

AREA-BASED ASSESSMENT

DNIPROPETROVSKA OBLAST – UKRAINE

AUGUST 2022



Profile cover photograph credit: Oleksandr Vlasenko / IMPACT Initiatives / 2022

About REACH

REACH is a joint initiative of two international non-governmental organisations - ACTED and IMPACT Initiatives - and the UN Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT). REACH's mission is to strengthen evidence-based decision-making by aid actors through efficient data collection, management and analysis before, during and after an emergency. By doing so, REACH contributes to ensuring that communities affected by emergencies receive the support they need. All REACH activities are conducted in support to and within the framework of inter-agency aid coordination mechanisms. All REACH resources are available on our resource center: www.reachresourcecentre.info. For more information please visit [our website](#). You can contact us directly at: geneva@reach-initiative.org and follow us on Twitter @REACH_info.

SUMMARY

Introduction

The sudden escalation of the war in Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has intensified the humanitarian crisis in the country. Among the primary issues of concern are **nearly seven million people displaced within the country as of August 2022**.¹

The scale of the displacement has led to questions about the impacts of population influx on host communities. In response, collective sites were established in different types of public and private buildings, including in many educational facilities (schools, kindergartens, university dormitories, etc).² The Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) cluster has currently mapped more than 7,000 collective sites across Ukraine.³ According to the International Organisation for Migration's (IOM) General Population survey, approximately 4% of the displaced population resides in a collective center, while the majority live in private residences in the community. While there are indications that needs among the population in collective centers are higher than those in the general population, **there is limited reliable data available to allow for representative comparisons between demographics** such as host communities, displaced households living in collective sites, and those living out of collective sites.

In addition, while many displaced households are located within the communities, **little is known concerning their access to public services**, in parallel with the humanitarian support they receive in and out of collective sites. Similarly, the scale-up of the response to involve national government, local civil society, and international humanitarian actors has led to questions around coordination between these various actors. In a recent study by ACAPS, it was found that challenges exist in distribution systems and coordination structures at different levels of the response.⁴ As of June 2022, there was **limited information available at the sub-national level on the coordination of response** efforts to address displacement concerns.

Dnipropetrovska oblast plays a key role in hosting displaced populations inside Ukraine. Official statistics in May reported the registration of 225,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), a number representing less than a third of the actual figure according to the regional council.⁵ According to the Organisation for Migration's (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), this influx makes Dnipropetrovska oblast the host to the largest number of refugees in the country.⁶ Moreover, the crucial role of the oblast as an arrival transit hub is only expected to increase in the coming months as hostilities continue to escalate in the East and South of the country.⁷

In this context, REACH worked with the CCCM cluster to develop and implement **an assessment on displacement dynamics and the humanitarian response in Dnipropetrovska** to support the information needs of the cluster and other actors who work in the displacement response in the oblast. REACH and the cluster consulted with a wide range of additional stakeholders to gather input on the research design as well as interpretation of findings, including local authorities and local organisations.

¹ International Organisation for Migration (IOM), [Ukraine | Displacement \(iom.int\)](https://www.iom.int/ukraine-displacement), August 2022.

² REACH / UNHCR Collective Site Monitoring (CSM) survey dashboard: [Ukraine CCCM \(reach-info.org\)](https://reach-info.org/ukraine-cccm), July 2022.

³ As of September 2022, following a baseline mapping conducted by the CCCM cluster with support of REACH, UNHCR, IOM, ACTED, NRC and other partners. Obtainable via CCCM cluster.

⁴ ACAPS, [Ukraine: Bridging humanitarian response | ACAPS](https://www.acaps.org/ukraine-bridging-humanitarian-response/), May 2022.

⁵ Dnipropetrovska Regional State Administration, ["There are more than 225,000 displaced people in the Dnipropetrovska region."](https://www.dniproregion.gov.ua/en/news/there-are-more-than-225000-displaced-people-in-the-dnipropetrovska-region), May 2022.

⁶ IOM, [Ukraine — Internal Displacement Report — General Population Survey Round 7 \(17 - 23 July 2022\) | DTM \(iom.int\)](https://www.iom.int/ukraine-internal-displacement-report-general-population-survey-round-7), July 2022.

⁷ Ministry for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine ["The number of internally displaced persons \(IDPs\) in Ukraine has exceeded 8 million people: from where and where did the most go"](https://www.mrtt.gov.ua/en/news/the-number-of-internally-displaced-persons-idps-in-ukraine-has-exceeded-8-million-people-from-where-and-where-did-the-most-go), May 2022.

The assessment sought to fill the information gaps highlighted above through answering the following:

Research questions:

- **What are the humanitarian needs of the community in Dnipropetrovska oblast and how do they vary by geography and displacement status?**
- **Which local NGOs, CSOs, or individual volunteers are responding to these needs, and what are they doing?**
- **In what ways could the local response be supported or made more efficient?**

The purpose of the assessment and this report is to provide an **overview of the needs and concerns of displaced populations in Dnipropetrovska Oblast**, including a comparison of the needs and concerns with non-displaced populations, and an assessment of how these needs and concerns are currently being met by local response actors.

To that end, REACH conducted:

- A total of **1,304 household surveys (HHS)** with displaced households (HHs) in collective sites and living in the community, and non-displaced households. Surveys were conducted through face-to-face interviews between 2nd and 17th July 2022. The sample was stratified by displacement status and geography to allow for a granular analysis of needs and concerns by these characteristics. Households were randomly selected in two-stages: In the first stage appropriate locations for each demographic were selected at random using randomly generated GPS points, or a prepared sample frame (e.g. CCCM master list of collective sites). In the second stage additional randomization techniques were applied to ensure respondent participation was random, such as approaching each fifth person to enter or leave a building. The survey instrument sought to capture key socio-economic indicators for each demographic, their needs and concerns, including issues of social cohesion, and movement intentions among displaced households.
- A **mapping of local response actors (LRAs) working in the oblast** including local non-government and civil society organisations, and individual volunteers between 22 and 30 June 2022. The mapping process involved a snowballing approach to compile **a list of 53 LRAs**, contacting one focal point for each organisation to participate in a short telephone survey (LRA-KIIs). The survey included questions on the size of the organisation, key activities and partner networks.
- **Eight focus group discussions with local response actors (LRA-FGDs)**. The discussion guide of the FGDs explored perceptions on issues surrounding social cohesion, challenges in coordination and collaboration among actors, and risk mitigation. Participants were selected from contacts gathered through local authorities and the mapping exercise, ensuring they included actors in both urban and rural settings.

This report seeks to draw together the findings from these sources to respond to the research questions, using a sequential triangulation approach. This was approached in the following way:

Analytical approach:

- **Research Question 1:** findings on **household needs and concerns** were first identified based on the HHS, with a **comparative analysis undertaken based on displacement status and location** (oblast centre / periphery).
- **Research Question 2:** findings on needs and concerns (as identified through the HHS) were then compared to the findings from the **local response actors mapping and LRA-KII, contrasting needs against levels of assistance that are available.**
- **Research Question 3:** findings from the LRA-KIIs on current coverage and planning of the response were then reviewed against the qualitative content analysis of the **LRA-FGD, with a focus on adding a localized perspective on existing challenges.**

The assessment also included the following data collection methods to provide additional information on the economic context, the consequences on public service provision, and the particularities of the crisis in conflict-affected hromadas. This information will be used sparingly in this report, as relevant in responding to the three central research questions.

Additional data sources

- **Eight focus group discussions with Economic Actors**, aimed at providing an overview of the economic consequences of the war on Dnipropetrovska Oblast.
- **Twenty key informant interviews with Public Service Providers in Priority hromada**, to gather data on the types of changes local government face in providing public services to displaced and non-displaced populations.
- **Five key informant interviews with Local Authorities in Conflict-Affected hromadas:** to capture data on the impact of the crisis and subsequent humanitarian needs and displacement dynamics in regions where household survey data could not be collected due to security and access constraints.

Key Findings

The stratified survey sample allows for a comparison of vulnerabilities, needs and levels of assistance between three types of households: displaced household living in collective sites, out of collective sites, and non-displaced. Interviews and focus group discussions with public service providers, local response and economic actors shed additional light on the organisation of the current response and the current capacity to respond to those needs. Below are some of the key take-aways:

- **The international response remains more focused on Dnipro city compared to other parts of the oblast.** IDP households in Dnipro city much more often reported receiving assistance from international organisations (53%) and UN agencies (59%), compared to their counterparts living outside of Dnipro city (33% and 41% respectively). Concerns that international assistance was not sufficiently reaching beneficiaries living in the periphery of the oblast were also raised by local response actors and regional authorities.
- **Conflict-affected hromadas are in strong need of early recovery support** to cope with the impact of shellings on infrastructure, energy and water facilities. Acute needs concern repair and construction work, provision of construction material, heating solutions, and energy and water provision alternatives.

- IDP households living in collective sites tend to be more vulnerable than IDP households out of collective sites, and non-displaced households. **54% of IDP households in collective sites reportedly include at least one pensioner, 32% have one chronically ill member, and 24% reported one member with disabilities.** Importantly, data from REACH's collective site monitoring (CSM) shows that 48% of assessed collective sites in Ukraine do not have an allocation plan for households with specific vulnerabilities.
- IDP households earned less income on average than non-displaced households before the conflict. In addition, they also reported suffering a greater loss of income since. This is particularly the case for **displaced households in collective sites outside of Dnipro city; with 51% reportedly earning very low incomes (less than 5.000 UAH per month) since the start of the conflict, versus 20% of them before the conflict.** By comparison, only 28% of non-displaced households outside of Dnipro city reported earning this level of income since the start of the conflict, versus 19% before the conflict.
- **Most reported needs by households overall are economic assistance (54%), food (48%) and employment support (48%).** IDP households reported additional needs such as long-term displacement solutions (43%), but **overall non-displaced households reported similar needs, and sometimes an even larger proportion reported needs in essential areas** such as healthcare (31% versus 24% for IDPs) and WASH (10%, versus 4% for IDPs). However, they were 11% to report not needing any assistance (versus 1% for IDP households).
- **Households living outside Dnipro City reported higher levels of needs than those living in Dnipro City.** It is the case notably for economic assistance (61% for households living out of Dnipro City, versus 46% for households living in Dnipro City), and employment (39% for households living out of Dnipro City, versus 24% for households living in Dnipro City). Importantly, non-displaced households outside Dnipro city reported a need for economic assistance far more important than those residing in Dnipro city (60% versus 35%).
- **Non-displaced households are far less likely to benefit from humanitarian support (32% versus 91% for displaced households).** For instance, the proportion of households reporting receiving financial assistance varies markedly (IDP in-site: 72%, IDP off-site: 68%; non-displaced: 19%) despite similar levels of needs reported. It may therefore be beneficial to further explore the degree to which, and under what conditions, non-displaced households are provided with humanitarian assistance.
- **The main types of assistance providers, according to household recipients are; Public service providers (67%), volunteer initiatives (64%), UN organisations (51%), international organisations (44%) and local organisations (41%).** IDP households in collective sites reported receiving assistance mostly from volunteer initiatives (73%), while those living out of collective sites most often reported receiving assistance from public service providers (69%). For non-displaced households, this was equal (69%), followed by local organisations (22%) and volunteers (13%).
- **Many local response actors appear to implement their activities independently, without engaging structures put in place by local authorities to supervise the response.** This leads to a multiplicity of coordinating bodies and channels of communication, potentially raising difficulties for international actors looking to engage with unique interlocutors at the local level.
- **Many collective sites may struggle to continue to house IDPs in winter,** according to local response actors. Of particular concern are the utility fees for electricity and heating likely to rise significantly in the coming months. While government and municipal institutions receive compensation for the cost of utilities, many collective sites managed by local organisations do not. When costs rise, many may not be able to continue providing assistance.

