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Regular Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon

Wave IV | September 2018

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

CP	Child Protection
DV	Dependent Variable
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
GPS	Global Positioning System
GoL	Government of Lebanon
HSAR	Hierarchical Spatial Autoregressive
IV	Independent Variable
MCMC	Markov Chain Monte Carlo
MLE	Maximum Likelihood Estimation
MCAR	Missing Completely at Random
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
PCA	Principal Component Analysis
PPS	Probability Proportionate to Size
PNCA	Propensity to Negative Collective Action
QoR	Quality of Relations
RPP-S	Refugee Population Pressure on Services
SD	Standard Deviation
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
LCRP	Lebanon Crisis Response Plan

Executive Summary

This report presents an analysis of data from the Fourth Wave of the UNDP Regular Perceptions Survey on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon. Funded by the Government of the Netherlands, it differs from the reports published on the first three waves in that it describes both the geographic or temporal variations in tension levels (Section 1), and also uses econometric modelling to answer the key question: "To what extent are changes in Lebanese perceptions of Syrian refugees *attributable* to the provision of assistance, particularly cash assistance?".

The data on which the analysis is based upon is representative to the district-level of the total adult Syrian and Lebanese populations[1] in Lebanon and was collected in June and July 2018. Given the reality that relations are reported more negatively by Lebanese than Syrian respondents[2], this analysis concentrated solely on Lebanese perceptions. To measure changes in these perceptions, three key outcomes were selected for further analysis:

i. *Refugee population pressure on services*: e.g. '"The presence of so many Syrian refugees in Lebanon today is placing too much strain on Lebanon's resources" To what extent do you agree / disagree?';
ii. *Quality of relations*: e.g. '"Lebanese and Syrians in this community are able to work together to solve problems they have together" To what extent do you agree / disagree?';
iii. *Propensity for negative collective action*: e.g. '"When tensions are high, some restrictions on foreigner' movement or curfews can

[1] With the combined first, second and third wave samples, together including over fifteen thousand interviews, these survey results are representative of and generalizable to the total adult Lebanese and Syrian population resident in Lebanon, with a margin of error of less than +/- 5% within most of the country's twenty-six districts and a margin of error of less than +\-2% nationally.

[2] Ark & UNDP, 'Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions in Lebanon', (Wave 1 & 2, May & September 2017)

help keep this area safe" To what extent do you agree / disagree?'.

To unpack the causal effect of assistance on these outcomes, assistance data from LCRP partners in 2017 was used as an input to the model to investigate statistically significant relationships. Ten types of assistance data were included in this analysis, offering detail on the effects of different types of assistance on the negative outcomes described above. **The model essentially builds a picture of what the outcomes would have been had this assistance not been provided, establishing a quantified counterfactual for comparable analysis**. For further details on the methodology, refer to the Wave III report Social Tensions.

The principal finding of this analysis is that higher levels of cash assistance was associated with lower levels of all the negative outcomes that were examined. It is very likely that greater cash assistance provided to Syrian refugees positively affects Lebanese, as well, alleviating pressure on the local economy by helping to address, for example, greater competition over lower-skilled jobs, and through the injection of cash into the local economy, with Syrian refugees utilizing the cash assistance to purchase goods and services from local Lebanese businesses. The link between the provision of cash assistance and the lowering of negative perceptions is likely to follow this logical flow. This explanation is in line with the rationale for cash assistance programming more generally, and in line with research conducted in other contexts which demonstrate the positive impact of cash not just on economic vulnerability but on alleviating social tensions.

The strongest results in this study were evident in positively affecting the perception of refugee population pressure on services and the weakest on the perceived quality of relations. **The likely impact of cash assistance is therefore more on alleviating the perceived pressure on services that Syrians pose in Lebanon, as they are enabled to spend in local economies, than on changing the structural nature of the relationship towards the more positive**. Therefore, we find that cash assistance does not significantly impact on deeper more structural negative

perceptions that affect the quality of relations – though this goal is not often the stated objective of cash assistance programming.

In addition, as per the findings of the Wave III report on Social Tensions, **Social Stability assistance[3] in particular, when coupled with other types of assistance, emerged as playing an important role in reducing more structurally negative perception outcomes**, particularly in reducing propensities to negative collective action against refugees. This includes pairing Social Stability assistance with cash assistance directly. Inclusive of the Wave IV results, the finding that humanitarian assistance has a positive impact on social stability continued. Indeed, health, basic assistance, and livelihoods programming proved to lower Lebanese dissatisfaction with services effectively. Moreover, the finding that **positive effects are not limited to the cadaster that the assistance was provided to,** continued through Wave IV. Assistance continues to have significant and positive regional effects (Union of municipality or district) beyond the area targeted area of assistance.

In terms of changes in context and evolution of social tensions, the Wave IV results did not differ meaningfully from Wave III. However, one of the main changes was a **deterioration in the Syrian responses on the quality of relations.** Syrians reporting 'very negative' and 'negative' relations increased from 12.7% to 16.6%. This is likely linked to the more severe conditions that Syrians are facing in country with marked increases in the level of harassment that they face, the number of Syrians reporting that they were affected by a raid, and the proportion of Syrians witnessing confiscations of identity papers all increasing from Wave III to IV.

In addition, a key finding that has emerged over the four waves of surveying is the **deterioration in the frequency in intercommunal contact as measured across different sites**. 'Daily' and 'regular' interactions have decreased steadily, including from Wave III to Wave IV, which is concerning due to the strong correlation found through all waves of

[3] Including assistance on youth programming and community dialogue mechanisms but excluding capacity building work with municipalities.

surveying between the frequency of contact and the quality of the relations. The deterioration is sharpest in 'social circles', which, given the strong association between social relations and addressing structurally negative perceptions, is a cause for concern.

Overall, the results of the analysis bring forward two key considerations. First, the important role that cash plays in reducing social tensions should be acknowledged, particularly in its role reducing the perception that refugees are adding pressure on services. At the same time, the limitation of the cash assistance alone is clear as the assistance does little to affect deeper qualitative perceptions of refugees. **Combining cash assistance with conflict dialogue and youth assistance plays should be acknowledged in strategic planning** as an effective combination of assistance on improving relations sustainably.

Second, **the decrease in intercommunal interactions requires special attention**. The culmination of restrictive measures on Syrians is likely contributing significantly to this lowering of interactions as Syrians are likely self-censoring their movement to avoid contact with local authorities and host community members alike, as found in other studies.[4] Programming to counter this trend must be considered by LCRP partners. These findings and implications should be taken by decision-makers as strategic considerations when designing how and where assistance is delivered in Lebanon, to ensure a conflict sensitive response.

[4] UNHCR, Participatory Assessment of Syrian Refugees, (2018).

1 Introduction

This report provides summary findings from the fourth wave of the *Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon* conducted by the ARK Group in coordination with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Lebanon, with generous funding from the Government of the Netherlands. The results and analysis detailed in this document should be considered supplementary to previous reporting on the *Regular Perception Surveys*, as we seek to build upon previous findings and to answer a number of new or previously-unanswered primary research questions. For further context on the research project, the reader should consult the UNHCR Operational Portal for Refugee Situations on Lebanon, where one may find detailed reporting on the project's (a) terms of reference and primary research questions, (b) survey and research methods and (c) summary results, descriptive and analysis from Waves I-III of the project.[5] Further, the reader may consult the *UNDP & ARK Interactive Dashboard: Host Community – Syrian Refugee Communal Relations in Lebanon*, which provides users with an interface to examine results from the previous four waves of surveying conducted in 2017-2018 disaggregated by a number of geographic and demographic categories; the dashboard has been designed as a tool for researchers but also for direct service providers seeking to better understand their client communities.[6]

1.1 Outline of the Report

The remainder of this report is divided into four primary sections. First a brief description of methods is provided, though the reader should consult previous project reporting for additional details on methods, and in particular, the project's inception report for additional details on survey methods, and the project's third narrative report for additional details on the regression modelling and other statistical tools used to evaluate the

[5] Operational Portal, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/71.
[6] Interactive Dashboard, http://tiny.cc/nvh9vy.

impact of assistance.[7] The first of two 'results' section provides descriptive statistics, or an overview of the public opinion findings, disaggregated by a number of relevant geographic and demographic categories, with a focus on three primary outcomes of interest: Refugee Population Pressure on Services (RPP-S), the Quality of Relations (QoR) between Lebanese host-communities and Syrian refugees and the Propensity to Negative Collective Action (PNCA), including the potential for violent conflict. The second of the two results sections looks at the inter-relationships between different predictors of these three primary outcomes of interest, with a focus on how the provision of different assistance types mediates or moderates relations between individual and community-level features and the three outcomes.

Where the analysis in this report builds upon the analysis in the third narrative report of the *Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon* survey research project is two-fold: first, the construct of 'Propensity to Negative Collective Action (PNCA)' has been updated to include additional individual-psychological features of the respondent, in addition to the more community-focused measure of PNCA used in previous analyses. This should help provide a better understanding of the individual-correlates with the potential for violence, whereas previous analyses focused more on the potential for other forms of Lebanese negative collective action, like public support for curfews or other restrictions on Syrian refugees' freedom of movement. Second, cash assistance has been incorporated into the analysis of the impact of assistance, so that the results summarised in the second of the two results sections in this report considers both the direct and indirect impacts of both cash assistance and direct service provision on Lebanese attitudes.

The final section of the report highlights a number of key trends and relationships, focussing on significant changes over time in Lebanese

[7] Inception Report, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/59620. Wave III Narrative Report, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/64953.

attitudes and opinion, regionally and nationally. A number of implications from the research, for both policy and programme, are also discussed.

2 Method

UNDP's Stabilisation Monitoring Framework (SMF) summarises a number of potential factors that may promote or threaten greater social stability in Lebanon, and the SMF provided the basis for the development of this project's primary research questions and the development of the survey questionnaire. The SMF breaks down the drivers for inter-communal Lebanese/Syrian and intra-communal Lebanese tensions into four conflict-cause categories: structural, evolving, proximate and trigger causes of conflict.

Figure 1: Assumptions in the Stabilisation and Monitoring Framework, (SMF), used for the design of the research, detailing likely structure and evolving and proximate causes of conflict between Lebanese host communities and Syrian Refugees.



Trigger events are incidents that escalate tensions when many proximate, evolving and structural drivers of conflict culminate. Proximate causes may be considered as factors contributing to a climate of exacerbated tensions. Proximate causes of conflict tend to be directly related to deeper evolving and structural causes. The evolving causes of conflict were considered across four dimensions: trust in institutions and trust in local community, refugee population pressure, basic needs and

livelihoods and the capability and fairness of service provision and international assistance. Structural drivers of conflict can be defined as the cornerstone to how the relationship between Syrian refugees and Lebanese host communities has evolved; the history of relations between these communities; and long-term socio-economic conditions in an area. ARK's survey questionnaire was designed to measure these conflict drivers.

2.1 Survey Questionnaire

The survey questionnaire was developed to measure the key constructs detailed in the SMF, with the intent both to validate the assumptions represented in the Framework and also to better understand the relationship between the different plausible dimensions of social instability identified in the Framework. The survey questionnaire (Appendix A) was developed by ARK in consultation with UNDP and other stakeholders. The same questionnaire was used in all four waves of surveying conducted to date, with only minor modifications to query new topics or priorities that emerged over the course of the research. The survey questionnaire was developed in English, translated to Arabic, and then back-translated to English before being piloted. Following the pilot of the initial questionnaire, only minor modifications to question wording were made.

2.2 Survey Sampling

Each of the four surveys conducted to date were conducted with the same multi-stage stratified cluster design. In first stage of stratification, surveys were allocated over Lebanese districts (*aqdiya*) on the basis of both population size and a 'vulnerability weight', which included a measure of the size of the Syrian refugee population in the area and a prior assessment of cadastre-level vulnerability conducted by the UNDP in 2015.[8] The vulnerability weight was included in stratification to ensure that more-vulnerable areas of Lebanon were adequately included in the sample, even when these more-vulnerable areas were in less-populous regions.

[8] See Vulnerable Localities in Lebanon Map, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/45715.

In subsequent stages of sampling, cadastres within districts were randomly selected probability proportionate to their population size (PPS). Buildings within cadastres were randomly selected with randomly generated Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinate. Random households within buildings and random adults within households were selected with random number generators. Buildings were sampled in clusters of six. In the event of refusal or non-response, households were substituted within clusters; however, individuals were not substituted within households.

