

101

Facts & Figures on the Syrian Refugee Crisis

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UNHCR

المفوضية السامية للأمم المتحدة لشؤون اللاجئين

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List of Acronyms

EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
ILO	International Labour Organization
LCRP	Lebanon Crisis Response Plan
PRS	Palestine Refugees from Syria
3RP	Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
WFP	World Food Programme

Introduction

“The figure of the ‘asylum seeker’, once prompting human compassion and spurring an urge to help, has been sullied and defiled, while the very idea of ‘asylum’, once a matter of civil and civilized pride, had been reclassified as a dreadful concoction of shameful naivety and criminal responsibility” argues the late Zygmunt Bauman in his book *Wasted Lives* (p.57).

Bauman eloquently tells us how refugees have become “unwanted” and seen in ways that everything “modern” society fears: those guilty in shaking our societies’ “certainty”. This is happening everywhere and in some instances live on TV: from North America to South Asia, from Central Europe to the Middle East.

The Syrian crisis, in its magnitude, intensity and protracted nature, has amplified a new wave of anti-immigrant and anti-refugee reactions and sentiments in Syria’s neighboring countries and in the Global North. It is the largest humanitarian tragedy and the biggest displacement crisis since World War II. Inside Syria, more than 6 million persons have been internally displaced, and more than 5 million have been displaced outside Syria, mostly in the neighboring countries of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. The rising anti-refugee and anti-Syrian sentiments are frequently fuelled by the use of half-truths and falsehoods to either exaggerate or generalize the impact of the refugees on host societies or the potential consequence of hosting them. The burden of Syrian refugees is exaggerated far beyond the realities, which is, admittedly, by no means a minor issue. This exaggeration starts with inflaming the demography-related phobia inherent in many host societies. We read and hear dubious figures of Syrian annual births with all its ensuing demography-related panic. We also read some observers making false claims that Syrian refugee men are trained to use arms and are infiltrating their host societies as terrorists, including through references to ‘ sleeper cells disguised as refugees’. Maintaining security,

as well as the exaggeration of the economic burden of the presence of refugees, have been the backbone of the prevailing narrative against refugees.

Within such heated debates, the status of the refugee as someone forcibly displaced due to persecution, conflict and fear of harm tends to be forgotten. The issue here is not only omitting, intentionally or not, the causes of displacement but the impact of that on the legal protection of refugees in host countries. It is worth recalling the universal definition of a refugee, set out in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, as someone “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”. This definition is declaratory, meaning that a person is a refugee as soon as he or she fulfils the criteria of the definition, even prior to a formal refugee status determination. Even when countries are not signatories of the 1951 Convention, refugees are entitled to protection from *refoulement*, as a principle, embedded in customary international law, and derived from universal as well as regional human rights norms. For example, the principle of *non-refoulement* has been unanimously adopted by the General Assembly in 1967 in the United Nations Declaration on Territorial Asylum, which stipulates that: “No person referred to in Article 1, paragraph 1, shall be subjected to measures such as rejection at the frontier or, if s/he has already entered the territory in which s/he seeks asylum, expulsion or compulsory return to any State where s/he may be subjected to persecution”. Overall, the principle of *non-refoulement* encompasses any measure attributable to a State which could have the effect of returning an asylum-seeker or refugee to the frontiers of territories where his or her life or freedom would be threatened, or where he or she would risk persecution or other serious human rights violations. This includes rejection at the frontier, interception and indirect *refoulement*.

Why this book? It is our role as engaged academics and action-oriented researchers, including the activists in the academy, to dispel the myths around the Syrian displacement crisis. Of course, by taking the debate into scientific evidence, we are by no means attempting to dilute the burden or impact of displacement on, first and foremost the refugees themselves, or on host societies and countries. On the contrary, we aim at contextualizing the crisis, nuancing its impacts, highlighting some positive contributions of refugees, as rare as they may seem, and informing the debate. In the age of post-truths, we underscore the centrality of evidence and of facts to inform the public and guide the debate.

'101 Facts & Figures on the Syrian Refugee Crisis' builds on the work that we commenced in spring 2017, to communicate through social media and other platforms key facts and figures on the Syrian refugee crisis, which was meant to inform the discussion and counter falsehoods and half-truths. We based our facts on available studies and reports produced by credible scholars, universities, think tanks, governmental agencies, UN agencies and NGOs. For each fact, we checked the source and the methods applied to reach the figure or evidence. We validate it by looking at other sources that tackled the same subject, and we contextualized it with the socio-economic and geographic realities. We looked at many instances at the policy and practice relevance of the selected facts, and the potential impact on decision-making.

In an era of re-emerging nationalism and populism, we believe in our ethical and humanitarian obligation to stand with those forcibly displaced individuals and families. In an age flaunted by some as post-truths, we adhere to showing the facts and evidence.

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Bauman, Z. (2014). *Wasted Lives*. Hoboken: Wiley.

Weis, P. (1995). *The Refugee Convention, 1951*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

I. Syria's Displacement Crisis in Numbers

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50%

of Syria's population has been displaced since the beginning of the Syrian conflict

More than 50% of Syrians have been displaced since the beginning of the conflict in 2011. This figure includes Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (6.1 million), Syrian refugees fleeing Syria (over 6 million), and Syrians migrating to other countries. As the violence in Syria has not ceased yet, the number of displaced Syrians is continuing to grow. Amid such a widespread displacement, the country has descended into poverty. By the end of 2017, 69% of the Syrian population was living in extreme poverty (less than US \$1.9 per day). As for the unemployment rate, it was estimated to be 53%, rising to levels as high as 75% among youth (15-24 years) in 2015. Overall, an estimated 2.3 million livelihoods have been lost as a consequence of the crisis. The crisis in Syria should be considered first and foremost a humanitarian crisis.

Sources:

UNDP. (2016). About Syria. Retrieved from undp.org: <http://www.sy.undp.org/content/syria/en/home/countryinfo.html>

UN OCHA. (2017). 2018 humanitarian needs overview: Syrian Arab Republic. Retrieved from reliefweb: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018_syr_hno_english.pdf

6.1 million

Syrians are internally displaced inside their own country as of September 2017

6.1 million is the number of IDPs in Syria, as of September 2017. Of this number, 12% are residing in last resort sites, such as planned camps, informal settlements, transit centres and collective centres including schools, residential buildings, and warehouses. Almost every community in Syria has taken in displaced persons. The internal displacement phenomenon has strained the economy of these communities and contributed to the high poverty rate in the country. Pressure has also been enormous on the already limited available resources, infrastructure, and economic opportunities. For Syrians in their new communities, finding employment is a real struggle as Syria faces an unemployment rate of 53%, as of 2015.

Source:

UN OCHA. (2017). 2018 humanitarian needs overview: Syrian Arab Republic. Retrieved from reliefweb: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018_syr_hno_english.pdf

5.3 million

is the number of children who are in need of assistance within Syria

Out of the 13.1 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in Syria, 5.3 million are children between 0 and 17 years old. Their physical security, basic rights, dignity, living conditions or livelihoods have been threatened or disrupted as the current levels of basic services, goods, and protection are inadequate to re-establish normal living conditions. Furthermore, of the 13.1 million people in need, almost 3 million are in hard-to-reach areas, and almost 420,000 are in United Nations (UN)-declared besieged areas. In some of these areas, the access by the UN and partners and the consequent provision of needed basic services is very limited. Neighboring medical facilities and schools have also been targeted and destroyed. As a result, children are often being deprived from education and needed services. Moreover, their proximity to violence is creating significant psychological trauma that requires psychosocial support and interventions. The situation of internally displaced children in Syria should be given particular attention as the epicenter of the crisis is in the country where all the violence has started.

Source:

UN OCHA. (2017). 2018 humanitarian needs overview: Syrian Arab Republic. Retrieved from reliefweb: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018_syr_hno_english.pdf

6,550

was the number of Syrians internally displaced every day between January and September 2017

Hostilities remain the principal driver of human suffering in Syria, presenting a direct threat to human life in many parts of the country. Nearly 6,550 people were displaced every day between January and September 2017. Sudden displacement often forces families to leave behind most of their belongings. With very limited resources, Syrians inside their country have no choice but downgrading their living conditions to live in cheaper and overcrowded settlements and shelters. Other IDPs who tried to move out of the country have been displaced two or three times after being denied entry on the borders of neighboring countries. They have been stranded in inhumane conditions or forced to return to unsafe areas back in Syria.

Source:

UN OCHA. (2017). 2018 humanitarian needs overview: Syrian Arab Republic. Retrieved from reliefweb: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018_syr_hno_english.pdf

90%

of Syrians who returned to their places of residence up until November 2017 were IDPs

721,000 IDPs have reportedly returned to their areas of origin as of November 2017, representing around 90% of individual spontaneous returns during 2017. This number is expected to further increase throughout the years, provided the situation in Syria improves. However, major challenges hinder the process of returning to original places of residence. Insecurity and violence disrupt the freedom of movement for individuals. Additionally, there is a pervasive destruction of shelter, services and livelihood opportunities across the country. In light of these issues and as a response to the increasing number of returns, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will work towards supporting the initial reintegration of IDPs by further expanding outreach capacities, promoting community-based initiatives, supporting shelter and livelihood programs, and rehabilitating infrastructures.

Sources:

UNHCR. (2017, June). Flash update: Syrian refugee & IDP returns. Retrieved from data.unhcr.org: data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=13658

UN OCHA. (2017). 2018 humanitarian needs overview: Syrian Arab Republic. Retrieved from reliefweb: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018_syr_hno_english.pdf

9,406,855

is the number of IDPs in the Middle East

In the Middle East, the Syrian war along with pre-existing conflicts in Iraq and Yemen has been inciting the phenomenon of internal displacement at an unprecedented rate. In addition to the 9,406,855 IDPs, there are also 3,633,009 returned IDPs in the region. Syria has the largest population with 6.1 million IDPs. Iraq comes second with over 3.6 million people internally displaced since the beginning of 2014. As for Yemen, the situation has been deteriorating markedly for the already existing 2 million IDPs since 2016. IDPs represent a vulnerable population that is struggling to access humanitarian assistance as surrounding violence is impeding related efforts, especially in hard to reach areas.

Sources:

UNHCR. (2017, February 21). Yemen's brutal conflict pushing one million displaced to return to danger. Retrieved from [unhcr.org: http://www.unhcr.org/afr/news/press/2017/2/58ac0b170/yemens-brutal-conflict-pushing-million-displaced-return-danger-joint-unhcr.html](http://www.unhcr.org/afr/news/press/2017/2/58ac0b170/yemens-brutal-conflict-pushing-million-displaced-return-danger-joint-unhcr.html)

UNHCR. (2017, November). 2018 planning summary: Subregion: Middle East. Retrieved from [unhcr.org: http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/pdfsummaries/GA2018-MiddleEast-eng.pdf](http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/pdfsummaries/GA2018-MiddleEast-eng.pdf)

UNHCR (2017, December 20). Global focus: Iraq. Retrieved from [reporting.unhcr.org: http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2547#_ga=2.7198898.1876650439.1513608066-163897103.1509627868](http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2547#_ga=2.7198898.1876650439.1513608066-163897103.1509627868)

5,456,108

is the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and North Africa as of December 2017

The Syrian war has caused the largest mass displacement since World War II. As of December 2017, 5,456,108 displaced refugees found refuge in neighboring host countries with around 3,400,195 in Turkey, 997,905 in Lebanon, 654,903 in Jordan, 246,974 in Iraq, and 126,027 in Egypt. In addition, more than 30,000 Syrians are registered in North Africa. Between April 2011 and September 2017, 987,571 asylum applications were documented in Europe. Of the total asylum applications, 64% were in Germany and Sweden, 20% in Hungary, Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark and Bulgaria, and 16% in other European countries.

Sources:

Inter-Agency Coordination. (2016). 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2017-2018 in response to the Syria crisis. Retrieved from <http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/ga2017/Syria%203RP%20Regional%20Strategic%20Overview%202017-2018.pdf?v2>

UNHCR. (2016). Regional summaries: Middle East and North Africa. Retrieved from http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/gr2016/pdf/07_MENA.pdf

Inter-Agency Coordination. (2017). Syria regional refugee response: Europe: Syrian asylum applications. Retrieved from Inter-agency information sharing portal: <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/asylum.php>

UN OCHA. (2017). 2018 humanitarian needs overview: Syrian Arab Republic. Retrieved from reliefweb: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018_syr_hno_english.pdf

UNHCR. (2017, December). Syria Regional Refugee Response data portal. Retrieved from data.unhcr.org. <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php>

2,485,779

is the number of Syrian refugee children living in Syria's neighboring countries

Currently, there are 2,485,779 registered Syrian children living in Syria's neighboring countries. Turkey is hosting the largest number, followed by Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt. In these countries, assistance for refugees is mainly provided through the UN and its partners, and includes services related to basic needs, water and sanitation, child and social protection, health and nutrition, and education. When it comes to education, 43.5% of registered school-aged (5-17 years) refugee children in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt remained out of school as of July 2017. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) defines 'out-of-school' children as those who do not have access to a school in their community, do not enroll despite the availability of a school, enroll but later than they should have, enroll in schools that have poor facilities/no teachers, drop out of the education system, or enroll but do not attend school.