- **Only 9% of displaced household reported a clear intention to move again in the month following data collection** (11% for displaced households in collective sites, 6% for displaced households out of collective sites). Of those (n = 76), 49% reported intention to return to their settlement of habitual residence, 39% to another settlement, and only 12% reported planning to move to another country.

In conclusion, the findings reveal a concerning trend in the way current assistance is targeted.

Households living in Dnipro City are much more likely to report receiving assistance from international respondents versus those living in areas outside Dnipro City. Likewise, displaced households are more likely to be targeted for assistance compared to non-displaced households, despite this latter group often reporting similar or in some cases even higher needs than the former. Findings do support the notion that IDP households living in collective sites tend to be characterised by additional vulnerabilities compared to IDP households living out of collective sites and non-displaced households.

The approach of winter also raises new challenges. Local actors involved in the management of collective sites voiced concerns about their ability to continue to house IDPs. Of particular importance are the utility fees for electricity and heating which will rise significantly in the coming months. Considering the role of Dnipropetrovska oblast as a key arrival and transit hub is presumably going to increase as the conflict wears on, this issue is likely to grow more salient. Also of high priority is the need for early recovery support in conflict-affected hromadas, where numerous infrastructures need repair or heating solutions. It matters therefore that needs, and the capacity of local actors to meet those needs, continues to be monitored regularly and that additional assistance is made available and delivered to where it is most needed.

CONTENTS

SUMMARY	2
CONTENTS	7
List of Acronyms.....	8
Geographical Classifications.....	8
List of Figures, Tables and Maps	8
INTRODUCTION	10
METHODOLOGY	12
Geographical scope	12
Data collection methods & Sampling strategy.....	12
Quantitative component	13
Qualitative component	13
Overview	14
Challenges and Limitations.....	14
FINDINGS	15
1. Context.....	15
1.1 Displacement dynamics.....	15
1.2 Social cohesion	18
1.3 Impact of the conflict on the economy.....	19
1.4 Environmental risks and infrastructure damages	22
2. Needs and priorities	25
2.1 Households' demographics and vulnerabilities	25
2.2 Accommodation	27
2.3 Priority needs.....	29
2.4 Households' incomes	31
2.5 Public service needs.....	33
3. Humanitarian response	35
3.1 Humanitarian assistance received by households	35
3.2 Mapping of local response actors.....	37
3.3 Ability to provide services in priority hromadas	38
3.4 Humanitarian response in conflict-affected hromadas	39
3.5 Coordination of the response	39
3.6 Priority needs of local respondents	42
CONCLUSION	43

List of Acronyms

ABA:	Area-Based Assessment
ATM:	Arrival and Transit Monitoring
CCCM:	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
CSM:	Collective Site Monitoring
DTM:	Displacement Tracking Matrix
IDP:	Internally Displaced Person
ILO:	International Labour Organisation
IOM:	International Organisation for Migration
EA:	Economic Actor
FGD:	Focus Group Discussion
FIRMS:	Fire Information for Resource Management System
GoU:	Government of Ukraine
HH:	Household
KII:	Key Informant Interview
LACA:	Local Authority from Conflict-Affected Hromadas
LRA:	Local Response Actor
MoD:	Ministry of Defence
NGO:	Non-Governmental Organisation
PSP:	Public Service Provider
SDR:	Secondary Data Review
SESU:	State Emergency Service of Ukraine
SME:	Small and Medium Enterprises

Geographical Classifications

Oblast/region:	First-level administrative unit (24)
Raion/district:	Second-level administrative unit (136)
Hromada/municipality:	Third-level administrative unit (1,496)

List of Figures, Tables and Maps

Figure 1: Most reported reasons for coming to the settlement	16
Figure 2: Perception of relationships between displaced and non-displaced population	18
Figure 3: Distribution of heads of households	25
Figure 4: Households' vulnerabilities	26
Figure 5: Accommodation of displaced households	27
Figure 6: Most reported channels for finding accommodation	28
Figure 7: Most reported needs of households to recover from the crisis	29
Figure 8: Most discussed issues mentioned in FGDs with local response actors	30
Figure 9: Monthly Incomes' Evolution of Displaced Households in Collective Sites	32
Figure 10: Monthly Incomes' Evolution of Displaced Households not in Collective Sites	33
Figure 11: Monthly Incomes' Evolution of Non-Displaced Households	33
Figure 12: Most reported humanitarian assistance by households	35
Figure 13: Reported type of assistance providers for displaced households	36
Table 1: Sampling of households' data collection	13
Table 2: Collection methods and samples	14
Table 3: Reported reasons for choosing accommodation	27
Table 4: Reported length of possible stay of displaced households	28
Table 5: Services that have reportedly become more difficult to access	34
Table 6: Local response actors operating throughout all raions of the oblast	41
Table 7: Most reported priority needs of local respondents	13

Map 1: Map of assessed areas.....	12
Map 2: Reported origin of displaced households	16
Map 3: Density of conflict incidents in conflict-affected hromadas	24
Map 4: Top-3 households' most reported needs	33
Map 5: Top-3 services that have become more difficult to access for households	35
Map 6: Local response actors operating in particular raions of the oblast.....	41

INTRODUCTION

The sudden escalation of the war in Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has intensified the humanitarian crisis in the country. Among the primary issues of concern are **nearly seven million people displaced within the country as of August 2022**.⁸

The scale of the displacement has led to questions about the impacts of population influx on host communities. In response, collective sites were established in different types of public and private buildings, including in many educational facilities (schools, kindergartens, university dormitories, etc.).⁹ The Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) cluster has currently mapped more than 7,000 collective sites across Ukraine.¹⁰ According to the International Organisation for Migration's (IOM) General Population survey, approximately 4% of the displaced population resides in a collective center, while the majority live in private residences in the community. While there are indications that needs among the population in collective centers are higher than those in the general population, **there is limited reliable data available to allow for representative comparisons between demographics** such as host community, displaced households living in collective sites, and those living out of collective sites.

In addition, while many displaced households are located within the communities, **little is known concerning their access to public services**, in parallel with the humanitarian support they receive in and out of collective sites. Similarly, the scale up of the response to involve national government, local civil society and international humanitarian actors has led to questions around coordination between these various actors. In a recent study by ACAPS, it was found that challenges exist in distribution systems and coordination structures at different levels of the response.¹¹ As of June 2022, there was **limited information available at the sub-national level on the coordination of response** efforts to address displacement concerns.

Dnipropetrovska oblast plays a key role in hosting displaced populations inside Ukraine. Official statistics in May reported the registration of 225,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), a number representing less than a third of the actual figure according to the regional council.¹² According to the Organisation for Migration's (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), this influx makes Dnipropetrovska oblast the host to the largest number of refugees in the country.¹³ Moreover, the crucial role of the oblast as an arrival a transit hub is only expected to increase in the coming months as hostilities continue to escalate in the East and South of the country.¹⁴

In this context, REACH worked with the CCCM cluster to develop and implement **an assessment on displacement dynamics and the humanitarian response in Dnipropetrovska** to support the information needs of the cluster and other actors work in the displacement response in the oblast. REACH and the cluster consulted with a wide range of additional stakeholders to gather input on the research design as well as interpretation of findings, including local authorities and local organisations.

⁸ International Organisation for Migration (IOM), [Ukraine | Displacement \(iom.int\)](https://www.iom.int), August 2022.

⁹ REACH / UNHCR Collective Site Monitoring (CSM) survey dashboard: [Ukraine CCCM \(reach-info.org\)](https://reach-info.org), July 2022.

¹⁰ As of September 2022, following a baseline mapping conducted by the CCCM cluster with support of REACH, UNHCR, IOM, ACTED, NRC and other partners. Obtainable via CCCM cluster.

¹¹ ACAPS, [Ukraine: Bridging humanitarian response | ACAPS](https://www.acaps.org), May 2022.

¹² Dnipropetrovska Regional State Administration, ["There are more than 225,000 displaced people in the Dnipropetrovska region."](https://www.dniproregion.gov.ua), May 2022.

¹³ IOM, [Ukraine — Internal Displacement Report — General Population Survey Round 7 \(17 - 23 July 2022\) | DTM \(iom.int\)](https://www.iom.int), July 2022.

¹⁴ Ministry for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine ["The number of internally displaced persons \(IDPs\) in Ukraine has exceeded 8 million people: from where and where did the most go"](https://www.mrt.gov.ua), May 2022.

The assessment sought to fill the information gaps highlighted above through answering the following:

Research questions:

- **What are the humanitarian needs of the community in Dnipropetrovska** and how do they vary by geography and displacement status?
- **Which local NGOs, CSOs or individual volunteers are responding** to these needs and what are they doing?
- **In what ways could the local response be supported or made more efficient?**

The purpose of the assessment and this report is to provide an **overview of the needs and concerns of displaced populations in Dnipropetrovska Oblast**, including a comparison of the needs and concerns with non-displaced populations, and **an assessment of how these needs and concerns are currently being met by local response actors**. In addition, this report provides insights on elements such as displacement dynamics or economic, social and environmental impacts of the conflict to contribute to a **better understanding of the context in which the needs occur and the response is taking place**. The report is therefore organised into the following sections:

- 1) Context (displacement dynamics, economic impact, etc.).
- 2) Needs and priorities of the displaced and non-displaced households in Dnipropetrovska oblast.
- 3) Humanitarian response.


METHODOLOGY

Geographical scope

The geographical scope of the assessment encompasses:

- 138 **settlements** across the oblast (Dnipro city and 137 settlements outside Dnipro City): these settlements have been determined randomly to be representative at the oblast level, excluding settlements within a range of 30 kilometers from the line of contact.
- Four **priority hromadas** (Dnipro City, Kryvyi Rih, Tsarychanka, and Petropavlivka): purposely selected for their particular interest to the humanitarian response, partly due to their high influx of IDPs. They were also chosen for their value in exposing variations between urban and rural hromadas.
- Five **conflict-affected hromadas** (Nikopolska, Zelenodolska, Apostolivska, Shyrokivska, and Pokrovska): purposefully selected to address gaps of information in the reportedly most affected by security incidents hromadas in the oblast.

Map 1: Map of assessed areas



Data collection methods & Sampling strategy

This ABA follows a **mixed-methods approach**, consisting of both quantitative and qualitative research methods. Before the start of primary data collection, REACH conducted a secondary data review (SDR) to build contextual knowledge to identify information gaps and inform tool design and the data collection plan. It was later used to triangulate findings.

Quantitative component

This ABA provides a series of findings that are representative of the population at the oblast level. To that end, REACH conducted a total of **1304 household surveys** through face-to-face interviews across the oblast from 2 July to 17 July 2022. Households were selected through two stage random sampling in six strata (see table 1), producing results that are generalisable and comparable – with a 95% level of confidence and 7% margin of error – between **displacement status** (displaced in collective sites, displaced out of collective sites, and not displaced) and **areas of settlement** (inside and outside Dnipro City). To ensure the safety of field staff, no face-to-face interviews were conducted in settlements that lie within a range of 30 kilometers from the line of contact.

Table 1. Sampling of households' data collection.