2.3 Analysis: Descriptive Statistics

In the analysis of the survey data, a probability weight was used to account for stratification in the first stage of selection and the additional elements of the sample design. The survey results were thus both representative of and generalisable to the total resident adult population of Lebanon, including both Lebanese and Syrian residents.

Each of the four waves of surveying included approximately N = 5,000 respondents, for a total of approximately 20,000 interviews over the course of the project. While the primary objective of the survey was to better understand variation in Lebanese attitudes and opinions, Syrian refugees were represented in the survey in proportion to their prevalence in the resident population. Data from the sub-sample of Syrian respondents has been included in this analysis and reporting.

Rates and their confidence intervals were calculated with a complex samples design, accounting for stratification in the first stage of selection, clustering in the second stage of selection and the probability of selection in subsequent stages. After accounting for these design effects, total sample estimates had a margin of error of approximately +/- 2.5%. The approximate margin of error within each of Lebanon twenty-six districts within for each individual wave ranged from +/- 4.0-10.0%; however, for the combined sample, over all four waves, the margins of error within all

district were less than +/- 5%, which greatly enhanced the potential to draw inferences concerning regional-specific trends.[9]

2.4 Analysis: Impact of Assistance

To analyse the impact of different types of assistance on the three primary outcomes of interest (RPP-S, QoR and PNCA), a Hierarchical Spatial Autoregressive (HSAR) regression modelling approach was employed. In short, such an approach sought to relate a number of plausible predictors to each of three outcomes, in a way that addressed three specific challenges to inference: (a) the endogeneity of assistance, (b) spatial dependence and (c) proximate exposure to violence:

> **The endogeneity of assistance** refers to the fact that greater assistance has already been provided to areas with greater pressures and greater tensions. Thus, without controlling for other factors, there would be *positive* relationships between greater assistance and more negative outcomes.
>
> **Spatial dependence** refers to the reality that communities do not live in isolation, and for example, the state of relations between Lebanese host-communities and Syrian refugees would be expected to be similar in neighbouring areas. Because of the concentration of Syrian refugees in specific areas, any approach to inference that did not take into account the spatial dimension of the data would most likely produce biased estimates.
>
> **Proximate exposure to violence** may confound estimates of the impacts of assistance, as conflict in the area may also affect individuals' assessment of the quality of relations between

[9] Variation in the level of precision over districts was due to variation in the size of the sample drawn from each district. While districts containing more vulnerable cadasters were oversampled, 50% of the distribution of interviews in the first stage of stratification was on the basis of population size. Thus, the margin of error was, on average, smaller in more populous districts. Nevertheless, the sample was designed in such a way as to maximize the potential to compare outcomes over different geographies.

> Lebanese host-community and Syrian refugees, or the other two outcomes considered in this assessment. Proximity to conflict, especially if such conflict included Syrian refugees as one party to that conflict, might heighten perceptions of the 'threat' of the Syrian presence.

The analysis of the effects of the impact of assistance sought to control for each of these 'challenges' to inference, in order to obtain more reliable estimates of the direct and indirect relationship between individual and community-level features and the three public opinion outcomes of interest. More information on the specifics of the models used and the approach to inference may be found in this project's previous Wave III narrative report, where this specific approach was initially developed.

Figure 2: Example mediation model, considering three types of assistance.



In short, our model specification allowed the relationship between both level-1 variables (individuals) and level-2 variables (cadastres) to vary regionally. This helped to partially control for regional dependency in the endogenous 'distribution' of both Syrian refugees and assistance in Lebanon. The analysis used a 'causal mediation' approach to identification, where it was hypothesized that each type of assistance could 'mediate' or weaken relationships between tension factors and tension outcomes. A mediation like this model is depicted below. For example, consider the following scenario: in an *unmediated* model (i.e. without controlling for the

level of assistance), there is a positive relationship between the perceived level of job competition and a negative assessment of the Quality of Relations, that this, Lebanese individuals *and* communities with a heightened perception of job competition are more likely to report negative relationships with Syrian refugees in their area. If in the *mediated* model, controlling for the level of assistance, this relationship weakens –- this taken as evidence of the *impact* of assistance. This is a fairly standard statistical approach to the evaluation of *impact*, where for example, case-control studies are not a viable option.[10]

3 Results: Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics have been organised into two categories: outcome measures and population features. This organisation reflects the modelling approach in the second results section of this report, where three primary outcomes are used as dependent variables (RPP-S, QoR and PNCA), and other population features are used as independent variables. The extended evaluation in this report seeks to explain these three outcomes as a function of other individual and community-level features. The summary of results in both sections—outcomes and population features—is nevertheless intended to provider readers with an overview of the research project's public opinion findings, including discussion of significant variation over region, age, gender, confession and other relevant demographic categories.

3.1 Outcome Measures

For each of the three primary outcomes of interest, a scalar measure of each was constructed by averaging responses to a number of different statements.[11] For each outcome, a single scalar measure was used as a

[10] For example, withholding assistance from some communities known to be in need, while providing assistance to other communities in need, would provide an ideal framework for evaluating impact with case-control methods but would be ethically untenable. The approach here seeks to 'mimic' such experimental conditions.

[11] Both confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and the calculation of reliability statistics like Cronbach's Alpha were used to establish the validity of the measures. For all three

dependent variable in the subsequent analysis. In this summary of the three outcomes measures, a brief discussion of significant changes, if any, from Wave III to Wave IV are discussed. In the main, however, in the approximately four months between both surveys, these higher-level outcomes remained relatively unchanged, and indeed, change in such higher-level outcomes would be expected to occur only gradually.

3.1.1 Refugee Population Pressure on Services (RPP-S)

To assess the perception of refugee population pressure on services, respondents were asked to rate the quality of each of eight public services, indicating whether they considered each to be 'excellent, good, far, poor or very poor'. On average, respondents were most satisfied with the quality of educational services, with 47.3% of Lebanese rating the quality of education services as 'good' or 'excellent', and 51.2% of Syrians reporting the same. For all other services, a plurality of Lebanese rated the quality of services as 'fair'. With regards to the level of satisfaction with services observed in Wave IV, there were minimal significant changes in perceptions, relative to the average across all four waves of surveying.

While overall satisfaction with all services dropped marginally from Wave III to Wave IV, this was most likely related to a 'surge' of greater satisfaction with all services in observed Wave III, coinciding with the run-up to parliamentary elections. Where a decline in satisfaction with specific services in Wave IV was observed, this was, in most instances, a return to the 'baseline' levels observed in Waves I and II of the survey, rather than part of a larger trend of declining satisfaction. For a number of public services, Syrian refugees had more positive assessments than their Lebanese counterparts, reflecting also their greater likelihood of using these services. For example, 33.2% of Syrians rated health services as 'good' or 'excellent', compared to 27.2% of Lebanese.

scales, all items loaded onto a single factor with a loading greater that 0.6 and an Eigenvalues greater than 1.0. And for all three scales, Cronbach's Alpha was greater than 0.9. Both indicted a strong degree of internal validity for the measures.

How would you rate the quality of each of the following services in your area? Would you say that each is excellent, good, fair, poor or very poor? [12]	
1. Electricity	2. Education
3. Water	4. Health services
5. Sewerage	6. Social services
7. Waste removal	8. Public and recreational space

Figure 3: Lebanese *dissatisfaction* with eight queried services, by wave and governorate, as a per cent of the scale maximum.



[12] Respondents were also asked about 'environmental services' in Waves II-IV. However, because it was not asked in Wave I, it was not used in the construction of this scale for this analysis, in order to maximize the available sample size.

3.1.2 Quality of Relations (QoR)

To assess the Lebanese perception of the quality of relations between host communities and Syrian refugees, Lebanese respondents were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with each of a number of statements related to the current state of relations. These QoR sought to capture public opinion data at various levels from the SMF, ranging from the structural causes hypothesized in the SMF to the evolving.

Agreement with statement, or direct assessment of QoR or change in QoR. Some items reverse-coded, so that higher values indicated a more negative assessment.
1. 'The presence of so many Syrian refugees in Lebanon today is placing too much strain on Lebanon's resources, like water and electricity'.
2. 'Lebanese and Syrians in this community are able to work together to solve problems they have together'.
3. `The presence of a large number of Syrian refugees in this community has contributed to more incidents of crime and violence'.
4. 'And how would you describe current relations between Lebanese and Syrians who live in this area? Would you say they are positive or negative?'
5. 'And would you say that compared to three years ago (since 2014), relations between Lebanese and Syrians in your area have improved or worsened?'
6. `Lebanese and Syrians share many values and have compatible lifestyles'.

From Wave III to Wave IV, the Lebanese assessment of the quality of relations between both communities remained relatively unchanged; however, the Syrian perception of the QoR declined somewhat. For example, the fraction of Syrians rating relations as 'negative' or 'very negative' increased from 12.7% in Wave III to 16.6% in Wave IV. However, asked about their perceptions of the *change* in relations, both since 2014 and in the three months prior to the survey, a plurality of both Lebanese and Syrians agreed that the QoR had 'stayed about the same'.

While nearly all Lebanese agreed that Syrian refugees were 'placing too much strain on Lebanon's resources', the fraction of Lebanese who 'strongly agreed' with this sentiment declined significantly, from 30.3% in

Wave III to 19.1% in Wave IV. Likewise, there was some improvement in the Lebanese assessment of 'cultural fraternity' between both communities, with the fraction of Lebanese who 'strongly disagreed' with the statement 'Lebanese and Syrians share many values and have compatible lifestyles' declining from 14.7% in Wave III to 8.3% in Wave IV.

Figure 4: Perception of more-negative Quality of Relations (QoR), by wave and governorate, as a per cent of scale maximum. Wave I omitted on account of differences in items and question wording.

There was, as might be expected, some discrepancy between Syrian and Lebanese assessments of a number of dimensions of the QoR. While Lebanese and Syrians shared similar perceptions of the state of relations, Syrian refugees were nevertheless more likely to see the potential for

positive social interaction. For example, asked to what extent they agreed with the statement, 'Lebanese and Syrians in this community are able to work together to solve problems they have together', 83.3% of Syrians 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed', compared to only 51.2% of Lebanese. Across all measures, Syrians generally reported more positive relations and fewer problems in relations. However, where Syrian respondents did indicate problems in relations, these generally coincided with Lebanese concerns, for example, with Syrians also most likely to rate 'competition over lower-skilled jobs' as a primary tension factor.

3.1.3 Propensity to Negative Collective Action (PNCA)

To assess the propensity for violence and other negative forms of collective action, respondents were asked to what extent they agreed with each of five statements. This measure was multi-dimensional, in that it included both items intended to assess the potential to take any action and items intended to assess the support, specifically, for more negative forms of collective action, for example, violence or restrictions on refugees' freedom of movement. Taken individually, the level of agreement with statements like, 'People in this area can be trusted', provide little indication of PNCA, but taken together, the five items provide a reliable measure of communal support for and the potential for these forms of negative collective action.

Agreement with statement. Some items reverse-coded, so that higher values indicated greater PNCA-1.
1. 'When tensions are high, some restrictions on foreigners' movement or curfews can help keep this area safe'.
2. 'Violence is sometimes necessary when your interests are being threatened'.
3. 'People in this area can be trusted'.
4. 'If some of your neighbours got into a fight would someone intervene to resolve it?'
5. 'People around here are willing to help their neighbours'.

Lebanese support for curfews or other restrictions on refugees' freedom of moment remained high, and unchanged from the previous

assessment in Wave III. In the most recent Wave IV survey, 90.4% of Lebanese 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with the statement, 'When tensions are high, some restrictions on foreigners' movement or curfews can help keep this area safe'. However, 58.6% of Syrians also agreed with the statement.

Figure 5: PNCA-1 scale, by wave and governorate, as a per cent of scale maximum.



In Waves II-IV, a number of additional questions were added to assess individual's propensity to violence and other negative forms of collective action. This was done to address a concern regarding the lack of an individual-psychological measure of PNCA in the original survey questionnaire. In the supplementary items, respondents were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed that they were 'like' a person in six scenarios. The question wording in each statement was adapted, given the

respondent's gender to refer to 'he' or 'she'. In the subsequent analysis in this report, both measures of PNCA are used, denoted PNCA-1 (community) and PNCA-2 (individuals), respectively. However, for analysis including the additional PNCA question items, Wave I survey data was not included, as this measure was unavailable.