Sources:

UNICEF. (2015). Out-of-school children: What do we mean by Out of School Children (OoS)? Retrieved from [https://www.unicef.org/ghana/REALLY_SIMPLE_STATS_-_Issue_4\(1\).pdf](https://www.unicef.org/ghana/REALLY_SIMPLE_STATS_-_Issue_4(1).pdf)

UNICEF. (2017, September). Syria Crisis: September 2017 humanitarian results. Retrieved from <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14417>

UNHCR. (2017, October 8). Update: Durable solutions for Syrian refugees. Retrieved from <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14349>

73%

of registered refugees in Syria's neighboring countries are women and children as of December 2017

Of all Syrians registered by UNHCR in Syria's neighboring countries, 73% are women and children (as of December 2017). While the humanitarian response needs to encompass food, protection, water, and shelter in order to fulfil related needs, the provision of services related to reproductive, maternal and child health services shall always be considered. These services need to be tailored not only to address general health issues but also issues related to sexual and gender-based violence, mental health needs, and early pregnancies and marriage. In Syria's neighboring countries, governments have their own health care policies and are responding, with support of the international community, to the needs of Syrian women and children based on their contextualized responses. However, challenges remain in balancing these specific responses to the immediate basic needs of refugee women and children while investing in long-term human development.

Source:

UNHCR. (2017, December). Syria Regional Refugee Response data portal. Retrieved from data.unhcr.org. <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php>

80.9%

of registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon are women and children as of December 2017

In Lebanon, 80.9% of registered Syrian refugees are women and children (as of December 2017). Compounded with poverty, women and children are particularly exposed to many forms of physical, sexual and mental abuse throughout their attempt to survive. As such, ensuring protection from Sexual and Gender Based Violence is one of the key priorities of the humanitarian community. Current efforts are directed towards strengthening community-based interventions to ensure that protection is being offered. The protection sector working group that operates under the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) is closely coordinating with the relevant authorities and service providers to enhance timely and effective responses to the needs of women and children.

Source:

UNHCR. (2017, December). Syria Regional Refugee Response data portal, Lebanon. Retrieved from data.unhcr.org. <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122>

178,000

is the number of Syrian refugee children under 5 years old in Lebanon as of May 2017

There are approximately 178,000 Syrian refugee children under 5 years old in Lebanon (as of May 2017). Born in displacement, these children are particularly vulnerable to illness and malnutrition. The vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon in 2017 found that 34% of the surveyed children of this age group had been sick two weeks prior to the survey. The most common reported illnesses were fever (25%), followed by cough (25%) and diarrhea (12%). Refugee children are also at increased risk for malnutrition, as families must often reduce their daily meals to cope with poverty and food insecurity. It was reported that refugee children under the age of 5 were eating an average of only 2.4 meals per day. In addition, only 2% of children between 6-23 months were found to have a minimum acceptable diet with limited consumption of fruits, vegetables and protein. These health vulnerabilities of children under 5 years of age are putting them at a high risk of life-threatening diseases and death.

Sources:

UNICEF. (2017). Syria crisis: April 2017 humanitarian results. Retrieved from [unicef.org: https://www.unicef.org/appeals/files/UNICEF_Syria_Crisis_Situation_Report_April_2017.pdf](https://www.unicef.org/appeals/files/UNICEF_Syria_Crisis_Situation_Report_April_2017.pdf)

UNHCR, UNICEF, & WFP. (2017). Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon 2017. Retrieved from [data.unhcr.org: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762](http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762)

19%

of all households among Syrian refugee communities in Lebanon are female-headed

The vulnerability assessment study of Syrian refugees in Lebanon in 2017 found that approximately 44,000 of Syrian refugee households were headed by women, representing 19% of all Syrian households. In female-headed households, women were married but without their husband, while few were divorced or widowed. Many are also experiencing food insecurity, and are struggling to access enough food and to have a nutritious diet. In order to overcome food shortages and poverty, women may resort to harmful coping strategies such as incurring debt, reducing the number of daily meals, and in some cases, marrying off their children at early ages or pulling them out of school to work.

Source:

UNHCR, UNICEF, & WFP. (2017). Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon 2017. Retrieved from [data.unhcr.org: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762](http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762)

2%

of the European Union population are refugees and asylum-seekers

Refugees constitute between 7% and 8% of the global migrant population, and represent only 2% of the European Union (EU) population. The latter figure lies in stark contrast to the high presence of refugees in host countries in the Middle East, which are currently shouldering the largest burden of the Syrian crisis with much fewer resources. Therefore, European countries' rhetoric around refugees burdening their economies and societies as well as Europe's primary focus on helping refugees stay in their own region, does not signal solidarity with Syria's neighboring countries hosting the majority of the refugees. On a global scale, 86% of the world's refugees are in developing countries, and many are residing in communities that are already destitute. Responsibility sharing for refugees is fundamental.

Sources:

EU. (2017). Living in the EU. Retrieved from Europa.eu: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/figures/living_en

Haas, H. D. (2017, March 21). Myths of migration: Much of what we think we know is wrong. Retrieved from [spiegel.de: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/eight-myths-about-migration-and-refugees-explained-a-1138053.html](http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/eight-myths-about-migration-and-refugees-explained-a-1138053.html)

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2,005

visas were granted to Syrians by the United Kingdom in 2016, to join those with refugee status or humanitarian protection

Under the United Kingdom's national policy that gives refugees the right to reunite with their families, 2,005 Syrians were granted a visa to the United Kingdom in 2016. Many of these families travelled directly from besieged areas such as Aleppo. With thousands of refugees arriving each day since the onset of the conflict, the United Kingdom has experienced an increase in the number of refugees and asylum seekers. In 2015, the United Kingdom received 38,878 asylum applications. Despite common misperceptions that asylum seekers choose the United Kingdom in order to receive the generous state benefits, most are unaware of the welfare assistance which can amount to as little as £5 per day.

Sources:

ICare. (2016). Neighbours in need. Retrieved from <http://www.icare.uk.com/neighbours-in-need/>

Refugee Council. (May, 2016). Tell it like it is: The truth about refugees and asylum. Retrieved from [refugeecouncil.org.uk: https://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/assets/0003/7967/Tell_it_Like_it_is_May_2016.pdf](https://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/assets/0003/7967/Tell_it_Like_it_is_May_2016.pdf)

United Kingdom Government (2017). Migration Statistics 2016. Retrieved from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/immigration-statistics-october-to-december-2016/asylum>

10,000

is the number of missing unaccompanied refugee children in Europe

Europol reported that 10,000 unaccompanied refugee and migrant children have gone missing in Europe after registering with state authorities. This has raised fears that many might have fallen victim to sex trafficking or slave trades, or were exploited by criminal groups. In Italy alone, 5,000 refugee children have disappeared. Europol has reported that pre-existing crime syndicates involved in human trafficking were smuggling refugees into Europe and targeting children for sex trafficking and slavery. Unaccompanied refugee minors are by far the most vulnerable of the migrant population, often traveling alone to Greece before reuniting with family members located elsewhere across Europe. Some individuals have reportedly posed as uncles or other family relatives in order to kidnap refugee children from authorities. These occurrences are one of the main concerns regarding the migration crisis in Europe.

Sources:

Al Jazeera. (2016, January 31). More than 10,000 refugee children missing in Europe. Retrieved from <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/10000-refugee-children-missing-europe-160131164555450.html>

European Parliament. (2016, April 20). MEPs discuss fate of 10,000 refugee children that have gone missing. Retrieved from <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20160419STO23927/meps-discuss-fate-of-10-000-refugee-children-that-have-gone-missing>

The Guardian. (2016, January 30). 10,000 refugee children are missing, says Europol. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/30/fears-for-missing-child-refugees>

24,131

is the number of individuals that were intercepted by Land Forces at the Greek and Bulgarian land borders since the beginning of 2017

In light of the deteriorating security and economic situation in Syria's neighboring countries, refugees have undertaken the dangerous journey to Europe. Since the beginning of 2017, 24,131 individuals were intercepted by Land Forces at the Greek and Bulgarian land borders, with over 22,171 (91%) intercepted at the Greek land border since the beginning of the year. The largest group intercepted in 2017 continues to be Syrians. Apprehensions at Bulgaria-Turkey and Greece-Turkey borders totalled 3,436 in October 2017. Other refugees or migrants went missing or were found dead on the road. As of 31 October 2017, an estimated 2,811 people have died or went missing while trying to reach Europe by sea via the Mediterranean: One death for every 55 people crossing.

Source:

UNHCR. (2017, October). Europe Monthly Report. Retrieved from [unhcr.org](https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/60980):

<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/60980>

II. Losses in Human Development and Local Economy inside Syria

35

years' worth of human development progress has been lost in Syria as a result of the crisis

The war in Syria has undone 35 years' worth of progress in human development. Only four years after the conflict, Syria's Human Development Index dropped from the 113th to the 173th rank out of 187 countries, placing the country in the "low human development" country group. With more than 50% of the population displaced, 69% living in extreme poverty, and 53% unemployed, the conflict has had a devastating impact on Syria and its population. Furthermore, Syria's education and health infrastructures have been the target for damage. During 2015-2016, 45.2% of Syrian children had dropped out of school. The country's health index has also decreased by 30% compared to 2010. The impact has been detrimental, exposing all generations to severe economic, social, and human capital development problems. Preventing further decline in the human development of Syria shall be addressed while balancing immediate humanitarian needs with long-term development goals.

Sources:

UNDP. (2016). About Syria. Retrieved from undp.org: <http://www.sy.undp.org/content/syria/en/home/countryinfo.html>

UN OCHA. (2017). 2018 humanitarian needs overview: Syrian Arab Republic. Retrieved from reliefweb: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018_syr_hno_english.pdf

US \$254.7 billion

is the total economic loss in Syria by the end of 2015 as the result of the crisis

The brutality of the Syrian conflict has done an irreparable damage to the Syrian economy. With the deterioration of schools and hospitals, migration of teachers and health care workers, and worsening of public services, Syria has seen a rapid decline in jobs, domestic production, and a considerable increase in prices. The result has been a dramatic collapse of the country's economic performance. US \$254.7 billion is the total economic loss in Syria by the end of 2015. Consequences have been severe on household incomes and poverty rates, which have reached an unprecedented level.

Source:

Syrian Center for Policy Research. (2016, December). Forced dispersion: A demographic report on human status in Syria. Retrieved from [alnap.org: http://www.alnap.org/resource/23915](http://www.alnap.org/resource/23915)

87%

is the increase in the price of bread in Syria since the beginning of the crisis

While food prices remained relatively stable in the first few years of the conflict, reductions in government subsidies and depreciation in currency have caused an increase of 87% in the price of bread in public bakeries since early 2015. In addition, the escalation of violence has led to security threats that have increased the costs for traders and transporters. Subsequently, the transfer of wheat between surplus-producing zones to wheat-deficit zones has declined markedly and the reliance on international imports has increased. These disruptions in the wheat supply chain and trade have even resulted in an increase in bread prices in areas not directly affected by the conflict. Prices went up from 20 Syrian pounds per 1.5 kg of public bread in 2014 to 39 Syrian pounds in 2015. The price of bread in private bakeries saw a slightly smaller change in price with 66% increase.

Source:

FAO, & WFP. (2015, July 23). FAO/WFP crop and food security assessment mission to the Syrian Arab Republic. Retrieved from [wfp.org: http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp276608.pdf?_ga=2.176676003.785642753.1498804635-1277979439.1496741698](http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp276608.pdf?_ga=2.176676003.785642753.1498804635-1277979439.1496741698)

III. Living Conditions of Displaced Syrians

Shelter	36
Localities	40
Poverty	45

8%

of all Syrian refugees in host countries live in camps

Only 8% of all Syrian refugees live in camps. Camp-based refugees are proportionally the largest in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq (37%), followed by Jordan (21%) and Turkey (6%). In Egypt and Lebanon, formal refugee camps do not exist. Around 90% of Syrian refugees and IDPs are concentrated in urban centers within Syria and its neighboring countries, searching for better access to economic opportunities and social services. Yet, despite all efforts by the international community, the integration of refugees into urban centers requires increased investments in host communities particularly because refugees mainly reside in impoverished areas that already suffer from underdevelopment and infrastructural challenges.

Sources:

UNDP, ILO, & WFP. (2017). Jobs make the difference: Expanding economic opportunities for Syrian refugees and host communities. Retrieved from <https://www.jobsmakethedifference.org/full-report>

UNHCR (2017). Syria Regional Refugee Response data portal. Retrieved from data.unhcr.org:

<http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php>

750,000

is the number of IDPs in Syria who live in last resort sites

Finding a suitable shelter is complicated for IDPs as displacement continues to manifest. Nowadays, 750,000 IDPs are residing in last resort sites, such as collective centers, informal settlements, planned camps, or reception and transit centres. There are 2,631 collective centers, generally in urban or semi-urban environments. These centers are mainly public facilities such as schools (33%), residential buildings (15%), warehouses (8%), and municipal buildings (8%) that have been converted into collective housing. The majority of them also suffer from overcrowding and infrastructural issues as well as insufficient access to water and sanitation services. As for the remaining population of IDPs, they reside in almost 3,500 informal settlements, planned camps, or reception and transit centres, where they rely on humanitarian assistance to meet basic needs. By living in substandard and insecure shelters and settlements, many vulnerable IDPs struggle and might be subject to secondary displacement.

Source:

UN OCHA. (2017). 2018 humanitarian needs overview: Syrian Arab Republic. Retrieved from reliefweb: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018_syr_hno_english.pdf

17%

of Syrian refugees in Lebanon live in informal tented settlements

17% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon are living in informal tented settlements. Informal settlements are most common in the Baalbek-Hermel (50%) and Bekaa (38%) regions. These settlements are mainly created from timber and plastic which largely fail to meet the minimum humanitarian standards. They also suffer from overcrowding, lack of sanitation facilities, and dangerous structural infrastructures. Under such conditions, refugees do feel insecure and in a constant fear of not being able to find a new shelter.

