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Response Plan

LRP Partners Update Meeting

December 13, 2024

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Opening Remarks

Dr. Ola Boutros, LRP General Supervisor (MoSA)

Agenda

1. **Opening Remarks**

2. **Update on the Refugee Situation**

3. **LRP 2025 Planning**

4. **Thematic Discussions**
   - Protection
   - Socio-Economic
   - Social Tensions
   - Access to Services

5. **AoB**

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Update on the Refugee Situation

Juliette Stevenson, Senior External Relations Officer (UNHCR)

Update on the Refugee Situation

Lebanon Response Plan (LRP):
- A key coordination, assistance, and resource mobilization tool.
- Coordination Structures have enabled strong responses to pressing needs and adaptability during mass displacement.

Fragile Context in Lebanon:
- Continued challenges with hopes of lasting peace.
- Situation requires flexibility and adaptability in response strategies.

Donor Support:
- Need for continued commitment and flexibility of resources to address needs of diverse communities, including Lebanese returning from displacement and refugees.

Regional Outlook – Syria:
- Monumental shifts in Syria, with anticipation of positive changes and stabilization after so many years of war.
- Syrians are making decisions on return: definitive returns, "go and see", or waiting for improved conditions.

Support for Voluntary Returns:
- Advocacy for returns to be voluntary, safe, and dignified.
- Humanitarian community ready to assist in creating conducive environments and supporting Syrians in need during transitions.

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LRP 2025 Planning

Stephanie Laba, Inter-Agency Coordination Officer (UNHCR)
Makiha Kimura, Head of Coordination (OCHA)

LRP 2025 Planning

Planning Assumptions

- **Comprehensive Support:** Address immediate and medium-term needs of vulnerable populations in Lebanon, including Lebanese, displaced Syrians, Palestinian refugees, migrants, refugees of other nationalities, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and returning IDPs.
- **Holistic Response:** Respond to the compounded effects of socio-economic, conflict, and displacement crises in an integrated manner, targeting both individuals and institutions.
- **Lessons Learned:** Build on 2024 contingency planning, emergency preparedness, and lessons from collective shelter responses to enhance operational readiness and resilience.
- **Adaptive Strategies for Dynamic Contexts:** Adapt the response throughout 2025, accounting for evolving needs, including funding adjustments, population movements, and geographical reprioritization.
    - Plan for a key review moment ('gatekeeper moment') in Q1-2025.
    - Adjust strategies based on potential displacement waves if the ceasefire fails.
- **Focus on Localized Recovery, Not Reconstruction:** Incorporate small-scale recovery interventions support but exclude large-scale reconstruction planning, which requires a dedicated evidence base and separate framework.
- **Prioritization:** Ensure strategies are realistic and focus on high-impact components for immediate and medium-term outcomes. Address feasibility, regional variations, and donor funding constraints.
- **Cross-Sectoral Priorities:** Strengthen inter-sectoral collaboration and highlight key priorities during the January 2025 cross-sectoral prioritization exercise.
- **Alignment with Regional Strategies:** Ensure coherence with the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) to maintain alignment with broader regional response frameworks.

LRP 2025 Planning

Context Assumptions

- **Baseline Population Planning:** Use 2024 population figures (5.7 million) as the baseline for 2025, adjusted with displacement and return data from the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) to inform planning targets and priorities. Updates will occur as needed.

- **Ripple Effects of Hostilities:** Plan for continued impacts of the escalation in hostilities, including vulnerability among displaced, returning IDPs, and conflict-affected populations, alongside challenges like UXOs, property damage, and access constraints.

- **Shifts in Displacement and Shelter Dynamics:** Expect some collective shelters to close, with potential for new transitional shelter solutions. Anticipate localized or renewed hostilities influencing shelter and return patterns.

- **Regional and Dynamics:** Incorporate regional variations and monitor key events such as the ceasefire's 60-day period, parliamentary sessions, and regional geopolitical changes, which could significantly alter dynamics.

LRP 2025 Planning

Context Assumptions (Cont.)

- **Social Tensions:** Recognize risks of heightened social tensions due to displacement, returns, and inter-communal pressures exacerbated by socio-economic crises and institutional fatigue.
- **Infrastructure and Services:** Critical infrastructure and basic services remain at risk of collapse without sustained support, with medium-term solutions and reconstruction efforts constrained by funding uncertainties.
- **Increased Vulnerability:** Socio-economic crises and hostilities disproportionately impact youth, older people, and people with disabilities, exacerbating pressures on institutions and response partners. Negative coping mechanisms are rising.
- **Environmental Strain:** Mass displacement has intensified strain on Lebanon's fragile environment, leading to pollution, waste issues, water resource diversion, and land degradation, fueling tensions.
- **Syria Crisis Impact:** Situation in Syria affects Lebanon, with continued barriers to large-scale returns in safety and dignity. Spontaneous movements to Syria may increase if conditions improve.
- **Inter-Communal Relations:** Inter-communal tensions and demands for returns will continue if Lebanon lacks sufficient support, risking sporadic escalations and deteriorating relations.

LRP 2025 Planning

LRP Terminology

- **"Displaced Syrians"**: Referring to Syrian nationals in Lebanon.
- **"Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)"**: Referring to the people displaced within Lebanon.
- **"Returning IDPs"**: Referring to individuals who have either returned to their original homes or to their area of origin. *This terminology is recommended as conditions for many IDPS are not conducive for sustainable return since many IDPs will continue to have habitual and safety needs.*
- **"Palestinian refugee *from* Syria"** and **"Palestine refugee *in* Lebanon.**
- Use **"Persons with Disabilities"** in full instead of PwD.
- Use **"Gender Based Violence (GBV)"** instead of Sexual & Gender Based Violence (SGBV).
- Do not use "ITS" or "Informal Tented Settlement" but **"informal settlement"** (no tented, no acronym and not capitalized).