Agreement that self is 'like' character is statement. Some items reverse-coded, so that higher values indicated greater propensity.
1. S/he believes that people should do what they're told. S/he thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching.
2. It is important to her/him to listen to people who are different from her/him. Even when she/he disagrees with them, s/he still wants to understand them.
3. S/he believes it is acceptable to hit someone who hits her/him first.
4. S/he would physically attack someone who verbally insulted her/him.
5. If s/he saw someone getting harassed on the street s/he would get involved
6. If s/he got in an argument s/he would be able to call on her/his friends to intervene.

Relative to the Syrian counterparts, as assessed with both the PNCA-1 And PNCA-2 scales, Lebanese were both more likely to agree that violence was acceptable in specific circumstances and also more likely to demonstrate the *potential* to take action, violent or otherwise, in defense of the community. For example, 77.8% of Lebanese 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with the statement, 'Violence is sometimes necessary when your interests are being threatened', compared to 49.5% of Syrians. For neither Lebanese nor Syrians, the level of agreement with this item did not change significantly from the level observed in the previous Wave III survey.

For the potential to take action, Lebanese were also more likely to state that they or neighbours would 'get involved' in a number of different scenarios. For example, 48.8% of Lebanese said they would 'get involved' if they 'saw someone getting harassed', compared to 29.3% of Syrians.

Figure 6: PNCA-2 scale, by wave and governorate, as a per cent of scale maximum.



3.2 Population Features

Respondents were also asked a number of additional questions relating to the structural, proximate and evolving causes of tensions hypothesized in the SMF. These included questions about, for example, perceptions of safety and security, confidence in government institutions and exposure to crime and violence, amongst other topics.

3.2.1 Safety and Security

Respondents were asked how safety they felt 'during the night' and 'during the day'. In the Wave IV survey, the perception who said they felt 'unsafe' or 'very unsafe' during the day remained unchanged, with a rate of 3.7%. And the per cent who reported feeling 'unsafe' or 'very unsafe'

during the night likewise remained unchanged at 9.6% of the public providing one of these two responses.

Figure 7: Average perception of *greater* safety, during night and day, by wave and governorate, as per cent of scale maximum.

3.2.2 Government Institutions

Respondents were asked about a number of government institutions and to what extent they 'improved life' or not. Between Wave III and Wave IV, confidence in Lebanon's elected institutions, like the Cabinet, declined somewhat, whereas support for Lebanon's security forces, which has always been high, even further improved. The flagging support for the Cabinet and other elected officials, however, was not necessarily part of a larger downward trend in support for the country's democratic institutions. Rather, the run-up to the most recent parliamentary elections

coincided with the Wave III survey, and this most likely provoked a 'spike' in public confidence. The 34.3% who said the Cabinet 'improved life a little' and the 4.4% who said the Cabinet 'improved life a lot' represented about a ten-percentage point drop in confidence, but the level of confidence in this institution, even with the new Cabinet's formation still pending, nevertheless exceeded the baseline levels of *distrust* observed in the initial Wave I and Wave II surveys. While public support for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) remained near-unanimous, increasing support both for the Internal Security Forces (ISF) and General Security (GS) brought public support the two other major Lebanese security agencies closer in line with public support for the LAF.

Figure 8: *Lesser* trust in government institutions, by governorate and wave, as a per cent of scale maximum.



3.2.3 Access to Services

Respondents were asked about their use of a number of public services in the previous three months. Syrian respondents were more likely to have utilised services like a 'primary health centre' (14.8% of Syrians), relative to their Lebanese counterparts (2.1%), with Lebanese more likely to use private alternatives for, e.g. school or healthcare. Nevertheless, reports of all service use declined marginally over the period between the Wave III and Wave IV surveys, for both Lebanese and Syrians. Of Lebanese, 70.1% said they had not used any public service in Wave IV, compared to 65.6% in Wave III. And amongst Syrians, 37.1% said they had not used in public service in Wave IV, compared to 30.2% in Wave III.

Figure 9: Aggregate measure of *greater* perception of the capability and fairness of assistance, by governorate and wave, as a per cent of scale maximum.

3.2.4 Tension Factors

Both Lebanese and Syrian respondents were asked about their understanding of what factors might contribute to heightened tensions between Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees. For each of thirteen items, the respondent was asked whether he or she thought the item was a source of tension. Additionally, respondents were asked if they though there 'were no tension'; however, less than 1% nationally did not perceive any significant tensions.

Figure 10: Per cent citing 'tension factors', by nationality and wave.



Over the four waves of surveying, there was little evidence of a significant change over time of the prevalence of tension factors. Over all four surveys, for both Lebanese and Syrians, 'competition over lower skilled jobs' remained the most-cited perceived causes of tensions, with

60.1% of the public citing this factor. Of all the possible tension factors queried, competition over jobs and other economic concerns remained the most prevalently cited causes of tensions between both communities. The most notable change over time in the perception of tension factors was concerning a cultural factor, where the fraction agreeing that 'child marriages or pregnancies' was a tension factor increased from only 1.5% in Wave I to 6.2% in Wave IV.

While on average, Syrian respondents were less likely to identify each tension factor, the ranking of tension factors, within each of the four waves, and in aggregate over all four waves of surveying, remained the same for both Lebanese and Syrians. For example, amongst Syrian respondents, competition over lower skilled jobs was also the most cited perceived causes of tensions. This indicated that Syrians, on average, had much the same understanding of potential sources of tension as their Lebanese counterparts.

3.2.5 Peace Factors

With the same approach that was used to assess tension factors, respondents were also asked about a number of 'peace factors' or factors which were perceived as helpful for 'facilitating good relations' between Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees. Consistently, over all four waves of surveying, 'pre-existing relations between Lebanese and Syrians' was the most-often cited factor for peace, with 27.8% naming this factor in the Wave IV, relative to an average over all four waves of 26.8% naming this factor. However, other than pre-existing relations, no other factor peace queried in the survey garnered more agreement that the alternative 'nothing helps improve relations', which 24.7% indicated in Wave IV.

Figure 11: Per cent citing 'peace factors', by nationality and wave.



3.2.6 Crime and Violence

To assess exposure to violence, respondents were asked if they had witnessed 'armed violence with a knife, gun or explosives' and if they had witnessed 'a physical or verbal confrontation' in the three months prior to the survey. Over the period between the Wave III and Wave IV surveys, exposure to both forms of violence remained high. Nationally, 7.8% reported exposure to armed violence in the Wave IV survey, which indicated no change from the 8.1% reporting the same in the Wave III survey. However, the per cent reporting exposure to other forms of confrontation dropped marginally, from 23.8% in the Wave III survey to 19.6% in the Wave IV survey.

Respondents were asked if they or a household member had experienced one or more forms of victimisation from a list in the three months prior to the survey. Though prevalence rates for each form of victimisation did not change significantly over the period between the Wave III and Wave IV surveys, compared to their Lebanese counterparts, Syrian refugees remained much more likely to have experience verbal or physical harassment or other forms of victimisation. For example, 29.6% of Syrians reported an incident of 'verbal harassment', compared to 8.2% of Lebanese in the most recent survey. The fraction of Syrians reporting 'physical harassment' declined over the previous wave of surveying from 6.8% to 3.9% but was nevertheless still more than twice the rate of 1.3% reported by Lebanese. Further, about 6.5% of Syrian refugees had an experience with 'raids' conducted by Lebanese security forces in the three months prior the Wave IV survey, and 7.8% of Syrians in the Wave IV survey said they had a problem with the confiscation of identify papers, a notable rise of the 3.2% and 3.3% reporting so in the Wave I and Wave II surveys, respectively.

3.2.7 Inter-Communal Contact

Because social interaction is known to reduce social distance, an in turn, to improve relations between communities, Lebanese respondents were asked how often they interacted with Syrian refugees in number of environments or scenarios, and similarly, Syrian respondents were asked how often they interacted with Lebanese in the same environments or scenarios, including: at work, in the street, in shops, while paying rent, in social circle, at religious events and at activities organised by NGOs or other local organisations. Throughout the span of the research project, the level of inter-communal interaction observed remained relatively constant, nationally, with consistently higher reports of interaction in 'in the street' 'at work' and 'in the shop' than in other environments or scenarios.

In each of these **three** environments, the average report of 'daily' interaction with persons of the other nationality ranged from 50%-60% over the four waves of surveying, declining slowly but steadily over the

course of the four waves of survey research. However, the fraction reporting regular interaction with persons of the other nationality 'in social circles' has declined more markedly over the same period, with the per cent reporting that they 'never' interact with persons of the other nationality in this context increasing from a minimum of 9.6% in Wave II to a maximum of 25.3% in the most-recent Wave IV survey.

Figure 12: Reports of frequency of interaction between Lebanese and Syrians, by site and wave. Rates include both Syrians and Lebanese proportionally.



With regards to exposure to community disputes and forms of crime like theft, results did not differ greatly by nationality. About 4.2% reported some experience with theft or vandalism, for example. Notably, while the survey did query sexual assault and harassment, less than 1% of either Lebanese or Syrians gave a report of this experience. However, it is a well-

known challenge in survey research to obtain accurate estimates of sexual assault or victimisation, especially in more general social surveys, such as this survey, and in surveys like this, where one householder is asked to report on the experiences of all householders. This should not be regarded as evidence that sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) amongst either Lebanese or Syrians is either non-existent or marginal. Other dedicated research on the topic of SGBV in Lebanon has demonstrated the persistent prevalence of this form of violence and victimisation.

4 Results: Impact of Assistance

To assess the impact of assistance, the same models as estimated and reported on in the Wave III narrative report of this research project were re-run, with both the additional public opinion data collected in the Wave IV survey and with additional data on the provision of assistance, in particular, the provision of cash assistance over the previous year and the distribution of this cash assistance geographically.[13]

For each of the three primary outcomes of interest, neither the results of the analysis nor the implications of the analysis changed greatly from those reported previously, in the narrative report for Wave III of this research project. That results were consistent, with the inclusion of additional data, nevertheless, helped to further strengthen the reliability of the evaluation. The analysis also demonstrated that cash assistance had effects similar to the effects of other forms of direct service provision, and further, that these effects were, in the main, positive. Greater cash assistance in more vulnerable areas, or where the fraction of Syrian refugees in the population was greater, generally contributed to more lesser dissatisfaction with services, improved relations between communities, and lesser potential for violence and other negative forms of collective action. Even though the type of cash assistance included in this

[13] Coefficient estimates and estimates of direct and indirect impact may be found in an appendix to this report. For more on the approach to modelling used, the specification of variables, and the economistic specifications of the models used, see previous report.

analysis was provided only to Syrian refugees, it nevertheless, on average, had positive indirect impacts on Lebanese assessments of each of the three outcomes. Logically, following the theory of change of cash assistance programmes, and corroborated by the data collected in this survey research project, greater cash assistance provided to Syrian refugees positively affects Lebanese, as well, alleviating pressure on the local economy by helping to address, for example, greater competition over lower-skilled jobs, and through the injection of cash into the local economy, with Syrian refugees utilising the cash assistance to purchase goods and services from local Lebanese businesses.

4.1 Refugee Population Pressure on Services (RPP-S)

After controlling for other factors, average Lebanese satisfaction with the scalar measure of service satisfaction was statistically indistinguishable from the level of satisfaction observed in the first wave of the survey research. While satisfaction peaked around the time of the Wave III survey, along with parliamentary elections, in the most recent survey, it had returned to baseline levels.

Lebanese satisfaction with the quality of services varied by a number of factors, not all of which necessarily related to Syrian refugees. Relative to the other two outcomes considered in this study—QoR and PNCA—Lebanese satisfaction with services was the most likely to vary over regions and individuals for reasons more related to state capacity or other socio-economic or economic factors. For example, independent of perceptions of Syrian refugees, Lebanese with less confidence in government institutions, Lebanese with less monthly income, Lebanese in more rural areas, and Lebanese who felt less safe were also, on average, more likely to be dissatisfied with the level and quality of services.

Looking more specifically at the effects of (refugee) population pressure on services, Lebanese satisfaction with the level of and quality of all services was significantly lesser in more populous areas and in areas of the country with a greater fraction of Syrian refugees, after controlling for other factors. This did add some credence to the widespread Lebanese

perception that there was some strain on Lebanese services, and that in many locales, this may be at least partly attributable to the increased demand for services resulting from the refugee presence. However, a significant perception of refugee population pressure was *also* observed in areas with little-to-no Syrian refugee presence. The attribution of pressure on services specifically to the Syrian presence, therefore, appeared to be driven by two separate mechanism: first, real pressure on services in more vulnerable areas, but also second, a *perceptional* attribution of the pressure to Syrian refugees that was not fully substantiated by other measures of pressure. This second mechanism tended to also be predicted by measures of social distance or prejudice. For example, Lebanese in less-vulnerable areas were also less likely to report regular interaction with Syrian refugees, and asked about 'how favourable' it would be to, e.g. 'live next to' or 'work with' persons on the other nationality, this same segment of the Lebanese population was also the most likely to consider these scenarios unfavourably. This segment was also more likely to attribute pressure on services to Syrian refugees.