Sources:

Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon. (2017, May 15). Shelter 2017: Quarter 1 dashboard. Retrieved from <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/57028>

UNHCR, UNICEF, & WFP. (2017). Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon 2017. Retrieved from [data.unhcr.org: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762](http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762)

3 times

is the increase in rent prices in Jordan's border areas with Syria and in places of high refugee density

As only 23% of the Syrian refugee population in Jordan resides in camp settings, the demand for housing has witnessed a sharp increase. Rent prices have increased 3 times in border areas with Syria, and in places of high refugee density. As a response, most incoming refugees are sharing housing with others in order to afford the high prices incited by the high demand. In Northern Jordan, the communities who hosted the greatest amount of Syrian refugees have been hit the hardest by the economic decline, and have also been displaced. Increases in the rent prices and the resulting consequences have exacerbated the growing tensions between Syrian refugees and their Jordanian host communities. While Jordanians were initially welcoming and sympathetic to Syrian refugees at the onset of the conflict, competition over international aid and waning resources has been a trigger to resentment towards the displaced.

Source:

Achilli, L., Yassin, N., & Erdoğan, M. M. (2017, January). Neighboring host-countries' policies for Syrian refugees: The cases of Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. IEMed Paper No.19. Retrieved from <http://www.iemed.org/publicacions-es/historic-de-publicacions/papersiemed/19.-neighbouring-host-countries2019-policies-for-syrian-refugees-the-cases-of-jordan-lebanon-and-turkey>

420,000

is the number of Syrians living in besieged areas inside Syria

The situation of the 420,000 Syrians living in the 10 UN-declared besieged areas in Syria is especially precarious. Surrounded by militant actors and impeded humanitarian aid, access to vital supplies and services such as health care, clean water, sanitation, and education is very limited. Besieged populations are currently suffering severely from malnutrition and waterborne as well as communicable diseases. Their attempts to better their conditions in search of food and security has also not been possible with the higher incidences of violence. In 2016, almost 20% of airstrikes and 37% of explosive barrel incidents carried out in Syria were taking place in besieged locations. Without a political solution, the situation will continue to deteriorate.

Sources:

UN OCHA. (2016, December). 2017 humanitarian needs overview: Syrian Arab Republic. Retrieved from reliefweb.int: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2017_Syria_hno_161205.pdf

UN OCHA. (2017). 2018 humanitarian needs overview: Syrian Arab Republic. Retrieved from reliefweb: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018_syr_hno_english.pdf

251

are the localities in Lebanon where 67% of the poorest Lebanese live and where 87% of Syrian refugees are hosted

In Lebanon, the same areas that are home to the most impoverished Lebanese are hosting the vast majority of Syrian refugees. 87% of Syrian refugees and 67% of poorest Lebanese are living in the 251 most vulnerable cadasters of the country. These areas characterize the geography of poverty in Lebanon, and were already marked by poverty, youth unemployment, and high demand for basic services prior to the crisis. The Syrian crisis has put more strains on these issues especially that public institutions have limited capacities to deal with the vulnerabilities of Lebanese and Syrian communities alike. For instance, municipalities which are the first responders, main service providers, and guardians of security in these disadvantaged areas were already overburdened before the crisis and are still struggling to deal with the situation.

Sources:

AKTIS. (2016). Impact evaluation report: Lebanon host communities support project. Retrieved from [unhcr.org: data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=11330](http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=11330)

UNDP. (2017). Lebanon stabilization and recovery programme 2017. Retrieved from [undp.org: http://www.lb.undp.org/content/lebanon/en/home/library/Response_to_the_Syrian_Crisis/Lebanon-Stabilization-and-Recovery-Programme-2017.html](http://www.lb.undp.org/content/lebanon/en/home/library/Response_to_the_Syrian_Crisis/Lebanon-Stabilization-and-Recovery-Programme-2017.html)

330,000

is the number of displaced Syrians who live in camps or informal settlements along the Turkish border

Since Syria's international borders were effectively closed in 2016, the prospect of leaving the country through commercial air travels has turned grim. As an alternative, Syrians have been seeking refuge in neighboring countries through displacement across borders. Yet, the process has not been easy. In the case of Turkey, for example, a very large number of internally displaced Syrians were stranded on the Syrian side of the border during the opening of the Turkish border. Currently, there are 330,000 displaced Syrians living in camps or informal settlements along the Turkish border in Northern Syria. Left with "last resort" sites, they are experiencing poor living conditions in settlements that are often overcrowded and lacking sufficient water and proper sanitation facilities.

Sources:

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. (2017). Syria: Country information. Retrieved from [internal-displacement.org: http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/syria/](http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/syria/)

30%

of Syrian refugees in Lebanon live in poor urban neighborhoods

In Lebanon, 30% of Syrian refugees reside in poor urban neighborhoods that were already densely populated prior to the crisis, creating issues of overcrowding. In only one year, the share of Syrian refugees living in overcrowded conditions increased from 27% in 2016 to 34% in 2017. Nearly 46% of Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS), who often settle in existing Palestinian camps, are experiencing overcrowding. The influx of displaced Syrians into poor urban neighborhoods has further deteriorated the already poor living conditions and placed increasing strain on the existing infrastructures. As a consequence, tensions between these two communities had been increasing. Humanitarian actors shall always consider providing aid to both Syrian refugees and their hosts residing in the same poor urban areas.

Sources:

UN, & Government of Lebanon. (2017, January). Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020. Retrieved from <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Lebanon-Crisis-Response-Plan-2017-2020.pdf>

UNHCR, UNICEF, & WFP. (2017). Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon 2017. Retrieved from [data.unhcr.org: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762](http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762)

50,000

is the number of people stranded in dire conditions on Syria's southeast border with Jordan as of September 2017

Approximately 50,000 people, 80% being women and children, are living in makeshift settlements in Rukban on Syria's southeast border with Jordan (as of September 2017). This number includes around 4,500 individuals evacuated from the Hadalat settlement in September after shifts in territorial control and increase of hostilities, in addition to hundreds of people fleeing southwards from Deir ez-Zor. These refugees became desperately trapped in a “no man's land” in the middle of the desert with restricted access to critical food supplies, food distributions, and health services. Without sufficient access to life-sustaining basic resources and services, they are living in starvation and sickness. Assessments done in July 2017 showed a rapidly deteriorating situation with increasing rates of basic infections and over 70% of children suffering from diarrhea.

Sources:

Amnesty International. (2016). Syria-Jordan border: 75,000 refugees trapped in desert no man's land in dire conditions. Retrieved from Amnesty.org: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/09/syria-jordan-border-75000-refugees-trapped-in-desert-no-mans-land-in-dire-conditions/?utm_content=bufferdbc2e&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer

UN OCHA. (2017). 2018 humanitarian needs overview: Syrian Arab Republic. Retrieved from reliefweb.int: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018_syr_hno_english.pdf

US \$798

is the average debt of Syrian refugee households in Lebanon

87% of Syrian refugee households are borrowing money or receiving credit with an average debt of US \$798. Although in debt, over half of these households are living below the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB), the metric that determines the amount needed to survive and meet lifesaving needs during displacement. The accumulation of debt among Syrian households has led some to engage in negative coping strategies that diminish their assets, and deteriorate their livelihoods. These strategies include selling household items, productive assets, lands or housing owned in Syria. Child labor is another harmful coping mechanism that many refugee households have turned to in order to cover basic expenses. Although only 2.3% of surveyed households reported children working under 14 years of age, it was reported that 20% of adolescents aged between 15 and 17 years were involved in different forms of labor.

Source:

UNHCR, UNICEF, & WFP. (2017). Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon 2017. Retrieved from [data.unhcr.org: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762](http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762)

58%

of Syrian refugee households in Lebanon live in extreme poverty

58% of Syrian refugee households in Lebanon have monthly expenditures less than the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB), meaning that they cannot meet their basic needs for survival. They live below the extreme poverty line, and have less than US \$2.87 per person per day. In total, 76% of Syrian refugee households live below the poverty line of US \$3.84 per person per day. In addition, two thirds of Syrian refugees adopt crisis and emergency coping strategies, such as selling household goods, productive assets and housing or land, or withdrawing children from school.

Source:

UNHCR, UNICEF, & WFP. (2017). Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon 2017. Retrieved from data.unhcr.org: <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762>

44%

of monthly expenditures of Syrian refugee households in Lebanon is spent on food

Food accounted for 44% of monthly expenditures of Syrian refugee households. The second largest household expenditure is rent (18%), followed by health (11%). The vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon showed that refugees are spending less every year with per capita monthly expenditures of US \$98, a drop of US \$6 compared to 2016, signifying that households are having fewer resources.

Source:

UNHCR, UNICEF, & WFP. (2017). Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon 2017. Retrieved from data.unhcr.org: <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762>

90%

of Palestine Refugees from Syria who were displaced to Lebanon are below the poverty line

By being exposed to the severe consequences of displacement twice, the impact of being double refugees on Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) has been immense as this community faces greater uncertainties in terms of obtaining a legal status, and accessing any form of employment. As a consequence, 90% of PRS are now living below the poverty line, 52.5% are unemployed, and 95% are food insecure. With diminished living standards, more PRS have been risking the dangerous migration to third countries. The PRS population has dropped from 41,413 in December 2014 to nearly 32,000 in December 2016.

Sources:

UN, & Government of Lebanon. (2017, January). Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020. Retrieved from <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Lebanon-Crisis-Response-Plan-2017-2020.pdf>

UNRWA. (2017). 2017 Syrian regional crisis emergency appeal. Retrieved from [unrwa.com: https://www.unrwa.org/resources/emergency-appeals/syria-emergency-appeal-2017](https://www.unrwa.org/resources/emergency-appeals/syria-emergency-appeal-2017)

UNRWA. (2017). PRS in Lebanon. Retrieved from [unrwa.org: https://www.unrwa.org/prs-lebanon](https://www.unrwa.org/prs-lebanon)

96%

of Palestinian refugee families from Syria in Lebanon reported UNRWA's cash support as their main source of income

In Lebanon, 96% of Palestinian refugee families from Syria rely on cash support from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) as their main source of income as of June 2016. This percentage has rapidly increased from 88% in January 2016. UNRWA's cash support is targeting the entire community of PRS. Each household is receiving a monthly cash support of US \$100, and an additional US \$27 for each family member. UNRWA is also supporting PRS with other essential humanitarian aid related to education and health services. However, the agency is currently facing deep budget cuts, which might severely affect its ability to cover the needs of this vulnerable community, putting it at the highest risks of poverty and insecurity.

Sources:

UNRWA. (2017). 2017 Syrian regional crisis emergency appeal. Retrieved from [unrwa.org: https://www.unrwa.org/resources/emergency-appeals/syria-emergency-appeal-2017](https://www.unrwa.org/resources/emergency-appeals/syria-emergency-appeal-2017)

UNRWA. (2017). PRS in Lebanon. Retrieved from [unrwa.org: https://www.unrwa.org/prs-lebanon](https://www.unrwa.org/prs-lebanon)

IV. Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Host Countries

74%

of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, aged 15 years and older, lack legal residency permits

Only 26% of Syrian refugees aged 15 and older have legal residency. The vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in 2017 revealed that only 19% of Syrian refugee households have legal residency permits for all of their members, a continued decline from 58% in 2014, 28% in 2015 and 21% in 2016. The lack of legal residency leaves refugees exposed to an increased risk of arrest, hinders their ability to register their marriages and births, and makes it difficult for them to work and to access public services.

The US \$200 residency renewal fee was cited as the largest barrier to obtaining legal residency. Yet, in February/March 2017, an announcement from the General Security Office (GSO) was issued to waive the fee for Syrian refugees who were registered with UNHCR before 1/1/2015 and who had not renewed their residency in 2015 or 2016 based on tourism, sponsorship, property ownership or tenancy. The impact of this waiver should be clearer in next year's vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees. Nevertheless, despite the fee waiver, refugees reported challenges in renewal due to inconsistencies in the implementation of the waiver and limited capacity of the GSO to process a large number of applications.

Source:

UNHCR, UNICEF, & WFP. (2017). Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon 2017. Retrieved from data.unhcr.org: <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762>

0.5%

of the working age refugee population in Lebanon have work permits

In Lebanon, employers need to apply for work permits for their workers. Yet, the Lebanese government issues a work permit only if the Syrian refugee has a residency permit. Residency permits, on the other hand, have not been easy to acquire due to the obstacles that Syrians continue to face throughout the process, particularly for those who fall outside of the fee waiver categories. The vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in 2017 has found that only 26% of Syrian refugees over 15 years of age have legal residency. All these complications have made it difficult for employers to submit work permit applications for their employees. By 2017, applications have only been submitted for 0.5% of the working age refugee population in Lebanon.

Sources:

UNDP, ILO, & WFP. (2017). Jobs make the difference: Expanding economic opportunities for Syrian refugees and host communities. Retrieved from <https://www.jobsmakethedifference.org/full-report>

UNHCR, UNICEF, & WFP. (2017). Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon 2017. Retrieved from [data.unhcr.org: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762](http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762)

52%

of married Syrian refugees in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon answered a survey that they lack any marriage document

In a survey of 580 refugee households representing 3,000 Syrians from Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, 52% of respondents reported that they do not have any form of marriage documentation. The lack of the marriage documentation can be the result of many situations that fall into one of three categories as the following: 1) the couple did not register their marriage in Syria, 2) the couple registered their marriage but lost their documents when fleeing Syria, or 3) the couple got married in the host country and did not register their marriage. The consequences can be severe as the unavailability of this document impedes the birth registration of children and puts them at a high risk of becoming stateless. Women might also not be able to access marital properties when their husbands are absent or missing. Legal identity is inextricably linked to human rights, and thus, facilitating the access to legal documentation is essential for protecting the rights of refugees.