Timeline	Planning Process Step
Nov	**Population figures** (overall) developed by Strategic Advisory Groups (SAGs) AAWG & IMWG. **Draft planning assumptions** to be developed by ISCG Co-Chairs and presented in HCT.
20 - 21 Nov	**Area-Based Sub-national Consultations** *(online sessions, 2 hours)* • Stocktaking of the response and qualitative insights from sub-national sectors.
26 Nov	**Circulation of response planning guidance package to sectors,** ahead of cross-sectoral planning workshop on 29 November. *(Updated documents circulated 4 Dec).*
29 Nov	**Lebanon Response Plan 2025 Planning & Needs Analysis Workshop:** • Present and validate next steps and planning timelines including FA components. • Provide a presentation on population data and baseline vulnerability analysis, planning assumptions, emergency situation snapshot and area-based qualitative insights following sub-national consultations. • Provide thematic presentations and discussions on situation and needs analysis, to inform sectors' evidence base and planning assumptions ahead of sectoral consultations: *socio-economic, protection, gender, access to services, social tensions, environment.*
2 Dec – 11 Dec	**Sector Planning with Strategy Consultation Discussions*:** • Ensure inclusive participation and consultations at all levels (including regions) – UN lead agencies; Government; Partners; Donors. • Update sector strategy. • Finalize sector situation analysis. • Update PiN and targets. ** To note, while sectors are working on sectoral strategy, outline of FA doc is to be prepared.*
6 Dec	**ISCG Meeting** used to confirm approach to sector / inter-sector PIN (following IMWG meeting) **Updated population package** shared with sectors (utilizing district-level displacement data as of 6 Dec)
12 Dec	**Inputs for Flash Appeal component to be submitted by sectors (400 words input, as well as target and budget). –**
17 Dec	Flash Appeal to be reviewed by IS Co-Chairs for redline comments and presented to HCT.
19 Dec	**Flash Appeal component, endorsement of key figures by HCT** (then from 19 Dec to 1 Jan, finalization of design, maps etc).
20 Dec	**Draft sector strategies & logframes to be submitted by the sectors** after consultation with: - Sub-national sector coordinators. - Sector partners including donors. - Core group members including line ministry.
26 Dec	**Inter-Sector PiN, Targets, and total Appeal** to be finalized by IMWG. **Sector strategies to be reviewed by IS Co-Chairs** (Light revision for redline comments)
31 Dec	**Sector Strategies to be Finalized by Sector Leads** (including at ministerial level within line ministries) **Final drafts of sector strategies circulated to partners**, with confirmed 'outputs' to be utilized for the partner appeal Expression of Interest (EoI) in January.
Jan 2025	**LRP Introductory Text** to be updated and finalized by Co-Chairs. Publication of **Flash Appeal** **LRP Appeal** - Launch of Expression of Interest / Capacity assessments for new partners: Appeal Deadline for Partners. Sectors to complete new partner capacity assessments. **ISCG Annual Workplan Workshop** **Steering Committee** endorsement of overall framework (co-chaired by PM and RC/HC)

Scope of Flash Appeal (FA)

- **Immediate life-saving assistance*** (not all humanitarian response)
- **Shock-based:** Needs arising from **direct results of hostilities and displacement/return**
- **Geographical scope: locations** with **displaced and returning people**
  - → **This covers people below (not exclusive)**
    - People remain displaced (in the place of destination of displacement)
    - People returning to their areas but not their "home" (e.g. people in temporary centers, urban areas, etc).
    - People returning to their homes (area of origin)
    - People in conflict-affected/hard-to-reach areas (in areas of origin of displacement, those who didn't leave their land during hostilities)

  Scope: 900K (internal displacement due to the recent escalation of hostilities; some of them have returned, some of them are returning, some of them remain displaced) + 80 K (people remained in hard-to-reach areas during the recent escalation of hostilities) = 1M (people directly affected) + contingency caseload of people who could cross the border into Lebanon.
- **Timebound interventions: 3 months** (**activities that are implementable within 3 months, immediate impact**)
  - → **Some examples of activities (not exhaustive)**
    - Hot meals and dry parcels or RTEs
    - Emergency medical support
    - Life-saving emergency cash and in-kind
    - Access to water (distribution of bottled water/water trucking)
    - Emergency nutrition rations
    - MHPSS
- **No FA specific PiN. LRP PiN only. But distinct caseload for FA target and FA budget. FA and LRP targets are not mutually exclusive. FA budget is a top up.**

*C.f. CERF life-saving criteria for reference https://cerf.un.org/sites/default/files/resources/CERF_Life_Saving_Criteria_2020.pdf

FA Planning

Flexibility, Agility, and People-Centered

1. **Target at the national level ONLY**, no district level breakdown.
2. **No population groups breakdown for target at planning stage** (but could be monitored with disaggregation).
3. Need for **clear strategy to ensure linkage of LRP and FA** (shift, exit strategy of FA) in sector strategy.
4. Importance to keep in mind that the demarcation of LRP and FA is not a science (nor mathematics). We have a gray zone, and we need to have **expert judgment**, **putting people at the center of response**.
5. This is "extension" of the current FA – **light touch** of update/revision based on the current FA (Oct-Dec 2024).

People in Need (PiN)

One PiN figure for LRP; No FA specific PIN



LRP Target and FA Target are not mutually exclusive

LRP Target:

People in need of humanitarian and stabilization assistance in 2025.

Example: NN has returned to her/his area of origin after displacement. NN managed to go back to her/his house and can sustain life, so does not need hot meal, water bottle distribution, etc but does need social protection assistance.

FA Target: Escalation-related Emergency Target

People in need of immediate and time-bound (3 months) life-saving assistance between Jan – March 2025 whose needs are arising from the escalation of hostilities.

Example: NN returned to her/his land from a Collective Site but has lost everything. NN needs emergency support now (FA) to survive in the coming weeks while finding out how to reestablish their life. NN also needs continued humanitarian support (LRP) in the medium term. This means that NN may receive both FA and LRP assistance.

* We cannot exclude the possibility that a person could be in need of FA assistance but then all his/her need is met so no need to get support under the assistance by LRP, but our assumption is that such cases would be rare.

Follow-Up to the Planning Workshop

LRP and FA budgets are Mutually Exclusive; FA Funding Requirement is a Top-Up



Why do we need this distinct funding requirement?

