: Youth jobs survey 2019

Figure 26 Youth attitudes toward work in agriculture



Source: Youth jobs survey 2019

68. **Most men will take on common tasks, but low pay, lack of interest, hard work, and danger are constraints.** It has been argued that cultural norms make young workers uninclined to work in certain activities for employers other than their own household (Figure 27). Across a range of activities, young men were always more likely than not to say that men in their community would carry out the task for others. Between two-thirds and three-quarters of respondents felt that workers would be available for a range of activities in primary agriculture, market sales, construction, and repairs. Cattle herding (and less so, transport) stood out as the one task fewer workers would take on for other employers (57%). Men tended to be concerned about hard work or low pay in some activities, a lack of interest in work in the market, and danger in cattle herding, construction, and working in transport.

69. **Most women also are willing to undertake common job activities, but many find these tasks uninteresting.** Women are similarly likely as men to say that women workers would be available to work in a range of simple job activities. By way of contrast with their male peers, those who felt that it would be hard to find women workers were most likely to feel that a lack of interest in the work would be the most obvious obstacle, followed by low pay.

Figure 27 Youth perceptions of different job activities





Source: Youth jobs survey 2019

70. **More than half of young urban workers believe they will at some point work for the government, but they show less impatience for such prospects than workers did before the conflict.** Among young survey respondents, about three in five (59%) expect to work for the government at some point in time Figure 28). About one in six (15%) expect such a job within two years or less, one in four (25%) within five years or longer, and one in eight (13%) do not know when to expect it. We can compare these expectations to the way workers saw their prospects in the public sector before the conflict. When an identical question was asked (of workers of all ages) in 2013, about 60% of respondents expected a government job within five years, half expected to join the public sector within two years of the survey, 42% within one year, and about 12%, within six months. Thus, while overall hopes for public employment have not diminished, young workers today are far less likely to expect such a job to become available soon.

Figure 28 Expectations of public employment



Source: Foreign labor survey 2013 and youth jobs survey 2019

What kind of assistance are workers looking for?

71. **Workers stress that lack of funds poses a crucial obstacle to improving their job activities, along with insecurity and weak demand.** Different survey data sources allow us to shed some light on how different groups of workers perceive their obstacles, and what kind of support they would like. Overall, the views of young urban workers, market traders, and the unemployed suggest that, in the current early recovery phase, the picture is simple: lack of funding is a dominant concern, along with security and weak demand.

72. **Young workers most often point to lack of funds as an obstacle to improving their activities, followed by weak demand.** Among those young respondents who express a preference for improving their current activities, three in five (61%) say their greatest obstacle is a lack of funds (Figure 29). One in five (20%) point to weak demand. Men are particularly likely to complain about a lack of funds (71%). Sample size limits our ability to look at how obstacles vary by activity. However, lack of demand does register more strongly about those active in processing, artisanry, and services (34%), while lack of funds unsurprisingly is a particular concern for those active in trade (77%). As noted, while our survey data does not collect detailed information on savings, work in other low-income fragile environments points to the difficulty young workers face in accumulating the funds needed to start a business. Households with market activities point to a similar set of constraints, but also emphasize the obstacles posed by bad and dangerous roads (Figure 30).

73. **Young workers feel that a broad range of support modalities would make work in agriculture more appealing, and are particularly keen on tools and inputs.** Youth take a positive view of a wide range of potential changes to make agriculture more appealing. They are somewhat drawn to growing traditional or new crops for the market (2.3 on a three-point scale expressing interest), and even more drawn to using tools, engaging in processing, or joining cooperatives for information (2.4) or funding (2.5). When asked what would make agriculture a more interesting option, most youth point to tools and inputs (46% - most common mentioned are machines, seeds, and fertilizer), followed by a diverse mix of other kinds of support. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that most (80%) of those with experience in agriculture have worked with more than hand tools, and are hence intimately familiar with the hard work and modest returns of farming without improved inputs or tools.

