



This Quarterly Mixed Migration Update (QMMU) covers the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region. The core countries of focus for this region are the countries currently affected by the Venezuelan crisis, including Colombia, Brazil, Peru and Ecuador, in addition to the Caribbean islands. Concerning northern movements to the United States, this QMMU covers Mexico and Central American countries. Depending on the quarterly trends and migration-related updates, more attention may be given to some of the countries over the rest.

The QMMUs offer a quarterly update on new trends and dynamics related to mixed migration and relevant policy developments in the region. These updates are based on a compilation of a wide range of secondary (data) sources, brought together within a regional framework and applying a mixed migration analytical lens. Similar QMMUs are available for all MMC regions.

The Mixed Migration Centre is a global network consisting of seven regional hubs and a central unit in Geneva engaged in data collection, research, analysis and policy development on mixed migration. For more information on the MMC, the QMMUs from other regions and contact details of regional MMC teams, visit [mixedmigration.org](https://mixedmigration.org) and follow us at [@Mixed\\_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

### **MMC's understanding of mixed migration**

"Mixed migration" refers to cross-border movements of people, including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking, and people seeking better lives and opportunities. Motivated to move by a multiplicity of factors, people in mixed flows have a range of legal statuses as well as a variety of vulnerabilities. Although entitled to protection under international human rights law, they are exposed to multiple rights violations along their journey. Those in mixed migration flows travel along similar routes, using similar means of travel - often travelling irregularly, and wholly, or partially, assisted by migrant smugglers.

#### **Front cover photo credit:**

Juan Carlos Tomasi/MSF/February 2018

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# Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: Latin America and the Caribbean

## Quarter 1 - 2020

### Key Updates

- **Number of displaced Venezuelans continues to increase:** From January to March, an estimated 100,000 new refugees and migrants left Venezuela. The total number of Venezuelans who have fled their country since the beginning of the current crisis has now reached [4.9 million](#).
- **New migrant caravans from Central America face restrictive response:** Two migrant caravans that departed from Honduras in January were largely stopped in Guatemala and Mexico, with [allegations of excessive use of force by Mexican National Guard troops](#) against the migrants and refugees. This stands in strong contrast to the reception that caravans received in [2018](#) and [2019](#).
- **Calls to guarantee minimum conditions in Mexican migration detention centres in light of COVID-19:** Following the [death](#) of an asylum-seeker in March during a protest at a Mexican immigration detention centre, which denounced the prolonged detention, overcrowding, and lack of sanitary conditions of the premises, calls to guarantee sanitary conditions in the centres — or to release migrants and refugees in detention in order to protect them from the spread of COVID-19 — have [grown](#).
- **COVID-19 and access to rights:** In light of the preventive measures adopted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in many countries – and, in particular, mandatory nation-wide self-isolation – access to food, clean water, shelter and work for migrants and refugees are currently [key challenges](#). In particular, migrants and refugees working in the informal economy, who become unemployed, and who live on daily earnings or on remittances from family members abroad, are among the most [affected](#).
- **Closure of international borders in response to COVID-19:** By the end of March, [all Latin American countries](#) with the exception of Nicaragua, as well as the U.S. and Canada, had imposed measures to close borders or restrict international travel in order to contain the spread of COVID-19, with [varied impacts on migrants and refugees](#) seeking to enter or exit these countries.



## Regional Overview\*



## The Caribbean



\*Information on the map relates to selected updates and does not represent all mixed migration flows within and out of Latin America and the Caribbean.

# Mixed Migration Regional Updates

## Venezuelan mixed migration flows

The Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela [reported](#) that, as of March 2020, the number of Venezuelans who fled their home country as a result of “one of the [largest and most underfunded](#) crisis in modern history” is at least 4.9 million. At least 100,000 Venezuelans left their country in the first three months of 2020 in search of protection and assistance. Numbers are [expected](#) to reach 6.5 million by the end of 2020, according to the Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RMRP) [2020 report](#), **with some 4,000 to 5,000 Venezuelans continuing to leave the country daily**. Updated estimates taking into account the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic are not yet available.