	Displaced population in collective sites	Displaced population out of collective sites	Non-displaced population
Dnipro City	241	242	226
Outside Dnipro City	182	202	211
Total	423	444	437

Additionally, an actor mapping including **53 local response actors' key informant interviews (LRA-KIIs)** across the oblast was conducted to obtain general information on their role and capacities in crisis response. Local response actors were identified via REACH Ukraine's network of informant, followed by snowballing. They were interviewed remotely through telephone calls from 22 – 30 June 2022. Contrary to the household survey, this data is not representative of local response actors at the oblast level and should therefore be considered indicative. It however allows to discern trends concerning the activities, capacities and needs of local response actors in the oblast.

Qualitative component

Qualitative data collection took place between 4 July 2022 and 2 August 2022 in four **priority hromadas** (Dnipro City, Kryvyi Rih, Tsarychanka and Petropavlivka) and in five **conflict-affected hromadas** (Nikopol, Zelenodolska, Apostolivska, Pokrovska and Shyrokivska). Priority hromadas were chosen for their particular interest to the humanitarian response, partly due to their high influx of IDPs. Conflict-affected hromadas assessed are the five most affected by security incidents in the oblast according to our preliminary research, they were assessed in a later stage on the data collection to address gaps of information in conflict-affected area of the oblast.

Unlike oblast-level quantitative methods described above, these data collection methods aim to draw local-based conclusions and inform the response in specific hromadas. Therefore, findings that emerge in priority and conflict-affected hromadas assessed do not aim to be representative at the oblast-level. Instead, they illustrate trends taking place locally, provide local expertise and knowledge on these trends, and inform variations between urban and rural areas. Some findings however – in particular concerning economic analysis – properly balanced, can give indication on generalizable dynamics in Dnipropetrovska oblast.

A total of **20 public service providers' key informant interviews (PSP-KIIs)** were conducted in the priority hromadas in order to understand the impact of the conflict on major service provider (education, healthcare, social, administrative, and finance). Key informants were selected purposively and interviewed remotely through telephone calls. Five interviews were conducted with representatives from each major service provider in each priority hromada.

REACH also conducted **8 economic actors' focus group discussions (EA-FGDs)** and **8 local response actors' focus group discussions (LRA-FGDs)** to understand the economic impact of the conflict, and the priorities and opportunities for the response. Two EA-FGDs were conducted in each priority hromada with a purposive sample of economic actors (local businesses, trade union and chamber of commerce representatives, owners of banks, owners of industrial and agricultural businesses). Two LRA-FGDs were conducted in each priority hromada with a purposive sample of local response actors (local authorities, local actors and representatives of key communities).

An additional 5 **key informant interviews with local authorities of conflict-affected hromadas (LACA-KIIs)** were conducted. Key informants were selected purposively and interviewed remotely through telephone calls. One interview was conducted in each conflict-affected hromadas assessed with one representative from the local authorities.

Overview

Table 2. Collection methods and samples

	Nature of data	Collection method	Respondents	Sample size	Geographical scope	Distinction
HH survey	Quantitative	Survey	Households	1304	All across the oblast	Inside/outside Dnipro City
LRA-KIIs	Quantitative	Key informant interviews	Local response actors	53	All across the oblast	Inside/outside Dnipro City
PSP-KIIs	Qualitative	Key informant interviews	Public service providers	20	Priority hromadas	Urban/rural
EA-FGDs	Qualitative	Focus group discussions	Economic actors	8	Priority hromadas	Urban/rural
LRA-FGDs	Qualitative	Focus group discussions	Local response actors	8	Priority hromadas	Urban/rural
LACA-KIIs	Qualitative	Key informant interviews	Local authorities	5	Conflict-affected hromadas	-

Challenges and Limitations

Firstly, as exposed above, quantitative and qualitative components are of various nature and span across different geographic scopes. While it allows for different types of analysis, the reader should keep in mind that only the household survey is statistically representative at the oblast level, and that most findings of qualitative components rather inform localized trends. In addition, quantitative and qualitative are designed to expose different variations. While quantitative tools are designed to expose variations between displacement status and areas of settlement (in and out of Dnipro City), qualitative tools are designed to highlight variations between precise hromadas, and between urban and rural set-ups.

Secondly, some collection tools relied too extensively on particular actors. First, findings related to conflict-affected hromadas lack some elements of analysis since only remote telephone calls with local authorities' representatives were conducted due to security considerations. These findings are therefore highly reliant on local authorities' information and point of views and should be considered at such. Second, the analysis related to the local response relies mainly on insights given by local organisations (local NGOs and volunteers initiatives). It reflects therefore their perspective of the response, their needs and their interests. This leads to some information gaps concerning the capacities and needs of local authorities, and of international organisations involved in the humanitarian response.

FINDINGS

1. Context


The first section of this report exposes the evolution of displacement, social, economic, and environmental dynamics since the start of the conflict in the oblast. It relies on quantitative and qualitative data, and has been triangulated with secondary data review.

1.1 Displacement dynamics

Areas of origin of the displaced population

The oblasts from which most of the displaced households came from are Donetsk (46% of households), Luhanska (31%), and Kharkivska (11%), followed by Khersonska (6%) and Zaporizka oblast (4%). This is in line with findings of the REACH Humanitarian Situation Monitoring (CSM) from July 2022¹⁵. The CSM highlighted in addition that a large influx of newly arrived IDPs was reported in Kryvyi Rih and Vodiiane (Dnipropetrovska oblast).

Map 2. Reported origin of displaced households



¹⁵ REACH, [Humanitarian Situation Monitoring \(Round 4\)](#), July 2022.

Push and pull factors for displacement


Push factors

The most commonly reported reasons for **leaving the settlements of habitual residence** were active fighting (presence of troops) (67%), shelling in or near my settlement (42%), loss of access to services (34%), and loss of livelihoods (27%). These findings further corroborate the indicative findings of REACH's Arrival and Transit Monitoring (ATM) in July, according to which the top 3 reported reasons for leaving area of origin (by households living in Dnipro) were shelling in/near the settlement (54%), worried about conflict escalation in the next days (43%), active conflict in my settlement (39%).¹⁶

Pull factors

The most commonly reported reasons for **coming to the settlement where households currently reside** are disaggregated by living arrangement in the Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. Most reported reasons for coming to the settlement, by displaced living arrangement (multiple choice question)



Displacement

A majority of displaced households (84%) arrived in the settlement between March and May. These findings are explained by the escalation of hostilities in Donetsk oblast in early April which pushed the head of the Donetsk Oblast State Administration, Pavlo Kyrylenko, to call on residents to leave the oblast, adding that authorities will facilitate evacuations.¹⁷ According to REACH previous findings, IDPs arriving during that time and after are likely to prefer settling in areas closer to their area of origin and increasingly in smaller rural settlements, suggesting that assistance is also required outside urban centers.¹⁸

Overall, **80%** of displaced household reportedly have come directly to the settlement where they currently reside from their place of habitual residence. Among those households who reportedly have passed through other settlements (20%), the majority (98%) passed through a single settlement. Only 6% of displaced households reported being abroad and returning to Ukraine since February 24, 2022. The most commonly

¹⁶ REACH, [Arrival and Transit Monitoring](#), July 2022.

¹⁷ OCHA, [Ukraine: Humanitarian Impact Situation Report](#), April 2022.

¹⁸ REACH, [Rapid Assessment: Evacuations from Eastern Oblasts](#), April 2022.

reported reason for returning to Ukraine was the lack of income and livelihoods in host country (40% of households).

Movement Intentions

Only **9%** of displaced household reported a **clear intention to move again in the next month** (11% for displaced households in collective sites, 6% for displaced households out of collective sites). Of those (n = 76), 49% reported intention to return to their settlement of habitual residence, 39% to another settlement, and only 12% reported planning to move to another country. The most reported **push factors** for moving the next month were security considerations (36% of displaced households) and difficulties with adjusting to the current location (33%). The **pull factors** for not moving the next month included availability of permanent accommodation (24%), the location of friends/ family (21%), and availability of income/ work (20%).

IDPs movements can be pendular; some people return to their places of habitual residence to assess the situation of their houses before deciding where to go next.¹⁹ Overall, **14%** of displaced households reported having **temporarily returned to their place of habitual residence** since leaving. Among those, 9% reported returning once, and 5% reported returning multiple times. The most commonly reported reasons for returning to the settlement of habitual residence were to collect belongings (82% of households), to check if the house has been damaged (47%), to visit family and friends (20%), and to collect family or friends (8%). According to REACH ATM, 95% (n=278) of assessed households in Dnipro reported intentions to return to their place of habitual residence at some point in the future, mostly when there would be no more active fighting.²⁰

Displacement dynamics in conflict-affected areas

Representative of local authorities from the conflict-affected hromadas assessed in the southern edge of the oblast indicated that they **suffered high displacement** in their hromadas. According to them, half (50%) the population from Zelenodolska, and almost a third (30%) of Apostolivska and Nikopol oblasts fled after February 24, 2022. However, many returned since then (20% in Zelenodolska). The most commonly reported reasons for staying or returning to these oblasts according to LACA-KIs are work, impossibility to leave houses or farms, and lack of money. For many people, their decision to leave the hromada can only be driven by an increase in the intensity of fighting.

"They [IDPs] don't want to start everything from the scratch. Our people are mostly stay-at-home, who are used to their environment. Despite the hostilities nearby, which we can hear and which are very scary, people tend to stay"

Representative of local authorities, Shyrokiivska

LACA-KIs indicated that IDPs joining their hromadas are coming predominantly from Donetsk, Kherson and Luhansk. Most IDPs came to stay at friends and relatives' accommodation. But some are also being hosted via local authorities and volunteers' initiatives such as public housing or accommodations free of charge. The most commonly reasons for IDPs to stay in these hromadas are relative safety, comfort and access to affordable or free accommodation.

¹⁹ ACAPS, [Thematic report. Return movement dynamics of IDPs and refugees](#), July 2022.


²⁰ REACH, [Arrival and Transit Monitoring](#), July 2022.

1.2 Social cohesion

Social cohesion according to the household survey

Results from the **household survey** are quite positive. Overall, **70%** of households reported that relationships between displaced and non-displaced populations in the settlement were 'very good' or 'good', and 3% of household reported that relationships were 'bad'. Nonetheless, 45% of household reported that the relationships between displaced and non-displaced populations should be improved. Finally, 7% of displaced households reported that the relationships between displaced and non-displaced populations have become worse since the they first arrived at the location.

Figure 2. Perception of relationships between displaced and non-displaced population, displayed by displacement status (one choice question)



Social cohesion according to the local response actors

Participants of LRA-FGDs were less encouraging regarding social cohesion between displaced and non-displaced populations in their hromadas. They frequently raise tensions due to perceived bad behaviours of IDPs, or perceived lack of appreciation, reportedly impacting the willingness of local organisations to continue providing support. This issue was raised in Kryvyi Rih, Tsarychanka and Petropavlivka, it was not the case in Dnipro city. Some participants also expressed disapproval of male IDPs unwillingness to register officially, perceiving it as an attempt to avoid being drafted into the armed forces.

"We have summer camps where IDPs live, the local population is annoyed that music is constantly playing there, people are having fun there as if nothing is happening in the country".

Local response actor, Tsarychanka

Participants of the LRA-FGDs however discussed a series of factors that could enable better social cohesion between displaced and non-displaced population. Among those were: integration initiatives for IDPs (social

events, educational projects, etc.), legal and psychological support for IDPs, active involvement of IDPs in the local response, employment, and retraining of IDPs.