Figure 29 Perceived obstacles to doing better in job activities



Source: Youth jobs survey 2019

Figure 30 Business obstacles reported by market traders



Source: Market trader survey 2019

74. A third of the unemployed in urban areas say that the key support they need are loans and business grants. The unemployed make up only two percent of the urban workforce. However, by way of understanding what kind of jobs support might be useful, it is worth noting that 34 percent of the urban unemployed, 20 percent IDPs and 27 percent South Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia seek loans and business grants or in-kind capital such as livestock or tools (Figure 31). An additional 11 percent unemployed urban, 16 percent unemployed IDPs and 7 percent unemployed refugees desire start-up training. Apart from business loans and start-up support, technical and vocational training and completing education are major avenues of support that the unemployed seek.

Figure 31: Support needed by the unemployed to find employment.



Source: Authors' calculations using HFSSS 2017, CRS 2017 and SPS 2017.

Wages, wage expectations, and reservation wages

75. Despite widespread poverty, earlier analyses of jobs in South Sudan pointed to high reservation wages as a problem for competitiveness. A 2014 World Bank study of jobs in South Sudan found monthly reservation wages to be approximately SSP 1,100 for men and SSP 700 for women in 2014 terms.[28] Comparisons across time are difficult, given explosive inflation and limited data. Using the World Bank's price data available until 2017[29] and monthly core inflation data thereafter, the price increase between the earlier survey and the 2019 surveys was about 51-fold. With this conversion rate (and assuming 20 work days per month), the earlier reservation wage would be the equivalent of SSP 2,800 and SSP 1,800 per day for men and women, respectively. At the unofficial exchange rate in June 2019, this was be the equivalent of about $9 and $6, respectively – indeed, a high reservation wage for a low-income country. Such expectations were viewed as a significant barrier to competitiveness, for instance, in agriculture.[30] However, after years of conflict, data collected in 2017 and 2019 suggests that South Sudanese workers expect far lower wage rates for many job activities. Across a range of activities and data, sources, wages of about US$2-3 are typical.

76. Households and market traders pay their unskilled helpers SSP 500-600 per day (about $2). In several surveys taken in summer 2019, we asked different types of employers who undertake very basic business activities what they pay unskilled helpers they hire from outside their own family (Table 8). Households that carry out casual market-linked activities say they pay at the median SSP 500. Market traders similarly pay SSP 600 at the median, although the range of common wage rates is wider. There is some evidence of substantial differences in wage levels between towns, but small sample size makes it hard to offer a clear assessment. There is little indication of substantial discrepancies between pay in different kinds of activities.

77. Workers who manage stalls and helpers in (foreign-owned) micro businesses can expect to be paid about SSP 800-1,000 (about $3). Workers who run market stalls on behalf of absent owners report that they get paid somewhat more than market helpers, SSP 800 at the median (albeit on a small sample). While we have no data on wages in microbusinesses owned by South Sudanese, unskilled workers employed by foreign microbusinesses are at the median paid SSP 1,000. Unskilled workers in larger businesses can expected a higher rate of around SSP 1,500 (about $5).

28 World Bank, "South Sudan: Jobs and Livelihoods."

[29] *World Development indicators*

[30] World Bank (2012), "Agricultural Potential, Rural Roads, and Farm Competitiveness in South Sudan".

Table 8 Observed daily wage rates

Observed daily wage rates (SSP June-September 2019)	Median	25th percentile	75th percentile	*Sample size*
Helpers in household income-generating activities	500	180	650	54
Responsible workers in market stalls	800	500	1500	*23*
Helpers in market stalls	600	400	1,100	*148*
Unskilled workers in foreign-owned micro businesses	1,000	800	1,500	*81*
Unskilled workers in larger foreign-owned businesses	1,500	1,000	1,500	*87*

Source: Youth jobs survey 2019, Market trader survey 2019, Foreign businesses survey 2019

78. **Data collected among South Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia allows for a complementary analysis of reservation wages.** Wage data from workers in South Sudan can shed some light on common daily pay. However, the surveys were not designed to elicit reservation wages, that is, the lowest wage rates workers would be willing to accept. Sample size also prevents us from analyzing correlates of wage rates, as they relate, for instance, to education levels. Data collected among South Sudanese refugees living in Ethiopia can provide complementary information.