In Venezuela, the government mandated a nationwide quarantine beginning on March 16. COVID-19 is likely to seriously affect Venezuela, as [70 percent](#) of hospitals have only intermittent access to running water and inadequate capacity. For Venezuelans [outside of Venezuela](#), ensuring access to public health systems in neighboring countries (particularly for Venezuelans without regular status) and the potential for a rise in xenophobia in response to the crisis are particular concerns. Everywhere, [access to food](#), clean water, [shelter](#) and work for migrants and refugees, particularly [those in the informal economy](#), who become unemployed, and who used to live on daily earnings or on remittances from family in other countries affected by the crisis, are proving to be key [challenges](#). Some Venezuelans living in Colombia have become so [desperate](#) that they have begun to [return](#) to Venezuela. Reports indicate that, upon reaching Venezuelan territory from Colombia, a group of about a thousand Venezuelan returnees were prevented from returning to their home cities due to quarantine requirements and are [confined at the border without proper assistance](#).

## Movements towards South America

### Colombia

As of January 2020, nearly [1.8 million](#) Venezuelan refugees and migrants were living in Colombia, projected to rise to 2.4 million by the end of 2020. In March 2020, Colombia ordered the [closure](#) of all its land and maritime borders, as well as the suspension of international flights, as a measure to limit the transmission of COVID-19. The closure of land borders, particularly those with Venezuela, has been controversial, as experts [predict](#) that this might increase irregular crossings in areas where complete control of border crossings has [never been possible](#).

Just over 640,000 Venezuelans had a regular immigration status as of January 2020, including more than 570,000 with PEP. Migration Colombia [extended](#) the validity of the Special Stay Permit (PEP) for Venezuelans in December 2019, permitting the more than 110,000 people who obtained the permit between February and July 2018 to renew the document by June 2020; this permit is supposed to provide access to health care, education and employment. Only Venezuelan refugees and migrants who have [registered](#) through the Venezuelan Migrants Administrative Registry (“RAMV” in the Spanish acronym) and/or entered the country regularly before December 2018 are [eligible](#) for this permit. In February, Colombia launched two additional [regularization rounds](#) for Venezuelans: a [new round of applications for the PEP](#), for those who regularly entered Colombia stamping their passport before 29 November 2019; and a new type of permit,

called [PEPFE](#), for Venezuelans in Colombia who received a formal job offer. These measures are expected to benefit an additional 100,000 Venezuelans. However, nearly [60 percent](#) of Venezuelan nationals in Colombia lack regular status.

A recent study indicates that approximately 55 percent of Venezuelan households in Colombia are moderately or severely [food insecure](#). Likewise, the imposition of quarantines throughout Colombia have led to [loss of income](#) and [evictions](#) for Venezuelan migrants and refugees; groups of Venezuelans have reportedly been [transported to the Venezuelan border](#) by the Colombian government after [requesting help to return to their country](#).

## Ecuador

As of February 2020, an estimated [385,000](#) Venezuelans were living in Ecuador, projected to rise to 660,000 by the end of 2020. Venezuelan refugees and migrants continue to face Ecuador's requirement, in place since July 2019, to obtain a visa to enter the country; difficulties in obtaining the visa have led to a steep decrease in the average number of regular crossings at Ecuador's main points of entry, and the February 2020 [DTM](#) indicates that nearly 70 percent of survey respondents are in an irregular status in Ecuador. Despite closure of the border between Colombia and Ecuador due to COVID-19, movement continues through [irregular border crossings](#). [Ninety-four percent](#) of DTM respondents interviewed in Ecuador indicated this country as their final destination; new passport and visa requirements in Peru, Chile, and other countries may impact respondents' decisions.

