

# UNHCR WINTERIZATION 2018 **POST- DISTRIBUTION MONITORING REPORT**

November 27th, 2018



**UNHCR**  
The UN Refugee Agency

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# Executive Summary

For the 2017-2018 winter, as in previous years, UNHCR provided winterization assistance to vulnerable households in Afghanistan, with a focus on recent returnees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and members of host communities. The goal of this post-distribution monitoring study is to assess whether UNHCR's winterization programme successfully mitigated the protection risks faced by vulnerable households, and whether the programme achieved these goals as effectively and efficiently as possible.

This study surveyed 1,049 beneficiaries of the winterization program (882 males and 167 females) in 33 of Afghanistan's provinces, as well as 667 respondents who did not receive assistance (624 males and 43 females) in 31 provinces. These 667 respondents were identified as vulnerable by community elders, but did not score high enough on the vulnerability assessment to qualify for assistance. These households form a "comparison" group for quantitative measures of programme impact. The study also interviewed UNHCR staff to better understand the programme implementation.

The evidence indicates that, on the whole, the winterization programme successfully reached vulnerable households and improved their ability to cope with harsh weather during winter. Despite the challenges of distributing cash across 34 provinces in Afghanistan, 98% of beneficiaries report receiving the full amount of cash allocated to them, which in most cases was \$200.<sup>1</sup> Corruption, according to survey data, was virtually non-existent.

Beneficiary households are more likely than the comparison group to be vulnerable, which indicates UNHCR's targeting was successful. The programme also achieved a positive impact. Beneficiaries were 24% more likely to report having sufficient fuel for the winter than comparison households, despite the higher levels of welfare among comparison households at baseline. Further, 98% of beneficiaries claimed the winterization programme improved their household's welfare during the winter months. An estimated 63% of beneficiaries used the winterization benefits to purchase fuel and/or a heating device.

The study reveals some challenges to the distribution process. Approximately 6% of households who qualified

for the winterization package did not receive aid due to perceived administrative challenges. Many of these interviewees perceived that they would not be able to claim the Winterization package without a Tazkira or other identifying documents. UNHCR staff in Herat and other offices, however, provided assistance to beneficiaries who lacked identity documents. An additional 7% of identified beneficiaries did not receive aid due to logistical challenges, such as impassable roads. By contrast, 28% of households who did not meet the vulnerability threshold received winterization assistance. This occurred in areas such as Herat where field teams were not able to make separate trips for assessment and distribution. The need to distribute aid in a single trip meant that field teams were not able to calculate vulnerability scores; rather, aid was distributed to every household on the lists provided by community elders or at the discretion of the field team.

## Recommendations:

- Consider supplementing the amount of cash assistance in those provinces where weather or market conditions reduce the impact of the standard cash assistance package.
- Begin the assessment exercise earlier so that field teams can distribute aid to beneficiaries before heavy snowfall makes roads impassable;
- Complete the transition to digital survey tools such as tablets so that beneficiaries can be identified faster and more accurately;<sup>2</sup>
- Invest in long-term resilience by providing durable shelter materials and other forms of support to households, prioritizing areas that experience the harshest winters;
- Ensure that all UNHCR and partner staff are properly identified when meeting with beneficiaries and members of the community (e.g. wearing appropriate UNHCR or agency branded vests);

1. Households in Khost and Paktika provinces received a different allocation of cash and blankets than households in other provinces. See the Programme Implementation section, below.

2. This recommendation is in response to the fact that while most teams used tablets, our key informant interviews highlighted that some teams continued to use paper assessment tools, which created some challenges.

- Continue to focus on ensuring that communities have timely information regarding winterization assistance, while also continuing to invest in comprehensive monitoring during both the assessment and distribution phases of the project;
- Consider transitioning assistance methodologies toward the use of mobile money, where functional markets for mobile money exist;
- Focus on the implementation of tangible activities for self-reliance and resilience, keeping in view the objective of gradually moving away from annual winterization assistance for self-reliance by 2020.

# 1. Overview of the Programme

Afghanistan's harsh winters mean that heating is a matter of survival for people in many parts of the country. During the last winter season, 33 out of 34 provinces were affected by extreme weather conditions including heavy snowfall, avalanches and rain related disasters.<sup>3</sup> The government's capacity to respond to the challenges posed by winter is limited. Humanitarian deliveries of blankets and other in-kind relief items often require huge logistical arrangements as roads could be blocked by heavy snowfall in remote areas, and poor visibility could prevent the delivery of assistance by air.