Source:

Norwegian Refugee Council. (2017, January 26). Syrian refugees' right to legal identity: Implications for return. Retrieved from: <https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/briefing-notes/icla/final-syrian-refugees-civil-documentation-briefing-note-21-12-2016.pdf>

83%

of Syrian children born in Lebanon since the beginning of the crisis are lacking birth registration

Syrian children born during displacement in Lebanon may be at risk of becoming stateless. UNHCR has estimated that 83% out of the 130,000 children born in Lebanon to Syrian refugees since 2011 do not have a legal birth registration. Barriers to acquire a civil status registration are many but primarily include a lengthy procedure, lack of refugees' awareness about the requirements for registration as well as a lack of proof of marriage or legal stay documents that they usually do not possess after being displaced. Registering a child becomes even more difficult after the age of one year as late birth registration requires lengthy and expensive court procedures. Without a birth registration, individuals face significant restrictions in exercising their rights to legal identity, nationality, freedom of movement, and in accessing education, health services, and employment.

Source:

UNHCR, UNICEF, & WFP. (2017). Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon 2017. Retrieved from data.unhcr.org: <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762>

37,621

is the number of Syrian refugee children born in Lebanon in 2016

It has been estimated that 37,621 Syrian refugee children were born in Lebanon in 2016. The average family size of Syrian refugee households in Lebanon is 4.3. Birth registration of children of Syrian refugees that are born in exile depends largely on the legal and policy frameworks of the host country. In Lebanon, the birth registration procedure starts by obtaining a birth notification from the birth attendant as well as a birth certificate from the local leader, and ends by approaching the Personal Status Department of the relevant governorate to register the Syrian newborn. The process is considered onerous for all foreigners, and particularly challenging for refugees. It is estimated that, since the beginning of the crisis, only 17% of refugees were able to complete the required steps to register the birth of their children. Without birth registration, children might become vulnerable to abuse and exploitation, including human trafficking, early marriage, illegal adoption, and may have difficulties proving their right to nationality in the future. They can also experience difficulties in accessing public services, including education and health care. Therefore, streamlining birth registration procedures as well as providing information and legal services to Syrian parents is crucial to mitigate the risk of statelessness and ensure the protection of newly born Syrian children.

Sources:

Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon. (2017). Health: Jan-December dashboard. Retrieved from <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=12880>

Norwegian Refugee Council. (2015). Birth registration update: The challenges of birth registration in Lebanon to refugees from Syria. Retrieved from nrc.no: <https://www.nrc.no/resources/reports/the-challenges-of-birth-registration-in-lebanon-for-refugees-from-syria/>

**V. Social
Relations
between
Syrian
Refugees
and Host
Communities**

78%

of Lebanese taking part in a 2016 survey answered that they had 'normal', 'good' or 'very good' relation with Syrians

78% of Lebanese taking part in a 2016 survey answered that they have 'normal', 'good', or 'very good' relations with Syrians. Only 18.7% reported to have 'no relation'. By comparing these results to a similar survey done in 2015, minor improvements were found. Yet, respondents who reported to have 'no relation' with Syrians were much more in 2015 (31%). The difference in the percentages might suggest that the interactions between Lebanese and Syrian refugees have increased, and that social tensions might have slightly decreased. This phenomenon is of particular importance to the Lebanese government because social tensions between the Lebanese and refugee communities can weaken resilience, and subsequently, threaten the security of the country.

Source:

University of Saint Joseph. (2017). Survey on perceptions of Syrian refugees in Lebanon: Between resilience and vulnerability. Retrieved from <http://www.isp.usj.edu.lb/pdf/Perception%20of%20Security%20Feb%202017.pdf>

55%

of Lebanese participating in a survey in summer 2016 ‘would accept that Syrian refugees live in [their] neighborhood’

Lebanese-Syrian relations in Lebanon have been inconsistent throughout the Syrian crisis. While a number of Lebanese have been concerned about the competition of Syrians over resources and the threat they might bring to the security of the country, others have been more open and welcoming to their presence in Lebanon. In a 2016 survey, 55% of Lebanese respondents indicated they ‘would accept that Syrian refugees live in [their] neighborhood’. 59% also reported that they would consider ‘hiring a Syrian refugee’. However, Lebanese respondents did not have the same positive responses when it came to more personal relations with Syrian refugees. 57% of respondents said they would not ‘send [their] kids to school with Syrian refugees’, and 78% said they would not ‘allow [their] child to marry a Syrian refugee’.

Another 2017 survey has found that, for both Lebanese and Syrians, greater interactions with persons of the other nationality are strongly correlated with more positive perceptions of the Lebanese-Syrian relations. Yet, this effect was found to be conditional on the presence of a larger refugee population, i.e., interactions help to mitigate prejudice in areas hosting a large refugee population but not necessarily in areas in which the refugee population is medium or small.

Sources:

Inter-Agency Coordination. (2017). Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon. Retrieved from:

<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/60272>

University of Saint Joseph. (2017). Survey on perceptions of Syrian refugees in Lebanon: Between resilience and vulnerability. Retrieved from usj.edu.lb: <http://www.isp.usj.edu.lb/pdf/Presentation%20EN.pdf>

71.6%

of Syrian urban refugees in Jordan have 'mostly positive' relations with their Jordanian, Palestinian, and Syrian neighbors according to a 2017 survey

The coexistence of Syrian urban refugee families in the Jordanian society has been shown to have improved over time. According to a 2017 survey done in Amman, only one-fourth of Syrian urban refugee families are living in neighborhoods with other Syrians, a trend that has decreased when compared to the previous year. Almost two-thirds are now mainly living in Jordanian neighborhoods, while 11.2% are residing in Palestinian neighborhoods. These figures relate to the fact that Syrian urban refugees have generally been experiencing good relationships with their neighbors, most importantly, their Jordanian neighbors. It was found that 71.6% of Syrian urban refugees have 'mostly positive' relations with their Jordanian, Palestinian, and Syrian neighbors, while only 2% reported having "mostly negative" relationships. When reporting about the problems they might have been facing with their neighbors, 93.7% stated not having problems. However, those who did face problems mentioned issues primarily related to housing (2.9%), school (1.4%) and work (1.0%).

Source:

CARE International. (2017, June). 7 years into exile: How Syrian refugees, vulnerable Jordanians and other refugees in Jordan are being impacted by the Syria crisis. Retrieved from <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14403>

50%

of Syrian refugees in Lebanon participating in a survey in summer 2016 reported going through some form of abuse

After 6 years of displacement, the security of Syrian refugee communities keeps on deteriorating. 50% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon participating in a survey in summer 2016 reported going through some form of abuse. 72% did nothing about it. These figures were lower in 2015 with 46% reporting some form of abuse and 69% doing nothing about it. In addition, a 2017 survey found that 20.4% of Syrian participants have been experiencing verbal harassment, considerably higher than the percentage of Lebanese who experienced such harassment. Reporting to the authorities in Lebanon might not be an option for many Syrian refugees who have faced assault or abuse due to their precarious legal status. In 2016, only 11% of those who experienced abuse notified authorities. Others dealt with the issue by changing their residence (6%), confronting their offender (5%), limiting their movement (5%), or changing their routines (1%). It was also reported that the majority of assaults (87%) towards Syrians were blamed on Lebanese perpetrators. Finding ways to change the negative perceptions toward Syrian refugees, and consequently, ease the social tensions between Syrian refugees and their host communities is essential to the safety of Syrians living in Lebanon.

Sources:

ARK. (2017, August). Regular perception surveys on social tensions throughout Lebanon – wave 1: Narrative report. Retrieved from <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14276>

University of Saint Joseph. (2017). Survey on perceptions of Syrian refugees in Lebanon: Between resilience and vulnerability. Retrieved from [usp.edu.lb: http://www.isp.usj.edu.lb/pdf/Presentation%20EN.pdf](http://www.isp.usj.edu.lb/pdf/Presentation%20EN.pdf)

VI. Health

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50%

of Syria's physicians left their country in 2015

The “weaponization of health care” has been implemented in Syria as a strategy that violently deprives people from their need of health care as a weapon of war. By violating the conventions on medical neutrality in violent conflicts, health care professionals and facilities across the country were severely targeted. At least 17 health workers were killed in the first six months of 2017. In addition, hundreds of them have also been detained and tortured as the Syrian government executed a counter-terrorism legislation that criminalized medical support to the opposition in 2012. As a consequence of the brutality of this situation, skilled health professionals have left Syria. In 2015, 15,000 Syrian medical doctors, constituting 50% of Syria's physicians, have left their country. There is an urgent need to implement effective policies that protect health workers operating in violent conflict zones. Rebuilding Syria's human capital should be considered a priority.

Sources:

Fouad, F. M., Sparrow, A., Tarakji, A., Alameddine, M., El-Jardali, F., Coutts, A. P., El Arnout, N., Bou Karroum, L., Jawad, M., Roborgh, S., Abbara, A., Alhalabi, F., AlMasri, I., Jabbour, S. (2017). Health workers and the weaponisation of health care in Syria: A preliminary inquiry for the Lancet-American University of Beirut Commission on Syria. *The Lancet*. Retrieved from thelancet.com: [http://thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736\(17\)30741-9.pdf](http://thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(17)30741-9.pdf)

UN OCHA. (2017). 2018 humanitarian needs overview: Syrian Arab Republic. Retrieved from reliefweb: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018_syr_hno_english.pdf

107

is the number of attacks affecting health workers and facilities in Syria in the first half of 2017

Indiscriminate and unlawful attacks on health care facilities have been occurring relentlessly since the onset of the Syrian crisis. The health sector reported up to 107 attacks affecting health workers and facilities in the first half of 2017, a 25% increase in attacks against health facilities as compared to the same period in 2016, with attacks on health facilities numbering around 20 every month between January and April, or one attack every 36 hours. So far, less than half of Syria's health facilities are fully operational. As a result, health vulnerabilities have increased for people in need, especially for individuals at increased risk. These individuals include those with life-threatening chronic diseases, pregnant women without access to life-saving obstetric care or reproductive health care, children that are not vaccinated, and those in need of mental health support.

Source:

UN OCHA. (2017). 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic. Retrieved from reliefweb: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018_syr_hno_english.pdf

30,000

is the average number of people in Syria who suffered conflict-related injuries each month in 2016

Parties to the conflict in Syria have been attacking densely populated areas amounting to serious violation of international humanitarian law. In 2016, 30,000 individuals in Syria suffered from conflict-related injuries each month on average. Treatment for these injuries has never been provided adequately with a very limited ability of humanitarian actors to intervene. As a consequence, 30% of these injured individuals went untreated and were left with permanent disabilities. Receiving health assistance in conflict zones in Syria remains a major challenge. The lack of sustained and predictable access to UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas continues to exacerbate needs in these areas, depriving people of essential medical services and supplies. It has been estimated that 11.3 million people require health assistance. As such, international assistance is needed now more than ever.

Sources:

UN OCHA. (2016, December). 2017 humanitarian needs overview: Syrian Arab Republic. Retrieved from reliefweb.int: <http://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/2017-humanitarian-needs-overview-syrian-arab-republic-enar>

UN OCHA. (2017). 2018 humanitarian needs overview: Syrian Arab Republic. Retrieved from reliefweb: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018_syr_hno_english.pdf

6.5 million

people in Syria are food insecure due to the crisis

Almost 50% of the Syrian population is unable to meet its daily food needs, resulting in extremely high levels of food insecurities. 6.5 million people in Syria are food insecure, and an additional 4 million are at risk of becoming food insecure, twice as many as last year. With depreciated incomes and assets, many households have been coping with the situation through reducing their number of meals per day or reducing their adults' intake to provide food for their children. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) reported that the agriculture sector in Syria has lost US \$16 billion from decreased production and related damages. It has also estimated that an amount of US \$11-17 billion is required to rejuvenate this sector over a period of three years.

Sources:

FAO. (2017, May). Syrian Arab Republic: Situation report - May 2017. Retrieved from fao.org: <http://www.fao.org/resilience/resources/resources-detail/en/c/884455/>

FAO. (2017, November). Syrian Arab Republic: Situation report - November 2017. Retrieved from fao.org:

<http://www.fao.org/emergencies/resources/documents/resources-detail/en/c/1072148/>

34%

of Syrian refugee children surveyed in Lebanon in 2017 were reported to be ill two weeks prior to the survey

Syrian refugee children's health is particularly affected by the interaction of numerous influences. Many are living in informal settlements and substandard shelters with minimum hygienic practices and unsanitary living conditions which have augmented their risk of infectious diseases. According to a vulnerability assessment survey in 2017, 53% of households were residing in shelters that fail to meet the minimum humanitarian standards. Insufficient and unvaried diets stemming from the prevailing food insecurity has also increased their risk of serious illnesses such as infections, measles and diarrhea. In addition, deficient feeding practices for infants and young children have particularly been a concern. In 2017, 34% of Syrian refugee children were reported to be ill two weeks prior to the same survey.

Source:

UNHCR, UNICEF, & WFP. (2017). Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon 2017. Retrieved from data.unhcr.org: <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762>

1/4

of Syrian refugee children living in Lebanon are anemic

Syrian refugee children are suffering from food insecurities that put them at high risk of negative health outcomes associated with lower intakes of nutrients. These health outcomes include poor growth, impaired cognitive development, and anemia. The immune system also gets weakened which increases the risk of death from ordinary and treatable diseases. In Lebanon, 1 in every 4 refugee children is anemic. The latter condition is also prevalent in Jordan where 40% of refugee children under the age of 5 years are anemic. Anemia is a concern for food insecure children. Efforts should integrate interventions that target the repercussions of food insecurity, such as anemia, among refugee children.

