

LEBANON INTER-AGENCY CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR SYRIAN REFUGEES

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
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Annex A – Refugee Population Projection under Scenario 1 (a + b)

Population Category	Apr-13	May-13	Jun-13	Jul-13	Aug-13	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13
Unaware, Unwilling, Unable to Register	44,600	52,600	60,600	120,600	150,600	165,600	173,100	176,825	178,688
Awaiting Registration	110,000	90,000	70,000	570,000	750,000	760,000	675,000	532,250	350,875
Registered	336,000	436,000	536,000	636,000	756,000	896,000	1,056,000	1,236,000	1,436,000
Totals	490,600	578,600	666,600	1,326,600	1,656,600	1,821,600	1,904,100	1,945,075	1,965,563
<i>Increase per month</i>	<i>93,600</i>	<i>88,000</i>	<i>88,000</i>	<i>660,000</i>	<i>330,000</i>	<i>165,000</i>	<i>82,500</i>	<i>40,975</i>	<i>20,488</i>



Annex B – Maps

– Thematic Maps of Key Infrastructure in Lebanon

- Thematic Infrastructure Map - Lebanon, April 2013
- Thematic Infrastructure Map - Bekaa, May 2013
- Thematic Infrastructure Map - Mt Lebanon, May 2013
- Thematic Infrastructure Map - North, May 2013
- Thematic Infrastructure Map - South, May 2013

– Who-What-Where maps

- Education Sector Activities Partners, June 2013 – still awaiting updates from the sector
- Health Sector Activities Partners, May 2013
- NFI Sector Partners, June 2013
- Shelter Sector Partners, April 2013
- WASH Sector Partners, April 2013

– Current Registered Refugee Distribution & Influx Points

- Registered Refugee Distribution Map - Bekaa, June 2013 – still under construction
- Registered Refugee Distribution Map - Mt Lebanon, May 2013
- Registered Refugee Distribution Map - North, May 2013
- Registered Refugee Distribution Map - South, May 2013

Please use the following link to download these maps:


<https://www.dropbox.com/s/mudu38bbmcl8cux/ContingencyMaps.zip>

Note that the file size is very large (250 Mb), so it will take some time to download.

Online there is an interactive 3D map that shows the location of refugees, information on crossing points, key sector partners and activities, and much more. The map is accessible through username and password, available upon request – email: ghosn@unhcr.org for more details on accessing this tool.

Annex C – CP Coordination Structure

– Diagram



On the management and coordination structure in operationalization of the CP, MoSA will play a leading role at the national level and also at the area level, through its Regional Coordinators and other government bodies. Other key actors on the government side will be the Ministry of Interior (MoI), Ministry of Defence (MoD), Army (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF). MoSA needs to be involved in decisions on any change in the coordination structure.

– Contact List

The latest version of the General Coordination Contact List for the Syrian Refugee Response in Lebanon is always available on the web portal <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122>

Note that the file is password protected. The password is: **1951convention**

Annex D – Plan for Border Monitoring, Reception & Registration

The following provides an outline of operational steps that may be required should the fighting in Syria - in particular in urban Damascus - intensify and result in a quick escalation of the number of persons fleeing Syria for Lebanon. It also outlines the preparatory actions that need to be undertaken immediately (section 4) should the overall plan be adopted. The note is intended to complement and further operationalize contingency plans already in place at UNHCR Lebanon. It is primarily concerned with:

- Border monitoring, reception and registration activities;
- Response during the crucial first 72 - 96 hours.

In other words, it does not address, for example, camp planning/management issues.

1. ASSUMPTIONS AND OBJECTIVES

Triggers

The initiation of the stepped-up response is called for by the UNHCR Representative in case of:

- Reliable reports of 10,000 persons crossing the official or unofficial border crossings over 24 hours;
- Reliable reports from inside Syria that populations exceeding 10,000 persons are amassed close to the Lebanese border;
- Other reliable indications that a significantly increasing influx is imminent.

Populations

- 1) Syrians - assumed to constitute the vast majority of arrivals.
- 2) Palestinians - assumed to constitute the second largest group (UNRWA claimed 487,000 Palestinians resided in Syria by beginning of 2012).
- 3) Iraqis – with 86,000 Iraqi refugees currently registered with UNHCR Syria.
- 4) Other refugees – with over 7,000 non-Iraqi refugees currently registered with UNHCR Syria.
- 5) Other Third Country Nationals (TCNs) - primarily migrant workers from Indonesia, Philippines, Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, India, Bangladesh and various Arab countries. (Syria hosted an estimated 120,000 migrant worker by end of June 2012, though many are believed to subsequently have returned to their home countries, or otherwise moved onward).
- 6) Lebanese.

Entry points

Scenario 1: It is assumed that in case of widespread panic in urban Damascus, the vast majority (> 75 %) of persons arriving in Lebanon will cross through Masnaa border crossing, with smaller numbers crossing elsewhere along the border.

Scenario 2: If Masnaa border crossing becomes very congested or if it is closed by either Syrian or Lebanese authorities, it is assumed that persons will arrive to Lebanon through multiple border crossings north and south of Masnaa, and possibly also through the northern border.

Assumptions

Camps - A key assumption is that existing shelter options will be exhausted, that it will be necessary for UNHCR to establish camps and that this will be permitted by the Lebanese authorities. Further assumptions include:

- 1) For practical as well as protection reasons, different camps will need to be established for different populations. As a minimum, two camps would be established. One larger camp, exclusively for Syrian refugees, with another smaller transit camp for TCNs (including both migrant workers and non-Syrian refugees).
- 2) Most humanitarian organizations, especially the international ones, will require several days in order to respond and deploy resources.

Transit Centre – The plan rests on the assumed need to establish transit centers in close proximity to the border within hours. In order to ensure orderly reception, the number of transit centers should be kept to a minimum and efforts need to be made to channel as many persons as possible into one, two or maximum three main transit centers.

Modular approach – For planning and preparations purposes, a modular approach is applied in that three “response units” – totaling over 80 UNHCR and partner staff/volunteers - are on stand-by for deployment to one, two or three locations.

Population profiling - In order for UNHCR to assume real and credible leadership of the humanitarian efforts, it is assumed that information on the populations will be key. In short, UNHCR needs to have more accurate and comprehensive data on the population, and their movements, than any other actor.

Regular/ongoing activities – An increased influx will not only necessitate a massive response at the border, but will also put strain on the existing offices. To the greatest extent possible, regular registration activities would be ongoing in Beirut, Tripoli, Bekaa and Ghaziyeh, and staff in these locations cannot be significantly depleted.

Main Objectives:

During the early stages of the response, the focus needs to be on i) protection, in particular security of the person and life-saving interventions, and ii) gathering, analyzing and presenting population data. The main objectives for the reception stage are consequently:

- a) Prevention of deportations, border closures and rejection at the border;
- b) Provision of emergency assistance and shelter;
- c) Population profiling and data management;
- d) Registration (Syrians, Iraqi refugees, other asylum-seekers);
- e) Identification and separation of combatants (primarily Syrians);
- f) Evacuation and transit shelter (TCNs).