Recently returned refugees ("returnees") and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are often the most vulnerable, although many host communities also include poor households that struggle to secure sufficient heating. According to a joint IOM-UNHCR report, in 2017 there were 60,000 registered refugees that returned from Pakistan, 100,000 undocumented returnees from Pakistan, and over 450,000 undocumented returnees from Iran.<sup>4</sup> In addition, UNOCHA estimates a total of 405,000 conflict-displaced IDPs will be in need of assistance in 2018.<sup>5</sup> Out of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, 29 are currently affected by conflict. In 2017 alone, more than 500,000 civilians were displaced from their homes.<sup>6</sup>

During the 2017-2018 winter, UNHCR provided winterization assistance to the most vulnerable families living in makeshift shelter conditions, damaged shelters, open space, and those living at higher altitudes, with particular emphasis on new returnees and IDPs. According to the TOR for this evaluation, the goal of the programme was to avoid:

- Secondary displacement;
- Exposure to health and environmental risks;
- Exposure to protection risks;
- Overcrowded living conditions;
- Negative coping mechanisms, such as reduced food intake;
- Increase in mortality rates;
- Increase in levels of vulnerability;
- Tensions due to use of local coping resources;
- Overburden on communities.

According to nationwide estimates prepared by the Emergency Shelter/NFI Cluster, each household would need approximately \$60 per month to purchase fuel such as firewood. To ensure consistency with other humanitarian actors, UNHCR adhered to this standard and provided cash transfers covering approximately 3 months (\$200), based on an analysis of both the average severity and duration of the cold season. Providing cash to beneficiaries allows them to use the grant based on their household needs, in particular to increase their spending on fuel during the critical winter months, without the complex logistics required to distribute fuel directly -- logistics that are often not possible due to weather conditions. The disbursement of cash was implemented through UNHCR's existing Hawala/money service provider at centralized distribution points monitored by UNHCR, the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR) and its provincial directorates (DoRRs), and partner staff.

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3. "AFGHANISTAN Emergency Shelter and NFI Cluster Winterization Strategy 2017"

4. IOM and UNHCR Joint Report. "Returns to Afghanistan in 2017". Available at <https://data2.unhcr.org/ar/documents/download/63077>. Accessed 29 August 2018.

5. UNOCHA. "2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview." Available at [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/afg\\_2018\\_humanitarian\\_needs\\_overview\\_1.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/afg_2018_humanitarian_needs_overview_1.pdf). Accessed 29 August 2018.

6. Ibid.

## 2. Study Objectives and Methodology

The primary goal of this study is to understand to what extent UNHCR’s winterization programme helped households meet basic needs – especially heating – during the winter months. The study is based on 1,716 surveys (1,506 males and 210 females) conducted over the phone by a team of trained enumerators based in Kabul. The surveys reached respondents in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan (see Figure 1). Among the respondents, 97% identified as a returnee and/or an IDP.<sup>7</sup> This study surveyed 1,049 beneficiaries of the winterization programme (882 males and 167 females) in 33 provinces and 667 respondents who did not receive assistance (624 males and 43 females) in 31 provinces. These 667 respondents were identified as vulnerable by community elders but did not score high enough on the vulnerability assessment to qualify for assistance. These households form a “comparison” group for quantitative measures of programme impact. Because these households were judged by UNHCR and partner field staff to have less need and/or lower vulnerability than those who benefited from the programme, the comparisons in this report can be viewed as a conservative measure of programme impact; the true impact is likely to be higher.<sup>8</sup>

### THE STUDY AT A GLANCE


<h1 style="color: red;">1,716</h1> <p style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">SURVEYS</p>	<p>Surveys conducted over the phone by a team of trained enumerators based in Kabul.</p>
<h1 style="color: blue;">34</h1> <p style="color: blue; font-weight: bold;">PROVINCES</p>	<p>The surveys reached respondents in all 34 of Afghanistan’s provinces (see Figure 1).</p>
<h1 style="color: blue;">1,049</h1> <p style="color: blue; font-weight: bold;">BENEFICIARIES</p>	<p>The survey includes 1,049 beneficiaries of the Winterization program.</p>
<h1 style="color: red;">667</h1> <p style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">VULNERABLE RESPONDENTS</p>	<p>Respondents who were identified as vulnerable by community elders but did not receive assistance.</p>

7. 835 respondents identified as a returnee; 959 respondents identified as an IDP; 128 respondents identified as both returnee and IDP. Only 50 respondents (3% of total) identified as neither IDP nor returnee.