"Preparation for schools and English lessons improve the psychological state of children. They don't even ask adults when they will go home".

Local response actor, Dnipro City

1.3 Impact of the conflict on the economy

Ukraine's economy is expected to shrink by an estimated 45.1% this year.²¹ Entire sectors of the country's economy have been plunged into crisis in the aftermath of the invasion. According to some estimates, the total direct and indirect damage to the economy has already reached \$600 billion (including \$83 billion of direct losses for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)). Moreover, forecasts are dire; with the budget deficit expected to exceed \$35 billion by the end of 2022, and 30% of Ukrainians potentially falling below the poverty line.²² This sub-section of the report exposes illustrations and trends in the four priority hromadas assessed. The findings rely on discussions with economic actors (EA-FGDs) and have been triangulated with secondary data.

General impacts of the conflict on the economy of priority hromadas

There was a consensus among economic actors participating in EA-FGDs that the conflict has had a negative impact on the local economy. Participants shared accounts of businesses having to reduce, relocate or cease their activities in order to cope with the crisis. However, some participants of the EA-FGDs insisted that the economy has been less impacted, especially in Dnipro City, than in conflict-affected hromadas where the impact is more acute (e.g., Zelenodolska estimates to suffer a loss of 50 to 80% due to the decrease of its commercial activities).

The **closure of ports and logistic disruptions** hampers export and import activities. Before the escalation of the conflict, many producers relied on ports to reach foreign markets. They are now forced to seek land-based alternatives which, when feasible, increase costs and duration of transportation. Participants discussed for example the delays at the border, the drivers' salaries, or railway disruptions. A few participants also denounced a widespread practice of corruption at border crossings. Many called for an implication of the authorities in the improvement of logistic routes and durations of transport across the country.

"We used to send goods via ports by sea. Now we use land transportation, though it is too long and expensive. Hence, the cost of logistics and goods has increased".

Economic actor, Tsarychanka

Participants of EA-FGDs also highlighted the **increase of costs for producers**. This is mainly the consequence of increased fuel and input prices, fluctuations in exchange rate, and the logistic disruptions mentioned previously. This in turn leads to price increases that affect end-consumers directly. Monthly data collected by the Ukraine Cash Working Group (CWG) as part of its Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (JMMI) shows median prices of core food and non-food items in the central region, which includes Dnipropetrovska oblast, had increased by 29% between May and June 2022.²³

"There is a lack of raw materials, logistics does not work, and fuel prices have increased significantly. These factors affect the cost".

Economic actor, Kryvyi Rih

²¹ The World Bank, ["Russian Invasion to Shrink Ukraine Economy by 45 Percent this Year"](#), April 2022.

²² Working Group for "Economic Recovery and Development", [Working Groups | Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine \(kmu.gov.ua\)](#), July 2022.

²³ ACTED, OCHA, REACH, [Ukraine: Joint Market Monitoring Initiative \(JMMI\) - June 2022 - Ukraine | ReliefWeb](#), June 2022.

Chain disruptions are caused by the inaccessibility of occupied territories. Inputs (notably raw materials) and finished goods from these territories have become inaccessible for economic actors, which impacts production. One participant in Kryvyi Rih also mentioned that some products shipped to these regions have been lost or stolen, leading producers to incur serious losses.

"Enterprises are locked in the occupied territories. Supply and collection of goods are impossible. The product gets uncompetitive or unprofitable".

Economic actor, Kryvyi Rih

Participants of EA-FGDs also reported a **decrease in demand for goods and services** as suppressing production and commercial activities. This is partly the result of the loss of markets in occupied territories, as well as a fall in purchasing power of households in Dnipropetrovska oblast. Household incomes have decreased, while prices are rising. This particularly affects expensive or 'non-essential' products such as furniture, clothing, or luxury items. It also impacts the service sector, notably cafes, restaurants or the entertainment industry. Conversely, there is an **increase in demand** for essential goods and food products. According to participants, it was initially due to panic in the early days of the conflict, and it is now followed by the need to sustain an increase of population. Although the prices for these products have risen, participants did not express any concerns about the ability of the market to meet this demand.

"People buy only necessities".

Economic actor, Tsarychanka

Coping mechanisms in priority hromadas

Several coping mechanisms are being implemented by economic actors throughout the country to cope with the crisis, many of which were addressed by participants during the EA-FGDs. These mechanisms reflect positive recovery dynamics that are observed at the country's level. For example, while 73.8% of the enterprises are estimated to have stop working completely in March 2022, there were only 20.6% in May, suggesting that 53% of enterprises resumed some level of activity.²⁴ Statistics on new business registrations also suggest improvement. In Dnipropetrovska oblast, 2,389 business entities were registered in the first 3 months of the conflict (third oblast in the country after Kiev and Lviv).²⁵

One coping mechanism that was discussed during the EA-FGDs is the **switch of production activities to the support of the Ministry of Defense** (MoD). Enterprises from the light industry, the technology sector or the food sector redirect their activities by producing and/or sending goods (e.g., clothes, laptops, waters) to support the war effort. A second coping mechanism is the **switch from exports to domestic sales** to meet national needs. Some participants stated that there is no need to search for external markets when several enterprises already face a strong demand inside Ukraine.

Many adapt to the needs of the Department of Defense in order to have contracts".

Economic Actor, Dnipro city

Governmental support

Half of the participants in the EA-FGDs called for a more extensive support from the State in the form of financial (refunds, grants, or subsidies), logistic, or legal support (e.g., simplification of procedures). On the other hand, the Government of Ukraine (GoU) affirms to contribute to business revival through multiple support programs such as a business relocation program, a new tax policy, interest-free lending programs, etc. It seems therefore appropriate to ask to which extend these programs are appropriated by economic actors or how aware they are of such programs. In this regard, a publication prepared by the Initiative for Economic Recovery of Ukraine provides a strong illustration. According to their estimations, 80,1% of

²⁴ Working Group for "Economic Recovery and Development", [Working Groups | Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine \(kmu.gov.ua\)](https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/working-groups), July 2022.

²⁵ Business.diia.gov.ua, [Ukrainian business in the conditions of war: analysis of the state for three months \(diia.gov.ua\)](https://business.diia.gov.ua/en/ukrainian-business-in-the-conditions-of-war-analysis-of-the-state-for-three-months), May 2022.

businesses do not communicate with their hromadas or oblast administrations and 94,1% do not know if they are eligible for these assistance programs.²⁶

"The government must understand that businesses needs state support".

Economic Actor, Dnipro City

Employment and labour market

According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), nearly five million jobs have been lost in Ukraine since the start of the conflict on 24 February.²⁷ The GoU further reports that high unemployment rates, a massive outflow of workforce and the risk of non-return of Ukrainian citizens who went abroad are key challenges for the Ukrainian economy.²⁸

Employment figures

Overall, **67%** of displaced respondents reported being employed before the displacement. Among them, **54%** reportedly had to leave their job since February 24. Of those, only 19% reported that they had found a new job since their displacement. Surprisingly, this figure shows a positive dynamic according to the oblast's regional authorities, when taking into considerations the small proportion of vacancies available in the oblast. In addition, only 16% of displaced respondents being employed before the war reportedly kept working actively. Of those, 42% reported working remotely.

"There are 300,000 IDPs in the region, of which 155,000 are able-bodied people, and at the same time only 1,000 vacancies are available in the regional employment center".

Representative of the oblast authorities, Dnipro City

Barriers to employment

The most commonly reported reasons by households for not finding a new job were: a lack of vacancies (51%), lack of respondents' qualifications to find a job in the new place (15%), and lack of knowledge on where to look for a job (13%). Importantly, of those who have found a new job (19%), 57% reportedly described their salary as 'much less' than the salary before February 24, 2022.

Accordingly, participants of EA-FGDs gave similar accounts of employment barriers in their hromadas. Most EA-FGDs (6 out of 8) addressed the issue of the lack of vacancies and the job cuts. Regarding the qualifications, all participants agreed that there is a shortage of skilled workers and specialists (doctors, nurses, industrial equipment maintenance workers, electric and gas welders, etc.). The shortage of agricultural workers was also addressed, mostly in Tsarychanka and Petropavlivka (rural hromadas). Conversely, participants in five EA-FGDs highlighted a labour surplus in the service sector and for unskilled functions.

"If before the war there was a shortage of several doctors, now this number has increased despite the fact that some positions of medical workers are occupied by temporarily displaced persons".

Economic actor, Petropavlivka

For more than half of the EA-FGDs, **the main factor for employment is skills**, and therefore being part of certain population group does not impact your vulnerability when it comes to employment. The vulnerabilities of certain population groups were however discussed in 5 EA-FGDs. For instance, some participants discussed additional difficulties for women to find a job, such as the need to take care of children, or smaller number of vacancies available. Finally, in line with findings from the household survey, participants in half the EA-FGDs (4 out of 8) reported a decrease in salaries.

²⁶ Business.diaa.gov.ua, [Regional results of the study of the state and needs of business in the conditions of war \(diaa.gov.ua\)](https://business.diaa.gov.ua/region/region-results-of-the-study-of-the-state-and-needs-of-business-in-the-conditions-of-war), May 2022.

²⁷ International Labour Organization (ILO), [The impact of the Ukraine crisis on the world of work: Initial assessments](#), May 2022.

²⁸ Ukraine Government Portal, [Economic Recovery and Development.docx \(kmu.gov.ua\)](#), July 2022.

"It is not difficult to find people for unskilled work. The problem is to find people for positions where technical skills and knowledge are needed".

Economic actor, Dnipro City

1.4 Environmental risks and infrastructure damages

Since the beginning of the conflict, more than 100 cases of ecocide²⁹ and more than 1,200 facts of negative impact on the environment (explosion of shells, burning of forests, chemical pollution, etc.) have been recorded in Ukraine.³⁰ The most dangerous for the environment are attacks on Ukrainian nuclear power plants, infrastructure and industrial facilities, nature reserves and ecosystems, and water resources.

According to the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine, 4.8 million hectares are mined, excluding the Chernobyl exclusion zone, rivers, and swamps.³¹ Since the beginning of the war, the pyrotechnic work groups of the Special Emergency Rescue Squad of the SESU (State Emergency Service of Ukraine) in the Dnipropetrovska oblast have discovered and destroyed more than 4,000 explosive objects.³²

Environmental considerations in priority hromadas

The main environmental risk in Dnipropetrovska oblast, according to participants of half of the LRA-FGDs is the shelling of industrial infrastructures, which are considered 'ecological disasters'. Accordingly, large-scale fires at infrastructure and industrial facilities lead to air poisoning by particularly dangerous substances. Shelling and fires in cities lead to toxic emissions into the air, which affects everyone who is near the place of impact and the resulting fire. Such damage can have a long-term effect and even lead to chemical poisoning.

Other major environmental risks are the remnants of exploded or unexploded ordnance that are likely to be found almost anywhere in Ukraine. Exploded or partially exploded ordnance can result in soil and eventually ground water contamination. Participants of LRA-FGDs in Tsarychanka and Petropavlivka (rural hromadas) reported being more exposed to the remnants of the war (e.g., metals in the air, solid and chemical remnants carried by the river).