As of February 2020, Ecuadorian authorities have [registered](#) more than 180,000 Venezuelan migrants and issued about 10,000 visas to Venezuelans who were already residing in Ecuador when the humanitarian visa requirement entered into force. Most recently, Ecuadorian authorities [extended](#) the deadline for Venezuelans to apply for humanitarian visas, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.

## Peru

Peru continues to host the second-largest number of Venezuelan refugees and migrants in the world, an estimated [862,000](#), of whom approximately 594,000 had regular migration status as of February. However, immigration restrictions and the implementation of new visa requirements in 2019 have impacted Venezuelans' ability to obtain regular status in Peru; the February 2020 [DTM](#) shows that only about 37 percent of survey respondents were admitted regularly to the country.

Following the declaration of a state of emergency and imposition of a nation-wide quarantine with mandatory curfew in light of COVID-19, there is concern that Venezuelans will not be able to receive adequate assistance. After initially declaring that migrants and refugees [would not be included in the bonus for families in poverty](#), at the end of March the government [announced](#) that Venezuelans identified as very vulnerable would be eligible to receive economic support from funding provided by the UN and donors. Notwithstanding, there is continuing [concern](#) that Venezuelan refugees and migrants will suffer discrimination in accessing essential services during the emergency, such as health and shelter.

## Brazil

To date, authorities estimate that approximately [264,000](#) Venezuelans are living in Brazil, with approximately 500 entering daily, principally through Roraima state, which shares a border with Venezuela. In January 2020, Brazil became the country with the largest number of recognized Venezuelan refugees, after the National Committee for Refugees (CONARE) recognized about [17,000](#) Venezuelans in a simplified prima facie proceeding and bringing the total number of recognized Venezuelan refugees in Brazil to about 37,000.

In Brazil, too, the closure of its international borders and social distancing measures in light of COVID-19 are [impacting](#) Venezuelan refugees and migrants, as they lose income, shelter, and livelihoods. The closure of borders has led to a “[drastic](#)” decrease in the entrance of Venezuelan refugees and migrants, and also affects access to asylum proceedings.

## Movements towards Caribbean countries

By the start of 2020, approximately [100,000](#) Venezuelans were estimated to be living in the Caribbean; this number is projected to rise to nearly 150,000 by the end of the year. About 24,300 Venezuelans were [estimated](#) to be living in Trinidad and Tobago, with figures projected to increase to 33,400 in 2020; Guyana had received about 17,000 Venezuelan refugees and migrants by the start of 2020 and could see 31,000 new migrants by the end of 2020. This would represent a [four percent](#) increase of Guyana's total population of 750,000.

As of January, there were approximately [34,000](#) Venezuelan migrants and refugees living in the Dominican Republic, projected to rise to about 41,000 by the end of the year. [Current projections](#) expect that most entries to Dominican Republic will be irregular, following the introduction of a visa requirement in December 2019.

The Dutch Caribbean (Aruba, Curacao, and other islands) imposed new [visa requirements](#) for Venezuelans, set to go into effect on April 1. The visa will be emitted for only 90 days.

## Movements towards Central and North America

An elevated number of [rejections](#) of Venezuelan asylum-seekers and migrants at airports in Mexico has been reported since December 2019.

## Mixed migration flows in Central and North America

The United States has long been the intended final destination of refugees and migrants from across the world; during recent years, Mexico has also increasingly become a country of destination, due both to the increasing difficulty of reaching the United States, and to expanded regularization options, notably asylum, in Mexico. Mixed migration flows, principally from Central America (Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua), Mexico, Cuba, Haiti, and Venezuela, as well as from Africa and Asia, transit through the Central-North American corridor towards the United States and Mexico. At the same time, restrictive measures adopted by the United States to prevent people on the move from reaching its soil, and increased immigration detention and deportation from both the United States and Mexico, have dramatically impacted migration patterns in the region, as further addressed in this issue's Thematic Focus.