2. ACTIVITIES

Border monitoring

Scenario 1: UNHCR staff will conduct border monitoring/liaison at Masnaa border crossing, keeping track of arrival and departure numbers and ensuring all arrivals are permitted to enter Lebanon and not stranded at the border or in no-mans-land.

Scenario 2: UNHCR staff will conduct border monitoring/liaison (as per above) at up to three main entry points. At

other entry points, UNHCR must rely on partners (for example CBOs) for information, for example in terms larger groups arriving.

Transit Centre

Depending on the rate and direction of the influx, one, two or three main transit centres, managed by UNHCR, can be established in close proximity to the border crossings. Activities at the transit centres are to be available to all persons requiring assistance or information and will include:

- Messaging – Provision of written and verbal information about UNHCR and partner activities, camp locations, rights and obligations of asylum-seekers and refugees, evacuation information to TCNs etc;
- Border screening / population profiling – The recording and systematization of rudimentary bio-data, particular vulnerabilities, intended final destination in Lebanon or abroad as well as availability and type of accommodation in Lebanon;
- EVI identification – Identification of extremely vulnerable individuals, primarily unaccompanied/separated children, disabled and persons with acute medical needs, with such identification being ensured by the border screening as well as through ocular identification on-site by UNHCR and partner staff;
- Emergency health care;
- Provision of food and NFIs – limited provision of water, basic foodstuff and hygiene kits as needed;
- Referrals - referral to camps or other shelter facilities, TCN transit facilities, hospitals, embassies and/or UNHCR partners;
- Transportation – for those needing to settle in the camps, transfer by bus to be provided by UNHCR.

Refugee camp for Syrians

- In addition to distribution and camp management - which is not covered in this note - UNHCR will conduct registration of Syrian refugees in the camp in a simplified manner through so called emergency registration.
- Registration will be undertaken within 24 hours of arrival to the camp.
- Those Syrians who do not wish to stay in the camp and/or already have access to accommodation will at the Transit Centre be informed of the possibility to register at UNHCR in Beirut and in the field.

Transit camp for TCNs

While IOM would be expected to manage the situation of TCNs - including through provision of transit accommodation and assistance where needed - it cannot be ruled out that UNHCR's logistical and protection capacities may be required, in particular at the outset of the influx. At a minimum, UNHCR will:

- Register Iraqi and other refugees registered with UNHCR Syria;
- Counsel, register and, at a later stage, conduct RSD for new TCN asylum-seekers.

3. STAFFING AND LOGISTICS

Staffing

UNHCR must be able to deploy a large number of staff to the border areas (i.e. crossing points, transit centers and camps) within hours. However, as increased population movements will also result in added pressure on existing UNHCR field offices, staff in those locations cannot all be relocated. This consideration is reflected in the below.

The following staffing requirements are minimum requirements for the initial five to seven days. Rosters of staff-on-call are being prepared in order to ensure that staff can be deployed on very short notice and assume their emergency functions within hours.

Border monitoring

- Six to twelve (depending on scenario) protection staff acting as border liaison officers, working in teams of two or three during twelve hour shifts.
- Border liaison officers report to the Transit Centre Team Leaders (see below).

Transit Centre

Scenario 1: The following staff will work at the transit centre in twelve hour shifts:

- 2 Transit Centre Team Leaders – overseeing the border and transit centre activities, reporting to the Assistant Representative (Operations);
- 4 Registration Officers – overseeing the border screening exercise
- 20 Volunteers (e.g. from the Red Cross, World Vision, UNRWA and/or Arc en ciel) – conducting the border screening
- 6 Protection Staff – identifying/referring extremely vulnerable cases and responding to immediate protection needs
- 6 Field Staff – Overseeing distribution, arranging camp transfer and handling logistical issues
- 2 IT Staff
- 6 drivers

Scenario 2: The following staff will work at the three transit centres in twelve hour shifts:

- 6 Transit Centre Team Leaders – overseeing the border and transit centre activities, reporting to the Assistant Representative (Operations);
- 6 Registration Officers – overseeing the border screening exercise
- 20 Volunteers (e.g. from the Red Cross, World Vision, UNRWA and/or Arc en ciel) – conducting the border screening
- 12 Protection Staff – identifying/referring extremely vulnerable cases and responding to immediate protection needs
- 12 Field Staff – Overseeing distribution, arranging camp transfer and handling logistical issues
- 3 IT Staff
- 12 drivers

In addition, fully equipped medical personnel (e.g. from the Red Cross) need to be present at the transit facility at all times.

Refugee Camp (Syrians)

The following staff will work at the refugee camp in twelve hour shifts:

- 2 Camp Team Leaders
- 2 Registration Officers
- 13 Registration Assistants (three UNHCR and ten volunteers as per above)
- 2 Protection Officers

- 8 Protection Assistants
- 2 IT Staff (who could be the same two as those in the transit center)

Transit Camp (TCNs)

UNHCR would not need a permanent presence in the transit camp for TCNs, and the following staff work one twelve hour shift per day:

- 1 Protection Officer
- 2 Registration Assistants

Reception and registration capacity

Under the above staffing structure, UNHCR has the daily capacity to conduct border screening for up to 12,000 persons as well as emergency registration in the camp for up to 6,000 persons. These figures are in addition to registration being undertaken in Beirut and at existing field offices.

Logistics


- The transit centres will initially be constituted by Rubb Halls (→up to three need to be held in reserve for this).
- Light-weight tents can serve as more confidential interview/counseling areas in proximity to the transit centre(s).
- At least three (in scenario 1) to six (in scenario 2) UNHCR vehicles must be dedicated to the staff at the border and at the transit centre.
- Registration and office space in the camp is required.
- 40 laptops are needed for border screening and registration activities.
- *Additional logistical requirements will be defined by UNHCR Registration (and Management).*


4. ACTION POINTS FOR FOLLOW-UP

	Registration Preparedness Actions (National)	Deadline	Responsible
1	Develop a database for emergency registration, a border screening methodology, form & database (also in Access?) for systemization of data	In progress	UNHCR Registration
2	Prepare a roster of UNHCR staff to cover border monitoring, reception & registration, & prepare existing registration centres to absorb more staff	To be determined	
3	Negotiate secondment to UNHCR of volunteers, available for deployment on short notice, from the Red Cross, World Vision, Arc en ciel, UNRWA	To be determined	UNHCR Registration
4	Develop capacity by training roster staff (UNHCR & partner) in emergency registration	To be determined	UNHCR Registration
5	Request Rubb Halls (up to three) + furniture for the transit centre(s)	To be determined	UNHCR Registration
6	Prepare, procure & preposition a stock of registration materials (family cards, fixing tokens, manifests)	To be determined	UNHCR Registration