Large-scale agriculture

The war has caused significant damage to Ukraine's agricultural sector, which before the war accounted for 11% of Ukraine's gross domestic product.³³ Now that the harvesting season is just around the corner, thousands of hectares of fertile land have been destroyed or damaged. According to the Dnipropetrovska oblast authorities, severe fires engulfed agricultural facilities in the Dnipropetrovska region.³⁴ Moreover, since 24 February, at least 25 grain saving objects, such as elevators, grain terminals and agricultural warehouses, have been destroyed, severely damaged or occupied across the country.³⁵ In Dnipropetrovska oblast, a grain hangar, a grain warehouse and two elevators were destroyed by rocket fire.³⁶

²⁹ Ecocide refers to the "unlawful or wanton acts committed with knowledge that there is a substantial likelihood of severe and either widespread or long-term damage to the environment being caused by those acts". World Economic Forum, [What is Ecocide and Can it be Prosecuted by the International Criminal Court? | World Economic Forum \(weforum.org\)](#), July 2021.

³⁰ Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources of Ukraine, [Overview of Russia's crimes against Ukraine's environment](#), April 2022.

³¹ Military Feodal, <https://military.feodal.online/landing/en/index.html>, August 2022.

³² State Emergency Service of Ukraine, [Employees of the State Emergency Service reminded citizens of the rules of behavior when explosive objects are discovered](#), August 2022.

³³ USAID, [Agriculture Fact sheet](#), July 2022.

³⁴ Head of Dnipropetrovska oblast administration – Valentyn Reznichenko, [Telegram: Contact @dnipropetrovskaODA](#), July 2022.

³⁵ REACH, [Agrarian sector in proximity to conflict - 24 Feb. to 15 July 2022: Damage to elevator capacities](#), July 2022.


³⁶ AgroPortal, [A missile hit an elevator in Dnipropetrovska region](#), July 2022.

Infrastructure damages in conflict-affected hromadas

According to preliminary estimates of the Ministry for Communities and Territories Development of Ukraine, 116,000 residential buildings were destroyed or damaged in Ukraine, with initially more than 3.5 million Ukrainians living in these buildings.³⁷ The destruction of buildings and settlements leads to environmental pollution with construction debris and asbestos.

The NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS), which detects large fires, recorded the hottest spots along the front line in Ukraine. Numerous fires in cities and fields due to shellings were recorded in all conflict-affected hromadas of Dnipropetrovska oblast. As illustrated in the map below, the hromadas that are most affected by shelling are Zelenodolska, Pokrovska, Apostolivska, Shyrokiwska and Nikopolska. For instance, an open area near one of the enterprises in the city of Zelenodolsk was attacked which caused a fire on an area of about 3.5 hectares.

Map 3. Density of conflict incidents in conflict-affected hromadas of the oblast



During LACA-KIIs, 4 key informants have reported damages on infrastructure in their hromada and 3 of them reported high costs estimations (an approximate price of 150 million UAH for Zelenodolska). Zelenodolska is by far the most affected, while Pokrovska is said to not have suffered any damages. 3 out of 5 KIIs affirmed to have suffered damage on education facilities (5 schools and 2 kindergartens in Zelenodolska). 3 out of 5 KIIs reported damages on residential buildings (700 private houses and 400 apartments in Zelenodolska). 3 out of 5 KIIs reported damages on roads and bridges (1 bridge destroyed near the village of Maryanske in Zelenodolska). Zelenodolska also reported several other damages on 2 cultural centers, 1 village council, 1 hospital, 1 rescue station, 1 post office, 1 stadium and 1 bank (Oschabank).

³⁷ Ministry of energy and environment protection of Ukraine, [Briefing on the environmental damage caused by the Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine](#), July 2022.

Four out of five LACA-KIs have recovery plans under development in their hromadas, mostly oriented towards building restorations. They are currently assessing the damages, and contacting partners to provide assistance. However, some affirm that damaged buildings cannot be restored while hostilities are ongoing.

Energy and water facilities in conflict-affected hromadas

Shelling impacts directly energy and water facilities in conflict-affected hromadas, leading to energy and water disruption. For instance in Nikopol, on July 22, a gas pipeline and water pipeline were damaged, and the railway track was destroyed.³⁸ In Shyroktivska, on July 6, the solar power plant was damaged, and on July 23 it was the gas pipeline and electricity grid, leading to a lack of electricity to power homes, businesses, and hospitals.³⁹

During FACA-KIIS, 4 out of 5 key informants reported damage on water and energy facilities. Apostolivska suffered from damages on water pipelines, power lines and gas pipelines. Shyroktivska also reported disruption in their gas and electricity supply, adding that repairman cannot reach some areas when active hostilities are taking place. In Zelenodolska, the key informant indicated disruptions in power supply, stressing the needs for high-capacity 3-phase generators from 50 to 70 kW to cope with this issue. In addition, he reported that local utility services, electricians, gas workers and the SESU were constantly working to restore gas and electricity supply. In addition, the hromada still suffer from strong disruptions of its water supply.

"The waterworks was destroyed in the village Maryanske, forcing inhabitants to collect water from the water tower, there is no water supply. There is a need for pipes and couplings".

Representative of local authorities, Zelenodolska

³⁸ REACH, [IMPACT UKR Hazardous-objects-and-conflict-incidents JULY2022.pdf \(impact-repository.org\)](#), July 2022.

³⁹ Ministry of energy and environment protection of Ukraine, [Briefing on the environmental damage caused by the Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine](#), July 2022.

2. Needs and priorities


The following section presents the demographic, vulnerabilities, needs, and incomes evolution of households across the oblast. It also gives indications on displaced households accommodation modalities. Findings show that displaced households (in particular those in collective sites) are more vulnerable and suffer from higher loss of incomes than non-displaced households. Most reported needs by households are economic assistance, food, and employment support. Displaced households generally report more needs, but non-displaced households expressed higher need for essential areas such as WASH and healthcare.

2.1 Households' demographics and vulnerabilities

Heads of households

A total of 1,304 respondents were surveyed, of whom **83% reported to be the Head of Household (HoHH)**. The majority of households was female-headed (61%) with an average size of three members per household. Many women are now heading households since many men were conscripted or voluntarily joined the Ukrainian armed forces⁴⁰. They now bear the responsibility to both provide and care for children, older relatives, and any other family members requiring care. The heads of households had an average of 47 years old. 25% of respondents were reportedly 61 years old or older.

Figure 3. Distribution of heads of households, by gender and age range



Households' vulnerabilities

Pensioners

Almost half of the households (47%) included at least one member who was a pensioner (individuals receiving all kind of pensions). **The proportion of households including at least one pensioner is relatively higher among IDPs living in collective sites (54%),** in comparison with households out of collective sites (42%) or non-displaced households (46%). These findings correspond with REACH Collective Site Monitoring (Round 1)⁴¹ according to which older women (77%) and older men (59%) are the most common vulnerable population present in collective sites.

⁴⁰ United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR), [Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine](#), 24 February – 15 May 2022.

⁴¹ REACH, [Collective Site Monitoring \(CSM\) survey. Ukraine - Round 1](#), June 2022.

Due to the particularities of European demography, older people account for an important proportion of the affected population in Ukraine, yet they are also among the most vulnerable. Following the crisis in 2014, the protection cluster was already alerting on the numerous challenges surrounding the provision of humanitarian support to older people. Some of the key concerns relate to mobility, access to medication, or difficulty in accessing information. The cluster also alerted on the risks of neglect, isolation, or even abuse of older people living in institutions, and/or suffering from declining family and community support.⁴²

Chronic illness

More than a quarter of the households (27%) included at least one member with a chronic illness affecting quality of life. Again, the proportion of households reporting at least one member with a chronic illness is higher among IDPs living in collective sites (32%) in comparison with IDPs living out of collective sites (25%) and non-displaced population (23%).


Disabilities

Less than a fifth of the households (18%) included at least one member with disabilities. Again, the proportion of household reporting at least one member with disabilities is higher among IDPs living in collective sites (24%) than for IDPs living out of collective sites (19%) and non-displaced population (12%).

Overview

Data confirm that displaced households living in collective sites are generally characterized by additional vulnerabilities, compared to non-displaced households and IDP households living out of collective sites. Importantly, data from the Collective Site Monitoring⁴³ shows that 48% of assessed sites in Ukraine currently **do not have an allocation plan for households with specific vulnerabilities**, raising concerns about the quality of accommodation.

Figure 4. Households' reported vulnerabilities, by displacement status



⁴² UNHCR, [Protection Cluster Ukraine: Older Persons, October 2015 \[EN/RU/UK\] - Ukraine | ReliefWeb](#), November 2015.


⁴³ REACH, [Collective Site Monitoring \(CSM\) survey, Ukraine - Round 1](#), June 2022.

2.2 Accommodation

Accommodation of households out of collective sites

The majority (74%) of displaced households living out of collective sites resides in their own accommodation (apartment or house), 24% are living in another person's home, and 2% reported to stay in a hotel or hostel. The proportion of displaced households in Dnipro city living in apartments or houses is relatively higher (83%) than for households living in areas outside Dnipro City (62%). However, it is in the areas outside Dnipro City that most displaced households are hosted in another person's home (see Figure 5 below).

Figure 5: Accommodation of displaced households out of collective sites, in and out of Dnipro City



Choice of Accommodation

Reasons for choosing an accommodation

Overall, the main reason for displaced households for choosing their accommodation are reportedly the affordability of the accommodation (27%), the fact that it is the only accommodation they are aware of (26%), and social network (26%).


Table 3. Reported reasons for choosing the accommodation, % of displaced households (by displaced living arrangement, and overall)

Reasons	Overall	IDPs in collective sites	IDPs outside of collective sites
It is affordable	27%	20%	33%
It was the only accommodation I am aware of	26%	28%	25%
It was offered to me by people I know and trust (social network)	26%	22%	30%
It was offered to me by volunteers or local authorities	19%	35%	3%
My friends/ family members were already in this accommodation	17%	14%	20%
It is comfortable	12%	8%	16%
I feel safe in this accommodation	12%	9%	14%

Channels for choosing accommodation

The most reported channels for finding accommodation for displaced households were via family and friends (47%), local NGOs and volunteers (24%), and social media (15%). As demonstrated in Figure 6 below, most IDPs in collective sites reportedly found a place to live through volunteers or local authorities.

Figure 6. Most reported channels for finding accommodation, by type of displaced households (multiple choice question)



Projected duration of stay

Nearly half (41%) of displaced households reported not knowing how long they would be able to stay in their current accommodation. Only 24% of households in collective sites reported being able to stay for as long as they want, versus 42% of households that reside in other forms of accommodation. These figures might indicate a higher degree of uncertainty and instability for displaced households in collective sites. This should be monitored carefully by humanitarian actors as the winter season approaches.

Table 4. Reported length of possible stay of displaced households, by living arrangement

Duration	IDPs in collective sites	IDPs outside collective sites
For as long as I want to	24%	42%
For up to 1 month	18%	2%
For up to 3 months	9%	9%
For up to 6 months	3%	5%
I don't know	41%	42%
Only a few days	4%	0%
Prefer not to respond	0%	0%

2.3 Priority needs

Priority needs according to households

Economic assistance/cash (54%), food (48%) and employment (48%) were the top priority needs reported by households in Dnipropetrovska oblast (see Figure 7 below).

There are a differences in reported needs between IDPs in and out of collective site. Long-term displacement needs is for instance one of the most crucial needs for both, but it is particularly significant for IDPs in collective sites (47% versus 38% for IDPs out-of-site). On the other hand, IDPs outside collective sites report more needs in NFIs (10% versus 5% for IDPs in site), and fuel (10%, versus 3% for IDP in site) These figure demonstrate variations in access to certain humanitarian aid/livelihood opportunities for IDP households in different settings.