### Mixed migration flows in Mexico

Between January and February 2020, 73,779 people were [detained](#) at or near the US' southern border, down 46 percent from 134,862 in the corresponding period in 2019. At the same time, as of February 2020, [62,687](#) individuals had been returned from the US to Mexico under the "Migrant Protection Protocols," better known as the "Remain in Mexico" policy, introduced in January 2019.

Mexico detained [13,578](#) migrants in January 2020, up from [8,521](#) in January 2019. In January, two new migrant caravans departed from San Pedro Sula, Honduras, northward through Guatemala and the southern Mexican state of Chiapas, on [January 14](#) and [January 31](#) 2020. Both were largely broken up and dispersed in Guatemala and [Mexico](#); in Mexico, allegations of [excessive use of force](#) by the National Guard were registered, as well as [reports](#) of deportations without access to asylum and lack of access to territory for refugees and migrants turned back to Guatemala before they could enter Mexico. Haitians [denounced](#) the deportation of some 180 refugees and migrants, who were allegedly awaiting regularization in Mexico, from Tapachula in advance of the arrival of the caravans. The response to these caravans marked a strong [contrast](#) to the more welcome reception given to caravans in 2018 and early 2019.

In March, civil society shelters across Mexico closed their doors to hosting more people on the move, [citing concerns](#) about the spread of COVID-19 and a lack of resources, quarantine facilities, sanitary protocols, and medical staff to address outbreaks in their shelters. The absence of capacity to receive and provide shelter to refugees and migrants, particularly in light of the US' new ["express" deportations under a public health order](#), is leading to humanitarian and public health concerns on Mexico's [northern](#) and [southern](#) borders. Likewise, the death of an asylum-seeker during a [protest](#) at a detention centre in southern Mexico in March highlighted the lack of sanitary conditions, overcrowding, and lack of medical attention in those facilities.

### Return flows to Mexico and Central America

Under the ["Asylum Cooperative Agreements"](#) (ACA - comparable to [Safe Third Country](#) agreements) signed over the course of 2019 between the US and Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, the US has to date returned [at least 930](#) Salvadorans and Hondurans, including 357 children, to Guatemala; other reports indicate as many as [1,100](#) transfers under the agreement. [Reports](#) indicate that as of the beginning



of March, just 14 of those returnees had [opted to seek asylum in Guatemala](#); this may be due to a [lack of official information and support](#) for these individuals, who are sent to a civil society shelter and given just 72 hours to decide whether to seek asylum in Guatemala. Those who do not seek asylum in Guatemala may [retake the journey](#) toward Mexico or choose immediate voluntary return to their countries of origin, raising concerns about chain refoulement<sup>1</sup>. It was reported in January that the US would be seeking to return even [Mexican](#) migrants to Guatemala under that ACA, though this has not been confirmed to date. As of early March, the US was [finalizing](#) implementation plans with El Salvador; however, the agreements with El Salvador and Honduras have not yet been implemented.

Implementation of the US-Guatemala ACA was [suspended](#) in March, pursuant to Guatemala's strict international travel restrictions to prevent the spread of COVID-19; notwithstanding, Guatemalan nationals [continue to be deported](#) to Guatemala. There is serious concern that continuing deportations from the US may [increase](#) the spread COVID-19 to Central American countries. This concern was exemplified by the [deportation](#) from the U.S. of a Guatemalan migrant later diagnosed with COVID.

Mexico received [18,218](#) deported Mexican nationals from the United States in January 2020, as compared to [14,066](#) in January 2019.

## Extracontinental mixed migration flows

Many African, Asian, Haitian and Cuban refugees and migrants travel from countries like Brazil and [Ecuador](#), through Colombia and northward through Panama in an attempt to reach North America. Reports of official [statistics](#) as of March 15 indicated that 85 percent of migrants currently passing through the Darien Gap, the densely forested and [notoriously dangerous](#) route from Colombia into Panama, were Haitian; migrants are then [bussed from Darién](#) north to the Costa Rican border. Additionally, a rise in the proportion of [children](#) journeying through the Darien Gap raises additional protection concerns. At the end of March, Costa Rica [accepted](#) the entry of [2,600](#) African and Haitian migrants and refugees from Panama. These people on the move were transported by [bus](#) through Costa Rica to the border with Nicaragua, and it was unclear what immigration documentation, if any, they were given by Costa Rica.