79. **South Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia have the lowest reservation wages among refugee groups and the worst welfare outcomes.** On average, a South Sudanese refugee reports a reservation wage[31] of ETB 2,800 per month for a full-time salaried job (which does not provide housing). This is significantly lower than the reservation wage for Somali refugees (ETB 4,500), Eritrean refugees (ETB 3,600) and Ethiopian host communities (ETB 3,900;

80. Figure 32). The reservation wage of Sudanese refugees is not statistically significantly different to that of South Sudanese refugees. The comparatively low reservation wage is consistent with the fact that, within Ethiopia, South Sudanese refugees have among the highest poverty rates, are more food insecure, and live in worse housing conditions, despite having a higher average educational attainment than Somali refugees.[32]

81. **The mean reservation wage for South Sudanese refugees translates roughly to SSP 800 per day in 2019.** Using purchasing-power parity conversion factors, ETB 2,800 translates approximately to SSP 6,500 per month as of 2017, and about SSP 800 per day in 2019 terms.[33] As noted, comparisons over time are problematic. But it is worth noting that mean reservation wages among refugees in 2017 are similar to, if somewhat above, median expected wages among young South Sudanese in 2019 (SSP

[31] The reservation wage is defined in this context as the monthly salary required to accept a job offer of full-time salaried employment within Ethiopia.

[32] World Bank, "Informing Durable Solutions by Micro-Data: A Skills Survey for Refugees in Ethiopia."

[33] Assumptions as above. The PPP conversion factor for South Sudanese Pound (SSP) in 2016, is 6.92 (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.PPP?locations=SS&view=chart, downloaded on June 14 2019). The inflation in South Sudan from 2016 to 2017 is 187.85 (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?locations=SS, downloaded on June 14 2019). The PPP conversion factor for Ethiopian Birr (ETB) in 2017 is 9.04 (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.PPP?locations=ET&view=chart, downloaded on June 14, 2019). Inflating the 2016 PPP conversion factor by 187.85 gives the rough 2017 PPP conversion factor for the SSP. Using the 2017 PPP conversion factor of Ethiopian Birr and South Sudanese Pound, ETB 2800 translates to roughly SSP 6500 in 2017.

500-600). They are far below reservation wages reported in 2014.[34] Wage expectations of South Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia may diverge from those among workers in South Sudan due a difference in profiles, perceived opportunities, and the availability of humanitarian aid. Since reservation wages of refugees who intend to return are higher for a job in Ethiopia (Figure 33 below), returnee refugees may have lower wage expectations within South Sudan if able to return.

Figure 32: Reservation wages for refugees and host communities in Ethiopia.



Source: Authors' calculations using SPS 2017.

82. Women have lower reservation wages than men – but not when taking account of education and current work experience. Among South Sudanese refugees, women have lower reservation wages than men in the corresponding age groups. The gap is more modest among youth (ETB 300), and larger among adults (ETB 700). The same pattern holds whether housing is provided or not. The gender gap in expectations mirrors a similar divergence observed in 2014 data from South Sudan, in which women expected SSP 700, but men expected SSP 1,100.[35] The significantly lower reservation wage for women may speak to a larger willingness among women to 'start small' with job activities – an important asset in an economy where there are few attractive job opportunities in the short-run. However, as reported below, regression analysis suggests that the gender gap in expectations is explained by education and work experience.

83. Youth and older adults have similar reservation wages, as higher education among youth balances out work experience among older workers. Among the working-age population of South Sudanese refugees, the reservation wages of youth and older adults are not statistically different. It is possible to interpret this as a high reservation wage for youth, who expect similar salaries as older and possibly more experienced groups. However, youth differ from adults in a range of characteristics that could make their expectations realistic. Thus, young workers are more highly educated. Adults of working age are almost 6 times as likely to have no education as youth (57 percent and 9 percent respectively; Appendix Table 1 Descriptive statistics for South Sudanese Refugees in Ethiopia). Similarly, youth may have a better 'outside option' than adults in pursuing further education.