8. To understand why this is a conservative measure of impact, imagine a simple vulnerability assessment that scores each household on a scale of 1 to 10; any households that score less than 5 receive the winterization package. Suppose household A receives a score of 3 and is given the winterization package while household B receives a score of 5 and does not receive the assistance. During post-distribution monitoring, it is discovered that household A now scores 6, while household B remains at 5. According to the study design used here, we take a simple difference of the scores to calculate impact, which in this case is 6 - 5 = 1. But the true impact is actually 3, because the winterization assistance moved household A from a score of 3 to a score of 6, while the comparison household did not improve. Unfortunately, without baseline data we are not able to make this more rigorous comparison (known as a difference-in-differences design). So we rely instead on the more conservative measure of the differences at endline.

FIGURE 1. SURVEYS PER PROVINCE

To make the comparisons as accurate as possible, survey weights are used in the analysis. These weights are calculated so that the gender and province distribution of the comparison group matches the distribution of the beneficiary population. For example, 14% of surveyed beneficiaries were located in Nangarhar Province, while only 6% of comparison surveys were located in the province; to compensate for this discrepancy, the weights of the comparison surveys in Nangarhar are increased proportionally (by a factor of approximately 2.3). Likewise, approximately 16% of beneficiary surveys were conducted with women compared to only 7% of comparison surveys; overall, female comparison surveys are given approximately double the weight to compensate. To increase the precision of the estimates, these weights are calculated at the gender-province level. So surveys with men in Nimroz, for example, will be given a different weight than surveys with women in Nimroz, or men in any other province.



### 3. Programme Implementation

In total, UNHCR assisted 54,309 households with around US\$11 million in unconditional cash assistance to purchase fuel, as well as 160,000 blankets. According to the survey, 97% of winterization beneficiaries identify as a returnee or an IDP, and interviews with UNHCR staff confirm that field teams focused on identifying these populations during the assessments.<sup>9</sup> In addition to returnees and IDPs, winterization assistance was also provided to a limited number of host community households, where they met the vulnerability criteria. In most areas, beneficiary households received \$200 and several blankets. Households in Khost received \$100, while households in Paktika province received in-kind support (blankets and firewood) rather than cash.<sup>10</sup>

Households were selected through a multi-stage process. First, historical and national-level data were used to estimate the number of vulnerable households for each field office. Second, community leaders assembled lists of vulnerable households. Third, field teams conducted an assessment of households on these lists to identify vulnerable beneficiaries. Households were assessed based on their “need” and “vulnerability” based on several factors, including:<sup>11</sup>

- Head of household is female, elderly, disabled, or a child;
- Large households (more than 8 members);
- Households with chronically-ill members;
- Poor quality of clothing;
- Lack of heating device;
- Damaged or poor quality shelter, including makeshift shelters and tents;
- Low income which would prevent family from buying fuel and/or repairing shelter.

Households with the greatest needs were given priority when selecting beneficiaries, followed by vulnerable households.

The distinction between “need” and “vulnerability” is important in this programme. For example, a “vulnerable” household may have some access to fuel, but not enough for the winter; a household with a high “need” score may not have any fuel at all.<sup>12</sup> Similarly, a single female-headed household is considered “vulnerable” if she can rely on some outside support, but in “need” if the female-headed household has no other source of support and income.<sup>13</sup> The survey data are consistent with the goals of the needs / vulnerability assessment.<sup>14</sup> For example, beneficiaries are nearly 40% more likely to be female-headed households than the comparison group.<sup>15</sup> Beneficiaries are also more likely to have a disability or serious medical condition.

#### Distribution of Benefits

The survey data indicates that the distribution process was largely successful: 98% of beneficiaries report receiving the full amount of cash allocated to them, and 95% of beneficiaries received blankets.<sup>16</sup> In addition, 21% of beneficiaries report that they received some clothing and 8% report receiving food assistance.<sup>17</sup> The distribution process was viewed positively by the beneficiaries. Less than 6% of beneficiaries report any problems with the distribution, and 81% of these problems related to waiting in a queue for two hours or more.<sup>18</sup> Only a single survey respondent (out of 1,049 surveys with beneficiaries) claims to have paid a bribe during the distribution process.