Source:

UNICEF. (2017, March). Hitting rock bottom: How 2016 became the worst year for Syria's children. Retrieved from reliefweb.int: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/SYRIA6_12March17.pdf

US \$308 million

is Lebanon's funding requirement to finance health services for Syrian refugees for 2017

Under the LCRP for 2017-2020, US \$308 million is Lebanon's funding requirements to finance its health services for a target of 1,535,297 vulnerable individuals. These requirements were divided over four specific outcomes with different budget requirement. The first outcome focuses on increasing the access to comprehensive primary care. The second outcome has the highest allocated budget, and focuses on expanding the access to secondary care, including emergency room care and advanced referral services such as diagnostic laboratory & radiology services. With the smallest budget requirements, the third outcome emphasizes on mitigating the spread of infectious diseases, and the fourth outcome aims at improving the overall health of children, adolescents, and youth. With only 35% of requested funds for the health sector in Lebanon received in 2016, donor governments shall consider the consequences of financial shortages on the health of communities in need, and subsequently, respond to the funding requirements for subsequent years.

Sources:

UNDP, & UNHCR. (2016). Health: January - December 2016 dashboard. Retrieved from data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=12880

UN, & Government of Lebanon. (2017, January). Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020. Retrieved from <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Lebanon-Crisis-Response-Plan-2017-2020.pdf>

829,430

is the number of refugees who received food assistance in Lebanon in 2016

In Lebanon, food assistance is one vital component of the humanitarian response to the Syrian refugee crisis. In 2016, 829,430 refugees received food assistance via electronic food vouchers, at the value of US \$27 per person per month, which was the preferred modality of assistance among refugees. Assistance has also been provided to vulnerable Lebanese households. In addition, food security partners focused on promoting agricultural investments and expanding opportunities for smaller scale Lebanese farmers. Such measures can promote healthier nutritional practices, and reinforce national and local food security structures.

Source:

UN & Government of Lebanon. (2017, January). Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020. Retrieved from <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Lebanon-Crisis-Response-Plan-2017-2020.pdf>

37%

of WFP's appealed funds for the 2017 Syria Crisis Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan have been received by September 2017

Large numbers of refugees with limited access to economic resources are in crucial need for food assistance in order to survive. The World Food Programme (WFP) is addressing this need by providing cash and direct monthly food assistance to vulnerable individuals in neighboring host countries, and up to 4.5 million people inside Syria. However, by only receiving 37% of the appealed funds for the Syria Crisis Refugee & Resilience Plan by September 2017, WFP is struggling to adequately meet the urgent food needs of vulnerable individuals. Noteworthy, same time last year, 66% of the appealed funds for the plan were received. Funds are urgently required to prevent taking serious measures that might affect the response to the crisis, such as reducing the number of beneficiaries of aid programs.

Sources:

Inter-Agency Coordination. (2016, September). 2016 Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan - 3RP (all agencies): Funding snapshot as of 19 September 2016. Retrieved from <http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2016-09-19%203RP%20funding%20tracking%20all%20agencies%20-%20September%202016.pdf>

Inter-Agency Coordination. (2017, September). 2017 Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan - 3RP (all agencies): Funding snapshot as of 08-Sep-17. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/10Sept2017-3RPInteragencyFundingSnapshot-2017Syria3RP.pdf>

WFP. (2017). Syrian emergency. Retrieved from [wfp.org: http://www1.wfp.org/syria-emergency](http://www1.wfp.org/syria-emergency)

2,549,625

is the number of consultations in primary health care services that Syrian refugees and local host communities received in 2016 in Syria's neighboring countries

Humanitarian and development agencies have prioritized primary health care in response to the Syrian crisis. In Syria's neighboring countries, primary health care is being offered to both refugees and their host communities and is delivered largely through local public health facilities. By the end of 2016, UN and its partners were able to deliver 2,549,625 consultations in primary health care services to Syrian refugees and local host communities. Primary care facilities have also received increased support for delivery capacities and training of health care staff. However, with the expected exponential increase in demand for services, how can health care delivery systems in refugee host countries adapt? Although a strong emphasis is placed on strengthening the delivery of health care services of the national health systems, the enormous humanitarian needs continue to strain the public health infrastructure and its ability to respond efficiently and effectively.

Source:

Inter-Agency Coordination. (2017, April). 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2016-2017 in response to the Syria crisis: 2016 annual report. Retrieved from [unhcr.org: data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=13223](http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=13223)

3,126

is the average number of hospital deliveries supported by UNHCR per month in Lebanon in 2016

A vast majority of Syrian refugee mothers in Lebanon deliver in hospitals. In 2016, an average of 3,126 of hospital deliveries supported by UNHCR took place in Lebanese hospitals every month. The access to tertiary care is facilitated for Syrian women given the availability of 53 hospitals that are contracted by UNHCR across Lebanon. The cost for refugees is also reduced to low ranges as UNHCR covers 75% of the hospitalization cost for deliveries. In Lebanon, deliveries count for more than half of the total number of hospital admissions for Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Nevertheless, antenatal and postnatal health care accompanying the pregnancies and deliveries of refugee women remain a challenge. Humanitarian agencies are still facing difficulties in ensuring and improving the access to and the utilization of related services by Syrian refugees.

Source:

Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon. (2017). Health: January - December 2016 dashboard. Retrieved from <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=12880>

11%

of Syrian refugee households in Lebanon surveyed in 2017 reported lacking access to the primary health care they required

The 2017 vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon found that over half of surveyed households required primary health care services six months prior to the study. Of these households, 11% reported that they lacked access to the required assistance. Although health care services are subsidized by UNHCR, 33% of refugees who were unable to receive their required assistance reported their inability to pay fees as one main barrier. The costs of drugs (33%), uncertainty about where to go (17%) and not being accepted at the facility (14%) were also other barriers that were mentioned by respondents. In addition, the same assessment found that Syrian refugee households spend a monthly average of 11% of their total expenditures on health care.

Source:

UNHCR, UNICEF, & WFP. (2017). Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon 2017. Retrieved from data.unhcr.org: <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762>

2,000

is the number of Syrian doctors practicing in Germany by the end of 2015

In EU countries, Syrian doctors represent an important asset that can contribute to protecting the health of their communities. They have the appropriate experience and language skills to assess Syrian patients, and can often reach a diagnosis faster than their European counterparts. In Germany, 2,000 Syrian doctors were practicing their medical profession by the end of 2015. Yet, this number could be much higher but many Syrian doctors do not have the appropriate documents to verify their qualifications. Furthermore, a number of Syrian doctors struggle with the German language which hinders them from working independently. With mounting health care needs of Syrian refugees in Europe, host countries can utilize the skills of Syria's health professionals. Streamlining the accreditation process for Syrian doctors could help in improving the health services for refugee communities living abroad while contributing in expanding the economic opportunities for Syrian medical professionals.

Source:

Deutsche Welle (2016, September 30). German system to assess foreign doctors' skills 'too bureaucratic'. Retrieved from <http://www.dw.com/en/german-system-to-assess-foreign-doctors-skills-too-bureaucratic/a-35935522>

VII. Education

Education Crisis in Syria78

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180,000

is the number of education personnel, including teachers, who have fled Syria since the crisis

In Syria, the current educational system has been set back by more than a decade. The conflict has damaged or destroyed much of the country's education infrastructure with more than 4,000 attacks carried out on schools since the onset of the war. So far, 1 in every 3 schools is out of use or utilized for other purposes such as military purposes or shelters for displaced persons. It was found that schools account for an estimated 33% of collective centres, and were reported as the most common building type used for IDP sites in Syria. As the situation continues to get worse, teachers are fleeing the country. Up until mid-2017, it has been reported that 180,000 teachers and education personnel have fled Syria. The long-term impact of this phenomenon has severe consequences on the national education system in Syria.

Sources:

Oxfam. (2017, March). Joint NGO briefing: Brussels Syria conference. Retrieved from [oxfam.org](https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp-syria-brussels-conference-220317-en.pdf): <https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp-syria-brussels-conference-220317-en.pdf>

UNDP, ILO, & WFP. (2017). Jobs make the difference: Expanding economic opportunities for Syrian refugees and host communities. Retrieved from <https://www.jobsmakethedifference.org/full-report>

UN OCHA. (2017). 2018 humanitarian needs overview: Syrian Arab Republic. Retrieved from [reliefweb](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018_syr_hno_english.pdf): https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018_syr_hno_english.pdf

1/3

of schools in Syria are either destroyed, damaged, sheltering the displaced or used for military purposes

UNICEF described 2016 as the “worst year for Syria’s children”. Syrian children suffered in attaining their education as schools and education personnel were attacked. In only one year, 87 attacks took place and 225 children were killed or injured. Some schools were also targeted more than once. Others were converted into shelters for internally displaced or taken over by military groups. One in every three schools in Syria is either destroyed, damaged, sheltering the displaced or used for military purposes. The deliberate targeting of schools and children is a gross violation of human rights and international law. Under international law, a child’s right to education should persist during times of war, and schools should be safe spaces for Syria’s children.

Source:

UNICEF. (2017, March). Hitting rock bottom: How 2016 became the worst year for Syria’s children. Retrieved from reliefweb.int: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/SYRIA6_12March17.pdf

1.75 million

Syrian children were out of school and an additional 1.35 million were at risk of dropping out in Syria and neighboring host countries in the 2015/2016 school year

In Syria, schools have been destroyed, impaired or converted for other uses. In neighboring host countries, schools have been severely overburdened by the influx of refugees, and their ability to receive additional students is being overstretched. Differences in language, curriculum and culture in those schools have also created significant barriers for education attainment, and caused many refugee children to drop out. In other situations, children are leaving school to work at early ages to sustain an income for their household. All these factors resulted in 1.75 million Syrian children out of school in Syria and neighboring host countries in the 2015-2016 school year. An additional 1.35 million were also at risk of dropping out. Ensuring the access of children to education is essential in order to reinforce their resilience to cope with the crisis as well as to safeguard their future and the long-term stability of their societies.

Sources:

No Lost Generation Initiative. (2014, January). No lost generation: Protecting the futures of children affected by the crisis in Syria. Retrieved from [unicef.org: https://www.unicef.org/appeals/files/No_LoSt_Generation_Strategic_Overview__January_2014.pdf](https://www.unicef.org/appeals/files/No_LoSt_Generation_Strategic_Overview__January_2014.pdf)

No Lost Generation Initiative. (2017, January). Retrieved from <http://childrenofsyria.info/2017/03/07/no-lost-generation-read-out-of-high-level-panel/>

UNHCR. (2017). Refugee children in crisis. Retrieved from [unhcr.org: http://unhcr.org/FutureOfSyria/the-challenge-of-education.html](http://unhcr.org/FutureOfSyria/the-challenge-of-education.html)

100,000

is the estimated number of Syrian refugees who are between 18 and 22 years old and qualified for university

Before the onset of the Syrian conflict, 26% of Syrian youth were enrolled in tertiary or post-secondary education. This percentage has dramatically dropped throughout the years. Although 100,000 Syrian refugees between 18 and 22 years old are qualified for university, only 6% are currently enrolled and able to get their education. Given the extreme humanitarian needs created by the conflict, the access to higher education has generally not been a priority for humanitarian actors. However, up until recently, it has become clear that ensuring this access is important to be considered as part of the efforts in rebuilding Syria once the conflict subsides or ceases. As such, the path to higher education for Syrian young men and women needs to be carefully studied and incorporated under the strategic plans that respond to the Syrian crisis.

Source:

Institute of International Education. (2016). The “Delivering Higher Education to Syrian Refugees” workshop: A rare moment of guarded optimism. [Blog post]. Retrieved from: <https://www.iie.org/Learn/Blog/2016-January-The-Delivering-Higher-Education-To-Syrian-Refugees-Workshop>

78%

of Syrian refugee adolescents aged from 15 to 17 years old in Lebanon are out of school

There are significant barriers on both the education supply and demand sides preventing children and adolescents from accessing formal education. Supply-side barriers include lack of schools in close proximity to refugees, limited amount of spaces in schools where they are registered, violence, and language/curriculum difficulties. On the demand-side, the inability to pay the education fees and transportation costs, child labor, early marriage, and cultural reasons also limit the access of refugees to education. In Lebanon, 78% of Syrian refugee adolescents aged from 15 to 17 years are out of school. The fear of a lost generation is real. Education is one aspect for ensuring resilience for young refugee children, and is essential to safeguard the future stability of the refugee community.

Source:

UNHCR, UNICEF, & WFP. (2017). Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon 2017. Retrieved from data.unhcr.org: <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762>

330

is the number of public schools in Lebanon that have second shift classes for Syrian refugee children

After opening its public schools to Syrian adolescents and children in 2012, the Ministry of Education and Higher Education has incorporated second-shift classes into their programs in order to better accommodate the high influx of refugees with different learning needs. The number of second-shift schools in Lebanon has approximately tripled, from 90 schools in 2013 to 330 schools in 2017. Offering second-shifts in schools is an effective tool to mitigate the language and curriculum barriers that Syrian refugees encounter in acquiring their education. They also help in filling the education gaps caused by displacement by providing accelerated learning programs. Still, hundreds of thousands of children refugees in Lebanon remain out of school. How can the Lebanese government further enhance the enrollment of these refugees in its public school network, and how can school capacities be strengthened to better accommodate increasing numbers of students?

Sources:

Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon. (October, 2016). Inter-Agency update - Lebanon: August - September 2016. Retrieved from reliefweb.int: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ENG_InterAgencyAugust-September-2016-10-19.pdf

UNHCR. (2016). Schools enroll more Syrian refugee children in Lebanon. Retrieved from unhcr.org: <http://www.unhcr.org/afr/news/latest/2016/7/577e34754/schools-enrol-syrian-refugee-children-lebanon.html>

US \$506 million

of funds were received in 2016 to support the education sector for Syrian refugees in Syria's neighboring countries

Ensuring the provision of education for Syrian refugees is essential for protecting Syria's future. In 2016, the UN and its partners raised US \$506 million in funds to support the education sector for Syrian refugees in neighboring countries. This constitutes 77% of the original US \$662 million appeal. Within this funding framework, efforts were directed towards strengthening national education systems, increasing access to educational opportunities, and providing quality formal and non-formal education. Related activities also focused on enhancing protective and safe educational environments for Syrian children. As such, a fraction of the funds was allocated to reaching out to children with special needs and enhancing protective mechanisms and policies in schools. There was also a focus on mitigating socio-economic barriers to accessing education by providing cash subsidies and grants to vulnerable Syrian families and children.