[34] The consumer price index in South Sudan, with 2010 as a base year, was 217 in 2014, and 4584 in 2017, representing a 21-fold increase in price levels over 2014-2017. Source: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL?locations=SS, downloaded on June 14, 2019.
[35] World Bank, "South Sudan: Jobs and Livelihoods."

84. **Regression analysis can help to understand how multiple factors interact with each other to influence the reservation wage.** While gender, educational qualifications, and labor market engagement differ among youth and adults, specific factors could be more influential drivers of the reservation wage expectation. A regression with the reported reservation wage as the dependent variable can help to unpack the underlying interaction of these factors in together influencing the reservation wage. Understanding the interplay of these multiple factors can help to inform strategic policy targeting of different factors to bring about desirable labor market outcomes overall.

85. **Education and labor market engagement drive differences in reservation wage across age and gender groups.** Regression results show that age and gender do not directly influence the reservation wage when other factors are taken into account (Appendix Table 2 Factors determining reservation wages for South Sudanese refugees: Levels Regression). Instead, wage expectations are driven by education levels, current labor market participation status, the primary employment activity, and intention to return. For instance, higher education and salaried employment are associated with higher reservation wages, and in addition to being less educated on average, women are less likely to be engaged in salaried labor and more engaged in helping household businesses.

86. **Wage expectations do not differ between workers with primary education and without formal education, but those with secondary and university level education expect much higher wages.** There is no significant difference in wage expectations between refugees without formal education and those with primary education – 85% of the refugee population, and 70% of urban residents. However, educational qualification above the primary level has a steep effect on the reservation wage. Against a baseline of no education, in which the reservation wage is ETB 2200, an individual with secondary school education expects an additional ETB 1300 per month, while someone with a university level of education expects ETB 1700 more (Figure 33). Similarly, in 2014, educational attainment commanded a premium in the national South Sudan labor market: primary, secondary and post-secondary education each added a premium of SSP 340 to wage expectations.[36]

87. **Workers in salaried jobs have higher reservation wages than those in agriculture or business.** The employment activity has a significant effect on the reservation wage, albeit less so than education. Compared to salaried labor, those who currently undertake a business activity have a reservation wage lower by ETB 500, while individuals who help in a business activity or work in own-account agriculture expect ETB 600 less, on average (Figure 33). These patterns indicate that, as is common in a low-income economy, salaried jobs are a relatively lucrative option. The unemployed (9% of the refugee population) report slightly higher wage expectations – perhaps a partial reason of their unemployment.

[36] World Bank, "South Sudan: Jobs and Livelihoods."

Figure 33: Factors affecting reservation wages for South Sudanese refugees.[37]



, ** and * indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.*

Source: Authors' calculations using SPS 2017.

88. **Refugee women who are out of the work-force report low reservation wages, which may suggest that some are particularly willing to 'start small' in their jobs.** Eight in ten working-age refugees are inactive, and report lower average reservation wages than those who work (accounting for education, prior experience, and other characteristics – Figure 33). In particular, those who are inactive because they engage in household care work give the lowest reservation wages, and expect on average about 40% (ETB 1,100) per month less than the employed. Women constitute more than 90% of this group. While it is not clear what part of the working age population these women represent, it is striking to observe that there is a group of women who may be particularly ready to 'start small' from modest job activities. It is worth understanding better what is the potential for such engagement in towns.

89. **While gender and age do not drive differences in reservation wages directly, youth and women are key groups that require policy attention in the jobs landscape.** Expectation about returns to education is a significant determinant of reservation wages. Youth have markedly better educational outcomes than do adults, which youth employment programs must account for. Too low a wage can be discouraging or frustrating for relatively well-educated youth. Women have significantly worse educational outcomes than men, driving their lower wage expectations. Educating women and girls is a key step to mobilizing a large section of the workforce of South Sudan's potential returnee groups.