1) **Advocacy**: Clearly frame urgent and immediate life-saving needs that cannot wait – resource mobilization is required NOW. This shows an immediate emergency caseload whose response is time-bound (short-term/3month) and time sensitive (ASAP).

2) **Facilitate emergency funding**: Some emergency funding schemes require clear articulation of emergency caseload.

Total amount of funding required to support people in the country with humanitarian and stabilization aid in 2025.

Y billion + X million

Needs for clear messaging: Funding for FA and LRP are not « zero-sum ». More funding for FA doesn't mean less funding for LRP, and vice versa. It's critical to advocate for overall total funding (Y+X) for Lebanon while noting time sensitivity of FA funding.

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Thematic Presentations

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Protection

Sophie Etzold, Protection and GBV Sector Coordinator (UNHCR)

Protection (including CP & GBV)

Drivers of Protection Risks Outlook for 2025

Decrease (if widespread armed conflict does not resume)

- Armed conflict-related violence – attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure
- Limitations on humanitarian access
- Unsafe locations due to unexploded ordinance

Remain

- Strained services and resources
- Lack of legal framework for asylum and inadequate legal protection for refugees and migrants
- Limited shelter options, substandard shelter
- Unequal access to services among different population groups
- Gender and social norms normalizing violence

Worsen

- Economic impact
- Social tensions
- Criminality and exploitation (labour, housing etc.)
- Returns in unsafe conditions

Protection (including CP & GBV)

Key Protection Risks and Programmatic Adaptation

Risk 1: Safety and displacement risks due to armed conflict: including risks of injuries and exposure from UXO, impact of exposure to violence and attacks, limited shelter options and increased vulnerabilities resulting in increase of psychosocial needs.

Risk 2: Communal tensions and unequal access to services and rights for those at heightened risk: concerns around return, tensions in relation to resources and services such as shelter, health education, legal and civil documentation.

Risk 3: Increased violence, abuse and exploitation: displacement, lack of livelihood options, socio-economic constraints, communal tensions and social norms all increase risks of full range of violence, abuse and exploitation for those who remained in conflict affected areas, those returning and those who remain displaced.

Programmatic Adaptation

Protection

- **Reprioritization of CS protection response into community-based programming** in areas with remaining IDPs and/or those returning

- **Re-establishing protection programs** in areas with high population of remaining IDPs and those returning to areas that are safe

- **Urgent scale up of protection activities in the most affected areas,** with slightly amended prioritization of activities including:
  - UXO safety and injury risk awareness
  - Provision of information and referral to services (with focus on Lebanese given their previous lack of awareness on these issues)
  - Support to local WLOs/CBOs/NGOs/ authorities' protection services to restart functioning including training/mentoring, small grants, repairs and staff care etc.
  - Identification and provision of response services (protection cash, emergency protection case management, services for PwD etc)

Gender-Based Violence

GBV Risks and Mitigation Needs Across the Response

Gender disaggregation: ~51% of those displaced are women and girls.

- *Need to ensure cross-sectoral gender-sensitive programming and risk analysis.*

Women faced with multiple responsibilities: caregivers for children, older persons in the HH, cared for HH members during displacement, supported HH economically given heightened risk of family separation.

- *Support integration of women into economic recovery, livelihood and social protection programs.*

Overall increased risk of GBV including rape, sexual violence, physical violence, forced marriage, kidnapping, denial or resources and conflict-related sexual violence, exploitation and sexual abuse; increase of harmful coping including exploitation, forced/ child marriage – specifically for marginalized groups (incl. migrants and displaced, persons with disability).

- *Ensure availability of specialized, survivor-centered, multi-sectoral response programs; knowledge of GBV referral pathways and SEA reporting mechanisms cross response sectors.*

Heightened risks of women and girls inside collective shelters and when hosted: lack of privacy/ lack of room separation, limited lighting, lack of hygiene and separation of facilities and limited freedom of movement.

- *Increase safety measures inside and around collective shelters.*
- *Enhance GBV risk mitigation in SCM/ Shelter, WASH, BA and FS and enhance cross-sectoral convoys and missions.*

New risks during return to homes: lack of adequate housing/ loss/ damaged houses; exposure to UXO.

- *Ensure upscaled response on economic recovery and livelihood programming to include gender ratio and strengthen access to programs in hard-to-reach/ formerly inaccessible areas.*
- *Area-based approach due to different impact and levels of destruction in different areas (South/ Baalbek vs Beirut and North).*

Child Protection

Child Protection Risks and response needs

About a third of the displaced population are children.

- *Need to ensure child friendly services and adapted assistance in places of return and prolonged displacement sites.*
- *Need to maintain services for unaccompanied and separated children and prevention and response to child trafficking.*

400.000 children have been out of school, leading to child labor risks and school drop-out.

- *Need to ensure close collaboration between the education sector, the social workforce and social policy.*
- *Monitoring of potential barriers to access education and other essential services for specific categories of children.*

More than 240 children killed and 1400 injured, and many lost family members and were exposed to extreme stress and violence.

- *Need of widespread MHPSS services, including on level 3, 4 and 5. Also need of joint work with the schooling system and community-based approaches, and support to families and caretakers.*
- *Need of coordinated case management.*

Dangers and Injuries: children disproportionately at risk of being injured by UXO and unsafe infrastructure.

- *Need to intensify awareness raising and safe behavior dissemination with children and caretakers.*
- *Need to coordinate decontamination of schools and other sites used by children.*

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Socio-Economic analysis

Abdallah Souhani, Head of Research (WFP)

Socio-Economic

Data

Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees VASyR

Syrians

FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM)

Lebanese and Syrians



Integrated Phase Classification

Lebanese, Syrian refugees, PRL, PRS

WFP Market Monitor

S/MEB and Market Prices
Additional Data and reports can be found on Dataviz: Link

Socio-Economic

Recap – Baseline Vulnerability Situation

- **Governance:** Lebanon has been without a president since October 2022 and key leadership positions remain vacant, including the Central Bank governor and Head of General Security.
- **Economic Growth:** GDP has contracted by 64% since 2018, dropping from USD 54.9 billion to USD 19.6 billion in 2024. Investment and consumption have dropped.
- **Inflation and Exchange Rate:** The Lebanese pound has lost over 98% of its value, and inflation peaked at 209% in September 2023, though it eased to 33% by September 2024.
- **Monetary Poverty:** More than tripled in ten years, from 12 percent in 2012 to 44 percent of the total population in 2022.
- **Food Insecurity:** 23% of the population (1.26 million people) faced acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) between April and September 2024.
- **Malnutrition:** Stunting prevalence among children doubled to 14% nationally, reaching 19% among Syrian children.