7	Develop mass info (e.g. on registration, or visibility material) leaflets & other media for dissemination at borders, transit centre(s) & where needed	To be determined	UNHCR Protection / Mass Comms
8	Scrutinize mapping of official & unofficial border crossings / make contact with CBOs in those areas	To be determined	UNHCR Area Offices
9	Negotiate with LAF &/or GSO for UNHCR to access border crossings / ensure LAF &/or GSO designates liaison officers to UNHCR	To be determined	UNHCR Management
10	Identify partners to assist in logistics & distribution at transit centre(s) (possibly DRC)	To be determined	UNHCR Registration
11	Discuss with MSB registration & office work spaces for the camps	To be determined	UNHCR Registration
12	Identify partners to provide emergency health care at transit centre(s) (possibly Red Cross)	To be determined	Health Sector Lead
13	Liaise with IOM regarding their preparedness / plan to transfer, accommodate & evacuate TCNs	To be determined	IOM
14	Liaise with UNRWA regarding their preparedness / plan to record, transfer & accommodate PRS	To be determined	UNRWA
15	Identify personal contractor(s) for bus services between transit centre(s) & camps	To be determined	UNHCR Admin
16	Draw up inventory of IT equipment available for for screening & registration - if nec., procure 40 laptops	To be determined	UNHCR Admin
17	Identify / allocate vehicles & drivers	To be determined	UNHCR Admin

5. MASS INFLUX SCHEMATICS





Annex E – Rapid Assessment Forms

Notes:

1. The Newcomer HH Assessment Form is a standardized home visit questionnaire for use by all agencies when assessing and subsequently assisting the newly arrived refugees in Lebanon, prior to registration by UNHCR. As a minimum the first part containing bio-data should be completed, while the sector-related questions in the form are available for agencies to complete according to their mandates and plans.
2. At a certain threshold of mass influx (the exact threshold has been determined by the inter-agency management team in each area and is detailed in Annex D of this CP), agencies should shift from conducting household assessment through home visits, to a group level rapid assessment. The Multi-Sectoral Rapid Assessment - Group Form has been designed for this purpose. It can be used in any situation where two or more families live together in the same location, and with key informants or a set of three people representing the group. The group should have arrived 3 days before the assessment takes place, and because it is a rapid assessment conducted on a group rather than a household basis, it does not have too many detailed questions while still aiming to provide sufficient information to plan an emergency response. If the influx is very large and capacity is overwhelmed, then the multi-sectoral rapid group-level assessment can be shortened by completing only the sections of the form highlighted in grey.

NEWCOMER HOUSEHOLD ASSESSMENT FORM
Questionnaire Number:

Date of assessment:	Governorate: Village:
Case number:	Staff name: Mobile Number:
Family book or Head of Household ID number:	

Consent for Release of Information

I hereby give my consent to (agency name) to release the below information to all relevant agencies. It is understood that in giving this consent the information will be treated sensitively and confidentially and strictly in the interests of facilitating access to protection or assistance

Date:

Signature:

A) Bio-data

Name of Head of HH:
Sex: <input type="checkbox"/> Female <input type="checkbox"/> Male
Date of birth (yyyy):
Nationalities:
Date of arrival to Lebanon (dd/mm/yyyy):
Place of residence in Syria (town, district):
Phone number in Lebanon (mobile):
Address in Lebanon:
Identification documentations: <input type="checkbox"/> ID, <input type="checkbox"/> Family Book, <input type="checkbox"/> Passport, <input type="checkbox"/> N/A, <input type="checkbox"/> Other, please specify: _____

Family members	Name	DOB (yyyy)	Sex (F/M)	Relation with head of household	Specific needs (Use UNHCR code guidance attached to the SoP)
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					
7					
8					
9					
10					

B) Protection Monitoring

1. What is the name of your last place of abode in Syria? (if different from the place of origin as registered):

2. What is the humanitarian situation in the last place of abode in Syria:

Very bad Bad Neutral Good Very good

3. Reason for fleeing Syria:

- Insecurity in place of origin
 House destroyed
 Fear of being arrested
 Injury/medical condition
 Other, please specify: _____

4. Displacement pattern:

- Primary displacement from Syria to Lebanon
 Secondary displacement within Syria than to Lebanon
 Secondary displacement within Lebanon

5. How did you access the Lebanese territory?

- Official border crossing point – location:
 Unofficial border crossing point – location:

6. After crossing into Lebanon did you stay in the border area you crossed into?

Yes No

6.1 If yes, why? _____

6.2 If not, why and where did you go? _____

6.3 How long did you stay at the border?

7. Reason for irregular crossing?

- Political opposition activities
 Financial reasons (official fees)
 Lack of documentation
 Wounded
 Other, please specify _____

8. What is the main difficulty you have faced while crossing?

<input type="checkbox"/> None <input type="checkbox"/> Lack of transportation <input type="checkbox"/> Lengthy journey <input type="checkbox"/> Shooting <input type="checkbox"/> Mine risk <input type="checkbox"/> Harassment by authorities (verbal or physical): Syria or Lebanon <input type="checkbox"/> Harassment by non-state agents (verbal or physical): Syria or Lebanon <input type="checkbox"/> Financial (exit/entry fees) <input type="checkbox"/> Request for bribes <input type="checkbox"/> Confiscation of ID documents in Syria <input type="checkbox"/> Confiscation of documents at the border <input type="checkbox"/> Prevented from crossing legally by authorities <input type="checkbox"/> Family held hostage at the border <input type="checkbox"/> Other, please specify: _____
9. Have you any family member left behind in Syria? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No 9.1 If yes, how many and for what reasons? The person(s) is/are <input type="checkbox"/> Missing <input type="checkbox"/> Detained <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify) _____
10. If missing or detained, would you like us to provide the ICRC with your contact information for them to follow up on this issue with you directly, in a confidential manner? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
11. Do you have any separated/unaccompanied children under your care? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No 11.1 If yes, under which circumstances they have been separated?
12. Are you willing to register with UNHCR? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No 12.1 If Not, why? <input type="checkbox"/> Fear of being reported <input type="checkbox"/> Fear of being stopped or arrested while crossing the checkpoint <input type="checkbox"/> Fear of being threatened by someone <input type="checkbox"/> Difficulty in transportation <input type="checkbox"/> Missing IDs <input type="checkbox"/> No interest, please specify why?..... <input type="checkbox"/> Other, please specify: _____

C) Shelter

1. Type of shelter: <input type="checkbox"/> Tent/hand made shelter <input type="checkbox"/> Rented <input type="checkbox"/> Shared rent <input type="checkbox"/> Hosted <input type="checkbox"/> Public building <input type="checkbox"/> Collective shelter <input type="checkbox"/> No accommodation
2. If hosted, by whom:

<input type="checkbox"/> Burning <input type="checkbox"/> In the street <input type="checkbox"/> Dump site <input type="checkbox"/> Waste pit (burial) <input type="checkbox"/> Leave it where it is <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify): _____
7. Other disease vectors (observation):
8. Is there any stagnant water near the WASH facilities?
<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No

E) Health

1. Health Status:					
<input type="checkbox"/> Chronic Illness: <input type="checkbox"/> Critical/severe <input type="checkbox"/> Moderate <input type="checkbox"/> Medical condition: <input type="checkbox"/> Critical/severe <input type="checkbox"/> Moderate					
Family member	Name	Medical condition	Symptoms (if any)	Medication (if any)	Impact on self/others
2. What are the main health concerns in your family? For children? For the elderly?					
3. Are there pregnant women in your family?					
<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No 3.1 If yes, did they have pre natal care? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No 3.2 If yes, where?					
4. Did they have prenatal care since they arrived in Lebanon?					
<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No 4.1 Do they go to a health center? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No 4.2 If yes, which one?					