[37] This figure only contains statistically significant results. For the full regression table, refer to Appendix Table 2.

Table 9 Reservation wages and factors by gender for South Sudanese refugees

	Men	Women
Reservation wage	3058.4	2626.0
No Education	13.5	51.3
Primary	57.8	42.0
Secondary	19.5	6.3
University	9.2	0.4
Paid labor	44.1	32.0
Own business	17.3	12.8
Help in business	23.3	42.3
Own-account agriculture	5.6	7.5
Unpaid apprenticeship/training	9.8	5.4
Active, Employed	19.0	19.5
Active, Unemployed	8.7	9.5
Inactive, Enrolled	50.6	24.2
Inactive, Household care	0.8	9.6
Inactive, other	20.9	37.2
Observations	*707*	*1017*

, ** and * indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Yellow indicates means that are not statistically significantly different. Red indicates outcomes associated with lower reservation wages, compared to men.*

Source: Authors' calculations using SPS 2017.

III. Policy Conclusions

90. **Once security improves, trade between towns can yield significant benefits – but in the short term, it is realistic to focus on ways to promote job recovery within towns, based on local demand.** Activity patterns differ across towns in line with local comparative advantage – in particular in terms of how much activity there is in agriculture. Since South Sudan spans several agroclimatic zones, the crops produced and livestock grown also vary significantly. Once greater security makes it possible again for producers and traders to travel from town to town with less fear, there is a significant potential for trade. However, in the short term, danger and poor road quality limit what can be done. Until security improves, it makes sense to think about the potential for job recovery within towns, based on local demand.

91. **Jobs support must start from the reality that even in towns, most jobs are low-productivity own-account activities in agriculture and services.** Most jobs outside of the public and NGO sector are self-employed activities in agriculture, commerce, and basic services. Few of them provide more than poverty-level income. The future of jobs need not reflect this present state. However, support for the

first steps toward better jobs outcomes needs to take account of what the situation is today. Progress toward better jobs is most likely to come from a recovery of productivity in these activities, and a resumption of the many casual household market-linked activities lost to conflict.

92. **Support to agriculture can build on a broad base even in towns, and leverage the fact that many youth are open to the idea of working in the sector.** Agriculture today is the main source of livelihoods to half of all urban households, and has the potential to become more productive as stability returns. While not all are interested in working in the sector, half of all young workers view jobs in agriculture favorably, youth currently active in the sector are more likely to want to continue their activities than those in other sectors, and many express interest in support to do better. There is therefore a broad base for better jobs linked to agriculture, and support programs are likely to encounter some interest.

93. **Capital grants stand a chance of helping a recovery of productivity in self-employed activities.** Many households report on the activities lost to conflict, households show little diversification of activities, and most respondents say that lack of funds is the greatest obstacle in their job activities. In the immediate term, the prescription for helping households recover some lost activities and raise productivity may be as straightforward as responding to this need for modest access to funds.

94. **Programs to support small business activities can look to engage women and young workers.** Women and young workers are particularly likely to be limited to roles as helpers in household income-generating activities. Support to them can build on their prior experience in household activities, and seize opportunities to help households diversify their jobs portfolios. At the same time, data suggests that reservation wages and overly optimistic expectations of government employment are unlikely to still pose the obstacle they once posed to engaging youth in small job activities.

95. **With much concern over weak demand in the markets, purchase programs to stimulate local demand may be a sensible short-term measure until trade can resume with greater stability.** Next to access to funding and insecurity, workers are most likely to complain that poor market demand is limiting their activities. Once some exchange between towns recovers, demand may rise. In the meantime, support that boosts demand is likely to have a role to play: injections of purchasing power through public works programs or cash transfers, humanitarian purchases (perhaps not only for grains but also for some processed agriculture products such as peanut paste or dried fish), and perhaps innovative instruments such as market guarantees for aggregators.