In general, the distribution process was safe and convenient for the beneficiaries. Less than 1% of beneficiaries report security concerns at the distribution site, and 89% of beneficiaries traveled less than 1 hour to reach the site.<sup>20</sup> The most common mode of transportation to reach the distribution site was public transportation (65% of beneficiaries), followed by traveling on foot (20%) and private transportation (14%).

The survey data and interviews reveal three challenges with distribution. First, in some cases the winterization package was distributed to households that did not meet the threshold for aid based on the vulnerability assessment. Based on the data, 28% of households who were assessed but did not meet the threshold received winterization assistance. These households were mostly located in Herat Province and comprised 64% of all beneficiaries in Herat. The reason for this is that, according to interviews with UNHCR staff, challenging logistics and/or security concerns in some areas meant that the winterization package was distributed at the same time as the assessment.<sup>21</sup> As a result, field teams were not able to calculate vulnerability scores and instead distributed aid to all households on the lists

9. Key informant interview, 25 June 2018.

10. Key informant interviews, 25 June 2018 and 10 July 2018b. Our document review and key informant interviews did not provide any further information on why recipients in Khost and Paktika received less assistance than recipients in other provinces.

11. See the “ES/NF Cluster Winterization Vulnerability Score Card”

12. This distinction was explained in a key informant interview, 25 June 2018.

13. Key informant interview, 10 July 2018a.

14. The survey used for this analysis was not designed to replicate the multidimensional assessment tool, so we have limited ability to verify whether the neediest households were selected as beneficiaries.

15. 14% of beneficiaries are female-headed households while 10% of the comparison households are female-headed. Although suggestive, this difference is not statistically significant due to sample size.

provided by community elders, or used their judgment to select beneficiaries from those lists.


Second, 6% of households who qualified for the winterization package did not receive aid during the distribution in their community. These excluded households comprise a small percentage of beneficiaries in each province; there are no significant clusters of excluded households.<sup>22</sup> Field staff commented on the difficulties of locating and verifying the beneficiaries who had been assessed on previous visits, especially in the absence of a Tazkira or Voluntary Repatriation Form.<sup>23</sup> This statistic corresponds to UNHCR's 2017 returnee monitoring exercise conducted by Orange Door Research and VOTO mobile, which found that 6% of returned refugees do not have a Tazkira.

Third, an additional 7% of households who qualified for the winterization package did not receive the aid due to logistical reasons. These households were either unable to travel to the distribution site, were unaware of the location of the distribution site, or were located in areas that were inaccessible to field staff. Interviews with field staff reveal that heavy snowfall prevented them from accessing certain areas, especially in Bamyan and Badakhshan; security concerns were also an issue in a few locations.<sup>24</sup>

### SUCCESSFUL DISTRIBUTION PROCESS

98%

Received the full amount of cash allocated to them



95%

Received blankets



21%

Received some clothing



8%

Received food assistance



### Community Communication

Community communication was a core component of the programme. Community leaders and/or field teams were expected to inform the community about how the entire distribution process would work, including how beneficiaries would be selected and the funds disbursed. This communication process seems to have been partially successful. According to the survey data, 95% of beneficiaries and 93% of comparison households were consulted during the winterization assessment in their communities.

### CONSULTED DURING WINTERIZATION ASSESSMENT

95%

OF BENEFICIARIES

Consulted during the winterization assessment in their communities.

93%

OF COMPARISON HOUSEHOLDS

Consulted during the winterization assessment in their communities.

Communicating the specifics of the programme, however, was less successful: 66% of beneficiaries reported that they were not told how much money they could expect to receive.<sup>25</sup> The provinces with the highest percentage of beneficiaries who were not told how much cash to expect are: Farah, Samangan, Ghor, Bamyan, Herat, and Jowzjan. Upon receiving the cash grant, 14% of beneficiaries said they were told how to spend the funds. Among these households, 70% said they were instructed to spend at least some of the money on food, 61% said they were told to buy heating fuel, and 29% were told to use some of the funds for health care. Approximately 41% of beneficiaries confirmed that someone from UNHCR or NGO partner was present during the distribution, while 49% of beneficiaries were unsure whether or not a staff member was present; 10% report that no official was present.

16. The surveys did not reveal the reasons why 2% of respondents reported receiving less than the full cash allocation and 5% reported not receiving blankets. Given how few respondents reported receiving less than the full allocation, this could potentially be attributed to measurement error, including respondent confusion with the question.

17. Food assistance was not part of the standard Winterization package. We hypothesize that those respondents who report receiving food assistance might be conflating Winterization assistance with assistance provided by other actors.