5. Do you have a family member with a disability?
<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No 5.1 If yes, how do you care for them? _____
6. Which health center/hospital have you been to?
_____ 6.1 If yes, for what treatment?
7. How do you procure your medication?

8. Can you describe the impact of your family's health on yourself and on other family members?

F) Education:

1. Head of Household level of education attained:								
<input type="checkbox"/> Elementary <input type="checkbox"/> Middle School <input type="checkbox"/> High School <input type="checkbox"/> Technical School <input type="checkbox"/> University Degree Educational Background (If applicable):								
2. Did your children attend school in Syria?								
<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No 2.1 If yes, how many of them were schooled and what level of education did they attain before coming to Lebanon? Kindly elaborate: <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; margin-top: 5px;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="width: 50%; padding: 2px;">Children name</th> <th style="width: 50%; padding: 2px;">Level of education before coming to Lebanon</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td style="height: 20px;"> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="height: 20px;"> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="height: 20px;"> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Children name	Level of education before coming to Lebanon						
Children name	Level of education before coming to Lebanon							
2.2 If no, why? _____								
3. Are your children attending school in Lebanon?								

Yes No

3.1 If yes, what grade are they in? Kindly elaborate:

<i>Children name</i>	<i>Level of education in Lebanon</i>

3.2 If no, why? _____

G) Livelihood

1. What is your household's main source of income?

Employment
 External support from friends or family– Donation or loan?
 External support from local community– Donation or loan?
 Humanitarian assistance
 Other please specify (open text)

2. If the head of household is not working, what is the reason?

Injury
 Disability
 Cannot find work in ____ field
 Other please specify (open text)

3. Since your arrival to Lebanon, has your household been unable to pay for basic needs, including: food, rent, health care, or children's school fees?

No
 Yes, check all relevant items:
 ___ food ___ rent ___ health care ___ children's school fees ___ other, (open text): _____

4. Have you been able to generate income since your arrival to Lebanon?

Yes No

4.1 If yes:
How many days do you work per week?
How much would you estimate your daily household earns?

H) Registration and assistance:

1. Have you received any type of humanitarian assistance in Syria prior to your displacement?

<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No 1.1 If yes, do you know who provided you with this assistance? <input type="checkbox"/> UN <input type="checkbox"/> INGOs (specify): _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify): _____		
1.2 If yes, what type of assistance <input type="checkbox"/> Food <input type="checkbox"/> Non-food (specify): _____ <input type="checkbox"/> WASH <input type="checkbox"/> Shelter <input type="checkbox"/> Health <input type="checkbox"/> Education <input type="checkbox"/> Protection <input type="checkbox"/> Cash <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify): _____		
2. What public services are working in your village of origin/last place of abode? <input type="checkbox"/> Hospital/clinics <input type="checkbox"/> Schools <input type="checkbox"/> Drainage/sewage <input type="checkbox"/> Water supply		
3. What would be the most important service to be restored or issue to be addressed, to allow you to return to Syria? <input type="checkbox"/> Hospital/clinics <input type="checkbox"/> Schools <input type="checkbox"/> Drainage/sewage <input type="checkbox"/> Water supply <input type="checkbox"/> Shelter <input type="checkbox"/> Safety and security <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify): _____		
4. Have you registered with the municipality where you live in Lebanon? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No		
5. Assistance received so far in Lebanon <table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; border: none;"> <input type="checkbox"/> Food coupons \$ _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Hygiene kits <input type="checkbox"/> Mattresses/ Blankets <input type="checkbox"/> Rent support \$ _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Medication <input type="checkbox"/> Health Services </td> <td style="width: 50%; border: none;"> <input type="checkbox"/> Financial assistance \$ _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Baby kits <input type="checkbox"/> Other, please specify: _____ </td> </tr> </table>	<input type="checkbox"/> Food coupons \$ _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Hygiene kits <input type="checkbox"/> Mattresses/ Blankets <input type="checkbox"/> Rent support \$ _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Medication <input type="checkbox"/> Health Services	<input type="checkbox"/> Financial assistance \$ _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Baby kits <input type="checkbox"/> Other, please specify: _____
<input type="checkbox"/> Food coupons \$ _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Hygiene kits <input type="checkbox"/> Mattresses/ Blankets <input type="checkbox"/> Rent support \$ _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Medication <input type="checkbox"/> Health Services	<input type="checkbox"/> Financial assistance \$ _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Baby kits <input type="checkbox"/> Other, please specify: _____	
6. Who provided the assistance in Lebanon? And when?		

<input type="checkbox"/> UN; when? <input type="checkbox"/> International NGOs (specify): _____; when? <input type="checkbox"/> Local NGOs (specify): _____; when? <input type="checkbox"/> Municipality; when? <input type="checkbox"/> Host community; when? <input type="checkbox"/> Parties; when? <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify): _____; when?
7. Did anyone had to pay for the assistance in Lebanon?
<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No 7.1 If yes, who? -----

I) FIs and NFIs needs

Item	Already Available	Not available
Mattresses		
Blankets		
Hygiene kit		
Kitchen set		
Baby kit		
Cooking gas set		
Food item		
Dignity kit for women (including sanitary napkins)		
Water container		
Clothes		
Shoes		
Jerry cans		
Buckets		
Others, please specify:		

J) OW observation/recommendation/ fast track

Important: Distribute the "UNHCR registration flier" in addition to all relevant hotline numbers and fliers

Annex F – Area-Specific Scenarios, Triggers & Assumptions

1. Summary of National & Area Specific Triggering Numbers

Area	Current rate of influx ¹	No. that would overwhelm current response capacity	
	(individuals per day)	Individuals (est.)	Households (est.)
National level (gradual)	2,577	300,000 over 30 days	60,000 over 30 days
National level (sudden)		50,000 in a single day	10,000 in a single day
Bekaa	925	> 3,750 over 3 days	> 750 over 3 days
North	663	> 3,750 over 3 days	> 750 over 3 days
South	245	> 3,750 over 3 days	> 750 over 3 days
Beirut & Mt. Lebanon	744	Not determined yet	Not determined yet

2. Bekaa

2.1. Area Scenario Description/Triggers

Up to a certain point the rate of influx is more important than the absolute numbers, since a high rate has the potential to overwhelm response capacity almost immediately and with little or no warning. The Bekaa Area Team considers that a rate as low as 1,250 individuals arriving (through all points) and staying in Bekaa each day for 3 days (i.e. only one third more than the current rate, about 6,500 individuals per week), could overwhelm existing capacity and necessitate a contingency response. Possible scenarios are as follows:

- Severe fighting in Qusair may trigger a mass influx into Arsel, with the potential of 30,000 persons crossing the border in a short space of time. If refugees enter the Arsel area, they will probably stay there, move to Wadi Khaled in Akkar, or on to Central/West Bekaa.
- Fighting in Rif Damascus and Damascus leading to a major reverse for one side or the other would trigger a large influx, particularly of women, children, and combatants from the defeated side, but with a problematic mix of civilians and combatants in the influx groups.