Source: WFP Food Security & Market Updates



Socio-Economic

Conflict Overview

- **Governance:** Lebanon has been without a president since October 2022 and key.
- **Escalation impact:** Over 1.3 million estimated to be directly affected/displaced (National Authorities). Affected regions include Baalbek–El Hermel, South and El Nabatieh governorates, Central Beqaa, and the southern suburbs of Beirut.
- **Displacement:** IOM reports 881,000 displaced between Oct 8, 2023, and Nov 13, 2024. Significant numbers of IDPs have taken refuge in five key districts: Chouf, Beirut, Aley, Saida, and Akkar.
- **Population movements:**
  - **To Syria:** 605,437 crossings (386,682 Syrians, 218,755 Lebanese) **(September 23–November 16, 2024)**.
  - **To Iraq:** 34,992 Lebanese arrived (September 27–November 13, 2024, per UNHCR).
- **Shelter response:** 1,173 centres opened (schools, educational complexes, clubs, etc.); 981 at full capacity.188,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) registered in shelters.
- **Flash Appeal (October 1, 2024):** $425.7 million requested to aid 1M people for 3 months; $131M allocated for food security response.



Source: FSAC, WFP Conflict Impact Index – November 8

Socio-Economic

Economic Growth

- The conflict's escalation is expected to deepen GDP contraction, disrupt consumption and investment, and challenge recovery prospects.
- The widespread displacement and destruction caused by the conflict have triggered a substantial decline in private consumption—historically, a key driver of the economy, accounting for 34 percent of GDP in 2023—significantly slowing economic activity.
- Tourism, another vital pillar of the economy, has been severely affected, with the 2024 escalation likely halting the sector entirely for the year, resulting in major losses in service exports.
- The World Bank estimated that, as of mid-September 2024, the significant escalation of the conflict is likely to lead to a projection of the GDP by 5.7% in 2024, compared to a previous growth forecast of 0.9%.
- The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) projects Lebanon's real GDP will shrink by 9.2% in 2024
- These impacts compound Lebanon's prolonged economic crisis, which has seen a 64% contraction in real GDP since 2019, equivalent to the loss of 15 years of growth. Recovery prospects remain bleak, further undermined by sovereign default, a banking crisis, reduced capital investment, and weakened public services.

Socio-Economic

Exchange Rate

Lebanese Pound Stability:

- Maintained stability in the informal exchange market despite ongoing conflict, which has remained at LBP89,700/USD since mid-October 2023;
- Supported by Central Bank interventions: Special withdrawals under Circulars 158 and 166 in October and November (estimated at USD180-200 million), as well as public sector salaries and allowances paid in US dollars (estimated at USD120 million);
- Central Bank collected USD2.1 billion in fresh dollars since July 2023, enough to cover these special measures and the support to the exchange rate for 3-4 months at this rate.
- Foreign Currency Reserves: Reserves dropped to USD10.2 billion by mid-November 2024, a USD500 million decrease from September 2024, and the first drop since July 2023.

Exchange Rate Unification:

- Local banks required to use LBP 89,500/USD for financial statements (Circular 167);
- LBP 89,500/USD rate was included in 2024 budget law for state revenues and expenditures conversions;

Future Expectation:

- Stability in the exchange rate to continue in the next 4-month period.

Socio-Economic

Inflation and Prices

Pre-Conflict (Source: WFP Market Monitors):

- Softening inflation between March 2024 – September 2024: CPI increased by 5%, Food price index rose by 4%; Food SMEB by 5% (LBP&USD) ; Non-Food SMEB by 11% (USD & LBP); Full SMEB by 8% (LBP) and 9% (USD);
- Year-on-year general and food inflation dropped in September 2024 to 33% and 20% respectively, down from 209% and 239% in September 2023. Energy price index dropped by 17 percent yearly in September 2024.
- Food SMEB per person in September 2024 higher than pre-crisis levels by USD3.3 (+10%); Non-Food Items SMEB almost adjusted (2% below), while Non-Food Services is still 49% below its pre-crisis level.

Conflict (Source: WFP Market Monitors):

- Sudden uptick in prices as effects of the conflict and lifting of wheat subsidies are being felt: Food SMEB increased by 4 percent monthly in October 2024 (USD37.4), while NFI SMEB increased by 3 percent. Highest monthly increase in these baskets in over a year. Some sort of stability registered first week of November.

Outlook

- Outlook (Nov 2024 - Mar 2025): Continuous, albeit contained, increases are expected in Food and NFI SMEB due to the conflict, while services are expected to continue further price correction and adjustments to pre-crisis levels.
- Full SMEB stood at USD 619/family in Oct 2019– currently stood at USD437/family in Sep 2024. Food and non-food items already fully adjusted to pre-crisis levels in USD. Services currently USD206/family (Vs. USD403/family on crisis onset)

Socio-Economic

Impact of Conflict

Damage Estimate per Sector



12-Month Loss Estimates per Sector



Source: **Lebanon Interim Damage and Loss Assessment (DaLA)**

The DaLA estimates sectoral damage that has occurred between October 8, 2023, and October 27, 2024 (inclusive), for commerce, health, housing, and tourism and hospitality, and between October 8, 2023, and September 27, 2024 (inclusive), for agriculture and environment.