Of the various assistance types considered in the research, job creation, livelihoods support, cash assistance, shelter creation, and conflict resolution support were amongst the most likely to effectively mediate more negative perceptions of refugee population pressure. The impact of these types of assistance was primarily regional and indirect, most likely mediating more negative perceptions of RPP-S by addressing the potential causes of tensions on the 'demand side', that this, by alleviating the degree of competition over resources though the direct provision of services.

4.2 Quality of Relations (QoR)

Some of the strongest predictors of more negative perceptions were structural in nature. For example, relative to their Sunni counterparts, both Lebanese Christians and Druze were significantly more likely to evaluate relations as negative, independent of, for example, the frequency of interaction with refugees or the fraction of the population in an area that was Syrian. Likewise, independent of other factors, those with more

negative memories of the Syrian occupation were also more likely to evaluate relations between Lebanese and Syrian refugees as negative.

Greater socio-economic vulnerability amongst Lebanese played a minor role in the formation of more negative perceptions of the QoR, with lower-income Lebanese, those with less schooling, and those unemployed or underemployed and searching for a job more likely to evaluation relationship negatively. However, social factors were, on average, the most important predictors of more positive assessments of the QoR. Lebanese who had greater interaction with persons of the other nationality, who believed more strongly in the potential for Lebanese and Syrians to work together to solve problems, and how saw few cultural divides between Lebanese and Syrians were amongst the most likely to rate the QoR as positive.

With respect to the impact of assistance, the provision of 'any' assistance in an area was associated with better evaluations of QoR, and more specifically, social (e.g. conflict resolution support) and economic (e.g. livelihoods assistance) forms of assistance had greater positive effects. The relationship between the provision of cash assistance and more positive perceptions of relations in an area was positive, but relative to its relationship with other outcomes considered in this research, the relationship was relatively weak. While economic factors played a measurable role in determining the QoR in most communities, social factors tended to be stronger determinants of both more negative and more positive evaluations of the relationship between Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees.

4.3 Propensity for Negative Collective Action (PNCA)

Of the three outcomes considered, PNCA was the outcome most strongly related to the fraction of Syrian refugees in an area. For example, the coefficient on the term for the fraction of Syrian refugees was approximately six times larger than it was in the QoR model. Greater PNCA was driven, to some extent, by both real and perceived refugee population pressures, as evidence not only by the relationship with a

greater percentage of Syrian refugees in an area, but also other perception measures, like the level of prejudice, a greater perception of strain on services or lesser agreement with the fairness of international assistance. Many of the same demographic trends observed in the RPP-S and QoR models were also observed in the PNCA-1 model, for example, with Lebanese Sunnis being significantly less likely to support negative forms of collective action, relative to their Christian, Druze and Shia counterparts. With the additional data from the Wave IV survey, the results of the model remained unchanged—with the same factors predicting Lebanese communal responses to a Syrian refugee presence in their area.

However, with the addition of the PNCA-2 scale, which was designed to measure a greater degree of 'individual propensity' to violence and other negative forms of action, the analysis identified a number of additional dynamics. That the second model was altogether more explanatory—that is, the model with a more individual-propensity opposed to a community-propensity outcome measure—suggested that, in most cases, the potential for violence will depend not only on the structure or dynamics of relations between Lebanese host-communities and Syrian refugees but also on personal characteristics of parties to the potential conflict.

In contrast to the PNCA-1 scale, which included a number of question items specifically related to attitudes and opinions of Syrian refugees, all of the items in the PNCA-2 scale related more broadly to the potential for any conflict, including for example, the level of agreement concerning situations where violence would be deemed acceptable. Nevertheless, after controlling for other factors, PNCA-2 scores (i.e. demonstrating a greater propensity for violence) were indeed higher in areas of Lebanon with a higher fraction of Syrian refugees in the population, indicating an interaction between refugee and host-community dynamics and individual propensities. This included some structural factors, as well. For example, those with more negative memories or assessments of the Syrian occupation in Lebanon were also significantly more likely to demonstrate an individual propensity for

violence and to condone more communal forms of collective action, for example, placing restrictions on refugees' freedom of movement.

Likewise, those who more strongly agreed with the statement, 'The presence of so many Syrian refugees in Lebanon today is placing too much strain on Lebanon's resources, like water and electricity' were also significantly more likely to demonstrate a propensity for violence.

Despite the greater individual-focus of the supplementary PNCA-2 scale, demographic features did relatively little to explain variation in the outcome. After controlling for other factors, women scored somewhat higher than their male counterparts on this scale—driven primarily by greater agreement amongst women on the acceptable use of violence. But age, gender, income, education and other demographic factors were not strong predictors of the propensity for violence. Rather, the individual-level factors that did more to explain the propensity for violence related to respondents' evaluations of the social and political landscape around them, including dynamics with Syrian refugee communities.

To this end, the level of assistance provided locally did play a discernible role in attitude formation. The provision of any assistance in an area, and the provision of jobs and livelihoods assistance specifically, were associated with a lesser propensity to violence. Attitudinally, both the perception of greater capability in the provision of assistance and the perception of greater fairness in the provision of assistance were associated with a lesser propensity to violence.

5 Conclusions and Recommendations

In the analysis of the data from the fourth wave of the Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon', there were three primary objectives: (1) to use the increased sample size from four combined waves ($N > 20{,}000$) to corroborate previous analysis, including the validation of the SMF, (2) to provide an updated empirical basis for policy and programme design, monitoring and evaluation, noting key shifts in attitudes, opinions and host-community and refugee dynamics, and (3) to build this research project's previous analysis of the impact of assistance

on alleviating tensions by including in the analysis the distribution of cash assistance, in addition to the nine other varieties of assistance considered in the previous analysis.

With respect to the first objective, the collection of additional data over the course of the research project strengthened the conclusions of previous analyses. In short, results of the research validated the assumption of the SMF, providing and empirical basis for better understanding the inter-relationships between the framework's hypothesised structural, proximate and evolving causes of conflict. This suggests the projects and programmes, including the LCRP, designed *logically* to address these tension factors, while also promoting peace factors within the same framework would be expected to reduce tensions, and ultimately, to prevent the escalation of tensions into violent conflict.

Real social change tends to occur only over an extended period of time. Within this research project, data was collected at approximately four-month intervals. Between each of the four waves, and over the course of the research project, significant changes in attitudes, opinion and dynamics have provided a basis for reporting; however, the extent to which dynamics have changed should not be exaggerated. While various improvements and deteriorates in the quality of relations were observed over the period—and reported on by ARK in this and previous reports—many of these were changes were temporary or limited in their magnitude.

Nevertheless, while there was little evidence of *radical* change in attitudes, opinion or dynamics, where there were trends of gradual change, these were generally in the direction of 'solidifying' the current trajectory of relations. Where relations have worsened or where tensions have grown, this has for the most part occurred slowly and as a result of other social changes. For example, rates of social interaction between Lebanese and Syrians have slowly but persistently declined over the four waves of surveying, and where these rates of social interaction have declined, both Lebanese and Syrian assessments of the quality of relations have worsened.

In terms of measuring change, and assessing the sequences of cause and effect, many of the tension causes and tensions outcomes considered

in this research were endogenous, or more colloquially, 'cyclical'. For example, concerning the relation between the assessment of the quality of relations and the level of inter-communal contact, the analysis suggested that two cause and effect stories were 'equally true', that is: more negative relations discouraged inter-communal contact *and* a lack of inter-communal contact led to more negative assessments of the quality of relations.

With respect to the third and final primary objective of this research, ARK's analysis sought to identify the impact of different types of assistance, including cash assistance, on the quality of relations between Lebanese host-communities and Syrian refugees, in addition to other tension outcomes. This analysis used a number of 'causal inference' tools in an effort to better identify impact, recognizing that the relationship between assistance and tension outcomes would also be endogenous, like the relationship between the level of inter-communal contact and assessments of the quality of relations. In other words, the impact analysis sought to control for the fact that assistance has not been distributed randomly or uniformly across Lebanon but rather has been specifically targeted at areas or communities known to be more vulnerable.

With this approach, ARK was able to provide empirical evidence of the positive impact of assistance. Very broadly speaking, the impact analysis substantiated the counterfactual: 'if there *had been no assistance* in more vulnerable areas, the relations *would have been worse*'. Each of the ten assistance types considered (including cash assistance) played a discernible role in alleviating one or more tension factors. In short, the provision of assistance helped slow, or in some cases, helped prevent the worsening of relations; and further, this phenomenon was observed regionally. Improved relations attributable to assistance had positive, spill-over effects on neighbouring communities, and this was even more effective when different types of assistance were provided to an area or community in combination, for example, the combination of cash assistance with other social stability programming.

This report concludes with four key recommendations; however, these should be considered *supplementary* to recommendations provided in previous reporting:

1. Higher levels of cash assistance was associated with lower levels of all the negative outcomes examined. It is likely that greater cash assistance provided to Syrian refugees positively affected Lebanese, as well, alleviating pressure on the local economy by helping to address, for example, greater competition over lower-skilled jobs, and through the injection of cash into the local economy, with Syrian refugees utilizing the cash assistance to purchase goods and services from local Lebanese businesses.
2. That cash plays in reducing social tensions should be acknowledged, particularly in its role reducing the perception that refugees are adding pressure on services. At the same time, the limitation of the cash assistance alone is clear, as the assistance does little to affect deeper qualitative perceptions of refugees. Combining cash assistance with conflict dialogue and youth assistance plays should be acknowledged in strategic planning as an effective combination of assistance on improving relations sustainably.
3. The decrease in intercommunal interactions requires special attention. The culmination of restrictive measures on Syrians is likely contributing significantly to this lowering of interactions as Syrians are likely self-censoring their movement to avoid contact with local authorities and host community members alike, as found in other studies. Programming to counter this trend must be considered by LCRP partners.
4. Social Stability assistance in particular, when coupled with other types of assistance, emerged as playing an important role in reducing more structurally negative perception outcomes, particularly in reducing propensities to negative collective action against refugees. This includes pairing Social Stability assistance with cash assistance directly.

Appendix A: Survey Instrument

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UNDP Regular Perceptions Survey Wave IV

Random Number Generator (Kish Grid)

ENTER THE NUMBER OF BUILDINGS OR HOUSEHOLDS TO RANDOMLY SELECT ONE:

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NAN

Form Management

CLUSTER ID:

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IN WHICH GOVERNORATE DOES THE RESPONDENT RESIDE?

- ◯ Akkar Governorate
- ◯ Baalbek-Hermel Governorate
- ◯ Beirut Governorate
- ◯ Beqaa Governorate
- ◯ Mount Lebanon Governorate
- ◯ North Governorate
- ◯ Nabatiye Governorate
- ◯ South Governorate

IN WHICH DISTRICT DOES THE RESPONDENT RESIDE?

IS THIS LOCATION IS IN A RURAL OR URBAN AREA?

- ◯ Urban
- ◯ Rural

Household Consent

I'M WORKING WITH A LOCAL RESEARCH ORGANIZATION CALLED ARK, WHICH IS CONDUCTING A SURVEY IN LEBANON THIS MONTH ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME. ARK IS AN ORGANIZATION WHICH DOES A LOT OF RESEARCH ON ISSUES OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN LEBANON. THIS SURVEY AIMS TO BETTER INFORM DECISION-MAKERS AND DONORS ON THE COMMUNITY'S PERCEPTION OF KEY ISSUES, IN THE HOPE THAT THIS WILL IMPROVE THE RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS IN LEBANON.
A MEMBER OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD IS BEING ASKED TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY BECAUSE YOUR BUILDING WAS RANDOMLY CHOSEN FOR INCLUSION IN THIS RESEARCH. THIS SURVEY IS ANONYMOUS. ALL ANSWERS WILL REMAIN IN THE STRICTEST OF CONFIDENCE, AND AT NO TIME WILL THIS INFORMATION BE RELEASED TO ANYONE OUTSIDE OF THE STUDY. NO INFORMATION THAT COULD IDENTIFY YOU OR YOUR FAMILY HAS BEEN OR WILL BE GATHERED, FOR EXAMPLE NAMES OR PHONE NUMBERS. WOULD SOMEONE IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD BE WILLING TO ANSWER A FEW QUESTIONS? I'D LIKE TO SPEAK WITH WHICHEVER ADULT (18 Y/O OR OLDER) IN THE HOUSEHOLD CELEBRATED HIS/HER BIRTHDAY LAST. IT'S IMPORTANT THAT THE ADULT I SPEAK WITH BE RANDOMLY CHOSEN IN THIS FASHION, SO THAT OUR SURVEY IS REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL PEOPLE IN LEBANON.