¹ Figures derived from the increase in number of refugees + pending registration between end-May and 18 July 2013.

- Various events in Syria could trigger a large influx into both North and Central Bekaa simultaneously. If the influx is into the Hermel area, the refugees will likely move to Baalbek area, and possibly on to South Lebanon. If large numbers enter through Masnaa, they will likely go to Marj, Ghazze, Sawiri, Dalhamiye, Saadnayel, Taalabaya, Bar Elias, Kherbet Rouha, Rashaya, Jib Jenin, and Mansoura.

2.2. Area Assumptions

In General

The combined capacity of all partners in the Bekaa would not be able to cope with a more massive influx than that projected in RRP5, particularly if much of the influx came in just a few days (Scenario 1(b)). There are neither sufficient stocks, staffing nor financial resources. Some places have no agencies present and working there, although it is possible that refugees could go there.

Implication:

- ⇒ *The lack of capacity would force the response community to focus on urgent emergency cases only for at least the first 3 days, in terms of shelter, WASH, food health, and other critical sectors.*

Security of Operations

Prolonged or severe insecurity in the above parts of the Bekaa could trigger onward movements towards Central and West Bekaa, possibly seeking refuge in the major urban areas of Baalbek and Zahle, following existing sectarian divisions. Implementation of operations would become more dangerous and much more difficult, as it could not easily be managed remotely from the sites without reliable local partners, who will become even more overburdened in this situation.

Implication:

- ⇒ *All agencies need to consider how they would manage their critical operations by 'remote control', and coordinate their efforts to prepare for this.*

Monitoring & Assessment

Although monitoring Masnaa and other legal entry points will help to judge whether the threshold of 4,000 individuals entering over 3 days has been reached, in a mass influx many, perhaps most, will enter not through legal points, and so judging the scale of the influx will be difficult. Even then, refugees will not all stay in the Bekaa, and will move on to other parts of the country. These flows should also be monitored if possible.

Implication:

- ⇒ *As well as monitoring at the borders, flows of refugees across the country should also be monitored.*

Shelter

The shelter situation at present is almost overwhelming, even without the possible even larger scale influx, in that currently there is insufficient shelter to meet the need, and few options to alleviate this. Available rental accommodation has been taken up and collective centres are getting to saturation point, while GoL has not authorised the establishment of transit sites, although five sites have been located, planned and the necessary partners identified. Consequently, refugees are resorting to small and dispersed informal tented settlements (ITS), where it is more difficult and inefficient to assist them, which are vulnerable and harder to improve in

terms of shelter status, water, sanitation and hygiene.

Implication:

⇒ *In terms of shelter, Bekaa Area is therefore already close to the contingency scenario at the moment, even at the lower number of refugees now entering. The implication is that some form of formal camps will be required sooner or later, and UNHCR should actively continue to discuss the issue of 'Transit Sites' with GoL at high level, to ensure that all actors understand that 'camps' will inevitably arise during a mass influx.*

3. North

3.1. Area Scenario Description/Triggers

A collapse of the regime in Damascus could trigger not only a large new wave of refugees entering Lebanon, but also a significant return of the current refugee population, but perhaps only in very large numbers once they perceive that the situation at home is more secure. Additionally, the level of destruction of infrastructure in and around e.g. Homs, Al Qusair, will not be conducive to early returns and/or only of male heads of households (with the women and children left behind until situation stabilises). The net effect is hard to gauge, but it is assumed that the refugee population will increase significantly, at least over the short term.

The Akkar Area Team estimates that it can cope with up to 1,250 new arrivals per day with the current response methodology focusing on HH level needs, but that more than this over 3 consecutive days will trigger a move from assessment at the household level to a 'group' level assessment approach. The capacity in T5 (Tripoli + 5 districts) is slightly lower and should the influx require simultaneous intervention in all the districts of the Northern Governorate, the partners operating in both Akkar and T5 would not be able to respond.

Northern Governorate regional capacity in general will therefore be overwhelmed by an influx of less than 2,500 individuals per day even with a group intervention approach, and some sectors including WASH and shelter would be overwhelmed by an influx of half this scale. The majority of the households may enter illegally which means their onward movement inside Lebanon will be restricted, especially in areas with many checkpoints (e.g. for assistance provided within Wadi Khalid and Akroum, where intervention will be required). Local political considerations and/or the host population profile might prompt some districts, which might otherwise be considered to have the capacity to absorb more new arrivals, to take measures that restrict the settlement or movement of refugees. Refugees of the Alawite confession are expected to move mainly into the Sahel area, but the return of other profile groups is not expected immediately.

3.2. Area Assumptions

In General

Above the rate of 1,250 individuals arriving in the North per day for 3 or more consecutive days, there are insufficient resources to respond following current approaches and this level of influx will trigger a move to a group assessment / response approach. Activation of the CP might be required for an influx of less than 1,000 HHs, simply in order to trigger additional human and financial resources (and also release stocks of food and NFIs). This is a rate far below the 50,000 individuals (10,000 HH) per day set for activation of the CP at national level. Additionally, the security situation in Tripoli or in Wadi Khaled might prevent humanitarian actors from

intervening where and when needed, even if they have the capacity.

⇒ *In terms of shelter and WASH, response capacity in the Northern Governorate would be overwhelmed by just double the current influx. Again, the implication is that some form of formal camps will be necessary.*

Coordination

It is crucial to keep the government entities including municipalities, MoSA and the security forces well informed of the CP and receive their feedback and support. An additional challenge will be to coordinate interventions of external entities (private and other non-traditional donors, e.g. Qatar, Gulf States) and ensure their approach follows the methodology established through coordination mechanisms (in terms of impartiality of assistance, common standards for targeting based on vulnerability assessment, etc.)

Implication:

⇒ *Improve networking and communication with the authorities and all partners on CP planning issues.*

Security of Operations

The security situation in the North already imposes significant limitations on operations and as the emergency progresses they may become even more tenuous. Alternatives to the normal transportation past the habitual flashpoints may be needed, including alternative road routes (contouring around Tripoli and/or passing through Bekaa) and the possibility of bypassing the danger by sea from Tripoli to Abdeh fishing port if feasible.

