

DURABLE SOLUTIONS & BASELINE ANALYSIS

for the UN Peacebuilding Fund and the
Durable Solutions Working Group in Sudan

**Key obstacles to durable solutions and peacebuilding
for the displacement-affected communities in**

Jebel Moon locality, West Darfur

August 2021



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ABBREVIATIONS

DSWG Durable Solutions Working Group

CBM/CBRM Community-based management resolution mechanism/Community-based management

CBO Community-based organization

GoS Government of Sudan

IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee

IDPs Internally Displaced Persons

IOM International Organization for Migration

INGO International Non-Governmental Organization

JIPS Joint IDP Profiling Service

OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

SUDIA Sudanese Development Initiative

UN-HABITAT United Nations Human Settlements Programme

UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

WFP World Food Programme

UNAMID United Nations African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur

UNCT United Nations Country Team

KEY TERMS

Displacement affected communities: refers to displaced persons and the communities affected by their presence, such as host communities, communities in areas of return, or other areas where displaced persons are seeking a durable solution to their displacement.¹

Displaced persons: refers to internally displaced persons, whether they are physically displaced or have returned to the place they lived prior to their displacement.

Durable solutions: a durable solution is achieved when displaced persons no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement. A durable solution can be achieved through return, local integration and resettlement.²

Durable solutions process: a community-based approach to durable solutions planning, based on durable solutions targets identified by displacement-affected communities at a decentralized level, in post-conflict or post-disaster settings.³

Durable solutions analysis: the purpose of a durable solutions analysis is to provide an evidence base to inform joint responses to displacement. It entails a systematic and principled process in line with the IASC Framework, including IDPs' perspectives and preferences for future settlement options, demographic profile, and the eight durable solutions criteria. The analysis focuses on the specific realities of the displaced populations, whilst making a comparison to the non-displaced populations and taking into account the broader macro environment.⁴

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: these principles are 30 standards that outline the protections available to internally displaced people (IDPs). They detail the rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of IDPs: from the beginning of their forced displacement, to IDPs protection and assistance during displacement up to the achievement of durable solutions.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.⁵

IDP returnees/return IDPs: displaced persons that have returned to their place of origin.

Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs: the framework, endorsed by the IASC Working Committee in 2010, addresses durable solutions following

¹ The Global Cluster for Early Recovery (2017) Durable Solutions in Practice, September 2017.

² Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement (2010) IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs, April 2010.

³ The Global Cluster for Early Recovery (2017) Durable Solutions in Practice, September 2017.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ UNHCR, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 22 July 1998, ADM 1.1,PRL 12.1, PR00/98/109.

conflict and natural disasters. It describes the key human rights-based principles that should guide the search for durable solutions.

Non-displaced persons: individuals who are not displaced (and may or may not be living in the same areas as displaced persons).

Peacebuilding: involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore a relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.⁶

Protracted displacement: a situation where IDPs and returnees have been displaced for a longer time period (5 years or more) and where they still have assistance needs linked to their displacement, and are not able to enjoy their human rights for reasons caused by their displacement.⁷

Refugees: individuals displaced outside their country of nationality or habitual residence as a consequence of generalized violence, conflict or well-founded fear of persecution.⁸

Resilience: refers to the ability of displacement-affected communities to absorb and recover from shocks (such as earthquakes, droughts, floods or conflicts), while positively adapting and transforming their structures and means of living in the face of long-term stresses, change and uncertainty.⁹

Return refugees: persons who have returned to their home country after seeking international assistance abroad. The home country is legally defined as the country of former habitual residence. It is usually their country of citizenship, but it may be that of their parents or grandparents, who fled many years ago, as many crises span several generations.¹⁰

⁶ UN Peacebuilding Support Office (2010) UN Peacebuilding: an Orientation

⁷ The Global Roster for Early Recovery (2017) Durable Solutions in Practice, September 2017.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ EGRIS (2020) The International Recommendations on Refugee Statistics (IRRS).

INTRODUCTION

Three decades of war and unrest have dominated the Sudanese political and civil scene but the ousting of Omar al-Bashir in 2019 has offered a window of opportunity for a political transition in Sudan. In 2020, significant political gains were made towards achieving peace in Sudan with the signing of a peace agreement in Juba (South Sudan) between the power-sharing government and five key rebel groups.¹¹ The current signed peace agreement—a product of a Sudanese-led process—aims to address historically root causes of conflict and marginalized populations in Sudan’s conflict zones.

While the political and overall context in Sudan witnessed a historic shift in the last two years, the humanitarian and development aspects have been subject to continuous and significant challenges. Protracted and new displacements continue to be a major issue—as a result of decades of conflict and natural disasters, there are currently approximately 2.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country and 800,000 Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries.¹² In the context of efforts to build a comprehensive peace and the ongoing UNAMID drawdown, in September 2019 Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok requested that Sudan be declared eligible for the UN Peacebuilding Fund. In his request, the Prime Minister asked that funding be made immediately available in the three priorities areas identified for Darfur; namely, the rule of law, durable solutions, and peacebuilding at the community level.

Durable solutions have to be an integral part of peacebuilding. Peace in Sudan cannot be divorced from durable solutions and thus must tackle the issue of conflict and protracted displacement in Darfur. ‘There is much talk about peace, but you cannot talk about peace in Sudan in isolation from durable solutions for IDPs and the issues of land and compensation. Peace cannot be reached without addressing these issues.’¹³ The Juba Peace Agreement regards solutions for IDPs as an important element of building peace and establishes durable solutions as a key priority. The agreement looks to resolve the consequences of conflict, such as the safe and voluntary return of IDPs and refugees to their original lands, whilst also paying attention to compensation, development and reconstruction. To support this, the peace agreement contains a protocol that deals with refugee and IDP return with specific attention paid to the situation in Darfur.

Just as durable solutions are integral to peacebuilding, lack of peace is often an obstacle to achieving solutions that are durable. Thus, solutions programming needs to identify the specific challenges and address these with suitable measures. The Juba Peace Agreement acknowledges these linkages and looks to address the root causes of conflict, such as issues of identity, marginalization, the relationship between religion and state, governance, resource-sharing, land issues and social justice.

IDPs living in protracted displacement can contribute to peacebuilding or be an obstacle. In other words, internally displaced persons are both peace and conflict actors. Displacement is highly political

¹¹ Despite the non-signature of two of the most important non-state armed groups—Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) Al-Hilu faction and the Sudan Liberation Movement—Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW), negotiations continue amongst the parties to join the final agreement.

¹² OCHA (2021) Sudan Humanitarian Needs Overview, December 2020.

¹³ Donor representative quoted in Jacobsen, K. and Bjorn Mason, T. (2020) Measuring Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Darfur: Evaluation of the Pilot in El Fasher & A Lite Toolkit.

in Darfur and peacebuilding that includes IDPs and displacement affected communities are less likely to fail. Hence, peacebuilding and supporting durable solutions for IDPs must go together.¹⁴

The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) portfolio involves programming in all of Darfur's five states that supports and underpins peace. The programme strategy recognizes that durable solutions for IDPs, the rule of law and local conflict resolution are building blocks for peace but also interdependent. To build peace and support durable solutions for IDPs and returnees, PBF programming pays special attention to addressing the root causes of Darfur's conflict, thus creating a conducive environment for return and integration of IDPs, strengthening local conflict resolution mechanisms, peacebuilding capacities and the rule of law.

At the request of the Government of Sudan, an integrated political and peacebuilding mission, UNITAMS, has been established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 2524 (2020). UNITAMS and its integrated UNCT partners are mandated to support Sudan in achieving a successful transition. UNITAMS has four strategic objectives.¹⁵ The peacebuilding objective provides for support to the implementation of the peace process. It will sustain peace through legitimate and functioning State institutions that provide basic security, protection and services to the population with full respect for the rule of law and human rights.

A JOINT ANALYSIS AND MULTI-STAKEHOLDER APPROACH

The Durable Solutions Working Group (DSWG) in Sudan has been a consistent forum championing joint durable solutions analysis to address protracted displacement. Commencing in 2017, the DSWG oversaw two durable solutions pilots respectively in rural Um Dukhun and two IDP camps situated on the outskirts of El Fasher in North Darfur. The working group followed up this work by commissioning a learning review of the pilots with input and feedback provided by all DSWG members.

The resulting 'lite' durable solutions toolkit and recommendations have provided the foundation and starting point for the PBF programme in Darfur.¹⁶ The DSWG continues to play a strategic role by overseeing and coordinating the overall durable solutions work process and deliverables. In equal measures, the consultative process and the evidence produced need to support the wider humanitarian-development-peace work in Sudan.¹⁷

Darfur's internal displacement dynamics are complex. This demands that humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors require a *shared* multi-sectorial analysis of the needs of the displacement affected communities. Following the collaborative approach piloted in El Fasher, a particular emphasis has been placed on generating shared data and engaging all major stakeholders including IDPs, local and state authorities. Accordingly, the Peacebuilding Fund partners combined all data collection activities using *one* methodology approach and *one* coordinated data collection in eight localities across the five Darfur states—Tawilla, Assalaya, Yassin, Sheiria, Nertiti, Um Dhukun,

¹⁴ Humanitarian Policy Forum, 2020, Policy Brief 77: Achieving Durable Solutions by including displacement-affected communities in peacebuilding.

¹⁵ The four strategic objectives of UNITAMS under SCR 2524 (2020) are: (i) Assist the political transition, progress towards democratic governance, in the protection and promotion of human rights, and sustainable peace. (ii) Support peace processes and implementation of future peace agreements. (iii) Assist peacebuilding, civilian protection, and rule of law, in Darfur and the Two Areas. (iv) Support the mobilization of economic and development assistance and coordination of humanitarian assistance.

¹⁶ Jacobsen, K. and Bjorn Mason, T. (2020) Measuring Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Darfur: Evaluation of the Pilot in El Fasher & A Lite Toolkit.

¹⁷ The Durable Solutions Working Group (DSWG) is co-chaired by UNHCR, UNDP and DRC. The working group is mandated to inform and advise, develop policy and coordinate work on durable solutions. DSWG is placing a strong focus on data and HLP issues with sub-working groups dedicated to these issues.

Gereida and Jebel Moon¹⁸—where they are carrying out comprehensive, area-based joint peacebuilding programming.

ACTORS

The DSWG is central to the Durable Solutions Analysis and Baseline process—it not only oversees the durable solutions analysis process and coordinates work streams but also guarantees data has visibility with government authorities as well as the broader humanitarian and development community in Sudan. And works to ensure that data and analysis is used for planning and programming at the locality level and feed into national policy. Support from the Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS) was requested by the DSWG to develop the methodology approach and indicators for both the survey and area-level analysis. JIPS also conducted the analysis of the results, all in a consultative manner. Remote support and expertise plus Khartoum deployment of a JIPS technical adviser has given quality assurance and provided technical support to field operations and built capacity for the teams deployed in Darfur.

The PBF projects are implemented by UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, IOM, UN-Habitat and FAO. The partners have actively taken part in designing the methodology by offering thematic expertise and on-the-ground knowledge of the Darfur localities to develop the indicators and data collection tools. Partners have also been key to raising awareness at the village and locality level, assisting with the training of enumerator teams and trouble-shooting with challenges at the field level in Darfur.

IOM managed all components and stages of the household survey including pre-fieldwork missions, training of enumerators, and operational management of the field data collection. Sudanese Development Initiative (SUDIA), an experienced national NGO, has been leading the qualitative area-level data collection and analysis. Tasks included development of the qualitative tools, training of interviewers, and identification of respondents in all localities before implementing the key informant interviews and focus group discussions.

PROCESS OVERVIEW

- Methodology approach and objectives shaped with PBF agencies and the DSWG.
- Indicators for population and area-level developed and agreed.
- Survey tools and qualitative tools developed and reviewed by partners and experts.
- Sampling approach designed.
- Testing of the survey tool.
- Pre-field work missions to inform sampling and sketch target villages.
- Training of field teams in all states and pilots.
- Data collection: survey and area-level (December 2020 and January 2021).
- Data analysis of survey results and area-level results jointly, including several thematic consultations with PBF agencies, DSWG and experts for validation.
- Locality-level report with the durable solutions analysis and baseline finalised.

OBJECTIVES OF DURABLE SOLUTIONS & BASELINE ANALYSIS

The durable solutions and baseline analysis exercises in each of the target localities in Darfur aim to:

¹⁸ Making use of a single methodology and joint data collection in all eight localities also sought to mainstream indicators and allow for a holistic analysis to avoid overburdening communities.

- Provide the foundation for analysis of displaced and non-displaced populations' progress towards durable solutions, including IDPs, IDP returnees, return refugees and nomads as an integral element to the peacebuilding process.
- Inform PBF programming and durable solutions Action Plan development in each Darfur target locality.
- Provide the baseline of the agreed-upon PBF outcome indicators for measuring programme impact.
- Inform broader Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (HDP) programming beyond the PBF.

METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

The methodology approach was developed based on consultations with the PBF agencies and the DSWG and was strongly shaped by the learning that emerged from the durable solutions analysis conducted in El Fasher in 2019.¹⁹ JIPS consolidated the combination of methods and made sure that agency programming needs, as well as the durable solutions analysis needs, were met. The indicators,²⁰ the household survey tool, the key informant interview questions and the joint analysis plan were reviewed in several rounds by all PBF agencies, relevant technical experts and local partner SUDIA.

TARGET GROUPS & LOCATIONS

The Jebel Moon household survey targeted 12 settlements.²¹ The target groups and locations were identified by UNHCR, as the PBF lead agency in West Darfur, in coordination with the authorities at the locality level. The data collection covered four target groups: IDPs in displacement (out of camps), IDPs that have returned to their village of origin (IDP returnees), returned refugees, non-displaced residents and, lastly, nomads residing in damrahs.

A MIXED-METHODS METHODOLOGY

Both primary qualitative and quantitative data inform the analysis of progress towards durable solutions at the locality level presented in this report. The approach consists of both a sample-based household survey and area-level key informant interviews. The survey data has been used to produce socio-economic population profiles for each target group at the locality level to conduct a comparative analysis between the groups.

The area-level data collection included a total of 15 key informant interviews (KIIs) targeting respondents in Jebel Moon locality. Originally there were plans to include state-level respondents, but tensions in El Geneina during the time of data collection restricted free movement in El Geneina and the research therefore only includes respondents from the locality level. In Jebel Moon, KIIs were conducted with six basic service representatives (education, health, police, judiciary, land and WES) as well as with local government and native administration representatives. In addition, eight community members were interviewed, including nomads, IDPs, farmers, women and youth as well as one representative from Concern, an INGO working in Jebel Moon locality. The qualitative data collection took place in two phases; in December 2020 but due to insecurity the field mission was disrupted and the data collected was insufficient. Thus, additional data was collected in April 2021. Analysis of the interviews and focus groups discussion focused on the context at the locality level concerning land and resource management, conflict resolution mechanisms, service provision, rule of law and civic participation.

¹⁹ UNCT, Government of Sudan, JIPS and World Bank (2019). Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Abu Shouk and El Salam IDP camps: Durable Solutions Analysis, Sudan.

²⁰ The PBF indicators were based on: technical lessons from the interagency durable solutions profiling in El Fasher, the PBF Results Framework plus the Interagency Durable Solutions Indicator Library. <https://inform-durablesolutions-idp.org/>

²¹ Target settlements in Jebel Moon include: Aburemail, Bardy, Donkya (Dianga), Gozminno, Hajar Habeel, Hijilija, Jiliel, Kishkesh, Manjura, Mastriha, Seleh, Semema.

SAMPLING APPROACH

The sampling followed a stratified multi-stage sampling approach in which villages were the primary sampling unit (PSU) and households were the secondary sampling unit (SSU), while stratification was done by target group. A random sample of households was then selected either based on systematic skips or systematic snowballing. Data collection took place in January 2021.

Considering the gender distribution of the respondents in the survey, 36% were male and 64% were female. The distribution varies by target group: among returnees (IDPs and returned refugees) as well as IDPs, the distribution is approximately 40% female and 60% male. Among non-displaced residents and nomads residing in damrahs, the gender distribution is ca. 30% male and 70% female.²²

The samples of the non-displaced and IDPs are urban, while the returnee samples are distributed between towns and villages: return refugees were captured 60% in towns and 40% in villages, and IDP returnees were captured 34% in towns and 66% in villages. All nomads interviewed resided in damrahs, as per the decision by PBF agencies to specifically target damrahs.²³

TABLE 1: POPULATION BASELINE FOR TARGET LOCATIONS UNDER THE PBF AND SAMPLES (TARGET AND ACHIEVED) BY TARGET GROUP IN JEBEL MOON LOCALITY

Target group	Population baseline ²⁴	Target sample	Collected sample (individuals)	Collected sample (households)
Non-displaced	3,122	380	923	193
Returnees (IDP returnees & return refugees)	3,386	363	2,858	542
IDPs (out of camps)	2,785	350	1,097	231
Nomads in damrahs	1,333	320	1,706	349

SAMPLING LIMITATIONS & SPECIFICATIONS

Following limitations and specifications should be kept in mind when reading the analysis:

- The sampling is designed to produce results representative for each target group in the selected geographic scope within the locality. Analysis at the village/town/camp level is not possible, and therefore no reference to specific settlements or breakdown by villages, towns or camps is performed in the report. Generalisation to the whole of Jebel Moon locality is also not possible without the required weights to adjust to the total population size of each target group in the locality. **Results are thus representative for each target group within the targeted geographic scope of the PBF.**

²² The distribution of respondents by sex in each target group is as follows: non-displaced (31% men and 69% women), IDPs (42% men and 58% women), IDP returnees (37% men and 63% women), return refugees (41% men and 59% women), and nomads (28% men and 72% women).

²³ During a meeting in Jebel Moon, nomad community representatives indicated to PBF programme staff that concentrating services in urban areas would significantly disadvantage nomad communities in terms of access to services.

²⁴ Population baseline estimates for the target locations were provided in August 2020 by UNHCR as the lead PBF agency in West Darfur.

- The achieved sample size for non-displaced and for IDPs are significantly lower than the target, and thus the results will need to be interpreted with caution.²⁵ For this reason, some of the smaller variations observed for these groups are not highlighted.
- The survey intended to identify IDP returnees, however, considerably more return refugees were identified than was expected. In the overview above, these have been grouped together, however, international standards for displacement statistics recommend that return refugees are not counted as IDPs upon return, regardless of the period of time they were abroad, in order to avoid double counting in official statistics.²⁶ **Therefore, in the analysis, the two groups (IDP returnees and return refugees) are analysed separately.** The sample size for IDP returnees is 108 households (HHs) and for return refugees 434 HHs. The sample for IDP returnees is quite small and should therefore be interpreted with caution, while more focus will be placed on the results concerning the returned refugees.

²⁵ The exact reason for lower the sample collected is not clear; it can be either linked to lower population numbers encountered or due to data collection limitations.

²⁶ EGRIS (2020) The International Recommendations on Refugee Statistics (IRRS).