Respondent Consent

YOU HAVE BEEN CHOSEN TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS SURVEY BECAUSE YOUR HOUSEHOLD WAS RANDOMLY SELECTED FOR INCLUSION IN THIS SURVEY, AND YOU WERE RANDOMLY CHOSEN FROM AMONG ALL ADULT MEMBERS IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD. IF YOU AGREE TO TAKE PART IN THIS SURVEY, THE INTERVIEW SHOULD TAKE ABOUT 30 MINUTES, AND YOU AND YOUR FAMILY WILL BE VISITED ONLY ONCE. AT ANY TIME SHOULD YOU NOT WANT TO ANSWER A QUESTION OR WOULD LIKE TO END THE INTERVIEW YOU ARE ABLE TO DO SO. THIS SURVEY IS ANONYMOUS. NO INFORMATION THAT COULD IDENTIFY YOU OR YOUR FAMILY HAS BEEN OR WILL BE GATHERED, FOR EXAMPLE NAMES OR PHONE NUMBERS. THERE MAY BE NO DIRECT BENEFITS TO YOU, BUT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT INFORMATION FROM THIS STUDY COULD BE USED TO IMPROVE PUBLIC SAFETY AND COMMUNITY WELL-BEING IN YOUR AREA, NOW OR IN THE FUTURE. THE STUDY IS OF NO COST TO YOU, AND YOU WILL NOT BE COMPENSATED FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE SURVEY. I WOULD LIKE TO REMIND YOU THAT TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY IS VOLUNTARY. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE NOT TO TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY.

DID THE RESPONDENT GIVE VERBAL CONSENT?

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No

REASON FOR REFUSAL

- ◯ Unable to establish eligibility due to physical / mental ability (non-contact)
- ◯ Unable to confirm eligibility as the contact doesn't speak any of the official languages (non-contact)
- ◯ Further information refused by contact (household refusal)
- ◯ Selected respondent away for fieldwork period (contact made)
- ◯ No contact with selected person after maximal number of visits (contact made)
- ◯ Refusal by selected person before interview (contact made)
- ◯ Proxy refusal by someone else at the address (contact made)
- ◯ Broken appointment – no re-contact (contact made)
- ◯ At home ill during survey period (contact made)
- ◯ Physically or mentally unstable / incompetent (contact made)
- ◯ Selected person doesn't speak any of the official languages (contact made)
- ◯ Not possible to secure privacy for interview (contact made)
- ◯ Concerns about privacy / information sharing (contact made)
- ◯ Other reason (non-contact), specify.
- ◯ Other reason (contact), specify.

Status

INTERVIEW WITHIN CLUSTER:

WHAT IS THE GENDER OF THE RESPONDENT?

- ◯ Male
- ◯ Female

WHAT IS THE NATIONALITY OF THE RESPONDENT?

- ◯ Lebanese
- ◯ Syrian
- ◯ Both Lebanese and Syrian
- ◯ Palestinian Refugee from Lebanon
- ◯ Palestinian Refugee from Syria
- ◯ Other
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

IF OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY

ARE YOU REGISTERED WITH UNHCR OR UNRWA?

- ◯ No
- ◯ Yes
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

IN WHAT YEAR DID YOUR FIRST ENTER LEBANON?

- ◯ 2010 or prior
- ◯ 2011
- ◯ 2012
- ◯ 2013
- ◯ 2014
- ◯ 2015
- ◯ 2016
- ◯ 2017
- ◯ 2018

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING BEST DESCRIBES YOUR HOUSEHOLD?

- ◯ The entire housholed moved from Syria to Lebanon together.
- ◯ One householder moved to Lebanon and was later joined by other householders.
- ◯ No other householders have moved from Syria.
- ◯ Other, specify.
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

Sense of Safety and Security

GENERALLY SPEAKING, HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE SAFETY OF YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD DURING THE DAY?

- ◯ Very unsafe
- ◯ Unsafe
- ◯ Safe
- ◯ Very safe
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

GENERALLY SPEAKING, HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE SAFETY OF YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD DURING THE NIGHT?

- ◯ Very unsafe
- ◯ Unsafe
- ◯ Safe
- ◯ Very safe
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

COMPARED TO THIS TIME THREE MONTHS AGO, WOULD YOU SAY YOU THAT YOU GENERALLY SAY THAT YOU FEEL MORE OR LESS SAFE WALKING AROUND YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD AT NIGHT? WOULD YOU SAY THAT SECURITY IN YOUR AREA HAS...

- ◯ Improved a lot
- ◯ Improved a little
- ◯ Stayed about the same
- ◯ Worsened a little
- ◯ Worsened a lot
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

I AM GOING TO READ YOU A SHORT LIST OF EXPERIENCE EITHER YOU OR A MEMBER MAY HAVE HAD. FOR EACH, WILL YOU TELL ME IF YOU OR A MEMBER OF YOUR FAMILY HAVE EXPERIENCED EACH OF THE FOLLOWING IN THE LAST THREE MONTHS?

READ EACH.

- [ ] Verbal harassment
- [ ] Physical harassment
- [ ] Extortion/bribes
- [ ] Kidnapping
- [ ] Theft/robbery
- [ ] Community violence/disputes
- [ ] Displacements/evictions
- [ ] Employer deducting salary
- [ ] Sexual assault/harassment
- [ ] Disputes between children
- [ ] Raids
- [ ] Detention
- [ ] Confiscated ID Paper
- [ ] Fines
- [ ] None
- [ ] Other
- [ ] Don't know
- [ ] Refuse

OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY

AND WHEN THIS HAPPENED, DID YOU OR SOMEONE IN YOUR FAMILY DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT? WHAT DID THEY DO?

DO NOT READ. CODE CLOSEST RESPONSES. CODE ALL THAT APPLY.

- [ ] Nothing
- [ ] Moved / changed residence
- [ ] Notified authorities
- [ ] Reported to landlord
- [ ] Reported to employer
- [ ] Reported to sawfish
- [ ] Resolved through family or friends
- [ ] Confronted offender
- [ ] Limited movement afterwards
- [ ] Notified NGO or UN agency
- [ ] Other
- [ ] Don't know
- [ ] Refuse

OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY

TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: 'I WORRY THAT THE RESULTS OF THE 2018 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS WILL LEAD TO MORE TENSIONS IN MY AREA.'

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

IN THE LAST THREE MONTHS, HAVE YOU PERSONALLY WITNESSED ARMED VIOLENCE, FOR EXAMPLE, WITH A KNIFE, GUN OR EXPLOSIVES IN YOUR AREA?

- ◯ No
- ◯ Yes
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

IN THE LAST THREE MONTHS, HAVE YOU PERSONALLY WITNESSED A PHYSICAL OR VERBAL CONFRONTATION IN YOUR AREA?

- ◯ No
- ◯ Yes
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

Inter-Community Contact

I'M GOING TO READ YOU A LIST OF LOCATIONS WHERE YOU MIGHT INTERACT WITH . FOR EACH, WILL YOU PLEASE TELL ME HOW OFTEN OVER THE LAST THREE MONTHS HOW OFTEN YOU'VE HAD CONTACT WITH IN EACH AREA?

AT WORK

- ◯ Daily
- ◯ Regularly
- ◯ Sometimes
- ◯ Rarely
- ◯ Never
- ◯ Not applicable
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

SOCIAL CIRCLES

- ◯ Daily
- ◯ Regularly
- ◯ Sometimes
- ◯ Rarely
- ◯ Never
- ◯ Not applicable
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

PAYING RENT

- ◯ Daily
- ◯ Regularly
- ◯ Sometimes
- ◯ Rarely
- ◯ Never
- ◯ Not applicable
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

IN THE STREET

- ◯ Daily
- ◯ Regularly
- ◯ Sometimes
- ◯ Rarely
- ◯ Never
- ◯ Not applicable
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

IN THE SHOP

- ◯ Daily
- ◯ Regularly
- ◯ Sometimes
- ◯ Rarely
- ◯ Never
- ◯ Not applicable
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

RELIGIOUS EVENTS

- ◯ Daily
- ◯ Regularly
- ◯ Sometimes
- ◯ Rarely
- ◯ Never
- ◯ Not applicable
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

ACTIVITIES ORGANIZED BY NGOS OR LOCAL ORGANISATIONS.

- ◯ Daily
- ◯ Regularly
- ◯ Sometimes
- ◯ Rarely
- ◯ Never
- ◯ Not applicable
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

AND HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE CURRENT RELATIONS BETWEEN LEBANESE AND SYRIANS WHO LIVE IN THIS AREA? WOULD YOU SAY THEY ARE POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE

- ◯ Very positive
- ◯ Positive
- ◯ Neutral
- ◯ Negative
- ◯ Very negative
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

AND WOULD YOU SAY THAT COMPARED TO THREE MONTHS AGO, RELATIONS BETWEEN LEBANESE AND SYRIANS IN YOUR AREA HAVE...

- ◯ Improved a lot
- ◯ Improved a little
- ◯ Stayed about the same
- ◯ Worsened a little
- ◯ Worsened a lot
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

AND WOULD YOU SAY THAT COMPARED TO THREE YEARS AGO (SINCE 2014), RELATIONS BETWEEN LEBANESE AND SYRIANS IN YOUR AREA HAVE...

- ◯ Improved a lot
- ◯ Improved a little
- ◯ Stayed about the same
- ◯ Worsened a little
- ◯ Worsened a lot
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT. FOR EACH WOULD YOU SAY YOU STRONGLY AGREE, AGREE, DISAGREE OR STRONGLY DISAGREE?

'THE LEBANESE PEOPLE IN THIS AREA HAVE SINCE 2011 BEEN GOOD HOSTS TO REFUGEES DISPLACED BY THE SYRIAN CONFLICT WHO ARE IN NEED.'

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

'THE LEBANESE PEOPLE IN THIS AREA HAVE BEEN GOOD HOSTS TO PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN NEED.'

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

'LEBANESE AND SYRIANS IN THIS COMMUNITY ARE ABLE TO WORK TOGETHER TO SOLVE PROBLEMS THEY HAVE TOGETHER.'

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

'THE PRESENCE OF SO MANY SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON TODAY IS PLACING TOO MUCH STRAIN ON LEBANON'S RESOURCES, LIKE WATER AND ELECTRICITY.'

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

`LEBANESE AND SYRIANS SHARE MANY VALUES AND HAVE COMPATABLE LIFESTYLES.'

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

`THE PRESENCE OF A LARGE NUMBER OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN THIS COMMUNITY HAS CONTRIBUTED TO MORE INCIDENTS OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE'

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

Quality of Relations between Communities

FOR EACH OF THE FOLLOWING SCENARIOS WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER THIS VERY DISAGREEABLE, SOMEWHAT DISAGREEABLE, NEITHER AGREEABLE NOR DISAGREEABLE, AGREEABLE OR VERY AGREEABLE?

SHARING A WORKPLACE WITH .

- ◯ Very disagreeable
- ◯ Disagreeable
- ◯ Neither agreeable nor disagreeable
- ◯ Agreeable
- ◯ Very agreeable
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

LIVING NEXT DOOR TO A FAMILY.

- ◯ Very disagreeable
- ◯ Disagreeable
- ◯ Neither agreeable nor disagreeable
- ◯ Agreeable
- ◯ Very agreeable
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

CHILDREN IN YOUR FAMILY ATTENDING SCHOOL WITH CHILDREN.

- ◯ Very disagreeable
- ◯ Disagreeable
- ◯ Neither agreeable nor disagreeable
- ◯ Agreeable
- ◯ Very agreeable
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

A FAMILY MEMBER MARRYING A .

- ◯ Very disagreeable
- ◯ Disagreeable
- ◯ Neither agreeable nor disagreeable
- ◯ Agreeable
- ◯ Very agreeable
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

WHAT DO YOU THINK SOME OF THE MAIN SOURCES OF TENSIONS BETWEEN LEBANESE AND SYRIANS ARE IN YOUR COMMUNITY, OR DO YOU THINK THERE ARE NO REAL TENSIONS?