96. **Labor markets are characterized by local trends, and it is crucial to customize support.** Tailoring to local job market challenges and opportunities will be a crucial component of livelihoods and jobs programming in South Sudan. While stark differences exist across different groups such as IDPs and urban residents, similarly large discrepancies exist among different towns – for instance, agriculture employs 70 percent of urban workers in Yambio, but only 20 percent in Aweil and Wau. Thus, while challenges of poverty, conflict, insecurity and resilience may be common across the landscape of South Sudan, a one-size-fits-all solution may not succeed.

97. **Regular salary payments to those on the public payroll will contribute significantly to livelihoods and help sustain local market demand.** Along with jobs in NGOs, public employment contributes to the livelihoods of a significant share of households. Paying salaries regularly will help these households improve their wellbeing, and may allow them to make the small investments needed to diversify their job activities. Public servants are also important clients for market traders, and resuming salary payments can directly help address depressed demand.

98. **While skills are unlikely to be a binding constraint in the immediate term, the erosion of education due to conflict is taking a toll on the skills base of the future workforce.** Because conflict has so

profoundly disrupted economic activities, it is likely that jobs outcomes can significantly improve in the short term without remedial investments in skills. However, conflict is taking a major toll on access to education, with one in three primary-age children estimated to be out of school even in towns. As recovery proceeds, better access to schooling is needed to avoid damage to the skill base.

99. **Better analysis is urgently needed to understand the looming challenge of re-integrating the displaced and demobilized fighters into the work force.** Many South Sudanese workers have been internally displaced or have fled the country. Re-integrating them into the labor force will pose specific challenges, given that many of the displaced have experienced trauma, lost assets, land, and networks, and many have been inactive for some time. In addition, because of the sheer scale of displacement, return could represent a sizeable shock to local labor markets. Better analysis is urgently needed to better understand what form the challenges are likely to take.

APPENDIX

Appendix Table 1 Descriptive statistics for South Sudanese Refugees in Ethiopia

		Overall %	Youth % (15-24 years)	Adults % (25-64 years)
	Female	62.3	47.3	73.1***
	Plan to return to South Sudan in 1 year	4.0	3.0	4.8
Skills	Comfortable with computer	7.6	8.3	7.1
	Comfortable with internet	10.5	11.9	9.4
	Can drive car, truck or 3-wheeler	1.9	1.2	2.4
Education level	No Education	37.2	9.0	57.5***
	Primary	47.9	73.8	29.3***
	Secondary	11.2	15.7	8.0**
	University	3.7	1.6	5.0**
Employment	Paid labor	36.2	15.7	42.9***
	Own business	14.3	16.8	13.5
	Help in business	35.8	50.3	30.9***
	Own-account agriculture	6.9	4.8	7.5
	Unpaid apprenticeship/training	6.9	12.4	5.1
Labor force status	Active, Employed	19.3	14.6	22.6**
	Active, Unemployed	9.2	5.2	12.1*
	Inactive, Enrolled	34.2	67.0	10.7***
	Inactive, Household care	6.2	2.2	9.1***
	Inactive, other	31.1	11.0	45.4***
	Observations	*1 725*	*779*	*956*

, ** and * indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Estimates for youth (15-24 years) are compared to estimates for adults (25-64 years).*

Source: Authors' calculations using SPS 2017.

Appendix Table 2 Factors determining reservation wages for South Sudanese refugees: Levels Regression

	Monthly Reservation Wage (no housing)
Age (years)	46.04
Age squared	-0.69
Female	110.31
Plans to return in 1 year	692.38**
Comfortable using computer	-517.74
Comfortable using internet	230.56
Can drive car/truck/3-wheeler	1,001.39*
Education (baseline: no education)	
Primary	223.03
Secondary	1,277.92***
University	1,738.24***
Employment activity (baseline: salaried labor)	
Own business	-478.12**
Help in business	-570.69**
Own-account agriculture	-587.38**
Unpaid training/apprenticeship	69.94
Current workforce status (baseline: active, employed)	
Active, unemployed	457.01*
Inactive, enrolled	-509.15**
Inactive, household care	-1,119.77**
Inactive, other	-396.28**
Constant	2,200.43***
Observations	795
R-squared	0.275

, ** and * indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.*

Source: Authors' calculations using SPS 2017.