Source:

Inter-Agency Coordination. (2017, April). 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2016-2017 in response to the Syria crisis: 2016 annual report. Retrieved from [unhcr.org: data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=13223](http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=13223)

11,000

is the number of Syrian teachers permitted to work with Syrian pupils in Turkey

Without making any new reforms to its existing labor policies and practices, the Turkish government has allowed skilled Syrian professionals, particularly teachers and medical professionals, to provide social services for their own refugee communities. There are currently 11,000 Syrian teachers permitted to work with Syrian pupils in Turkey and who applied for a work permit from the Ministry of National Education. By allowing Syrian teachers to work with refugee children, the government of Turkey is helping in reinforcing the resilience of the Syrian refugee community in Turkey, and encouraging its access to education. Syrian human capital is key to get refugee children back to school. Governments hosting refugees shall consider the steps taken by the Turkish authorities, and accordingly formulate policies towards encouraging the involvement of Syrian teachers in delivering education.

Source:

UNDP, ILO, & WFP. (2017). Jobs make the difference: Expanding economic opportunities for Syrian refugees and host communities. Retrieved from <https://www.jobsmakethedifference.org/full-report>

VIII. Livelihood

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75%

of households inside Syria have at least 1 child working

With increased poverty accompanying the Syrian war, the financial resources of Syrians have become scarce. In order to financially support their families, children have resorted to working. It was reported that 75% of households inside Syria have at least 1 child working, and almost half of them are joint or sole breadwinners. These children have been involved in different types of work in cleaning, garbage collection, garment factories, construction, mechanics, shops and restaurants, and agriculture, among other activities. Young girls who are not working are often forced to marry at early ages in order to relieve the economic pressure on their household. Syria's children have suffered severe loss and devastation and deserve to be free from exploitation, abuse, and violence.

Source:

UNICEF. (2017, March). Hitting rock bottom: How 2016 became the worst year for Syria's children. Retrieved from reliefweb.org: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/SYRIA6_12March17.pdf

32%

of employed Syrian refugees in Lebanon are working regularly

Due to limitations in seeking formal employment, the vast majority of Syrians work in the informal sector in Lebanon. Yet, for formal employment, Syrian refugees are legally allowed to work in mainly three sectors related to agriculture, construction, and environment, provided they have the right documentation. Syrians were traditionally engaged in work in these sectors even before the crisis. The vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon in 2017 has found that 36% of the households did not have a working member during the period of 30 days prior to the survey. Among employed Syrian refugees, only 32% reported to be working regularly. It was also found that, at a national level, 44% of Syrian refugee men aged 15-64 were not working.

Source:

UNHCR, UNICEF, & WFP. (2017). Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon 2017. Retrieved from [data.unhcr.org: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762](http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762)

1%

of 15-64 year old Syrian men who are working in Lebanon are involved in wholesale and retail trade

Only 1% of 15-64 year old Syrian men who are working in Lebanon are involved in wholesale and retail trade. Figures on employment by sector found that individuals earned more on average if they are engaged in wholesale and retail (US \$288 per month) or manufacturing (US \$270 per month). On average, the monthly income for working adults was US \$193 with US \$206 for men and only US \$158 for women despite being employed for nearly the same number of working days (14 days for men and 13 days for women). It was also found that the monthly income for working adults were different among districts. Beirut, Kesrwane and Meten were the districts where workers earned the most.

Source:

UNHCR, UNICEF, & WFP. (2017). Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon 2017. Retrieved from data.unhcr.org: <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762>

US \$1.9 billion

are the funds & concessional financing pledged for Jordan to allow legal employment for Syrian refugees

The Jordan Compact, a recent agreement between Jordan and the international community, outlines a series of development objectives and commitments aiming at enhancing the resilience of the refugee and Jordanian host communities. The compact has recognized the potential to leverage the Syrian refugee crisis to Jordan's economic benefit by encouraging foreign investment, and generating employment opportunities for Jordanians and Syrians. Accordingly, US \$1.9 billion of funds and concessional financing were pledged for Jordan in the London conference in 2016. In agreement that this amount will be used for development projects and that the access to European markets will be subject to easier terms, Jordan has accepted to relax its labor restrictions to allow Syrians to apply for work permits in sectors inside and outside the designated development zones. These sectors are mainly where there is low Jordanian participation and a high ratio of foreign workers (construction, agriculture, etc.), and where there is a high degree of skills match (handicrafts, textiles). With the right regulations, refugees can be offered opportunities that can ensure their own livelihoods while contributing to the economies of the host countries.

Source:

Government of Jordan. (2016, February 7). The Jordan Compact: A new holistic approach between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the international community to deal with the Syrian refugee crisis. Retrieved from reliefweb.int: <http://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/jordan-compact-new-holistic-approach-between-hashemite-kingdom-jordan-an>

32,000

is the number of work permits granted for the 350,000 working age refugees in Jordan

The Jordanian government has implemented recent reforms to the work permit system to allow more refugees to acquire related permits. These reforms have focused on soothing the requirements for Syrian refugees to access work permits as well as granting more authority for the approval of work permit applications. The number of work permits has increased from approximately 5,000 in 2015 to 32,000 in 2016. Yet, the latter figure only represents 9.14% of the total 350,000 working age refugees. In addition, granting access to work permits is not sufficient for guaranteeing jobs for Syrian refugees. Expanding decent economic opportunities for Syrian refugees and host communities should precede labor regulations. Several challenges in creating economic opportunities still exist in Jordan and need to be addressed by the Jordanian government. These challenges include the requirement for high amount of capital on new Syrian businesses, and the refusal of business registration applications for Syrian entrepreneurs.

Source:

UNDP, ILO, & WFP. (2017). Jobs make the difference: Expanding economic opportunities for Syrian refugees and host communities. Retrieved from <https://www.jobsmakethedifference.org/full-report>

IX. Spending and Investments of Syrian Refugees in Host Communities

US \$98

is the per capita monthly expenditures by Syrian refugees in Lebanon in 2017

In 2017, Syrian refugees in Lebanon had a per capita expenditure of US \$98 per month. The latter figure has dropped by US\$ 6 in comparison to 2016, a notable phenomenon that might be the result of decreased household income. Per capita expenditure had also varied from district to district in Lebanon. The highest per capita expenditures were in Beirut, Metn, Kesrwan and Marjaayoun while the lowest were in Baalbeck and Hermel. Noteworthy, the monthly income for the majority of refugees is not sufficient to cover monthly expenditures. 76% of Syrian refugee households are living below the poverty line, while 58% are living below the extreme poverty line. Syrian refugee families often struggle to sustain their living. For instance, the average monthly rent in 2017 was US \$183, while the average monthly income was US\$ 193, making the cost of rent a significant burden for many households.

Source:

UNHCR, UNICEF, & WFP. (2017). Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon 2017. Retrieved from [data.unhcr.org: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762](http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762)

US \$

78,700,180

is the value of real estate purchases by Syrians in Lebanon in 2016

While concerns over regional stability in the Middle East have slowed the economic growth in Lebanon, real estate investments by the better-off Syrians provided a source of revenue for the local economy. In 2016, the value of Syrian-owned real estate in Lebanon was estimated to be at US \$78,700,180. Syrians had the largest portion of real estate acquisitions by foreigners in Lebanon (14.17%), while Saudis came second (7.4%). The market for real estate owned by foreign nationals experienced a slight pickup in growth in 2016 from the previous year.

Source:

IDAL. (2017). Foreign investment structure. Retrieved from IDAL: http://investinlebanon.gov.lb/en/lebanon_at_a_glance/foreign_direct_investments/foreign_investment_structure

US \$378 million

is the total amount paid in 2016 by Syrian refugees in Lebanon for renting accommodation

Lebanon does not have formal refugee camps. 80% of Syrian refugees are paying rent for housing in urban, semi-urban or rural regions of the country. In 2016, refugees spent US \$378 million as a total amount for renting purposes. This is equivalent to US \$1.03 million a day. Furthermore, 7% of Syrian refugee households also cover the costs of their accommodation by working for their landlord.

The renting of garages, spare bedrooms and unfinished apartments has generated new revenue for Lebanon's real estate market. This potential to bolster the local economy has been harnessed by the support of non-governmental organizations. For instance, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) started a program known as "occupancy free of charge" in 2013 which provides landlords a package of upgrades for unfinished buildings in exchange of offering free housing for refugees. Investing in ensuring the access to decent housing for refugees does not only help the local economy but also provides important protection to this vulnerable community.

Sources:

The Daily Star Lebanon. (2017, June 20). Syrian refugees: A boom for Lebanon's economy? Retrieved from [dailystar.com.lb](http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2017/Jun-20/410237-syrian-refugees-a-boon-for-lebanons-economy.ashx): <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2017/Jun-20/410237-syrian-refugees-a-boon-for-lebanons-economy.ashx>

UNHCR, UNICEF, & WFP. (2017). Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon 2017. Retrieved from [data.unhcr.org](http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762): <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14762>

US \$965.5 million

is the amount that has been directly injected into the Lebanese economy by WFP since 2012 through cash-based interventions as of November 2017

In Lebanon, WFP's primary form of assistance is implemented through an electronic food voucher system through which electronic cards or e-cards are distributed to vulnerable Syrians in order to purchase food from WFP-contracted stores across Lebanon. The system allows individuals to choose the makeup of their meals and gives them access to fresh produce. WFP has also been collaborating with UNRWA to provide cash assistance to Palestinian refugees formerly based in Syria, and vulnerable Lebanese individuals. Since 2012, US \$965.5 million has been directly injected into the Lebanese economy by WFP through cash based interventions. Providing this type of assistance not only delivers essential aid to vulnerable communities, but also encourages the Lebanese economy. As such, refugees can be valuable consumers and can contribute to the local economy.

Source:

WFP. (2017, November). WFP Lebanon country brief. Retrieved from wfp.org: <http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ep/wfp274958.pdf>

450

is the number of grocery stores across Lebanon that are part of WFP's 'cash for food' e-card used by Syrian refugees

WFP provides essential food aid to Syrian refugees in Lebanon through its 'cash for food' e-card program. This electronic food voucher system provides cash assistance that can be used at any of the over 450 WFP-contracted grocery stores across the country. Beneficiaries of the program include Syrian refugees, PRS, and vulnerable Lebanese. This type of cash-based assistance does not only provide essential aid to vulnerable communities, but also boosts the local economy by benefiting local Lebanese enterprises. Through this programme, US \$965.5 million has been injected into the Lebanese economy since 2012.

Source:

WFP. (2017, November). WFP Lebanon country brief. Retrieved from wfp.org: <http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ep/wfp274958.pdf>

US \$800 million

is the amount spent by Syrian refugees as investments in Egypt since the beginning of the crisis

Refugees can positively contribute to the economies of their host countries as in the case of Syrians in Egypt. US \$800,000,000 is the amount of investments made by Syrians in Egypt since the beginning of the crisis. Even without the Egyptian government assuming a direct role in assisting Syrian business ventures, Syrians have demonstrated that their investments can offer an opportunity to bolster the private sector and create jobs for Egyptians and Syrians alike. They have also helped other Syrians by providing them with guidance on the local rules and regulations, and by using their connections with the government in order to advocate for newly established firms. As such, Syrian businesses are bringing capital, skills, and trade networks to Egypt. All the previous elements provide the private sector in Egypt with new financing and technical expertise.

Source:

UNDP, ILO & WFP. (2017). Jobs make the difference: Expanding economic opportunities for Syrian refugees and host communities. Retrieved from <https://www.jobsmakethedifference.org/full-report>

5,274

is the number of newly established companies in Turkey in the last 5 years (2012-2016) that had Syrian partners

A large number of Syrian entrepreneurs have been establishing businesses in Turkey since 2012. Over a period of only 5 years (2012-2016), 5,274 companies were newly established with Syrian partners. This figure represents 34% of all new firms that were established by foreign investors in Turkey in the same period. Syrian-owned businesses are contributing to the already vibrant Turkish economy and are creating employment opportunities for their own communities as well as Turkish nationals alike. They have also benefitted from the high concentration of Syrians in specific areas to provide needed services. Despite many challenges including language barriers, Syrian businesses have demonstrated that they can succeed.

Sources:

UNDP, ILO & WFP. (2017). Jobs make the difference: Expanding economic opportunities for Syrian refugees and host communities. Retrieved from <https://www.jobsmakethedifference.org/full-report>

Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB). (2017). Company establishment and liquidation statistics. Retrieved from <https://tobb.org.tr/BilgiErisimMudurlugu/Sayfalar/Eng/KurulanKapananSirketiStatistikleri.php>

84.1%

of new businesses established near Syrian refugee settlements in Lebanon in 2011-2014 were owned by Lebanese

In the period between 2011 and 2014, Lebanese nationals owned 84.1% of new businesses established near Syrian refugee settlements in Lebanon. Syrians owned only 13.6%. Yet, Syrians created 66% of the stock of informal businesses. According to research from 2016, this informality in the Lebanese economy is the result of numerous bureaucratic hurdles, excessive costs to formalize activities, and low risks of being caught. Informal businesses offer economic opportunities for refugees, but can also have many downsides such as the lack of enforceability of basic standards (health, safety, working conditions, etc.), and limited potential for growth.