DISPLACEMENT HISTORY AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

What is the general demographic profile of the target populations? In Jebel Moon the survey captured the returnee populations (IDP returnees and returned refugees), IDPs, nomads residing in damrahs and non-displaced residents. The basic demographics and the displacement history will be used to understand the key characteristics of the target populations. Breaking the population data into smaller sub-populations based on basic demographics such as sex, age, location, capacities, vulnerabilities and displacement characteristics, makes it possible to discern how different sub-groups within each target group are faring in comparison, thereby acknowledging that each target group is not a homogeneous entity.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **The population in Jebel Moon is overall very young; 58% (IDP returnees), 60% (returned refugees), 56% (IDPs), 57% (non-displaced) and 62% of nomads are below the age of 20 years.**
- **Female-headed households make up a significant part of the population among all groups. A third of households are headed up by a woman although a slightly higher proportion of nomad households are female-headed (35%).**
- **Literacy rates are much lower among the nomad population; respectively 20% of men and 2% of nomad women can read and write. Literacy is also much lower among women compared to men. Non-displaced (66%), IDP returnee (77%), returned refugee (79%) and 83% of IDP men are literate compared to 32–35% of women.**
- **The vast majority of IDPs (69%) have lived more than 10 years in their current settlement, and 29% arrived 5–10 years ago. One-fourth of the IDP returnee population (25%) and 20% of return refugees relocated back to Jebel Moon more than 10 years ago.**
- **IDPs retain a connection to their place of origin, as 64% have gone back at least once since they were displaced, most on a more regular basis due to farming.**

WEST DARFUR—JEBEL MOON LOCALITY

Jebel Moon is a locality in West Darfur situated north of the state capital El Geneina. The locality borders Central Darfur and Chad to the West. The locality is inhabited mainly by the Misseriya Jebel but also Fur sedentary farming communities. The nomadic and semi-nomadic sub-clans in Jebel Moon are reported to include the Eiregat, Awlad ChawChaw and Awlad Zeed, but members of Awlad Jaboub, Awlad Ghanem and Awlad Karamallah, which belong to Mahamid sub-clans, are also found in Jebel Moon locality. Many of the tribes in West Darfur have homelands that extends into Chad and have tribesmen on both sides of the international border, which has eased resettlements during the Darfur crisis. Livelihoods are mainly dependent on crop agriculture, animal resources, trade and mining.

Conflict in Darfur has often been presented to be between ‘Arab’ against ‘African’ tribes, however, it is not necessarily a helpful lens to view the conflict because present-day identities ‘operate within a

system of perceptions' that are largely ideological distinctions.²⁷ And such distinctions can move attention away from the political nuances of the conflict.

The situation in West Darfur was relatively calm during the last decade but with three large clashes between Arab armed groups and Masalit since 2019, two of which were on Kirinding IDP camp in El Geneina, the situation is fragile and has a high potential for relapse into conflict.²⁸ The surge in violence in both urban and in rural locations in West Darfur has been linked to the withdrawal of the UN joint mission in Darfur (UNAMID), whose presence acted as a deterrent.

The conflict dynamics in Jebel Moon, along with the Sirba and Kulbus localities that make up the northern part of West Darfur, are very different to El Geneina and other areas of West Darfur State, where most of the population is Masalit. Both the tribal composition and conflict trajectory is different in Jebel Moon. The majority of the inhabitants of Jebel Moon locality belong to the Misseriya Jebel tribe and the area was a stronghold of one of the former rebel groups, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).²⁹ Previously, the area of Jebel Moon was the site of clashes between JEM and government forces, which caused a large proportion of the population to take refuge across the border in Chad, of whom many have yet to return to Sudan. JEM is a signatory to the Juba Peace Agreement and are currently strongly pro the transitional government, which has resulted in a significant reduction of violence and the locality is now relatively stable compared to other parts of West Darfur. Conflict and disputes have been reported to take place in Jebel Moon locality, but the nature of the violence has changed. Conflict is now primarily linked to access over natural resources including water or during the rainy season in relation to access to farm land.³⁰ And during May 2020, conflict over the control of a gold mine in Girji was also reported.

An additional concern is that if more of the 300,000 Sudanese refugees in Chad decide to return—of whom many originate from West Darfur—which could ignite further conflict over natural resources.³¹ Return of refugees in large numbers could have a significant impact on the situation in Jebel Moon locality, as local authorities indicate that a huge proportion of the area's population was displaced across the border in Chad between 2003-05.³²

Jebel Moon locality has seen fluctuating numbers of Sudanese arriving from across the border during 2020 due to tribal conflict in neighbouring Chad. Other refugees chose to return because they were not allowed to cultivate or graze animals, and thus it was hard for refugee families to make a living. In February 2020, 27,000 Sudanese arrived in Jebel Moon that resulted in a huge increase in population numbers and put pressure on services and natural resources. Potentially due to the deteriorating security situation in West Darfur, UNHCR recorded that 24,000 returnees had travelled back to Chad during April and May 2020. Thus, population movements into Jebel Moon are expected to have a direct impact on peace and stability in the locality.³³

²⁷ Prunier, G. (2005) *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*.

²⁸ Tubiana, J. (2021) 'The revolution was hi-jacked': Inside the conflict in Darfur, Al Jazeera, 6 July 2021.

²⁹ The Misseriya Jebel are not to be confused with the Misseriya, which is an 'Arab' sub-clan in South Darfur and Kordofan.

³⁰ PBF programme staff, West Darfur, Nyala.

³¹ UN Peacebuilding Fund, December 2019, West Darfur project document.

³² PBF staff meeting with Jebel Moon local authorities, 2021.

³³ UN Peacebuilding Fund, December 2019, West Darfur project document.

BASIC POPULATION DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE SAMPLE

According to the latest Humanitarian Need Overview, Jebel Moon has a total population of 66,517, with 29,771 returnees (from 2003-2019).³⁴ The targeted locations in Jebel Moon locality for the survey were identified by UNHCR, the PBF lead agency in West Darfur, together with the local authorities based on the programmatic scope of the fund.³⁵ Therefore, the samples captured by target group are not necessarily representative of each target group across the locality. Specifically, all IDPs and non-displaced targeted resided in urban areas. Returned refugees are distributed between towns (60%) and villages (40%), while IDP returnees are distributed between towns (34%) and villages (66%). All surveyed nomad households resided in damrahs—temporary settlements that are used by nomads.³⁶ The achieved samples for IDP returnees and return refugees reveal very different relative sizes of these two groups compared to the expected population sizes.³⁷ This probably means that return refugees are often accounted for as return IDPs, while it is less likely to be explained by population movements just prior to the data collection.³⁸ Returned refugees, mostly arriving from neighbouring Chad, thus appear to make up a very big proportion of the returnees in the target areas of Jebel Moon locality.

It is worth noting that classifications are helpful tools, but that it is important to be aware of the conceptual limitations they impose:

- International standards for displacement statistics recommend that **return refugees** are not counted as IDPs upon return, regardless of the period of time they were abroad, to avoid double-counting in official statistics.³⁹ In the analysis, the two groups (IDP returnees and return refugees) are analyzed separately and compared. Attention is given to the extent to which these two groups differ as well as the similarities found when analyzing their re-integration process.⁴⁰ Given the proximity and porous nature of the border, it will be discussed whether the conceptual separation of these two groups reflects actual differences or not.
- **Nomads** and pastoralism are generally viewed in opposition to crop farming and sedentary livelihoods, and further complexity follows from the fact that in Sudan the words ‘nomad’ and ‘pastoralism’ refer to economic activity as well as a cultural identity, whilst in reality, the two do not always overlap. Defining nomads against the rural sedentary population can have a number of conceptual consequences; mobility becomes the defining feature of what it means to be nomadic; it creates a contrast between mobility and sedentary so that people can either belong to one classification or the other. Also, by defining nomads based on tribal identity (from the 1970s onwards),⁴¹ ‘the classification excludes in principle that people can move across the categories:

³⁴ OCHA (2021) Humanitarian Needs Overview Sudan, December 2020. Separate estimates on nomads are not provided. The provided estimate for IDPs is 428, however the population baseline provided by UNHCR for the targeted scope of the survey within the Jebel Moon locality amounted to 2,785 IDPs living outside of camps).

³⁵ See the methodology section in the Introductions’ chapter for details on target locations and baseline population figures for the targeted geographic scope.

³⁶ Specifically in Motor Alom (north).

³⁷ See methodology section in introductory chapter for details on sample sizes and population baselines.

³⁸ The vast majority of return refugees report having returned since more than 5 years ago (71%).

³⁹ EGRIS (2020) International Recommendations on Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (IRIS). March 2020.

⁴⁰ Re-integration of return refugees is referred to as ‘re-establishment’, however, in this report we will be using the term ‘re-integration’ given the joint analysis with the IDP returnees.

⁴¹ In Sudan, the 1955-56 census defined nomads (rohal) by their practice of mobile livestock keeping. But in the 1973 and 1983 census ‘nomads’ were no longer defined by their lifestyle but by administrative categorization that associated them with a northern identity: a person owing an allegiance to a nomadic sheik. Hence ‘nomads were in practice defined on an administrative bases rather than by empirical observation. Krätli et al. (2013) Standing Wealth: Pastoralist Livestock Production and Local Livelihoods in Sudan.

people belonging to a 'nomadic' tribe remain 'nomads' even if they settle. The definition of 'nomads' in relation to both mobility and tribe institutionalizes the confusion between economic practices and cultural identity.⁴² In this study, the surveyed households residing in damrahs may not all be viewed as nomadic if considered by their actual strategies of production; better definitions could include agro-pastoralist or semi-nomadic to describe the population. Environmental factors and the conflict in Darfur have demanded flexibility and dynamic adaptation from all population groups, and the inflexibility embedded in the classification will not always be adequate if used as an analytical tool for informing livelihoods and economic development interventions.

The household survey shows that the demographic characteristics are similar among the target population groups in Jebel Moon. The population in Jebel Moon locality is young—the proportion of persons below the age of 20 years is 58% (IDP returnees), 60% (returned refugees), 56% (IDPs), 57% (non-displaced) and 62% among nomads. 24–27% in all population groups are aged between 20 and 39 years, while older people only make up a small proportion of the population (13–17%).

When it comes to gender distribution, there is approximately a 50/50 split between men and women in all population groups. About a third of households are headed up by a woman among all population groups, however, a slightly higher percentage (35%) of the nomad households are female-headed.⁴³

The size of the household is similar for the surveyed non-displaced, return IDP and nomad groups; 64–66% of households have between one and five members, 29–34% of households are made up of six to nine members, and only a small proportion (1–7%) have ten or more members. IDP and return refugee households are bigger; 48% (IDP) and 56% (return refugee) households have 1–5 members, while 48% of IDP and 39% of return refugee households comprise six to nine members and 3–4% have 10-plus members.


To gain a more complete picture of household vulnerability, the household survey also recorded whether any family members have a disability. Between 4–5% of men and women across all population groups report having a disability that stops them from 'coping with all the things they need to'. There are no significant differences between age groups; more or less equal numbers of older and younger people are living with a disability. Those that report a disability say that it is 'somewhat' or 'very' difficult to cope indicating that their life is impacted significantly.

Literacy rates are used to gauge literacy skills, which span a range of proficiencies. Literacy, the ability to read and write amongst those above 15 years of age, is much lower among nomads as only 20% of nomad men and 2% of women are literate. Overall, a much higher proportion of men are literate than women. Non-displaced (66%), IDP returnee (77%), returned refugee (79%) and 83% of IDP men are literate compared to 32–35% of women.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Respectively return IDPs (27%), return refugee (28%), non-displaced (30%) and 33% of IDP households are headed up by a woman.

FIGURE 1: LITERACY (ABILITY TO READ AND WRITE) AMONG ALL PERSONS 15 YEARS OF AGE AND ABOVE BY SEX (SDG 4.6.1 A)



The age-dependency ratio is used to understand the pressure on the working-age population (15–65 years) to provide for the dependent family members—children 14 years or younger and adult family members above the age of 65 years.⁴⁴ The findings show that between 40–49% of households across the target groups have a heavier burden placed on the working-age members to provide for the family, meaning that the working age members expected to provide for the household are less than then dependent members. Interestingly, around 4–6% of the households in all groups are composed only of family members below 15 years or older than 65 years (dependent members).

It is common for households to have at least one household member who is away for more than 6 months per year, primarily for work purposes (and fewer cases for education or other reason). The proportion of households with a member away varies somewhat: between 18–22% among non-displaced and returned refugees and nomads, while it drops to 13% among IDP returnees and rises to 33% among IDPs.⁴⁵

DISPLACEMENT & MIGRATION HISTORY

The profiling household survey looked at the displacement history of refugee and IDP returnees and IDPs (out of camps) focusing on the movement between displacement and place of origin. 99% of IDPs originate from Jebel Moon locality and the vast majority (69%) have stayed in their current settlement for more than 10 years, whilst the remaining 29% of IDPs in Jebel Moon locality arrived between 5 and 10 years ago. The majority of IDPs (73%) were displaced more than 10 years ago, hence before 2020,⁴⁶ while the remaining were forced to flee their place of origin between 5 and 10 years ago. Considering the connection of IDPs to their place of origin, 64% have gone back at least once since they were displaced. Of those that have made the journey back, 45% have been back less than 5 times, 30% went 5-10 times, while 24% have been back to their place of origin more than 10 times, indicating a more regular connection. The main reason for making the journey back is to farm the land (72%), but some IDPs (14%) go to check on their land or dwelling. Livelihoods are thus still linked to the place of origin for many IDPs through seasonal farming.


⁴⁴ It is the ratio of those not in the labour force (children below 15 years and adults older than 65 years) in relation to the working-age population (15-64 years). The higher the ratio, the greater the pressure is on the working-age members to provide for the dependent family members.

⁴⁵ The small sample of IDP returnees should be kept in mind.

⁴⁶ The household survey did not capture the exact year that households were displaced, therefore, it is not possible to know during which wave of fighting households fled. Note, that it is possible that IDPs that left their place of origin more than 10 years ago could have been displaced during the beginning of the war (2003–05).

Looking at the IDP returnees, who have now come back to their place of origin in Jebel Moon, 25% returned more than 10 years ago, while 39% returned between 5 and 10 years; the remaining 33% returned more recently. Almost all returned refugees (99%) are also originally from Jebel Moon, and have returned to their locality of origin⁴⁷. 20% returned more than 10 years ago, half of them returned between 5 and 10 years ago, 28% between 1 and 4 years ago. The vast majority (91%) were displaced (for the first time) more than 10 years ago (before 2010). Most of the households (78%) did return to their place of origin while in displacement and more than half of them returned more than 10 times, indicating a more regular connection. The majority (78%) of those, who had been keeping a connection to their place of origin while in displacement did so due to farming, while 15% returned to check on land or dwelling.

FIGURE 2: IDPS' LENGTH OF TIME IN THEIR CURRENT SETTLEMENT AND DURATION OF RETURN OF IDP RETURNNEES AND RETURN REFUGEES



The survey also looked at nomads' movement patterns. The vast majority of surveyed nomads (82%) indicated that they are from Jebel Moon locality, and 8% and 3% are respectively from Kulbus and Sirba locality. 85% indicate that they have followed the designated migration routes, for the remaining who did not, the reasons are mainly 'looking for land and water', while 6% also point to increased crime and safety risks as reasons for diverting from these routes that are set out.

⁴⁷ This does not necessarily also mean that they have returned to their village or town of origin. This information was not directly collected, but can be deduced from the analysis of intentions for the future, where data shows that 18% of return refugee households would like to return to their village/town of origin (which then must be somewhere else within the Jebel Moon locality).

LIVELIHOODS AND HOUSEHOLD COPING STRATEGIES

Access to livelihoods is a key factor for local integration—durable solutions for displaced populations (IDPs, IDP returnees and returned refugees) require access to employment and livelihoods akin to that of the non-displaced population; while often livelihoods of all displacement and conflict-affected populations are impacted. Considering in more detail households' sources of income and coping strategies provides a more nuanced picture and a better understanding both of particular vulnerabilities as well as of the livelihood opportunities. Sustainable livelihoods and access to required resources is a key challenge in post-conflict settings and an important element to post-conflict redevelopment.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **A majority of both non-displaced and displaced communities rely on crop farming as their main source of income. Among the non-displaced (83%), IDPs (85%) and returnee (88–90%) populations, the vast majority report crop farming as their main income source. Among nomads residing in damrahs, half (52%) also rely on crop farming as their main source of livelihood and 34% depend on livestock.**
- **A significant proportion of female-headed households rely on aid as their main source of income: 14% of non-displaced, 10% of IDP, 5% of return refugee and 8% of nomad female-headed households in contrast to 1–5% of male-headed households.**
- **Own-use agriculture (farming or livestock) is the main occupation of the working age population across all groups and for both women and men (50–61% among men and 62–71% among women).**
- **The proportion working for profit or pay is much lower across the groups, but it is higher among men compared to women across all groups, with the starkest difference found among nomads as 32% of men work for profit or pay compared to only 7% of women. Among both non-displaced and displaced groups, male employment ranges between 19–32% and female employment 8–16%.**
- **All population groups point to the same obstacles to finding work: irregular or lack of work opportunities as well as inadequate or lack of skills. Among women, handicraft skills are highlighted as well as agricultural skills and food processing. While among men, agricultural know-how and masonry skills are requested. Nomad men request further knowledge and training on animal husbandry to a high degree.**
- **The proportion of young men not in education, employment or training (NEET rate) ranges between 2–9% across displaced and non-displaced groups, among nomad male youth reaching 14%. Higher proportion of young women (18–20%) across both displaced and non-displaced groups, and with a significantly higher proportion among young nomad women (45%) fall within this category.**
- **A higher proportion of non-displaced residents (27%) and IDPs (25%) report violence and attacks to be a shock to their livelihood compared to 19% of return refugees and 17% of nomads.**

MAIN LIVELIHOOD SOURCES

Agriculture is central to people’s livelihoods. The household survey shows that a majority of both non-displaced and displaced communities rely on crop farming as their main source of income. Among non-displaced (83%), IDPs (85%) and returnees (88–90%), the vast majority report crop farming as their main income source, while only 3–6% across the population groups report salaries and wages as a key income course. Half of the nomads residing in damrahs (52%) also rely on crop farming as their main source of livelihood. Among the surveyed damrah communities, 34% rely on livestock. Only a small minority of households across all surveyed population groups rely on aid (3–6%) and remittances (1–3%).


Across all groups, about one-third report that they have no secondary source of income, with the IDPs being the exception, as 43% reported having no second source of income. About one fifth across the all the population groups report crop farming as their second main income source. Livestock is reported by 12–14% among non-displaced and returnees, while only 3% of IDPs have livestock as a second income source. Among nomads, 25% indicate livestock as their second source of livelihoods. Wages, selling of wood as well as aid is reported by smaller proportions ranging between 5% and 16% across all groups.

Considering differences between male and female-headed households, the findings show that it is mainly female-headed households that rely on aid as their main income source: 14% among non-displaced, 10% among IDPs, 5% among return refugees and 8% among nomads (compared to male-headed households where between 1–5% across the population groups report aid as a key income source. Among nomads in the damrahs, equal proportions of male-headed households rely on crop farming (44%) and livestock (43%), while female-head households are more likely to rely on crop farming (52%) compared to livestock (34%).

MAIN OCCUPATION: EMPLOYMENT AND ‘OWN-USE’ AGRICULTURE

Own-use agriculture (farming or livestock) is the main occupation of the working age population across all groups and for both women and men (with 50–61% among men and 62–71% among women). The proportion working for profit or pay is much lower across the groups, while it is higher among men compared to women across all groups, with the starkest difference found among nomads as 32% of men work compared to only 7% of women. Among both non-displaced and displaced groups, male employment ranges between 19-32% and female employment 8–16%.

FIGURE 3: EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS BY TARGET POPULATION AND SEX



UNDER-EMPLOYMENT

Considering under-employment provides a better grasp of people's employment circumstances. For example, are those who are working searching for more work? Looking for additional work could indicate that people's current work is not providing enough income to support the household. And looking closer at how much people are working can expose whether people are only working part-time or during certain months of the year. In Jebel Moon, approximately half across the targeted displaced and non-displaced groups (engaged in subsistence farming or working for profit or pay) are looking for additional work with similar proportion among men and women. Among nomads, only 26% of men and 17% of women are looking for more work. All population groups point to the same obstacles to finding work (or extra work): irregular or lack of work opportunities as well as inadequate or lack of skills. Among women handicraft skills are highlighted, as well as agricultural skills and food processing. While among men, agricultural skills and masonry skills are requested. Among nomad men, further animal husbandry knowledge and skills are requested by a high proportion.