18. The second biggest complaint was rude behavior by staff during distribution (10% of complaints).

19. This survey did not ask to whom the single recipient paid a bribe, but will investigate further based on a request from UNHCR.

20. 38% of beneficiaries traveled less than 30 minutes to reach the distribution site.

21. Key informant interviews, 25 June 2018 and 10 July 2018a.

22. As mentioned above, many of these interviewees perceived that they would not be able to claim the Winterization package without a Tazkira or other identifying documents. UNHCR staff in Herat and other offices, however, provided assistance to beneficiaries who lacked identity documents.

23. Key informant interview, 25 June 2018.

24. Key informant interview 25 June 2018.

25. The fact that so many respondents were not sure of the correct amount adds credibility to our estimate that 98% of beneficiaries received the full amount of aid allocated to them. Respondents were asked to tell us the dollar amount that they received.

## 4. Programme Impact

Beneficiaries reported large impacts from this programme. Some 83% of beneficiaries claimed that their household welfare “improved a lot” due to the programme, and an additional 15% claimed their welfare “improved a little.” In general, beneficiaries did not suffer negative consequences from the host communities: over 94% of beneficiaries said the programme had either a positive effect or a neutral effect on their personal relationship with the community. When asked about whether the programme created any tensions among other households or in the community as a whole, 73% of respondents claimed there was no tension, while 26% said the programme did create some tension. There may also be broader, social impacts from the winterization programme: 73% of respondents believe families that received cash in the community are less likely to marry their daughters early; 84% of respondents believe families that received cash in the community are less likely to send their children to work

Self-reported measures of impact are encouraging, but have limited value: beneficiaries might claim the programme had a beneficial impact in the hopes of attracting more aid. The ideal way to measure impact for this programme would be to randomly select beneficiaries from a list of qualified households, and then compare their welfare to the qualified households that were not selected. Such a randomized control trial, however, was not deemed feasible due to logistical, security, and time constraints. Some idea of impact, however, can be estimated by comparing beneficiaries with households in the same communities that did not meet the threshold for aid. This comparison underestimates the true impact of the programme because the aid was targeted towards the neediest households, whose welfare was lower at baseline than the comparison households. As such, the impact of the programme is likely higher than the estimates presented below.

UNHCR’s winterization programme appears to have made a significant positive impact on households’ access to heating. Beneficiaries possess an average of 8 blankets, compared to 7.1 blankets among comparison households. Further, 41% of beneficiaries reported having sufficient fuel for the winter, compared to 33% of comparison households. The increased access to heating is at least partially due to the funds distributed by UNHCR: 63% of beneficiaries reported using the funds to purchase fuel and/or a heating device. Beneficiary households were more than twice as likely to spend at least half of their income on heating than comparison households (39% versus 14%). A majority of both groups rely on wood for heating (51%), followed by gas (33%).

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### KEY INDICATOR:

Number of households that demonstrate improved levels of resilience in coping with winter

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**98%** of beneficiaries self-report an improved ability to cope with winter (53,223 households).

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**41%** of beneficiaries (22,267 households) report having sufficient fuel for winter.


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Beneficiaries were **24%** more likely to have sufficient fuel for winter than comparison households (4,345 households), despite the higher welfare of comparison households before aid distribution.

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
### HOUSEHOLD WELFARE

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
### EARLY MARRIAGE

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### CHILDREN WORKING

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HOUSEHOLD WELFARE

USE OF FUNDS





FIGURE 2. HOUSEHOLDS HAVING TO RELY ON COPING MECHANISMS TO SURVIVE WINTER




The broader effects of UNHCR assistance on household welfare are promising, but less clear. Figure 2 depicts the percentage of beneficiary and comparison households that had to rely on different coping mechanisms. Beneficiary households are slightly less likely to reduce food consumption, rely on child labor, or have an additional adult join the labor force. These differences

are not statistically significant due to the relatively small sample size, but these impacts would be worth exploring in future studies. Figure 3 looks deeper at food security and charts the number of days in the past week that households have experienced various forms of food insecurity. Consistent with the previous figure, beneficiary households are less likely to reduce adult consumption

or limit portion size. Beneficiaries are more likely to eat less expensive food than comparison households. Again, these differences are not statistically significant due to sample size, but they are promising because comparison households had higher average welfare at baseline. Beneficiaries were equally likely to borrow funds for winter as the comparison households (54% versus 53%).