Implication:

⇒ *The teams in the North (especially Qobayat) need a plan for continuity of operations in the event of severe / prolonged fighting in Tripoli (Jabal Mohsen / Bab el-Tabbaneh and new areas of conflict i.e. Qobbeh, Abu Samra) leading to prolonged closure of the northern highway, with all the attendant logistic complications.*

Shelter

As in the rest of the country, the shelter options in the North are nearly exhausted but, unlike in the Bekaa, informal tented sites are small and spread out, and only 30% of the existing informal tented settlements (ITS) in Akkar could be expanded to absorb a new influx. The majority of the refugee population in T5 lives in an urban setting where shelter capacity is extremely limited – and simply not available for poorer refugees.

Implication:

⇒ *Continue to look for alternative shelter solutions through pre-identification of sites on government and vacant land – even ‘farm’ sites after appropriate disinfection – based on preset minimum criteria and the full involvement of municipalities, together with tents, ‘sealing-off kits’ and WASH facilities as needed.*

Protection

Maintaining the civilian nature of the refugee population and the identification and segregation of military and militia elements among refugees will become a major challenge in a mass influx situation.

Food, NFI & Logistics

Concerning the availability of commodities (food, NFIs) in-country and the use of food/cash vouchers for new arrivals in case of a mass influx, the destruction of infrastructure in Syria and the overall insecurity in Syria and Lebanon might prevent the circulation of trucks between the two countries and severely limit the availability

even of basic foodstuffs and NFIs on local markets in Lebanon.

Looking at the food and NFI stock situation, although there are nationwide reserve stocks for approximately 20,000 households (held across all agencies), for UNHCR and most other agencies these stocks are not allocated between the regions. For Tripoli and the North it has been assumed that re-supply from Beirut will always be possible, but this assumption may prove flawed and risky.

In case of relocating refugees to identified sites, transportation options need to be mapped out in advance, while the possibility of road blockage in the light of potential refugee concentrations needs further analysis, since the checkpoints to Wadi Khalid and Akroum can be completely closed, preventing movement in or out.

Implications:

- ⇒ *Allocate (and physically move) key stocks needed into the regions and establish a strategic reserve at national level for major emergencies.*
- ⇒ *Consider establishing common warehouses in strategic locations in Akkar such as in Wadi Khalid and Halba (to serve both Akkar and Minnieh-Denniye Districts).*
- ⇒ *Try out the seven alternative routes already identified, for the movement of relief items by truck, and examine the option of movement from Tripoli to Akkar by sea as a last resort.*

4. South

4.1. Area Scenario Description/Triggers

The South Area Team estimates that a relatively low level of newcomer families will overwhelm current response capacity – more than 1,250 individuals per day over 3 consecutive days. This rate of influx would trigger a move from assessment at the household level to a ‘group’ level assessment approach. As in other areas, the pattern of settlement tends to follow existing geographical divisions between the sects in Lebanon.

In the South the most alarming trigger for a mass internal displacement of refugees (and Lebanese citizens) would be armed action, including a possible incursion by Israel. An international conflict on the scale of 2006 has not been considered under this contingency plan, since it is beyond the scope of UNHCR’s mandate for refugees and is covered by the UNCT’s overarching Lebanon Contingency Plan

4.2. Area Assumptions

In General

One critical difference between the South and other areas is the existence and significant presence of UNIFIL. It is essential to clarify the relationship of UNHCR with UNIFIL concerning the refugee response, contingency planning and support arrangements, especially the security aspects, and also to consider how the wider response effort by NGOs can be brought within any coordination and support arrangements.

Implication:

- ⇒ *In the South UNHCR’s relationship with UNIFIL is critical, and linkages at different levels should be strengthened, also with the possible exchange of permanent liaison officers (probably CIMIC trained).*

Security of Operations

The main highway between Saida and Tyre could easily be cut by physical means or by general insecurity, seriously restricting the movement of supplies for the refugee response, and also hampering normal market functioning, at the same time as possibly limiting further refugee influx, into the area, at least temporarily. As in other areas, insecurity could also cut-off certain areas where refugees are residing, preventing access to refugees and host population alike. The Lebanese security authorities should be made aware of their responsibility to ensure humanitarian access, but in practice this may not be possible and life-saving interventions may have to be implemented through local municipalities and CBOs in the areas concerned.

Implication:

- ⇒ *The South Area Team should work on alternative transportation arrangements in advance, in case the main highway between Saida and Tyre is cut, including the possibility of bypassing the danger by sea, if feasible.*
- ⇒ *All agencies need to consider how they would manage their critical operations by 'remote control', and coordinate their efforts to prepare for this.*

Border Monitoring & Registration

All areas have identified the need for enhanced border monitoring, including capacity (i.e. an SOP plus trained staff) to conduct pre-screening to identify the most vulnerable and fast-track them to both initial assistance provision and registration, for mass communication with the population as it crosses the border, and for the operation of a system providing advance warning to the other areas from Bekaa (primarily Masnaa) of any large new refugee flows heading towards those other areas.

Implication:

- ⇒ *Enhance border monitoring for pre-screening / fast-tracking the most vulnerable, to start mass communication with the refugees, and to get advance warning of large flows heading to other areas.*

Protection

The protection situation is expected to worsen significantly, and so a special Protection Crisis Team will be established in the areas with the largest number of protection concerns, for instance where large numbers have crossed illegally. Focal points within the refugee population and host communities will also be identified, and trained (in advance). Another issue is the care needs of protection cases and others considered especially vulnerable, since the normal response to these cases is to move them away from the area. If insecurity in those areas prevents this, then there are few options to provide safe accommodation for them in the South.

Implication:

- ⇒ *Establish a special Protection Crisis Team, with trained staff from the UN and implementing partners, for early identification of those at high risk or with specific needs because of special vulnerability.*

Shelter & WASH

Even with the current target of assisting only 10,000 individuals (2,000 HH) per week / 40,000 individuals (8,000 HH) per month, shelter is as limited in the South as elsewhere. A renewed effort to explore shelter options (collective centres, open spaces) is unlikely to yield much that is new.

Implications:

- ⇒ *The Area Shelter Working Group needs to quantify the available shelter stock in the area.*

- ⇒ *The National Shelter Working Group need to start looking beyond this – outside the country – to identify other actors which might reinforce the response in the event of heightened emergency, and make provisional partnership agreements with them in advance.*

Food, NFI & Logistics

For all forms of assistance during the first phase of any heightened emergency, there is likely to be a reliance on stocks – of shelter and WASH materials, food and NFI packages. In terms of actual response as much in assessment, the approach is more likely to be on a ‘group’ rather than an individual basis, since it will not be logistically feasible to provide assistance on an individual basis, directly to a refugee’s temporary ‘home’.