- Total damage caused by the conflict since October 2023 is estimated by the World Bank at USD3.4 billion, 82 percent of which is in the housing sector.
- Losses between October 2023 and October 2024 are estimated at USD5.1 billion, 77 percent of which is in commerce, agriculture, and tourism and hospitality.
- Other estimates of total damage ranged from USD2 billion (UNDP) to USD13 billion (Independent Task Force for Lebanon).
- Ministry of Energy and Water reported USD480 million in losses across electricity and water sectors, with USD320 million attributed to the electricity sector and USD160 million to water infrastructure.
- Ministry of Telecommunications estimated USD67 million in damages to Lebanon's telecommunications infrastructure as of October 2024. Some 114 mobile stations and 26 Ogero stations out of service, significantly affecting service in conflict-affected areas.

Socio-Economic

Impact of War on Main Economic Sectors and MSMEs

- Lebanon's economy comprises 90% MSMEs (Central Bank).
- The escalation of hostilities impacted MSMEs in loss of assets, disruption of markets and supply chains, although in "displacement destination areas" businesses, especially consumption related, were thriving.
- Damage estimated on basic sectors: Tourism and Hospitality: USD20M, Health: USD75M, Agriculture: USD125M, Commerce: USD180M, Environment: USD221M, and Housing: USD2.8Bi
- Rapid assessment conducted in October 2024: out of the 713 displaced MSMEs displaced, **almost half declared that they temporarily closed, and they have plans to resume operations after the war, while 22% said they had their businesses completely shut down**. Around 45% of businesses are in services and 29% in commercial activities, 21% in food processing and 4% in agriculture

Sector	Damage (US$ million)
Agriculture	$ 124
Commerce	$ 178
Environment	$ 221
Health	$ 74
Housing	$ 2,799
Tourism and Hospitality	$ 18
Total [8]	**$ 3,413**



World Bank Estimations November 2024, NEF Rapid Assessment Oct 2024

Socio-Economic

Income Opportunities

- **Main Income Sources (2023):** Remittances from abroad (36 percent of GDP in 2022) & wage employment, temporary employment (freelancing) & daily labour.

- **Trends:**
  - Increase in informal employment: from 23 percent in 2018/2019 to 34 percent in 2022/2023
  - Increase in dollar-denominated salaries (almost 75 percent of wages in USD in August 2024 up from 4 percent in November 2022, (source: WFP mVAM data) → helped stabilize prices & boosted confidence of earner. Government paying in USD adjusted salaries.

- **Challenges & Risks:**
  - Conflict continuation and/or further escalation
  - Global and regional developments may affect remittance inflows.
  - Lebanese households have more diversified income streams, compared to Syrian refugees who heavily rely on temporary unskilled work and aid.
  - Sustainability of dollar availability uncertain; key sources (donors, remittances, Central Bank) might be unreliable.
  - Low female labour force participation
  - High unemployment rates among poorer families

- **Future Projections:**
  - Immediate increase in inflows from expats and remittances as soon as a ceasefire, even temporary, is reached, especially around Christmas.
  - Winter 2025: Possible income support but dependent on conflict situation, political stability and pricing, less than 2024 or initially projected.
  - Concerns: Security situation

Socio-Economic

Domestic Food Supply



Sources:

- *For global wheat prices: FAO Price Monitoring (average of ten classes of wheat sold on international markets)*
- *For cost of bread: WFP Price Monitoring*



Source: Ministry of Economy and Trade; WFP Price Monitoring



Source: FAO

Item	Stock Coverage
Food	3 to 4 months
Flour and gas (including cooking gas)	2 months
Fuel	25 days to 1 month
Poultry and beef	2 to 3 months
Medications	4 to 5 months

Source: L'Orient Today, MoET, BCCI

- Relevant stakeholders from both public and private sectors have reassured consumers about the steady inflow of shipments, which so far have ensured a proper supply of essential goods in the country despite the ongoing conflict.
- Wheat Supply: Enough to cover four to six weeks of needs for pita bread, with several more shipments planned for the following weeks.
- Arabic bread: On September 26, 2024, the Ministry of Economy and Trade implemented new bread prices following the end of wheat subsidies. A medium pack of Arabic bread (840 grams) now costs LBP65,000 at bakeries and LBP77,000 in stores. A smaller pack (400 grams) is priced at LBP40,000 at bakeries and LBP45,000 in stores.

Source: WFP Market Monitors & Rapid Market Assessments

Socio-Economic

WFP Market Functionality – Nov 2024



Source: WFP Lebanon Market Functionality Index Assessment November 2024
Report Link: https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000162990/download/

- Nationwide MFI survey of 982 retailers conducted between November 1 and November 15.
- Lowest market functionality was reported in El Nabatieh (MFI 0.8), followed by Baalbek-El Hermel (MFI 2.1) and South (MFI 2.2). The highest functionality was observed in Beirut (MFI 7.3) and Mount Lebanon (MFI 6.9).
- All shops contacted in the districts of Sour, El Nabatieh, and Bent Jbeil and 75 percent of shops in the district of Marjayoun reported not being operational, resulting in significantly low market functionality in these districts. Other areas heavily impacted by the conflict such as the Jezzine, Baabda, Baalbek, and El Hermel districts also reported widespread non-functionality.
- El Nabatieh and South also report significant challenges related to the vulnerability of supply chains, market access, disruption of food supply, and stock depletion.
- Other regions of the country remained functional despite persistent challenges.
- Expected gradual improvement to be registered in areas highly affected by the conflict. In the South and Baalbeck El Hermel, improvement will take longer due to the destruction.
- New round being conducted currently in December 2024 following the ceasfire.

Socio-Economic

WFP Market Functionality Index (MFI) – Previous Rounds

MFI Scores (Apr 24 – Aug 24)



Source: WFP Lebanon Market Monitors – May till August 2024
August Market Monitor Report Link: https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000162252/download/

- Previous rounds conducted between April 2024 and August 2024 revealed good market functionality nationwide despite the ongoing conflict that was still localized to certain border areas. Around 300 shops were surveyed in each round.
- The highest consistent functionality was reported in Mount Lebanon, Beirut and Akkar, with some fluctuation observed in Baalbek-El Hermel and Bekaa and the conflict dragging down El Nabatieh and South scores around the turn of the summer.
- All governorates registered the highest scores (10) in resilience of supply chains and availability of essential products throughout the monitored period.
- Some assortment issues were observed in El Nabatieh, North and South, mostly a result of the unavailability of shelter, communication, health and education items, which are not usually sold in food retailers part of these surveys.
- Price challenges, mostly related to price unpredictability, occasionally dragged the score down in Baalbek-El Hermel and Bekaa.

