



Agenda

- I. Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Analysis
- 2. Returning IDPs Situation and Preliminary Findings
- 3. Logistics Cluster Update
- 4. AoB



Mohie Al Wahsh, Food Security and Agriculture Cluster Coordinator (WFP)

The IPC Acute Food Insecurity Scale

| | | Urgent action required | | |
|---|---|--|---|--|
| | | | | |
| Phase 1 None/Minimal | Phase 2 Stressed | Phase 3 Crisis | Phase 4 Emergency | Phase 5 Catastrophe/ Famine |
| Usually adequate and stable food access | Borderline adequate food access | Highly stressed and critical lack of food access with high and above usual malnutrition and accelerated depletion of livelihood assets | Severe lack of food access with excess mortality, very high and increasing malnutrition, and irreversible livelihood asset stripping | Extreme social upheaval with complete lack of food access and/or other basic needs where mass starvation, death and displacement are evident |
| | | | RECOMMENDED ACTI | ONS |
| | Action is required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods | Urgent action is required to protect livelihoods and increase access to food to avoid a food emergency. | Urgent action is needed to save lives and livelihoods. If nothing is done, the population could face starvation or death. | Urgent immediate action is needed to stop widespread starvation and death, and the total collapse of livelihoods. |

Methodology



Population covered

99 percent of the total population: (Lebanese, Syrian refugees, Palestinian refugees)



Period

- Current: October 2024- November 2024
- Projected: December 2024- March 2025



Analysis Team

65 analysts participated from 30 organizations



IPC AFI severity scale

- At district level for Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees (22 districts)
- Clustering of districts in the South of Lebanon into one unit of analysis
- At national level for all Palestinian refugees
- Total of 47 units of analysis



Data sources

- Outcomes: VASyR 2024, LVAP 2023, mVAM 2024, MSNA 2023, High Frequency Crisis Monitoring Survey 2024
- Other data: Market Monitor (WFP), MFI (WFP), Tension monitoring (UNDP), LIMA (UNICEF/Nutrition Sector), DIEM (MoA and FAO), Protection Monitoring (UNHCR), Displacement Tracking Matrix (IOM).

Acute Food Insecurity results – Current

Total pop: 5.57 million



Syrian refugees: 1.5 million

CURRENT ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY - Syrian refugees OCTOBER 2024- NOVEMBER 2024 IPC Phase Population 96 579,000 Phase 1 - Minimal 16 234,000 39 percent of the population analysed Phase 2 - Stressed 687,000 46 facing high acute food insecurity Phase 3 - Crisis 485,000 32 (IPC Phase 3 and above) Phase 4 - Emergency 94,000 IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION Phase 5 - Catastrophe 0 0

Lebanese: 3.86 million




Palestine refugees: 210 thousands

CURRENT ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY - Palestine refugees

| 85,000 | IPC Phase | Population | 96 |
|---|-----------------------|------------|----|
| 40 percent of the population analysed facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION | Phase 1 – Minimal | 42,000 | 20 |
| | Phase 2 – Stressed | 84,000 | 40 |
| | Phase 3 – Crisis | 74,000 | 35 |
| | Phase 4 – Emergency | 11,000 | 5 |
| | Phase 5 - Catastrophe | 0 | (|

Lebanon Current Acute Food Insecurity | October 2024 - November 2024



lanuary 2025

Acute Food Insecurity results – Projected

Total pop: 5.59 million

| PROJECTED ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY – Total Population DECEMBER 2024- MARCH 2025 | | | |
|---|-----------------------|------------|----|
| 3.66 M | IPC Phase | Population | 96 |
| 30 percent of the population analysed facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION | Phase 1 – Minimal | 1,582,000 | 28 |
| | Phase 2 – Stressed | 2,351,000 | 42 |
| | Phase 3 – Crisis | 1,456,000 | 26 |
| | Phase 4 – Emergency | 201,000 | 4 |
| | Phase 5 - Catastrophe | 0 | 0 |

Syrian refugees: 1.5 million

| PROJECTED ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY – SYRIAN REFUGEES DECEMBER 2024- MARCH 2025 | | | |
|---|-----------------------|------------|----|
| 597,000 | IPC Phase | Population | % |
| 40 percent of the population analysed facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION | Phase 1 – Minimal | 220,000 | 15 |
| | Phase 2 – Stressed | 686,000 | 46 |
| | Phase 3 – Crisis | 517,000 | 34 |
| | Phase 4 – Emergency | 81,000 | 6 |
| | Phase 5 - Catastrophe | 0 | 0 |