The mobile phone network is reported to be very poor in Jebel Moon locality. The household survey looked at mobile phone ownership and, despite the poor network coverage, found that a high proportion of households own a mobile phone. Between 42–53% of men in the displaced and non-displaced groups own a mobile phone, while a smaller proportion of nomad men report owning a mobile phone (37%). Among women, 12–29% own a phone—nomad women have the lowest proportion of mobile phone ownership (12%), while the highest proportion is found among IDP women (29%). A recent ILO report on East Darfur points out that mobile phones could make it easier for businesses and cooperatives to reach markets at the regional, state and potentially at the national level. Also, the Bank of Khartoum has launched a mobile money service (MBok) that has the potential to provide access to banking services despite the absence of financial services providers. With regards to developing skills, repairing mobile phones could become a useful skill for young people in the target communities.⁴⁸

Using a different lens to view under-employment takes into account how much people are working. The vast majority of Jebel Moon residents who work in 'own-use' production only work between 5–8 months per year, and hence subsistence farming is a very seasonal occupation. 88% of non-displaced and IDPs as well as 85% of return refugees and 94% of IDP returnees engaged in subsistence farming work only 5–8 months. This is the case for 62% of nomads as 28% work 9–12 months. Working for profit or pay include occupations that are more distributed along a continuum stretching from seasonal (5–8 months) to full-time (9–12 months). Among non-displaced residents and IDP returnees, the proportion between seasonal and full time is evenly distributed. A majority, 59% of IDPs and 64% of return refugees, work seasonally, while one-third work 9–12 months. Nomad damrah residents stand out with merely 19% working seasonally, while a majority (73%) of the 32% of nomads who work for profit or pay do so for 9–12 months per year on average.

OUTSIDE THE LABOUR FORCE


The population referred to as 'outside of the labour force' are persons, who are of working-age (15–64 years) but economically inactive. The household survey results show relatively lower numbers for this group, compared to other localities in Darfur analysed under PBF. In Jebel Moon, the results point

⁴⁸ ILO (2021) PROSPECTS Sudan Baseline Survey. Draft report. March 2021

to 16–22% of working-age men and 21–27% of working-age women from displaced and non-displaced communities being out of work. Notably fewer nomad damrah residents are out of the labour force: respectively 9% men and 32% women of working-age. Women in this group neither work for profit or pay nor are involved in ‘own-use’ production, and instead report taking care of their family and house or studying as their main occupation.

When disaggregating this data further by age, figures show that a significantly larger proportion is found among the youth aged 15–24 years. Among male and female youths, 35–48% across displaced and non-displaced groups are outside the labour force, in contrast to only 8–19% among the age group 24–64 years. Nomads stand out with the highest ‘out of labour force’ proportion also among the age group 25-64 when it comes to women.

FIGURE 4: WORKING-AGE POPULATION BY AGE WHO ARE OUTSIDE THE LABOUR FORCE (I.E. NOT WORKING FOR PROFIT/PAY AND NOT ENGAGED IN OWN-USE PRODUCTION)




The proportion of youth not in education, employment or training (NEET rate) is a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicator.⁴⁹ It shows the number of young persons as a percentage of the total youth population, who are not in education, employment or training and hence conveys information about the labour market situation for the population of young people. In the targeted areas of Jebel Moon, the NEET rate is relatively lower compared to other localities in Darfur.⁵⁰ Among young men, only between 2–9% fall in this category, with the proportion of nomad male youth reaching 14%. Higher proportion of young women (18–20%) across both displaced and non-displaced groups fall within this category, and with a significantly higher proportion among young nomad women (45%).

⁴⁹ SDG indicator 8.6.1

⁵⁰ In Nertiti locality, the NEET rate for young men: non-displaced (7%), IDPs (10%), IDP returnees (9%), nomads (2%) and young women: non-displaced (34%), IDPs (34%), IDP returnees (37%) and nomads (62%); In Um Dukhun locality, NEET rates for young men are: IDP returnees (34%), return refugees (28%), nomads (22%), and for young women: IDP returnees (62%), return refugees (63%), and nomads (65%).

FIGURE 5: PROPORTION OF YOUTH (15–24 YEARS) NOT IN WORK, EDUCATION OR TRAINING (NEET)⁵¹



SHOCKS TO LIVELIHOODS AND COPING MECHANISMS

During the last couple of years, Sudan has seen soaring price rises for fuel and staple foods such as sorghum, millet and wheat. The household survey also looked at what respondents thought to be the most severe shocks to their livelihoods. Rocketing food prices impacted *all* households across the surveyed population groups (99–100%), while high fuel prices also affected the vast majority (98–100%). COVID-19 restrictions also impacted the vast majority across the population groups in Jebel Moon. Loss of income or employment was also a significant livelihoods shock to more than half of households across all groups.⁵²

‘Too much rain’ or floods have been an issue for approximately one fifth (20%) of the non-displaced and IDPs, while only 9% among return refugees and 14% among nomads reported this. Drought, irregular rainfall or prolonged dry spells presented a shock to livelihoods for 28% of return refugees and 22% of nomads, while fewer non-displaced (15%) and IDPs (11%) reported this to be a significant shock. A substantial proportion across the displaced and non-displaced households were impacted by crop diseases (80–86%) as well as 65% of nomads. Nomads (76%) also reported livestock loss as a serious shock. While livestock disease is less an issue across the other groups, significant proportions (33% of IDPs, 42% of non-displaced and 50% of return refugees) still indicate it as a problem. Violence and attacks were reported to be a shock mainly to non-displaced residents (27%) and IDPs (25%), while somewhat less reported this as a livelihood shock among return refugees (19%) and nomads (17%). When asked to identify the most significant shock during the last 12 months, 45–63% across the groups single out high food prices, while significant proportions among the non-displaced and IDPs point to fuel prices (20–25%). Livestock loss is selected as the most significant shock by 21% of nomads and 11% of the non-displaced residents.

The household survey also asked households how they dealt with the most significant livelihood shocks. Selecting from a broad range of coping mechanisms, a picture emerges of how households have coped. Grouping responses into ‘negative’ or non-reversible versus ‘positive’ or sustainable coping strategies is a good predictor of future vulnerability. In other words, this measures to what extent a household is resilient when facing potential future shocks. For example, ‘non-sustainable’ or more extreme coping mechanisms (selling productive assets) suggest serious long-term

⁵¹ It should be noted that the N for non-displaced and IDP returnees is low.

⁵² Non-displaced (61%), IDPs (48%) IDP returnees (53%), nomads (48%) and return refugees (65%).

consequences. Such strategies are less reversible and thus represent a more severe form of coping.⁵³ Many nomads rely on selling livestock, hence for this population group selling productive assets was not included in the 'non-sustainable' category of responses. The majority of households from all population groups used sustainable mechanisms to address the most significant shock, namely 83% of damrah households compared to 63–66% of return IDP and refugee households.⁵⁴ Sustainable mechanisms include renting out farm land, selling more of their crops, worked more or longer hours, started a new business, reduced non-food expenditures or received help from religious institutions, INGOs/NGOs, the government, family or friends. Among return IDP (30%) and refugee (28%) households, about one-third used unsustainable coping strategies to the most significant livelihood shock they faced, including reducing food consumption, selling farmland, animals or other productive assets, while only 11% of nomads had to resort to non-sustainable coping mechanisms.⁵⁵

FOOD SECURITY

Households were asked if there had been times when they did not have enough food or money to buy food during the past 7 days. Findings show that 28–30% of returnees, 20% of IDPs and 26% of non-displaced, and 32% of damrah households did not have enough food during the week prior to the survey (Jan. 2021).

The reduced Coping Strategies Index (rCSI) is an indicator of household food security. The rCSI assesses how people cope when they do not have enough to eat or any money to buy food. The proxy tool takes into account how often particular strategies are used and the severity of the strategies employed, by categorizing the way households are coping into low, medium and high coping strategies with the latter being the most severe.⁵⁶ Among the households that reported not having enough food the previous week, the majority in all surveyed groups used low or medium coping mechanisms—practically none of the households used 'high' coping strategies (1–2%).

The area level information points to some elements that are contributing to the food insecurity; local farmers struggle and need both fuel and agricultural machinery. The use of traditional ploughing mechanisms, the lack of improved seeds as well as insecticides are highlighted as key issues, as these agricultural inputs result in a drastic decrease in production.⁵⁷

⁵³ The categorization is based on the responses provided to the question 'what do you do when faced with X shock to your livelihood? Modest coping strategies are easily reversible or strategies that do not jeopardize longer-term prospects, while more extreme coping mechanisms have longer-term consequences. Categories for coping were reviewed by UNDP Sudan colleagues. Based on feedback, the coping mechanisms were grouped according to severity into non-sustainable/irreversible and sustainable/reversible. For example, 'sold farm area', 'reduced food consumption', 'selling animals' were categorized as 'non-sustainable', whilst 'selling more crops', 'starting a new business', 'received help from an NGO' were grouped as less severe/reversible coping mechanisms.

⁵⁴ 'Selling of animals' is categorized as a sustainable mechanism among nomads (given their livelihood practices). This is their primary means of coping as the data shows. It might be possible that for a certain proportion of households such mechanisms are negative.

⁵⁵ The category also includes spending cash savings, removing children from school in order to work, sending children to live with relatives and borrowing money from relatives, money lenders or banks.

⁵⁶ The reduced CSI has been developed to compare food security across different contexts. It is a sub-set of the context-specific CSI but food security is calculated using a specific set of behaviours with a universal set of severity weightings for each behaviour. Thus, the reduced CSI uses a standard set of five individual coping behaviours that can assess food security of households in any context: eating less-preferred foods, borrowing food/money from friends and relatives, limiting portions at mealtimes, limiting adult food intake, and reducing the number of meals per day. Maxwell, D. and Caldwell, R. (2008) The Coping Strategies Index. Field Methods Manual (March, 2008).

⁵⁷ West Darfur, Jebel Moon, community representative (farmer).

HOUSING, LAND AND PROPERTY: ACCESS AND TENURE

The enjoyment of housing, land and property rights is key to achieving durable solutions. The IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs regards effective accessible mechanisms to restore housing, land and property (HLP) as crucial criteria to determine if IDPs have reached a durable solution. This is because housing, land and property underpin people's livelihoods and standard of living.

This chapter explores IDPs' and returnees' access to land.⁵⁸ Have they managed to regain their land and rebuild their livelihoods? What are the specific obstacles to this? Drawing on the data of the non-displaced population as a benchmark, the analysis looks to explore and explain obstacles faced by IDPs and returnees. This section also analyses the nomad population's access to grazing and agricultural land.

From a peacebuilding perspective, violations of IDPs' housing, land and property (HLP) rights are a major obstacle to durable solutions for IDPs but are also integral to reaching peace, because land is a primary cause *and* ongoing driver of conflict between communities. The Juba Peace Agreement recognises the importance of land—land is a resource for the good of all people of Sudan. The agreement specifies that Individuals and communities have the right to restitution of lands lost as a result of the conflict in Darfur and where a return of the land is not possible, IDPs are entitled to compensation. As part of the peace agreement, several structures and institutions have been established with particular mandates relating to land issues.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **Very high proportions of return refugee (98%) and IDP returnee (94%) households have access to agricultural land, and many returnees have managed to regain access to the same land they farmed before being displaced (76% of IDP returnees and 58% of return refugees).**
- **Many IDPs in Jebel Moon have access to agricultural land (93%), but considerably fewer (43%) are accessing the same agricultural land as before displacement.**
- **The household survey shows that agricultural land is also important for the nomads residing in the damrahs, as 52% rely on crop farming for their main source of income. The survey indicates that 71% of damrah residents have access to agricultural land. The area-level analysis indicates that many nomads who used to be mobile and dependent on livestock production settled during the conflict and now cultivate land.**
- **Despite this high proportion of access, key informants say that nomads have the least access to agricultural land and face difficulties accessing farmland because the predominant land system (Hakura) is based on collective tribal ownership that has traditionally excluded the nomad population.**
- **Customary land ownership (hakura) is the dominant form of tenure as 62–64% of non-displaced, IDP returnees and return refugees say they own their agricultural land, although considerably less IDPs report owning their agricultural land (37%). Renting agricultural**

⁵⁸ Access refers to obtaining or using land. Access to land is governed through land tenure systems, which is a 'relationship, whether legally or customarily defined, among people, as individuals or groups with respect to land.' A land tenure system determines who can use what land, for how long and under what terms. FAO (2002) Land Tenure Studies (4). Gender and access to land.

land is not uncommon—13–14% of non-displaced and return IDPs and 17% and 18% of respectively the IDP and return refugee population rent farmland.

- Among the households that report owning the land they cultivate, a majority claim customary land rights—IDP returnees (75%), non-displaced residents (78%), return refugees (84%) and 96% of IDPs hold customary rights to their agricultural land. Merely 4% of IDPs hold a registration certificate, and between 8–9% of non-displaced, return IDPs and refugees refer to a decision by the local administration.
- A majority of nomad households have access to grazing land (76%), but access for nomad female-headed households is somewhat lower (67%). About a third (34–36%) of return refugees, IDP returnees and non-displaced residents also have access to grazing land, while this is a little lower for IDPs (29%).
- 38% of nomad damrah residents report that they own their residential plot in contrast to non-displaced residents (89%), IDP returnees (85%) and return refugees (74%).

THE DARFURI HAKURA LAND TENURE SYSTEM

Darfur is governed by plural legal land tenure systems. Since the start of the joint Anglo-Egyptian rule of Sudan, modern statutory laws have existed alongside traditional customary laws. In practical terms, this legal pluralism means that there are ‘overlapping institutions for accessing land’.⁵⁹ The customary ‘Hakura’ system is the traditional way to manage land in Darfur. Ownership of land does not correspond to the Western legal concept. Following the customary system, rights are not exclusive and land is ‘owned’ or belong to a community. Land in Darfur is split into tribal homelands, which is named a Dar. Generally, the homeland belongs to a major tribe, which gave this tribe monopoly over land but crucially also leadership and political representation and power.⁶⁰ A tribal sheikh from the dominant homeland tribe can assign a piece of land (Hakura) to a group of people, family or person. Permission is granted for a time period and in case the land allocated is not being used, then the sheikh may reallocate it to another person or group.⁶¹ Crucially, not all groups have a Dar—tribes can be categorized as land-holding and non-land holding tribes. Sheikhs not belonging to a tribe that do not have a homeland are known as ‘sheikh of the people’ and has no authority over land.⁶² A recent UN-Habitat report assesses that the customary ‘Hakura’ system is still the predominant way to manage land in Darfur and that registered land ownership cover less than 1% of the land in Darfur with very few registered parcels of land in rural locales.⁶³

The household survey results from Jebel Moon are in line with the UN report; very few of the surveyed households indicate that they hold a land registration certificate. Only 4% of IDPs say they have a land registration certificate to prove ownership of their agricultural land. A large majority claim customary rights; non-displaced residents (78%), IDPs (96%) IDP returnees (75%) and 84% of return refugees claim customary rights to their agricultural land. Between 8–9% of non-displaced, return IDPs and refugees refer to a decision by the local administration as proof of ownership, while

⁵⁹ Satti, H., Sulieman, H., Young, H., Radday, A. (2020) Natural Resources Management: Local Perspectives from North and Central Darfur.

⁶⁰ Unruh, J. (2016) Indigenous land rights and conflict in Darfur: the case of the Fur tribe in Tidwell, A, and Zellen, B. (eds) 2016 Land, Indigenous Peoples and Conflict.

⁶¹ UN-Habitat (2020) Darfur Land Administration Assessment: Analysis and Recommendations.

⁶² East Darfur, key informant—Native Administration

⁶³ UN-Habitat (2020) Darfur Land Administration Assessment: Analysis and Recommendations.

respectively 9% of non-displaced Jebel Moon residents and 17% of IDP returnees state they have no evidence or proof of land ownership. According to thematic experts, this refers to a situation when a sheikh allows for people to use a piece of land, but the land is not regarded as owned by the land users.⁶⁴

The Hakura system itself represents an obstacle to accessing land for some population groups. Interviews with community representatives in Jebel Moon say that women face inequalities when it comes to land ownership. Respondents say that women can cultivate land belonging to their husband or other male family members, but cannot themselves own land because of local customs.⁶⁵ Youth rarely own land, as most will not acquire land until they get married or they inherit land in case their father passes away. The vast majority of male youths will not have the financial means to buy land, and some respondents state that many displaced youths are not interested in land and agriculture after having been displaced to urban areas for an extensive period of their life.⁶⁶

As discussed above, Jebel Moon qualitative interview respondents agree that nomads have the least access to land.⁶⁷ This exclusion of nomads is also an outcome of how the traditional customary Hakura system manages access to land. According to 'Hakura' nomads do not have access to land due to their movement because traditional land rights are linked to agricultural use of land. Communal ownership of land was traditionally not attainable for nomadic communities. Instead, pastoralists had transient rights including access to water for animals and humans plus access to grazing land and livestock routes.⁶⁸ Hence, sheikhs from pastoralist communities that do not have a homeland—a Dar—would not have land to offer members of their tribe, whereas leaders of sedentary communities traditionally could assign or lease land.

Some Darfur experts argue that the inability of the indigenous Hakura system to allow for full participation by nomadic pastoralists aggravated divisions between sedentary farmers and nomads and thus was a major factor in the development of the conflict. This is because a Dar—a homeland—is traditionally linked to political participation and comes with formal leadership positions in local and regional state institutions and have excluded nomadic pastoralists and smaller tribes.

ACCESS TO LAND & TENURE TYPE

Access to land is central to the livelihoods of the majority of people in Jebel Moon locality, as livelihoods chiefly depend on crop agriculture including the livelihoods of damrah residents. Crop farming is the primary source of income for non-displaced (83%), IDPs (85%), IDP returnees (88%), return refugees (90%) and 52% of the surveyed nomads that live in the damrahs.⁶⁹ Very high proportions of the non-displaced (95%), returnees (94–98%), and IDPs (93%) report having access to agricultural land. Among nomad households residing in damrahs, the data shows that a high proportion—71% of nomads rely on crop farming as a source of income and thus have access to

⁶⁴ IOM key informant.

⁶⁵ West Darfur, Jebel Moon locality, youth and women community representatives.

⁶⁶ West Darfur, Jebel Moon locality, INGO representative (Concern).

⁶⁷ West Darfur, Jebel Moon locality, youth and women community representatives, INGO (Concern) and Land Office staff.

⁶⁸ Unruh, J. (2016) Indigenous land rights and conflict in Darfur: the case of the Fur tribe in Tidwell, A, and Zellen, B. (eds) 2016 Land, Indigenous Peoples and Conflict.


⁶⁹ Among the nomad population, another 35% rely on livestock and selling goods as their main source of income.

agricultural land.⁷⁰ A high percentage of all groups must walk more than 30 min from their dwelling to their agricultural land, although a higher proportion of IDPs (87%) and return refugees (85%) need to more than walk 30 min to reach their fields, compared to 66–70% of the non-displaced and IDP returnee population.