The beneficiaries were able to make the most of the received aid. Some 96% of beneficiaries reported no challenges with spending the cash. The most common challenge was high prices, which limited the amount of goods the beneficiaries could purchase (reported by 2% of beneficiaries). Only 1% of beneficiaries reported difficulties exchanging the currency. The blankets and other in-kind goods were used within the household: less than 1% of beneficiaries reported selling any of the goods received. For all nine households that reported selling aid items, the households explained that they sold the goods because they needed cash.<sup>25</sup>

FIGURE 3. DURING THE PAST WEEK, HOW MANY DAYS HAS ANYONE IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD DONE THE FOLLOWING... ?



25. The alternative choice for why the household sold goods was “I did not need the items”.

## 5. Discussion: Efficiency, Value for Money, and Future Improvements

Survey data and key informant interviews suggest that, in terms of distributing cash and other items to vulnerable households, the winterization programme was efficient. Field staff were able to assess and distribute goods to over 50,000 households in a short period of time with virtually no corruption. This assistance demonstrably improved the welfare of these households during a critical time of year. The programme also improved on previous years by (a) reaching more areas before they became inaccessible due to snowfall; and (b) creating more effective procedures to identify and assess potential beneficiaries, especially through the use of digital survey tools.<sup>26</sup> UNHCR staff agreed that, given the current structure, the programme delivers good value for money.

UNHCR staff offered several recommendations for improving the impact and efficiency of the programme. First, the amount of assistance could be calibrated to the severity of winter and the market conditions in the specific location, keeping in mind the need for stringent accountability procedures.<sup>27</sup> Households in more temperate climates may not need \$200 for heating supplies, while households in Badakhshan and other areas of the north may require more than \$200 to cope with winter. Market prices and political factors also play a role in the value for money. For example, less than a quarter of beneficiaries in Helmand, Nimroz, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Badghis, Takhar, and Nangarhar provinces reported having sufficient fuel for winter, despite relatively mild winters in some of these locations. By contrast, 91% of beneficiaries in Paktya and 83% of beneficiaries in Daykundi reported having sufficient fuel, despite the harsh winters in these provinces.

Second, the assessment process should begin earlier than August and be conducted entirely through digital survey tools such as tablets.<sup>28</sup> Although the 2017-2018 winterization programme reached more areas than the previous year, field staff were still unable to distribute aid in certain areas because of snowfall. According to the survey data, approximately 7% of intended beneficiaries were excluded from the programme for this reason. Beginning the assessment exercise two months earlier

would provide enough time for teams to complete the aid distribution before heavy snowfall in the northern provinces. And shifting to digital survey tools, where information is collected on tablets or smartphones rather than paper, will help teams complete the assessment faster and with higher accuracy. Implementing this recommendation would require additional equipment, training, and support for field teams. Most teams, however, are already using these tools, so only a modest investment should be required.<sup>29</sup>

Third, winter comes every year so the programme should help households achieve long-term resilience, in addition to meeting their short-term needs.<sup>30</sup> For example, households could receive durable shelter improvements that provide better insulation and/or solar-assisted heating.<sup>31</sup> Ideally, the government of Afghanistan should eventually assume responsibility for the welfare of the population. UNHCR could help this process by incorporating winterization into national planning discussions with donors and government, and by working to increase government support and preparedness.<sup>32</sup> For the foreseeable future, however, vulnerable households in Afghanistan will continue to rely on UNHCR and other actors to provide life-saving aid during the winter months.

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26. For example, see “UNHCR Mazar-i-Sharif: Challenges and Lessons Learned from Winterization Exercise, 2015-2016”, and “AFGHANISTAN Emergency Shelter and NFI Cluster Winterization Strategy 2017”. Also key informant interview 25 June 2018.

27. Key informant interview 25 June 2018.

28. Although all teams were expected to use tablets for the assessment, some teams continued to collect information on paper. Key informant interviews 25 June 2018, 10 July 2018b, 20 July 2018. Also see “UNHCR Winterization Strategy 2017 Concept Note.”

29. Key informant interview 25 June 2018.

30. Key informant interviews 25 June 2018, 10 July 2018a, 20 July 2018


31. Key informant interviews 25 June 2018, 10 July 2018a, 20 July 2018

32. Key informant interview, 25 June 2018.

# Donor Acknowledgments

UNHCR thanks the following donors for their support:

Australia | Canada | Denmark | European Commission - Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations  
Japan | Norway | Republic of Korea | United States of America



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From  
the People of Japan