[Press reports](#) indicate the likely occurrence of collective expulsions of Haitian and African migrants from Guatemala toward neighboring countries, as removals have been reported but those nationalities are not mentioned in first-quarter deportation statistics.

Following the grant of [legal status](#) in Mexico to about 1,000 African refugees and migrants in Tapachula, Chiapas, at the end of 2019, some of these have [moved on](#) from Tapachula. The COVID-19 outbreak has caused some African migrants in northern Mexico to [reconsider](#) whether to continue the path to the United States while the pandemic is ongoing.

1 " Refoulement is also prohibited when the returning state ought to have known that the destination state might further send the individual to another state where there is a risk of ill-treatment. This is known as indirect or chain refoulement ", see [https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/asylum-procedures-ja\\_en.pdf](https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/asylum-procedures-ja_en.pdf)

# Thematic Focus: Externalization of the U.S. Border and Mexico's Migration Policy

## Impact of “Remain in Mexico” and other measures to prevent access to U.S. territory on Mexico

The current US administration has undertaken [a number of measures](#) since 2017 to [prevent access](#) to US territory for people on the move via its southern border, with important impacts on refugees and migrants transiting through Mexico and on Mexico's migration policy.

“Metering” processes, [first introduced in Tijuana in 2016 and expanded across the US-Mexico border in 2017 and 2018](#), delay asylum-seekers' access to US Ports of Entry, requiring them to wait for weeks or months on formally or informally managed “lists” until their “number” is called to be processed into the US. This policy is currently being [challenged](#) in US federal court. As of February 2020, [15,000 people](#) were estimated to be waiting on metering lists, representing a 30 percent decrease from November 2019; of this total, 11,360, or about 76 percent, are Mexican nationals, principally from violence- and poverty-stricken Guerrero, Michoacán, Oaxaca, and Chiapas states.

The “Remain in Mexico” program (formally known as the “[Migrant Protection Protocols](#)” or “MPP”), implemented in January 2019, returns both individuals subject to metering who present at U.S. Ports of Entry to request asylum, and people on the move detained in the U.S. after crossing irregularly, to Mexico, where they await their US deportation hearings. Under this program, migrants and refugees seeking admission to the US are [returned](#) to northern Mexico border towns to await their US court hearings, leaving them [stranded and exposed](#) to kidnappings, robberies, hunger, homelessness, and other dangers. Northern Mexico is in general extremely dangerous due to organized crime and drug trafficking activity, and kidnapping for ransom of individuals in MPP is [common](#) in several cities; likewise, the Mexican state that borders south Texas is designated “[Do Not Travel](#)” by the U.S. Department of State due to crime and kidnapping, yet migrants and refugees in MPP are sent there to await court hearings. Mexico, for its part, admits to its territory those returned under the MPP with the equivalent of a tourist visa, valid until their next U.S. hearing date, putting them [at risk of detention and deportation](#) if this paper is lost, stolen, destroyed, or if they are unable to return to the border for their scheduled court hearing for any reason and the status expires.

[As of February](#), 62,687 people had been subjected to this policy; of them, 31,151 had been ordered deported (many in absentia, who are presumptively in Mexico or have returned to their home countries) and 19,622 cases remained pending. Just 481 people, or 0.07 percent, had been granted immigration relief. Additionally, numerous new [regulations](#) and [precedential decisions](#) now limit asylum eligibility and aspects of due process for people on the move arriving to the US via the southern border. This policy is also being [challenged](#), and is currently on appeal at the Supreme Court.