DO NOT READ OPTIONS. CODE UP TO THREE.

- ☐ Competition for higher-skilled jobs (including office and desk-based jobs such as teachers bankers, lawyers, engineers, architects)
- ☐ Competition for lower-skilled jobs (including manual labour such a cleaner, casual labourers, electrician)
- ☐ Competition for the establishment of businesses
- ☐ Competition for services and utilities
- ☐ The media
- ☐ The political situation regionally and nationally
- ☐ Cultural differences (like how women behave)
- ☐ Differences in religion, nationality, place of origin
- ☐ Unfair aid distribution
- ☐ Marriages between Syrians and Lebanese
- ☐ Child Marriages/pregnancy
- ☐ No tensions
- ☐ Other, specify
- ☐ Don't know
- ☐ Refuse

OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY

AND CAN YOU THINK OF ANYTHING THAT MIGHT HAVE FACILITATED GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN SYRIANS AND LEBANESE IN YOUR AREA, OR WOULD YOU SAY THAT NOTHING HAS HELPED IMPROVE RELATIONS?

DO NOT READ OPTIONS. CODE UP TO THREE.

- ☐ Pre-existing relationships between Lebanese and Syrians
- ☐ Social bonds between the communities (intermarriages, relatives, friendships etc)
- ☐ Positive role of local authorities (municipality/religious authorities)
- ☐ Better services by the municipality
- ☐ Assistance and community projects by NGOs/international organizations
- ☐ Restrictions on refugees' movements and access to jobs
- ☐ Return of Syrian refugees to their home
- ☐ Nothing helps improve relations
- ☐ Other, specify
- ☐ Don't know
- ☐ Refuse

OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY

Propensity for Collective Action

TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS? FOR EACH WOULD YOU SAY YOU STRONGLY AGREE, AGREE, DISAGREE OR STRONGLY DISAGREE?

'WHEN TENSIONS ARE HIGH, SOME RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGNERS' MOVEMENT OR CURFEWS CAN HELP KEEP THIS AREA SAFE.'

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

'VIOLENCE IS SOMETIMES NECESSARY WHEN YOUR INTERESTS ARE BEING THREATENED.'

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

NOW I WILL BRIEFLY DESCRIBE SOME PEOPLE. PLEASE LISTEN TO EACH DESCRIPTION AND TELL ME HOW MUCH EACH PERSON IS OR IS NOT LIKE YOU.

HE BELIEVES THAT PEOPLE SHOULD DO WHAT THEY'RE TOLD. HE THINKS PEOPLE SHOULD FOLLOW RULES AT ALL TIMES, EVEN WHEN NO-ONE IS WATCHING.

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

IT IS IMPORTANT TO HIM TO LISTEN TO PEOPLE WHO ARE DIFFERENT FROM HIM. EVEN WHEN HE DISAGREES WITH THEM, HE STILL WANTS TO UNDERSTAND THEM.

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

HE BELIEVES IT IS ACCEPTABLE TO HIT SOMEONE WHO HITS YOU FIRST.

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

HE WOULD PHYSICALLY ATTACK SOMEONE WHO VERBALLY INSULTED HIM.

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

IF HE SAW SOMEONE GETTING HARASSED ON THE STREET HE WOULD GET INVOLVED

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

IF HE GOT IN AN ARGUMENT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO CALL ON HIS FRIENDS TO INTERVENE

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

NOW I WILL BRIEFLY DESCRIBE SOME PEOPLE. PLEASE LISTEN TO EACH DESCRIPTION AND TELL ME HOW MUCH EACH PERSON IS OR IS NOT LIKE YOU.

SHE BELIEVES THAT PEOPLE SHOULD DO WHAT THEY'RE TOLD. SHE THINKS PEOPLE SHOULD FOLLOW RULES AT ALL TIMES, EVEN WHEN NO-ONE IS WATCHING.

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

IT IS IMPORTANT TO HER TO LISTEN TO PEOPLE WHO ARE DIFFERENT FROM HER. EVEN WHEN SHE DISAGREES WITH THEM, SHE STILL WANTS TO UNDERSTAND THEM.

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

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- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

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- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

IF SHE SAW SOMEONE GETTING HARASSED ON THE STREET HE WOULD GET INVOLVED

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

IF SHE GOT IN AN ARGUMENT SHE WOULD BE ABLE TO CALL ON HER FRIENDS TO INTERVENE

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

Trust in Institutions & Local Community

I'M GOING TO READ YOU A LIST OF ACTORS RESPONDING TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS IN LEBANON. THINKING ABOUT THE LAST THREE MONTHS AND THE AREA WHERE YOU LIVE, WILL YOU PLEASE INDICATE WHETHER THEIR ACTIVITIES/INTERVENTIONS HAVE CHANGED LIFE IN YOUR AREA FOR BETTER OR WORSE.

THE GOVERNMENT (CABINET) OF LEBANON

- ◯ Improved life a lot
- ◯ Improved life somewhat
- ◯ Had no effect on quality of life
- ◯ Worsened life somewhat
- ◯ Worsened life a lot
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

LOCAL AND CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS

- ◯ Improved life a lot
- ◯ Improved life somewhat
- ◯ Had no effect on quality of life
- ◯ Worsened life somewhat
- ◯ Worsened life a lot
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

NGOS OR INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES LIKE THE UN

- ◯ Improved life a lot
- ◯ Improved life somewhat
- ◯ Had no effect on quality of life
- ◯ Worsened life somewhat
- ◯ Worsened life a lot
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

LEBANESE ARMED FORCES

- ◯ Improved life a lot
- ◯ Improved life somewhat
- ◯ Had no effect on quality of life
- ◯ Worsened life somewhat
- ◯ Worsened life a lot
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

- ◯ Improved life a lot
- ◯ Improved life somewhat
- ◯ Had no effect on quality of life
- ◯ Worsened life somewhat
- ◯ Worsened life a lot
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES

- ◯ Improved life a lot
- ◯ Improved life somewhat
- ◯ Had no effect on quality of life
- ◯ Worsened life somewhat
- ◯ Worsened life a lot
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

GENERAL SECURITY

- ◯ Improved life a lot
- ◯ Improved life somewhat
- ◯ Had no effect on quality of life
- ◯ Worsened life somewhat
- ◯ Worsened life a lot
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

I'M GOING TO READ YOU A LIST OF COMMUNITY ACTORS WHO MIGHT HELP IN SETTLING CONFLICTS. FOR EACH, WILL YOU PLEASE TELL IF YOU WOULD TURN TO THEM FOR HELP IF YOU WERE INVOLVED IN A DISPUTE?

READ EACH.

- ☐ Neighbors, family or friends
- ☐ Local authorities (municipality)
- ☐ Religious authorities
- ☐ Municipal police
- ☐ LAF
- ☐ ISF
- ☐ Informal/traditional dispute resolution (community elders)
- ☐ No one
- ☐ Landlord / employer
- ☐ The Shawish
- ☐ A political party
- ☐ NGOs or international agencies like the UN
- ☐ Other
- ☐ Don't know
- ☐ Refuse

OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY

Sense of solidarity

TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT. FOR EACH WOULD YOU SAY YOU STRONGLY AGREE, AGREE, DISAGREE OR STRONGLY DISAGREE?

'PEOPLE AROUND HERE ARE WILLING TO HELP THEIR NEIGHBORS.'

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

'PEOPLE IN THIS AREA CAN BE TRUSTED.'

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

'IF SOME OF YOUR NEIGHBORS GOT INTO A FIGHT WOULD SOMEONE INTERVENE TO RESOLVE IT?'

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

Basic Needs and Livelihoods

WHAT HAS BEEN THE AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD IN THE LAST MONTH?

- ◯ Less than 500,000 L.L.
- ◯ 500,000 – 1,000,000 L.L.
- ◯ 1,000,000 – 2,000,000 L.L.
- ◯ 2,000,000 – 3,000,000 L.L.
- ◯ 3,000,000 – 4,500,000 L.L.
- ◯ 4,500,000 – 6,000,000 L.L.
- ◯ Over 6,000,000 L.L.
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

FOR EACH OF THE FOLLOWING, HAVE YOU OR YOUR FAMILY UTILIZED THE FOLLOWING PUBLIC SERVICES IN THE LAST THREE MONTHS?

SELECT ALL THAT APPLY

- ☐ Public schools
- ☐ Public hospitals
- ☐ Primary health center
- ☐ SDC (Social Development Center)
- ☐ I have not use any public services
- ☐ Other
- ☐ Don't know
- ☐ Refuse

OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY

AND WITH REGARDS TO ACCESSING THESE SERVICES, WOULD YOU SAY THAT ANYTHING HAS LIMITED YOUR ABILITY TO ACCESS THESE SERVICES, OR HAVE YOU NOT TRIED TO ACCESS ANY OF THESE PUBLIC SERVICES? WHAT WOULD YOU SAY HAVE BEEN THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS LIMITING YOUR ACCESS TO THESE SERVICES, IF ANY?

DO NOT READ OPTIONS. CODE UP TO THREE.

- ☐ Services not available in my area
- ☐ Quality of public services is too low
- ☐ Too many people use this service
- ☐ Services are used by people of other nationalities
- ☐ I don't feel safe for me or my family to use a service
- ☐ Corruption
- ☐ NSSF
- ☐ No relevant
- ☐ Other reason, specify
- ☐ Don't know
- ☐ Refuse

OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY

HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE QUALITY OF THE FOLLOWING SERVICES IN THE AREA WHERE YOU LIVE?

ELECTRICITY

- ◯ Excellent
- ◯ Good
- ◯ Fair
- ◯ Poor
- ◯ Very Poor
- ◯ No Access
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

WATER

- ◯ Excellent
- ◯ Good
- ◯ Fair
- ◯ Poor
- ◯ Very Poor
- ◯ No Access
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

SEWERAGE

- ◯ Excellent
- ◯ Good
- ◯ Fair
- ◯ Poor
- ◯ Very Poor
- ◯ No Access
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

WASTE REMOVAL

- ◯ Excellent
- ◯ Good
- ◯ Fair
- ◯ Poor
- ◯ Very Poor
- ◯ No Access
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

EDUCATION

- ◯ Excellent
- ◯ Good
- ◯ Fair
- ◯ Poor
- ◯ Very Poor
- ◯ No Access
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

HEALTH SERVICES

- ◯ Excellent
- ◯ Good
- ◯ Fair
- ◯ Poor
- ◯ Very Poor
- ◯ No Access
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

SOCIAL SERVICES

- ◯ Excellent
- ◯ Good
- ◯ Fair
- ◯ Poor
- ◯ Very Poor
- ◯ No Access
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

PUBLIC AND RECREATIONAL SPACE

- ◯ Excellent
- ◯ Good
- ◯ Fair
- ◯ Poor
- ◯ Very Poor
- ◯ No Access
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES (SUCH AS WASTE MANAGEMENT OR BEACHES AND SEASHORE CLEANING)

- ◯ Excellent
- ◯ Good
- ◯ Fair
- ◯ Poor
- ◯ Very Poor
- ◯ No Access
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

OF THE FOLLOWING SERVICES OR RESOURCES IN YOUR AREA, WHICH THREE WOULD YOU SAY REQUIRE THE GREATEST IMPROVEMENT?

PRIORITY ONE

- ◯ Public places
- ◯ Shelter/housing
- ◯ Medical care
- ◯ Water
- ◯ Waste removal
- ◯ Sewerage
- ◯ Roads and infrastructure
- ◯ Electricity
- ◯ Policing
- ◯ Public transportation
- ◯ Education
- ◯ Access to jobs
- ◯ Other
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY

PRIORITY TWO

- ◯ Public places
- ◯ Shelter/housing
- ◯ Medical care
- ◯ Water
- ◯ Waste removal
- ◯ Sewerage
- ◯ Roads and infrastructure
- ◯ Electricity
- ◯ Policing
- ◯ Public transportation
- ◯ Education
- ◯ Access to jobs
- ◯ Other
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY

PRIORITY THREE

- ◯ Public places
- ◯ Shelter/housing
- ◯ Medical care
- ◯ Water
- ◯ Waste removal
- ◯ Sewerage
- ◯ Roads and infrastructure
- ◯ Electricity
- ◯ Policing
- ◯ Public transportation
- ◯ Education
- ◯ Access to jobs
- ◯ Other
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY

HAS ANYONE YOU KNOW LOST THEIR JOB/BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION TO A SYRIAN

- ◯ No
- ◯ Yes
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

Capability and Fairness of Service Provision and International Assistance

HAS YOUR HOUSEHOLD RECEIVED ANY OF THE FOLLOWING ASSISTANCE IN THE LAST YEAR?