Socio-Economic

Big Ticket Items, and Potential Risks

- **Fiscal Situation**
  - State of expenses: emergency needs, revenues, etc.
  - State of revenues
  - Financing the deficit and aid tracking
- **Monetary Situation**
  - Stability of the LBP
  - Impact on access to finance
- **FATF and EU Grey Listing**
- **Fragile Drivers of Growth**
- **Population Figures**

LEBANON
Response Plan

Social Tensions

Joelle Assaf, Conflict Analyst (UNDP)

Tensions Overview

Current Tensions Landscape in Lebanon

TENSIONS MONITORING SYSTEM LEBANON

- **Intra-Lebanese relations continued to be highly volatile** despite the ceasefire, marked by political strife, insecurity, and divisions over the war.
- **Inter-communal tensions remain highly negative,** coupled with restrictive measures
- In a context of **increased vulnerabilities,** access to services, aid, and goods is leading to incidents and tensions.
- **Perceptions of insecurity reached their lowest level since 2017,** amidst growing concerns about the impact of hostilities, the threat of crime and a worsening security situation.

Tensions Overview

Intra-Lebanese Relations Have Been Impacted by the Escalation of Hostilities

- **Stagnant intra-Lebanese relations** on the eve of the escalation in hostilities.
- **Many acts of solidarity have arisen across the country since October 2023**; such as volunteering initiatives to assist the displaced with shelter, food, and NFIs.
- Tensions as **IDPs transition back to areas of origin**, with aid disparities for those in collective shelters over those in private housing.
- Looking forward, **prolonged displacement** (particularly for IDPs from border villages), especially in collective shelters, will exacerbate tensions around access to services and socio-economic pressures on host communities.

How would you describe current relations between different Lebanese groups who live in this area?





Tensions Overview

Volatile Inter-communal Relations Drained by the Current Context





- Despite **limited incidents and restrictive measures** amidst hostilities, some **collective actions**, in response to alleged incidents were **violent**.
- **Rising intra-Syrian tensions,** particularly in Akkar, some *Shawishs* expressed dissatisfaction about hosting more residents in ITSs due to overcrowding/insufficient aid.
- Over the past year, **inter-communal tensions have shifted.** Lebanese are increasingly concerned about **competition for services**.

Tensions Overview

Volatile Inter-communal Relations Drained by the Current Context

- **Surge in inter-communal tensions is anticipated** with increasing insecurity and negative rhetoric around refugees placing strains on scarce resources and weakened infrastructure.

- **Recent developments in Syria** could add another layer of complexity to the regional landscape.

- In parallel, 83% agree that restrictions on the movement of foreigners can help keep the area safe.

Map of Tension Hotspots and Places of Concern | Q3 2024



Tensions Overview

Increasing Worries about Access to Services Leading to Tension Amidst Reported Political Aid Bias

- **Increasing perceived worries about access to services** due to pressure on resources.
- Increased worries about **affording food, fuel, and access to safe drinking water.**
- **Sharp increase in worry about food security reaches all-time high in Beirut**; sharp increase in Mount Lebanon, especially in areas hosting IDPs
- **Service-related incidents reported** in Chouf, Tyre and Bekaa districts, mainly around water, fuel, and waste. Sanitation incidents also reported in Akkar, with flea infestations in some shelters.
- **Competition over access to shelter/housing** is particularly high in areas hosting IDPs (Mount Lebanon (36%) and the South (33%), particularly in Chouf (92%) and Saida (53%).





Tensions Overview

Perceptions of Security at Lowest Levels Since 2017





- Sense of insecurity reaches an all-time high, with 84% reporting worrying about the threat of crime.
- 68% reported that security conditions in their area have worsened a lot or a little in the last three months.
- Security hotspots are Tripoli, Akkar, Bourj Hammoud, Ain el Remmene, Saida, Tyr, Nabatieh, Zahle, Arsal, El Qaa.

Tensions Overview

Conflict Sensitivity Considerations

TENSIONS MONITORING SYSTEM LEBANON

! Minimize number of assessments to avoid assessment fatigue and raising beneficiary expectations

- Use common tools & initiate discussions with the Sector Leads using Sector Coordination Teams Contact List.

! Coordinate closely at local level

- Ensure close coordination with local authorities (MOSA, MOIM, Governors, UoM, Municipalities DRR/DRM/) & with the Inter-Sector Coordination Group and Sector Working Groups.
- Flag issues as they arise for timely, effective action.

! Link up to existing referral mechanisms

- Initiate safe identification and referrals (protection, health, education etc.) based on available referral pathways.

! Refer to conflict sensitivity guidance

- Getting started with Conflict Sensitivity Guidance Notes
- Conflict Sensitivity Toolbox Series
- Conflict Sensitivity and Monitoring and Evaluation Toolbox

Access to Services

Stephanie Laba, Inter-Agency Coordination Officer (UNHCR)

Access to Services

Overview

Pillar	Supply Challenges (Example)	Demand Challenges (Examples)
Affordability	High operational costs. Lack of subsidies. Reduced donor funding.	Widespread poverty. Inability to afford services. Hidden costs like transport fees.
Availability	Overloaded services in healthcare and education. Decaying infrastructure and maintenance gaps.	Surging demand from displaced population & returnees. Unpredictable crises causing spikes in need.
Geographical Accessibility	Services concentrated in urban areas. Security concerns in conflict regions. Poor road infrastructure.	Rising transportation costs. Limited access for rural areas esp. in winter. Infrastructure damage.
Acceptability	Services not tailored to diverse cultural backgrounds. Inadequate gender-sensitive facilities.	Perceived aid biased. Fear of rejection or deportation among refugees. Stigma against marginalized groups.