On March 21, 2020, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) announced the [closure](#) of the US border with Mexico to “non-essential” travel to limit the

spread of COVID-19 for a 30-day period, and a policy to [immediately return](#) individuals entering via Mexico and Canada without appropriate immigration documents to those countries, or a third country or country of origin, without access to immigration proceedings in the US. Mexico [announced](#) that it would only accept returns of Salvadorans, Hondurans, and Guatemalans under this policy (as well as Mexican nationals). Early reports [indicate](#) that more than 85 percent of migrants and refugees apprehended have been of these four nationalities, and that under this policy, daily border crossings fell from over 1,000 to under 600 from March 21 to March 29. [Reports](#) at the end of March indicated that in just under two weeks, more than 7,000 migrants and refugees had been returned to Mexico without any effective non-refoulement screening.

## Mexico's migration enforcement

Following the election of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who took office in December 2018, Mexico announced its intention to [expand](#) pathways to legal status, particularly for Central American refugees and migrants; this perceived [opening](#) toward migration was considered [by some, including US government](#) officials, to be a [pull factor](#) for Central American nationals who arrived in Mexico in the first months of 2019, many of whom arrived with the so-called “migrant caravans” during that period. At the same time, Mexico came under [pressure](#) from the US to stem migration flows.

In June 2019, under threat of [tariffs](#) from the Trump Administration, Mexico and the US came to an [agreement](#) to expand the MPP across the length of the US-Mexico border, increase Mexico's immigration enforcement (which has been done in practice through the deployment of 26,000 of Mexico's newly created [National Guard](#) troops, concentrated on the [southern](#) and northern borders), and to pursue an “ongoing regional strategy” [aimed at promoting development in Central America and addressing the underlying causes of migration](#). Following this agreement, deportations from Mexico increased [33 percent](#) and returns under MPP increased. Nearly 3,500 refugees and migrants—including presumptive asylum-seekers subject to MPP—have also been returned to their home countries through IOM's “[Assisted Voluntary Return](#)” (AVR) program.

Mexico's ability to timely respond to regularization requests in this context has been challenged. Its immigration agency (known as INM), had extensive [personnel turnover](#) in 2019, leading to [delays and backlogs](#). Likewise, Mexico's refugee agency (known as COMAR in its Spanish acronym) has consistently [called for](#)—but not been granted—additional funding, as refugee claims have grown from about 3,000 in 2015 to [nearly 67,000](#) in 2019. Lack of sufficient personnel and geographic reach, as well as supervening events like the 2017 earthquake (which has left about 11,000 cases [still backlogged](#) from that time) and the [current suspension of decisions owing to COVID-19](#), [all affect COMAR's ability](#) to adjudicate refugee claims in a timely manner, leaving people on the move in legal limbo as they face long regularization wait times.

## Changing migration patterns, increased costs and danger


Increased immigration enforcement both in the US and Mexico incentivizes seeking more surreptitious migration routes, and increases the bribes and fees that must be paid to [smugglers](#) and [corrupt authorities](#). It has also driven desperate migrants and refugees to attempt new and dangerous sea routes, for example

on Mexico's Pacific coast; the [drowning](#) of a Cameroonian asylum-seeker off the coast of Chiapas state in late 2019 after the boat he and others were traveling in capsized, exemplified this new phenomenon.

A [recent report](#) by a Mexican bank indicates that the average cost to reach the US from Central America is now \$11,500: 6,500 from Central America through Mexico to the US border, plus \$5,000 to cross the US border (it was about \$1,900 in 2013). Travelling with a smuggler through Mexico may be a [strategy](#) to protect oneself along the dangerous migration route.

The high cost of this trip causes many migrants and refugees, especially Central Americans, to [take out loans](#), whether personal or against property owned in their home countries, in order to afford the trip. For people on the move who do not successfully enter the United States but are detained and deported, the result may be a spiraling circle of debt and threats, motivating new migration attempts as the only available strategy to pay off debt.