SELECT ALL THAT APPLY

- [ ] National Poverty Targeting Programme (Hayat Card)
- [ ] Assistance from NGOs or International Organisations
- [ ] Other governmental assistance
- [ ] Assistance from political parties
- [ ] Assistance through Lebanese/Syrian community organizations
- [ ] Assistance through personal/family networks
- [ ] We do not receive any aid
- [ ] Other assistance, specify.
- [ ] Don't know
- [ ] Refuse

OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY

TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: 'INTERNATIONAL AID/ASSISTANCE GOES TO THE PEOPLE WHO MOST DESERVE IT.'

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Neutral
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: 'VULNERABLE LEBANESE HAVE BEEN NEGLECTED IN INTERNATIONAL AID/ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES.'

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Neutral
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: 'THE MUNICIPALITY IS DOING THE BEST IT CAN TO RESPOND TO THE NEEDS OF PEOPLE IN THIS COMMUNITY.'

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Neutral
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: 'IF I AM DISSATISFIED WITH A SERVICE I AM ABLE TO VOICE MY CONCERN WITH PROPER AUTHORITIES.'

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Neutral
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

Vulnerability

I AM NOW GOING TO READ OUT SOME THINGS THAT PEOPLE LIKE YOU HAVE SAID THEY SOMETIMES WORRY ABOUT. FOR EACH ONE PLEASE TELL ME WHETHER YOU WORRY ABOUT IT ALMOST NEVER, SOMETIMES, OFTEN OR ALL THE TIME.

MAKING SURE YOUR HOUSEHOLD HAS ENOUGH MONEY TO BUY FOOD BEFORE WHAT FOOD YOU HAVE RUNS OUT.

- ◯ Almost never
- ◯ Sometimes
- ◯ Often
- ◯ All the time
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

BEING ABLE TO BUY THE FUEL YOU NEED FOR COOKING OR FOR HEATING YOUR HOME.

- ◯ Almost never
- ◯ Sometimes
- ◯ Often
- ◯ All the time
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

OBTAINING ACCESS TO SAFE DRINKING WATER FOR YOURSELF OR HOUSEHOLD.

- ◯ Almost never
- ◯ Sometimes
- ◯ Often
- ◯ All the time
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

ACCESS TO MEDICAL CARE OR MEDICATION FOR YOURSELF OR OTHERS IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD.

- ◯ Almost never
- ◯ Sometimes
- ◯ Often
- ◯ All the time
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

THE THREAT OF CRIME.

- ◯ Almost never
- ◯ Sometimes
- ◯ Often
- ◯ All the time
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

THE PREVALENCE OF WEAPONS NOT HELD BY LEBANESE SECURITY SERVICES IN THE AREA WHERE YOU LIVE.

- ◯ Almost never
- ◯ Sometimes
- ◯ Often
- ◯ All the time
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

BEING ABLE TO TRAVEL WITHIN LEBANON SAFELY, FOR WORK OR TO SEE FAMILY.

- ◯ Almost never
- ◯ Sometimes
- ◯ Often
- ◯ All the time
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

RAIDS CONDUCTED BY SECURITY AGENCIES.

- ◯ Almost never
- ◯ Sometimes
- ◯ Often
- ◯ All the time
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

ACTS OF TERRORISM TARGETING CIVILIANS, LIKE CAR BOMBS.

- ◯ Almost never
- ◯ Sometimes
- ◯ Often
- ◯ All the time
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

Tension and resilience landscape

TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS. FOR EACH WOULD YOU SAY YOU STRONGLY AGREE, AGREE, DISAGREE OR STRONGLY DISAGREE?

'SYRIANS HAVE LIVED AMICABLY IN OUR AREA FOR A LONG TIME.'

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Neutral
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

'RELATIONSHIPS WITH SYRIANS WHO HAVE LIVED IN OUR AREA BEFORE THE SYRIAN WAR ARE MUCH BETTER THAN WITH THOSE WHO CAME AFTERWARDS.'

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Neutral
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

'MEMORIES OF THE SYRIAN ARMY OCCUPATION STILL IMPAIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH SYRIANS.'

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Neutral
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

Outlook on the Future

DO YOU THINK THAT 5 YEARS FROM NOW, LEBANON WILL BE A BETTER OR WORSE PLACE TO LIVE. WOULD YOU SAY THAT IT WILL BE...

- ◯ Much worse place to live
- ◯ Worse place to live
- ◯ About the same
- ◯ Better place to live
- ◯ Much better place to live
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

AND FOR YOU PERSONALLY? TO WHAT EXTENT WOULD YOU SAY YOU AGREE WITH THE STATEMENT, `GENERALLY, I FEEL OPTIMISTIC ABOUT MY FUTURE.'

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Neutral
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

AND IN YOUR OPINION, HOW LONG DO YOU THINK IT WILL TAKE FOR SYRIAN REFUGEES TO RETURN TO SYRIA?

- ◯ Less than one year
- ◯ Between one and two years
- ◯ Between two and three years
- ◯ More than three years, but less than five
- ◯ five years or more

GENERALLY SPEAKING, HOW INTERESTED WOULD YOU SAY YOU ARE IN POLITICS? WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOU ARE NOT AT ALL INTERESTED IN POLITICS, A LITTLE INTERESTED, INTERESTED, OR VERY INTERESTED?

- ◯ Very Interested
- ◯ Interested
- ◯ A little interested
- ◯ not at all interested
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: IN THIS AREA, LEBANESE FROM DIFFERENT CONFESSIONS LIVE PEACEFULLY AMONG EACH OTHER

- ◯ Strongly agree
- ◯ Agree
- ◯ Neutral
- ◯ Disagree
- ◯ Strongly disagree
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

SINCE 2011, DO YOU THINK THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT LEBANESE GROUPS HAVE IMPROVED OR WORSENED ?

- ◯ Much Better
- ◯ Better
- ◯ Worse
- ◯ Much Worse
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

AND IN YOUR OPINION, WHAT ARE THREE IMPORTANT ISSUES THAT HAVE CAUSED TENSIONS BETWEEN LEBANESE MEMBERS OF THIS AREA

- ☐ Economic competition (Jobs and resources)
- ☐ Political and sectarian conflicts
- ☐ Cultural and religious differences
- ☐ Differences in socio-economic status/class
- ☐ Unfair distribution of resources
- ☐ Presence of Syrian refugees
- ☐ None
- ☐ Other
- ☐ Don't know
- ☐ Refuse

OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY

Demographics

WHAT IS YOUR AGE?

ARE YOU SURE OF THE NUMBER ABOVE

WHAT IS THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION YOU COMPLETED?

- ◯ No formal education / incomplete primary
- ◯ Some elementary education / can read and write
- ◯ Finished elementary education, less than intermediate
- ◯ Finished intermediate, less than secondary
- ◯ Finished secondary, did not attend University or college
- ◯ Currently completing High School
- ◯ Vocational certificate
- ◯ Some University education, but did not complete degree/ did not graduate
- ◯ Currently completing University Education
- ◯ Graduate degree (Bachelor degree / License degree)
- ◯ Currently completing Post-Graduate Degree
- ◯ Post-graduate education but did not complete
- ◯ Post-Graduate Degree – Ph.D., MBA, etc.
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

WHAT IS YOUR RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION?

- ◯ Sunni Muslim
- ◯ Shi'a Muslim
- ◯ Allawite Muslim
- ◯ Druze Muslim
- ◯ Maronite Christian
- ◯ Greek Orthodox Christian
- ◯ Greek Catholic Christian
- ◯ Roman Catholic Christian
- ◯ Armenian Orthodox Christian
- ◯ Armenian Catholic Christian
- ◯ Syriac Christian
- ◯ Protestant Christian
- ◯ Latin Catholic Christian
- ◯ Coptic Christian
- ◯ Jewish
- ◯ No religious affiliation / do not identify
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ Refuse

AND HOW IMPORTANT OF A ROLE DOES RELIGION PLAY IN YOUR LIFE OVERALL?

- ◯ No importance
- ◯ Limited importance
- ◯ Some importance
- ◯ A great deal of importance
- ◯ Don't know
- ◯ No answer

INCLUDING YOURSELF, HOW MANY ADULTS (16 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER) HAVE RESIDED IN THIS HOUSEHOLD FOR AT LEAST 6 OF THE LAST 12 MONTHS?

-

ARE YOU SURE OF THE NUMBER ABOVE

AND HOW MANY MINORS (UNDER THE AGE OF 16) HAVE RESIDED IN THIS HOUSEHOLD FOR AT LEAST 6 OF THE LAST 12 MONTHS?

-

ARE YOU SURE OF THE NUMBER ABOVE

IS THE HOUSEHOLD SIZE:

WHO, IN THIS HOUSEHOLD, HAS VALID RESIDENCY PERMITS IN LEBANON

- [ ] Male head of the Household
- [ ] Female head of the household
- [ ] More than one child
- [ ] Eldest child
- [ ] No members
- [ ] Other
- [ ] Don't know
- [ ] Refuse

CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT YOUR OCCUPATION IS?

-

I'M NOW GOING TO READ YOU A NUMBER OF STATEMENTS ABOUT EMPLOYMENT. FOR EACH, WILL YOU TELL ME HOW MANY MEMBERS OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD INCLUDING YOURSELF FALL INTO EACH CATEGORY?

numbers in this category should match household total size

WORKING FULL-TIME

0

ARE YOU SURE OF THE NUMBER ABOVE

WORKING PART-TIME

0

ARE YOU SURE OF THE NUMBER ABOVE

DAILY LABOURER

0

ARE YOU SURE OF THE NUMBER ABOVE

HOUSEWIFE

if the mother works do not count her in this category

0

ARE YOU SURE OF THE NUMBER ABOVE

STUDENT, NOT WORKING

0

ARE YOU SURE OF THE NUMBER ABOVE

STUDENT, WORKING

0

ARE YOU SURE OF THE NUMBER ABOVE

CHILD TOO YOUNG FOR SCHOOL

0

ARE YOU SURE OF THE NUMBER ABOVE

SCHOOL AGED CHILD, NOT WORKING NOT AT SCHOOL

0

ARE YOU SURE OF THE NUMBER ABOVE

RETIRED

0

ARE YOU SURE OF THE NUMBER ABOVE

NOT WORKING, WITH DISABILITY

0

ARE YOU SURE OF THE NUMBER ABOVE

NOT WORKING, ACTIVELY LOOKING FOR EMPLOYMENT

0

ARE YOU SURE OF THE NUMBER ABOVE

NOT WORKING, NOT SEEKING EMPLOYMENT

0

ARE YOU SURE OF THE NUMBER ABOVE

OTHER EMPLOYMENT STATUS

-

0

OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY

ARE YOU SURE OF THE NUMBER ABOVE

THE HOUSEHOLD SIZE IS: AND THERE ARE MEMBERS IN THE ABOVE CATEGORIES

numbers in this category should match household total size

Employment Type

THANK YOU VERY MUCH. I WILL NOW ASK YOU A QUESTION REGARDING THOSE FAMILY MEMBERS WHO ARE WORKING FULL TIME, PART TIME, OR AS DAILY WORKERS (INCLUDING STUDENTS WHO ARE WORKING). HOW MANY OF THESE FAMILY MEMBERS ARE EMPLOYEES OR EMPLOYERS OR BUSINESS OWNERS WITH NO EMPLOYEES (OWN ACCOUNT) ?

EMPLOYEE

0

ARE YOU SURE OF THE NUMBER ABOVE

EMPLOYER (WITH EMPLOYEES)

0

ARE YOU SURE OF THE NUMBER ABOVE

OWN ACCOUNT (NO EMPLOYEES)

0

ARE YOU SURE OF THE NUMBER ABOVE

THERE ARE MEMBERS IN THE CATEGORIES ABOVE, AND MEMBERS IN THE RELEVANT EMPLOYMENT CATEGORIES

numbers in this category should match household total size

Sectors

HAVE YOU OR OTHER MEMBERS OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD WORKED IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING FIELDS OR SECTORS IN THE LAST ONE YEAR?