Lebanese: 3.86 million


| PROJECTED ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY - LEBANESE DECEMBER 2024- MARCH 2025 | | | |
|---|-----------------------|------------|----|
| 970,000 | IPC Phase | Population | 9/ |
| 25 percent of the population analysed facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION | Phase 1 – Minimal | 1,318,000 | 34 |
| | Phase 2 – Stressed | 1,576,000 | 43 |
| | Phase 3 – Crisis | 862,000 | 22 |
| | Phase 4 – Emergency | 109,000 | 3 |
| | Phase 5 - Catastrophe | 0 | (|

Palestine Refugees: 223 thousands


PROJECTED ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY - PALESTINE REF.

| DECEMBER 2024- MARCH 2025 | | | |
|---|-----------------------|------------|----|
| 89,000 | IPC Phase | Population | % |
| 40 percent of the population analysed facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION | Phase 1 – Minimal | 45,000 | 20 |
| | Phase 2 – Stressed | 89,000 | 40 |
| | Phase 3 – Crisis | 78,000 | 35 |
| | Phase 4 – Emergency | 11,000 | 5 |
| | Phase 5 - Catastrophe | 0 | 0 |

Lebanon Projected Acute Food Insecurity | December 2024 - March 2025



Changes from Previous Analysis



Discussion

- What are the implications of the deterioration in the food security situation relevant to sectors?
 - Many affected households resorting to negative livelihood and food-based coping mechanisms
 - o Impact on food consumption, malnutrition risk, morbidity and mortality.
 - o Increase in child labour resulting in a deprioritization of education (absenteeism and impact on academic performance)
 - O Households forced to use unsafe water sources and reduce hygiene-related expenses increasing risk of water-borne disease
 - O Deprioritization of rent or housing repairs could increase risk of evictions and protection/safety concerns.

Reduction in humanitarian food assistance and competition over resources could contribute to a rise in social tensions.

Increased emotional distress / psychosocial needs.

Reliance/need for cash assistance modalities to cover food and non-food needs (reduced incomes)

Convergence of needs at area level and increased number of vulnerable people

- o Prolonging or compounding pre-crisis vulnerabilities e.g., districts in Akkar and North, Bekaa and Baalbeck El Hermel
- o Increase from I.26 M (23%) in Mar 2024 to I.65 M (30%) in Mar 2025 e.g., districts in South and Nabatieh with returning IDPs

Examples from other contexts

| Sector | |
|----------------------|---|
| Health and Nutrition | IPC Indicators: Malnutrition rates (acute malnutrition, wasting, stunting), mortality rates, morbidity. Implications: Malnutrition increase of levels: Higher rates of wasting and stunting indicate poor nutrition, leading to long-term physical and cognitive impairments. Disease Outbreaks: Food-insecure populations are more vulnerable to communicable diseases due to weakened immune systems, by example cholera in lebanon last year |
| Education | IPC Indicators: Household food consumption gaps, access to food. Implications: • School Dropouts: Households in IPC Phase 3+ often prioritize immediate survival, forcing children to leave school to work or beg for food. Child labor :- increase of child labor levels, due to drop of income families possible to apply livelihood coping mechanism. |
| Livelihood | IPC Indicators: Food prices, market availability, income sources, purchasing power. Implications: Market Disruptions: In IPC Phase 3 and above, food shortages drive up prices, limiting economic activity and consumer spending. Livelihood Erosion: Households sell productive assets (land, livestock) to buy food, reducing long-term economic resilience. |

Examples from other contexts

| Sector | |
|--------------------------------|---|
| Agriculture and Livelihoods | IPC Indicators: Livelihood coping strategies, asset depletion, agricultural production. • Implications: • Overexploitation of Resources: Farmers adopt unsustainable practices, such as overgrazing, to compensate for production losses, harming ecosystems. • Dependence on External Aid: IPC Phase 4+ often requires food aid, weakening local food systems and creating long-term dependence. • Loss of Livelihoods: conflict and Climate shocks and resource depletion exacerbate food insecurity, trapping households in a cycle of poverty. |
| Social and Political Stability | IPC Indicators: Food access inequality, household resilience, coping mechanisms. Implications: • Social Unrest: Food scarcity in IPC Phase 3+ often leads to protests or conflicts over resources, destabilizing regions. • Displacement and Migration: In extreme phases, households are forced to migrate, straining infrastructure and resources in host regions |
| Humanitarian and Governance | IPC Indicators: Institutional response capacity, humanitarian aid requirements. Implications: Increased Aid Dependency: IPC Phase 3+ populations require large-scale aid, overwhelming humanitarian organizations. Weak Governance: Governments struggling to address food crises face reduced legitimacy and increased pressure from international actors. |

Discussion

• What is your recommendation to address the consequences of the food insecurity situation as a sectoral response and as a multi-sectoral response?