Implication:

- ⇒ *Map the availability of key stocks and pre-positioned a higher level of reserves in the South.*

5. Beirut & Mt Lebanon

5.1. Area Scenario Description/Triggers

Whilst the situation is very different in each area, shelter (and closely linked with shelter, WASH) is the most critical sector in both Beirut & Mt Lebanon. In Mt Lebanon you have a rural situation, with families setting up informal tented settlements (ITS), mostly very small, in a large number of locations. They have also taken over unfinished or abandoned buildings, including some empty schools. On the whole, the authorities in Mt Lebanon have only just perceived the scale of the problem they face in accommodating the refugees, and the fact that they have little experience and little capacity to respond. In Beirut there is no space for ITS, only collective centres, although other options need to be explored. Currently there is a gradual but constant flow of refugees into the city, but this is not sustainable as accommodation costs are high and any mass influx could be sudden and overwhelming.

Another critical factor is the ‘factionalization’ of the city, which results in refugees belonging to these different groups seeking to move into specific areas accordingly. This makes it imperative to communicate with the political parties that dominate these areas, since in some cases they have more capacity to respond than the state. Mt Lebanon also has its minority areas – in fact their area is a patchwork of sometimes quite hostile near neighbours owing allegiance to different sectarian groups, based on their differing religious confessions. This implies that refugees belonging to different confessions, which may have the potential to be hostile to one another because they are sympathetic to different parts of the political spectrum in Syria, would automatically tend to go to separate locations. In the event of intra-Lebanese clashes, this ‘factionalization’ of different areas would make movement difficult and perhaps even impossible to access some of the locations where refugees have settled.

Implications:

- ⇒ *Overall, in this area local government capacity is weak and capacity to absorb limited.*
- ⇒ *The local offices of all agencies working in the area must establish effective liaison with relevant municipal authorities and state security forces (especially the local ISF chiefs).*
- ⇒ *UNHCR must authorize its Area Office to initiate dialogue and forge the necessary relationships with the ‘political parties’ that dominate certain areas, in advance of any crisis.*

5.2. Area Assumptions

Management, Coordination & Information Management

One reality governing humanitarian response in the City of Beirut is the proximity of the national headquarters of most organisations, including UNHCR and GoL. This means that there is an unfortunate tendency for the headquarters of any agency to take over direct management of the emergency response in the city, thus disempowering the field office supposedly responsible for managing it. This tendency is exacerbated by the fact that most agencies have little capacity exclusively dedicated to the Beirut and Mt Lebanon area (e.g. UNHCR Beirut & Mt Lebanon has only 8 officers with 2 more on the way). Aside from increasing this capacity directly, this factor should be addressed by building an effective network of partners, not only international but also national, to support their 'Ka'em Makam' (district) and 'Beladiyah' (municipal) level government entities, and also the existing social networks and local charitable organizations, which are generally short of resources but could do more, particularly in certain medical and special needs cases.

Implications:

- ⇒ *GoL, UN Agencies, and NGOs must make sure together make sure that their respective roles, responsibilities, resources and the authority to commit funds of headquarters versus field offices are made crystal clear in advance of the activation of the CP.*
- ⇒ *All agencies in the area should increase their capacity, especially in shelter and WASH, and also get out there and find new partners, particularly national, and create a network of focal points in these agencies with whom to work.*
- ⇒ *The creation of focal points in a wide network of partner agencies (beyond implementing partners) will facilitate mapping of 'who is doing what, where', which would greatly support coordination, and would make a bigger difference overall (i.e. help a larger number of refugee families) than an exclusive focus on managing the agency's own direct response.*

Monitoring of refugee flows

There are no borders to be concerned about but the key difference in this area is the City of Beirut, which has significant 'pull factors', compared to the rest of the country. For this reason, any large influx (of say 150,000 refugees) could impact upon Beirut quickly – within a few days.

Implications:

- ⇒ *Establish a system to warn Beirut Area Team and all operational partners, in advance of any impending mass arrival (particularly from crossing points in Bekaa and the North).*
- ⇒ *Any response should try to strike the difficult balance of being sufficient, but without increasing 'pull factors' to the city, if at all possible.*

Shelter

Although a significant minority of the Syrian's arriving in Beirut are self-supporting who can find or pay for somewhere to stay, at least two-thirds of them are without resources or options. Based on previous experience, squatting illegally is a common solution that people take into their own hands, and so in a mass influx into Beirut, newly arrived refugees will have no alternative but to stay on the streets and also occupy any empty buildings. The police and local municipalities cannot really control this, but where they have responded it has been to treat it as a security rather than a protection issue.

Shelter actors need to tackle the shelter problem in the urban areas proactively by talking to the mayors

of local areas, and looking for innovative solutions. These include the use of stadiums and other public areas (as was done at Bourj Hammoud and another stadium in the 2006 war), but also possible use of multi-storey car-parks around the city. Most of the malls they serve are likely to close, at least temporarily in such a situation, and most of the car-parks are managed by one company, Liban Park, which should be contacted now.

Meanwhile in Mt Lebanon, it is unlikely that there would be explicit government endorsement for a tented 'camp' anywhere in the country, and so refugees will continue to live in ITS in small groups. As for schools, although they will shortly be empty during the summer recess, using them to accommodate refugees is a step that will have a very negative effect on education (of Lebanese even more than of Syrians), contributing to a further worsening of relations with the host community, and it is a move that will be difficult to reverse.

Implications:

- ⇒ *UNHCR Area Office and partners need to engage with municipalities and the ISF constructively to try to manage the issue of illegal occupation without exacerbating the already poor protection situation.*
- ⇒ *Failure to find innovative solutions and make contact with the owners or managers of potential shelter solutions like the stadiums or multi-storey car-parks in advance could mean that people suffer and even start to die soon after a mass influx actually occurs.*
- ⇒ *Since the Sunnis make up the largest constituent of the refugee population, these are probably the refugees that should be accommodated, temporarily, in any large public spaces that are available, like the stadiums.*
- ⇒ *Continue to look for shelter options in Mt Lebanon, including more locations suitable for transit sites, and also mapping the locations of schools as a last resort.*

WASH

Water will be a major challenge for refugees who have settled both in Beirut and the mountains, not so much because of supply, but because demand will rapidly exceed the quantity of water that can be distributed through Lebanon's inadequate water distribution capacity.

Implication:

- ⇒ *The national WASH Sector should try to increase water distribution capacity, primarily by establishing a series of standby arrangements for water trucking.*

Food, NFI & Logistics

Agencies, including UNHCR, do hold stocks of food and NFIs in the area, but it is not always clear where the authority to disburse these stocks lies. If they are national level stocks, although physically located in the area, they are not necessarily available to it.