Appendix Table 3 Factors determining reservation wages for South Sudanese refugees: Log Regression

Variables	**Log of Monthly Reservation Wage (no housing)**
Age (years)	0.02**
Age squared	-0.00**
Female	0.02

Plans to return in 1 year	0.21**
Comfortable using computer	-0.18
Comfortable using internet	0.03
Can drive car/truck/3-wheeler	0.30*
Education (baseline: no education)	
Primary	0.07
Secondary	0.45***
University	0.51***
Employment activity (baseline: salaried labor)	
Own business	-0.21**
Help in business	-0.20**
Own account agriculture	-0.28**
Unpaid training/apprenticeship	0.07
Current workforce status (baseline: active, employed)	
Active, unemployed	0.19*
Inactive, enrolled	-0.16**
Inactive, household care	-0.50**
Inactive, other	-0.19**
Constant	7.48***
Observations	795
R-squared	0.274

, ** and * indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.*

Source: Authors' calculations using SPS 2017.

Appendix Table 4 Differences on key outcomes among employed and unemployed South Sudanese refugees

		Employed	**Unemployed**
	Reservation Wage	3017.2	3425.0*
Education	No Education	32.2	36.1
	Primary	46.0	46.9
	Secondary	14.8	8.9
	University	6.9	8.1
Skills	Comfortable using computer	11.0	16.9
	Comfortable using internet	15.8	18.1
	Can drive car/truck/3-wheeler	2.9	0.1*
	Consumption (SSP) [38]	18.5	12.4**
	Observations	*332*	*79*

, ** and * indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.*

Source: Authors' calculations using SPS 2017.

[38] Imputed consumption per capita per day, also used as the monetary measure to calculate whether the individual is below the poverty line.

Appendix A: Assumptions made to assess the number of potential entrants to the labor force from return of displaced workers

Appendix Table 5 shows population statistics for displaced groups. We obtain the number of potential entrants to the labor force among refugees by applying the current urban labor force participation rate of 74% to the working-age population of refugees of 2.3m. This yields a number of about 0.6m potential entrants.

Assessing how many IDPs may wish to re-join the work force is more difficult, since the Crisis Response Survey 2017 provides data only on IDPs living in PoC sites and similar settlements, but not on those residing within communities. The latter population is included in the High-Frequency Survey, but IDPs cannot be distinguished from other residents. Hence, it is not possible to determine the working-age population, LFP and employment rate of this group of the internally displaced. IOM data suggests that as of early 2020, 23% of the internally displaced lived in PoC sites and settlements, and 73% in communities (with the residence of some IDPs not clearly recorded).

For an estimate of the number of potential entrants among IDPs, we first assume that employment among those in PoC sites and similar settlements will eventually rise to the level of employment among the general urban population. To bound the potential increase, we then assume for a lower bound that employment among IDPs in communities is already at the same level as among the general urban population. For a higher bound, we assume that it is currently at the same level as among IDPs living in PoC sites and similar settlements. This yields a range of 70,000-300,000 expected entrants.

Appendix Table 5 Displaced Groups

	Population	**Working-age population**	**Potential labor force** (at urban LFP)
Current urban labor force	3,102,159	1,989,499	1,492,125
IDPs	1,700,000	909,500	682,125
IDPs in PoC and *other sites*	*391,000*	209,185	*156,889*
IDPs *in communities*	*1,241,000*		
Refugees	2,260,000	858,800	644,100

Source: Authors' calculations using HFS 2017, CRS 2017, and data reported in IOM (2020) and WFP/FAO (2020).

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