Most area-level informants agree that nomads have the least access to land among all Jebel Moon population groups, followed by IDPs and returnees. The area-level data also indicates that among the other population groups in Jebel Moon there is a widespread perception that nomads have no need for land or interest in owning land, and therefore, access to land is not an issue for them. However, many nomads who used to be mobile and depended on livestock production settled during the conflict and now cultivate land. A Jebel Moon nomad leader emphasises that nomads that do want to cultivate land face difficult challenges, because the current land system is based on collective tribal ownership of land (Hakura), which excludes the nomad population and hence does not allow them to own agricultural land.⁷¹ ‘We are being treated unjustly’, the nomad leader says and states that international organisations ‘do not pay attention to this issue’.⁷²

Looking in more detail at the households’ tenure of agricultural land, household survey findings show that customary land ownership is the predominant form of tenure as the majority of all population groups reports owning their agricultural land with the exception of IDPs. 62–65% of non-displaced, IDP and refugee returnees say they own the land they cultivate compared to 37% of IDPs. Significant proportions also cultivate land provided for free by friends or relatives—32% of IDPs, 23% of return IDPs and 16–17% of non-displaced and return refugees. A slighter higher proportion among IDPs (17%) and return refugees (18%) rent farmland compared to the non-displaced (13%) and the return IDP population (14%).

FIGURE 6: TENURE OF AGRICULTURAL LAND BY POPULATION GROUP



In the context of West Darfur, what does it involve to borrow or rent land for cultivation? For many return IDPs or refugees that no longer have access to land in their place of origin, renting land is the next best option.⁷³ Rent can be paid in currency, part of the harvest yield or in services. The area-level data did not provide information about how much farmers are requested to pay for renting land.

⁷⁰ Note that the nomads living in damrahs were not asked questions related to agricultural land, but only questions relating to grazing land, therefore, their access to agricultural land is calculated based on the proportion that reports reliance on crop farming as either a primary or secondary source of livelihoods.

⁷¹ The damrah residents were not asked direct questions regarding access to agricultural land, however, from nomads’ reported sources of livelihoods it is possible to deduct that 71% cultivate land. Note, that it is not clear the size of land they can access or whether they are accessing land that used to belong to IDPs.

⁷² West Darfur, Jebel Moon locality, nomad community representative.

⁷³ Consultation with UN thematic experts.

Having to pay sizeable part of the harvest yields would make agricultural land rental very different from owning farmland. In some PBF programme localities, renting agricultural land has been reported to entail paying a quarter or more of harvested crops to cover the rent, and as a result poor households cannot afford to rent land.⁷⁴ In other localities renting agricultural land is reported to be 10% of the harvest.⁷⁵

With regards to regaining access to the same land, a high proportion of IDP returnees (76%) and to a lesser extent return refugees (58%) report that they are accessing and farming the same agricultural land as before their displacement. The survey tool did not inquire to what extent or under which conditions returnees have regained access to their land. Interestingly, area-level key informants report that sometimes returnees agree to compromise with the 'newcomers' that are using the land and hand over 50% of their land to the 'newcomers'. The people that are now occupying the land are referred to as 'newcomers', who are often said to have taken the land by force or been given the land by the previous regime.⁷⁶ The area located east of Selea town was frequently mentioned as a hotspot area where land is occupied by newcomers.⁷⁷ This compromise is reported to happen if the Native Administration is unable to resolve the land issue and the conflict has to be settled by a formal court. In this scenario, official documentation is required to serve as proof of ownership, which few returnees possess. And because of these difficulties in proving ownership, the returnees find a solution in order to recover parts of their land.⁷⁸

Among the IDP population, considerably fewer (43%) have been able to access the same land. Among the IDPs unable to access their previous land, 52% report issues related to re-accessing the land, mainly due to unlawful occupation, disputed ownership and boundary conflicts. 25% of those who say they cannot access the land they previously cultivated state they still hold a legal title or rights to this land.

Considering grazing land, a majority of nomadic pastoralists generally report having access to grazing land. 76% of surveyed nomads report having access to grazing land, but access is less among female-headed households (67%). About a third of return refugees (36%), IDP returnees (35%) and non-displaced residents (34%) also report having access to grazing land, while a somewhat smaller percentage of IDPs (29%) can access grazing. Most nomads report (46%) having to walk more than 30 min from their dwelling to reach the grazing land, but 32% have a shorter distance (20–30 min) to the grazing land they use). A similar proportion of nomads (60%) and other Jebel Moon population groups (55%) have to walk more than 30 min from their dwelling to reach the grazing land. Among the damrah residents, 16% have a somewhat shorter (20–30 min) distance to walk.

THE JUBA PEACE AGREEMENT—STIPULATED CHANGE

The Juba Peace Agreement sets out some changes to the hierarchy of the statutory and customary land tenure systems. The government of Jafar Numeiri enacted the 1970 Unregistered Land Act, which brought all land not formally registered into government ownership. In practice, the Act asserted government ownership over lands that were already claimed under the customary land tenure Hakura

⁷⁴ Consultation with UN thematic experts.

⁷⁵ Area-level information in Gereida locality in South Darfur suggests that renting agricultural land is common and costs 10% of the harvested crops.

⁷⁶ West Darfur, Jebel Moon locality, youth, women, returnee community representatives, NGO (Concern), Native Administration and Land Office official.

⁷⁷ West Darfur, Jebel Moon locality, Land office official.

⁷⁸ West Darfur, Jebel Moon, youth community representative.

system and administered by the Native Administration. The Juba Peace Agreement signed in 2020 explicitly recognises traditional ownership of tribal lands (referred to as Hawakeer), historic rights to lands plus customary livestock routes and opportunities to access water.⁷⁹ Moreover, customary law takes precedence in the event that there is a conflict between Sudanese statutory law and customary law relating to land. Subsequently, laws should be amended to include land rights 'according to the norms, traditions, and inherited practices of land tenure in Darfur'.⁸⁰ It is unclear whether these changes to land tenure in the peace agreement represent a view as to whether formal land registration in Darfur is the right tool for reducing conflict over land or not. But certainly, some Darfur scholars hold the view that it is the inherent flexibility and ambiguity of customary tenure that allows for the 'elasticity required in the tenure system to accommodate livestock migrations and pursue options in drought years'.⁸¹

DEMARCATION AND REGISTRATION CERTIFICATES FOR AGRICULTURAL LAND

Less than 1% of all population groups report that their farmland is demarcated. Having land demarcated is the first step to obtaining an official land registration certificate, which involves both the Native Administration and the Land Use Office.

The logic behind wanting to demarcate and legally register land is to establish clarity on boundaries and ownership, and in turn, reduce conflict over land.⁸² How come that only a small percentage of people possess a legal certificate documenting ownership of their land? One explanation is that it is a complicated, lengthy process that only grants ownership for a relatively short time period (6–7 years).⁸³ The issue of costs was also highlighted by thematic experts, who say that IDPs and returnees complain that the cost of the official GPS demarcation is high; it costs 200 SDG per feddan.⁸⁴ The process of obtaining a land registration certificate is not only costly and lengthy but also complicated because it involves dealing with both the Native Administration, who oversees the customary tenure system, and the formal legal judiciary in charge of the formal registration of land.

Some Darfur commentators suggest a different explanation as to why few have demarcated land or a land registration certificate to prove ownership. They reason that demarcation has been 'actively resisted' by the population that claim customary ownership of land. The rejection, it is argued, had to do with limited trust in the government and the government institutions that were involved in demarcation and land registration.⁸⁵ Furthermore, thematic experts point out that the process involved in the official land registration of farmland is open to manipulation. The process involves the Native Administration signing and endorsing a written form. The land claim is broadcast on local radio, and if no one disputes the claim it will be officially registered using GPS mapping to demarcate. People

⁷⁹ Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 7.1

⁸⁰ Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 7.5

⁸¹ Unruh, J. (2016) Indigenous land rights and conflict in Darfur: the case of the Fur tribe in Tidwell, A, and Zellen, B. (eds) 2016 Land, Indigenous Peoples and Conflict.

⁸² Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In War and Society Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156-181

⁸³ Consultation with a thematic expert from UN-Habitat, February 2021.

⁸⁴ Consultation with UN thematic experts, March 2021.

⁸⁵ Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In War and Society Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156-181

can register land, but it is very hard to verify that it is, in fact, their land. Therefore, they argue that the process itself needs to be strengthened or changed.

HOUSING AND RESIDENTIAL LAND

The greater majority of IDP returnees and return refugees have gained access to the same residential plot. 88% of both population groups report that they have managed to access the same housing plot. A majority among non-displaced residents (89%), IDP returnees (85%) and return refugees (74%) report that they own their housing plot, however, land ownership covers different tenure arrangements.⁸⁶ More than half of non-displaced residents (56%), IDP returnees (66%) and return refugees (63%) report owning their residential land according to customary rights, whereas 20% of nomads in damrahs claim customary rights to their housing plot. 80% of surveyed IDPs say they own their residential plot and refer to a decision by the local administration, and so do 20% of non-displaced and 17% of return refugees resident in Jebel Moon locality.

In contrast, only 38% of nomad damrah residents report ownership, whilst 31% say their residential plot is located on government-owned land and another 31% state that they live on communal grazing land. Furthermore, the vast majority of nomads residing in the damrahs (71%) say that they have no evidence or proof of ownership and this is also the case for 20% of non-displaced residents. Merely, 8% of IDP returnees report having a registered area certification as proof of ownership of their residential plot.

⁸⁶ Survey respondents were asked if they own their housing plot in order to capture their perceptions of the tenure. Follow up questions explored how they claim ownership including customary rights, a decision by the local administration etc.

SAFETY, SECURITY, CONFLICT AND THE RULE OF LAW

Perceptions of safety and security are key criteria for durable solutions. The analysis aims to understand if IDPs and returnees experience a higher degree of security incidents in comparison to the non-displaced population and nomadic communities. What type of insecurity and conflict do Jebel Moon residents face?

Lack of security has the ability to erode the overall confidence in peacebuilding processes and, therefore, restoring the rule of law is imperative. Peacebuilding is ultimately concerned with transforming post-conflict societies so that political, social disputes and conflict are managed and resolved through non-violent means. The rule of law is a framework for the peaceful management of conflict and fair administration of justice through institutions, mechanisms and procedures.⁸⁷ Ensuring the rule of law relies on the capacity of the police and formal courts, but how effective are the police and courts in Jebel Moon locality? The role of civil society in conflict resolution and peacebuilding is also important in Darfur and therefore local conflict resolution mechanisms are reviewed and their perceived effectiveness assessed. Key informants provided insight into the limitations of local conflict resolution mechanisms, but also how local mechanisms can be strengthened and local peacebuilding capacities supported.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **A majority of population groups feel very safe during the day, although 19% of IDPs and a small minority of returnees (7%) report feeling unsafe. Perceptions of safety during the night drop considerably but to a lesser degree among the nomad population. A higher proportion of men compared to women say they feel unsafe especially among IDP returnees.**
- **Robbery and damage to property and livestock are the most common security incidents faced by all Jebel Moon's population groups. Robbery is experienced more by IDPs (52%) and non-displaced residents (58%) but is also a common occurrence experienced by 37–41% of returnees and damrah residents. Property or livestock damage is also experienced by 50–66% across all population groups.**
- **Conflict drivers in Jebel Moon are primarily linked to land, but competition over access to water is also a cause of conflict and tension. A majority of return refugees and IDP returnees have managed to gain access to the same farmland, but half the non-displaced and returnees that have not regained access (15%–17%) report that they face issues such as disputed ownership, land unlawfully occupied by others and boundary conflicts.**
- **When experiencing a security incident, significant proportions of the population chose not report it—around half of nomads (51%) and returned refugees (47%) and a third of IDPs, non-displaced and IDP returnees. A majority of non-displaced (46%), IDPs (42%), IDP returnees (54%) and returned refugees (33%) sought assistance from the police, while most nomads turn to the Native Administration for help.**


⁸⁷ Kritz, N. J. (2007) The Rule of Law in Conflict Management in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds.) (2007) *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*.

- High proportions of non-displaced residents, IDPs and returnees (83–85%) report that their community has a water committee, while this is the case for merely 2% of nomads suggesting that the nomad population is not served by this conflict resolution mechanism.
- The area-level data indicate that the Native Administration serve as the most important local conflict resolution mechanisms. Native Administration members are heading and running several key committees including the Harvest Protection Committee and the Peaceful Reconciliation Committee.

PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY AND SECURITY INCIDENTS

Respondents were asked how safe they and their household members feel when walking in their neighbourhood or area during the day and during nighttime on a scale from 'very safe', 'safe', 'unsafe' and 'very unsafe'. Among the nomad damrahs residents (94%) and non-displaced residents (89%), a high proportion report feeling very safe during daylight hours. A somewhat lower proportion of IDPs and refugee returnees (76–79%) say that they feel very safe, but a small minority (7%) report feeling unsafe. Among return IDPs, the proportion that reports feeling unsafe is considerably higher (19%), and just above half (56%) of return IDPs say they feel safe during daytime.

FIGURE 7: FEELINGS OF SAFETY WHEN WALKING IN ONES' NEIGHBOURHOOD DURING DAY AND NIGHT - SDG INDICATOR 16.1.4




Perceptions of safety drop markedly among all population groups when asked about feeling safe when walking at night, although damrahs residents to a lesser degree. 69% of nomads residing in the damrahs say they feel very safe, whilst a small minority (7%) say they feel unsafe at night. In comparison, non-displaced (36%), return refugees (30%), IDPs (28%), and merely 23% of return IDPs feel very safe at night. And a considerable proportion report feeling unsafe when walking at night; non-displaced (19%), IDPs and return refugees (23%), whilst return IDPs is the group that feel most insecure as 36% of return IDPs say they feel unsafe and 3% that they feel very unsafe (risk to life).⁸⁸

⁸⁸ A third category is 'feeling somewhat safe', however, this category is less indicative with regards to perceptions of safety. 45–48% of non-displaced, IDPs and return refugees report feeling somewhat safe during the night, while respectively 35% of return IDPs and 24% of damrahs residents report feeling somewhat safe.

To identify the kinds of threats and confrontation that communities in Jebel Moon locality face, respondents were asked about incidents that they had experienced during the 12 months prior to the survey. The household survey shows that verbal and physical threat are not uncommon. Between 23–29% of non-displaced, IDP and IDP returnees have experienced verbal threats at least once in the previous 12 months. One third of IDPs (29%) and IDP returnees (31%) have been physically threatened, while fewer non-displaced residents report physical threats (20%). Returned refugees in Jebel Moon experience verbal (18%) and physical threats (19%) to a lesser degree, however, considerably less nomads report both types of threats (13%).

FIGURE 8: HOUSEHOLDS WITH MEMBERS THAT HAVE EXPERIENCED SECURITY INCIDENTS (PHYSICAL THREATS, ROBBERY, DAMAGE OF PROPERTY) IN THE 12 MONTHS PRECEDING THE SURVEY



For all population groups in Jebel Moon locality, robbery and damage to property or livestock are the most common security incidents. High proportions of IDPs and non-displaced residents have experienced robbery—respectively 52% and 58%. Still robbery is also experienced by significant proportions of IDP returnees (37%), returned refugees (41%) and nomad damrah residents (38%). Incidents of damage to property or livestock is very common. 66% of nomads reported property or livestock damage during the past 12 months before the survey, but this type of security incident was also reported by more than half of returned refugees and non-displaced residents (58–60%) and 50% of IDPs and IDP returnees.

PREVALENCE OF CONFLICTS LINKED TO LAND AND WATER

Conflict drivers in Jebel Moon locality are predominantly related to land, but disputes and tensions over water are also highlighted. Key informants and community representatives point out that land conflict often goes hand in hand with access to water and, therefore, are not always separate issues. Water sources are described as insufficient for people and their animals and the high competition for water leads to tensions and conflicts that includes ‘physical harm and looting’.⁸⁹

Conflicts around land are described as occurring between pastoralists and farmers, when farmers cultivate inside the boundaries of migration routes or pastoralists’ animals enter farm areas and destroy the crops. According to the area-level analysis, this type of boundary conflict between pastoralists and farmers is the most common problem with regards to land. Conflicts between returning IDPs and refugees and ‘newcomers’, who are perceived to be unlawfully occupying their

⁸⁹ West Darfur, Jebel Moon locality, WASH representative.

land is also regarded as a key source of conflict.⁹⁰ Respondents also point to conflict related to disputed ownership of land between farmers.⁹¹ None of the respondents flag livestock theft as a conflict driver but the household survey shows that both robbery and damage to livestock and property frequently happens to all population groups in Jebel Moon as discussed above.

In Jebel Moon locality, the household survey shows that 15–17% of IDPs, non-displaced, and refugee and IDP returnees face issues linked to the farming land that they are currently accessing, which are due to disputed ownership, land unlawfully occupied by others and land boundary conflicts. The majority of returned refugees (88%) and IDP returnees (80%) have managed to gain access to the same land, but among those that are not cultivating the land they previously farmed (12% and 20%), half of respondents (50–54%) say it is due to conflict—the main reason being the land is unlawfully occupied by others. The area-level data provides context to the household survey findings. Unlawful occupation of land and violent land acquisition are regarded as the main challenge that IDPs and refugees face upon their return.

Conflict linked to pastoralists' grazing routes is also seasonal. In Darfur, pastoralist tribes move their livestock from north to the south in the course of the dry season and head back north during the rainy season⁹² The pastoralists use traditional livestock corridors (masarat) and have customary rights to graze their animals on rain-fed farmland (talique) after the harvest.⁹³ Although the 'Hakura' system gives farmers customary rights to land, these rights are not exclusive and pastoralists have temporary rights to graze their herds on what is left of the harvested crops. Normally, a talique date for when pastoralists can graze their animals is agreed between farmers and pastoralists with the help of the local authorities or the Native Administration to avoid crop losses and conflict.⁹⁴ Disputes and conflict happen when talique agreements are violated by either side. Violations of these agreements are often caused by a poor rainy season, which press pastoralists to move their herds much earlier in search of pasture and water. This, in turn, causes damage to crops before the harvest and farmers are known to deny pastoralists passage or block passage by expanding their farms into these livestock migratory routes.⁹⁵

In Jebel Moon, key informants and community representatives identify tension and conflict linked to livestock migratory routes as a problem. When surveyed nomads in Jebel Moon were asked if they followed migration corridors, 85% confirmed that they did. The main reasons given for not following demarcated routes was to look for grazing and water (90%). Household survey findings also show that 10% of nomads report issues with grazing land and nomad community representatives emphasise that designated livestock routes are also disrespected by farmers, who expand their farmland into the corridors which reduces the grazing land available to the nomad population.⁹⁶

⁹⁰ West Darfur, Jebel Moon locality, youth community representative.

⁹¹ None of the area-level respondents refer to intra-family disputes nor disputes related to divorce cases.

⁹² UN-Habitat, 2020, Darfur Land Administration report.

⁹³ Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In *War and Society* Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156-181

⁹⁴ The talique date is referred to as a customary institution that has 'evolved through local practices of local communities, their leadership, and formal government structures. Osman, A.M.K., Young, H. Houser, R.F., and Coates, J. C. (2013) *Agricultural Change, Land, and Violence in Protracted Political Crisis: An Examination of Darfur*.

⁹⁵ Young, H. et al. (2019) *Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management*.


⁹⁶ West Darfur, Jebel Moon locality, nomad community representative.

REPORTING SAFETY INSTANCES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS

The household survey sought to understand how residents report incidents and to whom they turn to for solving disputes and effective remedies. Households that experienced a security incident during the 12 months preceding the survey, were asked to think about the most serious incident and indicate whether they sought help. The findings of the household survey shows that around half of the nomads (51%) and returned refugees (47%) did not report. Among IDPs, non-displaced residents and IDP returnees about a third also did not report security incidents.⁹⁷

Among the nomads that did report a security incident, the majority (26%) reach out to the Native Administration for help, while a lower proportion of Jebel Moon's other population groups seek assistance from the Native Administration (13–18%).⁹⁸ A majority of non-displaced (46%), IDPs (42%), IDP returnees (54%) and return refugees (33%) instead seek assistance from the police in contrast to only 14% of nomads.