- [ ] Agriculture
- [ ] Construction
- [ ] Manufacturing
- [ ] Other service industries
- [ ] Professional services
- [ ] Wholesale and retail trade
- [ ] Public service
- [ ] NGOs or charitable organisations
- [ ] Other sectors or fields
- [ ] Don't know
- [ ] Refuse

OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY

AND HOW MANY MINORS (UNDER THE AGE OF 16) HAVE BEEN WORKING IN THE LAST ONE MONTH?

THERE ARE CHILDREN IN THIS HOUSEHOLD AND CHILDREN WORKING

AND HOW MANY ROOMS IN YOUR HOME ARE USED FOR SLEEPING?

ARE YOU SURE OF THE NUMBER ABOVE

Appendix B: Coefficient Estimates

Table 1: Estimated Effects on Dependent Variable for Refugee Population Pressure on services (RPP-S), with HSAR model.

Model Term	Direct	Indirect	Total
(Intercept)	10.059	1.617	11.676
sum_vic	0.332	0.053	0.385
sum_interact	-0.009	-0.002	-0.011
night_day_safety	-0.457	-0.073	-0.530
propensity_sum	-0.030	-0.005	-0.034
trust_sum	0.138	0.022	0.160
prej_sum	-0.048	-0.008	-0.056
cohesion5Agree	-0.120	-0.019	-0.139
cohesion5Disagree	-0.423	-0.068	-0.491
cohesion5Strongly disagree	-0.407	-0.065	-0.473
capability_sum	0.154	0.025	0.179
fairness_sum	-0.291	-0.047	-0.338
livelihoods34Yes	0.396	0.064	0.459
tensions7Agree	-0.107	-0.017	-0.124
tensions7Neutral	0.132	0.021	0.153
tensions7Disagree	0.048	0.008	0.056
tensions7Strongly disagree	1.459	0.235	1.694
adults	0.030	0.005	0.035
minors	0.017	0.003	0.020
sect_fourShia Muslim	0.174	0.028	0.202
sect_fourDruze	-0.959	-0.154	-1.113
sect_fourChristian	-0.545	-0.088	-0.633
vul_sum	-0.009	-0.001	-0.010
genderMale	0.054	0.009	0.062
age	-0.002	0.000	-0.002
ed_threeHigh school	-0.120	-0.019	-0.139
ed_threeUniversity or above	-0.163	-0.026	-0.189

Model Term	Direct	Indirect	Total
income500,000	-0.622	-0.100	-0.722
income1,000,000	-0.670	-0.108	-0.777
income2,000,000	-0.433	-0.070	-0.503
income3,000,000	-0.727	-0.117	-0.844
income4,500,000	-1.150	-0.185	-1.335
incomeOver	-1.115	-0.179	-1.294
waveWave II	0.554	0.089	0.643
waveWave III	-0.389	-0.063	-0.452
waveWave IV	0.008	0.001	0.009
NUMPOINTS	0.001	0.000	0.001
log_pop	-0.415	-0.067	-0.482
frac_syrian	-0.607	-0.098	-0.705
frac_christian	-0.685	-0.110	-0.796
log_area	0.442	0.071	0.513
any	0.042	0.007	0.049
log.Any.Livelihoods.Assistance	-0.126	-0.020	-0.147
log.Conflict.Resolution.Support	-0.051	-0.008	-0.059
log.CP.Psychosocial.Support	0.016	0.003	0.019
log.Health.Consultations	0.014	0.002	0.016
log.Improved.Access.to.Clean.Water	0.043	0.007	0.050
log.Job.Creation	0.062	0.010	0.072
log.Shelters.Improved	-0.108	-0.017	-0.125
log.Workforce.Improvement	-0.018	-0.003	-0.021
log.Youth.Empowerment	0.087	0.014	0.101

Table 2: Estimated Effects on Dependent Variable for Quality of Relations (QoR) with HSAR model.

Model Term	Direct	Indirect	Total
(Intercept)	5.785	2.147	7.932
sum_vic	0.062	0.023	0.085

Model Term	Direct	Indirect	Total
sum_interact	0.015	0.006	0.020
night_day_safety	-0.094	-0.035	-0.129
new_ca	0.002	0.001	0.003
trust_sum	0.028	0.010	0.039
prej_sum	-0.090	-0.033	-0.123
services_sum	0.016	0.006	0.021
cohesion5Agree	-0.800	-0.297	-1.097
cohesion5Disagree	-1.312	-0.487	-1.799
cohesion5Strongly disagree	-1.401	-0.520	-1.921
capability_sum	0.046	0.017	0.063
fairness_sum	-0.086	-0.032	-0.118
livelihoods34Yes	0.152	0.056	0.209
tensions7Agree	-0.210	-0.078	-0.288
tensions7Neutral	-0.318	-0.118	-0.436
tensions7Disagree	-0.324	-0.120	-0.444
tensions7Strongly disagree	-0.230	-0.085	-0.315
adults	0.008	0.003	0.011
minors	0.005	0.002	0.008
sect_fourShia Muslim	-0.065	-0.024	-0.090
sect_fourDruze	0.253	0.094	0.347
sect_fourChristian	0.126	0.047	0.173
vul_sum	-0.012	-0.004	-0.016
genderMale	0.068	0.025	0.093
age	-0.002	-0.001	-0.003
ed_threeHigh school	-0.038	-0.014	-0.052
ed_threeUniversity or above	-0.047	-0.017	-0.064
income500,000	-0.005	-0.002	-0.006
income1,000,000	-0.027	-0.010	-0.037
income2,000,000	0.026	0.010	0.036
income3,000,000	0.015	0.006	0.020

Model Term	Direct	Indirect	Total
income4,500,000	0.000	0.000	0.001
incomeOver	0.119	0.044	0.164
waveWave II	0.089	0.033	0.122
waveWave III	-0.105	-0.039	-0.144
waveWave IV	-0.009	-0.003	-0.013
NUMPOINTS	0.000	0.000	-0.001
log_pop	0.007	0.003	0.010
frac_syrian	0.191	0.071	0.261
frac_christian	0.233	0.087	0.320
log_area	0.027	0.010	0.037
any	-0.071	-0.026	-0.098
log.Any.Livelihoods.Assistance	0.036	0.013	0.049
log.Conflict.Resolution.Support	-0.017	-0.006	-0.024
log.CP.Psychosocial.Support	-0.013	-0.005	-0.018
log.Health.Consultations	0.014	0.005	0.019
log.Improved.Access.to.Clean.Water	0.000	0.000	0.000
log.Job.Creation	-0.006	-0.002	-0.008
log.Shelters.Improved	0.005	0.002	0.007
log.Workforce.Improvement	-0.004	-0.002	-0.006
log.Youth.Empowerment	-0.008	-0.003	-0.012

Table 3: Estimated Effects on Dependent Variable for Propensity to Negative Collective Action – 1 (PNCA-1), with HSAR model.

Model Term	Direct	Indirect	Total
(Intercept)	2.519	0.602	3.121
sum_vic	-0.017	-0.004	-0.021
sum_interact	0.006	0.001	0.007
night_day_safety	-0.018	-0.004	-0.022
new_qor	-0.003	-0.001	-0.004
trust_sum	-0.003	-0.001	-0.004

Model Term	Direct	Indirect	Total
prej_sum	0.043	0.010	0.053
services_sum	-0.002	-0.001	-0.003
cohesion5Agree	0.137	0.033	0.169
cohesion5Disagree	0.295	0.070	0.365
cohesion5Strongly disagree	0.363	0.087	0.450
capability_sum	0.046	0.011	0.057
fairness_sum	0.010	0.002	0.012
livelihoods34Yes	-0.072	-0.017	-0.089
tensions7Agree	0.138	0.033	0.171
tensions7Neutral	0.175	0.042	0.217
tensions7Disagree	0.161	0.039	0.200
tensions7Strongly disagree	0.197	0.047	0.243
adults	0.002	0.000	0.002
minors	-0.020	-0.005	-0.025
sect_fourShia Muslim	-0.075	-0.018	-0.093
sect_fourDruze	-0.007	-0.002	-0.008
sect_fourChristian	0.054	0.013	0.067
vul_sum	0.005	0.001	0.006
genderMale	-0.065	-0.015	-0.080
age	0.003	0.001	0.003
ed_threeHigh school	0.047	0.011	0.058
ed_threeUniversity or above	0.102	0.024	0.126
income500,000	-0.076	-0.018	-0.094
income1,000,000	-0.096	-0.023	-0.118
income2,000,000	-0.139	-0.033	-0.172
income3,000,000	-0.162	-0.039	-0.201
income4,500,000	-0.209	-0.050	-0.259
incomeOver	-0.137	-0.033	-0.170
waveWave II	0.093	0.022	0.116
waveWave III	-0.025	-0.006	-0.031

Model Term	Direct	Indirect	Total
waveWave IV	0.061	0.015	0.076
NUMPOINTS	0.000	0.000	0.000
log_pop	0.045	0.011	0.056
frac_syrian	0.033	0.008	0.042
frac_christian	-0.081	-0.019	-0.101
log_area	-0.042	-0.010	-0.052
any_assistance	0.042	0.010	0.051
log.Any.Livelihoods.Assistance	0.008	0.002	0.010
log.Conflict.Resolution.Support	0.008	0.002	0.010
log.CP.Psychosocial.Support	0.003	0.001	0.004
log.Health.Consultations	-0.005	-0.001	-0.007
log.Improved.Access.to.Clean.Water	-0.002	-0.001	-0.003
log.Job.Creation	0.003	0.001	0.004
log.Shelters.Improved	0.002	0.000	0.002
log.Workforce.Improvement	-0.006	-0.001	-0.007
log.Youth.Empowerment	0.008	0.002	0.010

Table 4: Estimated Effects on Dependent Variable for Propensity to Negative Collective Action – 2 (PNCA-2), with HSAR model.

Model Term	Direct	Indirect	Total
(Intercept)	5.512	0.828	6.340
sum_vic	-0.071	-0.011	-0.082
sum_interact	0.018	0.003	0.021
night_day_safety	0.052	0.008	0.060
new_qor	0.017	0.003	0.020
trust_sum	-0.048	-0.007	-0.055
prej_sum	0.037	0.006	0.043
services_sum	-0.012	-0.002	-0.014
cohesion5Agree	-0.186	-0.028	-0.214
cohesion5Disagree	0.017	0.003	0.020

Model Term	Direct	Indirect	Total
cohesion5Strongly disagree	0.245	0.037	0.282
capability_sum	-0.023	-0.003	-0.027
fairness_sum	-0.018	-0.003	-0.021
livelihoods34Yes	-0.161	-0.024	-0.185
tensions7Agree	-0.150	-0.023	-0.172
tensions7Neutral	-0.065	-0.010	-0.075
tensions7Disagree	-0.155	-0.023	-0.179
tensions7Strongly disagree	-0.462	-0.069	-0.531
adults	-0.110	-0.017	-0.127
minors	-0.061	-0.009	-0.070
sect_fourShia Muslim	0.036	0.005	0.041
sect_fourDruze	0.174	0.026	0.200
sect_fourChristian	0.214	0.032	0.246
vul_sum	0.008	0.001	0.010
genderMale	-0.219	-0.033	-0.252
age	0.012	0.002	0.013
ed_threeHigh school	0.018	0.003	0.020
ed_threeUniversity	0.130	0.020	0.150
income500,000	0.074	0.011	0.085
income1,000,000	0.168	0.025	0.193
income2,000,000	0.185	0.028	0.212
income3,000,000	0.202	0.030	0.233
income4,500,000	0.191	0.029	0.220
incomeOver	0.395	0.059	0.455
waveWave III	-0.364	-0.055	-0.419
waveWave IV	-0.387	-0.058	-0.445
NUMPOINTS	0.001	0.000	0.001
log_pop	0.044	0.007	0.051
frac_syrian	0.313	0.047	0.361
frac_christian	0.318	0.048	0.365

Model Term	Direct	Indirect	Total
log_area	0.013	0.002	0.015
any	-0.089	-0.013	-0.103
log.Any.Livelihoods.Assistance	-0.039	-0.006	-0.045
log.Conflict.Resolution.Support	0.016	0.002	0.018
log.CP.Psychosocial.Support	0.013	0.002	0.014
log.Health.Consultations	-0.005	-0.001	-0.005
log.Improved.Access.to.Clean.Water	-0.003	0.000	-0.003
log.Job.Creation	0.002	0.000	0.002
log.Shelters.Improved	-0.012	-0.002	-0.014
log.Workforce.Improvement	0.017	0.003	0.020
log.Youth.Empowerment	0.009	0.001	0.010


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