Access to Services

Education

Situation Overview and Changing Context

- Delayed & Disrupted School Year: Slow start to the 2024-25 academic year; closures due to displacement and insecurity risks increased dropouts and learning losses.
- Out-of-School Rates: 27% of children out of school in 2023/24, with a likely increase in 2024/25.
- Relocation of Centers: Many learning centers need to relocate to safe spaces to continue learning.
- Schools as Shelters:
  - 40% of all shelters are public schools, and displacement + 600,000 students and 45,000 teachers.
  - Need for flexible and alternative learning options for displaced children in formal and non-formal education.
- Access barriers to Education: Socio-economic/ financial barriers (cash for transportation).
- School Rehabilitation: Urgent need to rehabilitate schools and centers, including those used as shelters.
- Access to Education: Ensure access to public schools and non-formal education, including learning materials and internet.
- Protection Risks: Increased risks for children, including psychological distress, family separation, trafficking, and violence due to displacement.

Most Affected Groups

- Displaced Children: Displaced children face instability and disrupted education, especially children displaced multiple times.
- Refugee Children: Syrian and Palestinian refugee children face particular barriers to accessing quality education due to access restrictions (second shift).
- Children in Conflict Zones: Children still living in conflict affected areas/the South experience trauma, which impacts their mental health and access and ability to learn.
- Economically Disadvantaged Children: Families facing economic hardships de-prioritize education, leading to increased dropout rates among these children.
- Children with Disabilities: Children with disabilities, often have limited access to inclusive education and support services, especially when displaced.
- Psychologically Affected Children: Many children suffer from anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress due to their war-related experiences.

Cross-Sectoral Considerations

Shelter & Child Protection Sectors:

- need for close collaboration with the Shelter, Protection/Child Protection sector to address education needs and mitigate protection risks related to the use of schools as shelter.
- Education programmes need to collaborate closely with child protection services to identify and include vulnerable/out-of-school children in education programmes.

MHPSS (including SEL/PSS):

- Educational initiatives need to include mental health and psychosocial support to help students cope with trauma and stress resulting from the conflict.

Technology and Digital Access:

- With the growing need for remote learning, cross-sectoral collaboration with the MEHE and Telecomunications ministry is critical to ensure equitable access to devices, connectivity, and online resources for students.

Challenges

- Children at-risk of drop-out (esp. not yet registered for the new school year).
- Children with interrupted learning and learning loss incl. children accessing remote learning options.
- Tracking of displaced children, non-Lebanese children, who are displaced and/or have left the country to ensure targeted learning based on needs.
- The use of schools both for education and as shelter, leading to high-end protection risks.
- Barriers to education for the most vulnerable.

Mitigation Measures

- Children at-risk of drop-out (esp. not yet registered for the new school year).
- Close collaboration with MEHE to track children and ensure adopted learning modalities are in place.
- Increase retention support for children to avoid dropouts.
- Close collaboration with DTM and Camp Management on tracking of displaced children.
- Flexible and adaptive EiE programming.
- Outreach and provision of non-formal education services.
- Ensure strong coordination and referrals systems are in place and followed.
- Financial support to households (e.g. Emergency cash, cash for transportations, learning materials, food in schools).

Access to Services

Health

Context & Situation Overview, Challenges

- Access of PiN to Humanitarian Aid: Restrictive administrative and bureaucratic constraints especially for refugees and migrants.
- Access of HCW to PiN: Violence against Health care workers negatively impacting the service availability, HCWs are afraid and not available in specific areas.
- Physical and Security Constraints: Extreme access constraints due to worsening physical constraints for affected population and HCWs (damage to HF, roads, bridges, ongoing violence).
- Financial Barrier: High dependency on the private sector, poorly regulated costing leads to one of the most expensive healthcare systems globally, due to financial collapse, people insured under the government schemes can't afford healthcare including medication, and hospitalization.

Most Affected Groups: Refugees, Migrants, PwD, Women, and Girls.

Changing Context: PiN includes additional Lebanese (majority displaced) who were not vulnerable in the past (or we didn't know due to lack of MSNA 2023 data in certain districts).

Mitigation Measures and Recommendations

- Identify ways to collaborate with sectors.
- Advocacy for the safe passage of Humanitarian Workers, HNS, Deconflict missions.
- Longer term commitment to sustain the public health facilities, will gradually reduce dependency on private sectors, and strategic leadership by the MoPH.

Cross-Sectoral Considerations

- How is individual vulnerability determined? Do we have a common list of vulnerable people?
- PwD are vulnerable to all services, how best we can collaborate? Are the referrals working? If not, what are the bottlenecks that we need to troubleshoot? How best could we support PwD Taskforce?

Access to Services

Nutrition

Situation Overview and Changing Context

Wasting

- Prevalence among U5 is 1.3% but 5% based on screening.
- Wasting 6% among under 6-month-old.
- 13,000 children and 10,000 PBW suffer from wasting and are untreated.

Stunting

- Prevalence of stunting -14% of U5 *(doubled since 2021).*
- Stunting is at 20% for Syrian Refugees.
- Stunting is 40% among U5 in in tented settlements.
- Micronutrient deficiencies affects 1 in 2 children U5 and 3 in 4 adolescent girls and women.
- Lack of Exclusive Breast-feeding in 4/5 children 0-6 months (decreased from 32% to 23 %).
- 1 in 3 children live in Severe Child Food Poverty- 30% increase since 2021.
- 85% of Syrian ,54% of Lebanese and 41% of Palestinian HHs live in food insecurity.
- 35% of children 0–23 months have developmental deficiencies & Severe child food poverty and stunting are the main drivers.

**All the above have been exacerbated by conflict and displacement; impacting on breast feeding practices; lack of access to cooking facilities (in shelters and for people on the move) and poor hygiene conditions.*

Most Affected Groups

- Children Under-Five years of age
- Pregnant & Breastfeeding Women (PBW)
- Adolescent & School aged- children
- IDPs, Refugees, Migrants/ People on the move

Cross-Sectoral Considerations

- **Operationalize the national nutrition strategy** where all systems/sectors (health, food, social protection, education, WASH) must be better equipped and more accountable to deliver results for children.
- **Geographic and programmatic convergence** in high priority areas
- **Develop joint SOPs to deliver nutrition** sensitive interventions.
- **Enhance referral mechanisms** across sectors.
- **Capacity building** for sectors on nutrition.
- **Enhance national and subnational representation** in coordination meetings between nutrition and other sectors.