# Highlighted New Research and Reports



## [An Uneven Welcome: Latin American and Caribbean Responses to Venezuelan and Nicaraguan Migration](#)

**Migration Policy Institute | February 2020**

This report focuses on reception conditions for Venezuelan and Nicaraguan refugees and migrants in Latin America and the Caribbean, including States' practices regarding regular status (including entry requirements and regularization), as well as access to education, health care, and labor markets in destination countries. The report finds that many Latin American countries had low entry requirements, particularly for Venezuelans, but many have begun imposing visa restrictions in recent months. It suggests that this is tied to countries' "grappl[ing] with strains on already overtaxed public services, ranging from schools to hospitals, and continue to search for ways to effectively integrate new arrivals into local labor markets," and calls for new strategies, including support from the international community, to meet these challenges.



## [No way out – The humanitarian crisis for Central American migrants and asylum seekers](#)

**Doctors Without Borders | February 2020**

This report by MSF draws on extensive medical data gathered by the organization's field posts in Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras to describe the "epidemic of violence and the deterioration of economic and social conditions" that cause migrants to leave their countries, the violence to which they are exposed while in transit, and the additional violence to which measures to close the US' southern border subject Central Americans. It confirms, in line with MSF's previous reports, high levels of violence in Northern Central America comparable to war zones like Syria. The report highlights that nearly half of migrants interviewed by MSF in Mexico in 2019 mentioned at least one event involving exposure to violent situations as a key reason for deciding to leave their home countries; that more than one-third of that group were initially internally displaced for the same reason; and that nearly 60 percent of interviewees were exposed to some kind of violence along the migration route. The report also gathers important data about the violence to which programs like "Remain in Mexico" subject Central Americans; for example, 75 percent of interviewees in Nuevo Laredo in October 2019 mentioned having been kidnapped in the previous month.





## [Deported to Danger: United States Deportation Policies Expose Salvadorans to Death and Abuse](#)

**Human Rights Watch | February 2020**

This report identifies over 200 cases of individuals killed or seriously harmed following deportation to El Salvador from the United States since 2013. It cites 138 documented cases of Salvadorans killed, though the number of those killed is likely greater, and cites more than 70 instances in which deportees were subjected to sexual violence, torture, and other harm, usually at the hands of gangs, or who went missing following their return. It highlights that in many

of the documented cases, there was a clear link between the killing or harm to the deportee upon return and the reasons they had fled El Salvador in the first place; all of the cases demonstrate the risks to which Salvadorans can be exposed upon return and point to flaws and gaps in US deportation processes that permit these outcomes.




## [In Search of Safety: Peru Turns its Back on People Fleeing Venezuela](#)

**Amnesty International | February 2020**

This report analyses the rapid deterioration in Peru's reception of Venezuelan migrants and refugees. It analyses Peru's use of the humanitarian visa, created in July 2019, to deny access to territory to Venezuelans from the border with Ecuador—which in turn incentivizes irregular border crossing and leaves Venezuelans living in Peru in an irregular immigration status, exposing them to further marginalization and exclusion—and highlights ad-hoc and inconsistent decision-making during asylum proceedings, as well as narrow interpretations

of international protection mechanisms. It calls on Peru to expand protection mechanisms and ensure access to territory for Venezuelan migrants and refugees.



The MMC is a global network consisting of seven regional hubs and a central unit in Geneva engaged in data collection, research, analysis and policy development on mixed migration. The MMC is a leading source for independent and high-quality data, research, analysis and expertise on mixed migration. The MMC aims to increase understanding of mixed migration, to positively impact global and regional migration policies, to inform evidence-based protection responses for people on the move and to stimulate forward thinking in public and policy debates on mixed migration. The MMC's overarching focus is on human rights and protection for all people on the move.

The MMC is part of and governed by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC). Global and regional MMC teams are based in Amman, Copenhagen, Dakar, Geneva, Nairobi, Tunis, Bogota and Bangkok.

**For more information visit:**  
[mixedmigration.org](https://mixedmigration.org) and follow us at [@Mixed\\_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