Non-displaced households reported overall similar and sometimes higher levels of needs in essential areas such as healthcare (31%, versus 24% for IDPs), and WASH (10%, versus 4% for IDPs). However, they were 11% to report not needing any assistance (versus 1% for IDP households). It is difficult to infer why levels of needs would be higher for non-displaced, despite supposedly having access to similar healthcare infrastructure for instance. Some explanations could be the higher level of humanitarian support to IDPs (see section 3.1 of the report), or the social advantages granted to vulnerable populations (see section 2.5 of the report).

Figure 7. Most reported needs of households to recover from the crisis since 24 February 2022, by displacements status (3 choices possible)

	IDP households in-site	IDP households out-of-site	Non-displaced households
Economic assistance (cash)	55%	56%	51%
Food	37%	58%	49%
Employment	39%	28%	29%
Long-term displacement solutions	47%	38%	0%
Healthcare	24%	24%	31%
Livelihoods opportunities	19%	22%	20%
Emergency accommodation	19%	15%	1%
Fuel	3%	10%	17%
Education	7%	12%	8%
Access to social security benefits	10%	5%	8%
NFI (household goods)	5%	10%	8%
WASH	4%	6%	10%


Households living outside Dnipro City reported higher levels of needs than those living in Dnipro City.

It is the case notably for economic assistance – cash (61% for households living out of Dnipro City, versus 46% for households living in Dnipro City), and employment (39% for households living out of Dnipro City, versus 24% for households living in Dnipro City). Importantly, **non-displaced households outside Dnipro city reported a need for economic assistance** far more important than those residing in Dnipro city (60% against 35%).

Map 4. Top-3 households' most reported needs, by raion

Priority needs according to local response actors

Participants taking part in LRA-FGDs gave complementary priorities action to be taken into consideration by the humanitarian response in the oblast.

Figure 8. Most discussed issues in crisis response as mentioned in the 8 FGDs with local response actors

"In winter the problem of heating will be acute. Not all the houses where IDPs are hosted are equipped with heating. Winter clothes are necessary. A big problem is that in old buildings the wiring is old and worn-out".

Local response actor, Petropavlivska

"The procedure of the checkpoints crossing for humanitarian cargoes should be simplified at the legislative level."

Local response actor, Kryvyi Rih

In Dnipro, **participants of the LRA-FGDs stressed the issue of utility payments in the shelters**, explaining that many organisations are ready to provide IDPs with foods and NFIs but have to close their shelters due to the utility costs. They added that state and municipal institutions receive compensation for utilities, but local organisations and businesses do not. The approach of winter exacerbates this issue and increases the need to find a timely solution, according to participants.

"We need to solve the issue of payment and compensation for utility expenses. All shelters already have debts from the previous season. Consequently, most shelters will be liquidated and we will see social tension between displaced and non-displaced populations. People will return to the occupied territories or to the unsafe areas where their homes are."

Local response actor, Dnipro city

Priority needs in conflict-affected hromadas

Conflict-affected hromadas have suffered numerous damages on infrastructure, residential areas and energy facilities. These communities are therefore in strong need of **early recovery support**. The top three recovery priorities reported in these hromadas are construction materials (4/5 KIIs), technical work/construction/repair (4/5 KIIs) and heating solutions (3/5 KIIs).

In Zelenodolsk, the hromada that suffered the most from shelling, the absence of windows, roofs, or ceilings on hundreds of buildings, the absence of heating sources (e.g., fuel boiler in schools), the destruction of water supply facilities (e.g., waterworks), or the lack of machinery to clean the debris, are acute issue ahead of winter. The key informant in Nikopol underlined the need for investment and industrial equipment and technologies to restore existing enterprises and create new ones.

"As result of shelling, 400 apartments, 700 private houses, and communal property objects are without windows. This is problem #1 on the eve of the heating season start".

Representative of local authorities, Zelenodolsk

According to the LACA-KIIs, humanitarian needs in the five conflict-affected hromadas are considered high in Nikopol, and very high in Zelenodolsk. There are considered moderate in the three others. The top three reported priorities are food (3/5 KIIs), hygiene products (3/5 KIIs) and fuel (2/5 KIIs). Two LACA-KIs stressed that older people should get more support from the humanitarian response.

2.4 Households' incomes

Figures from the household survey show that, while the conflict is negatively impacting household income, this is particularly the case for households that are displaced by the conflict in Dnipropetrovska oblast. On the one hand, displaced households earned less income on average than non-displaced households before the conflict, while on the other they also suffered a greater loss in income since the start of the current crisis. Among displaced households, **36%** reported currently earning **very low incomes** (less than 5,000 UAH per month), while this percentage was reportedly 15% before the conflict. In comparison, **24%** of non-displaced households reported currently earning very low incomes, while they were 16% before the start of the conflict.

Data shows that displaced households living in areas outside of Dnipro City, and particularly those in collective sites, are more negatively impacted than other displaced households. Not only are they currently

the category of displaced households with the lower incomes on average (51% of them responded currently earning very low incomes), but they also represent the highest increase reported (from 20% to 51%).

It contrasts with the other categories of displaced households, which reported a significantly lower average of households earning very low incomes: 35% for IDPs' households outside of Dnipro City not in collective sites, 32% for IDPs' households in Dnipro City in collective sites, 27% for IDPs' households in Dnipro City not in collective sites. All these categories saw a similar increase of 17-18%. These figures remain significant, but they confirm the tendencies for IDP's households to have higher incomes on average in Dnipro City and out of collective sites.

It can be argued that this situation is the result of a tendency for IDPs' households with lower incomes to reach rural areas where the cost of living is lower, and to be hosted in collective sites where they can seek humanitarian support. To this can be added the fact that this context probably provides less opportunities – such as employment or access to social services – for IDPs' households to earn higher incomes. Anyhow, the situation is alarming. The CWG estimates the minimum subsistence level at 2,220 UAH per individual in Ukraine. Less than 5,000 UAH is then far from necessary for many households (an average of 3 individuals in our study) to ensure the bare minimum for their subsistence.

Figure 9. Monthly Incomes' Evolution of Displaced Households in Collective Sites




Figure 10. Monthly Incomes' Evolution of Displaced Households not in Collective Sites





Figure 11. Monthly Incomes' Evolution of Non-Displaced Households



2.5 Public service needs

Increase of demand in priority hromadas

Since the start of the conflict, the GoU has adopted a number of regulations regarding the provision of social benefits to Ukrainian civilians who lost their source of income, became displaced, or to service members' families, in the form of payment, privileges, and rehabilitation opportunities. In addition, numerous advantages granted prior to the conflict are maintained for vulnerable populations such as pension recipients who change their place of residence during martial law⁴⁴. Social institutions may therefore face a surge of demand by beneficiaries eligible for these payments and privileges.

This trend is confirmed by key informant interviews with public service providers in priority hromadas (PSP-KIs). Representatives of social, administrative and educational services pointed out that their service saw an increase of users since the start of the conflict, partly due to arrival of IDPs and more vulnerable households in their hromadas. Most KIs indicated an increase of women, older persons and children, showing that existing vulnerabilities of these groups are likely exacerbated by the conflict. Conversely, key informants in the finance sector observed an opposite trend, despite initial surge at the start of the conflict, potentially indicating a deterioration of the economic situation of households.

Households' access to public service across the oblast

Household most reported needs

Most reported services needed since the beginning of the conflict by displaced households are IDP registration and assistance (72%), pharmacies (72%), banks or ATMs (70%), public transportation (58%), general medical care (55%). Non-displaced HHs most reported needs since the beginning of the conflict are banks or ATMs (52%), and pharmacies (50%).

Household accessibility to public services

There are significant differences in accessibility to public services between displaced households, depending on accommodation arrangement, and areas of settlement (in and out of Dnipro City). For instance, **37%** of displaced households in Dnipro city reported that there are no services that have become more difficult to access since February 24, in comparison with only 5% in other areas. Most reported needs by displaced


⁴⁴ VoxUkraine, [State regulation in wartime: how the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adapted the economy to martial law conditions](https://voxukraine.org/) (voxukraine.org), July 2022.

households in areas outside Dnipro city are banks and ATM (52%), pharmacies (52%), general medical care (41%), and employment (38%).

Table 5. Services that have reportedly become more difficult to access since the start of the conflict according to displaced households (multiple choices question)

	Displaced households in collective sites		Displaced households out of collective sites	
	Dnipro City	Outside of Dnipro City	Dnipro City	Outside of Dnipro City
Bomb shelters	4%	26%	5%	21%
Cash, banks or ATMs	16%	44%	18%	60%
Education	12%	20%	12%	28%
Employment	22%	43%	13%	32%
Financial assistance (social benefits)	5%	29%	13%	19%
General medical care	18%	38%	16%	44%
Long-term social housing	14%	23%	9%	17%
Pharmacies	20%	50%	18%	53%
Public transportation	13%	31%	12%	35%
None of the above	32%	6%	43%	5%

Map 5. Top-3 services that have become more difficult to access for households since 24th of February 2022, by raion



3. Humanitarian response

This section addresses the humanitarian response deployed in Dnipropetrovska oblast to meet the needs of the population. The aim being to identify the potential gaps in the response in terms of beneficiaries, activities and localization of implementation. Data suggests that non-displaced populations appear to benefit from less humanitarian support overall, and that when they do they receive it mostly from public service providers. The households survey and discussions with LRAs also indicate that international organisations are probably not sufficiently reaching beneficiaries in the periphery of the oblast, outside Dnipro city.

Discussions with local response actors also highlight the multiplicity of coordination structures and distribution systems that exist and operate - sometimes in parallel - at the hromada-level across the oblast. It is sometimes the result of tensions between local organisations and local authorities, leading to difficulties for international respondents to find unique interlocutors at the local level.


3.1 Humanitarian assistance received by households

Most received humanitarian assistance

A **vast majority of IDPs (91%) reported receiving humanitarian assistance** since February 24, 2022. Conversely, **only 32% of non-displaced households reported benefiting from assistance**, which may indicate a gap in provision of humanitarian assistance. For instance, of **total non-displaced respondents, only 19% of them receive financial assistance**, while 51% of non-displaced households were reportedly in need cash assistance (60% of them in areas outside Dnipro City), despite similar levels of need reported.

As seen in Figure 12 below, the most commonly reported types of assistance received by displaced and non-displaced households who receive assistance were food, employment and livelihoods, and cash.

Figure 12. Most reported assistance by households receiving humanitarian support, by displacement status.



Satisfaction with the humanitarian assistance


Households who received assistance expressed a strong level of satisfaction towards the assistance received, with an average of **97%** of households expressing “complete” (59%) or “partial” (37%) satisfaction. Only 2% expressed complete dissatisfaction, with 1% preferring not to answer.

This echoes the finding that 74% of LRA-KIs reported that “all” or “most” aspects of the response are relevant to the needs of the population in Dnipropetrovska oblast, with 85% reporting positive impact of the humanitarian intervention, and only 6% of them in Dnipro City reporting weak impact of the humanitarian work.

Assistance providers

The most commonly reported assistance providers overall for households who received assistance were **public service providers (67%)**, **volunteers initiatives (64%)**, **UN agencies (51%)**, **international organisations (44%)**, and **local organisations (41%)**.