FIGURE 9: HOUSEHOLDS THAT HAVE EXPERIENCED AT LEAST ONE SECURITY INCIDENT THE 12 MONTHS PRECEDING THE SURVEY, DETAILING IF THEY HAVE REPORTED AND TO WHOM



Satisfaction with the way an issue was resolved was overall low. The vast majority of non-displaced residents, IDPs and IDP returnees sought assistance from the police, but merely 18–25% reported the outcome to be 'effective and just'. 20% of returned refugees deemed the reported incident effectively resolved, while a higher proportion of nomads (30%) found the outcome fair. While less nomads report security incidents, a higher proportion of those that do report are satisfied with the outcome.

Jebel Moon locality has one police centre located in Selea town staffed by 23 male and two female police personnel. There are a further eight police points located across the Jebel Moon's four administrative units with a further 47 police staff. The police force has to cover a large geographical area while facing a number of challenges including lack of trained staff, funding, vehicles to respond to security incidents plus the mobile network in West Darfur hinders effective communication between the police posts.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ 33% of non-displaced residents, 29% of IDPs and 31% of IDP returnees, who had experienced a security incident during the preceding 12 months did not report it.

⁹⁸ Non-displaced (12%), IDP returnees (14%), returned refugees (18%) and 19% of IDPs turned to the Native Administration for help when they experienced a security incident.

⁹⁹ West Darfur, Jebel Moon locality, police representative.

There are a number of villages that do not have access to police services due long distances to the nearest police point including Shishule, Beer Batha and Delabaya in the western part of the locality and Girgi, a return village located in the northern part of Jebel Moon. Reportedly all population groups have good access to policing apart from women due to local traditions and customs that prohibit women from seeking assistance from the police.¹⁰⁰

In Jebel Moon, there is no formal civil court in but the police force works with six rural courts located in towns: Goz Meno, Jebel Moon, Ghibaish, Elsimemi, Fajola, Jamaina. The role of the rural courts is to resolve relatively simple problems and disputes in the locality. Rural courts serve as the entry point to the judicial system as these customary courts form part of the formal judiciary structure in Sudan as stipulated by the 2004 Town and Rural Courts Acts. Rural court judges are tasked with promoting dialogue and mediation as avenues to justice and reconciliation.¹⁰¹ According to area-level data, the rural courts are made up of members from the Native Administration. In Jebel Moon locality, there is no formal court to handle more complex cases. According to key informants, the main challenge for the rural courts is a lack of vehicles for the court members to reach remote areas, but courts also lack offices and space plus incentives as all members work on a voluntary basis.¹⁰² In terms of access, all population groups have equal access to the rural courts including women.¹⁰³

RATING LOCAL COMMUNITY RESOLUTION MECHANISMS

In Jebel Moon, there are several dispute resolution mechanisms alternative to police and formal court involvement. The Peace and Reconciliation Committee has a wider mandate, whilst committees like the Harvest Protection Committee and Water Committee manage competing demands and conflict linked to specific natural resources. Other grassroots-level mechanisms include the Native Administration and Judiya. Local mediators are part of the Judiya traditional mediation mechanism at the community level that resolves conflicts between community members. Judiya is a grassroots system of mediation that centres on reconciliation and repairing of social relationships and tackle low-level crime that does not need to be dealt with by the courts. The Judiya arbitrators are called Ajaweed and are respected community members, who have knowledge of customary law and inter-tribal history. They are not neutral mediators, rather their role is to exert pressure on a party to accept the settlement.¹⁰⁴ In Jebel Moon, there are also a number of youth-led committees including the Service Committee, Resistance Committee plus the Freedom and Change Committee. The latter two committees are grassroots local associations that were set up during the uprising against the former regime.

How do the local communities in Jebel Moon regard these conflict resolution mechanisms? The Jebel Moon Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES) Committee operates at the locality level and focuses on maintaining water points and manage access to water including mediating if disputes and conflict around water usage arise. The WES committee has ten members that all have received training, and their mandate extends to raising awareness in the community about pollution of water sources.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Tubiana, J., Tanner, V. and Abdul-Jalil, M. (2012) Traditional authorities' peacemaking in Darfur. Peaceworks No. 83.

¹⁰² West Darfur, Jebel Moon locality, police representative.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Young, H. et al. (2019) Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management.

¹⁰⁵ The Jebel Moon WES Committee has received training from Concern (INGO), FAO and JICA.

The household survey findings show that a high proportion of non-displaced residents (85%), IDPs (95%) and returnees (83%) report that they have access to a water committee. In contrast, only 2% of nomads report access to a water committee, which suggests that the nomad population are not served by this local conflict resolution mechanism. Area-level information suggests that the WES Committee in Jebel Moon is not very active nor able to effectively prevent disputes and conflict.¹⁰⁶ Household survey results, however, contradicts this finding as the majority (83–95%) across the population groups report having such committees where they live, and 41–45% of IDPs and returnees and 31% of non-displaced residents say that they are satisfied and that the committee was able to ‘effectively solve a problem and provide just solution’.

The area-level analysis highlights the Native Administration members as the most important actors in resolving conflict. Harvest Protection Committee is led by Native Administration but also includes members from the local government, the police and other community members. The Peace and Reconciliation committee is likewise headed up by the Native Administration but also comprises representatives from all population groups. The Native Administration members are said to know which land belongs to whom and the land borders. They are also reported to raise awareness of the need for peacebuilding through different activities including workshops.¹⁰⁷ Conflicts and disputes that are deemed too complicated to be solve by the Native Administration are referred to the police.¹⁰⁸

STRENGTHENING CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEBUILDING MECHANISMS

The area-level analysis explored challenges and elements that would strengthen the effectiveness of existing conflict resolution mechanisms. Insecurity is regarded as a hindrance to the Native Administration to mediate in conflicts and impose their authority. Funding especially for transportation and space for the committees to convene are regarded as important for the Native Administration and committees to fulfil their mandates. A need for training and capacity building to deal with community issues and conflict are also seen as critical to the work that local stakeholders are expected to carry out.¹⁰⁹

Other respondents place more emphasis on the role of the community, and see a need for more community capacity building and awareness raising vis-à-vis conflict resolutions and peaceful ways to address conflict.¹¹⁰ Community members also flag that there is a lack of participation in the existing committees, but that this could possibly be due to a lack of awareness of the various committees and what the functions they perform.¹¹¹

THE JUBA PEACE AGREEMENT AND CONFLICT OVER LAND

The Juba Peace Agreement attempts to address housing, land and property (HLP) that have significant implications for humanitarian, development and peacebuilding interventions. Effective and accessible mechanisms to restore housing, land and property is central to achieving durable solutions for IDPs as set out by the IASC Framework. Securing HLP rights is also critical for reaching durable solutions as it tackles one of the root causes of the conflict. The Juba Peace Agreement agrees with

¹⁰⁶ West Darfur, Jebel Moon, Native Administration, returnee and women community representatives.

¹⁰⁷ West Darfur, Jebel Moon, local government representatives, returnees and women community members.

¹⁰⁸ PBF staff working on the Jebel Moon programme also report situations where the police would refer cases back to the committees, because they were unable or preferred to not to deal with them.

¹⁰⁹ West Darfur, Jebel Moon, Land Office official.

¹¹⁰ West Darfur, Jebel Moon, Native Administration, Concern (INGO) and youth community representatives.

¹¹¹ West Darfur, Jebel Moon, youth community representative.

the IASC criteria and stipulates that ‘all victims of Darfur have a right to seek restoration of property or compensation for their lost or seized property resulting from the conflict in Darfur’.¹¹² The right to restoration or compensation is essential for transitional justice. This right to restitution is not only awarded to individuals but also to communities that have a collective right to pursue restitution for communal property, villages, farms and traditional land. Where IDPs cannot return, they are entitled to compensation for their loss resulting from forced displacement.¹¹³ This right is extended to displaced persons regardless of whether they choose to return to their places of origin or not.¹¹⁴ Thematic experts warn that a lack of funding and mechanisms to implement restitution and compensation will be an obstacle to durable solutions and peacebuilding efforts.¹¹⁵

Interestingly, the peace agreement provides for the review and possible revocation of registration of land that was expropriated or forcibly taken after June 1989.¹¹⁶ Potentially, this is a powerful tool to deal with land that is unlawfully occupied even when the resent settlers hold land registration certificates to prove ownership. However, there is little mention in the agreement of the rights of the ‘secondary occupants’ or settlers unlawfully occupying land apart from chapter two, which specifies that basic services should be provided in areas of resettlement for those who inhabited the lands of others illegally.¹¹⁷ Secondary occupation of land originally belonging to the people displaced by the conflict has been a critical barrier preventing durable solutions. But Sudan HLP experts warn that the JPA’s aim of addressing long-standing disputes may contribute to the resurgence of violence in Darfur.

Specifically, the lack of clarity on how the JPA will consider the rights of secondary occupants, who will become displaced if a returns process is implemented, is a ‘divisive factor’ and constitute a severe risk of triggering further conflict.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, the insecurity coupled with drought and environmental degradation have resulted in many nomadic pastoralist groups adopting a semi-sedentary or sedentary way of life, which requires land for housing and farming. Likewise, the HLP rights of these Darfuri communities also need to be included in the durable solutions process.¹¹⁹

The agreement sets out several institutions and their mandates that will govern conflict over land and aid peaceful co-existence between communities. The ‘Darfur Lands and Hawakeer Commission’ has a mandate to hear and mediate in property restitution claims for individuals,¹²⁰ who lost their land because of the conflict in Darfur. It is also tasked with arbitrating and adjudicating in cases of disputed land.¹²¹ The National Lands Commission has also been established and is tasked with working in tandem with the Darfur Lands and Hawakeer Commission, whilst the Internally Displaced Persons

¹¹² Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 4.11.3.

¹¹³ Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 5.3.2.

¹¹⁴ Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 4.11.8.2

¹¹⁵ NRC (2021), Housing, Land and Property Rights (HL) in the Juba Peace Agreement. Darfur Track briefing note.

¹¹⁶ Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 7.8.1.

¹¹⁷ This task is allocated to the Reconstruction and Development Commission. Juba Peace Agreement, chapter 2.18).

¹¹⁸ HLP Sub-sector, UN Sudan (24 June, 2021). Briefing note: HLP in the Republic of Sudan.

¹¹⁹ HLP Sub-sector, UN Sudan (24 June, 2021). Briefing note: HLP in the Republic of Sudan.

¹²⁰ A Darfur Land Commission does already exist, but is said to have little capacity. It is not yet clear whether the ‘existing’ commission will take on the role stipulated by the JPA.

¹²¹ Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 7.9.1 and chapter 7.10.11.

and Refugee Commission will be overseeing voluntary return and resettlement.¹²² The Commission for the Development of the Nomads is mandated with improving the nomadic pastoralist sector plus regulating relations between farmers and nomadic pastoralists.¹²³

The household survey and area-level analysis focused on conflict drivers, capacities for peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms at the local level. At the time of writing, none of the institutions and mechanisms stipulated in the JPA were up and running and it is not clear how these will interact with or support efforts at the locality level. The implementation of the JPA has suffered delays and, at the same time, the existing structures in Darfur are not capable of addressing land appropriation, restitution or compensation. As an example, the body entrusted to deal with land arbitration, the National Land Commission, has not yet been granted legal authority and has ‘struggled to address the scale and complexity of HLP issues’ according to experts.¹²⁴

¹²² Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 5.8.

¹²³ Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 7.7.1.

¹²⁴ UN Sudan HLP Sub-sector (2021) UN Sudan Briefing note: HLP in the Republic of Sudan. (24 June, 2021).

ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LIVING: AVAILABILITY AND ACCESS TO SERVICES

To assess adequate standard of living, this analysis draws on indicators such as availability and access to education, health, water, and sanitation. For displaced persons to enjoy an adequate standard of living is important for durable solutions.¹²⁵ The analysis draws on the household survey and area-level data focusing on the access to services among the displaced populations (IDPs, IDP returnees and refugee returnees), non-displaced neighbours as well as nomad residents in damrahs within the targeted areas. By benchmarking against the non-displaced population's level of access to services, the analysis can shed light on possible challenges and vulnerabilities linked to IDPs' and returnees' displacement as well as identify broader area-level development challenges, which affect service delivery to all population groups.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **Formal primary school attendance (net) for children between 6–13 years is somewhat lower among girls and overall ranges among non-displaced, IDPs, and return refugees between 44–45% among boys and 31–41% among girls. IDP returnees show a somewhat lower attendance rate (31% boys and 29% girls), while among the children living in the damrahs only 11% of the primary school aged boys and 3% of the girls are attending primary school.**
- **Access to health services is a challenge for all surveyed population groups in the targeted Jebel Moon areas. The poor provision of healthcare is reflected in the low the proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel across the groups (1–7%). A vast majority across all groups face challenges when attempting to access healthcare (85% to 94%). Costs, quality of services and distance to services are key barriers.**
- **Access to improved drinking water varies quite significantly between the surveyed groups: from 27% of IDP returnees, 34% of non-displaced to 43% of return refugees) and 72% of the IDP population.**
- **Access to improved sanitation also varies: non-displaced households (11%), while about one-fifth among the displaced groups have access (20% IDPs, 29% IDP returnees and 24% return refugees), and 0% of the nomads living in the damrahs. Open defecation is also the most common practice among non-displaced (70%), IDPs (42%), IDP returnees (56%), and returned refugees (48%).**
- **Similar proportions ranging from 28% to 32% amongst the non-displaced, IDP returnees, returned refugees and nomads report not having any personal documentation, while the majority of the surveyed persons mainly have national ID cards: non-displaced (66%), IDP returnees (71%), return refugees (77%) and nomads (71%). IDPs are found to have the highest proportion with documentation, as the vast majority (82%) hold national ID cards.**

¹²⁵ Typically, a durable solutions analysis will benchmark against the non-displaced population's level of access to services, and thus shed light on possible challenges and vulnerabilities linked to IDPs' and returnees' displacement as well as identify broader area-level development challenges, which affect service delivery to all population groups.


The area-level information suggests that administrative processes linked to land registration do require personal documentation.

ACCESS TO EDUCATION

The survey findings show that attendance at formal primary school in Jebel Moon locality is similar between the different target groups with the exception of children in damrahs, where attendance is significantly lower among both boys and girls. Specifically, looking at non-displaced as well as return refugees and IDPs in the ages between 6 and 13 years of age: between 44–45% of boys and 31–41% of girls attend school. IDP returnees show a somewhat lower attendance rate (31% boys and 29% girls). As indicated, in the damrahs only 11% of the primary school aged boys and 3% of girls report attending primary school.

Looking at education for 6–18 years shows similar trends as primary school attendance: girls are out of school to a somewhat higher degree (the difference ranging between 5 and 10 percentage points). Formal school attendance is highest among return refugees and IDPs, followed by non-displaced and IDP returnees—overall between one-third and half of the children attend school. School attendance in the damrah settlements is very low and is the same as for primary aged children (11% boys and 3% girls). Informal religious school, Khalwa, is attended by smaller proportions (among the age group 6–18 years): lowest among damrah children (7%) and highest among return refugees (25% of girls and 21% of boys). These findings are supported by the area-level analysis that highlights that access to education is a particular problem in return areas, where schools simply do not exist. Khalwa is a religious Quranic school, where pupils learn to read and interpret the Quran. Families consider khalwa schools to be an alternative to mainstream education, especially in areas where there are no government-run schools.

FIGURE 10: SCHOOL ATTENDANCE AMONG CHILDREN BETWEEN 6 AND 18 YEARS OF AGE, BY SEX, ACROSS THE TARGET GROUPS



Households with children not attending school, were asked about the reasons. Some variation is seen among non-displaced households with children out of school. A need for children to work and support the household and education not regarded as a priority, plus a lack of resources, are the main reasons

given. Among displaced households, financial obstacles, distance to schools as well as children working (either in the household or outside) are indicated.¹²⁶ Area-level data likewise emphasize that education often is not a priority for poorer households, and many do not appreciate the value of education especially for girls. This view is especially prevalent among the nomad population, since they also face challenges linked to their nomadic and semi-nomadic way of life. When it comes to financial obstacles, it is worth pointing out that primary education is in theory free of charge, but in reality, fees are often charged for attending school. Fees are said to cover the cost of running the school plus act as incentives for volunteer teaching assistants.¹²⁷

In Jebel Moon locality, primary education is available in all four administrative units. Some villages, however, do not have access to education due to long distances to the nearest school.¹²⁸ There are plans to set up schools in these villages, but financing is currently missing to put educational plans into action. A number of factors come into play when assessing the quality of education. A key challenge in Jebel Moon locality is a severe lack of trained teachers. The locality has a total of 127 teachers of whom 48 are trained teachers and 79 are untrained teaching assistants, who teach 6,988 students. This translates into a 1:146 teacher-student ratio. Most schools are reported to have a fence made from local materials, but many schools do not have enough furniture or equipment. Moreover, many schools also do not have latrines or access to clean water. Thematic experts say that school feeding programmes and clean drinking water can play a decisive factor as to whether children attend school, and currently there are no such programmes in any of the schools in the locality.¹²⁹

ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES

The household survey results show that access to health services is a challenge for all surveyed groups. A majority in all groups has attempted to access health services in the past 6 months: 86% of non-displaced, 85% of IDPs, 84% of return refugees, 75% of IDP returnees, but only 58% of the nomads. Of those households that sought medical assistance, the great majority reported that they faced challenges accessing healthcare (85% to 94%).

All groups specified the barriers to accessing healthcare to include the cost of services or medicine being too high, low quality or availability of services at the health facility or pharmacy and long distances to reach health services. The challenges cited match the most reported barriers to healthcare in the 2020 multi-sector needs assessment that covers all Sudan's states.¹³⁰ When asked to identify the most significant obstacle to accessing healthcare, a majority of non-displaced point to the quality of services (58%) and costs (32%). Among IDPs, the challenges are more equally distributed between quality of services (45%) and costs (50%) and similarly for return refugees (39% indicate costs and 50% quality of services). IDP returnees, however, also highlight costs (40%) and quality (25%) along with distance (36%) as a key obstacle. Similarly, distance is also a key obstacle

¹²⁶ Specifically among returned refugees, more than a fifth indicate lack of financial resources while another fifth point to work (within or outside the home). Among IDP returnees, one-third indicate distance while another third of girls are not in school and instead are required to work (within or outside the home). Among IDPs, lack of financial resources and education not perceived as a priority are key reasons. The number of responses is not large enough in all groups to allow for detailed proportions.

¹²⁷ UNICEF Sudan Education Team insights. UNCT, Government of Sudan, JIPS, World Bank (2019). Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Abu Shouk and El Salam IDP camps: Durable Solutions Analysis, Sudan.

¹²⁸ Villages with not access to education include Otash, Buda, Turleli, Babanosa, Hashaba, Dabang, Ferti in Goz Meno plus Graday village in the north eastern part of the locality.


¹²⁹ Consultation with thematic experts.

¹³⁰ The Sudan 2020 Multi-sector Needs Assessment show that the two most common barriers to accessing healthcare are 'lack of medicines at the health facility' followed by 'cost of services and/or medicine too high/cannot afford to pay'. REACH (2021) Sudan: 2020 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (March, 2021).

for nomads (37%) as well as costs (35%) and quality (27%). The area-level analysis likewise highlights distance as an obstacle for accessing healthcare especially for nomads, returnees (both IDP and refugee) and women. Nomads are reported to often stay in remote areas where there are no health services and returnees coming back to their area of origin frequently find that the previous health facilities have been destroyed. Especially women are affected by insecurity and are hesitant to travel the long distances to reach healthcare facilities, because the journey exposes them to danger. Insecurity is reported to affect provision of services in the eastern part of the locality in particular.

The proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel is a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicator (SDG 3.1.2) and is often used as a proxy for measuring access to healthcare. The vast majority of births are attended by a relative, friend or traditional birth attendant. The proportion of births attended by skilled personnel (doctors, nurses or midwives) is very low—between 1% and 7% for all population groups.¹³¹ The lowest proportion is found among nomads (1%) and IDPs (2%) and the highest among return refugees (7%); the remaining are found to have a 5% rate.

FIGURE 11: PROPORTION OF BIRTHS ATTENDED BY SKILLED PERSONNEL (SDG 3.1.2)



Overall, the provision of healthcare is very low in Jebel Moon locality. Healthcare services are available in each of the four Administrative Units,¹³² but many areas and villages do not have access.¹³³ Most of the healthcare centres that used to be operational are currently not active—leaving only 7 health centres open to serve the population of Jebel Moon locality. None of the health centres have clean water, but a number are equipped with latrines and electricity. Ministry of Health (MoH) officials emphasise that insufficient numbers of operating health centres are the biggest challenge, but that shortage of trained staff and medical equipment also greatly impact delivery of health services in Jebel Moon. Insecurity makes it difficult run health centres in the eastern part of the locality, and the local MoH official says that more security and policing is required to keep facilities in these parts open.¹³⁴

Looking at satisfaction with health services, the highest satisfaction is found among non-displaced (58%) and IDPs (63%), while among IDP returnees (43%), and return refugees (46%) the satisfaction

¹³¹ Note that the total number of births (N number) captured by the survey varies between the groups depending on the overall sample size, specifically: non displaced (59 births), IDPs (51 births), IDP returnees (22 births), nomads (107 births) and returned refugees (118 births).

¹³² See Annexe 2 for details of where the health centres are located.

¹³³ Villages with no access to healthcare include Jujik, Abou gerain, Gurgry, Shlshl and Khami (Selea Administrative Unit), Tramala, Fajola, Sumsama and Dulsu (western part of Selea Administrative Unit). Also, Alona in Goz Meno Administrative Unit along with Ashe Beer Bataha, Delabaya, Hamater and Babanosa located in the north-eastern part of Selea.

¹³⁴ West Darfur, Jebel Moon locality, MoH official.


is somewhat lower.¹³⁵ The lowest satisfaction is found among nomads (15%) which also reflects that significantly fewer nomads have attempted to access health services in the first place,¹³⁶ while birth attendance by skilled personnel is practically nonexistent (1%).

ACCESS TO WATER AND SANITATION

The household survey measured access to improved sanitation and improved drinking water sources. Access to improved drinking water differs quite significantly between the surveyed groups. 34% of non-displaced have access to improved water sources, while among the displaced and returnee population the proportion varies between 27% (IDP returnees), 43% (return refugees) and 72% (IDPs).¹³⁷ The remaining households rely on unimproved water sources,¹³⁸ with large proportions among non-displaced, IDP returnees, and return refugees accessing unprotected dug wells. Nomads residing in damrahs have the lowest access (10%) to improved sources of drinking water. The majority of nomads access either unprotected dug wells (47%) or unprotected springs (38%). According to area-level information, few water points are located near to where nomads live. A nomad community representative explains, ‘water places are far away from the living places of nomads. We asked the local government, organizations and the water authority for support, but the problem has not been solved. The water is insufficient and there is no pump or water source for nomads at all. We drink water from the ponds and valleys, which is not suitable for drinking’.¹³⁹

IDPs who have the highest access to improved sources, indicated they get water from protected dug wells (47%) as well as tube wells, boreholes, elevated tanks, or hand pumps (25%).

FIGURE 12: ACCESS TO DRINKING WATER BY TYPE ACROSS THE TARGET GROUPS (FOR RESULTS ON IMPROVED DRINKING WATER SOURCES)



¹³⁵ Given the very low quality and availability of health services, the level of satisfaction among survey respondents seems high. The area-level information does not provide context as to why a relatively high proportion of respondents are satisfied with the level of services.

¹³⁶ As indicated earlier, 37% of nomads report distance being the main challenge to accessing health services.

¹³⁷ Improved drinking water sources include the following: piped water into dwelling, yard or plot; public taps or standpipes; boreholes or tube wells, protected dug wells; protected springs; packaged water; delivered water and rainwater.

¹³⁸ Unimproved drinking water sources include unprotected dug well, unprotected spring, cart with small tank/drum, tanker truck, and surface water (river, dam, lake, pond, stream, canal, irrigation channels), bottled water.

¹³⁹ West Darfur, Jebel Moon, nomad community representative.

Area-level information indicate that water is insufficient for number of people and their animals in Jebel Moon locality. Many have to travel long distances to fetch water, sometimes as far as 5 hours to reach a water point.¹⁴⁰ This is partly due to the fact that many water points are broken or were deliberately destroyed during the conflict—some have not been working for 13 years. Broken water points have not been rehabilitated leaving only 50% in a working condition. Some water points are privately owned and thus cannot be accessed without people having to pay.¹⁴¹ In some areas, the geology poses a challenge as some organizations report difficulty identifying water sources.¹⁴²

Water services are concentrated in around the Selea area but a number of water points are still under construction in other areas including water pumps in the villages of Manjura, Aroshero, Abu Remeil and Abu Lijam. A number of villages do not have a water point including Falco, Kebish, Ghubaish, Karkro, Aatash, Irmwa, Hashaba, Semsemeh, Ardi, Bardi and Katraya. There are plans to provide water points for these locations but no concrete plans because government funding is lacking.

Satisfaction with the amount of water available to households varies. Non-displaced (59%) and IDPs (61%) are the most satisfied, satisfaction drops significantly among IDP returnees (38%), return refugees (35%) and nomads (32%). Having enough water for livestock is also key, not only for nomads of whom 91% report owning livestock, but also for Jebel Moon's other population groups as 65% of non-displaced, 57% of IDPs, 53% of IDP returnees, and 66% of return refugees own livestock. Findings are similar to those for drinking water: higher proportions among non-displaced (48%) and IDPs (48%) say that they are satisfied with the amount of water available for their animals, while only 25% of return IDPs are satisfied. Among the nomads, the group that rely on livestock the most, satisfaction is also low as only 25% say that they had sufficient water for their herds.

The household survey also considered access to improved sanitation.¹⁴³ The non-displaced households have the lowest access to improved sanitation (11%), while about one-fifth of displaced groups have access (20% of IDPs, 29% of IDP returnees and 24% of return refugees). None of the sampled nomad households living in damrahs had access to improved sanitation and instead practice 'open defecation' in the bush. This practice of open defecation is a major problem as water and sanitation-related diseases are leading causes of death for children under five caused by diarrhea. It is also a cause of acute malnutrition associated with repeated diarrhea or worm infections, and hence poses a major risk to public health. Open defecation is also the most common practice among non-displaced (70%), IDP (42%) IDP returnees (56%), and returned refugees (48%).


¹⁴⁰ West Darfur, Jebel Moon, Native Administration representative

¹⁴¹ West Darfur, Jebel Moon, WASH representative.

¹⁴² Accessing groundwater sources has been difficult in Falco and Katrya village. West Darfur, Jebel Moon, WASH representative.

¹⁴³ Improved sanitation facility includes pit latrine with slab (shared or not), ventilated pit latrine, flush latrine.

FIGURE 13: ACCESS TO SANITATION BY POPULATION GROUP



ACCESS TO PERSONAL DOCUMENTATION

The survey household asked all persons if they possess any official documentation. Similar proportions ranging from 28% to 32% amongst the non-displaced, IDP returnees, returned refugees and nomads report not having any personal documentation, while the rest of the surveyed persons mainly have national ID cards: non-displaced (66%), IDP returnees (71%), return refugees (77%) and nomads (71%). IDPs are found to have the highest proportion holding personal documentation, as 82% hold national ID cards.

Birth certificates are only held by a very small number of persons (ranging from 1%–7%). An indicator often tracked is the proportion of children under 5 years who have a birth certificate (SDG indicator 16.9). This is because registering births is the starting point for the recognition and protection of every person’s right to identity and existence, and is therefore important for ensuring the fulfilment of human rights. The results show that the proportion of the population holding birth certificates is very low, ranging from 11% among IDP returnee children under 5, to 6% among non-displaced, 3–4% among IDPs and return refugees and merely 1% among nomads.

Those that possess no personal documentation were asked if they had previously had such documentation. Up to one-fifth of the surveyed Jebel Moon residents reported having lost their documentation: 17% of the non-displaced, 18% of IDPs, 21% of IDP returnees, 12% of the returned refugees and only 5% of the nomads.¹⁴⁴ The majority amongst these (76–85%) have not been able to obtain new documentation because there is ‘no office to obtain such documents in the area’.


The area-level information suggests that documentation is not necessary for accessing education and health services, but that administrative processes linked to land registration do require personal documentation. Before the Ministry of Interior set up a ID card initiative to provide nomads with a national ID card, many nomadic pastoralists did not possess personal documentation, which made it harder for nomads to own residential land.

Looking at satisfaction with government administrative services (courts, government offices etc.) the rates are relatively high: 75% of non-displaced, 82% of IDPs, 80% of returned refugees as well as

¹⁴⁴ Note, they survey only asks about the reasons for not having personal documentation, and hence not how respondents lost their document.

68% of nomads report that they are satisfied with government services. Among IDP returnees, the proportion those that are satisfied with administrative services is lower (59%).

FIGURE 14: ACCESS TO DOCUMENTATION BY POPULATION GROUP



CIVIC PARTICIPATION AND INTERGROUP PERCEPTIONS

Social cohesion is a multi-faceted concept, however, this chapter focuses on specific aspects including participation and inclusion as well as inter-group contacts and perceptions. The IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs specify that displaced persons should be able to exercise the right to participate in public affairs on an equal footing with the non-displaced population without discrimination due to their displacement. People’s civic participation—engagement in public affairs, as well as how groups accept and engage with each other—can offer insights into social cohesion within and between communities. In turn, social cohesion has a bearing on integration and thus are important for durable solutions and peacebuilding. Greater cohesion may facilitate more consensus-oriented or inclusive governance, as well as create resilience to escalating conflict at the individual level.¹⁴⁵

KEY FINDINGS:

- **Only 19% of return IDPs report living together with non-displaced households in contrast to 68% of IDPs and 41% of return refugees. The findings indicate interaction and co-existence to a lesser degree in areas where IDP returnees reside as the majority of the population in these areas is made up of return IDPs.**
- **88% of non-displaced residents in Jebel Moon live side-by-side with nomads. Attitudes are generally positive towards nomads: respectively, 88% welcome nomads to take part in local activities while 85% believe they should have equal access to services. Attitudes change significantly when asked if they welcome nomads to settle in their village (42%) and whether nomads should be able to partake in decision-making regarding community matters.**
- **Overall, both IDPs and returnees feel welcome and accepted, but only 62% of returnees and 70% of IDPs say they are able to take on leadership roles and participate in decision-making on par with non-displaced residents.**
- **Reported community-based mechanism are not inclusive of women, and Jebel Moon locality has no organisations that advocate for women to be part of peace process. The youth only appear to be involved in youth-led committees.**
- **A lower proportion of nomads attend reconciliation (59%) and public meetings (56%), although still more than half have taken part in at least one such meeting during the last 6 months. Fairly equal proportion (65–74%) of non-displaced residents, IDPs and return refugees and IDPs have partaken in both reconciliation and public meetings on community matters.**

¹⁴⁵ For more on social cohesion analysis, see: UNDP, 2020. Strengthening Social Cohesion: Conceptual Framing and Programming Implications.

INTERGROUP PERCEPTIONS¹⁴⁶

The survey set out to understand how the different target groups perceive each other. As a starting point, IDPs, return IDP and return refugee households were asked if they live together with non-displaced families in the same village or location. 68% of IDPs, 41% of returned refugees surveyed say they live side-by-side with non-displaced households. In contrast, 19% of return IDPs report living together with non-displaced residents, which indicates a higher degree of interaction and co-existence in the areas where IDPs and return refugees reside. IDP returnees tend to be living in separate returnee villages in more homogenous communities, which is a factor when trying to understand the social cohesion in these communities at the micro-level.

Non-displaced households in Jebel Moon were similarly asked about their neighbours, and 88% say that nomads reside in the vicinity, while 28% report that they live together with or next to returnees. Of the non-displaced residents that report living with or near nomads, 88% welcome nomads to participate in local activities, 85% believe should have equal access to services and 73% have nomad neighbours that are friends. These positive attitudes drop significantly when asked whether they welcome nomads settling in their village (43%), if nomads should partake in decision-making (42%), or welcome nomads into their family through marriage (33%).

The sample is not large enough to gauge the nomads' perceptions vis-à-vis decision-making and the ability to take on leadership positions. However, area-level findings from focus group discussions (FGDs) emphasize nomads' positive interaction with neighbouring communities plus social engagement and economic ties through markets and sharing of services, but that the war has had a negative effect on inter-group relations. From key informant interviews it also appears that the nomad communities have separate leadership structures, and that nomads and their interests are represented in joint decision-making forums such as the Peace and Reconciliation Committee and the Harvest Protection Committee.

Overall, IDPs and return refugees feel accepted and welcome by the non-displaced community (83–86%).¹⁴⁷ IDPs (96%) and return refugees (89%) feel welcome to participate in joint activities with non-displaced neighbours, have non-displaced friends (90–96%) and feel welcomed into non-displaced families through marriage (95–88%). However, the picture somewhat changes when IDPs and return refugees are asked about their ability to partake in decision-making and take on leadership positions on an equal footing with their non-displaced neighbours. 62% of return refugees and 70% of IDPs say they are able to participate in decision-making or take a leadership role with regards to service provision or conflict resolution.

PARTICIPATION, PEACEBUILDING AND COORDINATION AT COMMUNITY-LEVEL

Community-based conflict resolution mechanisms are described by area-level respondents as inclusive of all population groups apart from women. However, when respondents are asked in more detail about representation, nomads are said to be active in the Harvest Protection Committee and Peace and Reconciliation Committee.¹⁴⁸ Outside of the youth-led committees, the inclusion of youths

¹⁴⁶ The module of the questionnaire focusing on intergroup perceptions only captures the attitudes between displaced and non-displaced groups. The module was not designed to capture the attitudes of the displaced/returnees vis-à-vis the nomads.

¹⁴⁷ Due to the limited sample size of IDP returnees, the analysis on their intergroup perceptions is not included.


¹⁴⁸ West Darfur, Jebel Moon, returnee and women community representatives.

is regarded as low because young men are deemed to lack the necessary experience to mediate in disputes and conflict.¹⁴⁹

The area-level analysis sought to find out if women are included in local committees and whether any civil society groups are advocating for women to participate in reconciliation and Darfur peace processes. Women are reported not to be included in any of the local committees due to local customs and traditions. Respondents did not make any distinctions between IDP, non-displaced, nomad and return refugees and IDPs. A women’s union was reportedly operating in Jebel Moon, but the organisation was set up during the previous regime and has ceased being active.¹⁵⁰ In general, women in Jebel Moon appear to be excluded from local committees and peace processes. Women make up half of the population in Jebel Moon locality and are important peace and conflict actors. A recent Darfur study by UNDP found that women play a significant role in conflict including instigating men to use violence—often singing traditional Hakamat songs to spur on the men to fight, preventing pastoralists from accessing water, but also partaking directly in conflict by providing cooking, nursing and intelligence to combatants.¹⁵¹

The household survey examines participation in public meetings and reconciliation meetings. Findings show that significant proportions across all population groups have attended a public meeting on community matters and a reconciliation meeting. Respectively, 67% of IDPs, 74% of IDP returnees, 67% of return refugees plus 65% of non-displaced residents took part in a public meeting, and very similar proportions attended a reconciliation meeting. Nomads had the lowest attendance rates for both types of meetings, however, still more than half reported attending at least one public (56%) and reconciliation (59%) meeting during the last 6 months prior to the survey. Across all groups, the reasons given for not attending were primarily ‘not invited’, ‘not aware of such a meeting’ and ‘not interested in attending’. Looking at the differences in participation between male and female-headed households, the abovementioned area-level results on the exclusion of women from peace processes and local decision-making is confirmed. A significantly lower proportion of female-headed households take part in reconciliation meetings compared to the male-headed households across all the groups.

FIGURE 15: PARTICIPATION OF MALE AND FEMALE HEADED HOUSEHOLDS IN RECONCILIATION MEETINGS



The area-level analysis explored collaboration and interaction between community members, the local government and local authorities. Key informants state that there is good coordination between the local government, the Native Administration and community members and point to the service committees (e.g. education committees) and committees that mediate and manage natural resources

¹⁴⁹ At the time of data collection, none of the area-level respondents noted whether any of the committees had been established or were supported by UN agencies or NGOs/INGOs. However, this did not form part of the questionnaire. Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ West Darfur, Jebel Moon, nomad representative and local government official.

¹⁵¹ UNDP (2019) Conflict analysis Darfur.

in Jebel Moon as examples.¹⁵² Health is an area where this assessment is disputed; the Jebel Moon health representative states that there is a severe lack of interaction between the health services, the local government and the Native Administration.¹⁵³

Respondents state that the Native Administration is the main communication channel between the community and the local government in case of any grievances in the community. None were aware of policy guidelines developed by the Ministry of Local Governance for effective engagement of the traditional authorities in the formal local governance structures.¹⁵⁴ Respondents agree that committees and making their voices heard through the Native Administration is an opportunity to encourage greater accountability from the government. However, training and capacity building are required along with some basic funding for local committees and organisations to foster more accountability.

¹⁵² West Darfur, Jebel Moon, key informants from the police, education department, Native Administration and Land Use Office.

¹⁵³ West Darfur, Jebel Moon locality, health representative.

¹⁵⁴ West Darfur, Jebel Moon locality, Native Administration representatives.

PREFERENCES FOR THE FUTURE

Displaced persons have a right to make informed and voluntary decisions regarding what durable solution is right for them. Understanding preferences and the perspectives behind the intentions for the future will help relevant actors to support the preferred durable solutions. Displaced households—whether in displacement or their return location—determine whether return and re-integration in the place of origin, settling elsewhere, local integration in the place of displacement or a mix of options is the preferred solution. This study employs a wide lens and examines the preferences for the future not only amongst IDPs but also amongst IDP returnees, whose return might not have proved durable, as well as amongst nomads, to also understand the general mobility in the area.

KEY FINDINGS:

- The greater majority of IDP returnees (92%) and return refugees (70%) intend to stay in their current location, which shows a preference for continuing to reintegrate. More than half of IDPs (58%) plan to stay in their current location. Fewer female-headed IDP households intend to leave their current location (31%) compared to the proportion among male-headed households (47%).
- 92% of IDP returnees that want to stay in their current location cite wanting to be near family (46%) and safety in the area (20%) as reasons. Return refugees' reasons behind preferring to stay include 'family reasons' (41%), 'safety in their current area' (26%) and 'access to home' (17%). For IDP households, safety is the main reason for wanting to stay (61%), while 17% cite 'family reasons'.
- Push factor underpinning return refugees' reasons for wanting to leave their current location are diverse: 'going back to place of origin' (20%), lack of access to basic services (20%), lack of employment opportunities (13%) and lastly 'family reasons' (13%). Of the group of IDPs that prefer to leave, a majority (72%) want to return to their place of origin. Reasons include 'wishing to return', 'family reasons' but also 'economic reasons'.
- According to area-level data, regaining access to land the area of origin is a precondition for return and so is the security situation. Access to basic services also plays a key role in IDPs' decision to return and the ability of returnees to stay. Both access to water and security services are highlighted as key, the latter is connected to the security situation.
- 84% of damrah residents do not intend to leave their current location, which indicates that many residents from nomad damrah communities no longer move around but have permanently settled. 52% of damrah residents report crop farming as their main source of livelihood, which is another indication of households having permanently settled in villages rather than practising a nomadic way of life.