Implications:

- ⇒ *If it is not efficient to establish separate warehouses exclusively for Beirut and Mt Lebanon, pre-allocate a proportion of them so that the authority for their distribution is vested with the local offices covering the area, including not stocks of food and NFIs but also materials for Shelter and WASH (e.g. building 'sealing-off' kits).*
- ⇒ *Physically distributing food or NFIs is not the most effective method of assisting refugees in an urban environment, so the initiative to introduce vouchers or various forms of cash assistance needs to be up-scaled and accelerated.*

Health

Access to health services in the city is a big issue, since they are very expensive here. Again, the only way forward is to map what is available in terms of primary healthcare and medical assistance, and the best way to do this would be to establish a functioning Area Health Working Group. AUB Hospital has already offered support with training and in emergencies. Another key member would be the Lebanese Red Cross.

Implications:

- ⇒ *UNHCR should establish a partnership agreement with Lebanese Red Cross at national level.*
- ⇒ *Establish an Area Health Working Group to build the capacity of existing PHCs that would accept Syrian refugees, and also look at the creation of mobile medical units to assist in any mass influx or mass casualty situation, such as might be caused by conflict.*

Annex G – Table of Suggested Actions for Initial Response Period

Actor(s)	Within first 24 hrs	Within first 48 hrs	Within first 72 hrs	Within first week	Within first month
MANAGEMENT, COORDINATION, INFO MANAGEMENT & FUNDRAISING					
GoL (MoSA) + UNHCR + all relevant agencies / sectors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Activate CP response after verification of numbers & inform UNSCOL, UNIFIL, OCHA & partners GoL start providing population movement data on a daily basis (entries & exits) Agencies adjust / re-deploy staffing for initial 24 hrs response & share lists of staff 	Seek urgent authority from the Council of Ministers to establish 'transit sites' at predetermined locations		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review existing national / field level coordination structure & adapt as necessary to the actual situation Ensure regular consultation with ICRC, the Red Cross Movement & any other relevant actors not formally in the coordination structure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sector working groups review priorities & capacities in the light of the new emergency, & report any alarming shortcomings Coordinate any inter-agency or cross-sectoral rapid assessment & present a 'gap analysis'
EXTERNAL RELATIONS & PUBLIC INFORMATION					
GoL (MoSA) + UNHCR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PI staff issue daily updates with info from the field & sectors Deploy the identified Comms / Reporting Officers to each area 	Issue a joint press statement / conference following consultation with agency PI units		Initiate joint GoL-UN donor meeting & repeat periodically	
REGISTRATION					
UNHCR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Switch to emergency registration process at all transit sites & registration centres Activate roster of standby registration staff & redeploy some existing capacity to predetermined points 	Depending on size of influx, prepare manifesting or fixing tokens at border points for refugee transportation	Engage additional local partners to support reception, registration & identification of the vulnerable		

UNHCR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mass info mechanism engaged at borders, transit centres & community centres 				
PROTECTION					
GoL (MoSA) + UNHCR + all relevant partner agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mobilize full-time presence at borders to ensure unhindered & safe entry, immediate identification of vulnerable persons & provision of information Monitor protection situation / identify protection issues on ground, including physical safety at transit sites, etc Ensure safe transport from border areas to transit sites, camps, other designated areas away from borders 	Centralize tracking of refugee movement from entry points within the country, & communicate this rapidly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordinate with relevant partners regarding voluntary returns, possible TCN evacuation & repatriation Coordinate relocation of populations in need of relocation - if necessary establish humanitarian corridors Liaise with LAF / ISF on documentation, detentions, application of guidelines on the quick identification & treatment of persons with special needs 		
CHILD PROTECTION / PREVENTION & RESPONSE TO SEXUAL & GENDER BASED VIOLENCE (SGBV)					
GoL (MoSA) + UNHCR + UNICEF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Liaise with other sector lead agencies to mitigate risks / ensure SGBV prevention & response is integrated into their own response 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Set up child protection monitoring at the border entry points to identify UAM / SC / children at risk 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conduct psychosocial & recreational activities in transit sites & through mobile outreach 		

GoL (MoSA) + UNHCR + UNICEF + all relevant partner agencies		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Disseminate IEC materials & conduct awareness raising on child protection concerns 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tracing & family reunification for UAM / SC & referral to alternative care, esp. if in transit sites Implement emergency interim care for UAM & provide shelter for children at risk Case management of children at risk – child recruitment, physical & sexual violence / exploitation, trafficking Ensure SGBV is integrated into any emergency protection monitoring & any inter-sectoral assessment 		
SHELTER / WASH					
GoL (MoSA) + UNHCR + UNICEF + all relevant partner agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Utilise agreed vulnerability criteria in order to radically prioritise most vulnerable for provision of shelter Rapid needs assessment particularly of ITS & potential transit sites not already been assessed & planned 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Open new ‘transit sites’ & extend existing ones to double their planned size if possible Hygiene promotion / awareness raising Provision of water to all main sites through connection to existing network / water trucking 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Initiate an immediate rapid assessment of the locations of families on the move elsewhere Construct emergency latrines (using pre-fabricated sanitation units) / defecation fields if no alternative 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Set up water distribution tap-stands including pipe networks Construct emergency showers Undertake drainage works Distribute hygiene kits (including water containers or buckets) 	Distribute latrine / camp cleaning kits

GoL (MoSA) + UNHCR + UNICEF + all relevant partner agencies		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Set up water storage facilities at all main sites Mass water treatment (chlorination) Distribute aquatabs / water purification filters Test water quality 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> & baby kits to those with infants Install solid waste bins & arrange garbage disposal 	
FOOD / NON-FOOD ITEMS (NFIs) Distribution					
GoL (MoSA) + WFP + UNHCR + all relevant partner agencies	Prioritise in-kind food & NFI distributions at ITS, transit sites, collective centres, etc., having already mapped out the likely locations & planned associated distribution points	Utilise the simplified targeting criteria to quickly identify the other vulnerable &/or needy families, who are not living in an ITS, transit sites or collective centres			WFP to set up a system to monitor for malnutrition
HEALTH					
GoL (MoPH, MoSA) + UNHCR + WHO + all relevant partner agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish teams at entry points to conduct triage / epidemic control / health monitoring / rapid assessment Referral system for stabilised cases, on to the network of existing PHC & SHC, & extend their opening hours 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitor & control health of population, particularly epidemic monitoring & control Mobile clinics/outposts to deliver emergency response & PHC at new sites or personnel, equipment & medicines at existing facilities to increase capacity 	Establish staffed, equipped & properly resourced field hospitals		
EDUCATION					

<p>GoL (MEHE, MoSA) + UNHCR + UNICEF + all relevant partner agencies</p>				<p>Ensure that education data is collected, consolidated, analysed & disseminated, & perform M&E regularly</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Initiate Two-Shift schooling country-wide, ensuring that fees, equipment & running costs are covered ▪ Set up child-friendly spaces in collective centres, transit sites, & ITS, so that some educational activities continue ▪ In a mass but gradual refugee influx, establish tented schools in collective centres & transit sites ▪ In a more rapid or overwhelming influx situation, use schools for shelter but initiate Education's plan to get all refugee & displaced Lebanese children back to school within 3-6 months
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