Figure 13. Reported type of assistance providers for displaced households, by accommodation arrangement and area of settlement.



As we can see in the Figure 13 above, displaced households’ assistance providers vary vastly depending on the accommodation arrangement and the localisation of the household (in or out of Dnipro City).

More displaced households living in collective sites reported receiving humanitarian assistance from volunteer initiatives (72%) than displaced households out of collective sites (55%). This number is particularly high for displaced households in collective sites in Dnipro City (78%).

UN organisations and International organisations are reportedly far more active with displaced households in Dnipro City (59% and 53% respectively) than with non-displaced households living in areas outside Dnipro City (41% and 33% respectively).

Conversely, displaced households located outside Dnipro City reported receiving much more assistance than those living in Dnipro City from public services providers (77%), local organisations (51%), and religious organisations (47%). Figures for displaced households living in Dnipro City are respectively 59%, 33%, and 29%.


The humanitarian response for displaced households in and out of Dnipro City, and in and out of collective sites, appears therefore relatively balanced among the different type of assistance providers. However, it does not seem to reflect the extra attention that should be allocated to displaced households in collective sites characterised by more vulnerabilities, and to displaced households outside Dnipro City expressing more needs. In addition, capacities of local actors (volunteer initiatives, local organisations, etc.) run the risk to fade as the conflict wears on, notably due to a lack of funding (see section 3.5 of this report). Volunteer initiatives are particularly vulnerable as their human resources may also be dwindling, while many might return to their daily activities, or simply start to show signs of burnout after months of constant assistance.⁴⁵

For non-displaced households receiving support, the aid is coming mostly from public service providers (69%), followed by local organisations (22%) and volunteers (13%). Only 6% of non-displaced respondents reportedly receive humanitarian support from international organisations, and 5% from UN organisations.

3.2 Mapping of local response actors

Fifty-three key informants part of local response organisations (LRA-KIs) were interviewed. The map presents assessed organisations operating in particular raions of the oblast. The table below presents assessed organisations operating throughout all raions of the oblast.

Map 6. Local response actors operating in particular raions of the oblast



⁴⁵ ACAPS, [Ukraine: Bridging humanitarian response](#) | ACAPS, May 2022

Table 6. Local response actors operating throughout all raions of the oblast

Name of organisation	Main office location	Name of organisation	Main office location
NGO "Martin Club"	Dnipro	Charity Foundation "Ukrainian Educational Foundation"	Dnipro
Human Rights Group "SICH"	Dnipro	NGO "Mrs. Patroness" Dnipro	Dnipro
CSO "Dnipro's helpers"	Dnipro	Religious organisation "House of Evangelical Christian Baptists"	Kryvyi Rih
CSO "Motivation circle"	Dnipro	NGO "For the future of Ukraine" Dnipro	Dnipro
NGO "Eleos-Donetsk"	Dnipro	NGO "Food of life" Dnipro	Dnipro
The Ukrainian Society for the Blind	Kyiv	Information and humanitarian hub "I-Mariupol" Dnipro	Dnipro
Luhansk Region Regional Development Agency	Dnipro	Information and humanitarian hub "I-Mariupol" Dnipro	Dnipro
Charity Foundation "DobroDiy"	Dnipro	Coordination headquarters of Dnipro volunteers	Dnipro
Charity Foundation "Board of Trustees"	Dnipro	Charity Foundation "Mom plus me"	Dnipro
Charity Foundation "Dniprovsky Svetoch"	Dnipro	Point of issue of humanitarian aid	Dnipro
Charity Foundation "Help"	Dnipro	CSO "Spivdiya hub"	Dnipro
Charity Foundation "Revival of the Region"	Dnipro	NGO "Outpost"	Dnipro

Key beneficiaries of local response actors

Overall, **94%** of LRA-KIs reported that IDPs (both living in collective sites and out of collective sites) are the key beneficiaries of activities provided, with **only 40% of them reporting conducting their activities also with non-displaced population**. This is in line with REACH HSM qualitative findings on the targeting of humanitarian assistance.⁴⁶ This report shows that interviewees from Dnipro City perceived that priority was given to the IDPs who had arrived from conflict-affected areas over other groups, such as returnees or local residents.

Activities of local response actors

Food (89%), NFI (60%), healthcare (28%), protection (28%), and WASH (28%) were the main sectors in which local response LRA-KIs reportedly provide their activities.

The majority of key informants part of local responses organisations (LRA-KIs) described their activities as multidisciplinary or direct assistance. The most commonly reported activities provided by LRA-KIs were distribution of NFIs, distribution of food items, provision of information, provision of critical hygiene materials and winterization items. Surprisingly, only a handful of local response actors reported providing cash assistance. Overall, 92% of these activities are reported ongoing, 6% are completed, and 2% are planned.

This finding concurs with LRA-FGDs in priority hromadas, where participants described their main tasks as being: provision of food to IDPs, provision of NFIs to IDPs, provision of house and shelters to IDPs, integration initiatives, support to the military, facilitation access to employment to IDPs, providing psychological care to IDPs and providing social and legal assistance to IDPs.

3.3 Ability to provide services in priority hromadas

More than half of the PSP-KIs (12 out of 20) reported that their facility's ability to provide services had not changed since February 24, 2022. Even more (16 out of 20) affirmed that they are able to fulfill the needs of

⁴⁶ REACH, [Briefing Note: Focus on accountability to affected populations \(AAP\) and information needs](#), July 2022.

the population in their community. This is particularly the case for services in Dnipro City and Kryvyi Rih (urban hromadas). PSP-KIs in Dnipro City affirmed that it is due to the fact that the city is the administrative center of the region, where a large part of state funding goes.

Reasons for not being able to provide services in full or not being able to meet the needs of their population vary from sector and hromadas. For instance, representatives of the social sector in Kryvyi Rih and Tsarychanka said that the change in the ability to provide services was associated with an increase of demand from IDPs, in Petropavlivka it is said to be associated with a lack of funding and transport capacities (fuel shortage). Notably, two representatives of educational facilities in Tsarychanka and Petropavlivka (rural hromadas) reported lacking an equipped bomb shelter. According to the head of the SESU, in Ukraine, only 11% of educational institutions have their own bomb shelters⁴⁷, which is an obstacle to the resumption of the educational process.

In addition, some residents of social and medical institutions in conflict-affected parts of the country were evacuated to many safe communities in Dnipropetrovska oblast. The receiving institutions face the challenge of providing the new arrivals with the required social and medical-social services as well as providing decent living conditions for all the residents. Another challenge is the need to provide mental health support, both to the new arrivals who have experienced war and/or evacuation, and to the permanent residents for whom a large number of new neighbors can be psychologically stressful. Finally, it is likely that the workload of the workers of the receiving facilities will increase, since not all the staff of the evacuated facilities move together with the residents.⁴⁸

3.4 Humanitarian response in conflict-affected hromadas

Four out of five LACA-KIs affirm that their hromada has received relevant assistance. However, **representatives of local authorities in Zelenodolska, Nikopol and Apostolivska stressed the need for more humanitarian support, in particular from international organisations.** According to most LACA-KIs, there is no barrier to international assistance in their hromadas.

Concerning the types of humanitarian aid received by the hromada, LACA-KIs reported to have received for distribution: food (5/5 LACA-KIs), hygiene and sanitary products (4/5 LACA), NFI (2/5), and clothing (1/5). The actors who provide assistance are local authorities (5/5), international organisations (4/5), local/national organisations (3/5), volunteers (2/5), regional/state administrations (1/5) and religious administrations (1/5).

3.5 Coordination of the response

Coordination at the local level in priority hromadas

Self-organisation of local response actors

Participants of the LRA-FGDs in the priority hromadas gave credit in their vast majority to the effectiveness of their response. Local response actors in Dnipro and Kryvyi Rih (urban hromadas) in particular highlighted the quality of their collaboration. In their view, the soundness of their mutual trust, cohesion and capacity to self-organize leads to a steady, fast and adequate response to the crisis at their level. Initial ground for collaboration would mostly arise out of social connections and be sustained by informal relations. Participants in most LRA-FGDs rely on phones and social medias (*e.g.*, Telegram channels) as tools to communicate on a

⁴⁷ SESU, [In Ukraine, only 11% of educational institutions have their own bomb shelters.](#), July 2022.

⁴⁸ CEDOS, [Social security and war in Ukraine](#), February 24 — April 30, 2022.

day-to-day basis. According to some LRA-FGDs, the main weakness of civil society's response is their lack of capacities, and their need for fundings.

"When there was a problem with kare mats, we asked for help. However, we cut them faster ourselves. When help was offered, the problems were already solved by us".

Local response actor, Dnipro City

Parallel coordination systems

Participants of the LRA-FGDs in Kryvyi Rih and Tsarychanka admitted a lack of structure in their response, reportedly missing an "effective coordinator". It is in part due to the fact that they do not engage with coordination system put in place and – partially – run by local authorities in their hromadas. Similarly, they would often express distrust towards them. It is hard to infer which element was the consequence of the other and presumably depend on each specific context.

"Everyone is boiling in their own porridge and the leg does not know what the hand is doing!"

Local response actor, Kryvyi Rih

Participants in one LRA-FGD in Tsarychanka for instance said there were pushed aside by local authorities that "took the process into their own hands" two weeks after the start of the conflict. These same participants would then proceed to criticize the effectiveness of local authorities or denounce appropriation of goods. Local response actors in Kryvyi Rih for their part would talk about "corruption schemes" of local authorities, and prefer discussing the creation of their own coordination structure rather than address the one put in place by local authorities. On the other hand, a member of a local NGO collaborating with local authorities in Kryvyi Rih said this was the result of a "lack of will to find partners" on their part.

Coordination bodies

When the presence of a coordination body is reported, the role is mostly undertaken by local authorities. In Petropavlivka an "operational response headquarters" has been created since the 4th day of the conflict, gathering every day members of local authorities, volunteers' initiatives, businesses, security forces, and the Ministry of emergencies. In Dnipro, one participant pointed out the important role that the "headquarters of volunteers" run by local authorities played in handling the massive load of IDPs.

In Kryvyi Rih, a "coordination council" assembles local authorities, local organisations and volunteers initiatives. It has established under its coordination a humanitarian hub where local partners collaborate to distribute food, NFI, clothes and hygiene products to IDPs. In addition they provide information, psychological support, children care, and facilitate registration process. Several IDPs from 2014 have been hired in public institutions and local organisations, they can therefore provide their expertise on meeting the needs of IDPs from the new wave of displacement.

Coordination with international organisations in priority hromadas

Collaboration between local and international organisations

According to local response actors in Dnipro City and Kryvyi Rih (urban hromadas), there is communication between local and international organisations. However, for most of them, collaboration and feedbacks predominantly occur through intermediaries (e.g., local authorities, large funds). Conversely, participants from one LRA-FGD in Dnipro City affirmed to have active communication (mostly meetings) with external partners, but they stated not seeing practical benefit from it.

Local response actors in Tsarychanka and Petropavlivka affirmed on the other hand not communicating at all with international organisations, this role being performed only by local authorities. Some participants

complained about it, affirming that due to their remote location they are unaware of the aid they could benefit from.

"International organisations prefer working directly only with large funds that have proven their competence in the implementation of large projects. They contact them themselves".

Local response actor, Kryvyi Rih

Local response actors who called for the creation of their own coordination bodies (free of local authorities supervision) affirmed that it would increase their level of credibility towards external partners and would allow them to enjoy direct interaction with international organisations. It would then improve communication, enable extensive and stable coordination, and guarantee reporting.