Challenges

- Insufficient **funding** for nutrition response (10 % funded in 2024).
- Major gaps in **nutrition supplies** and commodities
- Weak **Nutrition Governance**.

Mitigation Measures

- Accelerated evidence informed **resource mobilization** using LIMA prioritization of response.
- **Timely** securing emergency supplies in line with global guidance.
- Strengthen the **Nutrition Governance** and coordination at **MoPH**.
- Absence of inter-ministerial mechanism for advocacy and coordination on multi-sector/system work on nutrition.

Access to Services

WaSH

Situation Overview & Changing Context

- **Multifaceted crisis**: **Syria crisis** since 2011 – 300k displaced in IS, Acute **economic** contraction and **energy** crisis since, **Cholera** outbreak in 2022 and continued risk, **Cross-border hostilities** since Oct 2023, **full-scale escalation** and **massive displacements** from Sep 2024, including nearly 200k IDPs in 1,200 collective shelters.
- At least 36 water facilities were damaged, impacting 400,000 people.
- Direct and indirect damages to distribution networks, inaccessibility and issues with power supply for water stations in Beirut, Bekaa, Baalbek, South and Nabatiyeh.
- Eleven water establishment staff were killed.

Most Affected Groups: IDPs (collective shelters) Returnees, Displaced/ Refugees (Syrian, Palestine), people who remain in conflict affected areas (SAN, BBH).

Challenges

- Significant strain on the already fragile water and wastewater systems in areas hosting the IDPs.
- Inconsistent power supply to water and wastewater facilities.
- Damages to water stations and distribution networks due to intense shelling, increasing risk of contaminant infiltration into the potable water supply.
- Infrastructure inaccessibility due to security risks.
- Elevated public health risks due to a large number of IDPs in collective shelters with limited access to showers, toilets, sufficient, safe water, and hygiene supplies.
- Migrants and Syrians limited access to collective shelters. Evacuation orders for areas with CSs.
- Suspension of WaSH services to some ISs due to security risks. Severe underfunding of WaSH in IS.
- Humanitarian staff displacements; and supply chains and market disruptions.

Cross-Sectoral Considerations:

- Multi-sectoral approaches in collective shelters and the need for close collaboration with the Shelter, Site Coordination and Management and Protection sectors and with FSA cluster and BA sector to support people living in Hard-to-Reach Areas (convoys) and IDPs outside of collective shelters with cash assistance.
- Close collaboration with the Health sector on anticipatory actions to mitigate public health risks.
- Enhance referral mechanisms across the sectors.
- Strengthening the WaSH sector coordination structure is needed for efficient sectoral and cross-sectoral coordination, including with governmental entities.

Access to Services

Shelter

Situation Overview & Changing Context

- Over 100,000 homes destroyed, with 20% deemed fully uninhabitable (World Bank).
- Structural damage threatens further displacement, exacerbating shelter needs.
- 200,000 IDPs reside in collective shelters, with at least 20,000 unable to return due to irreparable damage.
- 79% of displaced Syrians live in urban areas, half in overcrowded or unsafe conditions.
- 300,000 Syrians in informal settlements require ongoing support to maintain livability.
- Increased demand for affordable housing has driven up rent, further straining vulnerable populations.

Most Affected Groups: Displaced/ Refugees (Syrian, Palestine), IDPs (collective shelters) Returnees who have lost their homes - (Elderly, Female-headed households, PwD).

Challenges

- Continued limited funding in the shelter sector hampers the ability to respond effectively to growing needs and risks in the crisis.
- Widespread destruction and structural damage to homes require some collective shelters to remain open, while new sites may need to be established in the most affected areas. This will also necessitate finding alternative shelter solutions for those who prefer not to stay in collective shelters.
- Displaced Syrians and migrants face a high risk of eviction from collective shelters due to the limited availability of viable alternative housing options. Many are left without shelter options, exacerbating their vulnerability.
- There is ongoing pressure to decommission collective sites, despite the volatile situation, with a potential need for families to return to these sites if hostilities resume

Cross-Sectoral Considerations:

- Close coordination with SMC, Protection, and WASH sectors is vital for integrated responses in collective sites.
- Collaboration with Protection, BA, and FS sectors ensures effective cash assistance complementarity.
- Working with Protection to identify Housing, Land, and Property (HLP) issues due to home destruction.
- Strengthening partnerships with municipal authorities and local organizations boosts response capacity and improves shelter solutions.

Access to Services

Municipal Services

Context & Situation Overview: With the increased number of IDPs the local authorities of the hosting communities had experienced a huge **pressure on the services provided by the municipalities** on all levels (SWM, Water, Sewer, public areas, fire brigades, police).

Most Affected Groups: Refugees, IDPs, returnees, and hosting communities (PWD, Migrant workers, Syrian and Palestinian refugees).

Changing Context:
Due to the current situation the SoST sector had focused it is activities on:
- Tension monitoring and conflict sensitivity mainstreaming.
- Support to emergency crisis response capacities of national institutions.
- Support municipalities, union of municipalities, line ministries and public institutions, to ensure effective delivery of essential basic services.
- Support to Humanitarian Mine Action.

Challenges
- Solid Waste Management in conflict and hosting areas due to lack of equipment and resources.
- Dramatic change in the numbers of IDPs which put pressure on the basic services supported by municipalities.
- Lack of financial and human resources for the municipalities.

Mitigation Measures & Recommendations:
- Enhance coordination mechanisms between SoST sector partners and all other sectors.
- Enhance the capacities of the DRM unit to help actors better plan and response to the needs.
- Enhance the capacities of municipalities, civil defense and fire brigades.
- Coordinate with all stakeholders on different levels (national and sub-national) to better plan and respond effectively and efficiently to the increasing needs of the target populations.
- Enhance Activity Info to have good insight on what was delivered and what are the gaps.

Cross-Sectoral Considerations: **WASH** Sector for Solid Waste Management , and Water Support, and **BA, Shelter and WASH** sectors for Winterization.

Access to Services

Conclusion

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AoB

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Thank You