Provision of unconditional and unrestricted multipurpose cash assistance

- Full food and non-food SMEB coverage and full transfer values recommended by sectors
- o Inclusion of nutritionally vulnerable in eligibility criteria

Expanding livelihoods opportunities for the most vulnerable

- Cash for work as part of recovery and reconstruction efforts
- Local food production

Conflict sensitivity, protection, PSEA and inclusivity (gender, age, Persons with disability, older persons)

Strengthening advocacy, joint prioritization and complementarity between sectors

- Enhancing basic services e.g., in schools (school feeding, WASH and health and nutrition programs to ensure children remain in school)
- O Multisectoral needs assessments to identify priority needs and gaps

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Returning IDPs Situation and Preliminary Findings

Amanda Melville, Senior Protection Sector Coordinator (UNHCR) Sophie Etzold, Protection and GBV Sector Coordinator (UNHCR)



Returning IDPs situation/Preliminary findings


December 2024

This dashboard presents the data collected through a series of Rapid Assessments, aimed at understanding the current locations, intentions, and barriers to return for internally displaced persons (IDPs) following the ceasefire in Lebanon and the large-scale movements it triggered. The assessments were carried out by the Protection teams across the four field offices during the week of 5–12 December, using a harmonized tool. The sampling frame was determined at the subnational level. It is non-representative at this stage but sufficiently large to provide an indication of the current situation, intentions and barriers to return for different populations. The respondents were selected from the lists of IDPs for whom UNHCR and partners have provided protection and shelter services. A total of 1,966 assessments were conducted. The respondents¹ were Lebanese IDPs and secondarily displaced refugees residing outside of collective shelters. When further data is available including from shelter partners in Collective Sites, this analysis will be updated.

82% of Lebanese and 64% of Syrians moved after the ceasefire




Plans/intentions for the 6/7 weeks







Current place of accomodation



Reasons not to return (tob 6)



Vulnerability prevelance (top 6)







Logistics Cluster Update

Valentina Signori, Logistics Cluster Coordinator (WFP) Sua Choi, Logistics Cluster IM Focal Point (WFP)



Lebanon Logistics Cluster Concept of Operations







Beirut Coordination Cell

+ Monthly Coord meeting in **Zahle** (and Tyre if needed)



Information Management (Lebanon Logistics Cluster Web)



Transport services for partners from Beirut and Zahle to hard-to-reach areas



- (1) Beirut Warehouse (**1,700** pallet positions / 2,720 m3)
- (2) Zahle Warehouse (**1,300** pallet positions / 2,080 m3), including temperature control
- (3) 2 Mobile Storage Units being installed in Tyre
- (4) Tripoli and Amman, Upon Request











4.7 MILLION

Required Budget (Jan – Mar 2025)





13 Coordination Meetings Facilitated



30 Document Published



Inter-Agency Convoys Facilitated to hard-toreach areas.



Warehouses Operational

(>)



Online Service Request Form for partners to access nocost logistics services



Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) are also available online





Logistics Services Provision







Transport


810 MT transported on behalf of **15 organisations** since its activation




Storage

956 m3 stored on behalf of **9 organisations** since its activation

Transport Product Category



Storage Product Category







Partners Logistics Gaps and Needs





Bilateral catch-up

- Areas of operation and plans for coming months
- Expected gaps in logistics capacity

(upstream/downstream, storage, transport and last mile)

- Warehouse capacity mapping
- Needs around the Syria Cross-Border Response

Met with 9 organizations,

- Big actors mostly self-sufficiency and others still facing logistics gaps (customs, transport and storage)
- Common interest: Capacity strengthening & Knowledge Sharing
- Others: Interest around cross-border operation for Syria



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AoB


Lebanon Coordination Page



Lebanon Country Page: https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/lbn



- Population Data
- Sector Working Group pages
- Latest Documents
- Interactive Dashboards
- Featured Documents
- Links to resources/websites



January 2025 29

AoB

Updated LRP Timeline

| Timeline | Planned actions |
|-------------------------|---|
| 13 – 24 January | Call for expression of interest; online briefing for partners on the submission (20 Jan) Approval of sectoral strategies |
| 27 – 30 January | Consolidation of the draft of LRP |
| 3 February | Circulation of the edited version of the LRP ahead of the JTF |
| 3 February – 4 February | Short presentations of the sector strategies by the lead agencies |
| 06 February | Joint technical task force meeting (Sectors at deputy level, donor focal points and technical focal points for line Ministries) |
| Mid-February | Circulation of finalized LRP 2025 |

January 2025 30