Limits of the international humanitarian response

Most participants taking part in the LRA-FGDs in priority hromadas acknowledged, in general terms, the effectiveness of the international response. Yet, numerous issues were voiced throughout the discussions.

The main issue (5/8 LRA-FGDs) revolves around to the lack or the reduction of aid and fundings. Some participants underlined that, despite being the best able to assess the needs of IDPs and respond accordingly, **they were lacking the timely assistance and fundings necessary to meet those needs**. A second issue (3/8 LRA-FGDs) concerns the **tardiness of the response**. One participant blamed the unnecessary length of "discussion and planning" for being the cause. In his opinion, by the time a need has been assessed by international organisations, it is already no longer relevant.

"The next grant was refused, due to the fact that our fund does not correspond to the selection criteria of the organisation. (...) Due to the lack of resources, I am forced to reduce the activity of my organisation. I have skills, sufficient experience, but I have no financial resources".

Local response actor, Dnipro City

A third issue concerned **the lack of humanitarian aid in areas outside of Dnipro and in remote locations which do not benefit from an equal distribution**. Regional authorities joined the participants of the LRA-FGDs in this observation, pointing out that international organisations have less activities and projects in the periphery of the oblast. It is however where a lot of IDPs are located and therefore where more efforts should be concentrated. They said that their administration focuses its attention mostly on rural regions, since Dnipro needs less support due to its extensive network of partnerships, projects and presence of international organisations. They also denounced the lack of timely support from international organisations ("there are no clear deadlines for projects"), and the fact that aid does not reach the final beneficiaries.

The only LRA-FGD (Dnipro) in which participants affirmed maintaining effective communication with international organisations saw a number of criticisms being raised in addition to those stated above. First, participants affirmed that **the needs were often misevaluated or irrelevant** (e.g., making participants feel like in a "third-world country"). Second, they pointed out that the evaluation of needs should be updated more often, as the context constantly changes. Third, they stressed the importance of stimulating Ukraine's economy and labour market by choosing to buy local products instead of importing those from abroad, many of which are delivered after extensive delays".

"There is enough local resource. I think it's necessary to use this resource, and not to wait for several months for food and goods from other countries to be delivered. They either get spoiled, or irrelevant".

Local response actor, Dnipro City

Coordination of public service providers in priority hromadas

Half of the representatives of public service providers in the priority hromadas reported not cooperating with other local actors on the crisis response, mostly in Kryvyi Rih and Petropavlivka. Cooperation with local volunteers and local businesses mostly come from the social, educational and healthcare sectors.

Similarly, half of the PSP-KIs reported that their institution did not cooperate with international organisations on crisis response, mostly in Kryvyi Rih and Petropavlivka. On that matter, regional authorities added that the coordination between service providers and international organisations had now been 'centralized', i.e., the cooperation is made through the Ministries. They explained it by the fact that too much time was lost at the beginning of the conflict in meetings reported "fruitless". Among the PSP-KIs that reported cooperation, the majority reported that the response was effective and immediate (6 out of 11). This particularly applies to the administrative and healthcare sector in Kryvyi Rih and Dnipro.

Coordination of the response in conflict-affected hromadas

All representatives of local authorities in conflict-affected hromadas pointed out their role in the coordination of the crisis response. A coordination center was noted in Apostolivska, Nikopol and Zelenodolska. The LACA-KI in Nikopol indicated for instance that his hromada has put in place a Humanitarian Policy Office that implements the measures defined by the current Development Strategy until 2027. In Zelenodolska, a centralized headquarters – in parallel to an independent volunteer headquarters – has been put in place to coordinate the response.

3.6 Priority needs of local respondents

Local response actors' priority needs

The most commonly reported needs for LRA-KIs to better respond to the crisis were funding (66% of LRA-KIs), food supplies for distribution (58%), non-food supplies for distribution and transport (both 45%). Notably, needs vary depending on the local response actors' location. For instance, transport was reported to be one of the main needs for local response actors in areas outside of Dnipro City (58%), in comparison with 38% in Dnipro City. **Finally, a relatively higher proportion of LRA-KIs in areas outside Dnipro City reported having the need of collaboration with partners (26%),** in comparison to 18% in Dnipro City.

Public Service Providers' priority needs in priority hromadas

The most requested type of support from international organisations for public service providers are repair work or provision of repair material (7/20), funding (6/10), staff training (3/10), and arrangement of bomb shelters (2/10). The last point concerns uniquely education institutions.

Overview

Table 7. Most reported priority needs of local respondents

Most reported priority needs for LRA-KIs (Quantitative tool)		Most reported priority needs for PSP-KIs (Qualitative tool)	
1. Funding	66% of LRAs	1. Repair assistance	7/10 of PSPs
2. Food Supplies	58% of LRAs	2. Funding	6/10 of PSPs
3. NFI Supplies	45% of LRAs	3. Staff training	3/10 of PSPs
4. Transport	45% of LRAs	4. Bomb Shelters arrangement	2/10 of PSPs

CONCLUSION

This report is based on representative, household-level data that allows for a comparison between the needs and concerns of three primary demographics in Dnipropetrovska oblast: IDP households living in collective sites, out of collective sites, and non-displaced. In order to further inform a well-coordinated response, the report also provides insights on the organisation and coordination of local actors, and their linkages with international partners.

Findings show that displaced households living in collective sites are often characterised by additional vulnerabilities compared to other households. They are more likely to report having an older person, a person with a chronic illness, or disability among them. They also, reportedly, on average earn less than their non-displaced counterparts, or displaced households not living in collective centers. This latter point is even more pronounced in collective centers in areas outside Dnipro City, in the periphery of the oblast, where 51% of households reportedly earn less than 5,000 UAH per month.

Notwithstanding, while displaced households living in collective centers may exhibit additional vulnerabilities, reported needs in sectors such as WASH, healthcare or food are often equal between household groups and, in some cases, non-displaced households reporting even higher needs than those displaced. Unfortunately, the data shows that a large discrepancy in levels of assistance received by different types of households exist. Indeed, non-displaced households are far less likely to report receiving assistance.

Additionally, much of the international response appears still focused on the centre of the oblast, with households in areas outside Dnipro City less likely to report receiving assistance compared to those in Dnipro City. This is especially important since, while reported needs are higher in the periphery of the oblast, public service providers there have less capacity to address them. Notably, this is also where reported household-level incomes are lowest, and where 60% of non-displaced households declare being in need of economic assistance.

Discussions with local response actors indicate that many implement their activities independently, without engaging the structures put in place by local authorities to oversee the process. The fragmentation of assistance-provision at the local level could potentially lead to inefficiencies and challenges for international partners as well as local response actors. Indeed, it is harder for international actors to engage with unique interlocutors at the local level. Similarly, a multiplicity of local response actors might be overlooked by external respondents when they interact only with local authorities, therefore enjoying fewer opportunities to access fundings, in particular in rural areas of the oblast.

Finally, with the approach of winter, local actors involved in the management of collective sites voiced concerns about their ability to continue to house IDPs. Of particular concern are the utility fees for electricity and heating which will rise significantly in the coming months. Considering the role of Dnipropetrovska oblast as a key arrival and transit hub is likely to only increase as the conflict wears on, this issue is likely to grow more salient. Also of significant importance is the need for early recovery support in conflict-affected hromadas, where numerous infrastructures need repair or heating solutions. It is important therefore that needs, and the capacity of local actors to meet those needs, continues to be monitored regularly and that additional assistance is made available and delivered to where it is most needed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ACAPS, [Thematic report. Return movement dynamics of IDPs and refugees](#), July 2022.
- ACAPS, [Ukraine: Bridging humanitarian response | ACAPS](#), May 2022.
- ACTED, OCHA, REACH, [Ukraine: Joint Market Monitoring Initiative \(JMMI\) - June 2022 - Ukraine | ReliefWeb](#), June 2022.
- AgroPortal, [A missile hit an elevator in Dnipropetrovska region](#), July 2022.
- Business.dii.gov.ua, [Ukrainian business in the conditions of war: analysis of the state for three months \(dii.gov.ua\)](#), May 2022.
- CEDOS, [Social security and war in Ukraine](#), February 24 — April 30, 2022.
- Dnipropetrovska Regional State Administration, ["There are more than 225,000 displaced people in the Dnipropetrovska region."](#), May 2022.
- International Labour Organization (ILO), [The impact of the Ukraine crisis on the world of work: Initial assessments](#), May 2022.
- International Organisation for Migration (IOM), [Ukraine | Displacement \(iom.int\)](#), August 2022.
- IOM, [Ukraine — Internal Displacement Report — General Population Survey Round 7 \(17 - 23 July 2022\) | DTM \(iom.int\)](#), July 2022.
- Military Feodal, <https://military.feodal.online/landing/en/index.html>, August 2022.
- Ministry for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine ["The number of internally displaced persons \(IDPs\) in Ukraine has exceeded 8 million people: from where and where did the most go"](#), May 2022.
- Ministry of energy and environment protection of Ukraine, [Briefing on the environmental damage caused by the Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine](#), July 2022.
- Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources of Ukraine, [Overview of russia's crimes against Ukraine's environment](#), April 2022.
- OCHA, [Ukraine: Humanitarian Impact Situation Report](#), April 2022.
- REACH / UNHCR Collective Site Monitoring (CSM) survey dashboard: [Ukraine CCCM \(reach-info.org\)](#), July 2022.
- REACH, [Agrarian sector in proximity to conflict - 24 Feb. to 15 July 2022: Damage to elevator capacities](#), July 2022.
- REACH, [Arrival and Transit Monitoring](#), July 2022.
- REACH, [Briefing Note: Focus on accountability to affected populations \(AAP\) and information needs](#), July 2022.
- REACH, [Collective Site Monitoring \(CSM\) survey. Ukraine - Round 1](#), June 2022.
- REACH, [Humanitarian Situation Monitoring \(Round 4\)](#), July 2022.
- REACH, [IMPACT UKR Hazardous-objects-and-conflict-incidents JULY2022.pdf \(impact-repository.org\)](#), July 2022.
- REACH, [Rapid Assessment: Evacuations from Eastern Oblasts](#), April 2022.
- State Emergency Service of Ukraine, [Employees of the State Emergency Service reminded citizens of the rules of behavior when explosive objects are discovered](#), August 2022.
- State Emergency Service of Ukraine, [In Ukraine, only 11% of educational institutions have their own bomb shelters](#), July 2022.
- The World Bank, ["Russian Invasion to Shrink Ukraine Economy by 45 Percent this Year"](#), April 2022.
- Ukraine Government Portal, [Economic Recovery and Development.docx \(kmu.gov.ua\)](#), July 2022.
- UNHCR, [Protection Cluster Ukraine: Older Persons, October 2015 \[EN/RU/UK\] - Ukraine | ReliefWeb](#), November 2015.
- United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR), [Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine](#), 24 February –15 May 2022.
- USAID, [Agriculture Fact sheet](#), July 2022.
- VoxUkraine, [State regulation in wartime: how the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adapted the economy to martial law conditions \(voxukraine.org\)](#), July 2022.
- World Economic Forum, [What is Ecocide and Can it be Prosecuted by the International Criminal Court? | World Economic Forum \(weforum.org\)](#), July 2021.
- Working Group for "Economic Recovery and Development", [Working Groups | Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine \(kmu.gov.ua\)](#), July 2022.