PREFERENCES FOR THE FUTURE

What preferences for the future do the displaced population (IDPs, IDPs returnees and return refugees) have? Findings show the vast majority among **IDP returnees** (92%) intend to stay in their current location where they have returned to. This strongly indicates a preference for continuing to

reintegrate in their places of origin where the majority (64%) returned more than 5 years ago.¹⁵⁵ The pull factors—the reasons for wanting to stay—that households themselves highlight centre around wanting to be near family (46%) and safety (20%) in their home area.

Among **return refugees**, 70% intend to stay in their current location while the remaining prefer to leave. While all returned refugees are from Jebel Moon locality, not all have returned to where they are originally from. The results show that more than half (58%) of the returned refugees who intend to leave their current location, are planning to move to their place of origin (i.e. a different area within Jebel Moon).¹⁵⁶ However, only about one-fourth (27%) have concrete plans to relocate within the following 12 months. The reasons stated for preferring to leave (push factors) include ‘going back to place of origin’ (20%), lack of access to basic services (20%), lack of employment opportunities (13%) and lastly ‘family reasons’ (13%). A great majority of returned refugees who want to stay in their current location, their reasons include ‘family reasons’ (41%), ‘safety in current area’ (26%) and ‘access to home’ (17%).

Among **IDPs**, more than half (58%) intend to stay in their current location, while the remaining intend to leave. However, only less than half of those intending to leave (42%) have concrete plans to move within the following 12 months. The majority (72%) of the IDPs who prefer to leave, would like to return to their place of origin, while a smaller proportion (16%) intend to resettle elsewhere within Jebel Moon locality. The main reasons for preferring to leave (push factors) include in equal proportions: the ‘wish to return’, ‘family reasons’ and ‘economic reasons’. The reported reasons for intending to stay in the place they are currently living (pull reasons) include primarily considerations around better safety in their current location (indicated by 61% of the household intending to stay), while a smaller proportion (17%) highlights ‘family’ as the chief reason.

Area-level informants in Jebel Moon also point to access to basic services as a key factor influencing returns.¹⁵⁷ Security services and access to water are listed as the most important services followed by education, health and justice in no particular order.¹⁵⁸ However, other informants flag that since many IDPs now reside in towns and have adapted to a more urban living, their expectations to services are higher than the very basic services that typically would be available in return villages.¹⁵⁹ In addition, key informants highlight that regaining access to the land in the place of origin is a precondition for return.¹⁶⁰ This is also seen from the survey results, where very large proportions of the returnees report having regained access to their land. And thus, it can be reasonably assumed that they would not have returned otherwise. Informants also emphasize that access to land is closely linked to the security situation, which is regarded as an overarching and decisive factor.¹⁶¹

The same question regarding plans to move were also posed to the **nomad** households interviewed in the damrahs. Surprisingly, 84% responded that they had no intention to leave their current location, which contradicts the assumption that nomad pastoralists reside only temporarily in the damrahs. 52% of the nomad households in the targeted damrahs reported crop farming as their main livelihood

¹⁵⁵ 33% returned between 1 and 5 years ago, 39% between 5-10 years ago while 25% returned more than 10 years ago. Only 3% are recent returnees who came within the year preceding the survey.

¹⁵⁶ The remaining return refugees who prefer to leave, state they intend to move to a different location within Jebel Moon.

¹⁵⁷ West Darfur, Jebel Moon, youth community representative

¹⁵⁸ West Darfur, Jebel Moon, NGO representative (Concern)

¹⁵⁹ West Darfur, Jebel Moon, returnee and women community representative

¹⁶⁰ West Darfur, Jebel Moon, youth and nomad community representative

¹⁶¹ West Darfur, Jebel Moon, returnee, women and INGO representative (Concern)

source, while 71% are assumed to have access to agricultural land.¹⁶² The reliance of nomad households in Jebel Moon on land as their primary or secondary source of income explains this high proportion of households intending to stay. Nomad key informants flag that some nomads also want to settle because the constant movement makes it difficult to access healthcare and education for their children.¹⁶³ In addition, many nomad families have lost their livestock, on which their livelihoods depend, due to animal diseases and environmental degradation. Livestock farming also pose security risks as there is a widespread proliferation of weapons and cross-border crime and some nomads have lost their herds because of theft

EXPLORING DRIVING FACTORS FURTHER

What else does the survey data tell us? What characterises the IDP and return refugee household that prefer to stay and those that want to leave? ¹⁶⁴ Additional analysis considered the land tenure situation and land related conflicts, food security as well as security incidents and the specific situation of female-headed households.

- **More female-headed IDP households intend to stay in their current location.** Among IDP female-headed household, less intend to leave (31%) compared to the proportion among male-headed households (47%). Among returned refugees, the difference is only 6 percentage points, with just slightly more male-headed households intending to stay.
- **Return refugees who have conflict linked to their current land are more likely to leave.** Though only a small proportion of the returned refugees report a conflict issue linked to the land they are currently accessing (13%), when looking closer the data shows that a greater proportion (47%) intend to leave compared to the proportion of households that do not report challenges in relation to their land (18%).
- **Return refugees in towns are more likely to leave compared to those in villages.** The surveyed return refugees are distributed between towns and villages. The results show that a greater proportion among those residing in towns (39%) intend to leave compared to the proportion that live in villages (18%). Most of these return refugees report that they intend to return to their place or village of origin somewhere else within Jebel Moon.
- **Food insecurity is not a factor.** Overall, the proportions of return refugees reporting that they are food insecure (27%) do not make up a significantly larger proportion of households intending to leave or stay.¹⁶⁵

In summary, drawing upon the key informant interviews and the survey results, the key factors that influence returns and generally movements of displaced include the overarching security situation, the ability to regain or negotiate access to land in place of origin as well as access to services (but with expectations to better services than the very basic). IDP households headed by a woman have a higher tendency to prefer staying in the area to where they have been displaced, while land tenure and conflict linked to the land that they farm in the area of displacement play no significant role, and neither do security incidents and food security.

¹⁶² While households in damrahs are not asked about land tenure, the proportion having access to land is deduced based on the households reporting crop farming as either primary or secondary livelihood source.

¹⁶³ West Darfur, Jebel Moon, nomad community representatives.

¹⁶⁴ Due to sample sizes, this further analysis is only possible for return refugees and only for IDPs with regards to some variables.

¹⁶⁵ Among IDPs, the N is too small to allow for such analysis.

CONCLUSIONS: PROGRESS TOWARDS DURABLE SOLUTIONS AND PEACEBUILDING

JEBEL MOON, WEST DARFUR: HOW WAS PROGRESS TOWARDS SOLUTIONS ANALYSED?

Durable solutions for IDPs living in displacement is part of building peace in Darfur. At the same time, peace is also central to achieving solutions for the displaced population that are durable—the two aspects are intrinsically linked. Jebel Moon is one of the localities with the highest numbers of displaced persons, as a direct result of conflict. Most Jebel Moon residents took refuge in Chad and both spontaneous and facilitated returns from Chad have recently taken place, including via UNHCR's Voluntary Repatriation programme. And without sustainable—or in other words durable—returns, it is impossible to envisage stability and security in Jebel Moon locality in the long term.

This study paid attention to a number of areas crucial to peace and durable solutions for IDPs and IDP returnees. Importantly, the analysis included the views and concerns of Jebel Moon nomad communities, whose perspectives need to be mainstreamed into conflict analysis and any peacebuilding approach informing future activities—whether with a humanitarian, development or durable solution focus.

As per the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs, 'a durable solution is achieved when IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and such persons can enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting from their displacement'. It is of central importance to focus on the non-discriminatory and voluntary nature of solutions, and to measure local integration—whether in the place where people have found refuge or upon return—as a *process* towards overcoming vulnerabilities linked to their displacement. In other words, durable solutions are not defined or achieved by merely the geographic features of the solutions outlined in the IASC Framework—to return, stay or settle elsewhere. What is key is the principles of non-discrimination and the voluntary nature of reaching long-term solutions.

The approach designed for this study is to measure progress towards durable solutions by conducting a **comparative analysis of the socio-economic situation of the displaced populations against the non-displaced**, across the key criteria outlined in the IASC Framework. By identifying the key differences in the situations of displaced and non-displaced, the analysis has pointed to areas where the displaced populations are worse off and can be assumed to still face displacement-linked vulnerabilities. In this way, the analysis pinpoints the key obstacles to reaching solutions.

To strengthen the understanding of the locality and peacebuilding capacities, the methodology approach combines the population analysis (based on household survey results) with the area-level analysis of the locality that looks at conflict dynamics, local conflict resolution mechanisms, the capacity of the police and courts to uphold the rule of law, land and resource management structures, availability and capacity of services etc. Lastly, it is critical to also understand the preferences and plans for the future that displaced populations have and the factors that drive their intentions.

The guiding questions for the analysis have been:

- To what extent are the displaced populations who have returned and those who are still displaced progressing towards durable solutions? And what are the key obstacles and opportunities in this process?

- What are their own preferences for the future and what is driving these intentions?
- How are these integration processes of displaced groups interlinked with the broader peacebuilding process at the locality level?

The above questions were addressed by analysing the following:

- What is the **rule of law** situation in the locality? Do people feel safe and are they able to access the police and courts?
- What land **governance structures and dispute resolution mechanisms** are in place? How are conflicts and disputes solved within the community?
- What is the **housing, land and property** situation in the place of displacement and return for both displaced and non-displaced households including nomads?
- How is the **standard of living** for the different populations in terms of access to basic services and livelihoods?
- How **socially cohesive** are the communities, to what extent are different groups participating in decision-making, and how active and equipped are civil society organisations?

PEACEBUILDING CONSIDERATIONS

Durable solutions programming focuses on the needs of the displaced populations, however, successful peacebuilding efforts necessitate that the nomad population is not overlooked. In fact, development programmes specifically need to target nomad communities, whose neglect and marginalization are part of the spectrum of root causes of the conflict.

Rule of law and insecurity: For the last decade, the security situation was relatively calm in West Darfur, which allowed for both permanent and seasonal returns of IDPs and refugees. Since the withdrawal of the UNAMID mission in Darfur, West Darfur has seen increased insecurity in the state capital. While this has so far only had a tangential impact on the Jebel Moon area, it is still possible that if conflict were to expand, Jebel Moon would be affected down the line.

Robbery and damage to property or livestock are very common and experienced by all population groups. Property or livestock damage is experienced by more than half of all population groups (50–66%), while robbery is also a common occurrence for returnees, as returnees (37%), damrah residents (41%), IDPs (52%) and 58% of non-displaced residents have been victims of robbery during the last 12 months prior to the survey. The area-level analysis shows that insecurity and crime affect access to healthcare and water especially impacting women, as reaching water points and health centres involves travelling long distances that presents a risk of violence and assault.

Although crime rates are high and experienced frequently by all groups, the findings show that one-third of IDPs, non-displaced and IDP returnees and half of nomads (51%), return refugees (47%) do not report security incidents. Area-level data stress that the police force lacks staff, resources and funding and not having enough vehicles to respond to incidents is particularly crucial. An ineffective police force coupled with a weak justice system that similarly lacks qualified personnel, offices, a formal court and prosecutors office has resulted in impunity and for some residents a lack of faith in the police. In the words of one community representative, people do not seek help from the police 'because they had previous experiences dealing with the police, which ended up in nothing'.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁶ West Darfur, Jebel Moon, community representatives in FGD.

Despite the limited capacity of the police and courts in Jebel Moon, the survey findings do suggest that there is an opportunity to build on a foundation already in place. With the exception of the damrah residents, a majority of IDP returnees (54%), and to a lesser degree non-displaced (46%), IDPs (42%) and return refugees (33%) sought assistance from the police when experiencing a crime, which is a clear contrast to the situation in other surveyed Darfur localities. However, although a significant proportion seeks help from the police, less than a third (18–30%) of those that reported a crime says that the police and courts are providing a ‘just and effective’ outcome.

Conflict and local conflict resolutions mechanisms: Conflict in Jebel Moon is predominantly linked to land and centres around livestock migratory routes, but unlawful occupation of land is also a major issue. In Jebel Moon, access to water is also a critical issue that is a cause of tension and conflict. In focus group discussions, especially nomads highlight access to water and water quality as critical issue.

In Jebel Moon, a majority of IDP returnees (76%) and more than half of refugee returnees (58%) have retained or gained access to the land they previously farmed and only 15–17% of IDPs, non-displaced and returnees report issues linked to farmland. It should be kept in mind that the returnee target groups captured by the study have returned *because* they were able to re-access their agricultural land. Land is a central productive resource to livelihoods in Darfur, and hence a fundamental factor that affects whether IDPs and refugees are able to return. Agricultural land perceived to be unlawfully occupied by ‘newcomers’ is a key problem faced by many of the IDP and return refugees (12% and 20%) that have not managed to access their previous land.

In Jebel Moon, area-level key informants state that the members of the Native Administration are key arbitrators in all of the conflict mediation forums; the Judiya, the rural courts and the various local conflict resolution mechanisms including the Peace and Reconciliation Committee, Harvest Protection Committee and Water/WES committee. Yet, the household survey findings show that only 13–18% of Jebel Moon residents apart from the nomads report security incidents to the Native Administration. The area-level information does not shed light on how come relatively few choose to reach out to the Native Administration for help.

A higher proportion of nomads (26%) report security incidents to the Native Administration of whom 30% found the outcome fair. Nomad key informants confirm that the nomad community is represented on the Harvest Protection Committee and Peace Reconciliation Committee, and that these committees are made up fairly with 50/50 split between nomads and farmers. The lack of water is a big concern to the nomad community and a source of tension; only 25% say they have sufficient water for their livestock and household needs, and among all the groups the nomads have the lowest access (10%) to improved sources of drinking water. Yet, hardly any nomads are involved in water committees that manages competing demands by different water users, and merely 2% of nomads report having a water committee. Findings point to a gap, plus potential in the future for better managing a scarce resource that is central to the livelihoods of all.

The Juba Peace Agreement (JPA): The peace agreement brokered in November 2020 specifically recognizes the Native Administration in relation to administering land, which may help strengthen this institution when it comes to land management and arbitration in disputes. The agreement also stipulates the setting up of the Commission for the Development of the Nomads with a mandate to improve the nomadic pastoralist sector plus manage relations between farmers and nomadic

pastoralists plus the Darfur Lands and Hawakeer Commission, which is tasked with arbitrating and adjudicating in cases of disputed land. The establishment of such commissions could help mitigate conflict over land and grazing in Darfur and potentially be a key tool in peacebuilding.

Importantly, the JPA stipulates that all victims of Darfur have a right to seek restoration of property or compensation for their lost or seized property resulting from the conflict in Darfur'.¹⁶⁷ Although the right to restoration or compensation is essential for transitional justice, experts warn that the issue of unlawfully occupied land is a very sensitive and divisive factor, which may trigger conflict and resurgence of violence in Darfur.

Livelihoods, competition over natural resources and environmental degradation: 52% of the nomads residing in the damrahs report crop farming as their main source of income, which indicates that many households now have either permanently settled or practise a semi-nomadic way of life. In general, conflict and blocking of livestock migratory routes have meant that many pastoralists no longer practise long-distance mobility. This often means that nomad communities choose to stay in areas they consider safe and practice short or medium distance mobility.¹⁶⁸ For the livestock to range over less land also means asserting additional pressure on land. Nomad key informants flag that some nomads also want to settle because the constant movement makes it difficult to access healthcare and education for their children.¹⁶⁹ In addition, many nomad families have lost their livestock, on which their livelihoods depend, due to animal diseases and environmental degradation. Livestock farming also poses security risks as there is a widespread proliferation of weapons and cross-border crime and some nomads have lost their herds because of theft. Interestingly, judging from the area-level interviews, there is little understanding of the pastoralists' situation by the traditional sedentary farming communities, who appear to have stereotype perceptions of who nomads are and what they want. For example, respondents refer to nomad 'newcomers' that are unlawfully occupying the land of IDPs and refugees, while they at the same time categorically state that 'nomads move with their livestock and neither want nor need land'.

Darfur studies have documented degradation of natural resources, which in turn led to an expansion of land cultivated involves clearing forested areas that were sources of livestock fodder.¹⁷⁰ Changing cultivation patterns, from leaving agricultural land fallow to continuous cultivation reducing the fertility, means farmers require more land, which in turn, is intensifying competition for land plus leading to further degradation of agricultural land.¹⁷¹ In general, conflict and the blocking of livestock migratory routes have meant that many pastoralists no longer practise long-distance mobility. This often means that nomad communities choose to stay in areas they consider safe and practise short or medium distance mobility.¹⁷² For the livestock to range over less land also means asserting additional pressure on the land. Community sessions could offer a forum to explore these dynamics in more detail.

Access to services: All population groups in Jebel Moon face obstacles accessing basic services, and it is ,therefore, an area-wide development challenge. The surveyed damrah residents, however, are consistently worse off when comparing against Jebel Moon's other population groups. Only 11%

¹⁶⁷ Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 4.11.3.

¹⁶⁸ Young et al. (2009) Livelihoods, Power and Choice: The Vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat, Darfur.

¹⁶⁹ West Darfur, Jebel Moon, nomad community representatives.

¹⁷⁰ Young et al. (2009) Livelihoods, Power and Choice: The Vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat, Darfur.

¹⁷¹ Osman, A.M.K., Young, H. Houser, R.F., and Coates, J. C. (2013) Agricultural Change, Land, and Violence in Protracted Political Crisis: An Examination of Darfur.

¹⁷² Young et al. (2009) Livelihoods, Power and Choice: The Vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat, Darfur.

of boys and 3% of girls attend primary school, 0% have access to improved sanitation, 1% of births are attended by skilled medical personnel and nomads also have the lowest access to improved sources of water (10%).

The long-term processes of economic and political marginalization of Darfur by the central government in Sudan is well documented, and how this led to resentment and encouraged many to join the armed resistance, which in turn, led to war in 2003. The marginalization resulted in inequality and underdevelopment in the shape of poor education, healthcare, transport, and other services affecting *all* communities in Darfur, but not to the same extent.¹⁷³ That Darfuri pastoralist nomad communities were sidelined to an even greater extent through active and passive neglect of pastoralist groups, is perhaps a less known fact as it took place within the wider marginalization of Darfur and other peripheral regions.¹⁷⁴ The neglect of nomad pastoralists' rights to veterinary services, healthcare and education affected their relationship with sedentary communities and was a factor in the conflict. In the light of this history of marginalization, providing services to all Darfuri communities on an equitable basis will be an important factor for social cohesion between communities.

Women: Local conflict resolution mechanisms and committees do not appear to include women representatives, and in Jebel Moon locality, there appears to be no civil society groups are advocating for women to participate in reconciliation and Darfur peace processes. Women account for half of the population in Jebel Moon locality and are important conflict actors in their communities. Although seldom directly involved in fighting, women partake by blocking pastoralists from accessing water or instigating men to use violence in Hakamat songs. Hence, peacebuilding efforts will need to involve women's active participation.¹⁷⁵ Nevertheless, the results show that fewer female-headed households attend reconciliation meetings compared to male-headed households (by 30 percentage points on average across the population groups).