Source:

Errighi, J., & Griesse, L. (2016, May). The Syrian refugee crisis: Labour market implications in Jordan and Lebanon. European Commission discussion paper No. 029. Luxembourg: Retrieved from europa.eu: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/dp029_en_2.pdf

X. Responses to the Syrian Crisis

**Humanitarian Aid Channelled to
Governments of Host Communities to
Support the Syrian Crisis104**

Gaps in Funding for Year 2017113

US \$73 million

is the amount invested in 240 municipalities and unions across Lebanon in 2016 to strengthen service delivery

Since the onset of the Syrian crisis, the population has doubled in size in 56 Lebanese cadasters, and increased between 50% and 100% in another 84 cadasters. The municipalities in these cadasters already had limited resources and capacities pre-crisis: 70% were unable to provide basic services, and another 57% lack administrative infrastructure. As such, the growing population has additionally burdened these entities. As such, the LCRP has prioritized the provision of support to public institutions at the local level. In 2016, US \$73 million was channelled to 240 Lebanese municipalities and unions to improve their service delivery. This funding was used for investments in infrastructure and rehabilitation of public spaces, hospitals, public schools and housing. In addition, municipalities were supported with 97 additional staff to strengthen the key role of these institutions as first line responders to the crisis.

Source:

UNDP. (2017, June 23). Support to public institutions under the LCRP 2016. Retrieved from undp.org: http://www.lb.undp.org/content/lebanon/en/home/library/Response_to_the_Syrian_Crisis/Support-to-Public-Institutions-under-the-LCRP-2016.html

US \$105 million

is the amount invested to improve the service delivery of energy and water in communities hosting Syrian refugees in Lebanon

Access to safe and sufficient energy and water is essential for maintaining the health and resilience of refugee and host communities, particularly in localities that have been historically neglected and are under substandard conditions. As part of the LCRP for year 2016, US \$105 million out of the required US \$391 million, was invested to improve service delivery of energy and water in host communities. In the same year, LCRP partners have identified 2.4 million people in need of improved access to water and electricity, and were able to reach 1,117,454 individuals. This progress was only made possible after improvements of public water distribution networks, and providing septic tanks to remote areas. However, despite many related achievements, LCRP partners are still facing many challenges due to funding shortages. More investments are much needed for water and energy delivery in host communities in Lebanon in upcoming years.

Sources:

Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon. (2016). Energy & Water: January - December 2016 dashboard. Retrieved from <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=12965>

UNDP. (2017, June 23). Support to public institutions under the LCRP 2016. Retrieved from [undp.org: http://www.lb.undp.org/content/lebanon/en/home/library/Response_to_the_Syrian_Crisis/Support-to-Public-Institutions-under-the-LCRP-2016.html](http://www.lb.undp.org/content/lebanon/en/home/library/Response_to_the_Syrian_Crisis/Support-to-Public-Institutions-under-the-LCRP-2016.html)

1.6

is the estimated multiplier effect as a result of financial assistance provided to refugees and host communities in Lebanon

In light of the high levels of humanitarian assistance provided in response to the Syrian crisis, it is important to measure the economic impact of aid packages on the economies of host countries. In the case of Lebanon, it was found that every US \$1 spent on humanitarian aid has a multiplier effect of US \$1.6 in the local economy. The multiplier effect represents the total impact of the humanitarian aid expenditure on the total demand and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the pre-crisis Lebanese economy. As such, US \$1.258 billion of humanitarian assistance that was provided to Lebanon from 2011 till early 2017, as documented in the LCRP 2017-2020, actually injected US \$2.01 billion into the Lebanese economy. It has also produced a corresponding rise in demand complemented by an increase in supply. Although the spillover effects of the Syrian crisis has put constraints on local resources and infrastructures, humanitarian aid packages has helped in mitigating some of its negative consequences by infusing financial resource into the budget of governments.

Source:

UNDP, & UNHCR. (2015). Impact of humanitarian aid on the Lebanese economy. Retrieved from undp.org: <http://www.lb.undp.org/content/lebanon/en/home/library/poverty/impact-of-humanitarian-aid-undp-unhcr.html>

44%

of the aid package to Syrian refugees in Lebanon was injected into the economy in form of direct cash to beneficiaries

A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-UNHCR report that measured the economic impact of humanitarian aid on the Lebanese economy from the end of 2011 to mid-2014 revealed that 44% of the amount that was spent during this period was injected into the Lebanese economy in the form of direct cash to beneficiaries that was spent in the Lebanese market. This study also found that different types of aid have different impacts on the economic sectors. For the aid provided in the form of cash assistance, the food sector was the most-impacted economic sector. For the other type of aid that was provided in the form of in-kind purchases, the two sectors that were most-impacted were education and furniture.

Source:

UNDP & UNHCR. (2015). Impact of humanitarian aid on the Lebanese economy. Retrieved from reliefweb.int: <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resource/Impact%20of%20Humanitarian%20Aid-UNDP-UNHCR.PDF>

US \$1 billion

is the amount of concessional financing provided to Jordan and Lebanon for projects that support Syrian refugees and their host communities

In April 2017, the World Bank's Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF) pledged financial support for three new development projects in Jordan and Lebanon, bringing the total amount of concessional financing provided for the two countries to US \$1 billion. Two of these development projects will aim at expanding public health services, and will be financed by the World Bank Group and Islamic Development Bank Group at concessional levels totalling US \$150 million. The third project will work towards enhancing essential wastewater infrastructure in Jordan, and will be financed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Concessional financing benefits refugees and the communities hosting them, and represents a new innovative approach to meet challenges related to gaps in humanitarian aid from international governments. As the World Bank Director for Regional Programs and Partnerships in the Middle East and North Africa once said, "Responding effectively requires forging strong partnerships that adapt and innovate to meet the evolving nature of the challenge [...]".

Source:

World Bank. (2017, April 21). New support for refugees and host communities in Jordan and Lebanon brings total concessional financing to US\$1Billion. Retrieved from [worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/04/21/new-support-for-refugees-and-host-communities-in-jordan-and-lebanon-brings-total-concessional-financing-to-us-1-billion): <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/04/21/new-support-for-refugees-and-host-communities-in-jordan-and-lebanon-brings-total-concessional-financing-to-us-1-billion>

US \$340 million

is the concessional loan provided for Jordan for rehabilitation of water infrastructure in communities hosting Syrian refugees

Concessional loans provide financing at much lower interest rates than market rates and/or for longer grace periods for payments. Providing refugee host countries with concessional loans can be an effective tool that bridges existing gaps in humanitarian aid. It additionally offers these countries the opportunity to leverage the refugee crisis in order to accelerate their development, and address their needs that predate the Syrian conflict. The Jordanian government secured US \$340 million as a concessional loan for rehabilitation of water infrastructure in communities hosting Syrian refugees. This one-third of a billion USD has been provided to help in improving its capacity to respond to the refugee crisis, in meeting its development objectives, and in supporting its economic growth over the long term. Through similar innovative initiatives, supporting refugees and host communities should be a priority for governments and donors.

Sources:

UNDP, ILO & WFP. (2017). Jobs make the difference: Expanding economic opportunities for Syrian refugees and host communities. Retrieved from <https://www.jobsmakethedifference.org/full-report>

UN, & Government of Lebanon. (2017, January). Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020. Retrieved from <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Lebanon-Crisis-Response-Plan-2017-2020.pdf>

772

is the number of additional staff that were seconded to Lebanese ministries to enhance the government's crisis response capacities in 2016

Capacities of the Lebanese government have been enhanced to cope with the refugee crisis. In 2016, 772 additional staff members were seconded to Lebanese ministries to strengthen its institutional capacities at national and field levels. The recruitment of the additional number of staff was only made possible by the funding received from international donors, and as part of the US \$157.5 million that was channelled to public institutions. Although the overall financial and staff support to public entities has declined for 2016 as compared to 2015, there has been a specific focus on scaling-up the support to three main institutions. There has been an increased support to the Ministry of Education and Higher Education and its network of public schools. There has also been a strong emphasis on supporting the Ministry of Social Affairs and its network of social development centers as this entity is in charge of coordinating the crisis response and is the lead provider of social services. Capacities of unions and municipalities across Lebanon were also reinforced as those units represent the main providers of basic services and are the frontline in responding to the needs of vulnerable Lebanese and refugee communities.

Source:

UN Inter-Agency Coordination. (2017, February). Inter-agency meeting: Sectors end of year presentations. Retrieved from unhcr.org: <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=12922>

€9.4 billion

is the total aid funding by EU and its member states in response to the Syrian crisis

As the main international aid providers for the Syrian crisis, the EU and its member states have mobilized more than €9.4 billion in funds in response to the Syrian crisis. Funding has been used to support a number of humanitarian programs that provide Syrians in need with food, shelter, safe drinking water, sanitation services, education and health care. It has also been directed toward enhancing the stability and resilience in Syria and its neighboring countries including Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt. The EU and its member states pledged an additional €3.7 billion during the Brussels conference on “Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region” in April 2017. This amount represents approximately 67% of the total donations pledged by other countries.

Source:

European Commission. (2017, September). Syrian Crisis: ECHO factsheet. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/syria_en.pdf

€3 billion

is the amount of aid provided by EU to support Syrian refugees in Turkey for 2016 and 2017 as part of the EU-Turkey deal

As declared by the EU, the EU-Turkey deal has become “an important element of the EU’s comprehensive approach on migration”. This deal, agreed upon on 18 March 2016 between EU Heads of State or Government and Turkey, has a core principle which states that “all new irregular migrants or asylum seekers crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands will be returned to Turkey [...]. For every Syrian being returned to Turkey, another Syrian will be resettled to the EU from Turkey directly”. In order to further support Turkey in its efforts in hosting refugees and providing support on the ground, the EU has delivered on its financial commitment by providing the Turkish government €3 billion for 2016 and 2017 through its Facility for Refugees in Turkey. In the first year of the deal, €2.2 billion has already been allocated from the Facility and 39 projects worth €1.5 billion have been signed. This amount of funding is directed towards projects addressing the needs of refugees and host communities with an emphasis on humanitarian assistance, municipal infrastructure, socio-economic support, education, and health.

Source:

European Commission. (2017, March). EU-Turkey statement: One year on. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/eu_turkey_statement_17032017_en.pdf

63%

of the appeal for funding the Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan in response to the Syrian crisis was received in 2016

The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) consists of country-specific chapters (Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt) that draw together national crisis response plans to the Syrian crisis for humanitarian relief, resilience, and stabilization. For each country, needs, targets, approaches, and resources are identified and implemented under the national framework. For this plan to operate, the appeal for funding needs to be comprehensively received from donors. In 2016, only 63% of the total US \$4.54 billion appeal for funding was received. The overall funding contribution also varied between the different assistance sectors (basic assistance, education, food security, health, livelihoods, protection, shelter, social stability, and energy and water). The livelihoods sector received the least funding, with only 16% of the requested funds received. The education sector, on the other hand, had 77% of the funds. Assistance sectors require an adequate level of funding as needs continue to surpass available resources. As such, responsibility sharing among donor governments is required to ensure requested funds are received and are addressing needs.

Source:

Inter-Agency Coordination. (2017, April). 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2016-2017 in response to the Syria crisis: 2016 annual report. Retrieved from [unhcr.org: data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=13223](http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=13223)

US \$8 billion

is the amount of funds that UN agencies have appealed for to support IDPs and refugees in Syria and its neighboring countries for 2017

The UN agencies have appealed for approximately US \$8 billion for 2017 to provide assistance and safety to the IDPs and refugees across Syria and its neighboring countries. Of this amount, US \$4.6 billion was allocated for the support of over 5 million Syrian refugees in neighboring countries and members of communities hosting them. The other US \$3.4 billion was appealed to deliver humanitarian assistance and protection to 13.5 million people in Syria, including IDPs. The UN and development agencies aim at enhancing humanitarian access, improving protection, and strengthening resilience in Syria's neighboring host countries. The aid they receive from donor governments is, therefore, essential in order to respond to the large-scale humanitarian and protection needs of vulnerable populations affected by the crisis.

Sources:

Inter-Agency Coordination. (2016, December). 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2017-2018 in response to the Syria crisis. Retrieved from reliefweb.int: <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/3RP-Regional-Strategic-Overview.pdf>

UN OCHA. (2017, March). 2017 humanitarian response plan: January - December 2017. Retrieved from reliefweb.int: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/syr_wos_operational_plan_hrp_2017.pdf

27%

of requested funds to respond to the needs of refugees & host communities in Lebanon have been received by September 2017

To finance the response to the Syrian crisis for 2017, the LCRP requires US \$2.75 billion. However, resources received by implementing partners in support of this plan totaled US \$729.32 million, which amounts to 27% of the appeal by September 2017. This figure is alarming as this funding level for LCRP 2017 is lower than last year. At the same time last year, \$980 million were received by LCRP partners, representing 40% of last year's appeal. Sharing responsibility of refugees and host communities is key to ensure that LCRP will continue in supporting the crisis. Through the holistic approach of LCRP and with the support from international and national partners, the Lebanese government and its partners aim at strengthening the delivery of needed services, reinforcing Lebanon's economic and social stability, and providing protection to refugees as well as vulnerable Lebanese in upcoming years. They also seek to continue in mitigating the existing tensions between refugees and their host communities by not limiting the assistance exclusively to refugees, but also to Lebanese in the most impoverished areas in the country.

Sources:

UN, & Government of Lebanon. (2017, January). Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020. Retrieved from <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Lebanon-Crisis-Response-Plan-2017-2020.pdf>

UN OCHA. (2017). Humanitarian bulletin: Lebanon Issue 29 | 1 August - 31 October 2017. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA-HumanitarianBulletin-Issue29-31october2017-EN.pdf>

19.66%

of the requested funds to finance UNRWA's support to Palestinian refugees in/from Syria have been received by June 2017

Since the onset of the Syrian crisis, focus has shifted away from Palestinian refugees. Consequently, funding for UNRWA, the main provider of basic services to registered Palestinian refugees in the Middle East, has been severely reduced. For 2017, UNRWA requested US \$328,952,593 to provide humanitarian assistance to 438,000 Palestinian refugees remaining in Syria, and thousands who fled to neighboring countries such as Lebanon and Jordan. However, by June 2017, only 19.66% of the funds have been secured. Shortages in funding have had dramatic consequences on Palestinian refugees. In 2015, the school year was delayed in 700 UNRWA schools due to funding shortcomings. In other instances, in 2016, the agency was able to carry out only three out of the six planned rounds of cash assistance for Palestinian refugees inside Syria. Securing funds for the Palestinian community in/from Syria should not be neglected.