Youth: The NEET rate is relatively low in the targeted areas in Jebel Moon locality when comparing to the other surveyed areas in Darfur. The NEET rate is highest among the nomad population as 14% of nomad male youths and 45% of female youths (15–24 years) are neither in education, employment or training. For all other Jebel Moon communities, only 2–9% of male youths and 18–20% of female youth fall into this category. In terms of peacebuilding, these numbers are positive because a recent study found that unemployment and poverty were the main drivers for youths joining armed groups.¹⁷⁶

Peaceful co-existence and social cohesion: 68% of IDPs and 41% of return refugees say they live together with non-displaced households, whereas this is only the case for 19% of return IDPs who appear to be living mostly in separate returnee villages. The vast majority of IDPs and returnees report feeling welcome and accepted by the non-displaced community, although a smaller proportion of returnees (62%) and IDPs (70%) feel able to participate in decision-making and take on leadership positions.

¹⁷³ Young, H. and Osman, A. K. (2006) Challenges to peace and recovery in Darfur. A situation analysis of the ongoing conflict and its continuing impact on livelihoods.

¹⁷⁴ For an in-depth study of marginalization of Darfuri pastoralist communities, see Young et al. (2009). The study specifically focuses on the Northern Rizaygat but many observations relate to other pastoralist communities as well. Young et al. (2009) Livelihoods, Power and Choice: The Vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat, Darfur.

¹⁷⁵ UNDP (2019) Conflict analysis Darfur.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

88% of non-displaced households in Jebel Moon report that nomads live in their village or nearby. A high proportion is positive towards nomads; 85-88% welcome nomads to participate in local activities and believe they should have equal access to services. Fewer non-displaced (42%) are accepting when it comes to nomads taking on community leadership positions and participating in decision-making. According to area-level information, nomad communities have separate leadership structures and they are represented in joint conflict resolution and decision-making forums. More than half of nomads have attended a public meeting (56%) and a reconciliation meeting (59%) during the last 6 months. The attendance rates for IDPs, IDP returnees and return refugees are even higher (65–74%), which indicates a healthy engagement in community affairs which is a good building for building peaceful coexistence.

TO WHICH EXTENT ARE RETURNEES RE-INTEGRATING?

IDP returnees and return refugees: International standards for displacement statistics recommend that return refugees are not counted as IDPs upon return, regardless of the period they were abroad, in order to avoid double-counting in official statistics.¹⁷⁷ In the analysis, the two groups (IDP returnees and return refugees) are analysed separately. The reported population figures for the targeted scope only included IDP returnees and no return refugees. However, the study found a significantly larger refugee returnee population and a much lower IDP returnee population than expected. Of the total returnee sample, which was randomly selected, IDP returnees made up 20% while the remaining 80% was return refugees. This indicates that the distinction between the two groups is not clear,¹⁷⁸ which is explained by the similarities of the two groups when it comes to their demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Given the proximity and porous nature of the border, the Sudanese refugees returning from Chad are not encountering a situation much different from the IDP returnees in the same area.

It is also important to highlight that a majority of both IDP returnees and return refugees surveyed returned a considerable time ago, which means that they have had time to re-establish themselves and their livelihoods since returning. 33% of return IDPs came back recently, between 1 and 4 years prior to the survey, while 39% have returned to their place of origin between 5 and 10 years, and another 25% for more than 10 years. It is a similar picture for the return refugees; 20% returned more than 10 years ago, half of them returned between 5 and 10 years ago, only 28% between 1 and 4 years ago. Data from UNHCR shows that Chad is still hosting large numbers of refugees from Darfur and a big challenge will be to support those who want to return to their areas of origin in West Darfur.¹⁷⁹

It is important to state that returnees have not achieved a durable solution merely based on their physical return. Their progress towards a durable solution in their place of origin needs to be assessed, as is done with the IDPs living in displacement. To understand whether the returnees are more vulnerable as a result of their previous displacement, the analysis is using the non-displaced population as a benchmark across the IASC criteria.

Regained access to land and livelihoods: Very high proportions of refugee returnees (88%) and return IDPs (80%) households captured in this study, have regained access to the same agricultural

¹⁷⁷ EGRIS (2020) International Recommendations on Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (IRIS). March 2020.

¹⁷⁸ The achieved samples for IDP returnees and IDP refugees reveals very different relative sizes of these two groups compared to the expected population sizes. This probably means that return refugees are often accounted for as return IDPs while it is less likely to be explained by population movements just before data collection.

¹⁷⁹ UN Peacebuilding Fund (2019), West Darfur project document (December 2019).

land they cultivated before they were displaced. Similarly, high proportions among both groups (88%) are also living on the same residential plot. Thus, the vast majority have re-established their chief source of livelihood. This is also indicated by the finding that the vast majority of IDP returnees (92%) intend to stay in their current location, as do 70% of return refugees in Jebel Moon locality. The fact that a smaller proportion of return refugees prefer to stay is because not all have returned to where they are originally from.¹⁸⁰ Some return IDPs and refugees report conflict linked to the farmland that they are currently farming, but this proportion is not any higher than among the non-displaced (15–17%).

Even though they have returned and have to a high degree access to the same land, they have *not* necessarily overcome vulnerabilities linked to their displacement. Hence, the analysis examines whether vulnerabilities still exist vis-à-vis the IASC criteria for durable solutions.

- **Safety and security:** Damage to property or livestock is experienced by 50–66% of all Jebel Moon population groups. And findings show that robbery is actually experienced by a higher proportion of non-displaced residents (58%) in contrast to 41% of returnees. Thus, security and crime impact *all* population groups in Jebel Moon and does not constitute a vulnerability linked to displacement.
- **Food security and coping:** Findings show that returnees are not more vulnerable in terms of food insecurity. According to the household survey, 28–30% of IDP and refugee returnees did not have enough food during the 7 days prior to the survey in January 2021 compared to 26% of Jebel Moon non-displaced residents. The majority in all surveyed groups that reported to have insufficient food used low or medium coping mechanisms: only 1–2% resorted to ‘high’ coping strategies.
- **Prospects of youth:** Youths are largely excluded from reconciliation and conflict resolution mechanisms in Jebel Moon, as well as peace processes despite accounting for a majority of the population. Decision-making and mediation are traditionally perceived to be the remit of older and more experienced generations, however, going forward it will be important to include younger men and women in reconciliation and peacebuilding.

The NEET rate is the proportion of youth (15–24 years) not in education, employment or training and provides a picture of the prospects of young people in Jebel Moon. The NEET rate in Jebel Moon is low compared to other surveyed localities in Darfur, which could be a reflection of the relatively calm security situation that West Darfur enjoyed for a decade. When benchmarking against the non-displaced, the returnees are doing better. Respectively 5% of IDP returnees and merely 2% of return refugee male youths are in this category compared to 9% of non-displaced male youths. 18% of all female youths are NEET in all three population groups. Hence, the survey findings show that returnee youths are not more vulnerable due to having been displaced previously. And, do not have fewer opportunities as a result of their displacement.

- **Local participation and reconciliation mechanisms:** Both IDP returnees and return refugees largely feel welcome and accepted by their non-displaced neighbours. 74% of IDP returnees and 67% of return refugees took part in a public meeting compared to 65% of non-displaced residents. However, a smaller proportion of returnees (62%), in contrast to the high proportions that say they

¹⁸⁰ More than half (58%) of the return refugees who intend to leave their current location, are planning to move to their place of origin within Jebel Moon.

feel accepted and welcome, report that they feel able to participate in decision-making on equal footing with the non-displaced and take on leadership roles.

- **Access to services:** Access to basic services is essentially the same for returnees and non-displaced residents in Jebel Moon and the lack of services affects all population groups. With regards to education for children aged 6–18 years, only IDP returnees have a somewhat lower attendance (41% of boys and 34% of girls) compared to non-displaced boys (46%) and girls (37%) enrolled in education. Meanwhile, 50% of boys and 42% of girls from return refugee communities attend school.

In terms of healthcare, fairly equal proportions of non-displaced and returnees attempted to access health services; 86% non-displaced, 85% IDPs, 84% of returned refugees, and 75% return IDPs and a majority of all groups reported facing challenges accessing healthcare. The only thing that marks out the IDP returnees is that 36% highlighted distance as a key obstacle, whereas the non-displaced and return refugees only list costs and quality of services as challenges. This suggests that IDP returnees are in areas less serviced by health centres.

27% of IDP returnees measured against 34% of non-displaced have access to improved water sources. In this respect, IDP returnees are a little disadvantaged and area-level data suggests that water points were damaged during the war in the areas that were attacked. However, return refugees have better access as 43% report having access to an improved water source. And when it comes to sanitation, IDPs (29%) and return refugees (24%) have considerably better access to improved sanitation compared to 11% of non-displaced residents.

In summary, according to the results of the household survey the targeted return refugees and IDP returnees in Jebel Moon locality do not appear to have considerable vulnerabilities that are linked to their previous displacement. Only IDP returnees seem to face some challenges which are linked to the rural areas to which they have returned.

DATA TO INFORM GOVERNMENT-LED AND COMMUNITY-DRIVEN PLANNING

The analysis does not point to specific displacement linked obstacles that the return IDP and refugees face in the targeted areas in Jebel Moon locality, but instead highlights general development linked obstacles that impact all population groups in Jebel Moon locality such as the poor availability and capacity of basic services and high levels of insecurity and crime.

IDPs uprooted by conflict, returnees and displacement affected communities are not merely people in need of assistance, but dynamic actors who must not be left on the sidelines. Community-driven planning with displacement affected communities at the centre is key to finding solutions to displacement and secure peace. This durable solutions analysis is an important step to inform priorities centred on evidence-based analysis that builds on representative samples of the displacement affected population as well as key informant interviews with central stakeholders in Jebel Moon. However, inclusion must go beyond ensuring that the realities of the displacement affected communities are analysed. Therefore, key results from this analysis were presented (in May 2021) to communities in order to validate and prioritize the most significant obstacles to solutions as seen from their perspective. These priorities and the community's vision will form the point of departure for the drafting of the durable solutions and peacebuilding Action Plan for Jebel Moon








locality. This will happen during a joint workshop with the relevant stakeholders from locality and state-level authorities as well as the humanitarian and development community. The Action Plans will serve as a roadmap to link the results on barriers to solutions and peace to concrete programming activities that can support communities to build peace.

ANNEX 1: DURABLE SOLUTIONS INDICATOR OVERVIEW

DURABLE SOLUTIONS CRITERIA	KEY INDICATORS	Non-displaced	IDPs	IDP returnees	Return refugees	Nomads in damrahs
Long-term safety and security	HHS having experienced physical threats in the past 12 months	20%	29%	31%	19%	13%
	HHS having experienced robbery in the past 12 months	58%	52%	37%	38%	41%
	HHS having experienced damage of property/assets (incl crops) in the past 12 months	60%	50%	50%	58%	66%
	HHS having experienced security incident(s) who reported to police	46%	42%	54%	33%	14%
	HHS having experienced security incident(s) who reported to Native Administration	12%	1%	14%	18%	26%
	HHS having experienced security incident(s) who did NOT report at all	33%	29%	31%	47%	51%
	HHS having reported incident and reporting that issue was fairly resolved	21%	25%	18%	20%	30%
	Reported feeling of being safe/very safe when walking in the night- SDG indicator 16.1.4	81%	76%	58%	76%	93%
Adequate standard of living / access to basic services (health, education, water, sanitation, documentation)	HHS facing challenges when needing to access health services in the past 6 months	85%	85%	91%	87%	94%
	Births attended by skilled health personnel (doctors, nurses or midwives) - SDG 3.1.2	5%	2%	5%	7%	1%
	Access to improved drinking water sources	34%	72%	27%	43%	10%
	Perception of drinking water being sufficient for the HH, the past summer	59%	61%	38%	35%	32%
	Access to improved sanitation facilities	11%	20%	19%	24%	0%
	Primary school attendance amongst boys - 6-13 years old	45%	45%	31%	44%	11%
	Primary school attendance amongst girls 6-13 years old	31%	41%	29%	35%	3%
	Men above 15 years of age who are literate (can read and write) - SDG indicator: 4.6.1 (a)	66%	82%	77%	79%	20%
	Women above 15 years of age who are literate (can read and write) - SDG indicator: 4.6.1 (a)	32%	35%	30%	33%	2%
	Men who own/access a mobile phone - SDG indicator 5.b.1	46%	53%	42%	49%	37%
Women who own/access a mobile phone - SDG indicator 5.b.1	18%	29%	16%	17%	12%	
Access to employment and livelihoods	HHS having NOT had enough food or money to buy food the week preceding the survey	26%	20%	31%	27%	32%
	HHS applying 'high coping' strategies based on the reduced Coping Strategy Index (rCSI)	0%	2%	0%	2%	2%
	Male working age persons (15-64 years) working for profit or pay	32%	28%	22%	32%	19%
	Female working age persons (15-64 years) working for profit or pay	10%	16%	9%	7%	8%
	Male working age persons (15-64 years) engaged in own-use production	52%	50%	60%	61%	59%
	Female working age persons (15-64 years) engaged in own-use production	65%	62%	63%	71%	61%
	Male youth (15-24 years) not working and not studying - SDG indicator 8.6.1	9%	8%	5%	2%	14%
	Female youth (15-24 years) not working and not studying - SDG indicator 8.6.1	18%	20%	18%	18%	45%
	HHS relying on crop farming as their main livelihoods source (whether for own use or selling)	83%	85%	88%	90%	52%
	HHS with access to agricultural land in current location	95%	93%	94%	98%	71%
	HHS with ownership/secure rights over agricultural land - SDG 5.a.1	64%	37%	62%	64%	n/a
HHS with ownership certificates amongst those who report owning land	0%	0%	0%	3%	n/a	
Access to documentation	Persons with birth certificate	5%	5%	7%	3%	1%
	Persons with national ID	66%	82%	71%	77%	71%
	Children under 5 years of age with a birth certificate - SDG 16.9.1	6%	3%	11%	4%	1%
Access to effective mechanisms to restore housing, land and property (HLP)	Displaced HHS that access the same agricultural land as before displacement	n/a	43%	76%	58%	n/a
	Displaced HHS that still have rights over the land in place of origin (out of those who do NOT access th	n/a	25%	20%	27%	n/a
	Displaced HHS that have regained access to the same residential plot, as before displacement	n/a	n/a	88%	88%	n/a
Civic participation in local community	Male headed HHS attended local reconciliation initiatives the past 6 months	74%	75%	79%	71%	71%
	Female headed HHS attended local reconciliation initiatives the past 6 months	44%	46%	59%	41%	37%
	HHS reporting presence of water committees	85%	95%	83%	83%	2%
	Displaced HHS reporting they can participate in local decision making (linked to SDG 16.7.2)	n/a	70%	**	62%	n/a
	Non-displaced HHS reporting that nomads should be able to participate in local decision making	42%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a







*not available information; **too few observations

ANNEX 2: DETAILED OVERVIEW OF SERVICES¹⁸¹




Primary education Jebel Moon locality – capacity per school									
Village	School name	Teacher		Ratio	Student numbers		Fence	Seating seating for x % of students	Latrines
		Trained	Untrained		Male	Female			
									
Goz Meno Administrative Unit									
Alona	Alona basic school	0	1	135	80	55	Fixed material new	20%	none
Arosharw	Arosharw basic school	1	1	130	145	115	Fixed material old	40%	2 (fixed material)
Falco	Falco basic school	1	1	47	52	41	Fixed material old	10%	none
Garjegarje	Garjegarje basic school	0	1	122	48	74	Local material, old	0%	none
Goz meno	Goz meno basic school	2	0	123	148	97	Fixed material new	90%	2 (fixed material)
Kitray	Kitray basic School	0	1	102	55	47	Local material, old	0%	none
Narmala	Narmala basic school	1	1	120	120	120	Local material, old	10%	none
Nourania	Nourania basic school	0	1	189	104	85	Fixed material old	10%	2 (fixed material)
Mangora Administrative Unit									
Abulogame	Abulogame basic school	0	2	91	107	74	Fixed material, new	50%	1 (fixed material)
Labona	Labona basic School	2	3	32	100	59	Local material, old	10%	1 (fixed material)
Mangora	Mangora basic school	4	6	38	221	161	Local material, old	40%	2 (fixed material)
Mangora Tate	Mangora Tate basic school	1	1	57	71	42	Local material, old	10%	none
Tambsitate	Tambsitate basic school	1	2	101	176	127	Local material, old	40%	1 (fixed material)

¹⁸¹ Villages marked with a * are not included in the maps.

Mastraiha Administrative Unit									
Abu Girain Targo	Abu Girain Targobasic School	2	2	37	106	43	Local material, old	20%	1 (fixed material)
Aburimeel	Aburimeel basic School	3	5	50	191	205	Local material, old	25%	2 (fixed material)
Arafa	Arafa basic School	2	3	26	68	63	Local material- New	60%	2 (fixed material)
Ed Alaben	Ed Alaben basic School	0	1	134	79	55	Local material, old	0%	none
Mastraiha	Mastraiha basic School	2	2	31	78	47	Fixed material, new	30%	none
Um sharina	Um sharinabasic School	0	1	81	51	30	Local material, old	0%	none
Abu Girain Targo	Abu Girain Targobasic School	2	2	37	106	43	Local material, old	20%	1 (fixed material)
Selea Administrative Unit									
Bardi	Bardi basic School	1	1	34	50	18	Local material	20%	none
Fajola	Fajola basic school	1	2	62	108	79	Fixed material new	100%	4 (fixed material)
Farida north	Farida north basic school	0	1	114	66	48	Fixed material old	10%	none
Farida south	Farida south basic school	0	1	77	45	32	Fixed material old	5%	none
Giglak	Giglak basic school	1	3	54	125	92	Fixed material	80%	1 (fixed material)
Higlega (Hijlija)	Higlega basic School	1	3	68	173	97	Fixed material	80%	1 (fixed material)
Kibash	Kibash basic school	0	1	133	83	50	Local material old	20%	none
Ordi	Orrdi basic school	0	1	215	116	99	Local material	0%	none
Selea	Selea alum basic school	7	8	31	469	0	Local material	20%	2 (fixed material)
Selea	Mabroka basic school	8	10	52	469	465	Local material	30%	1 (fixed material)
Selea	Alhumaira basic school	4	6	31	0	310	Fixed material	50%	2 (fixed material)
Selea	Almatar basic school	2	4	31	113	71	Fixed material	20%	2 (fixed material)
Semya	Semya basic School	1	3	68	173	97	Fixed material	10%	none

Health services Jebel Moon locality – capacity per health centre					
Village	Active	Condition	Electricity	Clean Water	Latrines
					
Goz Meno Administrative Unit					
Jebel Moon	Yes	Fixed Material, New	Solar	No Clean Water	Yes
Narmala	No	Fixed Material	No Electricity	No Clean Water	No
Fajola	No	Fixed Material	No Electricity	No Clean Water	No
Mangora Administrative Unit					
Mangora	Yes	Fixed Material, New	Solar	No Clean Water	Yes
Selea Delsi	Yes	Fixed Material	No Electricity	No Clean Water	No
Shatan	Yes	Fixed Material	No Electricity	No Clean Water	No
Mastraiha Administrative Unit					
Aburimeel	Yes	Fixed Material, New	No Electricity	No Clean Water	Yes
Aburimeel	Yes	Fixed Material, New	Solar	No Clean Water	No
Arafa	No	Fixed Material	No Electricity	No Clean Water	No
Selea Administrative Unit					
Higlega	Yes	Fixed Material, New	No Electricity	No Clean Water	Yes
Kibash	No	Fixed Material	No Electricity	No Clean Water	No

ANNEX 3: MAPS OF SERVICES¹⁸²



¹⁸² All maps have been developed by SUDIA based on service mapping outlined in Annex 2.

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