Source:

UNRWA. (2017). Syria Palestine refugees humanitarian snapshot June, 2017. Retrieved from [unrwa.org](https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/syria-palestine-refugees-humanitarian-snapshot-june-2017): <https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/syria-palestine-refugees-humanitarian-snapshot-june-2017>

47%

is the gap in the requested funds to support the Syrian crisis in Syria and its neighboring countries by December 2017

By the end of 2017, only 53% of the required funding to support the situation in Syria and its neighboring countries has been received. This figure marks a significant decline in donor support when compared to year 2016, where 63% of the requested funds had been received by the end of the year. 47% of the total funding is still needed. The current funding gap jeopardizes the continuation of all efforts that fall under the 3RP in response to the Syria crisis for year 2017-2018 related to humanitarian relief, resilience and stabilization. UNHCR fears that insufficient support to Syrians and host communities will have a negative impact on the social stability in host countries. The regional responses to the Syrian refugee crisis are contingent on contributions from international donors. Solidarity to a humanitarian crisis through shared international responsibility saves millions of people in need from various forms of harm, poverty, hunger, and devastating social and health conditions.

Sources:

Inter-Agency Coordination. (2016). 3RP 2016 Annual Report. Retrieved from: data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=13223

Inter-Agency Coordination. (2017). Syria Situation: 2017 funding update as of 5 December 2017. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/3RPInteragencyFundingSnapshot-2017Syria3RPasof5.12.17.pdf>

XI. Unmet Needs of Syrians in Syria and Host Countries

35%

of the population in Syria relies on unsafe water sources to meet daily water supply needs

The war in Syria has affected almost every city and village of the country, making it very difficult for the population to live comfortably with adequate access to essential services such as water and electricity. It has been estimated that up to 35% of the population in Syria is relies on unsafe water sources to meet daily water supply needs. In addition to water pumps being destroyed and sources being contaminated, a minimum of 30 water cuts occurred deliberately in 2016 in Hama, Raqqa, Dara, Aleppo, and Damascus. People's access to safe water is not a privilege, it is a right according to the "Human Right to Water and Sanitation" recognized by the UN.

Sources:

UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2014, May). International decade for action 'WATER FOR LIFE' 2005 - 2015. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/human_right_to_water.shtml

UN News Centre. (2017, August). Children's access to safe water and sanitation is a right, not a privilege – UNICEF. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=57427#.Wgh31q2B2CR>

UN OCHA. (2017). 2018 humanitarian needs overview: Syrian Arab Republic. Retrieved from reliefweb: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018_syr_hno_english.pdf

2.98 million

is the number of people living in UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas in Syria as of September 2017

It is estimated that approximately 2.98 million people are living in UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas in Syria (as of September 2017). In the 10 UN-declared besieged areas, 419,000 Syrians are experiencing severe forms of hostilities with indiscriminate attacks and airstrikes. The needs of people in UN-declared besieged areas continue to be extremely severe due to arbitrary restrictions on freedom of movement, imposed constraints on the delivery of basic commodities and humanitarian assistance, the lack of livelihood opportunities, and ongoing hostilities. The remaining 2.56 million are in hard-to-reach areas. The systematic removal of medical items from assistance destined for UN-declared besieged and hard-to-reach areas continued with more than 600,000 medical items removed from or prevented from being included in UN inter-agency convoys in the first eight months of 2017.

Source:

UN OCHA. (2017). 2018 humanitarian needs overview: Syrian Arab Republic. Retrieved from reliefweb: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018_syr_hno_english.pdf

13%

of refugees in Lebanon who participated in a survey in 2017 reported that their priority needs have been met by humanitarian organizations

With the crisis well into its seventh year, the living circumstances of refugees in their host countries have not been easy to improve. Refugees remain reliant on aid. A survey done in 2017 targeting Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Palestine refugees from Syria (PRS), and Palestine refugees from Lebanon (PRL) found that refugees living across all governorates in Lebanon do not feel that the support they are receiving prepares them to live without aid in the future. Despite being well-informed about the aid available to them, most refugees indicated that they are still struggling to cover their basic needs. 66% do not feel their lives have improved in the period of four months prior to the same survey. In addition, only 13% reported that their priority needs have been met by humanitarian organizations. Despite all humanitarian efforts, food, proper housing, health care services, and financial aid continue to be the most urgent unmet needs.

Source:

Ground Truth Solutions. (2017, August). Refugee perceptions in Lebanon: Survey round two. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/mixed-migration-platform-refugee-perceptions-lebanon-survey-round-two-10-august-2017>

22%

of the total Syrian refugee household income generated through labor in Jordan comes from working children under the age of 16

Child labor refers to children who are involved in physically and mentally harmful work that deprives them of the chance to attend school, causes them to leave school, or forces them to miss many days of school. It has been found that child labor is one reason among many others (such as the lack of proper documentation, school violence, and high costs of schooling, etc.) that deprive children from education. In Jordan, only 18% of Syrian refugees reported that they or members of their family have registered for work permits. As such, children turn to work to generate income for their households. It was shown that 22% of the total Syrian refugee household income produced through labor comes from working children under the age of 16. Over 88% of them are boys.

Sources:

ILO. (2016). National child labour survey 2016 of Jordan. Retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_510520.pdf

ILO. (2017). Child labour. Retrieved from <http://www.ilo.org/ipecc/facts/lang--en/index.htm>

UNICEF. (2017, March). Running on empty II: A longitudinal welfare study of Syrian refugee children residing in Jordan's host communities. Retrieved from <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=14278>

2/3

of Syrian refugee children that are out of school in Lebanon are working

Child labor is depriving Syrian refugee children of their right to education. In Lebanon, Syrian refugee families who are struggling with pervasive poverty and few opportunities to secure their income are in many cases dependent on their children as breadwinners. It is estimated that 2/3 of Syrian refugee children who are out of school are working. Many working children are vulnerable to exploitation, abuse, and violence. They are often faced with long working hours and extremely low wages. Although child labor was present in Lebanon even before the Syrian crisis, the number of both Syrian and Lebanese children working has increased over the course of the crisis.

Source:

UN Inter-Agency Coordination. (2017, July). Child labor in Lebanon. Retrieved from <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=13839>

2,405,965

is the number of refugees and host community members who have limited access to adequate quantity of safe water in Syria's neighboring countries in 2016

Before the Syrian crisis, water systems in most neighboring countries that are currently hosting refugees were already weak in terms of infrastructure and necessitated rehabilitation. The crisis imposed additional unbearable pressure on these systems. In 2016, 2,405,965 refugees and host community members had limited access to adequate quality of safe water. This number approximates the population size of the city of Paris in France. Reflecting on this surprising figure, one can imagine the risk that limited access to safe water can have on the spread of communicable diseases among vulnerable populations. Investments do not only need to address long-term efficient water management systems and networks, but also plans that monitor water quality to ensure the delivery of safe water to all communities.

Source:

Inter-Agency Coordination. (2016, October). Regional monthly update: 3RP achievements October 2016. Retrieved from <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Regional-3RP-Dashboards-October-2016.pdf>

XII. Future Prospects of Syrian Refugees

96,030

is the number of Syrian refugees who have resettled in 45 countries between January 2012 and October 2017

Finding durable solutions for the transitory situation of refugees is the ultimate goal of international protection, and therefore, UNHCR's work. One of these solutions is resettlement to third countries. Between January 2013 and October 2017, UNHCR submitted around 190,978 Syrian refugees from the Middle East and North Africa region and Turkey for resettlement. Out of this figure, 96,030 individuals have departed for 45 resettlement countries. Other solutions do include complementary admission pathways to third countries such as humanitarian visas, family reunification, and opportunities for labor mobility and education. It has been advocated that these pathways can majorly contribute to achieving normalcy of life for refugees, and to reducing their dangerous movements to seek asylum. UNHCR has a mandate to facilitate voluntary, safe and dignified returns as a solution for displacement. Yet, it does not promote or facilitate refugee returns to Syria at the moment, as these conditions are still not in place.

In Lebanon, the local integration is not a durable solution offered by the Government, and this position is not contested by UNHCR and the international community.

Sources:

UNHCR. (2017, August 7). Update: Durable solutions for Syrian refugees. Retrieved from [unhcr.org: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=13878](http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=13878)

UNHCR. (2017, December 21). Resettlement data portal. Retrieved from [unhcr.org: rsq.unhcr.org](http://unhcr.org/rsq.unhcr.org)

90%

of Syrian refugees in Turkey interviewed in a large scale survey hope to return to Syria

Refugees still see themselves as part of Syria's future. Among 1,120 interviewed Syrian refugees in Turkey, 90% reported that they hope to return to Syria. For their second choice after Syria, 85% stated that they would prefer to stay in Turkey while only 9% would like to be living in Europe. These two figures confirm the fact that Syrian refugees preferred to stay in Turkey. According to recent research, policies need to further address the process of integrating Syrians into the Turkish economy and the Turkish society given the protracted nature of the Syrian crisis.

Source:

Fabbe, Hazlett and Sinmazdemir. (2017, May). What do Syrians want their future to be? A survey of refugees in Turkey. Retrieved from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2017-05-01/what-do-syrians-want-their-future-be>.

96%

of Syrian refugees taking part in a survey in Lebanon said that they 'will go back to Syria if things go back to normal'

In Lebanon, concerns over the protracted nature of the stay of Syrian refugees have fuelled tensions between both communities and is consequently threatening social stability. Yet, most Syrian refugees in Lebanon prefer to return to Syria when it becomes safe and in dignity. In a survey conducted in summer 2016 on the perceptions of Syrian refugees living in Lebanon, 96% of 1,200 respondents indicated that they 'will go back to Syria if things go back to back to normal'. Furthermore, 81% of these respondents said that they intend to return to their original home in Syria, while 4% like to move to a different place within Syria. Security and safety were the primary factors that respondents said would influence their decision when to return, followed by housing, jobs, peace and justice, and efficient government. Other considerations they noted were having access to services, food security, and infrastructure.

Source:

University of Saint Joseph. (2017). Survey on perceptions of Syrian refugees in Lebanon between resilience and vulnerability. Retrieved from <http://www.isp.usj.edu.lb/pdf/Perception%20of%20Security%20Feb%202017.pdf>

16,557

is the number of Syrians who crossed the Mediterranean in 2017

Between January and December 2017, 16,557 Syrians have crossed the Mediterranean Sea to reach the safe lands in Greece, Italy, and Cyprus. Despite strict measures imposed by European countries, Syrians are still migrating by undertaking more varied and dangerous journeys. Without accessible legal ways to Europe, they are still relying on smugglers and trafficking networks, risking “death, serious abuses, or both”. Refugees reported being abused, beaten up, and robbed by smugglers during these journeys. Many individuals who arrived, including children, were victims of sexual violence or trafficking. Nevertheless, reaching Europe does not guarantee asylum for individuals who desperately need it. UNHCR and partners received allegations of push-backs by government authorities, including “Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Spain and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. As advocated by UNHCR, renewed commitment is much needed to ensure protection and offer protective solutions for refugees, including measures that incorporate more safe and legal pathways such as increasing resettlement and facilitating family reunification.

Sources:

UNHCR. (2017, August). As Europe refugee and migrant arrivals fall, reports of abuses, deaths persist. Retrieved from <http://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2017/8/599ec5024/europe-refugee-migrant-arrivals-fall-reports-abuses-deaths-persist.html>

UNHCR. (2017, August). Refugees & Migrants: Arrivals by sea to Europe. Retrieved from [unhcr.org: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/58880](https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/58880)

UNHCR. (2017, 21 December). Operational portal: Refugee situations. Retrieved from [data.unhcr.org: http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean](http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean)

66,000

is the number of Syrian refugees who are estimated to have spontaneously returned to Syria from the neighboring countries between January and October 2017

UNHCR monitoring and registration data recorded at least 66,000 refugees returning to Syria from neighboring countries between January and October 2017. This must be seen in the light of the estimated 1.1 million new displacements inside Syria, which were recorded in the first half of 2017.

Surveys done by UNHCR showed that the decision to return to Syria was mostly influenced by “family reunification in Syria” and the return of other family members. Of the refugees surveyed in 2017 in Egypt, Iraq and Jordan, 82% of those who said they would consider returning to Syria stated “family reunification in Syria” as a main factor.

While political and security developments in Syria during 2018 may continue to result in a reduction of hostilities as well as relative stability may emerge in some areas of the country, overall conditions in Syria are, as of November 2017, not conducive to allow for voluntary return to Syria in safety and dignity.

Nevertheless, the international community is working towards the creation of conditions conducive for voluntary return in safety and dignity. For example, UNHCR is monitoring through voluntary return interviews. It is also conducting border monitoring, undertaking intention and perception surveys and focus group discussions, supporting refugees’ acquisition of civil status documentation and birth registration, facilitating capacity building and training, and doing data analysis to identify and predict trends. By doing these activities today, refugees can be more efficiently assisted to return in a sustainable, safe and dignified way the day the conditions are ready.

Sources:

Inter-Agency Coordination. (2017). 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2018-2019 in response to the Syria crisis: Regional strategic overview. Retrieved from <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/3RP-Regional-Strategic-Overview-2018-19.pdf>

UNHCR. (2017, August). Update: Durable solutions for Syrian refugees. Retrieved from [unhcr.org: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=13878](http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=13878)

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